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Royal Netherlands Army

COMBAT OPERATIONS

ARMY DOCTRINE PUBLICATION II - PART A
FUNDAMENTALS

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COMBAT OPERATIONS AGAINST AN ENEMY FORCE CONDUCTING
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Preface

The revised doctrine of the Royal Netherlands Army is described in broad terms in the Army Doctrine Publication Part I (Military Doctrine). That publication stated that a number of subjects would be worked out in further detail in subsequent publications. Before you lies the first of these, namely the Army Doctrine Publication Part II, 'Combat Operations'.

This publication too was developed on the basis of current NATO documents. Because of the cooperation in the German-Netherlands Corps, special attention was paid to the relevant German doctrinal publications. Coordination also took place wherever necessary with the Royal Netherlands Air Force and the Netherlands Marine Corps. This approach ensures the much needed unity of opinion in a national and international context.

The doctrine for combat operations is founded on the principles of manoeuvre warfare and mission command. The application of this doctrine requires independence, creativity and flexibility at all levels, well-trained troops who can achieve the necessary tempo and decentralisation of the execution so that those in the field can respond satisfactorily to opportunities and threats.

Unity of opinion and mutual trust are essential conditions for the successful application of this doctrine. The demands described above cannot be met without any effort; an active approach is needed in the education and training of individual personnel as well as units. Commanders at all levels play a leading role in this respect.

The Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Army

M. Schouten
Lieutenant General

Examples from military history

Various examples from military history are included in this Army Doctrine Publication. Their main function is to illustrate to the reader the reality of the application of doctrine. The historical examples are in no way intended to prove the correctness of the doctrine. They merely illustrate how a particular situation in the past was affected by the application or absence of doctrine. Secondly, the historical examples are intended to stimulate the reader to look at the subject in more depth in order to gain a greater insight into the background and application of this doctrine for combat operations.

1 Introduction

Section 1 - General

0101. The doctrine publications of the Royal Netherlands Army serve as a **guide for the planning, preparation, execution and completion of military operations**, in peacetime, during an armed conflict and in times of war. Each military operation is in principle carried out by means of joint action by at least two Services. The chance of joint action by two or more Dutch Services is slim, as the Dutch armed forces virtually always operate in a multinational setting. This publication concentrates on the deployment of the land component in that context.

0102. This publication describes the **doctrine** for combat operations at the tactical level. **Combat operations** are all military operations in which:
• at least one of the warring parties does not consent to the deployment of the troops;
• the objective is achieved by means of the use of force.

These operations are thus enforcing in nature. They will normally take place on the basis of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty or Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter.

0103. A military operation is divided into three phases.

a. the preparatory phase
b. the deployment phase
c. the completion phase

The **preparatory phase** consists of getting units ready and moving them to the area of operations. In the area of operations, the units are placed under the command of the theatre commander (transfer of authority). A substantial part of the preparatory phase takes place on Dutch soil. The **completion phase** comprises all measures taken after deployment, such as repatriation, evaluation and personnel welfare.

It is not always possible to be precise about the time at which a particular phase begins or ends. At the tactical level, this point may even differ for different units taking part in the same operation. This publication focuses mainly on the deployment phase. The activities conducted in the preparatory and completion phases are covered in the Army Doctrine Publication Part IV ('National Operations').

Section 2 - Doctrine

0104. Doctrine is the **formal expression of military thought**, valid for a certain period of time. It describes the nature and characteristics of current and future military operations, the preparations for these operations in peacetime and the methods for successfully completing military operations in times of crisis and war. Doctrine is general in nature and describes fundamentals, principles and preconditions for military operations at the various operational levels.

0105. Doctrine forms the core of one of the components of **military potential**, namely the conceptual component. Military potential also comprises a mental and physical component. The mental component consists of three elements: the motivation to perform the task as well as possible, effective leadership and the responsible organisation of the deployment of all resources in terms of personnel and equipment. The physical component - the capacity of the assets or combat power - comprises personnel and equipment that can be deployed in a combat or other operation. These assets are developed, trained and drilled in peacetime and tailored to a specific (combat) operation when an operational deployment is imminent.

0106. This publication concentrates primarily on operations at the tactical level by formations (brigade, division and possibly army corps). The book also gives guidelines for operating at the lower tactical levels. This also creates a coherent picture of combat operations.

Section 3 - Combat operations

0107. Combat operations occur as **wartime operations** and **operations other than war**. All wartime operations are by definition combat operations. Some operations other than war are also combat operations, although this is usually only on a local and temporary basis. This could be the case in a peace-enforcement operation.

0108. When taking part in combat operations, troops can be confronted by two **main groups of adversaries**, each of which requires its own

doctrinal approach:
- regular forces
- irregular forces

When operating against a regular enemy, war may not have been officially declared, but it is in fact a wartime situation. This publication deals with operations against both categories in two separate volumes. Combinations will, however, occur in practice.

Section 4 - Organisation of this publication

0109. The **Army Doctrine Publication Part II (Combat operations)** is the in-depth development of the fundamentals of combat operations, which are described in Chapter 6 of the Army Doctrine Publication Part I (Military Doctrine). Part II consists of three volumes.

The first volume (A) deals with the fundamentals of combat operations in general. It includes basic principles, core tasks, a description of the functions in military operations and the characteristics of joint and multinational operations. Lastly, it covers the transition to a peace support operation: post-conflict operational planning.

The second volume (B) describes combat operations against a regular enemy, in other words regular combat operations. First it looks at the specific fundamentals for these operations, insofar as they can be added to the fundamentals in Part A and where manoeuvre warfare and the operational framework are discussed. It then deals with the various types of combat: offensive, defensive and delaying operations, followed by the transitional phases during operations. It goes on to deal with a number of special forms of operation, such as operations in extreme weather and terrain conditions (exceptional circumstances) and those of a special nature (airmobile, amphibious, etc).

The third volume (C) looks at tactical operations against irregular factions, in other words irregular combat.

Section 5 - Guide to use

0110. This publication is a **manual** for commanders and staffs at the formation level. The application, however, is always dependent on the actual situation. This publication does not offer solutions; the commander's input is the determining factor in this respect. The book also forms the basis for all tactical training courses and for all Army Field Manuals (AFMs) and other derived RNLA publications. The publication

is intended to create unity of opinion in the preparation, planning and execution of combat operations. Like 'Military Doctrine', this book is designed to stimulate the thinking of commanders and staff officers. Ultimately, the aim is to apply this doctrine sensibly in a particular situation.

0111. Land forces (including special, airmobile and airborne units) virtually never operate without the assistance of **other Services**. Each formation commander integrates and coordinates these contributions. Army corps or higher staffs usually make detailed plans for joint operations. When planning their operations, corps, divisions and brigades tailor the joint aspects, such as offensive air support and airspace control, to each other. In this publication, the integration between the operations by the various Services, in particular the land and air operations, is implicit. References to air operations are thus intended to emphasise this connection.

0112. A division usually operates in a larger **multinational context**. The division has a high degree of self-sufficiency and can operate to a great extent without support from the corps level. Brigades can, if necessary, also be deployed directly under the corps level, even as part of another multinational force. In such cases, the brigade is normally reinforced.

0113. This publication is derived not only from the Army Doctrine Publication Part I but also from the *Allied Tactical Publication 35(B)*, '*Land Force Tactical Doctrine*'. This ensures interoperability for multinational operations. This publication is also derived from the German *Heeres Dienstvorschrift 100/100, 'Truppenführung' (1998)*, in so far as it does not deviate from the *Allied Tactical Publication 35(B)*. This of course facilitates operations with German troops.

0114. The Army Doctrine Publication Part I shows the six **functions** in military operations as a conceptual aid for commanders and staff in planning and execution. The description of combat operations for the tactical level, however, requires a recognisable approach. It is, therefore, not always possible to abide by the original intention, as the land forces are not organised according to these conceptual functions. This means that in describing the functions, the following deviations from the original conceptual approach occur:

a. The function 'manoeuvre' is described in the main part of each form of operation in the sections 'planning' and 'execution'. This is because the operation is guided by planning and execution.
b. The function 'fire power' is described as 'fire support', as the added value of the fire power element is expressed in the manoeuvre.
c. The function 'protection' comprises (besides general protection measures) engineer support, air defence and airspace control.

The other three functions (command and control, intelligence and military information and service support) will be dealt with according to their conceptual meaning.

2 Use of force

0201. The **use of force**, the development of force-related activities and the threat of force form the time-honoured military core of an armed conflict. It is a test of strength, often coupled with the loss of lives, human suffering and major collateral damage. The violent, life-threatening environment of the battlefield will always place heavy physical and psychological demands on military personnel. They will continue to face extreme danger in situations which change quickly and in which chaos and uncertainty play a part. A soldier's physical strength and moral courage, his professional know-how and skills, as well as the quality of his equipment, will be put to the test. International rules have been drawn up in order to keep the use of force and its consequences to a minimum.

Grebbeberg military cemetery.
Photograph: Netherlands War Graves Association

0202. The **framework for military operations** is formed by:
• the Humanitarian Law of War
• political and military guidelines
• national law
This is all expressed in the Rules of Engagement.

0203. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the international law in force at the time placed few, if any, restrictions on the powers of states to settle their differences by means of a war. The enormous toll taken by the First World War led to changes in this respect and brought about the founding of the League of Nations, in which the member states agreed to place restrictions on the way wars were conducted. In the Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), the same states agreed that they would no longer use war as a political instrument. The Second World War appeared to be at odds with this development, but ultimately proved to be a powerful impetus to pursue it with more emphasis, with the result that the United Nations Charter banned the use of force. This charter also forbids states to threaten to use force and instructs them to seek peaceful solutions to international differences. Under current international law, only an extremely limited degree of military force is considered acceptable. This applies primarily in the following cases:

- if the UN Security Council has consented to it (to restore international peace and security);
- for the purpose of individual or collective self-defence (as stated in Article 51 of the UN Charter); Article 5 of the NATO Treaty is derived from this.

In these cases, there is no question of a violation of the UN's ban on the use of force.

Special situations may also occur in which military force could signify a violation of the ban on the use of force, but where this violation could, under certain, extremely closely defined circumstances and conditions, be regarded as justified. This could, for example, be the case if one country orders military intervention in another for no other purpose than the evacuation of its own threatened citizens or for the purposes of humanitarian intervention.

0204. The **Humanitarian Law of War** is the basis for the law that regulates hostilities if an armed conflict has broken out. It imposes restrictions and obligations on individual members and commanders of military units at all levels. Most of the Humanitarian Law of War is contained in agreements, conventions and international treaties, of which the most important are the Hague Land War Conventions of 1907, the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the related Additional Protocols I and II. Many of the rules and stipulations in these treaties are derived from the international unwritten law that has been developed in practice over the course of time.

The Humanitarian Law of War contains two fundamental principles for the use of force: military necessity and proportionality. Necessity means that force may only be used if it is essential in order to achieve the military objective. Proportionality means that force and destruction must be kept to the minimum needed to achieve that objective. A logical extension is that additional damage be limited as much as possible.

The actual combat may only be conducted by combatants. Combat actions may only be directed at combatants and military targets. Military targets are those objects which, because of their nature, location, designation or use, contribute actively to the military operation and of which the complete or partial destruction, capture or rendering inoperative in the prevailing circumstances would produce a clear military advantage.

0205. The **Rules of Engagement** (ROE) provide guidelines for commanders regarding the nature of and the methods for the use of force within the political framework. They are designed to ensure that politi-cal authorities can control the use of force within the political and legal framework. The Rules of Engagement inform military personnel about the restrictions and freedom in performing their tasks; they are not a means of assigning specific tasks. They apply to both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. When developing their plan, commanders make proposals for adapting the Rules of Engagement.

0206. **Self-defence**. The Rules of Engagement do not restrict the explicit authority and right of a soldier to use every available, necessary means and take all appropriate measures to ensure the self-defence of his unit or of allied troops in the immediate vicinity. This applies in the case of self-defence against a hostile act or a proven hostile intent. The principles of necessity and proportionality apply in all cases when considering appropriate measures.

0207. A **hostile act** is the use of force by troops, a warring faction or terrorist unit (organisation or individual) against own or allied troops, fellow countrymen or possessions. This does not always have to be direct force: for example, hindering the deployment of troops to evacuate civilians or vital possessions is also regarded as a hostile act. If confronted with a hostile act, one has the right to apply force proportionally for the purposes of self-defence. All necessary means can be used to deter or neutralise the attacker.

0208. A **hostile intent** is the threat of force by troops, a warring faction or terrorist unit (organisation or individual) against own or allied

troops, fellow countrymen or possessions and, under a specific mandate, also against those of non-allied countries. If a hostile intent is identified, one has the right to use force proportionally for the purposes of self-defence. All necessary means can be used to deter or neutralise the potential attacker.

0209. **Obstacles and demolitions**. Laying obstacles and carrying out demolitions must take place in consultation with the local civil and any military authorities of the host country and are subject to legislation based on the 1948 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, as well as any treaties with the host nation where the operation is being conducted.

0210. A civil or military warring party is designated as a **warring faction** if it meets the following criteria:
• it consists of an organised, armed force or paramilitary (irregular) groups
• it functions under a command that bears responsibility
• it takes part in hostilities

0211. **Terrorist attacks** are directed against a state, and are intended to:
• cause fear among certain individuals, groups of people or the general public
• realise certain political objectives
• realise certain financial objectives

Such attacks by combatants as well as non-combatants are always prohibited. Attacks by combatants on other combatants or military targets, provided they act in accordance with the rules of the humanitarian law of war, do not fall into the category of 'terrorist attacks' and are, therefore, permitted.

3 Principles of combat operations

0301. **Success in a military operation** stems largely from the correct interpretation and application of the principles of military actions. These principles are rules of a fundamental nature, formed by years of military experience in the use of the physical component of military potential. Although these principles form the basis for each military operation, they are not in themselves a direct instrument for use by commanders and staffs. The principles can, however, be used by commanders and staffs to derive a practical application of the concepts and ideas incorporated in them. In this respect, they help in the responsible organisation of the deployment of assets, part of the mental component of military potential.

0302. The principles of combat operations are rules of a **fundamental nature** for the use of military means in combat operations at all levels. A distinction is made between:
- principles that apply exclusively to combat operations
- principles that apply exclusively to peace operations
- principles that apply to both

principles specific to peace operations

principles specific to combat operations

freedom of movement
transparency
minimum use of force
impartiality
mutual respect
perseverance

security
concentration
objective
economy of effort
unity of effort
simplicity
flexibility
credibility
initiative
legitimacy

mobility
offensive actions
surprise

0303. The principles must always be considered **in relation to each other**. Complying fully with one principle may make it impossible to take another into consideration. The application of these principles needs to go hand in hand with an evaluation of their importance for the specific situation. In this evaluation, the commander must take account of the intent of the higher commander, the orders received and his own objective, the anticipated actions of the enemy and the factors of time and space.

0304. **Security** is an essential precondition for retaining own assets and freedom of action. It is a condition for concentrating the force and for taking risks outside this point of main effort. A certain degree of security is gained by withholding information from the enemy and by the physical protection of one's own unit. Security includes taking active measures to prevent surprise by the enemy or other parties, such as the physical protection of units and objects, ensuring a favourable situation in the air, protecting the flanks or keeping sufficient reserves ready. Security also incorporates passive measures to prevent information about own means and plans falling into the wrong hands, or at least make it more difficult.

0305. If a decision is sought, a point of main effort has to be established at the right time and in the right place by means of **concentration**. This is necessary in order to gain enough dominance to achieve the objective successfully. The capacity to concentrate the effort depends on an effective command and control system and a force that can move quickly. Concentration means that one has to accept relative weakness elsewhere. Commanders have to take calculated risks. A precondition is a style of leadership which allows risks to be taken: mission command.

0306. Any military operation must be **focused on its objective**, which is unambiguous, clearly defined and attainable. If a force lacks unity of objective or loses sight of what has to be achieved, this might result in the failure of the military operation. At higher levels, the objective can be expressed in a guideline or directive describing the desired end state. At the tactical level, subordinate commanders derive their objective from the intent of the higher commander and from the orders issued to them. These aspects occupy centre stage in the estimate of the situation, which ultimately results in orders for the lower level. This leads to targeted handling at all levels involved in an operation. Taking account of this principle becomes difficult if the objective is changed in the course of the operation. Obviously, the new objective has to be made known as quickly as possible to all those involved: higher commander, adjacent units and subordinate commanders.

0307. **Economy of effort** means that the commander at all times deploys his assets according to type and quantity in relation to the set objective. Effectiveness is the main priority! Partly because of the required formation of a main point of effort, a commander has to deploy a responsible minimum of assets outside it. The commander's challenge is to establish the right time and place to achieve success. Only then can he decide where he can afford to be weak. In this way he is expected to take well-considered risks.

0308. All the assets and effort applied in the pursuit of a single objective have to be synchronised in a **unity of effort.** This enables the commander to deploy all available military capacity (combat power) to achieve his objective efficiently, while at the same time reducing his vulnerability to the enemy. A cohesive conduct also influences the morale and credibility of own troops and thus the enemy's will to continue the conflict. Modern military operations place heavy demands on the combination of the elementary functions (discussed in Chapter 5), particularly because a growing number and variety of means from various units, both national and international, work towards the same objective. Unity of effort can be achieved by, for example, unity of command and the effective synchronisation of own and supporting means. Common doctrines also help in this respect. If the means are not under command, the authority and the deployment must be coordinated. Unity of effort requires training, team spirit, a positive attitude, a common purpose, a clear delineation of responsibilities, standardised procedures and an understanding of each other's capabilities and limitations.

0309. Because of the rapid succession of events and the complexity of modern military operations, chaos, stress and friction are inevitable. These are thus typical circumstances for military operations. Composite and difficult plans and orders increase the likelihood of confusion. **Simplicity** and clear plans and orders, on the other hand, increase the chance of success. In the execution of the plans, too, the commander must pay particular attention to simplicity.

0310. Although the objective that has to be achieved does not change in principle, a commander is expected to be able to adapt his plans if necessary. It may be necessary to adjust a plan to tailor the deployment to a changed situation in order to respond to unexpected chances or threats. Preconditions for **flexibility** are the right mental attitude and an organisation that can respond quickly to changing demands. Warfare is often a test of strength of the relative flexibility of the two forces. A commander can use his own mental flexibility and the acumen and flexibility of his troops to utilise the chaos of combat to his own advan-

tage. A less capable opponent will then be overpowered by the pace at which various events take place.

0311. Combat operations require the deployment of credible forces at all levels. **Credibility** plays a key psychological role in the success of an operation. At the tactical level, credibility stems mainly from five elements: a feasible operation plan, the appropriate assets, proficiency, high morale and dedicated execution. The last element requires a consistent, disciplined, accurate and effective execution of tasks.

0312. Commanders should at all times strive to achieve or maintain freedom of action by taking the **initiative**. The objective is to be the first to act instead of merely responding to the actions of the enemy. Only by acting faster than the enemy can the latter's persistence in striving to achieve his goals be broken. However, this does not mean that patience is not required in some cases. Here, too, a style of leadership that allows for taking initiative and thus risks is a precondition for success.

0313. **Legitimacy** has a legal and a social component. When conducting military operations, account must be taken of the rules of national and international law, in terms of both the 'letter' and the 'spirit'. This law provides a framework for military operations as such, and provides rules for their execution. Dutch soldiers act in accordance with national law, even if they are operating under the responsibility or command of an international organisation or otherwise within an allied framework. The Humanitarian Law of War is of paramount importance in combat operations. Other, often completely different legal rules also apply. A legitimate operation adds to the credibility of the force and help to maintain public support among the local population in the theatre of war and at home.

0314. Social legitimacy refers to the support for the conduct of the military operation from a country's own population and from its political leaders: the majority of the population and its representatives consider the actions to be correct and just. Social legitimacy is a precondition for sustaining and completing military operations. This aspect is even more relevant if a military operation is conducted while the home front is living in a state of peace. Public support from the local population in the theatre of operations is also extremely important. This gives commanders more freedom of action and movement. It helps the commander to focus his attention on the objective of the operation.

0315. **Mobility** is necessary to surprise the enemy at an unexpected location. As a result, the enemy is put into a less favourable situation in

respect of friendly troops. This is a precondition for going on to exploit the success achieved. A flexible organisation, guaranteed communications and flexible plans are essential in this respect. The degree to which mobility comes into its own depends not only on the terrain, enemy actions and the technical mobility of friendly units and equipment, but especially on the mental and physical mobility of commanders and staffs at all levels.

0316. **Offensive operations** are the most important means available to a commander to enable him to act effectively and decisively to achieve his objective. As well as physical offensive actions, offensive operations also require the right attitude for constantly gaining and holding the initiative. By choosing where to fight the battle, the commander can ensure that the enemy deploys at least part of his combat power in the wrong place. In defensive operations, too, the commander must use every opportunity to attack the enemy. This can be done without manoeuvre, by deploying fire power locally.

0317. **Surprise** means that the enemy is attacked before he finds out where, when or how the attack is to occur. The commander may also deploy means for which the enemy is not prepared. Surprise actions can produce a decision in our favour, even if we have less combat power. The commander must keep trying to unbalance the enemy by thinking and acting fast and by means of secrecy and deception, as well as by varying the methods of operation and by deploying unexpected assets.

4 Core tasks in combat

0401. An understanding of the core tasks in combat is essential for conducting combat operations. These core tasks are: **finding** the enemy, **fixing** the enemy and **striking** the enemy. These help the commander to translate his orders into concrete, practical and feasible orders for his subordinate commanders. Commanders at every level can use this method in the planning and execution of combat operations, although it comes into its own most effectively at brigade level and higher. This is because of the wider variety and performance of the equipment available at higher levels.

0402. Striking the enemy is the decisive core task. Finding and fixing create the necessary conditions. Simultaneous execution of these core tasks on various fronts are, together with tempo and surprise, methods of using manoeuvre and fire power to break the enemy's cohesion. This way, the commander ensures that the various activities supplement and reinforce each other and that he concentrates all the military potential against the enemy's most vulnerable spot.

0403. **Finding** the enemy is a continual process which forms the basis for fixing and striking. The aims of this core task are to determine quickly where the enemy is located, establish his capabilities and ascertain his intentions. The task includes gathering and processing information with all available information collection units from all available sources. Information collection units at the commander's disposal include:
- ground-based reconnaissance units
- electronic warfare units
- target acquisition units
- air reconnaissance units

If the commander does not have enough of these units at his disposal, the higher level and adjacent units will have to support him. The enemy, however, will also regard 'finding' as one of his core tasks; for this reason, measures have to be taken to prevent the enemy from gathering information about friendly troops.

