Aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal Binnenhof 4 Den Haag Bezuidenhoutseweg 67 2594 AC Den Haag
Datum 11 juni 2001 Auteur Karel E. Vosskühler
Kenmerk DVB/VD-340/01 Telefoon 00-31-70-3485231
Blad /1 Fax 00-31-70-3485479
Bijlage(n) E-mail karel.vosskühler@minbuza.nl
Betreft Seminar inzake de parlementaire dimensie van het EVDB (Den Haag, 14 mei j.l.)
Zeer geachte Voorzitter,
Op 14 mei j.l. kwam in de oude vergaderzaal van de Tweede Kamer een internationaal seminar van parlementariërs bijeen over de parlementaire dimensie van het Europees Veiligheids- en Defensienbeleid (EVDB), op uitnodiging van de Voorzitters van de Eerste en Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal en onder de leiding van de Voorzitter van de Europese Beweging Nederland, Dr. W.F. van Eekelen.
Van deze bijeenkomst is bijgaand samenvattend verslag gemaakt, dat ik U hierbij gaarne doe toekomen. Uit reacties van diverse deelnemers aan het seminar kon worden opgemaakt dat men het initiatief tot het bijeenroepen van het seminar toejuichte en dat men was ingenomen met het verloop. Gaarne zeg ik U dank voor Uw ondersteuning van dit initiatief.
De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken
Summary of Proceedings at the
SEMINAR ON THE PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION
OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP)
The Hague, 14 May 2001
THE CHAIRMAN (
Dr W.F. van Eekelen, Chairman of the Netherlands European Movement
) opened the seminar and invited Mr Korthals Altes, President of the Senate
of the States General of the Netherlands, to introduce proceedings.
MR KORTHALS ALTES (
President of the Senate of the States General of the Netherlands
) suggested that for many people a logical connection between the European
integration process and the establishment of a European security and defence
policy was by no means selfevident. He recalled similar problems with the
European Defence Community and of the European Political Community in the
early 1950s, which Dr. Van Eekelen in his recent memoirs had characterized
as a unduly ambitious attempt to take a leap forward, adding that Europe
was not yet ready for one army. This, he ventured, was still the case.
Nevertheless, European integration was not limited to economic matters, but
extended also to security and defence policy. American and Canadian
involvement was also vital in this sphere, and cooperation with North
America should therefore not be jeopardised, but development of this aspect
of policy had to be aimed at showing that Europe was taking its full share
of responsibility for ensuring a secure world. He argued that there was a
pressing need for growing European involvement in this sphere; involvement
which was clearly expected from elsewhere but not as yet fully forthcoming.
He was particularly concerned about the question of democratic
accountability. Security was a core concern of the sovereign nation state
and as such was of great interest to the citizen. It was therefore necessary
to strengthen the basis for the involvement of the citizen in such matters.
National parliaments in particular, but also the European Parliament and the
inter-parliamentary assemblies, could not duck this responsibility. It was
for that reason that the two houses of the Dutch Parliament had invited
participants to attend the seminar. He had every hope that the fifth option
suggested by Dr van Eekelen in his introductory paper, that of no
multinational scrutiny at all, would not be chosen, convinced as he was of
the need for scrutiny at both national and international level. He wished
participants a fruitful and in-depth exchange with a view to ensuring the
identification of clear prospects for a secure Europe and the assumption by
the old continent of its proper international role. (full statement
attached)
THE CHAIRMAN thanked Mr Korthals Altes and welcomed participants. This would
be a preparatory seminar designed to compare the experiences of the existing
multinational assemblies which dealt with issues relating to security and
defence policy; to collect views on the way forward; and to engage in some
"soul-searching" among parliamentarians about what was meant by
parliamentary control and scrutiny and how parliamentarians' multinational
role related to their work at home. Introducing the speakers, he expressed
the hope that the seminar would be forward-looking, and not simply dwell on
what the WEU had done in the past. The intention was to prepare consensus
and to draw some general conclusions in advance of the forthcoming
conference in Brussels on 3-4 July on the same subject, and he hoped that
President De Decker of the Belgian Senate would be able to do this in his
summing-up at the conclusion of the day's proceedings.
MR BÜHLER (
President of the Assembly of the Western European Union
) thanked the Chairman. The WEU had been calling for a European security and
defence policy for decades. The need for a parliamentary dimension to that
policy was now being taken seriously. The Nice summit had placed the issue
of the role of national parliaments in the EU architecture on the agenda for
the IGC in 2004, and for that reason the day's seminar and the upcoming
conference in Brussels were particularly to be welcomed. This would not the
last discussion on the topic; he suggested that much would depend on the
future of the European executive.
Responsibility for carrying out the Petersberg tasks was to be transferred
from the WEU to the EU, but the EU had not adopted any mutual assistance
clause corresponding to Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. Nor had
it taken on any responsibilities in respect of the Western European
Armaments Group (WEAG). He considered it particularly important to continue
cooperation in the field of armaments, noting in this context that European
defence spending was 60-70% of that of the US, but that its efficiency was
only 10-15% of that of the US.
The Nice summit had considered only the role and functions of relevant
executive bodies, not the parliamentary dimension. The result was a
"parliamentary deficit". More and more national governments were recognising
this deficit. The Netherlands Foreign Minister Van Aartsen, presently
Chairman op the WEU Council, had referred to a parliamentary deficit at the
meeting of the WEU Assembly, last December in Paris. Many were now looking
to the European Parliament to make it up. The European Parliament already
had co-decision rights in the area of civilian crisis management, and had
limited rights of information and consultation in respect of Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) matters. Whilst he believed that these rights
should be strengthened, and enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, this
provided only a partial solution to the problem of the "parliamentary
deficit". This was because the political and financial decision-making power
over military operations under ESDP lay with individual national
governments. This was unlikely to change in the near future. Yet bilateral
relations between individual national governments and their respective
parliaments made it difficult for parliamentarians from other countries
concerned to obtain information,&c. This was why WEU governments were under
an obligation to report directly to the WEU Assembly. There was with respect
to ESDP no collective parliamentary dimension comparable to this: hence the
parliamentary deficit.
The WEU Assembly had itself put forward proposals to address this serious
problem. Its suggestion was for an assembly made up of delegations from
national parliaments, which would complement the work of the European
Parliament. Participating governments would be under an obligation to submit
written replies to proposals adopted by the Assembly, and would have the
same obligation to report to the Assembly as the WEU Council had to the WEU
Assembly. He did not consider that hearings of relevant persons before the
European Parliament would be sufficient. Only when national parliaments had
the opportunity to contribute to decision-making at a European level through
a collective body would they be able properly to exercise their duty of
scrutiny, he claimed.
The Nice decision had resulted not only in a parliamentary deficit, he
continued, but a political deficit. This concerned the limited rights of
participation in ESDP of non-EU NATO countries and countries which were
applying for membership of the EU, which represented a loss of status
compared with those they enjoyed with respect to the WEU. It was therefore
all the more important to ensure the involvement of such countries in the
parliamentary dimension of ESDP. The WEU Assembly proposal for a European
Security and Defence Assembly offered a practical solution to this problem.
The interim period before the question of the role of national parliaments
was discussed at the 2004 IGC was too long, he argued. ESDP could not be
permitted to continue to develop in the absence of a parliamentary
dimension. For this reason the WEU Assembly was ready to assume the
responsibilities as an interim European Security and Defence Assembly until
such time as such another body might be established. The recent colloquy of
national parliamentarians from some 30 countries held in Berlin under WEU
Assembly auspices demonstrated the contribution that Assembly was making to
the parliamentary dimension of ESDP.
In response to Mr van Eekelen's paper, which provided a solid basis for
discussion, he raised doubts regarding the funding of ESDP activities. In
his view, national contributions would be required in addition to those from
the EU.
