

 **Landmacht**

Royal Netherlands Army

PEACE OPERATIONS

ADP III



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Royal Netherlands A



Royal Netherlands Army

ARMY DOCTRINE PUBLICATION III

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Contents

Preface	9
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PART A

FUNDAMENTALS

Chapter 1

Introduction

Section 1	General	13
Section 2	Doctrine	14
Section 3	Peace operations	15
Section 4	Operational tasks	20
Section 5	Lessons learned	22
Section 6	Structure	23

Chapter 2

The international environment

Section 1	Introduction	25
Section 2	A changing world	26
Section 3	The intrastate conflict	30
Section 4	International organisations	33
Section 5	Other actors	49

Chapter 3

A general approach to peace operations

Section 1	Introduction	59
Section 2	The success of peace operations	60
Section 3	Peace support operations	72
Section 4	Other peace operations	81
Section 5	Consent in peace operations	82

Chapter 4

A military approach to peace operations

Section 1	Introduction	87
Section 2	Basic principles of military operations	88
Section 3	Rules of engagement and the use of force	102
Section 4	Functions in military operations	104
Section 5	Operational framework	115

Chapter 5		
Political decision-making and military command and control		
Section 1	Introduction	119
Section 2	Strategic decision-making at international level	119
Section 3	Strategic decision-making at national level	129
Section 4	Operational command and control in the area of operations	136
Chapter 6		
Support in a multinational framework		
Section 1	Introduction	145
Section 2	Support options	146
Section 3	Sources of support	147
Section 4	Support during the peace operation	148
Section 5	Command and control and coordination	152
Section 6	The logistic planning process	154
Section 7	Support in a UN framework	155
PART B		
OPERATIONAL TASKS		
Chapter 7		
Observation, monitoring and supervision		
Section 1	Introduction	161
Section 2	Characteristics	162
Section 3	Aspects of planning and execution	167
Chapter 8		
Preventive deployment		
Section 1	Introduction	177
Section 2	Characteristics	179
Section 3	Aspects of planning and execution	181
Chapter 9		
Enforcement of sanctions		
Section 1	Introduction	187
Section 2	Characteristics	190
Section 3	Aspects of planning and execution	194
Chapter 10		
Establishing and maintaining protected areas		
Section 1	Introduction	201
Section 2	Characteristics	202
Section 3	Aspects of planning and execution	205

Chapter 11		
Interpositioning		
Section 1	Introduction	217
Section 2	Characteristics	217
Section 3	Aspects of planning and execution	224
Chapter 12		
Forcible separation of parties		
Section 1	Introduction	233
Section 2	Characteristics	233
Section 3	Aspects of planning and execution	236
Chapter 13		
Guaranteeing or denying freedom of movement		
Section 1	Introduction	243
Section 2	Characteristics	245
Section 3	Aspects of planning and execution	246
Chapter 14		
Demobilisation operations		
Section 1	Introduction	259
Section 2	Characteristics	259
Section 3	Aspects of planning and execution	262
Chapter 15		
Military aid/support to civil authorities		
Section 1	Introduction	275
Section 2	Characteristics	276
Section 3	Aspects of planning and execution	279
Chapter 16		
Non-combatant evacuation operations		
Section 1	Introduction	287
Section 2	Characteristics	288
Section 3	Aspects of planning and execution	293
Chapter 17		
Humanitarian operations		
Section 1	Introduction	307
Section 2	Characteristics	308
Section 3	Aspects of planning and execution	315

Chapter 18		
Operating in transitional situations		
Section 1	Introduction	329
Section 2	Deployment	329
Section 3	Transition to another operational task	332
Section 4	Relief	334
Section 5	Termination of a peace operation	336
Glossary		341

Preface

The renewal of the doctrine of the Royal Netherlands Army began in 1996 with the publication of the Army Doctrine Publication Part I, 'Military Doctrine'. Its publication was accompanied by the announcement that a number of subjects would be developed further in subsequent publications. Since then, Part II, 'Combat operations' has also been published and now you have before you the Royal Netherlands Army Publication Part III, 'Peace operations'.

As in the case of the previous publications, this part has also been compiled on the basis of the relevant NATO documents. Because of extensive cooperation with the United Kingdom, much attention was paid in the development of this publication to the British doctrine for peace support operations.

Over the past few years, peace operations have in practice become highly complex operations in which, besides military actions, many other factors play a role. And this development is not at a standstill: every peace operation is different and, in each one, a peace force will face new challenges.