*Ground-based reconnais-
sance: an indispensable ele-
ment for operating success-
fully.
Photograph: Media Centre
RNLA*

*Electronic warfare: an
invisible key player.
Photograph: Defence
Organisation for
Recruitment and Selection,
Ministry of Defence*

*Summary of the core task
'finding'*

Objective	Method	Remarks
To determine quickly where the enemy is located, establish his capabilities and ascertain his intentions.	Gathering and processing information with all available information collection units from all available sources.	Finding is necessary for fixing and striking; if there are insufficient information collection units, the higher and/or adjacent level must be involved. The intelligence preparation of the operation is geared towards this. Finding may also be the result of battles to fix or strike the enemy.

0404. The aim of **fixing the enemy** is to deny him freedom of action. The commander thus creates freedom of action for himself and room to manoeuvre, so that he can strike the enemy at a time and place of his choosing.

Target acquisition with the aid of mortar-locating radar.
Photograph: Media Centre RNLA

A UAV is launched for air reconnaissance.
Photograph: Media Centre RNLA

Summary of the core task 'fixing'

Objective	Method	Remarks
To deny the enemy freedom of action.	Prevent the enemy from achieving his objectives by: • surprise • deception • enticement	The enemy is forced to split or spread his combat power to cover all eventualities.
To create freedom of action for own units in order to strike the enemy in a way and place that best suits the commander.	Gain the initiative and force the enemy into a position in which he can only react. Deny the enemy information and impede his command and control by controlling the use of the electromagnetic spectrum.	The crucial importance of timing is such that it is sometimes necessary to fix and strike at the same time. Fixing loses its importance as soon as the enemy has lost the initiative.

Summary of the core task 'striking'

Objective	Method	Remarks
To manoeuvre into a position from which all combat power can be concentrated on the vulnerable points and from which enemy units, objects and installations can be attacked.	Manoeuvre when the enemy is fixed.	This is the decisive core task.
	Use sparsely occupied or unoccupied areas in the enemy defence.	These areas may be physical (e.g. a sector boundary) or structural (e.g. a weak link in a system).
To break enemy cohesion.	Attack the enemy by targeted use of force in order to achieve the assignment objective.	Striking the enemy is a joint and combined action, which needs good coordination to successfully concentrate sufficient fire power on the desired point.
	Use movement, deception, special forces and electronic warfare in conjunction with the deployment of fire support means.	Breaking the enemy cohesion and destroying specific elements. If striking the enemy becomes a prolonged effort, the operation must be planned in such a way that the cumulative effect is optimal. In that case, every possibility must be used to manoeuvre and to strike from another direction.

0405. The main ways of fixing the enemy are to **surprise, deceive** and thus ultimately entice him into a response that is to our own advantage. To do so, the commander constantly takes the initiative and tries to maintain it. This forces the enemy commander into a position in which he constantly has to react to friendly actions, so that he has no opportunity to achieve his own objectives.
- If the enemy is surprised, he is faced with an unexpected situation to which he may not be able to respond in time.
- If the enemy is deceived, he thinks he knows how to react, but that response is wrong.
- If the enemy is enticed, our own actions or information force him to make a response which later proves to be to his disadvantage.

0406. The aim of **striking the enemy** is to carefully manoeuvre friendly troops into a position from which they can use fire power to neutralise or, if necessary, even destroy selected elements of the enemy force. In some cases, the threat alone may be enough to achieve the objective. In this context, manoeuvre means more than simply crossing terrain using fire and movement. It is the entire process in which friendly combat power is concentrated at the point at which it has a decisive effect. This means that a choice has to be made between:
- speed of operating against time for preparation
- width versus depth
- concentration of means versus dispersion

In any event, the commander takes a certain amount of risk; no single option can fully guarantee success.

OPERATION SILVER BAYONET IN THE IA DRANG VALLEY, 1965

In the spring of 1965, South Vietnam collapsed into chaos. Constant changes of government in Saigon and defeats of the South Vietnamese army led to a situation in which half of the country had fallen into the hands of the Vietcong. The American government decided for the first time to intervene in the war with regular ground units, since it was afraid that the Vietcong, supported by the North Vietnamese army, would claim a decisive military victory. March 1965 saw the start of Operation *Rolling Thunder*, the almost daily bombardment of North Vietnam which was to last for years. The first marines landed on 8 March. During the months that followed, the build-up of the American army proceeded extremely quickly. In July, the American commander in South Vietnam, General Westmoreland, received the go-ahead from President Lyndon Johnson for an all-out deployment of troops. There were almost 200,000 present that year.

While the Vietcong was attacking American bases continually during the summer of 1965, North Vietnam was preparing a major offensive that was to take place in the central mountainous region in the dry season of 1965-1966. Possession of this area would enable the North Vietnamese army to split South Vietnam in two and pose a direct threat to the most important areas, the coast and Saigon. It would also be the first operation by regular North Vietnamese units of division size in South Vietnam.

…deployment of many small units on the ground…
Photograph: Dutch Press Agency (ANP)

Westmoreland, for his part, also recognised the strategic importance of the central highlands. At his insistence, the showpiece of the American army, 1 Cavalry division (airmobile) was stationed in this very region under the command of Lieutenant General Kinnard. This division arrived between July and September 1965. Its equipment included 400 transport Chinook and Iroquois transport helicopters, which could set down units, vehicles and artillery quickly in difficult terrain. In 1 Cavalry division, Westmoreland saw the ideal means for his 'search-and-destroy' concept, the aim of which was to find and fix sizeable Vietcong or North Vietnamese units by fast and surprise actions by ordinary or airmobile infantry. Superior fire power delivered by the artillery and especially by the air force would then destroy the enemy. Westmoreland expected that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese army would eventually be forced to stop fighting because of heavy losses of personnel.

The fighting in the central highlands and particularly in the valley of the Ia Drang river began on 18 October 1965 with a raid by a North Vietnamese regiment on the Plei Me base, where a South Vietnamese unit and several American advisors of the Special Forces were located. This base, 50 km south of the provincial capital Pleiku, was to prevent infiltration from Cambodia and protect route 19, an important east-west connection. A South Vietnamese relief force on the way to Plei Me ran into a North Vietnamese ambush. Bombardments by the American air force helped to repel this attack. On 25 October, the North Vietnamese gave up their siege of Plei Me.

On 27 October, after the siege of Plei Me, 1 Cavalry division received orders from Westmoreland to seek out and destroy the retreating North Vietnamese

units. Westmoreland hoped that this modern unit would bring about a turning point in the war in terms of the offensive. This was to be the test for his 'search-and-destroy' concept. For 1 Cavalry division, this operation was their baptism of fire.

The enemy could have been anywhere in a jungle area of 2500 km^2 . There were hardly any through roads. The going was made even more difficult by inaccessible river valleys and mountains. Helicopters from the helicopter reconnaissance battalion scouted the terrain from 28 October to 14 November. The Americans talked about 'saturation patrolling': air reconnaissance and ground deployment of many small units in a large area. It was expected that the main enemy force could be located in this way. Once they were certain of the location of the main force, the Americans would set up a large landing zone (LZ). However, the North Vietnamese retreated in dispersed formation and avoided the American patrols as much as possible. On occasions, they took the initiative and raided American jungle camps. In the ensuing battles, fought at extremely close range, American fire power could not be used. Fate, however, lent a helping hand. A helicopter patrol spotted an enemy hospital and maps were seized there. With the help of these maps, the Americans were finally able to lure a North Vietnamese unit into an ambush on 2 November.

In the meantime, North Vietnamese regiments were assembling in attack positions for the offensive through the central highlands: 32 Infantry regiment to the north of the Ia Drang near the Cambodian border and 33 and 66 Infantry regiment between the Ia Drang river and the eastern boundary of the massif. The build-up of troops did not escape Kinnard's notice. He was able to reach this conclusion on the basis of intelligence gathered by his patrols and the maps they had seized; it was even more likely in the light of the fact that the inhospitable Chu Pong massif had for decades been used for infiltration. The area was also criss-crossed by numerous branches of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. So Kinnard decided to set up a large LZ in the area. However, the actual scale of the North Vietnamese troop build-up, three full regiments, had escaped the Americans' notice. On 14 November, Kinnard had LZ X-Ray (100 x 200 metres) set up at the edge of the massif. The plan was to make this area a base of operations for a brigade. However, only ten helicopters could land at any one time. Kinnard later contended that, in line with the 'search-and-destroy' concept, he wanted to use this to draw the enemy to engage in battle. The execution, however, proved to be a good deal more complicated than the theory. Various American units ran into ambushes in the first few days. In all kinds of minor confrontations, the North Vietnamese constantly held the initiative. They surrounded the landing zone, where four entrenched American companies, under the commander of Lt Col Moore, held out with difficulty. The battle around the landing zone lasted from 14 to 16 November. During this period, the Americans kept up constant artillery shelling and air strikes on the North Vietnamese, with helicopters as their only means of logistic support. Several companies were flown in as reinforcements while the fighting was still taking place. After three days, the North Vietnamese retreated into the jungle. The Americans left the landing zone shortly afterwards. The badly hit brigade was pulled back to the division headquarters in An Khe. During the withdrawal from LZ X-Ray to the nearby LZ Albany, an American battalion again ran into a battalion-size North Vietnamese ambush. This brought the number of American dead and wounded to more than 470. The Americans estimated the number of North Vietnamese casualties to be over 1800.

Over the last few days, between 20 and 24 November, the operation consisted of the deployment of an American and South Vietnamese brigade near the Cambodian border to track down retreating units of the North Vietnamese army. Although they did indeed find and attack small groups, American army leaders had no choice but to conclude that the main North Vietnamese force had managed to reach the safety of neutral Cambodia.

The advocates of the 'search-and-destroy' concept regarded the operation by 1 Cavalry division as a success. It had, after all, managed to eliminate several thousand enemy troops and thus prevented an enemy offensive in the central highlands. The tide of the ground war had thus turned to the advantage of the Americans and the South Vietnamese. They felt that the battle in the Ia Drang Valley had been decisive in this respect. Westmoreland felt that two things had been proved: firstly, that an aggressive 'search-and-destroy' was the only way to victory and, secondly, that the concept of airmobile operations worked in practice. This was the only way that could guarantee that the enemy could not only be found, but also destroyed in a very short space of time. On the basis of this experience, the Americans decided to proceed with the 'search-and-destroy' method.

The reality was, however, somewhat more complicated than this optimistic conclusion. During the confrontations, the initiative was for the most part in the hands of the North Vietnamese. They were barely susceptible to surprise or deception and after a while managed, if things went wrong, to avoid American fire power. They also managed to escape in the end to Cambodia with most of their units. They did, however, suffer heavy losses at the Ia Drang. After the offensive in the Ia Drang Valley, the North Vietnamese decided to abandon major conventional offensives for the time being and concentrate temporarily on guerrilla warfare. The Americans were to discover that the 'search-and-destroy' approach was not effective. After all, the 'search-and-destroy' (find and strike) concept had an inherent weakness, as the core task 'fixing' did not feature. The objective of this method could, therefore, be only partially achieved.

Source: G.C. Herring '*The 1st Cavalry and the Ia Drang Valley, 18 October - 24 November 1965*' in: C.E. Heller and W.A. Stofft '*America's First Battles 1776-1965*', Lawrence, 1986.

5 Functions in military operations

Section 1 - Introduction

0501. This chapter will look at the six functions in military operations as referred to in paragraph 0114. There are also a number of military activities which cannot be brought under a single heading of any of these functions. This is because the composite aspects of these activities occur in more than one function, while a coherent description is nonetheless necessary. These are command and control warfare, deception, civil-military cooperation, psychological operations and road movements in the combat zone. These activities are, therefore, described in annexes to this chapter.

Section 2 - Command and control

0502. **Command and control** is the process of leading and steering a military organisation in order to achieve its objective. The command of a unit is the authority and responsibility, assigned by a higher commander to a single individual, for leading the troops assigned to him, for making decisions about deployment and for exercising command during the execution of an operation. Along with this authority, the commander is given directions regarding the deployment, often reflected in an assignment or a goal to be reached. Command and control plays the connecting role with the other functions. The elements of command and control are:

a. leadership
b. decision making
c. command

Command and control warfare, in which the enemy's command and control capacity is attacked while one's own is safeguarded, is described in Annex A to this chapter.

0503. The implementation of the doctrine described in this publication is based on the guiding principle of **mission command**. Mission com-

Command and control: signals vehicle with an antenna mast for high mobility.
Photograph: Defence Organisation for Recruitment and Selection, Ministry of Defence

mand is in turn based on such aspects as the decentralisation of authority for the execution of all military operations. Mission command during operational deployment only comes into its own if it has already been made a matter of routine before deployment, for example during education and training. Past experience has shown that, because of the chaos and friction that can be expected during military operations, decisions are best taken at the level directly involved in the execution. Mission command engenders a sense of involvement for subordinates, promotes unity of opinion between a commander and his subordinate commanders and ensures that the units operate at maximum speed. Another advantage is that only essential information has to be passed down the chain of command and back. Mission command also ensures

that local commanders take decisions based on the most recent and up-to-date information. In this respect, they are expected to accept their responsibility at all times and to deviate from the original orders on their own initiative if the situation requires it, while staying in line with the higher commander's intent. They notify the latter as soon as possible with regard to their initiative. Conditions for mission command are previously established team spirit, unity of opinion, cohesion and mutual trust. The general rule is that the more changeable the circumstances, the lower the level of decision making should be.

0504. Decentralisation does not affect the indivisibility of **responsibility**. The delegation of authority does not relieve the commander of his ultimate responsibility: he remains responsible for his own actions as well as for those of his subordinates. This means that he must monitor the execution of the orders from a distance and, if there is no alternative, must intervene if the objective of the operation is at risk. There are also conceivable situations in which the **intrinsic freedom of action** of mission command is restricted. If, for example, great political importance is attached to the actions of a subordinate unit, a commander may exercise more directive command and control. Although the commander must in principle adhere to mission command, he who bears the responsibility is after all free to determine which method of command he thinks is appropriate.

Elements of command and control

0505. **Leadership** is the process of consciously influencing the behaviour of others and applying oneself fully in order to achieve the set objective together. Leadership is the projection of the personality and character of an individual, usually the commander, to motivate soldiers to do what is expected of them. The possession of leadership skills is one of the most important qualities a commander must have in order to exercise command; for a unit, it is a precondition for success. There is no recipe for leadership, nor can it be learned from a book. Each commander will motivate his personnel in a different way.

The location of the commander is extremely important for effective leadership. He positions himself at a point from which he can influence the battle decisively. As far as operational circumstances allow, he must see and be seen.

0506. **Decision making and command** cannot be separated from each other. Both form part of a cyclical process which is constantly undergone at all levels.

0507. **Decision making** is an essential element of command and control. In a decision-making process, one determines which method of operating offers the best chance of success. The higher commander's intent plays a key role in the decision-making process. This process comprises the following sub-processes:

- analysing the assignment
- evaluating the influential factors
- weighing up own capabilities
- taking a decision
- drawing up a plan

Alternative or additional possibilities can be worked out in contingency plans. These will allow a unit to respond quickly to opportunities or setbacks. The decision-making process also has a cyclical character.

0508. The **staff** can support the commander in the decision-making process. In order to steer them, the commander issues initial guidelines, which may be supplemented at a later stage. The commander determines to what extent the various sub-processes should be carried out and by whom. Factors such as the time available, the complexity of the operation, the level of experience of the commander and staff and the degree of uncertainty play an important role in this respect. Ultimately, the commander takes decisions on the method of operating. He also develops the **concept of operations**, containing his intent, the overall course of the operation and the point of main effort. It is the commander who links units and tasks or, in other words, gives orders to his subordinate commanders. In this way, he makes the link between decision making and command.

0509. **Command** is the process by which the commander, assisted by his staff, organises, directs and coordinates the activities of his assigned troops as well as any supporting troops. Particularly important is the synchronisation of the various activities that take place within the operations of the unit. Command refers, therefore, to the execution of the mission. It starts with an operation plan or order which incorporates assignments and objectives for subordinate commanders. Command consists of:

- formulating orders
- notifying all interested parties of the decision
- supervising the implementation
- checking and evaluating the achieved result
- if necessary, adjusting the implementation by means of an oral or written fragmentary order

0510. At battalion level and lower, the commander himself will perform the various functions of planning, decision making, directing and monitoring the troops. He is supported in this by a small staff, which gathers information and acts as a sounding board. At formation level, a larger staff is needed to provide support in the decision-making and command process, so that the commander can concentrate on main issues and be where he is needed to exert a decisive influence on the combat.

0511. Important instruments for command are plans and orders. A commander issues these both before and during an operation. The process of producing and distributing written orders is extremely intensive and time-consuming, both for the commander and his staff. In order to bring about as high a tempo as possible in an operation, there is a preference for **orders** to be given orally, certainly at battalion level and lower. The use of computerised battle command systems substantially improves speed and clarity. **Assignments** should be short, concise and unambiguous and must not impose any unnecessary restrictions on the subordinate commanders.

0512. In order to use the available time as efficiently as possible, the commander issues a **warning order** to his subordinate commanders as soon as he can. In this way, the subordinate commanders are supplied with essential information at an early stage, so that they are aware of the forthcoming action and can start or adapt their decision-making process. Ideally, a commander issues a warning order as soon as he has analysed his assignment. Following the decision, an **operation plan** or **operation order** will normally be given. Any adjustments during the operation are often made by means of **fragmentary orders.**

0513. Further important command instruments available to the commander are **standard operating procedures**. These are specific instructions for a particular unit relating to aspects of the operation which lend themselves to standardised procedures, without the loss of effectiveness. The aim of standard operating procedures is also to ensure continuity and to improve coordination between units. By referring to standard operating procedures both during the preparation and the execution of an operation, the commander and his staff can keep the plans and orders brief and increase the operational tempo.

Principles of command and control

0514. The **decentralisation** described in paragraph 0503 in respect of mission command must ensure that a high pace of command and con-

trol can be brought about at all levels. This is essential in order to penetrate the decision-making cycle of the enemy. It will help to break the enemy's unity of effort and cohesion of operations.

0515. Because of the decentralised nature of mission command, there is a danger that the **unity of command** and with it the unity of effort will be lost. The skill lies in decentralising authority without losing unity of effort. There are various techniques for ensuring unity of command. A precondition is a command and control system based on single leadership and clear chains of command, command relationships and support relationships. The tasks, powers and responsibilities of commanders at various levels must be clearly defined. This not only applies to command relationships but also to support relationships.

0516. Ensuring that the decision-making process incorporates the intent of the **next higher** commander and also that of the commander **two levels** higher helps to achieve consistency in the objective of an operation. Understanding the context of the operation is essential for each commander if he is to stick to his goals in unforeseen circumstances. Consideration of the intents of the higher commanders is an essential step in the decision-making process; it is a permanent element in the analysis of the assignment.

0517. In order to exercise mission command effectively, the commander must inspire trust in his subordinates and must himself have confidence in them. **Mutual trust** means that personnel have confidence in the leaders of the operation, at all levels in the chain of command, and that the commander trusts his personnel to carry out the assignment in accordance with his wishes.

0518. **Mutual respect** depends primarily on the competence of the commanders. It goes further and is created by getting to know each other. Every opportunity to do so should be seized in order to create the required team spirit. Only then can a unit survive combat.

0519. Mission command requires **timely and effective decision making** at all levels. The art is to correctly assess the circumstances and the points at which a new decision is required. The commander must also ask himself whether not he but one of his subordinate commanders should take a decision. A precondition for timely decision making is **continuous command and control**. The commander, if necessary assisted by his staff, must at all times be able to command the units assigned to him. Continuous command and control means that the command and control support system, comprising personnel, equipment and pro-

cedures, can function round the clock. This system must also be able to support command and control under any circumstances and is thus subject to heavy demands in terms of mobility and protection. Maintaining good communications is an essential requirement for command and control during the operation. Communication systems can be disrupted by enemy fire, electronic countermeasures and the effects of electromagnetic pulses

THE BATTLE OF GOOSE GREEN IN 1982

Passing judgement about command and control is a sensitive business. On the one hand, there is much at stake: the commander 'proves' his actual worth with his orders. On the other hand, the marks are usually given by outsiders, particularly the armchair strategists who, in the privacy and comfort of their own study, have had ample opportunity to take another careful look at the combat actions. This is how the Falklands War (1982) produced various controversies regarding command and control. The capture of the village of Goose Green by the 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, on 28 and 29 May 1982 was the most prominent. This issue is particularly sensitive because the battalion commander, Lt Col H. Jones (known to his subordinates simply as 'H') was killed during the assault on an Argentinian trench. Jones was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross for this action.

In 1995, the military historian Spencer Fitz-Gibbon, himself an officer in The Parachute Regiment, set the cat among the pigeons. Based mainly on Jones' actions, he unravelled the principles of the British command in a highly critical manner. Fitz-Gibbon concluded that the existing literature about the capture of Goose Green was full of inaccuracies and myths and that the British army had learned the wrong lessons from the battles. The assault by the Paras on Goose Green was not a heroic and well-considered action 'against all odds' against a well-entrenched enemy that was superior in numbers. Neither had the assault confirmed the superiority of a gradual attrition of the enemy with close attacks ('close with and destroy the enemy'), as the British doctrine publications claimed. The dispersed Argentinians, at most 1100 in all, had only put up sporadic resistance. Most of them surrendered immediately or after a brief skirmish.

Nevertheless, the British attack on Goose Green was touch and go. Fitz-Gibbon's remark that the impulsive Jones had lost his life needlessly by recklessly storming an Argentinian trench on his own ruffled many a British feather. But Fitz-Gibbons went further. He stated that Jones' death had benefited the command and control in the 2nd Battalion - it had even tipped the balance in the Paras' favour. According to Fitz-Gibbon, the authoritarian Jones had been the personification of the traditional restrictive control approach, which had dominated British staff schools, certainly up to the beginning of the 1980s. The commander of the 2nd Battalion wanted to keep control of everything himself. He drew up an over-structured plan of attack in six phases, telling the company commanders precisely which enemy positions should be captured and when. The inflexible plan of attack, without clear points of main effort ('not unlike World War I') went wrong at the first contact with the enemy, a completely predictable turn of events, according to Fitz-Gibbon. Because of the absence of orientation points, most of the British soldiers soon lost sight of exactly where they were. And this, emphasised Fitz-Gibbon, was 'despite clear, deliberate orders, total friendly fire superiority, no casualties and

no interference from the enemy'. Jones' personal and dominating style of command ('rank is right') prevented the company and platoon commanders from acting on their own initiative when the assault by the Paras was in danger of running aground. This pattern was perpetuated when, half way through the attack on Goose Green, their boss arrived at the front to lead the battle personally. Jones was surrounded by the enemy, but even in this precarious position, he blocked alternative plans of attack by his subordinates, saying 'don't tell me how to run my battle!' Even worse was the fact that as long as the Argentinians had Jones pinned down, the entire assault by the 2nd Battalion was at a standstill. The hierarchical command culture did not allow independent action by subordinates, even though they had a much clearer view of the situation than did Jones, who was under fire.