He wished to add the WEU Assembly's proposal to the list of options proposed
at the end of that paper. With respect to the other options proposed, he
argued that option 1 was not a sufficient solution because it excluded
national parliaments; option 2 had the advantage of an inclusive approach,
but could create problems in practice; and option 4 had weaknesses in terms
of quantitative and political representation, as COSAC had demonstrated. He
advocated option 3, modified as indicated above, as a basis for debate.
THE CHAIRMAN invited questions of clarification. None were forthcoming so he
invited Mr Brok to speak.
MR BROK (
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament
) said that organising a parliamentary dimension of security and defence
policy was an important task for national parliaments and the European
Parliament. He had great understanding for the efforts of the WEU Assembly
to redefine its role now that the functions of the WEU had effectively been
integrated into the EU. His Committee, in an opinion of 10 April 2001, did
not consider there was a gap in oversight, however. The European Parliament
now had the key scrutiny role both in receiving reports from the Council of
Ministers and relevant Commissioners and as the budgetary authority for the
European security and defence policy. The European Parliament's enhanced
role was illustrated by the recent negotiations with the Council over best
practice on classified documents, now concluded, and the reports by Mr
Solana on the situation in Macedonia. It was also significant that
representatives of the Swedish Presidency were travelling straight from the
General Affairs Council to report to the Foreign Affairs Committee tomorrow.
He argued that one institution should be responsible for oversight of both
the civil and military aspects of European security and defence policy,
especially given the importance of conflict prevention activity. The
European Parliament had begun regular exchanges of views with the chairmen
of national parliaments' foreign and defence committees and there were
numerous options for expanding this initiative. There was scope for
increased cooperation in relation to the future of the European defence
industry, and other topics related to defence issues; more members of
national parliaments' committees could be included, to create a body similar
to COSAC covering security and defence matters; and members of non-EU
countries' parliaments could be invited to certain Foreign Affairs Committee
meetings. The Foreign Affairs Committee already had joint fora with the
Russian Duma and the US Congress and had sought a relationship with the NATO
Assembly. The European Parliament was now an associate member of the NATO
Assembly and its delegation would soon be placed on a permanent footing.
Turning to the Chairman's proposals, he supported an exchange of views by
parliamentarians, not the establishment of a new organisation with no
competency over the matters it wanted to scrutinise. Institutional
structures needed to be simplified not complicated and there needed to be
clear lines of responsibility. The key division of responsibility in this
area was between the European Parliament and national parliaments and there
was no need for a separate body without decision-making powers. He concluded
by saying that it would be difficult for the European Parliament to take
part in the Brussels meeting in July, as it clashed with a plenary meeting,
and he apologised that he would need to leave this meeting early.
THE CHAIRMAN invited questions.
MR LEMOINE (
WEU/France
) asked, considering the establishment of an interim assembly, when did Mr
Brok think the interim period would end and the European Parliament would
fully take on responsibility for defence competencies.
MR DE DECKER (
Belgium
) said that it would be a mistake to ignore the democratic deficit and
argued that Mr Brok's views would not stand up.
MR SPERONI (
EP/TDI
) said that parliamentary scrutiny was not only about exchanging opinions. A
parliamentary body needed decision-making powers not just a budgetary role.
The Treaty of Rome did not give the European Parliament a co-decision role
in relation to defence policy and the Treaty of Nice did not change this.
Consequently, the European Parliament was not plugging the democratic
deficit and was at best advisory in this area. Finally, the European
Parliament's participation in the NATO Assembly was haphazard and there was
no standing delegation yet.
MR SCHLOTEN (
Germany
) questioned Mr. Brok's preference for an EP's relationship with the NATO
P.A. over a relationship with the WEU Assembly; thought that a joint meeting
of national and European parliamentarians would lack legitimacy and
responsibility; and wondered how the European Parliament could fully replace
the WEU Assembly as a forum for dialogue involving non-EU as well as EU
countries.
MR MUTMAN (
Turkey
) asked how the relationship between EU and non-EU members could be
strengthened by Mr Brok's proposals.
MR BLAAUW (
WEU/Netherlands
) questioned whether non-EU politicians would have a right to attend
Committee meetings of the European Parliament or could only attend if
invited and argued that COSAC lacked legitimacy in national parliaments.
MR EYSKENS (
WEU/Belgium
) said that it was not necessary to discuss the relationship between the EU
and WEU because the answers could be found at national level. Instead of
waiting for the European Parliament to dictate a solution, national
parliamentarians needed to work with colleagues inside and outside of the
EU, although he was not a supporter of a COSAC-style body being established.
MR ROCHE (
WEU/Ireland
) asked Mr Brok whether he thought parliamentarians from beyond the EU would
be happy with his proposals, in which they would be left at the fringes of
debate, except if invited to join in.
MR MEDALINSKAS (
Lithuania
) asked on what basis non-EU members would participate in Mr Brok's proposed
forum, compared to the full participation enjoyed at present in the WEU
Assembly. When the chairmen of EU foreign affairs committees recently
discussed security and foreign policy, chairmen from non-EU countries were
excluded.
THE CHAIRMAN invited Mr Brok to respond.
MR BROK said, first, that there was no interim period. There was a clear
delimitation of tasks between the European Parliament and national
parliaments in the treaties. Parliamentary scrutiny may well be inadequate,
but, if so, this was a reason for the European Parliament and national
parliaments to work more closely together, rather than for squabbling.
Foreign and defence policies were traditionally within the exclusive control
of national governments and even national parliaments often have limited
competencies. It would be a long time before the European Parliament had
control of these policies at EU level and it was not desirable to campaign
for this. The European Parliament was not meddling with the powers of
national parliaments, it wanted to strengthen the role of national
parliaments, although not at its own expense. There was no point in setting
up a new assembly without power so new options needed to be considered. If
the WEU Assembly did not exist then no-one would seek to create it. His
proposal would extend the existing committee system and improve relations
with national parliaments. Contrary to Mr Schloten's and Mr Speroni's
comments, there was no lack of status vis a vis the NATO Assembly and nor
was the European Parliament's relationship with that Assembly haphazard.
Moving to the position of non-EU countries, many would become members soon,
there was no risk of enlargement being delayed. Scrutiny of the EU's
policies, however, could only be carried out by EU parliamentarians. It was
not desirable for parliamentarians from 30 countries to scrutinise the
policies of 15 countries. Cooperation with non-member states'
parliamentarians was an additional task which should be treated separately
from the question of how best to scrutinise the EU's security and defence
policy.
THE CHAIRMAN had two supplementary questions of his own. Firstly, he
recalled the WEU Assembly concept of "security through participation", and
suggested that something would be lost if the 28 were shrunk: would the
participation of all those 28 be at the same level of intensity? He
questioned the adequacy of the COSAC model, describing that forum as
"completely useless". Parliamentarians wanted to be able to participate, not
just be informed, as in COSAC. He commended the process of
consensus-building, and of getting to know what the colleagues in other
countries were thinking: how could the European Parliament take on that
role?
MRS SQUARCIALUPI (
WEU/Italy
) questioned the popular legitimacy of the European Parliament where the
subject of ESDP was concerned. This was an important area with major
implications for both budgets and the deployment of personnel and called for
in-depth debate and expression of public opinion.
MR BROK agreed that participation by non-EU members was very important. It
was clear that both national governments and EU institutions had failed
miserably in that regard, as demonstrated by recent events in the Ukraine.
He fully endorsed the idea of building relationships which would draw
countries together and of giving other countries the opportunity of
developing international ties. There was much more to international
parliamentary assemblies than simply bringing national parliamentarians
together. He continued to advocate the creation of a forum bringing together
the Chairmen of relevant national parliament committees, suggesting that
there were a number of workable options which would bring the 15 and others
together in an appropriate fashion. He said he was open to a wide range of
suggestions, but would not simply sign up to a pre-ordained solution -
particularly not one put forward by a WEU Assembly which didn't really even
exist any more.
MR BLAAUW intervened to assert that the WEU Assembly most certainly did
still exist.