The Royal Netherlands Army Doctrine Publication Part III is not a set script for concrete actions. This doctrine describes the characteristics and fundamentals of peace operations in general and then looks at the operational tasks that can be assigned in the framework of peace operations. This publication describes the context of peace operations and formulates principles for military actions. Awareness of this frame of reference is thus essential for those in charge at all levels participating in peace operations.

For the Royal Netherlands Army, participation in peace operations is part of everyday life. Countless individual soldiers and units have already been on deployment and many will follow. This book thus satisfies a need and forms the basis for the education, training and operational deployment in peace operations. Commanders at all levels must, therefore, be familiar with the contents of this publication.

Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Army,

M. Schouten
Lieutenant General

EXAMPLES FROM MILITARY HISTORY

Various examples from military history are included in this Army Doctrine Publication. Their main function is to illustrate to the reader the reality of the application of doctrine. The historical examples are in no way intended to prove the correctness of the doctrine. They merely illustrate how a particular situation in the past was affected by the application or absence of doctrine. They also illustrate the area of tension between the positively formulated theory and the often unruly practice. Secondly, the historical examples are intended to stimulate the reader to look at the subject in more depth in order to gain a greater insight into the background and application of this doctrine for peace operations.

PART A
FUNDAMENTALS

1 Introduction

Section 1 - General

0101. The **doctrine publications** of the Royal Netherlands Army serve as guidelines for the planning, preparation, conduct and completion of military operations, in peacetime, during an armed conflict and in times of war. This publication describes the doctrine for operations by the ground component as part of a multinational force during peace operations.

0102. This publication is a **manual** for commanders and staffs at formation and battalion level. The extent to which it is applied, however, always depends on the actual situation. This publication does not provide solutions. It is intended to create unity of opinion in the preparation, planning and conduct of peace operations. It also forms the basis for all tactical training and for all Army Field Manuals (AFMs) and other derived RNLA publications. Like the Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Part 1, 'Military Doctrine', this publication is intended to stimulate the thinking of commanders and staff officers. The ultimate aim is to encourage the sensible application of this doctrine in unique and unpredictable situations.

ARMY FIELD MANUALS AND HANDBOOKS

The ADP series forms the basis for functional publications known as 'Army Field Manuals' (AFMs). AFMs aim to bridge the gap between the abstract (operational-tactical) level of the ADP series and the necessarily concrete (tactical-technical) level of the handbooks. AFMs confine themselves to a single subject and contain general information. Examples are the 'Command and Control' and the 'Fire Support' AFMs. This information is intended to provide the non-specialist in particular with an insight into the nature of the function area in question. For the specialist, the AFMs provide a starting point for a detailed description of the subject in handbooks. Handbooks look at doctrinal aspects of actions ranging from those by units to those by individual military personnel. Examples are the 'Tank and Mechanised Infantry Battalion' and 'RNLA Soldier' handbooks.

0103. A military operation is conducted **jointly** by at least two Services. A joint operation by two or more exclusively Dutch Services is,

however, unlikely. This is because the Royal Netherlands Army always conducts its operations in a multinational setting, which means that units are more likely to work with Services from other countries. The resulting cooperation can take shape in many ways and at many levels. It can range from the participation of individual Dutch military personnel in, for example, observation missions, to the participation of Dutch units in composite multinational units.

0104. The nature of peace operations makes it impossible to establish a fixed link between the level of operation and the command level of the unit. It may be the case that actions by small units at a low level have repercussions for the higher levels up to and including the political-strategic level. In reverse, it is also conceivable that the political-strategic level may have a direct influence on the (tactical-technical) execution of operations.

0105. This publication focuses primarily on the actions at the **operational and tactical** level by formations (brigade, division) and units (battalions). It also gives guidance for operations at the lower levels, thus presenting a cohesive picture of peace operations.

0106. Besides the Army Doctrine Publication Part 1, the following NATO publications were used as a basis for this publication:

- AJP-01(A) 'Allied Joint Doctrine', Chapter 22 (Military Operations Other Than War)
- MC327: 'Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations'

A **common foundation** has thus been laid for operating in a NATO context. The British Joint Warfare Publication 3-50, 'Peace Support Operations', was also used for this publication.

Section 2 - Doctrine

0107. Doctrine is the **formal expression of military thought**, valid for a particular period. It describes the nature and characteristics of current and future military operations, the preparations for these operations in peacetime and the methods for successfully completing military operations in times of crisis and war. Doctrine is general in nature and describes fundamentals, principles and preconditions for military operations at the various operational levels. It also guides the thinking in respect of future operations by the Royal Netherlands Army in terms of organisation, personnel and equipment.