The death of Lt Col Jones at Darwin Hill gave his subordinate commanders the opportunity to bring the initiative back to the British. According to Fitz-Gibbon, it was a happy coincidence that Jones' successor, Major Chris Keeble, had been on detachment to the *Bundeswehr* for two years. There, Keeble had been able to see the concept of mission command (*Auftragstaktik*) in practice. This approach, 'a higher art in command' according to Fitz-Gibbon, attaches much less importance to strict command and control and positional (often sta-

A British para looks at some seized weapons. Photograph: British Embassy, Defence Section

tic) thinking than to tasks, manoeuvre and mutual trust. In Goose Green, mission command proved in any event to be far more successful than Jones' intolerant leadership. Keeble immediately moved the main effort of the assault and delegated the responsibility for this to the appropriate company commander. The latter immediately exploited the withdrawal of the Argentinians, a step which, according to Fitz-Gibbon, the much more cautious and methodically-minded Jones is highly unlikely to have ventured. But Fitz-Gibbon makes an important note in this respect: the Argentinians were ultimately defeated at Goose Green because of their own inferior command and control. The Argentinian commanders showed themselves to be even more fervent advocates than Jones, if that is possible, of restrictive control and inflexible positional thinking. Wallowing in defeatism, they did not launch a single counterattack, even though the British actions provided opportunities to do so. At the end of his book, Fitz-Gibbon endorses Major Keeble's statement: 'I believe the Argentinians lost the battle rather than the Paras winning it.'

Source: Spencer Fitz-Gibbon, '*Not mentioned in Despatches - The History and Mythology of the Battle of Goose Green*', Cambridge, 1995.

Coordination measures

0520. Commanders must take steps to maintain communication under all circumstances. The responsibility for establishing connections between **communication and information systems** is as follows:
• from top to bottom
• from left to right
• from the unit providing support to the one receiving it

0521. Use of **liaison** ensures the cooperation required for multinational and joint actions. It is essential that liaison detachments possess:
• the necessary language skills
• knowledge of the operations of the units they represent
• knowledge of communication and information systems for their own command posts

0522. There are **two methods** of establishing liaison.

a. **On a mutual basis.** It is advisable to establish liaison on a mutual basis between higher, lower and flanking formations or units. In the following cases, liaison must be mutual:
   • if a force is placed under the command of a commander of a different nationality
   • if formations of brigade size and higher from different countries operate alongside each other

b. **Unilateral**. If liaison is not established on a mutual basis, the responsibility for it is organised as follows:
   • from left to right
   • from rear to front for units of the same echelon
   • from higher to lower command level
   • from units providing support to those receiving it
   • from relief units to those being relieved

Area planning

0523. Area planning is the allocation of areas to a unit, formation or installation for tactical or administrative reasons. Often a unit does not have exclusive use of an area because other units or certain objects of particular importance are in the same area. Allocation is usually done by giving an area of several square kilometres to a unit. The commander of this unit is the **area commander** for this particular area. This allocation not only requires a good knowledge of the qualities of the unit in question, but also an insight into the possibilities and restrictions of the area.

Area planning applies throughout the entire assigned area of responsibility.

0524. The aim of area planning is:
- to make optimal use of the terrain, based on the operation to be carried out
- to allocate to the unit an area that meets the specific requirements (as far as possible)
- to prevent friction and misunderstandings between units wishing to use the same area
- to ensure that an area commander is responsible for each part of the allocated sector

0525. Area planning is a **staff responsibility** of the G3/S3. He advises his commander with regard to the allocation of areas to subordinate commanders and to commanders of units operating in the area of responsibility. They in turn are responsible for the coordination of all units which are not under their command but which have to operate in their area in order to carry out their tasks. They will then allocate areas of responsibility to their subordinate commanders. This internal division of areas means that a commander is thus known to his higher commander and to the relevant local military and civil organisations.

0526. The **allocation of an area** does not mean that only one unit may operate in that area. Other units can indicate their requirements to the main user to ensure that their actions do not hinder those of other units. Adjacent units must coordinate their actions between themselves in order to prevent fratricide and other incidents. To prevent friction in the allocation and use of areas, the commander can set priorities on the basis of the operation plan.

0527. The **non-linear and extended battlefield** may mean that formations and units do not operate with flanking units. It may, therefore, be necessary to deliberately create and accept less densely occupied areas, areas in which only surveillance is possible and long and vulnerable supply routes. One must realise, however, that there must at all times be a designated area commander for the entire area. The allocation of this responsibility depends on the situation and the following factors:
- future operations
- opportunities for local protection
- protection of the rear area
- opportunity for collocation
- opportunity for dispersal
- communication facilities

- locations of main supply routes, railways, airports, ports and water-ways
- characteristics of the units

0528. The **area planning** is part of the operation plan. After reconnaissance and coordination with adjacent units, the subordinate commanders report their findings to the G3/S3. An order can then be issued, after which all those involved report any changes that arise as in the course of the operation. In that case, the G3/S3 adjusts the area planning.

It is essential that the area planning be kept up to date during the course of the operation. Arriving and departing units must report to the area commander.

Section 3 - Intelligence and military information

0529. **Intelligence** is produced by processing information about foreign powers, (potentially) hostile forces and geographical areas in which military actions are needed. The aim of the intelligence system is to provide intelligence for the decision-making process. It also provides information about targets which can be engaged.

The staff, and particularly the intelligence section, must be in a position to assess and evaluate the available information and use it to form intelligence to meet the intelligence requirement. This is only possible if a clear intelligence requirement has been set. This can be done by drawing up **priority intelligence requirements**, from which core questions can then be derived.

0530. The analysis of the factors influencing terrain and enemy in the decision-making process can take place in the context of the **intelligence preparation of the battlefield**. This is a dynamic process which illustrates the possibilities regarding weather, terrain and enemy capabilities. This preparation also helps with the conclusions about decisive points in time and space. During the decision-making process, the intelligence preparation of the battlefield reveals the enemy's high-value targets.

0531. The **targeting process** requires fast and accurate intelligence about the locations, composition, grouping, capabilities and vulnerabilities of the enemy. In order to obtain this intelligence, information collection units need to be deployed; they must be able to gather the necessary information with sufficient accuracy. On the basis of this information, potential targets in time and space are selected in the targeting process.

These are selected on the basis of their quality and quantity and the available weapons. This targeting process is thus a joint effort on the part of the staff, whereby the ultimate staff responsibility lies with the G3. On the basis of the anticipated results of the targeting process, the commander can allocate units and equipment and set priorities.

0532. In the intelligence system, an **area of intelligence responsibility** can be allocated to a commander. In this allocated area, he is responsible for gathering intelligence within his assigned capabilities. The size of this area is determined by the range of his collection units. This area must at least cover the area of influence.

The entire intelligence requirement of a commander determines the size of his **area of interest**. This area is not only determined by the current operation, but also by future operations. As a rule, the intelligence requirement in this area can only be covered by higher units, adjacent units and national authorities.

0533. Intelligence activities occur in a cyclical process. This process concerns activities that are developed to meet the intelligence requirement of the commander, of his staff and of higher, adjacent and lower commanders. The beginning of this **intelligence cycle** is formed by the intelligence requirement of the commander prior to and during the operation. Depending on developments, the commander will have to supplement or change his intelligence requirement over the course of time. On the basis of new information, the intelligence is constantly renewed, particularised and adjusted and checked as to its reliability and probability. The process consists of the following four steps:

a. **Initiation**. Carrying out the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, establishing the information requirement, making a collection plan, issuing orders, making requests to adjacent and higher command levels and bringing in other parts of the intelligence organisation.
b. **Collection**. The activities of collection units and the transmission of the collected information to the processing centres and cells within the intelligence organisation.
c. **Processing**. Converting the information into intelligence by registering, evaluating, analysing, integrating and interpreting the information.
d. **Distribution**. The timely transmission of intelligence, in the required form, by means of any suitable channel to those who need it.

0534. Information is gathered by information collection units, which use their sources to do so. Activities conducted in this respect are;

- monitoring
- deep reconnaissance
- battle reconnaissance
- target acquisition

Intelligence and military information: the Fennek reconnaissance vehicle. Photograph: Media Centre RNLA

0535. The systematic **collection of information** is formalised within NATO in the procedure known as Collection Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM). Each tactical level looks at what intelligence is available or can be obtained with its own collection units. If the required collection capacity is not available, an intelligence request is submitted to the higher or adjacent unit. Using a collection plan, the intelligence organisation monitors the progress of the intelligence requests and steers and coordinates the collection units for each staff. This plan indicates, in order of priority, the intelligence requirement of the commander, the information requirement of the intelligence organisation and other requests and orders for intelligence.

0536. Gathering intelligence in the area of intelligence responsibility requires special attention for the way in which the collection units are set up, particularly the intelligence units. Economical use of these scarce resources can thus be guaranteed and undesired redundancy prevented.

Collection units at the operational level are often unable to collect sufficiently accurate information in time to meet the intelligence requirement of the commander. It will, therefore, be necessary to deploy collection units before an operation begins. These systems then operate

under the functional leadership of the G2/S2, who is supported in this respect at division and corps level by a processing centre, known as an all-sources intelligence centre.

0537. There are four categories of intelligence:
a. **human intelligence** (HUMINT): intelligence obtained from human sources
b. **signal intelligence** (SIGINT), divided into:
   • **communications intelligence** (COMINT): intelligence obtained from electromagnetic communications transmissions or communications systems
   • **electronic intelligence** (ELINT): intelligence obtained from electromagnetic non-communication transmissions
c. **imagery intelligence** (IMINT): intelligence obtained from images from photographic, radar, optronic, infrared, thermic and multispectral sensors
d. **acoustic intelligence** (ACINT): intelligence obtained from acoustic source

THE BATTLE OF SOLLUM IN JUNE 1941

Situation regarding the German Africa Corps until 1941

To the surprise of the German army, the German Africa Corps was formed at the beginning of 1941 and sent to North Africa. The principle that intelligence be obtained in peacetime about possible theatres of operation was thus in this instance ignored. On arrival in Tripoli, the G2 of the Africa Corps was obliged to rely on the picture of the enemy as built up by the Italians.

The G2 had the following means for gathering intelligence.
• The reconnaissance battalions of the German divisions had the capacity for reconnaissance of large areas. However, these battalions had fewer reconnaissance vehicles than the British; the Italians did not have this type of battalion at all.
• The Italian air force had out-dated aircraft, which had difficulty carrying out the air reconnaissance task. The German air force did have more modern aircraft, but the growing air superiority of the British made air reconnaissance increasingly difficult over the course of time.
• The interception platoon Africa, which was expanded in April 1941 to form an interception company. With this, the Africa Corps had a strong and well-equipped EW unit.

Other sources available to the Africa Corps' G2 were captured documents, analysis of the news and interrogation of prisoners of war.

The map shows:

- SOLLUM
- HAFID RIDGE
- CAPUZO
- HALFAYA
- SCARP
- SIDI OMAR
- SHEFERZEN

16 ▷ MOVEMENTS BY GERMAN AFRICA CORPS ON 16 JUNE

15 ▷ MOVEMENTS BY THE BRITISH ON 15 JUNE

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
The run-up to the battle of Sollum on 15 June 1941

The intelligence obtained by the EW company was a particularly decisive factor for the course of the Battle of Sollum. The interception yielded the following clues to the enemy tank attack.

6 June 1941	Full regrouping of enemy troops and radio traffic bearing strong resemblance to the period preceding the previous enemy attack on 15 May.
7-11 June	The advance of 7 English Division detected because of incidental transmissions despite radio silence.
after 12 June	Picture of the enemy becomes clear and hostile intent confirmed, because: • the logistic radio traffic shows typical signs of an attack • new radio links are detected for messages between air reconaissance squadrons and air bases The change of signal orders (call names, frequencies, code words) is identified as deception, because many mistakes are made after the change and because it is a deception activity that is not confirmed by other measures.
14 June	The main body of 7 English Division is detected as it moves into an assembly area. The code word 'Peter' is received. (On 14 May, the code word 'Fritz' was used for the assault on 15 May.)
15 June	At 06.15 hrs, 15 German Armoured Division reports that the enemy has launched an attack via the German security line south and southwest of Sollum.

The report - 'At 07.30 hrs, strong enemy column 15 km north of Sidi Omar, moving in southerly direction' - made clear the hostile intent to make a strong push through the western flank of the Capuzzo-Sollum position and to relieve Tobruk.

On 14 June at 21.00 hrs, it was already possible to give orders for countermeasures to the divisions of the Africa Corps:
• the Italian Division Ariete was put on alert
• regrouping and new tasks for 5 Light Division
• orders to all artillery to deliver harassing fire ahead of Tobruk
• orders to the air forces to keep all means on standby on 15 June

On 15 June, the Africa Corps took the following measures:
• deployment of fighter bombers targeting the enemy column north of Sidi Omar
• extra air support by 10 Airborne Corps
• mobile parts of the Italian Division Ariete were made available
• 3 Reconnaissance Battalion, reinforced with an air defence battery, received orders to carry out reconnaissance

The British plan of attack was based largely on the principle of surprise, certainly with regard to the grouping and the direction and time of attack. Because of the interception, the element of surprise was completely lost. Only the location and deployment of 4 Indian Division remained undetected, as this unit maintained extremely strict radio discipline.

The information was only a few minutes old. A liaison officer of the interception company was permanently based in Rommel's tactical command post. Rommel thus often received information before the enemy staffs for whom it was actually intended.

Typical communication habits (code words, change of signal orders) and poor radio discipline (transmitting during movements) made it easy for the interception company to gather information and prevented the Africa Corps from being surprised. Thus the conditions were created for the Africa Corps to see that the British attack failed.

Source: Hans-Otto Behrendt, '*Rommels Kenntnis vom Feind im Afrikafeldzug*', Verlag Rombach, Freiburg.

Section 4 - Manoeuvre

0538. The function 'manoeuvre' comprises the required deployment of troops on the battlefield by displacing these troops in combination with the use or threat of fire power, in order to get into an advantageous position in respect of the enemy. Manoeuvre is the most important means for putting into practice the principles of concentration, economy of effort and surprise.

Manoeuvre: the Leopard 2A5 main battle tank, the mainstay of armoured combat.
Photograph: Media Centre RNLA

Section 5 - Fire support

0539. **Fire support** is the capacity to deliver indirect fire from ground and sea forces and fire from air forces and thus eliminate, temporarily or otherwise, the military potential of the enemy. With a wide range of ammunition types, fire support can be used to (help) carry out deep operations and to support close and rear area operations. In combination with mobility, this creates the freedom of manoeuvre needed to retain the initiative. Fire support is at its most effective if the available means are fully integrated with the intelligence and manoeuvre functions.

0540. Fire support covers three **tasks** which must be carried out simultaneously:
- creating conditions for retaining own freedom of manoeuvre by restricting that of the enemy
- dislocating the enemy's command and control system, his combat support means and his capacity to sustain the operation for a prolonged period
- eroding the will of the enemy to continue fighting

0541. The **effect** on the enemy that the commander aims to achieve using fire support can be expressed as follows:
- **suppressing**, whereby a target is engaged with such intensity that the influence of the target elements on the battle is reduced during a limited period
- **inflicting so much damage and/or losses** on an enemy unit that it is temporarily unable to deploy its full combat power cohesively
- **putting a unit out of action**, whereby fire is delivered on an enemy

unit with the intention of inflicting so much damage that it is no longer deployable for a prolonged period

THE SEIGE OF DIEN BIEN PHU IN 1954

In 1953, the fighting in Vietnam between the Viet Minh and the French had been going on for six years. The French army was strategically on the defensive. The Vietnamese guerrillas and regular units, supported by the Chinese People's Liberation Army, were largely in control of the rural area in the north of the country. The French government began to realise that the war, which they could no longer win on the battlefield, would have to be ended at the negotiating table. In the north, which had to be regarded as virtually lost, it was a question of beating an honourable retreat and hindering the Viet Minh's advance from there. The south of Vietnam, where the Viet Minh was weaker, could thus be protected from a further drive by this force.

How could the objective in the north be achieved against Vietnamese guerrillas and regular units, which had up to then proved elusive? General Navarre, the French commander in Indo-China, decided to set to work in the three areas in which he presumed there was a durable superiority: fire power on the ground, fire power from the air and air transport. He decided in November 1953 that the key terrain of Dien Bien Phu, near the border with Laos, would be developed to form a sizeable, reinforced artillery position occupied by 14,000 men. The artillery would control the roads and paths to Laos through the valley of the Nam Yum river, as well as the surrounding hills. The French air force would carry out interdiction missions on the routes to the valley. Because the French did not control the roads between the south and Dien Bien Phu and these were also unsuitable for heavy transports, all personnel and equipment for the construction of the base would be supplied by air. The same was to apply to supplies for the base after completion. Navarre thought that Vo Nguyen Giap, the commander of the Viet Minh, would be unable to assemble enough artillery, air defence artillery or troops in the area to take

Colonel De la Croix de Castries discusses the situation at Dien Bien Phu. Photograph: Dutch Press Agency (ANP)

Dien Bien Phu. However, this soon turned out to be a miscalculation and Dien Bien Phu came to be seen by both parties as a symbol of victory or defeat in the war in Indo-China.

20 November 1953 saw the beginning of Operation *Castor*, the French occupation of Dien Bien Phu. A series of nine fortified points was set up with a total perimeter of 45 km. Guns and mortars, concentrated in two places, were to control the approach roads. Underground shelters and many miles of barricades had to be built for the ten infantry battalions and two artillery regiments that were planned. The supply of equipment was to require an airlift lasting five months. Even this turned out to be an optimistic estimate. When the siege began, only 6,000 tons of the planned 36,000 had arrived. There were 10,000 troops, mainly consisting of Thai, Moroccan and Vietnamese battalions and units of the Foreign Legion. As for artillery, there were only four 155 mm pieces and twenty-four 105 mm pieces, supplemented by 20 mm and 40 mm air defence guns. Right from the start, the French were plagued by setbacks. To their surprise, the first Vietnamese divisions reached the hills around Dien Bien Phu as early as December 1953. From that moment, the commander, Colonel Christian de la Croix de Castries (promoted during the battle to Brigadier General) had to send out patrols and order trenches and artillery emplacements to be made.

The patrols were too small in number to discover how many Viet Minh soldiers had gathered in the mountains surrounding the fort. These soldiers were able to locate the French artillery positions and command posts with precision. In that respect, it was to their advantage that the French had cut down an enormous number of trees to provide building material for their fortifications. The French had thus inadvertently improved the visibility of the terrain from the hills. Giap was supported by Chinese advisors, who gave particularly valuable advice with regard to artillery. Before he launched the attack, Giap arranged for a major concentration of artillery as well as for smaller-scale, simultaneous attacks on French troops, spread all over Vietnam. Navarre had not expected the Viet Minh to be able to build up massive artillery positions in the surrounding hills, nor that they would be able to protect them effectively with camouflage and air defence guns. Lastly, he had assumed that he would be able to make constant use of the landing strips. However, these soon came under Vietnamese fire, which meant that the French supply facilities for Dien Bien Phu were seriously affected.

When the siege began on 13 March, Giap had assembled 37,500 men, reinforced by 300,000 for the supply lines, which stretched into Chinese territory. Roads and bridges were laid and kept in good condition, partly so that guns and shells could be moved up. Manpower was used to move the artillery in the mountains. The artillery positions were dug out in the mountain slopes, with protection strong enough to withstand hits by 105 and 155 mm shells. Giap later calculated that the total logistic support had cost three million working days. The North Vietnamese had more than 220 pieces of artillery, American 75 mm and 105 mm howitzers and 120 mm mortars. They also had Katyusha missiles and 180 pieces of air defence artillery from 12 mm to 37 mm, much of which was of Russian manufacture. In all, Giap had more than a hundred pieces with calibres greater than 57 mm.

Giap realised that his troops had little experience of attacks on reinforced positions and that the French would organise reinforcements in the time it took him to assemble his troops and set up gun emplacements. The siege would thus last a long time. There was, however, a chance of giving the war in the

north of Indo-China a decisive turn and thus also bring about a drastic improvement in the Vietnamese position at the negotiating table. He therefore decided to go for the safe option and attack the nine strongholds one at a time.

On 13 March, the Vietnamese artillery opened fire on strong point Beatrice, defended by the Foreign Legion. The stronghold fell that same day. The next day, strong point Gabrielle, defended mainly by Algerian troops, was attacked. Heavy artillery shelling and hand-to-hand combat led to the surrender on 15 March, despite bombardments of the Vietnamese positions. The commander of the French artillery, Col Piroth, committed suicide that day when it became clear that he would be unable to keep his promise to silence the Vietnamese guns.

Strong point Anne Marie was defended by a Thai unit, which deserted virtually in its entirety. Now there were Vietnamese along the full length of the

northern front of the French central fortification. Using trenches and tunnels, they had dug themselves a path ending right next to the French defence lines, and were receiving constant support from their own artillery. Because of continuing losses and the desertion of hundreds of soldiers, De Castries' combat power was dwindling. The airfields could no longer be used because they were under Vietnamese fire and because the Vietnamese air defence artillery was proving to be highly effective. The only way of getting supplies was by parachute. However, the drop zones were also under fire, which meant that the transport aircraft could only make their drops under cover of darkness. Because of the inaccuracy inevitably associated with night drops, the French were unable to recover all their supplies. Nevertheless, apart from equipment, more than 4,200 men, most of them paras, still managed to reach Dien Bien Phu from 14 March to compensate some of the losses. In total, almost 83,000 parachutes landed. The French made 20,800 sorties to support the ground troops. Forty-eight aircraft were shot down by air defence artillery and 167 were damaged. Fourteen planes were destroyed on the ground.

Giap also had problems. The attacks claimed many casualties and the supplies dwindled. Extra supplies were needed. His soldiers were also suffering because of the primitive jungle conditions in which they had been living for weeks, even months. So it was not until 30 March that the next phase of the attack began. The targets were now strong points Dominique and Eliane, on the eastern side of the central fortified position. The Vietnamese opened the battle with a mine explosion under strong point Eliane and heavy preparatory fire. The battles lasted more than three weeks. There was heavy fighting for every inch of ground. The French constantly launched counterattacks, but the Vietnamese advanced nonetheless. The landing strip and the rest of the fortification were now within range of the Vietnamese small-calibre weapons.