MR BROK conceded that of course it did still exist, but pointed out that a
great many of its functions had been transferred elsewhere. In response to
Mrs Squarcialupi's point, he agreed that, as more powers built up at
international level, so there was a growing need for public debate and
participation. The European Parliament had not perhaps met this need very
effectively in the past, but its increasing role was being matched by an
increasing public profile. He advocated the establishment of a specialist
committee of the European Parliament to examine this, and asked participants
to do the same.
In conclusion, he said that national parliaments and the European Parliament
had to work together within their respective competences. He was willing to
listen and discuss the options and come to a decision along with others.
THE PRESIDENT introduced Tom Spencer, Executive Director of the European
Centre for Public Affairs, Visiting Professor of Global Governance at the
Surrey European Management School, University of Surrey, and Chairman of
Counterpart Europe.
MR SPENCER welcomed the initiative which had led to the seminar. Speaking as
an academic (not as Mr Brok's predecessor), he felt he had some claim to
neutrality in the debate. He set out a number of principles which would
guide his contribution. He strongly believed in parliamentary oversight as a
key to effective government. But the nation state was no longer
uni-competent, as parliamentarians were well aware. He also noted a paradigm
shift in the electorate, which no longer had the faith in the effectiveness
of government which it did, for example, when NATO was set up. He considered
that electorates had a sense of identity on various levels, to a greater
extent than was given credit for. Globalisation was leading to problems for
the traditional nation state, particularly where institutional structures
were concerned. The electorate expected transparency, accountability and
legitimacy. Defence structures failed on all three counts.
He drew a distinction between "organisations" and "institutions".
Organisations were a failure: what was needed were institutions. What had
just taken place was a classic "organisation" debate: rearranging the
jigsaw. There had to be an "institution" debate, about what was actually
required. There was a problem because the debate kept tripping over the
problem of existing institutions, history and the sibling rivalries of
national parliaments. Governments, he suggested, would like nothing better
than for these squabbles to continue.
What, then, was required of Assembly X, the ideal forum? The core would be a
solid working relationship between national parliaments and the European
Parliament, without which the structure would lack political credibility.
There were three keys to political credibility, and thus political clout.
Firstly it is absolutely essential that any assembly would deal with both
foreign policy and with defence and would have the ability to express
Europe's opinion, and exert its power, amongst the rest of the world.
Secondly, legitimacy only came from power and knowledge. This, he argued,
militated in favour of the participation of the Chairmen of parliamentary
foreign affairs and defence committees, which would result in real political
activity and discussion - though he argued against the COSAC model, which he
described as a "parliamentary dead end". It also favoured the participation
of delegates in transnational political parties, sitting thus and not as
national delegations. Thirdly, it should have its own research institute, to
ensure it had its own intellectual ability and could formalise links with
other institutions. He further argued that its members should be
"multi-hatted", sitting also as members of eg. the NATO and OSCE Assemblies.
The structure created had to be "elegant": if there were debates in many
fora, no-one listened, and the public would not understand. There had to be
as few parliamentary assemblies as possible, and, bearing in mind the dictum
"Don't take travelling politicians seriously", they should meet in one
place, preferably in Brussels. Whatever was created had to grow using
European Parliament institutions - he felt that the European Parliament
itself was possibly not ready for this. He suggested a structure which had
the European Parliament and national parliaments of EU member states at its
core, with applicant states around that core - reassuring delegates from
states such as Poland and Lithuania that they would be full members by the
time such a structure was set up.
He welcomed discussion of an "interim European Security and Defence
Assembly", but was not convinced that it represented the best way forward.
The key was the relationship with the European Parliament. A way had to be
found to prevent the Council of Ministers from behaving like a "rogue
elephant". The Assembly should involve
all
parliamentarians, from the European Parliament and national parliaments
alike. It should elect its own Speaker, with a small Bureau made up of
Committee chairmen, the leaders of the political groups, and the like, and
should discuss whatever it liked. In this way it could draw political
attention and thus have a chance of being listened to - bearing in mind that
there were things that Parliaments could say which Governments could not.
The fallacy that foreign, security and defence policy was purely a national
matter had to be ignored. Defence and defence industries, for example, were
clearly multinational.
What, then, were the next steps? Firstly, to do no harm. Don't destroy
anything which might be useful. Secondly, control it. Keep it in
parliamentary hands. It was a question of demonstrating that there could be
both accountability and effectiveness in defence policy. Finally, set a
goal, and use political skills to work towards it. (Paper attached)
THE CHAIRMAN thanked Mr Spencer for setting the scene and said that there
would now commence a general debate featuring first the representatives of
other international assemblies.
MR HALLER (
Secretary General, Council of Europe Assembly
) said that, although defence was excluded from the remit of the Council of
Europe Assembly, it was possible for it to discuss related subjects such as
conflict prevention and the defence of human rights, which contributed to
the stability of a country or region. The Assembly also shared many members
with the WEU Assembly and the OSCE Assembly. He did not intend to review the
paper he had submitted, but he explained how the Council of Europe
Assembly's remit had broadened over time. Human rights issues were once seen
as primarily legal matters, but now they encompassed conflict prevention,
the protection of minorities and monitoring of situations, including, for
example, torture. The expansion of the Council of Europe, following the end
of the Cold War, had been an important turning point for the Assembly. In
defining conditions of membership, the Assembly had e.g. helped end capital
punishment in Europe and assisted the consolidation of democratic
institutions in former Communist countries. He concluded by pointing out
that the Council of Europe Assembly was now a fully representative
parliamentary assembly, not a consultative assembly as suggested by the
Chairman's paper.
THE CHAIRMAN said that in writing his paper he may have been unduly
influenced by his experiences as a member of the Assembly twenty years
before and he asked to what extent international parliamentary institutions
could better work together, before calling Mr Lunn.
MR LUNN (
Secretary General, NATO Assembly
) said that the remit of the NATO Assembly would not be affected by the
current debate as there would always be a need for a transatlantic defence
forum, but he recognised the importance of a dialogue between the European
Parliament and national parliaments. There were already several
international parliamentary institutions with similar, but separate,
mandates which worked well together, and he warned that any new structure
would draw on the same pool of parliamentarians and resources. The NATO
Assembly lacked a formal status but since 1989 its relationship with
governments had improved because its out-reach activity was regarded as
valuable. Governments still resisted real scrutiny: there was no requirement
on governments to respond to reports of the Assembly, for example. The
Assembly exerted indirect influence, by raising parliamentary awareness of
issues and insisting on transparency and openness. It was worth bearing in
mind, however, that the Assembly and its governmental counterparts worked in
very different ways and that even national parliaments found it difficult to
scrutinise defence policy. He concluded by arguing that national sovereignty
over defence policy was not being shared: countries would long retain full
control over their own armed forces and this reinforced the scrutiny role of
national parliaments.
THE CHAIRMAN called Mr Spencer-Oliver.
MR SPENCER-OLIVER (
Secretary General, OSCE Assembly
) said that the OSCE Assembly had been recently created by governments,
against the will of many parliamentarians who had wondered what it would do.
The Assembly had proved valuable because it included the US, which could not
join the Council of Europe Assembly. It had 54 member countries and one half
of its parliamentarians did not fall into traditional European political
groupings. The Assembly worked well with other parliamentary assemblies and
political institutions, especially on election monitoring and conflict
prevention. The OSCE had now out-grown its Assembly and there were clashes
between the two bodies over lack of transparency in the former and scrutiny
arrangements. The OSCE Assembly was now indispensable, however, and there
might be important lessons from the operation of the Assembly which could be
useful in the current debate.
THE CHAIRMAN said that Mr Wiersma would make a short contribution before
lunch.