0108. Doctrine constitutes the core of one of the components of **military potential**, namely the conceptual component. Military potential

also comprises a mental and physical component. The mental component consists of three elements: the motivation to perform the task as well as possible, effective leadership and the responsible organisation of the deployment of all resources in terms of personnel and equipment. The physical component - the capacity of the assets or combat power - comprises personnel and equipment that can be deployed in a peace or other operation. The three components are developed in peacetime by means of training, education and maintenance. This produces units which are ready for deployment.

Section 3 - Peace operations

0109. Peace operations can be categorised in different ways. The perceptions concerning this categorisation are also subject to change, especially now that various countries are becoming more experienced in conducting peace operations. Given that the Royal Netherlands Army will always operate in peace operations in a multinational setting, the aim is to adhere specifically to two relevant **international approaches**, namely that of the United Nations and that of NATO. These approaches can be regarded as complementary. The ability to work together (interoperability) during peace operations is thus enhanced.

The United Nations (UN)

0110. The way in which the United Nations categorises peace operations stems from 'An Agenda for Peace'. This report, written in 1992 by the then Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council and later augmented with the 'Supplement', distinguishes between a number of peace operations:

- preventive diplomacy
- peacemaking
- peacekeeping operations
- post-conflict peace-building
- peace-enforcing operations

These operations can be placed in a **conflict spectrum**, which indicates the state of the relations between population groups or nations: peace, (armed) conflict or post-conflict. In this context, 'conflict' can also be taken to mean 'war'.




Figure 1-1: 'An Agenda for Peace' in the conflict spectrum.

OIII. **Preventive diplomacy** involves diplomatic steps which are in effect taken before an expected crisis and which are designed to remove the cause of the conflict. The aim is to prevent the use of force. Preventive measures may also be taken to prevent the spread or intensification of the limited use of force. Conflict prevention operations, such as the preventive deployment of units, can support that process with military assets.

OII2. **Peacemaking** is a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful consultation in order to end a conflict. Peacemaking is designed to help resolve the problem which caused the conflict. Peacekeeping, peace-building or peace-enforcing operations can contribute to this process with military assets.

OII3. **Peacekeeping** focuses on containing, reducing the intensity of or resolving a conflict, armed or otherwise, between or within states by intervention by a third, impartial force. Peacekeeping operations are usually authorised by an international organisation and have the consent of the warring parties (at least at political level). Military units and civil organisations provide joint support for a political process to maintain or achieve peace.

OII4. **Post-conflict peace-building operations** are conducted after an armed conflict to consolidate a fragile peace. Peace-building operations are designed to prevent a situation in which a conflict flares up again immediately after the departure of the intervening troops. During peace-building operations, attention is given to rebuilding infrastructure, a democratic government structure, a police apparatus and the promotion of economic activity. These operations may also help the demobilisation of the force or the dismantling and disarming of irregular forces.

0115. **Peace-enforcing operations** are conducted to restore peace between parties, of which at least one does not consent to the intervention of a peace force. These operations may be either interstate or intrastate in nature and have a relatively high force intensity. In general, these actions will not be led by the UN, but will be 'outsourced' to a (regional) security organisation, such as NATO or a coalition of states.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

0116. A substantial part of NATO's doctrine concentrates on combat operations. Combat operations usually constitute a response to a demonstrable threat and are designed to defeat an identifiable enemy by military means. The circumstances under which the NATO Alliance is used for peace operations (NATO uses the term Crisis Response Operations in this context) are more difficult to predict: the threat or the opponent cannot always be clearly identified. Many civilian, political and humanitarian organisations will also be involved in these operations.

PEACE OPERATIONS AND CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

Strictly speaking, the terms 'peace operation' and 'crisis response operation' are not interchangeable. In Army Doctrine Publication 1, the Royal Netherlands Army distinguishes between combat operations on the one hand and peace support operations and operations other than war on the other.

NATO uses the term 'crisis response operations' to mean all operations for which military means are used for a purpose other than large-scale combat operations. Currently (autumn 2000) NATO is working on policy and doctrine for non-article 5 Crisis Response Operations. It is conceivable that the outcome of this process will be that NATO Crisis Response Operations (CRO) will, apart from Peace Support Operations (PSO), also include (multi)national tasks, such as antiterrorist and counter-drug operations as well as operations against irregular enemy forces.