The last phase of the Vietnamese attack started on 1 May, on the central fortification as well as on the southern strong point Isabelle. On 3 May, Giap's troops neared the central command post. The remaining French positions came under continuous fire. On 6 May, Giap even employed the Katyusha missiles. Ten thousand men surrendered the following day. Only a fraction of this number was to return alive. It is estimated that two thousand men on the French side were killed. The number of Vietnamese killed in the fighting is estimated at 7,900. Just one day after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the conference that was to lead to a political solution to the Vietnam problem started in Geneva.

Looking back, the French estimated that the Vietnamese had fired 130,000 artillery and mortar shells on them. The French themselves fired 93,000 shells. The French plan to use fire power and superior equipment to turn the war in the north to their advantage had failed. The assumption that the Vietnamese would be unable to assemble and support a major concentration of artillery and personnel in mountainous jungle terrain at the end of a long logistic chain proved to be a miscalculation. As far as the Vietnamese were concerned, their fire support largely determined their success. The scope, coordination and diversity of the Vietnamese fire led to a situation in which the French became isolated, both in terms of supplies and in terms of conducting a cohesive defence of the entire fortification of Dien Bien Phu.

Sources: P. Macdonald, '*Giap: The Victor in Vietnam*', London 1993
J. Dalloz, '*La Guerre d'Indochine 1945-1954*', Paris 1987.

0542. To achieve the desired effect, the **right mix of weapon systems** must be selected with regard to volume, duration of deployment, lethality, precision and ammunition type. To maintain flexibility in this respect, the following considerations apply.

- Fire support must be tailored to the activities in the operational framework.
- As a rule, the planning of fire support is centralised and its execution decentralised. In this way, the necessary coordination between fire support and the other military functions is assured at all times, while nothing is lost in terms of speed, precision or safety of own troops.
- Priorities need to be set in the various stages of the battle regarding the deployment of systems for the collection of information as well as for target acquisition. This choice will need some adjustment in the course of the battle.
- The mobility, protection and supply of the deployment assets must be tailored to the units receiving support.

0543. The fire support system is an integrated system of target acquisition means, weapon systems and ammunition, command and control systems, support systems and coordinating elements in headquarters.

0544. The fire support system has various **target acquisition means**. These include:

- observation groups, assigned to combat units
- sound ranging service
- tactical control radar for detecting indirect fire weapon systems

All these assets primarily provide target information, but are also particularly useful as collection units. Assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and battlefield surveillance radar are, on the other hand, primarily intended as intelligence collection units, but are also used for gathering target information.

0545. **Gun systems** can be armoured or non-armoured guns and howitzers, self-propelled or otherwise. The **missile systems** assigned to the field artillery are intended for firing surface-to-surface missiles. Because of the great range of the weapon systems and the variation in their ammunition packages, gun and missile systems can be used in deep operations, can be used to provide concentrations of fire and can be moved quickly throughout the sector without the need for the fire units to displace.

0546. **Mortars**, because of their range and ammunition package, as well as their characteristic high-angle fire, are ideally suited for deployment

against targets in covered or uneven terrain. They are, therefore, assigned to (mechanised) infantry units.

0547. The fire support system has **support systems** for meteorology and artillery surveys, intended to provide the quantitative information needed for deployment of the other sub-systems.

Fire support: the M109 A2/90, the backbone of the fire support system. Photograph: Media Centre RNLA

0548. Tactical air forces are effective in respect of the integrated land-air battle. They are shown to their best advantage in more or less autonomous deployment in areas or against targets where field artillery units are unable to fire efficiently, if at all. Air forces can carry out various tasks under the heading of **offensive air support** in support of ground forces. Outside the ground commander's area of operations, the air forces can carry out air interdiction fully autonomously.

Offensive air support comprises the following tasks:

a. Close air support consists of air operations as part of the close operation against enemy targets in the immediate vicinity of friendly troops. This deployment must be fully geared towards the manoeuvre and combat support units requiring support.

b. Battlefield air interdiction comprises air operations against ground targets which may affect the course of the battle without there being a question of direct engagement. They are mainly geared towards

enemy units which, after a while, may influence the close operation and thus jeopardise the operation plan. Battlefield air interdiction is particularly effective if it is carried out in the context of a joint air assault team (JAAT) operation. This is the integrated deployment of combat helicopters and fighter aircraft, possibly supplemented by or with support from ground troops, including artillery and air defence systems, which operate simultaneously to engage high-priority targets. A JAAT gives the ground commander a highly mobile capacity to engage armoured units in the context of a deep operation.

0549. Some land operations can be supported from the sea with **naval gunfire support**. Specialised naval gunfire liaison teams can be used for observation for the firing vessels and coordination of the deployment of naval gunfire support. If there are no specialised teams, these tasks are carried out by the assigned field artillery.

0550. **The targeting process** is the process in which targets are selected and engaged, taking account of operational circumstances and possibilities. A link is made in this process between the intelligence process and fire support. The targeting process is not an isolated process, but forms an integral part of the command and control process. It requires coordination between several staff functions under the leadership of the G3/S3. The targeting cycle consists of a number of successive activities:
• determining the areas containing important targets
• determining the types of target
• determining the accuracy with which targets must be localised
• processing the information requirement in the intelligence collection plan
• determining which identified targets should be engaged, when and with what assets
• establishing how the effectiveness of the targeting is to be determined
• engaging the target
• looking at the effect the target engagement has had and, if necessary, bringing the target back into the targeting process

0551. Managing fire power (direct as well as indirect fire) which is used simultaneously in deep, close and rear area operations requires **coordination measures** in order to achieve the necessary speed, without subjecting friendly troops to unnecessary risks with regard to their safety. The coordination measures are as follows:

a. **Fire support coordination line**. This line is established by the ground forces commander authorised to do so (normally the corps commander) in coordination with the air component commander. The

line must, if possible, be recognisable in the terrain. Fire support on the friendly side of this line must be coordinated; fire support on the other side of the line may be carried out without prior coordination.

b. **No fire area**. No indirect fire is permitted in this area.

c. **No fire line**. On the friendly side of this line, fire may only be delivered with permission from the commander who established the line.

d. **Fire coordination line**. This is a line between two units, over which no fire may be delivered without coordination.

Section 6 - Protection

0552. **Protection** focuses on preserving the military potential so that this can be used at the decisive time and place. Thus protection also focuses on retaining freedom of action. It always constitutes an essential part of any operation.

0553. Protection is brought about by passive and active measures. **Passive measures** are always taken at every level and consist of:
• cover
• dispersal
• electronic protection measures
• correct use of terrain
• change of location
• surveillance and alarm system

Active measures involve the deployment of combat power against a potential enemy threat.

Specific forms of protection are:
• **security** to guard against a surprise enemy action
• **operations security** to deny the enemy information about friendly troops
• NBC **defence** with active and passive measures against the effect of NBC weapons
• **air security** with active and passive measures against a threat from the air, consisting of air defence and all arms air defence
• **counter psychological operations** to minimise the effect of the enemy's psychological operations

0554. **Cover** provides protection for personnel, equipment and the unit or installation as a whole against enemy reconnaissance and enemy fire. Cover is achieved by making proper use of the terrain, camouflage, moving in limited visibility and with electronic and infrared emission discipline.

0555. The extent of protection is directly dependent on the sort of terrain and the buildings in the area. Protection can be improved by setting up **fortified positions and combat shelters.** Engineer units can play an important role in this respect.

Protection begins with individual combat cover. Photograph: Media Centre RNLA

Dispersal limits the vulnerability to enemy fire or bombardments. It makes it more difficult for the enemy's intelligence collection units to obtain the intelligence needed for their operation. The weighing of dispersal against effectiveness has particular consequences with regard to the way in which service support installations are set up and where they are located.

Vulnerability can be reduced by changing location frequently. Some flexibility can be gained by using several command posts, which can take over one another's task. When deciding whether or not to move command posts and in particular logistic installations, the commander must constantly decide between protection and availability.

0556. All those who use electronic equipment are responsible for taking **electronic protection measures.** Detection and degradation of use can thus be prevented. Electronic protection ensures that the electromagnetic spectrum can be used freely by friendly troops, despite enemy electronic warfare. It also enhances operations security.

0557. The purpose of **security** is to protect the unit against (surprise) enemy action and, if necessary, to create the time and space to enable the higher commander to take countermeasures. If security is specifically aimed at the protection of an object or area, this is known as object or area security.

0558. If a unit protects itself with its organically assigned means, this is known as **local protection**. Each unit is responsible for protecting itself and the areas allocated to it. The responsibility for security is set out in the operational area allocation and area planning.

0559. Units deployed for security repel a weaker enemy; against a stronger enemy, enough time is gained for the higher commander to take countermeasures. Enemy airborne actions are countered immediately with all available means and without any specific orders to do so.

0560. For the protection of a unit or object, a **security line** can be established, in which the protective elements are set up. This is located in such a position as to force the enemy to engage there. The commander thus creates the time and space needed to take countermeasures.

0561. **Operations security** is the use of active and passive measures to deny the enemy information about the order of battle, capabilities and intentions of own troops. The principles of operations security are as follows:
- it focuses on all aspects of the operation, including combat service support, communications and movements
- it focuses on information which is vital to the enemy in order to build up a complete picture
- it is a permanent process, which begins long before the operation itself

Operations security manifests itself in:
- passive measures, such as electronic protection measures and cover
- active measures, such as electronic countermeasures, counter reconnaissance and counter intelligence activities

0562. The basis for NBC **defence** is formed by passive measures, such as cover and dispersal, and by active measures, such as the deployment of organically assigned detection and warning means and personal and unit protection measures.

0563. The commander is responsible for the NBC **defence measures.** The individual soldier is responsible for taking the proper individual protec-

tion measures. If the deployment of NBC weapons is thought to be imminent or if they are being used:

- the appropriate protection level must be announced
- personnel and equipment must be afforded optimum protection by using dispersal as well as natural and man-made cover
- the potential targets and the vulnerability of the units must be analysed in order to adjust the grouping if necessary
- an analysis must be made of the combat power still available, including the service support
- plans must be drawn up for the decontamination of units and for the evacuation and treatment of contaminated personnel

Protection against NBC warfare affects operational flexibility.
Photograph: Media Centre RNLA

0564. **Supplementary measures** in the context of NBC defence are:
- evacuating or avoiding contaminated areas
- declaring a higher NBC protection level
- establishing a permissible dose
- preparing decontamination sites

The announcement of a higher protection level will only take place after the desired preventative effect has been weighed carefully against diminishing operational deployability. It is also possible to operate a lower protection level temporarily if this is considered essential in order to perform the task properly.

0565. Launching attacks from the air is one of the most effective ways of dislocating the enemy's cohesion and freedom of action. **Air security** therefore occupies an essential place at every operating level. The threat from the air is a result of the capacity of the enemy to carry out air actions with all available means. An effective air defence is a precondition for maintaining friendly cohesion and freedom of action. Enemy air superiority can make friendly movements on the ground virtually impossible.

0566. **Air defence** comprises the full range of coordinated defence measures against enemy operations from the air, with the aim of restricting the enemy's ability to carry out air operations. Air defence is carried out by **two complementary components**:
- aircraft in the counter air operation
- ground-based air defence systems (surface-to-air weapon systems)

At tactical level, the deployment of surface-to-air weapon systems plays the most important role. This deployment must, however, be geared towards the counter air operation. The necessary conditions are created at the level of the joint force.

0567. Because of the air threat, ranging from aircraft and helicopters to UAVs, cruise and ballistic missiles, it is essential that complementary surface-to-air weapon systems be deployed in a **multi-layered air defence**. In order to be able to protect the mobile battle as well as maintain a multi-layered air defence at the same time, it may be necessary to regroup air defence units.

At tactical level, systems are deployed which are effective at extremely low altitude (below 300 feet), low altitude (between 500 and 5,000 feet) and medium altitude (between 5,000 and 25,000 feet).

0568. If air forces deploy ground-based air defence assets, coordination is required. The protection provided by an air defence cluster, mixed or otherwise, must be exploited. One should bear in mind that these clusters only provide limited protection at extremely low altitude. Friendly air defence should nonetheless be deployed in the main effort of the operation.

0569. Air defence systems usually have active **sensors**. The emission control plan must give guidelines about the use of these sensors. The most important considerations in this respect are the desired extent of protection, offset against the desired operations security. For a timely warning, there is a minimum requirement for air surveillance sensors.

0570. The deployment of air defence assets requires thorough **reconnaissance** in order to make the available combat power fully effective. If the battle is mobile, the choice of positions is limited.

Protection: Patriot, part of the integrated air defence. Photograph: Physics and Electronics Laboratory, Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)

0571. With **airspace control measures**, the deployment of airspace users is coordinated in time and space. In these measures, the greatest possible freedom for all airspace users is combined as far as possible with maximum safety.

The responsibility for airspace control measures normally rests with the regional commander of the air forces. He coordinates this with the appropriate army commanders. The army commander can influence this on the basis of his operational concept.

Airspace control measures include the following:

- measures to limit the use of the airspace in time and place (zones, routes, corridors, levels)
- restrictions in the use of weapon systems for engaging air targets

0572. If air defence means are in short supply, it is necessary to set **priorities** in respect of air defence. They can be determined on the basis of the following factors:
- the importance of an object, installation or unit
- the vulnerability of an object, installation or unit
- the redundancy or replaceability of the object or the installation
- the probability that the enemy will attack an object, installation or unit (based on, for example, weather and terrain conditions)

0573. Since air defence assets are unable to guarantee absolute protection, all arms air defence is necessary. This is a responsibility for each commander. Passive **all arms air defence** focuses on the prevention of air strikes by using camouflage, dispersal and by changing location. Active all arms air defence is geared towards self-defence and concentrates on repelling the attacking enemy with all suitable weapons.

0574. **Counter psychological operations** are designed to neutralise the enemy's offensive psychological operation and to protect friendly personnel from its effects. They support or strengthen the morale of friendly troops. The main effort lies with the available internal information media.

Section 7 - Service support

0575. **Combat service support** focuses on sustaining units before, during and after operations. The ultimate aim of this support is to maintain the required level of military potential in order to achieve the operational objectives within the desired time frame. The planning of the combat service support is centralised, while its execution is decentralised. Central planning ensures an efficient and effective use of scarce resources. The commander anticipates the future requirement for combat service support for the units to be deployed and sets priorities and makes capacity available accordingly. The aim of decentralised execution is to make combat service support fast and flexible. During battle, combat service support tasks will be decentralised and as routine as possible. Only in the event of unforeseen disturbances will the commander organise the combat service support centrally. Civil-military relations are also important for the provision of combat service support. They may even play an essential role in certain logistic activities.

0576. Combat service support has two **sub-functions**: operational logistics and operational personnel support.

0577. The aim of **operational logistics** is to sustain a deployed unit by looking after the equipment and supporting personnel in terms of administrative and technical services. This is done by means of six logistic processes which are closely related: supply, maintenance, medical care, personnel transport, administrative and technical services and infrastructure support.

a. The aim of supply is to make all ranges of goods (expendable and non-expendable) available to the users at the right time and in the right place. The main activities are keeping stocks, inventory control, distribution and removal of supplies and equipment.

b. The purpose of maintenance is intended to make and keep equipment usable by performing maintenance activities. Collection and recovery of defective equipment also forms part of this process.

c. Medical care comprises the evacuation, treatment and nursing of sick and wounded personnel. Operational medical care is organised in phases, so that full medical support can be given in each treatment phase. The effectiveness of medical care is mainly determined by:
   • the right medical care within the required time limit
   • fast evacuation, once the casualty has been stabilised, to the appropriate medical installation

d. Personnel transport involves all movements of personnel, with the exception of the transport of wounded personnel and movements of units with organically assigned vehicles. This can be a major process at the beginning and end of an operation.

e. Administrative and technical services consist of issuing particular goods and providing services. These relate to issuing money, providing bathing and washing facilities, energy supply, water supply and purification, graves registration and field post.

Service support: supply is one of the core activities. Photograph: Media Centre RNLA

f. Infrastructure support focuses on restoring or building infrastructure for all units present in the deployment area. In a theatre of operations with limited infrastructure, this form of support will be much needed, particularly at the beginning of the operation.

0578. The aim of **operational personnel support** is to keep the personnel complement at the required strength and to provide the personnel present with mainly non-material resources. This is done by means of two personnel support processes: personnel management and personnel welfare.

a. Personnel management comprises all activities geared towards keeping the personnel of the deployed unit up to standard in terms of both quality and quantity. The most important instrument for this is the personnel replacement system. Promotion policy, the application of military criminal and disciplinary law and the awards and evaluation system also form part of the management function.

b. Personnel welfare comprises all activities and provisions designed to protect the physical, mental and social interests of the personnel of deployed units, using mainly non-material resources. Some aspects included in this are information, psychological care, recreation and spiritual welfare. A number of activities from administrative and technical services are related.

0579. The provision of combat service support requires a large number of **movements** of personnel and equipment in the operational area. To ensure that these movements proceed in an orderly fashion and that full use is made of the infrastructure, there is a need for movement control, traffic regulation and traffic control. This includes the preparation, organisation, coordination and control of movements in a particular area.

0580. The need for autonomy of tactical units on the one hand and the requirement for flexibility and economy of effort on the other lead to an **echelonned service support system grouped in the depth**. The link-up of echelons for each service support process forms a service support chain.

The lowest level in the support chain is the **user unit**: a battalion, independent company or similar unit. These units have basic capacities (supply, maintenance and medical care) and thus have limited and basic logistic self-sufficiency, both in terms of quality and quantity.

In principle, a **brigade** has greater logistic self-sufficiency. This self-sufficiency is made up on the one hand of the service support assets for

the user units and, on the other, a supplement to these means for the brigade level. This supplement is known as the sustainability of the user units and consists of an extra supply of non-expendable goods and the availability of a number of combat service support units. These units support the user units.

The **division** has an extra supply of expendable items (the additional self-sufficiency of the brigades and the division units) and a number of extra combat service support units. These units support the user units at division level (which are not assigned to a brigade) and combat service support units made available to the brigades. In this way, the logistic self-sufficiency of the division is guaranteed.

At **national level**, the National Command instructs the National Support Command to set up a logistic base in the deployment area for the units deployed in the mission area. This base contains both supplies and units in order to guarantee the required additional self-sufficiency.

0581. **Combat service support units** meet the requirement for combat service support for all units. They may have a specific task in respect of personnel support or logistics.
- **Supply units.** The main task of these units is in principle the supply of all goods. Tailored to the demands of mobility and the method of supply (direct delivery and/or collection), the supply units may have organically assigned transport capacity for mobile storage and distribution.
- **Maintenance units** are primarily tasked with performing maintenance on all pieces of equipment and goods. The maintenance process imposes special demands on the supply of spare parts and the recovery and removal of defective pieces of equipment. It may thus be necessary to make these capacities available to the maintenance units on a temporary or local basis.
- **Medical units** can set up medical facilities for the treatment and nursing of sick and/or wounded personnel and provide ambulances. Pharmaceutical tasks, blood supply and the supply of medical service items place specific demands on the supply process. It may, therefore, be necessary for medical units themselves to look after the supply of smaller quantities.
- **Transport units** are equipped with light, medium or heavy road transport means or a combination of these. These units provide general support in the form of the transportation of personnel or equipment. Given that the task of these units is largely related to the supply process, supply and transport units are usually combined. The

tasks of transport units include the following:
- transport of units
- supply of goods
- keeping goods mobile
- **Engineer units** are not specifically combat service support units, but perform an essential task in infrastructure support because of their specialised equipment. These units are able to carry out infrastructural work for friendly troops, such as building shelters or logistic installations.

0582. The following considerations apply to the support function:
- A reliable **command and control system** is indispensable for the provision of combat service support. This is of vital importance to support processes which work against the clock, such as the medical evacuation process in particular.
- Given their size, intensity and length, support routes are easy to detect and difficult to protect. This also applies to service installations. This means that both routes and installations are **vulnerable** in respect of the enemy's deep operation. They thus constitute a risk for the continuity of friendly combat service support.
- A dynamic balance is needed between, on the one hand, positioning service installations far enough forward to support manoeuvre and, on the other, staying beyond the range of the enemy threat. If the distances between combat service support units and the troops requiring support are too great, the continuity of the support is threatened.
- Dispersal of logistic installations reduces their vulnerability, but restricts the internal management, whereby the capacity of the logistic support is reduced. The logistic installations must also be prevented from being dispersed over the whole battlefield as this limits the manoeuvre space for the other units.
- Combat service support units are capable of providing their own local protection. The service installations, however, need to be incorporated in the plan for the protection of the rear area.
- The right choice of area (with possibilities for cover) contributes to the protection of the logistic installations. Growing supply routes require a choice between the effectiveness of the service support and providing combat power for the protection of these routes.
- Service installations become most effective and efficient if work can be done over a **prolonged period from the same location**. Frequent movement limits the capacity of these installations. However, given that a large number of service activities are linked to time and space factors, frequent movements will nonetheless be necessary in a mobile operation. Time and space factors are, for instance, the time within which wounded personnel must undergo surgery and the

maximum turn-around times in the supply chain.

- **Preparation time** is of vital importance to the service support task. The preparation time may differ greatly from the time needed by combat units to prepare for their operations. It may, therefore, be necessary to deploy parts of service installations early, before the actual operation. The element of surprise may thus be lost.
- The grouping of the service support elements must be able to support the commander's plan fully in a **balanced organisation**. Depending on the type and duration of the operation, service support elements must be assigned to combat units.
- The joint and often **multinational nature** of most operations is reflected in the service system. Like the combat units, the combat service support units will also need to be able to cooperate with installations of other Services or countries. Although combat service support remains a national responsibility, the coordination and guarantee of sustainability are the joint responsibility of all the troops involved and thus rest with the commander of a joint or multinational force.

THE CRITICAL LOGISTIC SITUATION OF PANZERGRUPPE 4 IN JULY 1941

Situation of Panzergruppe 4 on 15 July 1941 in the vicinity of Luga

Operation Barbarossa, the German attack on Russia, began on 22 June 1941 with three army groups operating next to each other on a broad front. From East Prussia, Army Group North launched the offensive in the direction of Leningrad via the former Baltic states. This offensive was carried out with Panzergruppe 4 (three armoured divisions and three motorised infantry divisions in two armoured corps) as the leading formation, and with 16 and 18 Army (infantry divisions only) as follow-up formations. After a rapid offensive, they reached the Pskov-Ostrov region on 8 July.

On 9 and 10 July, Panzergruppe 4 continued the offensive in the direction of Leningrad with 41 Corps along the Pskov-Luga road (left) and 56 Corps via Porkhov - Sol'tsy (right). The protection of the right flank was to be the task of 16 Army. The Panzergruppe estimated that it would need another four days for this assault on Leningrad.