MR WIERSMA (
European Parliament/PSE
), speaking on behalf of the Socialist Group of the European Parliament,
said that it might be necessary to set up a working group to consider a
detailed plan arising from this seminar or its successor. There was a grey
area between national parliaments and the European Parliament which needed
to be covered by new scrutiny arrangements. The European Parliament would
obviously fight for more rights with respect to second pillar issues, but
the role of national parliaments would remain crucial. His Group supported
the European Parliament's view of the need for a forum in which European and
national parliamentarians could meet but there might be scope for broadening
such a forum to ensure adequate political representation. If such a forum
had existed, scrutiny of governments' policies in Kosovo and Ukraine could
have been enhanced. What ever solution was found, it must give national
parliaments a prominent role and be explicable to ordinary people. The key
thing was not to let the Council of Ministers get away with it.
THE CHAIRMAN said that this was a good motto for lunch.
Lunch was taken.
THE CHAIRMAN introduced the afternoon session. He wished to make two further
points following on from his paper. Firstly, when discussing parliamentary
control and scrutiny, it was important to bear in mind the big difference
between the role of the European Parliament, in particular in the First
Pillar, and that of other international assemblies. When talking about a
"democratic deficit", one had to consider what powers these parliamentary
assemblies really had. Security and defence policy was a matter for national
parliaments; but at the same time it was important that an international
network of parliamentarians be maintained. International parliamentary
assemblies did not just receive information: they ensured "security through
participation" and encouraged consensus-building such that the positions and
interests of other countries were better understood.
Secondly, whilst Mr Brok had been right to stress that European Parliament responsibilities were different from those of the other bodies, and that the EP should not be scrutinised unnecessarily, he had failed to recognise that the link with national parliamentarians has to be more substantial than it is today. COSAC's information-receiving role was insufficient: what was needed was more dialogue and control of multinational decision-making.
Those concerned with parliamentary scrutiny of ESDP were in a fix. The EU
had not been prepared to give the European Parliament real power, but the
WEU was losing much of its functions. Whilst not wishing to dwell on the
legal position, he argued that the WEU Assembly did something unique in
maintaining the link with the others, in the area of "security through
participation". It had been in the lead in this area; but much of the
substance of its work would fall away. Could the European Parliament
maintain the inclusiveness of the WEU Assembly, maintaining the necessary
links with other countries whilst the main members took the important
decisions?
The focus had to be not on control and scrutiny but on consensus-building
and cooperation. He hoped that this would lead to some real practical
suggestions which could be taken forward in Belgium.
MR DE PUIG (
WEU/Spain
) believed that Mr Brok's view, shared by other European Parliament
colleagues, was based on an erroneous perception of reality. Governments had
decided to set up the WEU and its Assembly; then to transfer some, but not
all, of its functions to the EU's CFSP. Article V remained, as did the
armaments structures. Governments had decided to expand the WEU to the 28,
creating different categories of membership. Governments had also made clear
that they did not wish the European Parliament to be the scrutineer of
defence policy: witness, for example, the St Malo declaration. That was the
reality. Nor were these mere whims, as the 43 years of the WEU Assembly's
work testified. At 28 countries, the WEU Assembly encompassed more than just
the 15 EU states, and this meant a good deal in terms of strategic thinking,
and of opening up to Eastern Europe and the new democracies.
It would be nice if the European architecture were simpler, but it was not.
Mr Brok had spoken of cooperation with national parliaments, but the fact
was that the WEU
was
national parliaments, working at European level, and whilst on many
occasions cooperation with the European Parliament and its rapporteurs had
succeeded, generally there had not been a great deal of cooperation, and
this was not the WEU's fault. Personally, he was in favour of the European
Parliament being the only European parliamentary body, with competence in
all areas. In the meantime, however, Governments did not wish that.
One could not ignore the fact that the WEU Assembly encompassed 28
countries. Mr Brok had said that 30 should not scrutinise 15; but nor should
15 scrutinise 30. He agreed with Tom Spencer when he had warned against
focussing on organisations. The Assembly had always had the political
objective of securing European defence, and of including within that as much
of Europe as possible, the east as well. It had also had the objective of
ensuring a parliamentary dimension to European defence, which he believed
should continue. The European Parliament's proposal for a sort of defence
COSAC terrified him. COSAC was a nice, friendly forum, but was useless,
producing no practical results.
If the European Parliament wanted competence in the sphere of defence policy
in an enlarged Union, he would recognise and support that, and in that case
the WEU Assembly could be taken over by the European Parliament. In the
meantime, however, the useful work of the Assembly should not be wasted.
Ultimately the EU and European Parliament should be able to forge ahead, but
until then it was necessary to work together to avoid a democratic
shortfall. He therefore advocated the continuation of the WEU Assembly until
such time as the European Parliament was in a position to assume all that
Assembly's previous responsibilities. Mr Brok's view, that as much power
should pass to the European Parliament as possible, was understandable, but
he had failed to take account of the reality of the situation.
As far as Dr van Eekelen's options were concerned, he was of the opinion
that a mixed Assembly would be best; but that if that were not possible,
option 3, the European Parliament working within its competence, the WEU
likewise, avoiding duplication. It was important that institutional
squabbles did not hinder the exercise of democracy in such an important and
delicate area. Colleagues from the European Parliament had to understand
others' point of view.
THE CHAIRMAN broadly agreed, but asked whether Article V and cooperation in
the domain of armaments were enough to keep an Assembly in operation.
Article V was an important commitment, and he hoped that it would continue,
but it had not been the reason for any WEU institution since 1954. Since
then the commitment it enshrined had been put into practice via NATO, and
purely European matters, therefore, now fell outside the scope of Article
V. He was more favourable to other arguments for a parliamentary dimension
to ESDP besides the European Parliament, and did not think it helpful to
continue to refer to Article V.
MR DE PUIG replied that he had cited Article V as an example of where
Governments had not placed all the WEU's responsibilities into the hands of
the European Union. His argument for a parliamentary dimension to ESDP was
not based solely on Article V, but on the expertise on defence matters which
such an Assembly could provide (e.g. on issues related to anti-missile
defence). He stressed that, whilst the European Parliament did not have
competence in respect of all the WEU Assembly's former responsibilities, a
further parliamentary dimension was required.
MR BÜHLER argued that American discussion of an anti-missile defence system
suggested a new interpretation to Article V. Article V was not an outdated
Cold War relic. Relations with the US were very important, but the whole
question of European defence structures was based on Article V, which had
not been accorded the importance it deserved.
THE CHAIRMAN said that that was a very important point, but maintained that
the Council of Ministers, which would report to the Assembly in whatever
form it took, would not be talking about collective defence, which was an
issue for NATO.
MR WIERSMA asked whether it was suggested that, because of the US proposals
for missile defence, NATO was no longer so important but Europeans could
fall back on Article V of the WEU Treaty. He did not think the Treaty could
be thought of in that way.
THE CHAIRMAN said Mr Bühler would respond later and asked for future
speakers to restrict their comments to three minutes.
MR SPERONI said that the European Parliament had proposed cooperation with
the WEU Assembly in the past but this had been turned down. Mr de Puig was
right to say that direct elections had imbued the European Parliament with
democratic legitimacy and, as a consequence, it should be involved with
national parliaments in scrutinising defence policy. Perhaps the European
Parliament's relationships with national parliaments could be enhanced if it
became a member of the Council of Europe Assembly? There was a high degree
of overlap between the WEU Assembly and the Council of Europe Assembly in
terms of membership. He asked whether it was necessary to have two
assemblies covering human rights and defence issues. He thought this could
be simplified. These bodies were not decision-making bodies anyway and
existed to facilitate exchanges of opinion.
THE CHAIRMAN called Mr Anderson.
MR ANDERSON (
UK
) said that national parliaments were primarily responsible for scrutinising
defence policy but there was a role also for the European Parliament, in
areas such as disaster relief, civil reconstruction and the interface
between defence and civil responsibilities. Any new body would not control
governments in the accepted sense, but it could have an important educative
role. He set out three key issues. Firstly, was Europe still in an interim
phase? He thought it was, and interim arrangements could usefully be made
until at least the 2004 IGC. Secondly, in relation to the Chairman's second
option, the European Parliament should have equal dialogue with national
parliaments but it should not be considered a first amongst equals. Thirdly,
while there was a need for EU and non-EU countries to debate defence issues,
oversight of EU policies rested with EU politicians, particularly those in
national parliaments. Turning to the COSAC model, he found the meetings of
the chairmen of foreign affairs committees helpful and argued that they
could be merged with the meetings of chairmen of defence committees and
expanded to bring in non-EU politicians.