The NATO concept of 'crisis response operations' is thus wider than the Dutch concept of 'peace operations'. This publication uses 'peace operations' to mean peace support operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, military aid/support to the civil authorities and humanitarian operations. The other crisis response operations are described in ADP II, 'Combat operations' and ADP IV, 'National operations'.

0117. Building on the United Nations' categorisation (see paragraph 0110), NATO made further refinements by defining concrete tasks. A number of these tasks fall under the heading of **peace support operations**. A distinction is made in this respect between tasks conducted in a NATO context and those conducted in a national, binational or multinational context. Figure 1-2 illustrates these tasks.




Figure 1-2: NATO categorisation of peace operations. (Note that tasks conducted in a national, binational or multinational context still need to be confirmed as Crisis Response Operations).

0118. **Conflict prevention** comprises all military measures designed to forestall the development of an interstate or intrastate conflict. Conflict prevention requires the consent of the parties involved and includes aspects such as early warning, surveillance, taking stabilising measures and the deployment of peace troops. The level of force during the conduct of these operations will be relatively low.

0119. A **humanitarian operation** is a task designed to alleviate human suffering. This is not the main objective, but is performed as part of a wider peace support operation. It is known as humanitarian relief in order to distinguish it from humanitarian operations.

0120. **Humanitarian operations in non-PSO scenarios** are also designed to alleviate human suffering. Unlike a pure humanitarian operation, these are operations in themselves and are conducted in situations in which the responsible authorities are unable - and in some cases unwilling - to assist in providing adequate support for the population.

0121. **Military aid/support to civil authorities** relates, in this context, to all forms of assistance given by a peace force under mandate to a civil government. If there is no functioning government, the aid or support may consist of direct assistance to civilian communities or to a temporary international authority. It covers a wide variety of potential tasks

and may precede or follow a successful demobilisation operation. By providing military aid or support, the peace force supports the civil government in accordance with the stipulations of a peace agreement or mandate.

0122. The **enforcement of sanctions** is, in a general sense, intended to force a country to comply with international law or a UN resolution. The sanctions normally consist of the denial of diplomatic or economic privileges and the restriction of the freedom of movement of those living in the affected area. The sanctions may apply to a specific party in a conflict or, assuming the principle of impartiality, to all parties in a particular area. Examples of the enforcement of sanctions are maritime interception operations, customs and police operations on rivers and the enforcement of no-fly zones.

0123. A **non-combatant evacuation operation** is an operational task designed to evacuate civilians or unarmed military personnel from a crisis or conflict area to a safe or safer environment. An evacuation operation involving the RNLA will, in principle, concentrate on evacuating Dutch citizens or citizens of Allied nations for whom the Dutch government has taken responsibility.

0124. **Search and rescue operations (SAR)** involve the deployment of specialist teams to rescue personnel who have run into difficulties; for example, crews of crashed aircraft or (small) military units which are unable to return unaided from an isolated position. In peacetime, SAR is in principle a national responsibility, which is organised on a regional basis within Europe. During a conflict or a NATO-led operation, regional responsibilities may no longer be feasible. In that case, the operational commander is responsible for the planning and execution of the rescue operation. If such operations take place in combat conditions, they are known as combat search and rescue (CSAR).

0125. **Combating terrorism** is regarded by some (NATO) countries as a military task; in the Netherlands, it is primarily a police task for which the armed forces may provide support. International terrorism is seen by NATO as a threat to the security of its territory. The use of force by one of the parties against a peace force during a peace support operation can also be regarded as terrorism in some cases. Terrorism often resembles operations by irregular forces. Antiterrorist operations are always conducted in support of other government organisations.

0126. **Counter-drug operations** are a responsibility of the civil authorities. The armed forces are, however, highly suitable for supporting

operations to detect and combat drug trafficking. Counter-drug operations comprise all operations designed to prevent the possession of drugs as well as drug trafficking and dealing. Operations of this sort are taking on an increasingly international character.

0127. This part of the ADP series will not look at antiterrorist and counter-drug operations in any further detail; they will be discussed further in other national or Army Doctrine publications. SAR operations will not be dealt with any further in the ADP series.

0128. **Operations against an irregular enemy force** target the armed resistance of irregular combatants, often consisting of individuals who have received paramilitary training or of armed civilians. Such resistance may occur during intrastate conflicts in the form of an uprising against the government. If there is no government, this action may be directed at the population. However, armed resistance by irregular forces can also be part of an interstate conflict or a war. This is the case if one of the parties continues the fighting in (part of) its territory with what is known as ‘partisan guerrilla warfare’. The RNLA regards these operations as combat operations. This subject is described further in ADP II, part C.