The resistance east of Pskov, however, was unexpectedly fierce. On 11 July, this 'rapid' offensive alongside the roads ground to a halt. There was deadlock in the Plyussa-Sapolje-Utergosh region. Panzergruppe 4 therefore attempted to come from the west and skirt around the strong Russian defence in this region. It worked and on 15 July, 41 Corps was at Porietschje and Sabsk. In 23 days, a distance of 750 km had been covered in an offensive.

By order of Army Group North, Panzergruppe 4 now had to neutralise a threat on the southern flank. This took place at Osmino, in the penetration of 41 Corps. To reinforce the penetration at Sol'tsy, 1 and 10 Corps were placed under the command of Panzergruppe 4.

Regrouping of the assault troops after 15 July, differences of opinion between Panzergruppe 4 and Army Group North about the follow-up operations, and logistic problems in particular all meant that the continuation of the offensive was delayed on more than one occasion. It was not until 8 August that the offensive was resumed.

Logistic planning for the formations of Army Group North

Calculations for Operation *Barbarossa* had shown that logistic support could only be guaranteed up to a distance of 500 km. This fact was the basis for the operational planning. The Pskov-Opochka line was the outermost boundary for the logistic support from the logistic base in East Prussia. A new logistic base was needed to sustain the offensive. The addition of extra service support units and supplies for Panzergruppe 4 could do nothing to change that. Nevertheless, there was a hope that if things went quickly, fuel and food in particular could be seized, whereby this distance could be increased. The acquisition of spoils was thus systematically planned.

Ammunition stocks for Operation *Barbarossa* were based on five standard ammunition rations; one standard ammunition ration was enough for eight days of fighting. Based on the experiences of the campaigns in Poland and Western Europe, the norm was believed to be one day of combat for every three days. The ammunition stocks were thus sufficient for 40 days of fighting over the four months considered necessary by the army leaders for Operation *Barbarossa*.

Another part of the logistic planning was that the rapid formation (Panzergruppe 4) was deployed between two infantry formations (16 and 18 Army). The rapid formation would advance and the infantry armies would follow to the left and right in echelons, thus exploiting the success and ensuring cohesion and security. The Panzergruppe was not, therefore, assigned its own sector; the operational area to the rear of the Panzergruppe was divided among the two infantry armies. Unlike the infantry armies, Panzergruppe 4 was not a link in the logistic chain, since it was regarded as a temporary grouping. It needed logistic support from the nearest logistic facilities. The logistic facilities for the infantry armies were based in the built-up areas. The few roads (one road per corps) were used by all subsequent infantry divisions (both of Panzergruppe 4 and the two infantry armies) and by the logistic transports. This presented the road network with a heavier burden than had been expected. In the rear area, Panzergruppe 4 was not in charge of the situation; this was the responsibility of the infantry armies. Their needs were thus met more quickly, also because the Panzergruppe did not have its own logistic facilities and had to fall back on those of 16 and 18 Army.

Thanks to the thorough preparations (including map exercises), the logistic support up to the Pskov-Ostrov line proceeded completely according to plan. Despite the growing traffic problems on the few and poor roads, it was still possible to meet the full requirement for fuel and ammunition. With the success of the attack, however, the commanders lost sight of the boundaries that had been set for the logistic support. In spite of all the risks (dependence on spoils), everything had gone well until then. There was now a great temptation for the planners to assume a similar success in terms of logistic support in the follow-up operation.

The logistic situation at the end of July 1941

Because of the way the situation was developing and for the purposes of further operational planning, the logistic base needed to be relocated to a more forward position. The service support routes were overloaded and the open flanks of 41 and 56 Corps posed a risk for the rear area. Service support routes were sometimes impassable for days at a time because of partisan actions and also because of enemy units for whom there were no obstructions on the large open flanks. The air superiority of the Red Army meant that the supply of air defence artillery ammunition could not keep pace with the use. The stock levels (particularly ammunition and food) worsened by the day. The growing enemy resistance with tanks increased the use of ammunition considerably. The situation on the railways did the rest; instead of the usual four trains per day, there were only 2.5 trains a day between 16 and 29 July, and these were often carrying ammunition that was useless to Panzergruppe 4.

The commanders of Panzergruppe 4 and its two armoured corps constantly drew attention to the precarious logistic situation. Nonetheless, they also expressed their displeasure at the fact that the offensive to Leningrad was not to be resumed immediately. Only because of the threat to both flanks could they raise any understanding for the orders of the army group to stop and wait.

There were other causes of the logistic crisis. On 22 July, Panzergruppe 4 reported that it had lost 12% of the wheeled vehicles and 15% of the armoured vehicles. On top of that, some 20% of the wheeled vehicles and 30% of the armoured vehicles were constantly being repaired. So on average, the units never had more than 40-50% of their combat power. Consumption should have fallen accordingly, but because of the constant and intensive fighting, this was actually increasing.

The consumption per day of battle was estimated at one eighth of the standard ammunition ration. That indeed turned out to apply to most types of ammunition, but the use of artillery ammunition proved to be considerably higher, sometimes even as much as half of the standard ration. Added to this was the fact that, because of the growing resistance after the beginning of July, virtual-

ly every day was a day of combat. The result was that, in mid-July, Panzergruppe 4 was using 415 tons of ammunition per day, while the calculations had been based on 210 tons. The organically assigned ammunition loads could not be replenished in any phase of the battle. The shortages sometimes amounted to 50-70%.

When Panzergruppe 4 resumed the offensive on 8 August, the organically assigned ammunition load had indeed been replenished, but it was not possible to accumulate any more supplies. The attack time proposed by Panzergruppe 4 was changed six times by Army Group North, apparently because of the threat to the flank. But it was also the critical logistic situation that had made it impossible to continue the offensive any earlier.

Source: Ch. W. De Beaulien, '*Der Vorstoss der Panzergruppe 4 auf Leningrad*', Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, Neckargemünd, 1961.

ANNEX A

Command and control warfare

5A01. **Command and control warfare (C2W)** is the use of **all military means** to neutralise the capacity of the enemy command and control, while at the same time protecting friendly command and control. The aim is to gain and retain the initiative and deny it to the enemy.

5A02. Command and control warfare consists of the integrated use of:
- physical destruction
- electronic warfare
- deception
- psychological operations
- operations security

The elements are also known as the **'pillars' of command and control warfare**. They rest on a foundation of communication and information systems and all-source intelligence. Their **integrated use** improves the friendly situation awareness, while adversely affecting that of the enemy.

5A03. Command and control warfare forms part of the decision-making process and is incorporated as part of the operation plan. A distinction is made between **offensive** and **defensive** command and control warfare.

Offensive command and control warfare

5A04. The objective of offensive command and control warfare is to disrupt and deceive the enemy's command and control and to nullify its effectiveness or at least reduce it at the decisive moment. It can be applied at all levels. Command and control warfare can affect the enemy's capacity to generate combat power because it leads to a situation in which:
- the tempo of the enemy operation is reduced
- the integrated operation is disrupted
- the enemy's decision-making process is disrupted
- the enemy's will to continue the battle is broken

5A05. In order to disrupt, deceive and reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's command and control, particular use is made of the elements of **electronic warfare, physical destruction, deception and psychological operations**. Offensive command and control warfare targets command and control elements selected in advance, such as command posts and reconnaissance means.

5A06. Before the actual combat operation begins, **electronic intelligence** contributes significantly to the collection of information. Based on the results, elements such as jamming units can be deployed. However, these results are not accurate enough for a specific deployment of weapon systems. For this, additional target acquisition systems need to be deployed.

5A07. The elimination of reconnaissance assets, as well as the related communication and information systems, requires precise weapon systems with a long range. This can be achieved with air support, but also with combat helicopter units, combat units and special forces.

5A08. Quickly changing circumstances and new, unexpected reconnaissance results often offer the best opportunities for attacking the enemy command and control system. Command and control warfare must be able to respond quickly in this respect.

Defensive command and control warfare

5A09. Defensive command and control warfare aims to protect friendly command and control and to reduce the effects of enemy activities targeted against it. Without effective command and control, there is a risk that freedom of action and initiative will be lost and that combat power will be deployed in the wrong way, whereby the entire operation could fail. Defensive command and control warfare makes particular use of operations security. The most important objectives are as follows:
- to reduce the vulnerability to physical attacks on command posts and command and control systems
- to counter the effects of enemy electronic warfare
- to prevent the enemy from using friendly command and control to obtain information
- to ensure that the enemy's psychological operation has no effect

Deception

5B01. **Deception** is the range of measures used to portray a situation designed to make the enemy act in a way that is disadvantageous to him.

5B02. Deception has the following **objectives**:
- to achieve surprise
- to maintain security
- to increase the freedom of action
- to reduce friendly losses

Deception measures at the tactical level can include all activities from the function of protection.

5B03. Deception measures are divided into **offensive** and **defensive measures.**
a. **Offensive deception measures** consist of the dissemination of false information to mislead the enemy with regard to friendly plans or to put him at a disadvantage in another way. Offensive deception measures are designed to achieve surprise and retain the initiative.
b. **Defensive deception measures** consist of misleading an enemy who has the initiative. These measures entail diverting attention from actual positions and targets. They are designed to heighten security and create favourable conditions for a follow-up operation.

5B04. A number of **principles** of a deception operation can be identified. These include the following.
- The deception must aim to achieve a **clearly defined objective** which reflects the desired results and supports the operation plan.
- Single leadership of the operation is essential. Deception activities which extend beyond the immediate tactical objective must be coordinated with the next higher level.
- The success of deception depends strongly on a **high degree of coordination and cooperation between the staffs and staff sections**. Deception, when uncoordinated between levels, leads to confusion among friendly troops and compromises the deception plan.
- The deception operation **must be aimed at the enemy commander** and his staff and must be based on their probable responses. All measures that form part of the deception plan must be prepared thoroughly.
- The deception operation must be **consistent and logical** and, if possible, correspond to the expectations held by the enemy. If this is not

possible, the false information must be relayed to him indirectly through sources which he considers to be highly reliable.

- The false information must be transmitted to the enemy through **as many channels as possible.** However, the more channels that are used, the more complex the deception operation becomes.

5B05. The **object of deception** is the enemy commander and his staff. The following factors play a role in determining the object in a deception operation.

- The **human mind** has a number of characteristics that make it vulnerable to deception: preconceived ideas, the habit of interpreting information according to previously acquired information or wishful thinking, the desire to avoid uncertainty, the tendency to filter information and the hypnotic effect of the regular provision of information.
- The effect of deception must be reached **within a particular time frame**, but in such a way that the information can play a role in the enemy's decision-making. The required amount of refinement is proportional to the envisaged duration of a deception operation.
- Knowledge of **national characteristics** is important in determining the level of sensitivity to certain deception techniques.

DECEPTION IN OPERATION *LIGHTFOOT* IN OCTOBER 1942

Montgomery's plan

'...The main attack was to be carried out by 30 Corps in the north, whereby two corridors would be made through the enemy minefields and barricades. 10 Corps was then to pass through these corridors and attack the main enemy supply roads. The German tanks would then attack there and, I hoped, be destroyed by us.' (Montgomery's memoirs). This was the core of Operation *Lightfoot*, with which the British wanted to seize the initiative from the Germans in North Africa once and for all.

In the flat desert with the as yet limited British air superiority, it proved virtually impossible to keep the preparations hidden from Rommel's German Africa Corps. Montgomery, the commander of 8 Army, who wanted to break through Rommel's El-Alamein line, decided to leave the surprise element as much as possible to the tactical level. He also wanted to keep the enemy in the dark as to the time and place of the attack, and that required a major deception plan: Operation *Bertram*.

The deception plan

Operation *Bertram* was based on the fact that strategic surprise was impossible, as Rommel could reasonably expect a British offensive after his defeat at Alam Halfa. The deception plan had to make the German intelligence system expect the main attack to take place in the south (in 13 Corps' sector) on 6 and

7 November. As a result, the two enemy armoured divisions (21 Armoured Division and the Italian Armoured Division Ariete) had to be fixed in the south, so that these divisions would not be able to reinforce the two armoured divisions in the north (15 Armoured Division and the Italian Armoured Division Littorio) in time. The combined combat power of these four armoured divisions could make it impossible for 10 Corps to continue the attack. The deception was to be achieved by keeping secret all actual intentions and troop movements in the north and by feigning activities in the south.

The entire deception operation was led by the headquarters of 8 Army. For its execution, a task group (A-Force) was formed with a camouflage company, field shops, engineer units and local workers, who made large quantities of dummy vehicles, dummy weapons and dummy equipment.

One of the deception measures was the dissemination of false information and rumours to the extensive German and Italian espionage network in North Africa. The assault troops of 10 Corps also held training exercises in 13 Corps' sector, with the emphasis on movement in a south-easterly direction. Several division headquarters provided radio signals which suggested an attack in the south.

A dummy pipeline was laid from the coast to the south. At the end of September, the laying began with such speed as to suggest that the pipeline had to be ready by the beginning of November. It was over 40 km long, started at the water supply point at El Imayid and was supposed to end at Samaket Gaballa. Dummy railway tracks were made out of old jerry cans; the dummy

One of the aims of the deception operation was to fix the armoured divisions, which only had enough fuel for a single deployment.
Photograph: Military History Section

pipeline was made in the same way. When one section had been completed, the material was removed at night and taken to the next section and the trench filled in. Dummy pumping stations and supply points were set up in several places.

From 7 October, a service support area was set up a few kilometres east of Samaket Gaballa with 9,000 tons of supplies and 700 dummy vehicles and tanks. A fortnight later, this area was ready.

The assault troops of 10 Corps were accommodated in three assembly areas for training activities. An advance assembly area for 10 Corps lay 40 km further to the west next to 30 Corps' sector. The British had no illusions about the fact that such an assembly area of 20 by 15 km would not have escaped German observation. In the weeks before the attack, a pattern of training activities was built up and sustained until the time of the attack (the night of 23-24 October). The moment the assault troops left their assembly area, their places were filled by dummies. For the move to the forward assembly area, the tanks were covered with wood and jute to look like trucks and moved via the normal service support routes. The German air reconnaissance was thus given a picture of activities which suggested a normal training pattern.

Operations security

It was clear to Montgomery that the assault troops should be told nothing until all leave was cancelled and all contact with the outside world had been cut off. On the other hand, Montgomery did not want to create any premature unrest with an official curfew in Cairo and Alexandria. He gave the following instructions for operations security: the assault troops were to be informed of the operation as follows:
• Brigade commander and commanders
   of engineer units   on 28 September
   commanders of other units   on 10 October
   company, squadron and battery commanders   on 17 October
   any others   on 21 October

- All leave was to be cancelled on 21 October. This was not to be done via written orders, but orally, the motivation being indications of a German attack.
- No-one, regardless of rank, was to leave the combat zone once they had been informed about the operation.

None of the troops on the FLOT were given this information. They were not to be notified until 23 October.

The course of Operation *Lightfoot*

Operation *Bertram* was at that time the largest and most successful deception operation that had ever been conducted. Prisoners of war and captured documents show that the deception operation achieved its objective. When General Von Thoma, acting commander of the German Africa Corps was taken prisoner, he told his captors that an attack with three armoured divisions was expected in the south. The concentration of 10 Corps in the north had been completely unnoticed. That is why 21 Armoured Division and Armoured Division Ariete were only moved to the north four days after the British attack. However, Operation *Lightfoot* ran aground, albeit for other reasons. It was not until 2 November that the El-Alamein line was breached in Operation *Supercharge*.

Source: Eugen Weyde, '*Die trojanische List - Zur Theorie und Praxis der unkonventionellen Kriegführung*', Markus-Verlag, Cologne, 1965.

ANNEX c

Civil-military cooperation

5C01. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) refers to **cooperation with the national civil and military authorities** and the population in the area of operations. Cooperation with non-governmental and/or international agencies, organisations and authorities working in the area also falls under civil-military cooperation.

5C02. CIMIC **activities** are geared towards **gaining operational advantages for the unit, improving the security** of friendly personnel and **engendering trust** among the civil authorities and the population. Local civil capacity within the mission area is used to support the military units and to gain an operational advantage through intelligence, more security and greater freedom of action. The knowledge and expertise of specialists is needed for many tasks with regard to civil-military cooperation.

5C03. Civil-military cooperation **forms part of the operational planning as a whole and the execution of an operation** and thus represents an integral part of the activities of a unit's staff.

5C04. Civil-military cooperation can be divided into the following **sub-areas**:
• humanitarian aid
• administrative activities
• cultural and religious matters
• civil facilities
• economic and logistic matters
• other CIMIC tasks

5C05. The cooperation in a number of these sub-areas falls outside the province of this publication. CIMIC **activities in the context of combat operations** can be identified in the following sub-areas.

5C06. **Administrative activities**, including a number of international and national (political) interests, such as tracing and arresting (war) criminals, proving (war) crimes and, if necessary, graves registration activities. Other areas of cooperation within this sub-area are:
• the protection of the civilian population and evacuation if necessary
• labour support for the military unit
• legal cooperation to enable the mission to be accomplished

- cooperation to make the accomplishment of the mission possible or easier
- cooperation with civil health care organisations in order to be able to fall back on them
- cooperation in respect of maintaining public order

5C07. **Cultural and religious matters,** in the context of the Geneva Conventions and to foster trust among the population. CIMIC activities in this sub-area are designed to protect buildings, works of art and other items with historical value.

5C08. **Civil facilities,** geared towards obtaining support with regard to energy and water supply, communication facilities and civil engineering activities. These tasks are also geared toward the (shared) use of civil infrastructure.

5C09. **Economic and logistic matters.** CIMIC activities in this sub-area focus on the possibility of falling back on:
- civil supplies
- civil transport
- civil repair, particularly of the (road) infrastructure which is important for the operation
- civil medical facilities
- movement control and traffic control

Other tasks are sub-tasks such as translation services, liaison and the provision of specific expertise regarding the local population and culture.

Psychological operations

5D01. **Psychological operations** (PSYOPS) are activities in times of peace, crisis and war, directed at hostile and neutral parties with the purpose of influencing their attitude and conduct with regard to political and military affairs. Well-executed psychological operations can, in combination with operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, provide a valuable contribution to the military potential.

5D02. Psychological operations have three objectives:
- to weaken the mental component of the enemy
- to strengthen the mental component of friendly forces
- to gain support among parties not involved in the conflict

5D03. Psychological operations can be either offensive or defensive.

5D04. **Offensive** psychological operations are designed to affect the will and enthusiasm of the enemy troops and population. In the decision-making process, weak points in the political, economic, social or military situation are determined and assessed according to their importance, accessibility and vulnerability. A coordinated and consistent attack is then launched on a selected target group. Use is also made of credible and, ideally, straightforward themes which focus attention on the previously established weak points in order to undermine the enemy's morale. This attack is carried out by using a combination of means: radio, television, press reports, articles in magazines, speeches, posters, pamphlets and flyers. Such an approach will sow seeds of doubt; for example, doubts as to whether the right policy is being implemented and about the competence and integrity of the leaders, the dependence on allies, the outcome of the war and, most importantly, one's own chance of survival.

5D05. **Defensive** operations aim to protect friendly morale and win the support of neutral parties or those not yet involved. Themes for these operations are geared towards reducing the enemy's prestige, negating the effect of his propaganda efforts and providing information about friendly intentions and measures.

5D06. Psychological operations can be split into **three categories**. This is primarily intended to simplify the division of responsibilities between national authorities, host nations and operational commanders. In practice, however, there is a substantial overlap between the three categories.

a. **Strategic psychological activities** are psychological operations which are conducted at the highest level in times of peace as well as war. Their objectives are long term and the operations are political in nature. Strategic psychological operations are always a national responsibility.

b. **Psychological consolidation activities** focus on the population in areas under friendly control. They aim to increase the freedom of action of the tactical commander by obtaining the support and cooperation of the local population. Psychological consolidation activities are performed in times of crisis and war and must be coordinated with strategic psychological activities. Psychological consolidation activities are a national responsibility if they are conducted in friendly territory. If they have to be conducted in another country, they fall under the responsibility of the host nation.

c. **Psychological activities on the battlefield** benefit friendly operations, normally for a short duration and in the short term. These activities form an integral part of the combat operation. They are designed to undermine the morale of enemy troops and the willingness of the enemy's civilian population to support the operation.

5D07. The **possible targets** of psychological operations are political, social, cultural, ethnic, religious or military groups. Because the resources with which psychological operations can be conducted are scarce, careful consideration must be given to the choice of target group. Account must be taken of:

• the vulnerability of a particular target group to a psychological approach
• the capacity of the target group to display the desired effect, be it among themselves or in respect of other groups
• the extent to which the target group has access to the media

5D08. Once a vulnerable and easily accessible target group has been established, a suitable **theme** must also be established. The considerations involved in this respect are as follows.

• The themes must be credible and verifiable. To meet these criteria, they must be based on detailed background information and on accurate knowledge of the existing situation.
• The themes must lead the target group to adopt a particular mentality and course of action which the target group feels is logical and realistic.

5D09. Psychological operations seldom have a direct result. **Time** is needed for certain ideas to come to fruition, as it is for undermining or strengthening morale and thus the willingness to fight. It is for this rea-

son that psychological operations must be embarked upon as early as possible and sustained for prolonged periods.

5D10. More than other activities, psychological operations require **coordinated planning at the highest level**. The execution takes place at all levels in as broad a context as possible. If this fundamental principle is not adhered to, the enemy can easily see through a psychological operation and friendly credibility is damaged. A consequence of this form of planning is that it limits the freedom of action for lower commanders to carry out their own psychological operation.

5D11. Psychological operations form an **integral part** of military operations. Plans must be developed at an early stage and should provide a supplement to the operation plan as a whole. Both the planning and the execution must be constantly adjusted to cope with developments in the psychological, strategic and tactical situation.

5D12. A close relationship between **intelligence activities** and psychological operations is vital. Suitable target groups and credible themes can only be determined on the basis of reliable intelligence. Good intelligence is also indispensable when it comes to determining the effects of psychological operations and making any necessary adjustments to the planning.

5D13. Psychological operations must be coordinated with public information and with CIMIC activities.

Road movements in the combat zone

General

5E01. Movements are used to change the location of troops, units and facilities. In the combat zone, movement by road is the most important method. The probability of engagement determines whether demands in terms of combat readiness take precedence over technical demands in respect of the movement itself.

Characteristics

5E02. By day, the enemy can localise road movements from the air. This is also possible to a lesser degree in limited visibility. Depending on the extent of air superiority, road movements present a target for air strikes. Any threat from the air should always be borne in mind in the planning and execution.

5E03. During the movement, constant account should be taken of disruptions. Hostile resistance, long-range weapon systems and special operations can suddenly affect progress considerably. Obstacles, civilian traffic (particularly uncontrolled movements of population and refugees), extreme weather conditions and poorly developed infrastructure can disrupt road movements in the combat zone.