THE CHAIRMAN called Lord Jopling.
LORD JOPLING (
UK
) said that COSAC was not popular, the OSCE Assembly was not appropriate for
discussing defence issues, the Council of Europe Assembly had no defence
remit, and governments were not keen to support the WEU Assembly. In his
experience, the parliamentarians with the greatest expertise in defence
matters preferred to attend the NATO Assembly. He did not want to see
another organisation established just for exchanging opinions, but an
organisation with real teeth. Although it might be desirable to avoid
setting up yet another international assembly, there seemed little
alternative to this course. A new organisation should not be too encumbered
with committees, travel and the like, but should attract real experts and
hold meaningful debates. The European Parliament should participate but not
dominate and he expressed scepticism about whether a second chamber of the
European Parliament could fill this role, if and when it came into
existence.
THE CHAIRMAN said that there was much talk about the composition of a second
chamber, but not about what it would do. He called Mr Köse.
MR KÖSE (
Turkey
) said that he did not think the options in the Chairman's paper were
exhaustive. As a politician from outside the EU, the WEU Assembly was the
only forum for the discussion of European security matters. Such issues were
not of interest only to the EU: other countries which contribute to EU
security ought to have a role in scrutinising and debating defence policies.
He wanted a broad forum for debate based on the second or third options
outlined by the Chairman but it had to be a workshop not a talking shop. A
broad forum would entail some degree of popular legitimacy. He welcomed the
Belgian Presidency's decision to hold a seminar on this issue in July.
THE CHAIRMAN complimented Mr Köse on his appeal for a workshop, not a
talking shop, and called Mr Sebej.
MR SEBEJ (
Slovakia
) said that he had led the Slovak delegation to the NATO Assembly and he
thought it was important not to underestimate the value of communication, no
matter how much it might sometimes seem a waste of time. Not all
international assemblies were suitable to debate security and defence
matters. The OSCE and the OSCE Assembly, for example, included both
potential aggressors and victims and was therefore unsuitable. The Council
of Europe Assembly had reduced its threshold for including members, as was
shown by the recent problems with Russia. In comparing the NATO Assembly
with the WEU Assembly it was noted that Art. V of the Washington Treaty had
more teeth than the Art. V of the modified Brussels Treaty. A broad forum,
including countries such as Norway and Turkey, was required to debate
security matters. The European Parliament did not have competence in many
key areas of the ESDP, so national parliaments needed to be involved. He
concluded by saying that if a second chamber of the European Parliament was
formed, countries had to be represented in it equally, irrespective of size.
MR LEMOINE referred to the practical example of the value of parliamentary
scrutiny which was offered by the French parliamentary commission which had
examined the after-effects on troops of the Gulf War. He suggested that a
similar situation could arise as a result of certain munitions used in the
action in Kosovo. It was certainly legitimate to hold rhetorical, academic
debates, but there were also more concrete results from parliamentary
involvement in security and defence policy.
With regard to Article V, he claimed that it was this article which had led
to French logistical support being offered to British troops during the
Falklands conflict. He questioned whether the European Parliament was in a
position to assess the risks faced by national troops in a conflict
situation, and argued that the parliamentary dimension to ESDP had to be
defined with reference to some clear examples.
MR KOENDERS (
Netherlands
) made a plea for the second of Dr van Eekelen's options. New structures
were needed: though it was necessary to be careful about disposing of
existing ones, the WEU Assembly was outdated. Article V militated in favour
of scrutiny by national parliamentarians. He agreed with Mr Spencer that
what was important was not the turf wars with the European Parliament, but
rather getting down to the basics of what the structure to be created should
actually do. There had to be a European debate about Europe's proper role in
the world. He suggested that a false distinction was being drawn between
conflict prevention and crisis management on one side and military
operations on the other. Only when national parliaments and the European
Parliament came together could there be a full expression of public opinion.
Parliamentarians could not expect the same level of control over troop
deployment as over other aspects of policy. The new interim Assembly should
be open to the North Atlantic Assembly and to NGOs setting the debate. It
should enable the European Parliament to get experience of what national
parliaments think. Its role should be in controlling strategy, obtaining
information, and holding question and answer sessions with Ministers. It
should have a logical executive counterpart in the interim structures under
the Second Pillar and the Council. There should be no blurring of the
competencies of the European Parliament and national parliaments. It should
be open to those outside the EU. It should be the right size - better 100
than 200. The European Parliament should play an important role within the
Assembly, but as an equal, not first among equals. The Assembly should also
be able to draw upon relevant expertise, as Tom Spencer advocated.
MR EYSKENS repeated the message to Mr Brok: national MPs representing the 15 (up to 28) had to decide how to scrutinise ESDP, albeit bearing in mind the proper role for the European Parliament given the EU's responsibilities in this area. National MPs sitting in a European Security and Defence Assembly ("double-hatted") would work with colleagues from countries not in either the EU or NATO and those from the European Parliament, which should be able to send a delegation. He argued that a more effective system would not require all members of the Assembly also to be members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, as this meant too heavy a workload. There should be an open discussion within national parliaments about sharing the burden of financing such an Assembly. With respect to the question of what functions the Assembly could exercise given the aspects of the Treaty which had not been transferred to the EU, he suggested that there were a wide range of duties - as opposed to powers - which it could carry out.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE (
WEU/UK
) agreed with Mr de Puig. His British colleagues, and Mr Brok, had raised
the question of how the Assembly could have real teeth. In his view,
however, the functions of education and participation were just as
important. He had learnt more about European politics in the WEU Assembly
than in his own national parliament. Equally, the participation by countries
such as Russia, which took its WEU membership very seriously, was very
important. The Assembly's practical influence would depend largely on what
issues were discussed, and the quality of debate, not the structure, was the
crucial factor in ascertaining what influence it could have on national
governments.
MR GUNDERSEN (
WEU/Norway
) wondered why EU politicians were so negative about the WEU, saying that it
"didn't respond to real needs". Mr Patten, for example, had told the
Norwegian foreign affairs committee that the cleverest politicians did not
get sent to the WEU. The ten members of the Assembly could never agree on
anything, so it had no real power. Why was this? Was it because Norway and
Turkey, big peacekeepers, were there, for example? Time would tell if the EU
would find it easier to agree if Norway and Turkey were not there, but was
this the way to deal with European defence?
MRS SQUARCIALUPI stressed the point made by Mr de Puig regarding the
importance of the participation of countries which were not part of the EU.
The new Assembly could prove to be a vital point of contact. She was
concerned that some of these countries were Baltic states, because of the
potential Russian reaction to their alignment with the West: the "interim
Assembly" would have plenty of work to do during this important "changeover
period".
Mr Speroni had suggested that the European Parliament should be enabled to
send a delegation to the Council of Europe Assembly: as a member of both the
WEU Assembly and the Council of Europe Assembly, she thought that this was a
suggestion well worth looking at. The Council of Europe Assembly looked at
immigration and human rights, for example: these issues were not
disconnected from military concerns. Military action implied action to
protect civilians.
National parliaments did feel sidelined - she asked how they could best
support those who had not yet joined the EU or NATO. She suggested that the
best way would be to synchronise support with that given in other areas such
as the economic and cultural spheres. The European Parliament might be the
most logical body to provide such support, but it was not in as good a
position to do so as was the Council of Europe.
THE CHAIRMAN asked Mr Blaauw to bear in mind that it was near the end of the
seminar.