Section 4 - Operational tasks

0129. Every peace operation is different. Peace operations consist of one or more operational tasks, according to the **mandate**. Depending on the objective, there will be more emphasis on particular operational tasks in a specific situation or phase of a peace operation. There is, however, no internationally recognised list of ‘peace (support) tasks’. An operational task, such as observation, can in itself be an operation (an observation operation). It may also be a technique that is applied in a wider operation, such as a peacekeeping operation.

A mandate indicates:

- the political objective of the operation
- the powers (and possible assets) available to the (civilian) leaders of the operation

0130. The following operational tasks can be derived from an analysis of previous peace operations. These tasks are also identified in the relevant international publications.


- observation, monitoring and supervision
- preventive deployment
- enforcement of sanctions
- setting up and maintaining protected areas

- interpositioning
- forced separation of parties
- guarantee or denial of freedom of movement
- demobilisation operations
- military aid
- non-combatant evacuation
- humanitarian operations

These tasks are by no means exhaustive and do not cover all forms of military activity during a peace operation. Neither is the division absolute, as the tasks often overlap each other. Naturally, the military activities needed for one core task may also be performed for another.

013I. The operational tasks are clearly dependent on the **form of peace operation** in which they are conducted. This link is shown in Figure 1-3. The diagram shows how military assets can be used in the different forms of peace operations. These possible methods of deployment constitute the operational tasks.

Figure 1-3: Forms of peace operation in relation to operational tasks.



Section 5 - Lessons learned

0132. A substantial part of doctrine comes from operational experience gained during military operations conducted in the past. It is for this reason that this publication contains examples from military history. To keep doctrine up to date, it is important to record operational experiences, analyse them and, where necessary, incorporate them in current doctrine. **Lessons learned** must, therefore, be taken seriously. This applies to all aspects of doctrine, including peace operations.

0133. Lessons learned are important for various organisations and levels. At the **military-strategic level**, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and the Commanders in Chief, it is important to use lessons learned to gain insight into the success of the operation and the extent to which the presupposed context of the deployment turned out to be correct. Another aspect to be looked at is whether the actions of the peace force lived up to requirements and where shortcomings arose. These lessons learned are mainly parameter-setting in nature and apply to the long term.

0134. At the **operational level** (Contingent Commander or Senior National Representative), the aim is to ensure that the Dutch contribution is and remains tailored to the assigned and expected tasks. This requires regular consultation with the commander of the peace force and the Dutch unit commanders. These lessons learned are both parameter-setting and task-specific in nature and usually relate to the medium term.

0135. At the **tactical level** (unit commanders), lessons learned are particularly important in terms of guaranteeing the quality of the execution of tasks. These lessons learned apply mainly to procedures and equipment and are important in the short term. Together, all lessons learned must eventually lead to improvements in the quality of the Dutch contribution to peace operations.

Over the past few years, the Royal Netherlands Army has accrued a large number of lessons learned which have resulted in concrete measures. For example, most units now take their own organically assigned equipment with them, training is now 'green' instead of 'blue' and deployed personnel now take part as assistant leaders in the final exercise of the following unit. A decision was also made to tackle structural problems in the preparation and execution of a peace operation. The approach was based partly on the experiences of the commanders of Dutch units and contingents.

0136. In the Royal Netherlands Army, the Director of the Operational Staff (D-OPS) is responsible for **itemising, analysing** and **evaluating** the experiences. For this purpose, he has a separate 'Lessons Learned' section in his staff. Officials from this section pay numerous visits to the deployed troops to record their experiences. The experiences of personnel returning from deployment are also collected by means of debriefing interviews with personnel from the Lessons Learned section. Any criticism or suggestions are also recorded during these interviews. All information is registered and then analysed and evaluated. Where action is needed, the relevant authorities or officials are notified. After that, the section keeps a finger on the pulse, looks at the extent to which measures have been or will be taken and whether these will produce the desired effect.

0137. Extra attention is also paid to the contributions of **unit commanders**; before deployment, they are informed of the importance of lessons learned and asked to register and report their experiences. After the mission, they are asked to report on their experiences in relation to operational tasks, intelligence and security.

Section 6 - Structure

0138. The Army Doctrine Publication part III ('Peace operations') is the development and elaboration of the **fundamentals** of peace support operations and other peace operations, which are described in Chapters 7 and 8 of the Army Doctrine Publication part I ('Military Doctrine').