5E04. The legal status in the combat zone influences the use of the available infrastructure. The movement requirement and the interests of the civilian population demand meticulous coordination between the commanders and the **civil authorities.** In principle, this coordination proceeds via the military territorial authority. The road network is divided as far as possible into roads with priority for military use and those with priority for civil use.

Planning

5E05. A commander may draw up a **traffic plan** in his area of responsibility. He may determine that, in his sector or in part of his sector, movements will take place on established routes and in a prescribed direction. He may also stipulate that certain routes may only be used if clearance has been given. Signposts or vehicle guides may be used on the routes.

5E06. Road movements in the most forward part of the combat zone take place after **centralised preparation** by the commander who holds the area responsibility. In the rearmost part of the combat zone, the movement plan is prepared by the territorial authority in coordination with the commander of the formation to be moved.

5E07. Thorough preparation is essential for the smooth progress of movement in the combat zone. All **available information** must be evaluated and issued to the relevant units before the movement begins. This applies particularly in the case of:
• reconnaissance results
• information from local government and population
• information from the territorial organisation and staffs in the combat zone

5E08. The following factors of influence need to be taken into consideration in the planning:
• the assignment after the movement
• time and space factors
• the effect of the terrain, particularly the available infrastructure
• the influence of the weather
• the probability of engagement on the ground
• air threat
• NBC threat

5E09. Movements can take place over one or more march routes or through a march sector. Only if there is no other possibility does the movement take place over a single march route. Moving over several routes shortens the duration of the movement and reduces vulnerability. A march sector is assigned in the event of limited infrastructure and particularly if troops are to proceed directly to engagement. Within a march sector, as many roads as possible must be used, even if only over short distances. Off-road movements take considerably longer, cause more wear and tear and lead to increased fuel consumption.

5E10. The **order of battle** during the movement is based on the forthcoming assignment. In the case of movements over greater distances, during which direct contact with the enemy is not expected, one option may be to move in column formation. Units under single command moving along a march route with the same destination form a march column. Larger march columns can be split into march serials; these are no bigger than a battalion. A further division of march serials into march units may be effective in creating a greater dispersal.
As well as movements in columns, time blocks may be used, within

which movements occur in irregular formations. This method is recommended for movements over short distances and in the event of enemy air superiority.

Units may have to engage in combat immediately after the movement. In this case, the movement is carried out in the formation necessary for the engagement. If the movement is carried out in order to occupy a new area, the choice of formation takes account of the terrain management in that area.

5E11. In **good visibility**, moving units are exposed to air reconnaissance and air attacks. Intensive dispersal, air defence and all arms air defence are therefore essential.

Limited visibility restricts the rate of march. The enemy is also impeded in his reconnaissance and target acquisition. If possible, movements take place in darkness. If darkness does not last long enough, it is better to begin the movement before darkness falls than to end it after day breaks.

Execution

5E12. The (march) units are assembled into march serials and march columns at **start points**. Unit commanders are responsible for the movement to the start point and for passing through the start point smoothly and without delays.

5E13. In order to ensure that movements proceed as smoothly as possible, it may be necessary to take steps to facilitate mobility. The emphasis thereby lies on:
• repairing roads
• maintaining and protecting bridges and other crossings
• preparing alternative crossings and routes

5E14. In the event that the movement is interrupted, the spaces between the various elements remain the same. In the event of a prolonged interruption, troops will move into waiting areas next to the march routes. Any **deviation** from the assigned march routes or the given timetable may disrupt the movements of other units. This may have major implications. If deviations have to be made from the movement plan, this must be reported to the movement control staff immediately.

5E15. If the area through which the movement is proceeding is contaminated with NBC agents, the commander determines on the basis of NBC

reconnaissance whether the contaminated area is to be crossed or circumvented. If a unit is attacked with NBC weapons during the movement, it first takes protective measures. The formation or unit commander then decides which elements of the units/formations should continue their movement and which should first be decontaminated.

5E16. A lack of march discipline is often the cause of disruptions in the movement. Every effort should be made at all levels to maintain march discipline.

5E17. Movements in the dark, in extreme cold and on roads through mountainous terrain often place heavy demands on personnel and equipment. In these cases, extra attention must be given to service support. Driving techniques must be adapted to suit the conditions. The rate at which the movement takes place will be lower.

5E18. At the release point, the groupings established for the movement are dispersed. The movement from the release point to the given march objectives is the responsibility of the unit commanders.

Functions in military operations

Command and control

5E19. The commander is responsible for the movements of his units. If he is also the area commander, he is also responsible for the movement control in his area. The movement is carried out in accordance with a **movement plan**. The plan may form part of an operation plan and contains all the technical measures needed to get units from the start point to the release point within the given time frame.

5E20. In the case of movement covering great distances (over 100 km), the decision may be taken to form a **movement control centre**. This could also incorporate representatives in charge of combat support and combat service support.

5E21. The execution of the movements is monitored and directed by setting up movement control. The movement control centre can then use specialist traffic elements and personnel assigned to the units. They are concerned with movement control and traffic control. **Movement control** involves all measures designed to ensure that the traffic and movement plans are properly implemented. Traffic control concentrates on a smooth flow of traffic and on maintaining march discipline.

5E22. It is difficult to maintain communications permanently during the movement. In the interests of operations security or the deception operation, electronic silence will be imposed during the movement. In the first instance, wire communications, couriers, traffic control posts and light helicopters should be used as means of communication. A prepared radio network should be available.

Protection

5E23. Each unit is responsible for protecting its movement. A formation or battalion can protect the front during a road movement with an advance guard. The advance guard is normally of team strength and consists of combat units, forward observers and engineer scouts. The advance guard must be capable of disposing of light resistance and of fixing a stronger enemy so that the following units have enough time and space to engage in combat. If a road movement is carried out in a rearward direction, a rear guard may be designated. The strength and formation of the rear guard must be such that it is possible to protect the moving units against a pursuing enemy.

Combat service support

5E24. Sufficient combat service support ensures that units can engage in combat at any time. Before the movement commences, units must have received full service support. During the movement, every opportunity must be used to supply the units with fuel and food. Immediately after the movement, all supplies must be replenished and the necessary repairs carried out on defective equipment. If the situation allows, expendable supplies can be replenished in waiting areas or at the march objective. March routes should at all times be kept clear by recovering broken-down vehicles quickly. Recovery capacity must be assigned to the march columns or kept on standby along the march routes. Depending on the situation, wounded personnel are taken to the march objective or evacuated to the nearest medical facility.

6 Troop and area organisation

Section 1 - General

0601. Army units are **organised** in two ways:
a. according to their function in operations
b. according to their place in the organisation

For an operation, units may be brought into a different chain of command or receive orders for tailored support. This grouping ensures the most effective combat organisation.

Section 2 - Functional organisation

0602. According to their function during operations, a distinction is made between:
a. **combat forces**, which find the enemy and use direct fire and manoeuvre to attack him.
b. **combat support units**, which provide fire support and other operational support for the combat forces
c. **combat service support units**, which sustain the physical component of combat and combat support units and thus provide service support for all units
d. **command and control support units**, which support the commander and his staff

0603. **Combat forces** consist mainly of:
• armoured forces: tanks and mechanised infantry
• light or non-mechanised infantry
• reconnaissance units, armoured and non-armoured
• armed or attack helicopters
• special forces

Armoured forces and light infantry are mainly involved in the close operation. Reconnaissance units and special forces will usually operate in the deep operation. Attack helicopters are extremely flexible and pos-

sess enormous combat power; they operate, therefore, in both the close and the deep operation.

0604. **Armoured forces** are primarily offensive in nature. Their mobility, fire power and protection mean that they are ideal for penetrating an enemy defence and for exploiting success in offensive actions. Because of their protection, armoured forces have great resilience and are well able to withstand enemy attacks and then launch counterattacks as part of a defensive operation.

0605. **Heavy armoured forces** (tank units) offer an optimal combination of off-road capabilities, fire power and protection and thus provide striking power for the armoured units. Their primary purpose is to engage enemy armoured units. Their performance is most effective in relatively open terrain with few obstacles.

Tanks on the attack, supported by mortars.
Photograph: Media Centre
RNLA

0606. **Mechanised infantry units** have limited off-road capabilities, fire power and protection. With their armoured infantry vehicles, they are able to alternate quickly between mounted and dismounted combat and combat on foot. They can thus be deployed in any condition. Mechanised infantry units make it possible for the striking power of the heavy armoured forces to come into its own under virtually all circumstances.

The versatility of its weaponry (including mortars) enables the mechanised infantry to fight in covered and uneven terrain. The mortars supplement the direct fire. Because of the complementary characteristics,

the mechanised infantry can cooperate directly with tanks in virtually any type of terrain. The versatility of this combination offers the possibility of regaining and retaining the initiative and forcing a decision. Mixed operations at battalion and team level are possible.

0607. **Light** (or non-mechanised) **infantry** has limited mobility and protection. The fire power is restricted to small firearms, machine guns, light and medium anti-tank weapons and light mortars. It fights primarily against enemy infantry and its (armoured) vehicles. It realises its full potential in covered and uneven terrain. At short and medium range, it is also capable of engaging other armoured vehicles and tanks on a limited scale. Mortars supplement the direct fire.

0608. **Reconnaissance units** have good observation and communication assets, but limited fire power. They are suitable for operating over a great width and depth. The most important tasks are conducting reconnaissance and providing security and monitoring. They are capable of finding the enemy, thus providing the higher commander with response time and security.

0609. **Attack helicopters** have enormous fire power, high tactical speed and a long range. They are thus highly versatile and capable of operating in deep, close and rear area operations. The speed and manoeuvrability compensate for the helicopter's vulnerability. Attack helicopters are particularly suited to situations with little response time and in which the terrain imposes restrictions on the ground troops. However, their deployment must be well prepared. Attack helicopters can be used to engage tanks, personnel and area targets and for reconnaissance and security tasks, with or without close coordination with ground troops. They can also operate against enemy helicopters.

0610. **Special forces** are units which perform tasks deep in enemy territory. These may be either reconnaissance or combat tasks. Special forces are therefore specially trained and equipped. They generally operate in very small groups and use secrecy and surprise.

0611. **Combat support units** support combat units and exert a direct or indirect effect on the enemy operation, improve friendly mobility and restrict the enemy's mobility or provide defence against the enemy air threat. Combat support units include the following:
- fire support units: field artillery and mortars
- engineer units
- air defence units

- electronic warfare units
- unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) units

0612. **Fire support units** provide fire for the operation with indirect laying. This occurs in the deep, close and rear area operation. The task of fire support units is to provide fire support for the battle by engaging targets:
- in the depth of the enemy territory
- immediately in front of friendly combat forces

An M109 A2/90 gun platoon in action.
Photograph: Media Centre RNLA

To do so, they can form and relocate surprise main efforts. Fire support units are also able to collect intelligence.

Mortars do not in principle operate outside the context of the (mechanised) infantry battalions and constitute an integral part of the fire power of these battalions. The fire power of mortars will nonetheless have to be integrated with the other available fire support means.

0613. Some land operations can be supported by **naval gunfire**. The field artillery is responsible for coordinating this fire. This asset can also be deployed in deep, close and rear area operations.

0614. **Tactical air forces** are not part of the RNLA, but can nonetheless be used in its operations. They are able to conduct reconnaissance and

engage targets. These targets may be either in front of the combat forces or in the depth of enemy territory. Given that availability is limited, they should mainly be used for targets which cannot be engaged by the army itself.

Mechanised infantry cross a water barrier with the aid of a ribbon bridge. Photograph: Communications Section, 13 Mechanised Brigade

0615. **Engineer units** provide primary support for combat forces and, where possible, for other units by conditioning the terrain to the advantage of friendly operations (mobility and protection) and to the disadvantage of enemy operations (countermobility). The mechanised engineer units are mainly intended to cooperate closely with mechanised units.

0616. **Air defence units** operate in conjunction with the air defence, which is organised at a higher level, including the air forces. To do so, they have gun systems, guided missile systems and organically assigned assets for target acquisition, warning and battle command. Air defence is conducted by countering any form of enemy air operation at very low, low and medium altitude. It is organised in units that are able to follow the manoeuvre in mobile combat and units that are less capable of doing so. Mechanised air defence artillery is the most suitable system to support combat forces in mobile combat. The relative scarcity of resources and the link with air defence systems at higher level usually mean that planning is centralised and execution decentralised.

0617. **Electronic warfare** units support the combat forces in the electromagnetic spectrum. The function of these units is to detect and jam transmissions by enemy units while at the same time protecting friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. The following possibilities are open to these units.

a. By seeking, intercepting and locating the source of enemy radio and radar transmissions and analysing the derived information, they can gain insight into the identity, deployment, combat organisation and plans, including, if possible, the main effort, of enemy units. This can be carried out up to a depth of 20-80 kilometres ahead of the forward line of own troops. The analysis of the radio transmissions received is confined to the general meaning. They thus serve as a collection unit for the 'intelligence and military information' function.

b. They can carry out jamming and deception tasks to damage the enemy's command and control. This takes place by order of the tactical commander in connection with manoeuvre and fire power.

c. They can mask friendly radio transmissions by jamming or deceiving enemy electronic reconnaissance means.

0618. UAV **units** have unmanned aerial observation systems, which are flown above enemy territory. These systems gather information which is used in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and for engaging targets.

0619. **Combat service support units** include:
- personnel replacement units
- medical units
- supply units
- transport units
- maintenance units

0620. **Personnel replacement units** have the task of taking in replacement personnel, providing them with service support, providing limited training and transferring them to their assigned units.

0621. **Medical units** are responsible for providing medical care for the sick and wounded. A distinction can be made in this respect between medical facilities responsible for the treatment and/or nursing of patients and ambulance units. Pharmaceutical tasks, supply of blood and other medical provisions are closely linked to medical care. Therefore, medical units at the first and second echelon (company/battalion level and brigade level respectively) usually have a supply task too.

0622. **Supply units** are units whose main task relates to the physical distribution of expendable items. In accordance with the demands of mobility and the method(s) of supply (direct delivery and/or collection), the supply units have organically assigned transport capacity for distribution and mobile storage. For the purposes of execution, mainly at levels below that of army corps, services such as field post and graves

registration are integrated in the supply service system and are carried out at the same locations.

Medical care in the field.
Photograph: Media Centre
RNLA

0623. **Transport units** are equipped with light, medium or heavy transport assets or a combination thereof. These units provide general support in the form of the transportation of personnel and/or equipment.

0624. **Maintenance units** are chiefly responsible for maintaining or restoring the required deployability. The availability of spare parts and evacuation capacity plays a vital role in this respect.

0625. **Command and control support** units are units which support the commander and his staff in the command and control process. They also include various units which could not reasonably be incorporated in the combat, combat support or combat service support units. The command and control support units include:
- staff units
- signal units
- intelligence units
- counter intelligence units
- military police units
- movement control units

The execution of tasks relating to psychological operations, civil-military cooperation and information also falls into this category.

0626. **Staff units** consist of specific personnel and equipment in order to make it possible for the commander and staff of all units to perform

their activities in respect of command and control. These activities also include administrative services and local protection.

0627. **Signal units** have a large number of different assets with which information can be provided within and between the command posts. Depending on the objective and type of these communications assets, they are either grouped regionally or linked directly to the command posts concerned.

0628. **Intelligence units** are specially trained and equipped for collecting and processing information. They have the capacity for:
- interrogating prisoners of war
- analysing terrain
- giving advice and assistance in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield

For the interrogation of prisoners of war, deployment of the units may, depending on the situation, be decentralised in order to gather information as quickly as possible. Terrain analysis teams can provide headquarters with specialist support for the analysis of terrain.

As well as these intelligence units, there are other units which collect information, such as fire support units and combat forces. This is, however, not their main task.

0629. **Counter intelligence units** advise the commander in respect of taking measures to protect friendly troops against the activities of enemy intelligence services, against sabotage, subversion and terrorism. In so far as the implementation of the measures taken by the commander require specialist knowledge or special powers, these units may also be responsible for the implementation.

0630. **Military police** units carry out police tasks for the troops and support the movement control units in (tactical) movement control.

0631. **Movement control units** are responsible for the preparation, organisation, coordination and control of movements.

Section 3 - Organisation of troops

0632. Land forces have the following groupings.

- **Organic units.** These are units which are already organised in peace-time according to a table of organisation. For deployment purposes, individuals and modules can be added to or removed from organic units, but they remain organic units.
- **Task forces**. These are temporary groups of units under one commander, formed to carry out a particular operation or assignment. The composition is generally set out in the operation order.
- **Formations**. These are groups of military personnel, ranging in size from a brigade to a joint force. They are organised as combined arms teams, which means that all functions in military operations are represented in the organisation. A **unit** is a generic term used for any group of personnel and equipment.

> The term 'formation' has two meanings:
> - the designation of a unit of brigade level or higher;
> - the geographical arrangement of units, vehicles or personnel.

0633. For an operation or battle, the organic composition must generally be adapted to a **combat organisation**. In this respect, the chain of command of organic units is changed in such a way that it is fully tailored to the forthcoming operation or battle. In virtually all cases, however, any shift in combat forces results in a shift in the related combat support and combat service support units.

When forming a combat organisation, the commander must take account of the demands of operational effectiveness and cohesion. Efforts must also be made to ensure that as few changes as possible have to be made to the combat organisation during the operation or battle. If this nonetheless becomes necessary, the change should be implemented during a lull in the battle.

0634. If a task force is formed, this can be made up in one of three different ways.

a. In the case of a **reinforced unit**, a sub-unit is added to an organic combat unit.

b. In the case of a **mixed unit**, one unit is added to the organic unit and another is removed. The number of sub-units thus remains the same.

c. In the case of a **unit-minus**, at least one sub-unit is removed from the unit.

GROUPING AND COHESION

Cohesion within military units is a phenomenon that is not easy to grasp: everyone has some idea of what it means, but it is difficult to give a clear definition. The fact that there is a link between the extent of cohesion within a unit and its military efficiency is clear. Aspects such as training, doctrine, tactics, collective proficiency, trust and friendship are also important elements. Much less clear is the question of which social conditions are the most favourable for military cohesion to thrive. Does unit cohesion flourish particularly well in the armed forces of democratic, 'open' societies? At first glance, this would seem to be a logical assumption. Doesn't cohesion after all need an 'open' climate, in which all ranks can make criticisms or suggestions and dare to accept their own responsibility for the whole organisation?

The Falklands War (1982) seems to confirm this line of thought. The Argentinian soldiers were adequately armed and undoubtedly convinced of the legitimacy of the 'liberation of the Malvinas'. But in the course of the battles, their military cohesion proved to be fragile. The young conscripts, many no older than 19, were poorly trained and doubted their own abilities. There was

British and American soldiers during the operation in Noord-Brabant. Photograph: Military History Section

no 'vertical' bonding with the officers. This became clear, for example, during the cease-fire negotiations. During the talks, the Argentinian commander asked whether his officers might be permitted to keep their personal weapons, particularly with a view to fending off disgruntled soldiers. Among the British units, on the other hand, the close cohesion was undisputed. The basis for this was the traditional regimental system, based on local and regional recruitment, which offered soldiers a 'home'. British soldiers make a career in 'their' regiment and can in principle be trained for any function or specialism in that regiment. Another characteristic is the great amount of responsibility assigned to British NCOs in training and combat. The Argentinian NCOs, on the other hand, were almost exclusively occupied with administrative tasks. They thus had hardly any tactical experience, which made it very difficult for them to command any respect among their troops on the battlefield.

British military history is rife with examples in which well-trained units trusted in their cohesion in order to defeat an enemy superior in numbers but less 'cohesive'. In the First World War, for example, cohesion was a factor of decisive importance. In the infamous 'killing zones' of this war, British units often found themselves in hopeless situations. Literature often refers to the example of the 2nd Scottish Rifles at Neuve Chapelle. In February 1915, the regiment lost 75% of its men, including all officers with the exception of one lieutenant, in a single morning. Nevertheless, the survivors managed to maintain a high level of cohesion: the unit fought on for two full days. As evidenced by later battles, the 2nd Scottish Rifles maintained this cohesion even after the regiment was taken off the front line and its 75% loss replaced with new personnel.

Nevertheless, the relationship between the 'open' form of society and military cohesion is not a hard and fast rule. Even in closed, rigid and undemocratic societies, military team spirit can flourish. The German *Wehrmacht* before and during the Second World War is a striking example. The German personnel system encouraged military cohesion by creating stability in the unit. To start with, soldiers were recruited on a regional basis. The divisions then provided all the training. Recruits were trained by the division's officers and NCOs in their own division depots. After their training, the soldiers moved in organic *Marschbataillone* to the front under the supervision of officers or NCOs, who then rejoined their division. In the division rear area, the soldiers received a further 2-5 weeks of supplementary training from instructors from the regiment which they were to join. The new recruits were not placed until the regiment was taken off the front line for recuperation. The veterans were thus able to look after the new soldiers in relative peace and quiet and show them the ropes in their new 'home'. On the actual battlefield, the officers shared the hardships with their men. Decisions which affected the soldiers directly (punishment, remuneration, transfer) were left as much as possible to the unit commander rather than to an anonymous headquarters a long way behind the front. In this way, the Wehrmacht impressed upon their soldiers the importance of unit cohesion. Because of this cohesion, the demarcations of rank were blurred in battle, even in the strict hierarchy of armed forces such as those of Nazi Germany.

Source: William D. Henderson, '*Cohesion, The Human Element in Combat*', Washington D.C., 1985.

0635. The largest organic unit of land forces is the army corps. These are generally binational or multinational. An **army corps** is split into divisions, which are usually national formations, and army corps troops. The corps troops include command and control support units and combat support units. If an army corps forms a link in the logistic chain, combat service support units are also included.

0636. The **division** usually has a fixed composition in organic terms. It consists of a division headquarters, brigades and division troops. The division can be reinforced for its assignment, sometimes with units of a different nationality. Supplementary logistic measures are required if the

division is reinforced or if friendly troops have to be placed under a different command. Division troops consist of command and control support units, combat support units and combat service support units. The division is the lowest level which can conduct sustained combat.

0637. The **brigade** is the smallest formation of combined arms. The brigades are capable of conducting combat independently for a limited period of time. There are various types of brigade.

- Because of its special combination of tactical mobility, varied fire power, protection and sustainability, the **mechanised brigade** is suitable for conducting all types of combat and the related tasks.
- Because of its great operational and flexible tactical mobility, which is only slightly limited by the terrain, the **airmobile brigade** is suitable for specific deployment options in all types of combat. It has varied fire power, including armed helicopters. Speed and surprise carry more weight than ground-based mobility, protection and sustainability.