MR BLAAUW said that there was a consensus about the need for scrutiny of
European defence policy and for cooperation between the European Parliament
and national parliaments, although it was not clear which parliaments should
be included. There was also agreement about the need to use, or even
simplify, existing structures, not create new ones. It ought not to be
forgotten that the WEU Assembly was not some extra-terrestrial body: it
comprised national parliamentarians, although it was perhaps regrettable
that, for historical reasons, it was usual for the same delegations to be
sent to the Council of Europe Assembly and the WEU Assembly. Other
organisations were not as appropriate as the WEU Assembly for focusing on
defence issues. The OSCE Assembly and the NATO Assembly were not based on a
treaty and COSAC did not adequately represent national parliaments. The WEU
Assembly had milk teeth and needed stronger teeth, but at least it was in a
better position than the OSCE Assembly which was toothless. He commended
option two as a synthesis of the views expressed at the seminar, which was
in line with how the WEU Assembly was developing. It was based on the
existing structures and, crucially, included members of parliaments in
countries both inside and outside the EU. The need for action had been
demonstrated by the EU's decision to wind up a WEU mission to train the
police force in Albania (MAPE), as part of the transfer of WEU functions to
the EU, because the EU lacked competency in this area and MAPE didn't fit
the framework of its rules. The European Parliament had not objected,
showing how it was not capable of taking the place of the WEU Assembly.
THE CHAIRMAN invited the speakers to sum up.
MR SPENCER said he would not sum up the debate but would make some brief
concluding comments. Parliamentarians had agreed that COSAC served little
purpose. Formal, open, general meetings led to an exchange of information,
but not of wisdom. Perhaps less formal, closed meetings, including non-EU
members, would be of more use. There was an interim period until mid-2004
during which time the interim Assembly should continue at 28 and there
should be a series of formal or informal meetings that build a political
intimacy between key national parliamentarians and members of the European
Parliament so that by 2003 a consensus transcending national boundaries
could develop to influence the outcome of the 2004 IGC. He emphasised that
parliamentarians would be more powerful and effective, both at the national
and at the European level, if they can find the language to talk to each
other.
THE CHAIRMAN called Mr Bühler.
MR BÜHLER hoped that those present would disseminate the results of the
seminar to national parliamentarians. He did not share Mr Brok's concerns
about parliamentarians from non-EU member states controlling EU defence
policy in a revived WEU Assembly - it was possible to use different classes
of membership to avoid this problem. He agreed that an interim period had
now commenced and something was required to fill it. There should not be
rivalry between different European institutions and the European Parliament
was regularly invited to WEU occasions, although this was not necessarily
acknowledged nor reciprocated. With respect to Article V, it was clear that
the WEU complemented NATO but there was a need for more European involvement
in European defence (Petersberg tasks) and this did not mean a reduced US
role. The way ahead did not lie in formalising meetings of committees'
chairmen, as such groups tended only to represent national ruling parties.
That there was a democratic deficit was evident from the EU Council of
Ministers' recent refusal to report to the European Parliament on defence
matters, as the latter had requested. With good will on all sides a solution
could be found, but the European Parliament should stand on an equal footing
with national parliaments and no more.
THE CHAIRMAN said that Europe was over-organised. If political integration
had begun today, the current arrangement of institutions would not have been
arrived at. He regretted the way the transfer of functions from the WEU to
the EU was being planned as some odds and ends had been overlooked. The
Council of Ministers' neglect of the parliamentary dimension was especially
worrying and difficult to reverse. The options he had presented were not
exclusive but he was pleased that option two was attracting a certain amount
of support, at least for the interim period. He was struck by Mr Spencer's
emphasis on the need for wisdom rather than information. The value of an
international assembly covering defence matters lay in the need to
scrutinise the emerging common defence policy, but who would the assembly
address and who would reply? The essence of parliamentary democracy was
parliament against government, parliament against executive, and there
should be some relationship there. Any new structure needed to be inclusive
and to ensure that it generated a meaningful dialogue with an appropriate
response. He thanked participants and introduced the last speaker, Mr De
Decker.
MR DE DECKER thanked the Dutch for organising the seminar. The WEU Assembly
had enjoyed an exceptional 50-year history at the forefront of scrutiny. In
a speech before the conclusion of the Lisbon session of the WEU Assembly in
2000, he had set out the following three principles to guide the debate
about the organisation's future:
the transfer of the WEU's responsibilities to the EU ought not to lead to a
reduction in scrutiny
as long as military matters remain primarily the responsibility of national
governments, national parliaments must take the lead in debating them,
hopefully in a European context
future scrutiny arrangements should not lead to a proliferation in the
number of assemblies
He had foreseen the following problems:
as Mr Brok's speech showed, the European Parliament lacked a culture of
defence scrutiny and failed to acknowledge this deficiency
there was a tension between parliamentary scrutiny involving 15, 28 or 30
countries
a new assembly must have the political weight of the WEU Assembly, ideally
by being based on a treaty.
Now, there were a number of fresh issues to focus on, including:
the need that the European Union would develop a real military capacity for
crisis management
the need for European governments to spend money on defence capabilities
more efficiently, so as to at least match US performance; national
parliaments should approach these questions and questions regarding troop
deployment, both clearly national prerogatives, from a European perspective
the fundamental difference between an assembly comprising representatives of
European national parliaments and a body such as COSAC, which would lead
nowhere
the need for both EU and non-EU countries to be involved in the debate on
European defence issues
irrespective of Mr Brok's view, which was not an official view of the
European Parliament, at the Lisbon meeting Mme. Lalumière, representing the
European Parliament, had endorsed the need for the European Parliament and
national parliaments to scrutinise defence matters jointly
the impossibility of viewing European defence matters purely from a national
perspective. In fact, European scrutiny of such issues should take
precedence over national scrutiny
that democratic control of European defence policy should be formally based
on a treaty or protocol
the unlikelihood of swift progress towards the formation of a second chamber
of the European Parliament, which should not distract from the need to
improve scrutiny of defence matters in the short run.
In conclusion, he said that there was a democratic deficit and a
parliamentary overview of European defence policy was required. Neither the
European Parliament nor the national parliaments could fill the void on
their own. The WEU Assembly would remain in existence as it was based on the
Treaty of Brussels but it had been a mistake to transform it into the
interim assembly as it did not include a European Parliament presence and
had no locus over EU activities. With great prudence, he advocated setting
up an ad hoc assembly to deal with European security and defence policy
issues encompassing members of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs
Committee and members of EU national parliaments. It would be about the same
size and composition as the WEU Assembly, and would have a similar range of
committees and structures as the WEU Assembly, which might limit its own
committee structure to its Political Committee. That way, the WEU Assembly's
well of experience would remain on tap. National ministers ought to report
annually to this body on relevant matters. The assembly would be based on
political groups, not individual countries, and it would not necessarily
involve the same parliamentarians as attend the Council of Europe Assembly.
Details would need to be filled in but such a body would reflect EU member
states and the wider Europe and would encompass the European Parliament and
national parliaments. Although on paper a new body, it would be based on
resources already in existence. It was a practical response to the current
problem. If agreement on a solution could be reached in the conference of
July 3-4 in Brussels, it was possible, but not certain, that the results of
the Brussels meeting could be picked up in the Laeken summit at the end of
the year.
THE CHAIRMAN closed the seminar by presenting gifts to the speakers.
Welcoming speech to be given by the President of the Dutch Senate,
Frits Korthals Altes, to the participants in the
Seminar on the Parliamentary Dimension of the European Security and
Defence Policy, in The Hague on 14 May 2001
Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,
For many people a logical connection between the European integration
process and the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy is
by no means self-evident. Many Europeans with a knowledge of history will
remember the ignominious failure -in the early 1950s in a national
parliament - of the European Defence Community and of the European Political
Community that was linked to it. You, Mr Chairman, in any event remember
this event: in your memoires, which were published in February, you referred
to the subject and described it as an unduly ambitious attempt to take a
leap forwards. You added: 'Europe was not yet ready for one army, nor is it
ready for it today'. And I would add that we shall perhaps today see how far
Europe now is.