0139. The publication consists of two parts. **Part A** ('Fundamentals') looks at the general aspects which apply to peace operations. It describes, for example, the international environment in which peace operations take place and looks at the fundamental principles of peace operations. It also deals with the starting points for support in a multinational context and the characteristics of political decision-making and operational command.

0140. **Part B** ('Operational tasks') outlines the way in which tasks are performed. It presents the most important characteristics of all operational tasks and looks at the relevant aspects of the planning and execution of each task. This part also examines the circumstances and procedures of both arrival in and departure from the area of operations.

2

The international environment

Section 1 - Introduction

0201. The fundamental objective of a state is in principle to protect **vital interests**, while upholding its own norms and values. Because of international relations, this objective must be placed in a wide context. In large parts of the world, therefore, the national interest is also to strive towards a well-ordered international society in which human rights are respected and social justice is sought. Dutch security policy fits into this wider context.

0202. The end of the Cold War heralded the end of the overriding importance of military security in the traditional sense. Security continues to be important, but now consists of much more than purely military aspects. Wherever (international) problems need to be resolved, it will always be necessary to find a **multidisciplinary approach**, in which the relationship between the various approaches of foreign policy receive more attention.

0203. Dutch foreign and **security policy** distinguishes between protecting the integrity of national territory in the context of the Alliance and contributing to the international rule of law. With regard to the latter, attention must also be given to fostering secure and stable relations in the countries that border on the NATO area. The various perspectives of foreign policy and the prevailing security situation will be used to decide whether military means could or should also be used to achieve the foreign policy objectives. In principle, this use of military means always occurs in conjunction with NATO Allies or other security organisations.

For the Dutch armed forces, three main tasks stem from the foreign and security policy:

- to defend national and Allied territory against security risks
- to protect and uphold the international rule of law
- to provide support and assistance, nationally and internationally

0204. This chapter describes the international environment and the changes it has undergone in the last few decades, thus outlining the context in which peace operations take place. An awareness of this context is necessary in order to understand the meaning of the following chapters.

Section 2 - A changing world

0205. The end of the Cold War brought about radical changes in the **international security situation**. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact meant the disappearance of the direct and sizeable threat against NATO territory. As the same time, the pacifying effect of the traditional superpowers on their allied states diminished sharply. Processes of democratisation began, but there also turned out to be a breeding ground for latent conflicts between and within states. Nationalism, religious and ethnic differences, weak or non-existent state structures, economic deprivation and inequality, overpopulation and underdevelopment, migration, environmental damage, terrorism and internationally organised crime became the catalysts for tension and the ensuing conflicts.

*The end of the cold war.
Photograph: Dutch Press
Agency (ANP) (Berlin,
1989)*



0206. The disappearance of the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact created a new environment in which **a number of trends** can be identified. Firstly, interstate cooperation is being sought actively, regionally as well as globally. As a result, supranational organisations have become increasingly important. In this context, countries are more and more frequently prepared to surrender part of their sovereignty. On the other hand, we see parts of a country that wish to break away or claim greater autonomy. This gives rise to dividing lines which are based on ethnic, religious or economic factors and which deviate from the existing geographic borders. It is also safe to say that there are often regional or local armed conflicts which are more in the nature of a transnational, interstate or, increasingly, intrastate conflict. Section 3 of this chapter will look at the last category of conflict in more detail.

A transnational conflict originates from a common and cross-border problem for two or more states, without necessarily becoming an interstate conflict. Examples in broad terms are organised crime, terrorism, natural disasters and the migration of ethnic groups; more specific examples are the problems surrounding the Kurds (involving Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Armenia) and the Albanians in Kosovo (in which Yugoslavia and Albania are involved and which may yet involve Macedonia).

0207. A development which will undoubtedly affect the international security situation over the coming years is the **increasing globalisation** of political, economic, financial and military problems. Destabilising developments elsewhere in the world can have far greater implications than they did in the past for relations in our part of the world. Conflict hot spots which cross borders and which are difficult to control can result in the disintegration of states, intervention or armed conflict between states. Humanitarian emergencies and refugee movements are often the result.

0208. Illustrative of the changed international security situation are the developments in the **countries which border on the NATO treaty area**. For the Balkans, North Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and southwest Asia, the security situation has changed drastically. A complicating factor is that the national political, economic and military structures of many of the NATO area's neighbouring countries are not yet fully developed, which means that there is a greater chance that conflicts will break out. Although the instability in these regions does not necessarily have a direct effect on the security of the NATO countries, the member states of the Alliance cannot be expected to simply stand back and watch as a conflict develops or escalates. This is certainly true if the situation involves or may involve large-scale human suffering as a result of genocide, widespread famine or refugee movements.