There are also other types of brigade, such as armoured brigades (tank-heavy), mechanised infantry brigades, infantry brigades and light brigades (equipped with light materiel and thus able to make rapid strategic movements).

0638. In order to ensure smooth command and an effective division of tasks with regard to combat support or combat service support, a **group** may be formed. This is a unit consisting of a staff and a number of units with the same function; for example the field artillery group, the engineer group or the Command Support Group. Incidentally, the term 'group' is also used for the smallest unit within the organisation as part of the platoon.

0639. **Battalions** are the largest units of a single function or of an arm or branch. Battalions are deployed as part of the brigade. A battalion can also be temporarily converted to a battalion task force, as a result of which it can operate independently outside the brigade. It is then reinforced by combat support and combat service support.

0640. **Companies, squadrons and batteries** operate within the battalion. They consist of a staff and platoons, usually with the same composition. There may also be companies, squadrons and batteries as independent units within a brigade. If a task force of mechanised infantry and tank platoons is formed at company level, this is known as a team.

The requirement for tactical and social cohesion and the need for periodic recuperation in respect of personnel and logistics give rise to the principle that, at company and squadron level, once a combat organisation has been chosen, it should be changed as little as possible. The combat organisation at this level is only broken up temporarily and preferably not during a combat action.

Section 4 - Order of battle

0641. The **order of battle** of units for an operation or battle is expressed in command relationships and support arrangements. Depending on the situation, the kind of unit and the assignment, the best relationship is chosen; this can, incidentally, change during the course of the operation or battle.

0642. The **command relationships** give commanders the authority to give orders and instructions to assigned units. The following command relationships can be applied.

a. **Full command** (FULLCOM) is the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer for issuing orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national Services.
b. **Operational command** (OPCOM) is the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics.
c. **Operational control** (OPCON) is the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks, which are usually limited by function, time or location. With this authority, units concerned can be deployed and tactical control can be retained or assigned. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.
d. **Tactical command** (TACOM) is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
e. **Tactical control** (TACON) is the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish

missions or tasks assigned.

f. **Administrative control** (ADMINCON) is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.

Command relationships

Paragraph 0642 defines the States of Command as set out in AAP-6 (NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions). These definitions give meaning to various forms of command and are generally accepted within NATO. However, they are not defined on the basis of the same criteria and may, therefore, be open to different interpretations.

The following approach may help in interpreting the definitions given in paragraph 0642, although it is not binding.

In order to establish a command relationship, the following questions must be answered:
- can the unit in question be employed for any task and can assignments thus be given accordingly?
- if the unit in question cannot be given assignments, can it then be given certain tasks within the original mission received from the unit's higher commander?
- can the organisation of the unit in question be broken up or must it remain intact?
- are there restrictions in the use of the unit in question in the event of hostilities or are there restrictions in terms of time?

The command relationships are derived from these criteria:

FULLCOM	Unlimited authority to employ units for any purpose.
OPCOM	Authority to use units for any purpose, but on the assumption that the duration of the operation is limited. Parts of the assigned unit may also be employed for separate missions.
OPCON	Units may be used for any purpose, subject to certain restrictions. These specific restrictions may also relate to the timescale (duration of hostilities or part of the operation). The use of the unit is in any event limited, as it must be possible to withdraw the assigned unit at any given moment for a new mission with another unit or with its mother unit.
TACOM	The unit to be assigned is used to accomplish a mission which has already been ordered (e.g. by the higher unit or its mother unit). The receiving commander may be in charge of accomplishing that mission and order (sub) tasks in this respect.
TACON	The unit to be assigned has already received its orders from its mother unit. The receiving commander may only give orders in respect of manoeuvres, terrain management and local protection.

0643. As well as the command relationships, the order of battle for combat purposes can be expressed in **support relationships**. With this, an order for support is given, arrangements for which are made through coordination between the units. The command relationships remain unchanged.

- **General support** is the task of supporting a formation or unit in its entirety.
- **Direct support** is the task of giving priority support to a specified formation or unit.

Section 5 - Area organisation

0644. The **theatre of war** is that part of the ground surface, the sea and the airspace which is in any way involved in war actions. It may contain more than one theatre of operations. The theatre of operations is that part of the theatre of war in which a joint force is needed to conduct and support military operations.

Schematic presentation of the area organisation.

0645. A **theatre of operations** consists of one or more combat zones, the communications zone, the airspace (not necessarily confined to the airspace over the theatre of operations) and any part of the sea from which the land operation can be influenced.

0646. The combat zone is the area needed by land forces to conduct a land operation. The part of the combat zone where army corps operate is the **forward combat zone**. The area behind the rear boundaries of the

army corps is the **rear combat zone**. The **communications zone** is the rearmost part of the theatre of operations. It lies behind the combat zone and borders on it. It contains the lines of communications (LOC) and the installations for supporting the troops in the combat zone. The LOC run from the combat zone via the communications zone to the logistic bases in the Netherlands.

0647. Formations and units are usually assigned a **sector** for the accomplishment of their mission. This is the **area of operations** of the commander in question. In this area, the commander is responsible for setting up and maintaining installations, controlling movements and conducting tactical operations with the troops under his command.

Based on a unit's order of battle and situation, an **area of influence** is created. This is the area in which the battle can be influenced by the use of weapon systems. If this goes beyond a sector boundary, support can be given to an adjacent unit, provided coordination takes place.

7 Joint and multinational operations

Section 1 - Introduction

0701. This chapter describes the fundamentals governing **joint and multinational operations.** Although the various aspects of these operations are usually prepared at the strategic and operational level, their execution also needs special attention at the tactical level. After all, the Royal Netherlands Army operates with armies of other nationalities in many situations. Furthermore, virtually all operations are conducted in close cooperation with other Services.

0702. Participation in combat operations is almost always based on multinational and joint cooperation. This chapter, therefore, looks at the fundamentals for this cooperation.

Section 2 - Joint operations

0703. **Joint operations** are integrated military operations which are in principle conducted with other Services, such as the navy or air force. This does not, incidentally, preclude cooperation with other organisations such as the civilian police, intelligence services, customs authorities or merchant navy. Cooperation with non-governmental organisations is also a possibility.

Joint planning at the division command post. Photograph: Media Centre RNLA

0704. In order to bring about an **integrated operation**, the participants must be aware of each other's capabilities and limitations. There must at least be a mutual understanding of each other's doctrines and procedures. Joint planning at the level of the joint force as well as coordination and liaison at the executive level pave the way for effective, synchronised cooperation. Joint planning and direction of operations are also vital in a national context, either at home or in a foreign theatre of operations. This is the only way to ensure that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. As in the case of multinational operations, joint operations require intensive education and training.

0705. **Relationship between land and air operations**. With their fight for air superiority, air forces conduct a battle that is essential for the land forces. By removing or reducing the threat posed by enemy air operations, the commander of the ground component is given the freedom of movement needed for his operations. Air forces can also make a real contribution to the operations by ground forces by providing support from the air in the following ways:

- air defence operations with, for example, the deployment of air defence fighters and ground-based air defence missiles to protect the ground forces
- helicopter deployment, in support of air mobile operations or in an air-mechanised role
- offensive air support, including:
  - battlefield air interdiction
  - close air support
- armed reconnaissance
- airborne command and control facilities
- airborne intelligence and EW facilities
- combat search and rescue (CSAR)

An armed F16 on the way to its target.
Photograph: Audio-visual Service RNLAF, Soesterberg air base photographic flight

0706. **Relationship between land and naval operations.** Support by naval units focuses on free use of the sea, partly for the purpose of conducting the support operation. The aim of this is to keep the lines of communications (LOC) open to enable the land forces to continue with their task. For the navy, these operations are always multinational operations involving other NATO navies. After an amphibious operation by marine units, ground forces can also be deployed from the sea. If they have had special supplementary training, they can themselves take part in amphibious operations. Some of the ways in which naval operations can support operations by land forces are:

- protecting land operations from the sea
- ensuring free use of the sea to guarantee support and prevent encirclement by the enemy
- cutting off enemy sea lines of communications
- firing on land targets in support of land operations (naval gunfire and naval cruise missile support)
- forming part of the integrated air defence
- performing and/or escorting and protecting sea transports
- putting ashore units and/or supplies
- preparing and/or conducting an evacuation by sea
- making command and control means available
- amphibious operations

Functions in military operations

Command and control

0707. The synchronisation of the activities of the various components is complicated by the different operational and tactical interests of the individual Services. The **command structure** must support the commander in this synchronisation in such a way that the common interest always prevails over that of a single Service. When setting up the command structure, the commander must, within his own responsibility, give a clear indication of the division of responsibilities. This division may relate to functional sub-areas, but may also relate to time phases in the operation. He must also ensure an effective span of control and a feasible organisation. Command relationships must be clear and detailed. When forming the command structure, the joint commander is dependent on higher political or military considerations. These may even influence tactical command structures.

0708. **Effective communication** is necessary for the command and control. The commander should take measures to safeguard the communi-

cations. Synchronising the deployment and use of communications equipment and frequency management are certainly included in these measures. Attention should also be given to exercises in procedures and the use of each other's communications assets. It is not merely a question of interoperability and compatibility of equipment and software, but also of mutual cooperation, coordination and an understanding of each other's jargon and terminology.

0709. It may be necessary in the case of joint operations to set up one or more specific **coordination centres**, whether or not on a permanent basis. Examples of these are:
- a coordination centre for air and land operations at army corps headquarters level
- an airspace control element at the level of army corps, division and brigade headquarters
- a naval gunfire support coordination centre

0710. In his plans and orders, the commander must incorporate **coordination measures** to ensure coordination in the operation. He must, therefore, establish the fire support coordination line. Between friendly units and this line, which is easily recognised in the terrain, air forces only operate on the basis of prior coordination. In the case of close air support, the local coordination is in the hands of a forward observer or a tactical air control party. This is because of the presence of friendly ground forces in the immediate vicinity.

Intelligence

0711. The **exchange** of information and intelligence between the various parts of a joint formation is something that must be carefully coordinated. The commander can develop a special organisational element that maintains the contact with all external and internal collection units. The commander must pay particular attention to the creation of a common target acquisition procedure.

Manoeuvre

0712. If possible, the forthcoming operation must be practised. This can be done by means of a small-scale map exercise, a computer-aided exercise or an actual exercise in which all procedures and aspects are adequately covered. The commander must make constant use of lessons drawn from recent similar types of operation to evaluate his current procedures.

Fire support

0713. In joint operations, too, **fire support coordination and synchronisation** are the key to the effective execution of fire support. The commander must organise his staff in such a way that the fire support coordination centre is able to coordinate and synchronise the fire support assets of the various Services: field artillery, air support and naval guns. The commander can thus ensure that fire can be delivered on a target at the right time using the most appropriate fire support means. This method of coordination is also an essential measure in preventing fratricide. One of the most important measures is the timely reporting of mutual capabilities and limitations as well as the required procedures.

Protection

0714. The **survivability** of a joint formation is of the utmost importance. In order to guarantee this aspect, high priority is given to establishing agreements and common procedures. The protection of personnel and equipment must result in minimal and balanced attrition. Excessive losses in one of the participating contingents may have far-reaching political implications. The commander must, therefore, pay particular attention to:
• operations security
• identification and recognition procedures
• deception

0715. Use of the available **air defence** must be coordinated in order to deploy these units as effectively as possible in a balanced mix of gun and missile systems. Procedural agreements must also be made in order to prevent overkill and to guarantee the safety of friendly helicopters and aircraft. The tactical commander uses his assets primarily for the protection of his formation as a whole. The commander must also take supplementary measures with regard to airspace control.

Service support

0716. At the tactical level of joint operations, the combat service support encompasses the capabilities for carrying out the operation with the organic tactical service support assets. At this level, the essential functions of supply, transport, maintenance, medical support and personnel care must enable the commander to accomplish his mission. A good combat service system provides the right support at the right time in the right place. The link with national logistic support and the way in which it is carried out must be arranged in detail before the formation is deployed.

Section 3 - Multinational operations

0717. In principle, the Royal Netherlands Army's operations are **multinational operations**. There may already be an international alliance as a result of a previous agreement or such an alliance may be assembled on an ad hoc basis.

*Multinational cooperation
in practice.
Photograph: Media Centre
RNLA*

0718. Multinational operations are usually based on **political considerations**. The political and military risks are thus spread among several countries. In addition, multinational operations are often necessary to assemble sufficient troops to help to resolve a conflict. In terms of preparation and execution, multinational operations are more complex than national operations. The participating units assigned to a force have different cultures, doctrines and procedures, different equipment and often different terminology. The same type of units from different countries have different capabilities because of a different organisational structure or training level. Attempts are being made within NATO to minimise these differences and thus achieve interoperability. However, the diversity of cultural backgrounds means that there will always be differences. In a multinational alliance, it is essential to understand these differences and take account of them. That is why commanders and their staffs must receive intensive training in operating with armed forces of other nations.

0719. Of the **basic principles of war**, two are of particular importance for multinational operations. These are the principles of 'objective' and 'unity of effort'.

a. A commander of a multinational operation must pay particular attention to the principle of **objective**: common goals which are clearly defined and understood by all involved and which contribute to the desired end state. The political reasons for the various nations to contribute to an operation often differ. The motivation to participate may also change during the course of the operation. Different national interests play a role in this respect, although often not explicitly. The commander must be aware of national political interests and take them into account. He must then formulate a good, clear, unambiguous and feasible objective for the operation. He will draw up a plan to achieve this objective, bearing in mind any national sensitivities.

b. For a successful multinational operation, a commander must at least achieve **unity of effort**. Each of the participating countries must grant the commander the necessary authority to do so. These powers can seldom be regarded as absolute. It is vitally important for the success of the operation that the commander obtains and retains consensus.

0720. As well as the usual **factors of influence** in an operation, a number of other factors are relevant to multinational operations. These are often difficult to identify and are not immediately tangible. Besides factors such as language and liaison, they are less concrete factors, which cannot guarantee the success of an operation, but can make it more likely to succeed. These are the following aspects.

• A good, direct and personal sense of **mutual understanding** between the various national commanders in a multinational operation is something that can only be achieved through good contact. A good analysis and understanding of the character, personality, abilities, ambitions and personal and professional habits of the commanders involved in a multinational operation are extremely important for the commander of this operation. With this, he can earn the respect and trust of his subordinate commanders. He must also be able to make compromises in order to achieve this. Good mutual understanding between the commanders at various levels results in successful teamwork by their staffs and subordinate commanders. All this benefits unity of effort.

• **Mutual respect** between the commanders is essential. All the commanders involved must feel equal, regardless of the nature and size of

their direct contribution to the multinational operation. An understanding of and consideration for each other's ideas strengthen the relationship. This requires respect for the cultural background, religion, values, norms and customs of the other commanders.

- Each of the participating countries has its own **cultural identity**. Commanders must get to know the abilities of the partners well in order to be able to make good use of them. These abilities are based on aspects such as national aspirations, political guidelines and restrictions for the national contingent, doctrine, organisation, rules of engagement, equipment, religion, customs and history.
- The partners must be involved in the **planning** of the operation and they must be able to have a say in the allocation of tasks and the formulation of assignments. In this respect, it may be necessary to weigh aspects such as the political consequences for the multinational operation in the event of heavy losses incurred by a partner against practical military solutions.
- Multinational staffs are often large, if only because all the countries represented wish to see a proportional number of their own officials posted at the right level. This means that the **decision-making** often proceeds more slowly than in purely national staffs. The consequences can be minimised by developing and implementing good standard operating procedures.

0721. Operating at the **tactical level** usually requires a more detailed approach in comparison to the higher levels. After all, the commander at the tactical level needs to arrange many practical matters with the commanders of flanking and supporting units as well as those units placed under any form of command or control. To do so, discrepancies in respect of tactical operations and standard operating procedures must be eradicated.

Functions in military operations

Command and control

0722. For the tactical commander, the **command structure** is usually a fact. This structure is imposed either by a higher military authority or as a result of political decision-making. Nonetheless, the tactical commander must retain the flexibility to adjust his command structure. In any event, unity of effort and coordination must be guaranteed. If the abundance of different national instructions make it impossible to implement single leadership, the commander may form a joint operations centre from which he will command his multinational units. This

requires not only personnel and equipment, but also language skills on the part of the staff of the operations centre.

0723. The **command relationships** must be clearly defined. One should also be aware that these concepts are often interpreted differently by other countries. It is necessary to state what authority has been granted to a commander. The relations between the joint force commander, his various national contingent commanders and their respective political leaders must also be established. An important point here is what authority, set out by the political leaders, is to be transferred to the joint force commander from the national chain of command.

0724. The choice of a **single language** for the command and control of the formation is essential. The use of abbreviations and national jargon must be discouraged. The commander will also promote effective communication by considering the following aspects:
- large-scale use of interpreters, if possible at all tactical levels and for all aspects of the operation
- use of glossaries for military and other concepts
- practising procedures and manoeuvres in the area of operations
- use of radio equipment and other electronic communication means for which interoperability and compatibility are guaranteed

The function of interpreting may in principle never be combined with that of liaison.

0725. It may be necessary to set up one or more specific **coordination centres**, either permanently or temporarily. Examples of these are as follows:
- a military operations and coordination centre
- a civil-military operations and coordination centre
- liaison officers or liaison teams

In multinational operations, particularly with non-NATO partners, the deployment of liaison officers or teams is essential in order to set up a good command and control system in a short space of time. Ideally, mutual liaison should be established in multinational operations.

0726. The **legal status** in the sense of Dutch military (criminal) legislation and the **legal authority** of a foreign commander to command Dutch units must be clearly established in advance. Clear agreements must also be made with regard to any supporting (civilian) personnel.

0727. Within a multinational staff, there must be unity of opinion regarding the **decision-making and command procedures.** The Chief of Staff plays a key role in bringing about this unity of opinion. Here, too, standard operating procedures make a positive contribution to the unity of opinion, certainly where personnel are relieved regularly.

Intelligence

0728. An open exchange of information is often complicated and laborious. The commander must in any event make sure that all **priority intelligence** necessary for the success of the operation is available to everyone. It may, therefore, be necessary to direct special requests to national governments for their cooperation; for example, permission to use information obtained by satellite. Any previous experience of a particular region gained by one of the participants in the operation can also be used as a source of information. The local population may provide additional information. Well-trained liaison teams are thus essential. The commander of a multinational operation must use as many of the national resources available within his formation as possible to gather the necessary intelligence.

Manoeuvre

0729. The commander of a multinational operation must take careful stock of the military capabilities of the various nationalities when establishing his manoeuvre. Differences in doctrine and equipment may or may not complicate a particular operation. The multinational force commander makes use of the strong points of the various national contingents. The correct use of the capacities and capabilities of each of the national contingents must exploit their strengths and compensate their weaknesses. If the various units and nationalities have never operated together before, procedures must be coordinated beforehand. Supplementary training must also be provided to allow procedures to be practised.

Fire support

0730. A greater number and variety of weapon systems will be deployed in a multinational operation than in a national one. This means that special attention is required for the **coordination of the deployment of fire support means**. The commander must organise his staff in such a way that the fire support coordination centre is able to coordinate and synchronise all the fire support means of all nationalities. In this way, the commander can ensure that timely fire is delivered on a target with

the most appropriate means. This method of coordination is also an essential means for preventing fratricide.

Protection

0731. Excessive losses on the part of one of the participating contingents can have far-reaching political implications. The commander must therefore pay special attention to:
• operations security
• identification and recognition procedures
• deception

Service support

0732. Service support is in principle a national responsibility. For multi-national operations, NATO procedures can be used as a basis in most situations.

To ensure that the participating countries can continue to participate in the operation at the same level, the countries agree beforehand on what is known as a **sustainability statement**. This states which logistic services will be supplied by the participating nations. The commander needs this statement in order to set up the logistic organisation and to determine his policy with regard to supply, maintenance and medical care. This statement takes account of:
• the expected duration of the deployment and/or operation
• the required level of deployability
• special operational, climatic or topographic factors which affect the logistic support and planning
• the expected number of casualties and the anticipated wear and tear of equipment

THE OFFENSIVE OVER THE 38TH PARALLEL IN KOREA IN 1950

Shortly after the beginning of the Korean war (1950-1953), an American captain wrote about the South Korean soldiers placed under his command: 'Late in the morning a lone sniper fired at us, and immediately my ROKs (Republic of Korea Army) went to pieces. Hysterical they lay on the ground with faces pressed to the earth, weapons pointed in the general direction of the enemy, firing wildly, wasting ammunition, completely out of hand.' The American officer added: 'And to make matters worse, most Koreans I have observed love to greet the morning sun with a song. This habit did not always fit into our security plan.' At the time, many Americans were able to identify with this condescending view of the South Korean brothers-in-arms. It was not until

later that the Americans learned to appreciate the South Koreans, because on many occasions during the campaign they proved themselves to be good soldiers.

The combat skills of the South Korean soldier were not the only initial source of concern to the Americans. It soon became clear that the South Korean government and the ROK high command preferred to make plans of their own. In the first place, the South Koreans were fighting out their own bitter civil war. The UN Security Council wanted to forge Korea, divided since 1945, back into a single state. To this end, the American Commander in Chief Far East, General MacArthur, was given command of contingents from fifteen UN member states. The South Korean army supplied about half of this multinational force. The South Koreans also wanted to unify the country - under their own administration - but they thwarted these plans with their ruthless treatment of the North Korean prisoners of war and civilians, thus alienating their 'brothers from the north'. Officers of the British contingent complained to the UN high command when South Korean soldiers mercilessly executed hundreds of 'subversive elements'. 24 (US) Infantry division said of their South Korean

A patrol in Korea.
Photograph: Military
History Section/W.W.
Dussel

comrades: 'Their ideas of treatment of a fallen foe are diametrically opposed to ours.' Western newspapers embarrassed the United Nations and the United States by publishing ever more frequent reports of South Korean war crimes. The Americans asked the South Koreans to exercise the necessary discretion in future, but the damage had already been done. The official UN account of events, which portrayed the fight against North Korea as a war of liberation, had lost almost all credibility.

The limitations of the multinational operations rose to the surface at a crucial point in the Korean war. At the end of September 1950, the UN coalition managed to force the North Korean attackers back to the 38th parallel. This parallel had marked the pre-war dividing line between the two countries. The question now was whether the UN force should sustain its offensive beyond the 38th parallel, if necessary as far as the border with communist China. The danger of escalation was considerable. China and Russia were openly threatening to intervene, a step to which the US might react with atomic weapons. The UN General Assembly and the American government nonetheless gave General MacArthur permission on 27 September 1950 to cross the 38th parallel. But the

South Korean government had already made it clear that its own armed forces, unaided if necessary, were to conquer the whole of North Korea. The objective would be the River Yalu on the Chinese border. 'We will not allow ourselves to stop', stressed the South Korean President, Syngman Rhee. So blatant were the South Korean intentions that American correspondents were able to get to the front in time to see the first of Rhee's troops cross the 38th parallel. The 3rd (ROK) Division advanced at high speed along the coast towards the north. It was a strange sight to behold: the South Koreans hunting down their disorderly, retreating enemy day and night, on foot or even in civilian vehicles. In just a few days, 3 Division covered 150 kilometres. For most of the advance, the division headquarters had no communication with a higher (American) headquarters. There was no flank protection whatsoever.