In the 1970s and 1980s new ideas on a common defence policy were developed
through the process of intergovernmental European political cooperation.
Ideas on European parliamentary involvement also evolved. I would remind you
of the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart of 1983. Nonetheless, any suggestion
that the European integration process is limited to the economic success
generated by European union would not do justice to the true significance of
European unification. I would recall the cooperation under the Pact of Dover
and the Pact of Brussels, which was extended in 1955 - after the failure of
the European Defence Community - into the Western European Union (WEU), the
organisation having the most far-reaching obligation to provide military
assistance. This period also saw the Prague Coup, the partition of Germany
and the wars in Korea and Indochina. The impression made by these events
caused many West Europeans to fear for the future. Subsequently, the growing
involvement of the United States and Canada in the development of NATO
successfully assuaged these fears of a loss of liberty and democratic
values.
This brief review of the beginnings of European integration leads me to draw
two conclusions. The first is that the establishment of a European Security
and Defence Policy must not be allowed to weaken the North Atlantic Treaty
Alliance or jeopardise good relations among its members. European security
organisation and defence capacity should complement NATO's capacity as proof
of Europe's acceptance of its own responsibility for an orderly world and as
a channel for the articulation - in all modesty - of European views and
interests.
My second conclusion is that the European integration process has clearly
matured to the point at which a pressing need is felt for formulation of a
European Security and Defence Policy. This maturity occurs during a period
in which the increasing interdependence in the world requires greater
involvement and responsibility on the part of Europe. This growing
involvement of Europe was already perceptible and tangible at the time of
the Iraq-Iran War, the Gulf War and later in Kosovo. Possibly it was
apparent even earlier, for example in the 1970s when the then President
Sadat, after the breakthrough in relations between his country and Israel,
called on Europe from the dais of the European Parliament to strengthen the
peace process in the Middle East. It has in any event been the case that the
rest of the world has for some time attributed a greater unity to Europe
than we do ourselves, and that the rest of the world has based its
expectations on this.
In view of this fact and of the presumed maturity of the European
integration process, the European Union has set itself the goal, following
various meetings of the European Council, of making the European Security
and Defence Policy operational without delay. The aim is that the framework
of this policy should be available by the end of this year at the latest,
namely during the meeting of the European Council in Laken under the Belgian
Presidency.
Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, when I read about all the technical,
institutional and complex issues that are involved and must be solved
(fortunately interesting articles are now published on this subject in the
Netherlands), I realise just how much knowledge, wisdom, dynamism and
caution are needed. This is all the more so when we consider that the terms
and membership of the EU, the WEU and NATO and the applicants for EU
membership play a role. It will be a huge challenge to bridge the potential
gap between the political ambitions and responsibilities on the one hand and
the availability of sufficient means, instruments and institutions - in
other words the 'assets and capabilities' - on the other.
As president of a parliamentary assembly, I am even more concerned, however, about a transparent and democratic decision-making structure over which national parliaments, the European Parliament and interparliamentary assemblies can keep balanced and effective control. Security goes to the heart of the territorial State and its sovereign powers. Citizens too recognise this. This is why now more than ever it is necessary to foster support for this policy from the outset among European citizens and their parliamentary representatives. Since the Treaty of Maastricht national parliaments have been asked to play a stronger role within the European integration process. National parliaments - like the European Parliament and interparliamentary assemblies - cannot ignore an appeal to their sense of responsibility, certainly not in the area of security and defence.
An exchange of ideas is taking place in the Dutch Senate too on how we can
design and elaborate a control mechanism for the Second Pillar of the
European Union. This is why my counterpart in the House of Representatives,
Mrs Van Nieuwenhoven, and I, have gladly invited you - at the request of the
organisers - to attend this important seminar. We therefore very much hope
that it will be a success. I have taken note with particular interest of the
"options paper" for this seminar. May I say that I sincerely hope that the
"no multinational oversight at all" option will not be the epitaph of this
seminar! I am convinced of the need for adequate national and multinational
parliamentary and democratic control. I hope that you can all appreciate my
reasons for saying this. I take this opportunity, Mr Chairman, to wish you,
the organisers and the participants in this seminar every success in
achieving a good and penetrating exchange of views. Ultimately it is all
about a safe and secure Europe for us and for those who come after us and a
suitable place for Europe in the world community.
Thank you.
Seminar on the Parliamentary Dimension of the European Security and Defence
Policy,
The Hague, 14th May 2001
Paper delivered by Mr Tom Spencer,
Executive Director, European Centre for Public Affairs,
Visiting Professor of Global Governance, SEMS, University of Surrey
Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen
May I congratulate the Dutch and Belgian governments on their non-paper and
on carrying forward this important initiative. May I thank the organisers
for inviting me and make it clear that my comments are of an entirely
personal nature unconnected to my former role as Chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. I may have moved from being a
rather academic politician to become a rather political academic, but I can
reassure Elmar Brok that I in no way speak this morning for the European
Parliament.
Indeed it is my work on Global Governance that I wish to take as my starting
point. I am convinced that proper parliamentary oversight is the key to
success at all levels of governance. It is particularly important in areas
where the nation state is seen as insufficient such as environment and
defence. We are in the process of a paradigm shift. Electorates are better
educated, less deferential, and have less faith in governments than they had
at the time of the establishment of NATO. They have a greater sense of
global identity. The globalisation debate and the emergence of more global
governance poses a threat to the parliamentary democracy which we have
achieved and which has historically been rooted in the nation state. In this
century the effectiveness of policy and institutions is dependent on public
consent, and that consent depends on accountability, transparency and
legitimacy. This is of particular importance here in Europe. It has been
wisely said that it is necessary to win the argument for NATO every twenty
years. The same can be said for European integration. This morning we are
discussing the parliamentary dimension of the integration of both
institutions and we do so against the background of the Future of Europe
Debate ahead of an IGC in 2004.
Konrad von Moltke, in the context of environmental global governance, draws
a useful distinction between 'organisations' and 'institutions'. The
'organisational' approach is similar to rearranging a jigsaw. It suffers
from the problem of organisational heritage at a moment of rapid change and
inevitably raises problems of conflicting institutional and personal
agendas. In the case which we are considering this morning we have
substantial organisational complexity, the geographical expansion of Europe
and the problem of sibling rivalry between Parliamentary Assemblies, a
rivalry often encouraged by the Executives. The 'institutional' approach
requires us instead to look at political processes, purposes and behaviour
and to ask the question 'what is needed?'. It is my experience that in the
European Union the shortest path between two points is not a straight line.
I want therefore to look at an ideal form of Parliamentary Assembly in this
area as it might appear in ten years time. I would like to suggest that our
approach should be that of the 'Go Board'. We are engaged in placing pieces
on the board which will make sense in the final picture. What do we need
from a Parliamentary Assembly on these subjects? What is the essential
political logic? What will give it credibility?
The key to the successful creation of a parliamentary assembly in the field
of security and defence, lies in the relationship between the European
Parliament and the National Parliaments of the Union. If we establish a good
working relationship inside the Union, it will then be possible to react
intelligently to the applicant states, to the non-EU members of NATO, to the
Russians and to other Partners for Peace.
There are three essentials for public credibility: the combination of
foreign policy and defence, the involvement of individuals with expertise
and influence; and the creation of an elegant structure which the public can
comprehend.
It no longer makes sense to discuss defence issues in isolation from the
foreign policy of the Union. Work done by the Governance Unit of the
European Commission in preparing the White Paper shows that the public
regard Europe's place in the world as a major justification for European
Integration. Defence issues in the future will be about the exercise of
Europe's power in the Balkans, in our 'near-abroad' and will centre in our
relationships with North America and with Russia. Any effective assembly
must therefore involve both foreign policy experts and defence experts.