0209. In the **Balkan region**, the old political, economic and military structures have lost their stabilising effect. Numerous conflicts smoulder or flare up, the main causes being ethnicity, nationalism and religious extremism. The region is being ravaged in particular by intrastate conflicts, such as those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Albania, in which the NATO member states are now directly involved. There is also a very real danger that such conflicts will escalate to interstate conflicts. This is particularly true if there are cross-border problems involving ethnic minorities, religious or cultural differences or if a state which feels itself to be under threat forms alliances with neighbouring countries. If the European security structures in cooperation with the United Nations are not able to contain such conflicts promptly, a larger, regional conflict may arise.

0210. **North Africa** and the **Middle East** are another two regions characterised by political instability and potential conflict. In these regions' countries, there are often major ethnic-religious, political and socio-economic differences coupled with a rapid population growth. As well as internal tensions, there are also border disputes, controversies regarding oil and water supplies and military-political rivalry. Expectations are that these factors will in the future give rise to conflicts, possibly armed, between countries in both regions. Socio-economic conditions in a number of countries have deteriorated considerably over the past few years and we are seeing an upsurge of extremist fundamentalism. As a result, there is constant tension between and within various states. Islamic fundamentalism is heavily influenced by the local situation and also manifests itself with varying degrees of intensity and aggression.

0211. For a long time, both regions have had terrorist groups which strive towards very different goals. Several countries support these groups and hope to realise their political objectives partly by means of terrorist attacks. In a number of countries, terrorist groups, particularly those of extremist fundamentalists, concentrate on local regimes as well as western targets. Their resistance against the Western-backed peace process in the Middle East is also an important factor.

0212. Another region which constitutes a potential security risk and which borders the NATO treaty area is **eastern Europe**. During the past decade, countries such as Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova broke away from the Russian Federation and now have internal problems and regional disputes. They are trying to integrate with existing European and transatlantic institutions. Disputes with neighbouring countries with regard to minorities and relations with the Russian Federation

combined with stagnating political and social transformation, faltering economic development and extreme nationalist tendencies are the main sources of instability. The military capacities of the Russian Federation, particularly its nuclear capabilities, also continue to be an influential factor.

0213. The countries in **southwest Asia** (including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Iraq and Iran) experience frequent conflicts regarding raw materials, in particular petroleum. Further tension may also arise between the emerging Muslim republics and the Russian Federation. In Turkey, Iran and Iraq, the Kurd problem is already a long-running issue.

0214. The trends which are emerging in the countries bordering on the NATO treaty area can also be seen in other parts of the world. The relatively stable situation of the Cold War has made way for an environment in which intrastate and local interstate conflicts in particular are more likely to occur. Ethnicity, nationalism and religious fundamentalism are becoming ever more important in this respect, while underdeveloped institutional structures and the inability or unwillingness of a state to protect the physical or economic safety of a population group are major causes of conflict.

0215. In addition to all this, the world has a number of highly dangerous regimes. Some are well armed with conventional weapons, while their arsenals become more important as democratic countries reduce their defence apparatus. The risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological and, perhaps in the future, nuclear) is also increasing rapidly. The example of Iraq showed that these countries threaten not only their neighbours, but also the vital interests of western nations and that they even jeopardise international stability.

0216. There are also **new threats** which put our security at risk. Drug trafficking and organised crime have now become so powerful that they could seriously undermine the establishment and cohesion of society, certainly wherever they cross international borders. The disappearance of the Iron Curtain as a physical partition between Eastern and Western Europe as well as the disappearance of the borders between various member states of the European Union have increased the mobility of criminal organisations which operate internationally. The growing influence of organised crime on society has a destabilising effect and can threaten the national and even international rule of law from within. Combating organised crime in areas such as drug trafficking, migrant trafficking and piracy will increasingly require a pooling of the various control instruments. Lastly, the advances in information technology are

also accompanied by negative aspects; the vulnerability of the western world as a result of this has already been clearly exposed.



Combating organised crime .

Photograph: Richard Frigge (dismantling an ecstasy laboratory, 1998)

0217. All these **security risks** are diverse in nature and more diffuse than the large-scale military threat that prevailed during the Cold War. They will by no means always result in a direct military threat, but they may have dangerous repercussions for international stability and security and for the functioning of government organisations and society in general. The new security situation requires an integral use of political, economic, financial and military means. Conflicts can escalate to an armed struggle or dislocate society to such an extent that it is only with military means that a safe and stable situation can be achieved. Timely deployment of military means to counter security risks can in this way control or even prevent conflicts in the countries bordering the NATO treaty area.