Once the other South Korean divisions had also crossed the 38th parallel, the Americans and the smaller UN contingents followed. The offensive proceeded extremely well, but in practice the multinational character of the fighting caused confusion. That happened, for instance, at Sariwon, a few dozen kilometres to the south of the North Korean capital, Pyongyang. 'There were many times during that wild night in Sariwon when UN soldiers thought the North Koreans were South Koreans coming up from the south with the 24 (US) Div, and the North Koreans thought the British were Russians', wrote the American military historian, Roy Appleman, about the chaotic situation. Groups of unsuspecting soldiers exchanged thanks and cigarettes in the darkness. 'One group of North Koreans greeted a platoon of British Argylls with shouts of 'comrade!' and, rushing forward in the dim light, slapped the Scots on the back and gave them the red stars from their caps as souvenirs. The ensuing fight was at very close quarters.' At the end of October, the first South Korean soldiers had arrived at the border river Yalu. At the same moment, the Chinese Red Army joined the battle. Reinforced by Mao's troops, the North Koreans forced the UN units back towards the south, until the front line stabilised more or less along the 38th parallel in the spring of 1951. The Panmunjon cease-fire agreement (July 1953) confirmed the reinstatement of the pre-war dividing line between North and South Korea.

Source: Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950)*, US Army in the Korean War series, Washington D.C., 1961.

8 Operational planning for post-conflict operations

Section 1 - Introduction

0801. This chapter describes the fundamentals for the planning and preparation for a post-conflict operation as well as the transition from a combat operation to a **post-conflict operation**. Post-conflict operations are those which follow on immediately from a successful combat operation and are designed to lead ultimately to the strategic end state desired by the political leaders. For his operations at tactical level, the commander must be aware of the intent of the higher levels in order to be able to prepare a post-conflict operation properly. A post-conflict operation ends with the transfer of responsibility to the designated civilian organisations.

0802. **The end of an armed conflict** cannot always be precisely identified. The transition from a state of war to a state of peace is sometimes very gradual. An armed conflict can be suspended or ended in the following ways:
a. peace settlement
b. cease-fire
c. general truce
d. capitulation

0803. The clearest way to end a state of war is to agree on a **peace settlement.**

0804. A **cease-fire** merely suspends the use of arms in a conflict temporarily, locally and above all at a particular level. It may be unilaterally announced or agreed by more than one party, usually for a specific purpose, such as rescuing casualties or evacuating civilians.

0805. A modern method of ending a state of war is the **general truce** for an indefinite period, which in practice is subsequently seen as a definitive termination of the state of war. Although a general truce brings to an end combat actions everywhere, it may, for example, only apply to the land forces. The termination of combat actions means that weapons

are no longer used. If more is required, specific agreements must be made. The aim of a truce is usually to provide the opportunity for negotiations which can lead to peace. Although a truce does not, therefore, officially represent an end to a war, from the point of view of the development of international law, it is regarded as such.

0806. Under international law, a **capitulation** is an agreement between the commanders of warring parties, whereby conditions are set under which troops will discontinue armed resistance. Every capitulation, even if it is unconditional, must contain stipulations regarding the point in time at which it enters into force and the area and units to which it applies. The capitulating units must allow the area previously controlled by themselves to be occupied by the opposing force.

0807. The conduct of post-conflict operations bears similarities to peace support operations as described in the Army Doctrine Publication Part III (Peace Operations). This chapter looks at the specific requirements that a commander must bear in mind in the planning and preparation for a post-conflict operation as well as for the **transition from a combat operation to a post-conflict operation**. The post-conflict operation is normally followed by the return to the peace location, which forms part of the completion phase. This chapter will not look at the completion phase in any further detail; this is described in the Army Doctrine Publication Part I, Chapter 10 (National Responsibilities) and the Army Doctrine Publication Part IV (National Operations).

Section 2 - Characteristics

0808. A post-conflict operation consists of **two distinct parts:**
a. a transition operation
b. a follow-up operation

0809. The **transition operation** involves activities which, on the one hand, focus on maintaining the safety of friendly troops, preparing for and executing the redeployment of troops and, lastly, safeguarding the transfer of responsibility to civil organisations and if necessary protecting these organisations. On the other hand, the activities are geared towards restoring public order and civil infrastructure, as well as minimising the impact of the recently terminated combat operation.

0810. The nature of the **follow-up operation** depends on the end state of the combat operation and the politically desired end state. This means that there are two options for a follow-up operation:

a. transferring tasks to the civil authorities, whereby the military resources may be given a peace supporting task

b. operating as an occupying force

0811. Once the fighting has ended or a truce has come into force, there must be a **smooth transition** from the combat operation to a post-conflict operation. During this transition, local and temporary fighting may take place in order to bring about the desired military end state.

0812. Even during the initial preparations for a combat operation, the operational commander, together with the political leaders, must concentrate on the ultimate realisation of the strategic end state, the conduct of post-conflict operations and the eventual transition to a permanent peace. Timely decisions regarding the units that are to be deployed and those that may be mobilised and their place in the combat operation as a whole are important factors for the operations at the end of the fighting. It is particularly important to anticipate the consequences of the combat operation, thus simplifying the transition from a combat operation to a post-conflict situation.

0813. For the execution of a post-conflict operation, the commander must, if possible, deploy **units other than** those deployed during the combat operation. Personnel would, after all, be required to make an enormous mental adjustment to cooperate with what was originally the enemy. Where the aim was in the first instance to destroy his combat power and military potential, the emphasis is now on, for example, restoring public order, building or rebuilding his infrastructure and performing other tasks which are the direct result of the recently terminated combat operations. Seen from the other side, friendly troops who were hostile in the eyes of the local population and warring factions will not immediately be regarded as impartial. The units deployed for the post-conflict operation must be instructed and trained in operating with strict rules of engagement. They must also recognise the need to understand the circumstances of the local population. These units must be strictly impartial in all their actions.

0814. Post-conflict operations impose specific demands on commanders at all levels. Also at lower tactical levels, a commander can be asked to use the means available for combat operations to perform other tasks, such as providing humanitarian relief or maintaining public order. Commanders must cooperate with civil authorities, international organisations and non-governmental organisations in order to smooth the way to restoring peace.

0815. The following tasks are among those that can be distinguished in post-conflict operations:
- security tasks
- restoring and maintaining public order and safety in cooperation with any civil authorities; this is to take place in the context of relevant agreements
- ensuring the basic necessities for the local population
- restoring airports, ports and roads
- assisting in the return and shelter of displaced civilians or civilian evacuees (transport and registration)
- cooperating with civil authorities, international organisations and non-governmental organisations
- registration, medical care, administrative processing and supervision of the return of prisoners of war
- providing emergency medical care and assisting in restoring medical facilities
- marking or clearing dangerous war equipment, explosives and mines
- ending local border disputes and issuing new maps
- preparing the transfer of responsibilities to a unit or civil organisation to be designated later

0816. A new outbreak of hostilities can disrupt a post-conflict operation. The commander must, therefore, take measures to allow his unit to recover from the combat operation as quickly as possible. He must also devote attention to the continued training of his unit. In addition, he must make contingency plans so that he is prepared for containing any new outbreak of fighting. The protection of his own unit is vitally important in this respect in order to prevent damage to either the unit or the post-conflict operation by individuals or remaining elements of enemy units with malicious intentions.

Section 3 - Planning

0817. In the **planning** for a post-conflict operation, the commander must take account of the following steps:
- a transition from a combat operation to a post-conflict operation
- conducting a possible follow-up operation
- transferring tasks and authorities to civil organisations

The planning of these steps forms an integral part of the operational planning before the start of the combat operation. The aim is to ensure a smooth transition to the desired end state. Once the fighting has ended, the commander must ensure that the suffering already undergone by non-combatants is eased as much as possible and that no addi-

tional damage is incurred. The planning entails the synchronisation of all relevant activities and a smooth transfer of tasks and responsibilities to the civil organisations.

0818. If the follow-up operation to a post-conflict operation is peace supporting in nature, the commander must apply a number of basic principles that differ from those described previously in this publication in relation to combat operations. These are partly at odds with the specific basic principles for combat operations (mobility, offensive actions and surprise).

0819. **Freedom of movement**. A sufficient degree of freedom of movement is essential for post-conflict operations. A force which cannot move freely in an area of operations in order to perform its tasks will fail to accomplish its mission. For example, routes must be kept free, even if they are not in use.

0820. **Transparency**. In a post-conflict operation, a force must act 'openly'. It is important that a post-conflict operation is not misinterpreted by the parties involved in the conflict or by the local population. The activities must not give rise to accusations about carrying out a hidden agenda. Measures concerning operations security must correspond with accepted requirements. There must be absolute clarity regarding the motives and intentions of the force. Any fault in this communication will arouse mistrust and fuel suspicions, whereby the development of credibility and confidence may stagnate. This will damage the co-operation and the prospect of a successful and early termination of the post-conflict operation. A good supply of information to the local population is extremely important in this respect.

0821. **Minimum use of force**. The international Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) stipulates that force may only be used proportionally and according to military necessity. The success of a post-conflict operation requires only a minimum of (necessary) force. This requirement limits where, when and to what extent troops continue to use force. Achieving long-term success in post-conflict operations also depends on the controlled and proportional use of force. A tactical success as a consequence of the use of force may result in failure in the long term. The principle of 'minimum use of force' may not be defined as no use of force. If the situation so demands, the commander may decide to use force once again.

0822. **Mutual respect** should not only exist between the military and civilian contingents of the multinational force, but also between them

and the leaders and troops of the party or parties to the conflict. Prejudices, chauvinism and a lack of consideration for sensitivities may lead to the loss of mutual respect and can in the long term damage the prospects for the successful termination of the post-conflict operation. It is, therefore, necessary to take account of laws, beliefs, customs and culture, both of the various friendly civilian and military contingents and of the warring parties and the local population.

0823. **Operating as an occupying force.** The post-conflict operations described in this chapter may be wider in scope if the units of the Royal Netherlands Army operate in a situation in which they, on the basis of the humanitarian law of war, can be designated as an occupying force in enemy territory. In this situation, they must be able to assume responsibility for the civil administration from the moment they occupy the area. In the preparations for the combat operation, this aspect must be fully incorporated in the operational planning, because the Land War Convention contains special stipulations regarding the rights and obligations of the (Dutch) national commander. Even during the conflict, while the combat operations are still in progress, it is possible for this occupation law to be brought into effect. An example would be to maintain law and order in a rear area in the interests of the safety of friendly personnel; another would be a situation in which a unit stays for a prolonged period in an assembly area. The fundamentals for operating as an occupying force are set out in the following documents.

a. **Land war regulations of 1907**. These regulations stipulate that the occupier is obliged to take all measures within his power to restore and maintain public order and public life. These measures must, unless absolutely impossible, be taken with due regard to national laws. The measures may not interfere with life in the occupied area any further than is necessary for the occupation.

b. **Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949**. This convention protects those who, in the event of a conflict or occupation, find themselves in the power of a party involved in the conflict or of an occupying power of which they are not citizens. The convention includes the protection of the population against the effects of war, the status and treatment of all protected persons and provisions regarding the protection of inhabitants of occupied areas.

c. **First Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions**. This protocol is a further addition and extension of the protection of civilians. In general terms, this protocol indicates that the intended military advantage of an action must constantly be weighed against the resulting disadvantage to the civilian population. This obligation also applies to the occupying force.

0824. **In the transition from a combat operation to a post-conflict operation**, the commander must take particular account of the following aspects:

- the safety of friendly troops, in particular immediately after hostilities have ended
- the disarming and demobilisation of enemy forces
- the provision of information to the local population

The result of this planning is a **transition plan**. This describes the way in which the units involved in the combat operation must prepare and execute this transition. This plan is based on planning information and the expected military end state.

0825. For the planning of any peace support operation, the commander must consider the aspects which apply to this type of operation and which are described in the Army Doctrine Publication Part III (Peace Operations). Special aspects which, in this situation too, require extra attention from the commander and possibly additional measures are **the protection of friendly units** and **the ability to continue to conduct combat operations** in the event of new outbreaks of fighting.

0826. The result of the planning must be an operation plan, geared towards the **execution of a planned peace support operation**. In this, the commander indicates which troops he is committing for this operation and which he is keeping in reserve. In principle, units that are not needed return to the peacetime location. This plan also sets out the necessary preparations, the deployment methods, the conduct of the operation and any preparations needed for the termination of the operation.

0827. For the planning of the **transfer of tasks and authority to civilian organisations,** the commander must take particular account of the following aspects.

- Even during this period, the safety of friendly troops must receive the constant attention of the commander. His first concern must at all times be the safe return of friendly units to the peacetime location.
- The commander must have timely access to information from the organisations taking over with regard to their position and structure, their equipment and personnel complement. However, getting this information can often be difficult.
- The authority of the civilian organisations taking over must be properly set out. Clear criteria must be established and these must be met before this authority can be transferred and the military units can depart. There should be a timetable for the transfer, with critical points and milestones.

0828. Other areas of attention in the planning of the transition are:
- establishing the command relationships
- the exchange or transfer of intelligence or military information
- the continuation of any current military emergency relief operations (for example bridge building and road repair)
- communication and liaison
- whether or not operations by international organisations and non-governmental organisations are to be continued
- destination of the supplies in the area
- termination or extension of existing contracts with local suppliers
- introducing a clear division of responsibilities between the civil organisations that are taking over and the departing military units

0829. The transfer must be properly supported by **press and public information campaigns**. The commander must adopt a proactive policy in this respect and ensure that the information is given in good time to the friendly troops and the civil organisations that are taking over as well as to the local population.

0830. The result of this planning is an **operation plan**, in which the commander describes how the transfer to the civil organisations is intended to proceed and indicates where and how he will concentrate his units to conduct the return of the unit to the peacetime location: the completion phase of the whole operation.

0831. The commander and his staff must at all times respond swiftly to changing circumstances, even long before the beginning of the post-conflict operation. In the planning phase, the commander must conduct the operational decision-making process for this assignment, too, and in any event take the following into consideration:
- constantly adjusting and refining the mission and the analysis
- assembling the necessary units and training these units for their tasks
- preparing and setting up logistic support
- preparing and setting up the command structure
- preparing the integration of all available and necessary means, obtained from coalition partners or allies and civil organisations

Section 4 - Execution

0832. The execution of post-conflict operations is described in the Army Doctrine Publication Part III (Peace Operations).

Section 5 - Functions in military operations

Command and control

0833. In the planning and preparation of a post-conflict operation, the staff section G5/S5 (CJ9), tasked with the conduct of civil-military operations, plays an important role. This occurs in close cooperation with the other staff sections. Section G5/S5 also works closely with, for example, legal advisers, the Press Information Officer (PIO) and the military spiritual welfare service. Liaison officers from civilian organisations and diplomatic representatives can also advise the commander in this process.

0834. The organic command structure of the unit must be maintained as much as possible in the execution of a post-conflict operation. A commander may decide to set up what is known as a CIMIC centre. All military activities with civilian organisations, international agencies and non-governmental organisations can be coordinated in this CIMIC centre. The latter in particular may have objectives which do not correspond with those of the other coordination partners.

0835. **The reorganisation of the units' areas of responsibility** deserves special attention, since after the completion of a combat operation, a transition from a combat organisation to an area organisation takes place. When establishing the boundaries of these areas, the commander must take as much account as possible of the civil structure that existed before the conflict. Ideally, the boundaries he selects are identical to municipal or other boundaries. The areas defined in this way may be considerably larger than the sectors that existed during the combat operation. If possible, the commander will choose a location for his command post in the immediate vicinity of the most important local political organisations. This simplifies communication and is extremely important in containing new outbreaks of fighting.

0836. Post-conflict operations always take place within an **international framework.** The official language used by the various participants in the operation and the international and non-governmental organisations will usually be a foreign language. Besides differences in nationality and language, these operations are characterised by the participation of organisations with different disciplines with regard to the provision of aid. Because of the need to coordinate with these (civilian) organisations, it is necessary that military plans are clear and understandable to non-military personnel too. The plans for the execution of the overall post-conflict operation must, therefore, be drawn up in such a way that

they are straightforward and comprehensible. Military abbreviations and jargon should either be avoided as much as possible or clearly explained. It is of vital importance for good communication between one's own unit and all the other parties involved in the operation that interpreters and translators are available.

Intelligence

0837. In post-conflict operations too, **intelligence collection** continues to be a constant activity. In order to carry out the post-conflict operation, the commander must also have access to intelligence which confirms the accuracy of assumptions that have been made. On the basis of this intelligence, he must be able to take measures or make timely adjustments to his plan. Information sources which can and must be used to complete this picture are the various civilian and non-governmental organisations. The commander also uses all the means available to him, as far as the situation during the post-conflict operation allows. The deployment of reconnaissance helicopters, special forces and possibly electronic means is virtually always an option. The exchange of military information with all those involved can improve and restore mutual trust. This can be seen as a special and positive gesture by the commander towards all the civilian agencies involved. Information must be distributed equally among the parties involved.

Manoeuvre

0838. In the execution of the post-conflict operation, the emphasis of the manoeuvre is on the **protection and security** of friendly units, certainly during the phase in which not yet all enemy units have been disarmed, demobilised or even completely disbanded. A small, mobile reserve must be able to contain any pockets of resistance which may become active. This reserve consists primarily of reconnaissance and heavy armoured units, mechanised infantry or airmobile infantry.

0839. **Tank units** also have a role to play in post-conflict operations. Their primary task is to achieve the necessary escalation dominance. They can reinforce and occupy key terrain. The commander might keep a tank unit as a mobile reserve.

0840. **Reconnaissance units** are needed to provide the commander with intelligence from the entire area of responsibility. The speed and mobility of these units mean that they are also ideal for frequent 'flag flying' throughout the area.

0841. **Infantry units** form the backbone of the entire operation. The commander can commit the infantry units for occupying key terrain, flying the flag, reconnaissance and observation, manning road blocks and checkpoints and collecting information and intelligence.

0842. **Attack helicopter units** are ideal for carrying out reconnaissance and observation. They also play a highly significant role in flying the flag. They are shown to their full advantage in cooperation with ground-based units.

0843. In the post-conflict operation, **engineer units** perform tasks in the context of the 'manoeuvre' function in respect of improving mobility. This consists of clearing friendly and enemy obstacles and minefields, as well as repairing roads and bridges. In the event of a follow-up peace support operation, this may benefit the transport and distribution of humanitarian relief supplies.

0844. The commander may deploy **special forces** to conduct reconnaissance. If the teams of these units have a command of the local language or have access to interpreters, they can also be used as liaison teams with local civil organisations and (previously hostile) military units. They can thus provide the commander with vital information.

0845. In a post-conflict operation too, **airmobile units** are ideally suited to carrying out surveillance tasks. As part of a reserve, they are able to respond quickly to possible incidents.

Fire support

0846. The use of **field artillery and air support** is not necessary in a post-conflict operation, except for a limited capacity to support the mobile reserve. A possible deployment option is the use of illuminating shells in the protection of friendly units. The commander may deploy **artillery and mortar-locating radars** for surveillance tasks in order to identify violations of agreements. This information forms the basis for taking protective measures. If there is no longer an organic task for these units, the commander may consider returning them to the peacetime location.

Protection

0847. **Engineer units** can make it their first priority to create protective shelters for the units in the area and protected storage facilities for freindly stocks and relief supplies that have been moved up. This pro-

tection is intended to safeguard friendly troops against terrorist activities. The stocks and relief supplies need to be protected against theft and looting. Engineer units must also safeguard the friendly supply process by carrying out road and bridge repairs. The emphasis here is on keeping friendly lines of communications open.

Engineer units can also play a significant role in restoring civil infrastructure, building shelters, disposing of refuse and repairing civil water supply and electricity facilities. Engineer units can also help by marking and clearing unexploded ordnance.

0848. **Air defence units** may be used to monitor the observance of a no-fly zone. If required, the commander can also commit these units to deny the use of part of the airspace above a particular object or area.

Service support

0849. All service support processes are vitally important and play a crucial role in the support of the units weakened in the preceding combat operation. The use of resources available locally and additional support with logistic means from the Netherlands may be necessary in this respect.

0850. The **medical support** for own units at the end of the combat operation requires a major effort, also to maintain the political and public support in the Netherlands. A typical feature is the transition from concentrated support focused on movement to dispersed and static area support. A post-conflict operation can demand the utmost from medical units, since they can also be called upon to provide emergency medical relief and assist in making the local medical facilities operational. The main priority, however, is to provide medical support for friendly units. The general idea is to ensure that the civil medical support ceases to be dependent on military support as soon as possible. In this respect, particular attention is required for restoring public health care and preventing epidemics. Identifying environmental hazards (arising from the combat operation) to the health of friendly troops, prisoners of war and the local population also takes high priority.

0851. In post-conflict operations, **military police** are primarily intended to provide police support for military units. Maintaining public order in cooperation with the local police is only possible if the mandate on the basis of which the operation is conducted offers the scope to do so. MP units can, if necessary, be used as a link between military and police deployment. In that case, their task is to maintain public order in situ-

ations which require a more robust police action but for which military means are excessive and may thus have an escalating effect.

0852. Once the combat actions have ended, the commander decides which units are the most suitable for conducting the post-conflict operation. In this respect, not only the outcome of the planning process, but also the quantity and quality of the units play a role. It does not, therefore, necessarily follow that units which form part of the reserve will conduct the post-conflict operation. The commander must, however, ensure that the units designated for this operation are brought up to strength. This is not done by changing the assignment of units but by using the **personnel replacement system** as much as possible.

Military operations require good planning, preparation, execution and completion. For a military operation to be successful, not only common sense is needed, but also professional expertise. This official manual of the Royal Netherlands Army will help to further the unity of opinion regarding the methods of operating.

The volume on Combat Operations describes the doctrine for operating in warfighting operations at the tactical level. Combat operations are all those military operations in which at least one of the warring parties has not consented to the deployment of troops and in which the objective is achieved by conducting battles or engagements. The nature of such operations is one of enforcement.

This doctrine is partly based on the experiences gained in military operations conducted by various armies during both World Wars, in Korea, the Falklands and the Middle East. A number of examples have been used to illustrate the way in which doctrine is applied in operations.