Parliamentary assemblies are respected, if at all, for their expertise and
influence. It is important therefore that members should not only be
multi-hatted participants in other relevant parliamentary assemblies, but
should also involve national specialists, who may not have the tradition of
attending European level activities. The structure of an ideal Parliamentary
Assembly should therefore involve the Committees of the Chairman of Foreign
Affairs Committees and of Defence Committees. It is important to involve
trans-national political groups as a key building block, indeed members
should sit by political group rather than by national delegation. Efforts
should be made to involve spokesmen from the various political groups in the
national parliaments. For credibility a new parliamentary assembly should
have its own research institute and should deliberately cultivate links to
think-tanks. It will be respected primarily for the quality of its ideas. It
should be intimately linked to the office of the High Representative and to
his support team.
Elegance is crucial for public credibility. We should strive to have as few
parliamentary assemblies as possible. The current situation is an invitation
to be ignored by the public. It is important that the assembly should meet
regularly in one place to avoid the accusation of parliamentary tourism.
Preferably this should be Brussels, although a case could be made for
Strasbourg. A new Parliamentary assembly should rely on the organisational
infrastructure of the European Parliament. As far as possible we should
apply the 'concentric principle'. National parliamentarians and MEPs should
meet first and only subsequently turn to discussions with the rest of NATO
or with Russia or to specific issues such as the OSCE.
We are in an interim period and I welcome the establishment of the interim European Security and Defence Assembly, even though I doubt that it is a sufficient basis for further development. We need to establish a robust working relationship between MEPs and National Parliamentarians in the immediate future while the post-Nice debate about the Future of Europe is open. It may be that we will see the creation of a Second Chamber of the European Parliament composed not of states on the German model but of parliaments. However, regardless of the desirability or otherwise of this development, the areas of foreign policy and defence are an excellent test bed to work out relationships. Both sets of parliamentarians have their own direct mandate. Indeed a vigorous relationship between parliamentarians may indicate ways of controlling the European Council. We should remind the Heads of State and Government, who currently reinvent the Union at every summit, that their claim to power rests ultimately on the mandate of their national parliamentarians, from whom they form their governments.
A new parliamentary assembly should be technologically sophisticated and
deliberately inclusive. It should send its working papers and conclusions to
all MEPS and to all national MPs electronically. We should give them a sense
of ownership in the venture, invite their opinions and answer their
questions.
A new assembly should elect its own speaker by a 75% majority. It should
abandon the nonsense of the six month revolving presidency. It should have a
small and powerful Bureau that meets regularly. Above all it should be free
to debate all relevant subjects - landmines, defence and the single market,
arms exports, National Missile Defence or Echelon. Governments should
realise that there are some things which they cannot discuss for reasons of
diplomacy which parliaments can. Such debates are a key to public
credibility and would go a long way to meeting the public perception that
there was some democratic input to inter-governmental decisions of great
importance. In a world where defence is multi-national, the defence
industries are multi-national and the challenges are multi-national we can
no longer permit the heresy that these matters are only discussed inside
national governments. The decisions to make war or risk lives remain
national decisions, but that does not justify an impenetrable conspiracy of
silence in intergovernmental discussion. The role of public opinion, as
expressed by parliamentary debate, was of considerable importance during the
Kosovo war.
The Belgian Presidency of the EU is of crucial importance. You should first
of all resolve to do no harm and to avoid destroying anything which might be
useful until we have something better. You should strive to keep
parliamentary control of the process, as governments, with a few notable
exceptions, will be at best ambivalent.
These are matters of high seriousness. This debate is about winning public
consent for NATO, for the European Union and for their new and intimate
relationship. It is about re-invigorating parliamentary democracy, not just
in Europe, but as evidence that it is possible to establish an element of
democratic, parliamentary oversight in all our common institutions of global
governance.
Seminar on the parliamentary dimension of the European Security and Defence
Policy
The Hague, 14 May 2001
List of actual attendees
Attendee Status (1) Country of Origin
Aagaard, Mrs. T.F. C/O Denmark
Åberg, Mr. M C/O Sweden
About, Mr. N P France
Anderman, Mr. P C/O Sweden
Anderson, Mr. D P UK
Andersson, Mrs. M. P Sweden
Ardenne-vd. Hoeve, Mrs. A.M.A. v. P Netherlands
Arnold, Mrs. E. P Denmark
Belder, Mr. B. P European Parliament/EDD
Bellekom, Mr. L.P.T. C/O Netherlands
Blaauw, Mr. J.D. P WEU/Netherlands
Brok, Mr. E. S European Parliament
Burchard, Mr. E. C/O WEU Assembly Dept. SG
Bühler, Mr. K. S WEU Assembly President
Cameron, Mr. C. P WEU Assembly Clerk
De Decker, Mr. A. S Belgium
Dereymaeker, Mr. B. C/O Belgium
Dossier-Carzou, Mrs. C. C/O France
Dreimane, Mrs. S. P Latvia
Eekelen, Dr. W.F. van S (Chair) Netherlands
Emden, Mrs. M.E. van C/O Netherlands
Evriviades, Mr. E.L. C/O Cyprus
Eyskens, Mr. M. P Belgium
Fernandez-Fernandez, Mr. J C/O European Parliament
Gennip, Mr. J.J.A.M. P Netherlands
Gou, Mr. F. de C/O WEU Assembly
Gresch, Mr. N. C/O European Parliament
Gricius, Mr. A. P Lithuania
Gundersen, Mr. F.F. P Norway
Haller, Mr. B. P P.A. CoE, SG
Henry, Mr. J.P. P Belgium
Hilger, Mr. M. C/O Germany
Hoekema, Mr. J.Th. P Netherlands
Hommes, Mr. J. C/O Netherlands
Jopling, Lord P UK
Kelemen, Mr. A. P Hungary
Koenders, Mr. A.G. P Netherlands
Köse, Mr. T P Turkey
Kostelka, Mr. P. P Austria
Labanovskis, Mr. R. P Latvia
Labedzka, Mrs. A. P Poland
Leavy, Ms. J. C/O Ireland
Lemoine, Mr. G. P WEU/France
Lewandowski, Mr. J. P Poland
Lucion, Mr. D. C/O Belgium
Lunn, Mr. S P P.A. NATO SG
Maelen, Mr. D. v. d. P Belgium
Marsal, Mr. J. P Spain
Medalinskas, Mr. A. P Lithuania
Mussi, Mr. L. C/O Austria
Mutman, Mr. A. P Turkey
Nederlof, Mr. K. C/O Netherlands
Newton Dunn, Mr. W.F. P European Parliament
Partljic, Mr. T. P Slovenia
Pelttari, Mr. A. C/O Finland
Plancke, Mrs. B. de C/O Belgium
Ponsonby of Shulbrede, Lord P UK
Power, Mr. S. P Ireland
Puig, Mr. L.M. de P WEU/Spain
Riet, Mrs. N.G. van 't P Netherlands
Roche, Mr. D. P Ireland
Rouck, Mr. M. de C/O Belgium
Schade, Mr. H. C/O P.A. CoE
Schloten, Mr. D. P Germany
Sebej, Mr. F. P Slovakia
Seela, Mrs. U. C/O European Parliament/Greens
Spencer, Mr. T. S UK
Spencer-Oliver, Mr. R P P.A. OSCE S.G.
Speroni, Mr. F.E. P European Parliament/TDI
Squarcialupi, Mrs. V. P WEU/Italy
Swinnen, H.E. J. C/O Belgium
Szabó, Mr. K. P Rumania
Tacus, Mrs. A. C/O Italy
Theriault, Mrs. B. C/O Iceland
Timmermans, Mr. F. P Netherlands
Valk, Mr. G. P Netherlands
Van Maele, Mrs. B. C/O Belgium
Velliste, Mr. T. P Estonia
Vosskühler, Mr.K. C/O Netherlands
Wiersma, Mr. J.M. P European Parliament/PSE
Mr. M. Egan, summary reporter
Mr. H. Yardley, summary reporter
Interpreters
EBN staff
House of Representatives staff
(1) S = Speaker (seated at head of table) P = Participant (seated at
table) C/O = Company/Observer (seated on second row of seats)
Kenmerk
Blad /48
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