Section 3 - The intrastate conflict

0218. A major threat to peace and stability is the (potential) escalation of intrastate conflicts. In practice, these often turn out to have the following **characteristics**:

- The fighting is usually about freedom, identity and power of certain groups in respect of other groups or a (legitimate) government. This may take the form of a battle for (part of) the state's territory to achieve autonomy or independence or to seize power within the state. An armed struggle may be seen by the conflicting parties as a rational solution.

- The armed struggle is often characterised by anarchy and chaos. It is less likely to be conducted by regular troops than by unregulated groups who do not usually fall under central authority and who conduct guerrilla-type actions. The belligerent parties are prepared to fight long and hard for their goal and their survival and to accept substantial losses in terms of personnel and equipment.
- The distinction between the warring parties and the civilian population is not always clear. Civilians may take an active part in the fighting and combatants can disappear in the local community.
- It is difficult to arrive at any settlement and cease-fire agreements are often violated, as are human rights and the law of war.
- The actions of the warring factions often originate from a position of weakness. This results in adapted methods, such as terrorist activities. The parties often make use of mobility and surprise in their operations. Actions are usually designed to create confusion and incur damage. The scale of the actions varies enormously.
- The level of force also varies greatly. Light and unsophisticated weapons are used in virtually all cases. Theft and illegal trading are popular ways of obtaining weapons. Locally, however, the conflicting parties may use heavier and even highly sophisticated weapons, including weapons of mass destruction.
- There is no single clear aggressor, but a number of parties, factions and groups who are trying to achieve their goals by violent means.

ADP 1, 'Military Doctrine', makes a distinction between two fighting methods in a conflict: regular and irregular operations. In this context, regular warfare means 'operations characterised by the usually open, structured, large-scale and coordinated deployment, normally in accordance with established doctrine'. ADP 1 defines irregular warfare as 'operations by smaller units, often rebels, who normally use the element of surprise and may apply a high level of force locally'.

In this publication, the terms 'regular' and 'irregular' are not confined to describing the method of operation, but also apply to the conflict as a whole. This does not mean that a conflict is purely regular or irregular: in practice, both methods would occur to a greater or lesser extent during a conflict. A conflict in which regular methods have the upper hand will normally be referred to as a regular conflict; one in which the majority of the belligerent parties adopt irregular methods will be referred to as an irregular conflict.

0219. The characteristics of an intrastate conflict resemble those of an irregular conflict. The list below shows the various characteristics of **regular and irregular conflicts**.

REGULAR

- territory, raw materials
- security of the state
- ideology, greed
- law of war
- large units under central authority
- combined arms
- manned weapons
- large-scale use of fire power and manoeuvre
- overt actions
- civilian population outside the conflict

IRREGULAR

- government power, territory
- security of the group
- ethnicity, political/religious fundamentalism
- small units under local authority
- individual weapons systems
- armed individuals
- hit-and-run
- anarchy and chaos
- covert actions
- civilian population part of the conflict

0220. It is precisely because intrastate conflicts pose a threat to international peace and security that the international community will try to mediate and reach a lasting solution. To this end, military means will, if necessary, be used in the form of a peace operation. A possible problem in this respect is that the dividing line between regular and irregular is not always clear. The peace force must, therefore, be mindful of the fact that it may be confronted by both regular and irregular methods. The challenge to the peace force is to respond appropriately to both methods. A show of military power will thus play a key role in regular operations, whereas in irregular operations the parties will be more concerned with influencing the hearts and minds of the local population.

0221. The changes in the international security situation have meant that it is now more important that existing international organisations function properly. This has led to a revival of these organisations and has made the **'international community'** a reality. This is embodied, for example, by the more active role played by the United Nations Security Council, although there are limits to the influence of this forum.

The IFOR/SFOR peace operation, which was conducted under the NATO flag after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, was unique and unprecedented. Troops from thirty-seven countries, including Russia and other members of the former Warsaw Pact, together with a large number of international organisations joined forces to stabilise and develop the fragile peace. The aftermath of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina has, however, also underlined the need for intensive cooperation between military units and the main international organisations.

0222. Lastly, it is clear that the number of institutions and organisations involved with international security has also changed as a result of changes in the international environment. The intertwining of mutual interests on the one hand and the individual identity of such organisations

on the other do, however, increase the complexity of the international environment.

Section 4 - International organisations

0223. An ‘international organisation’ is an organisation, created by states under international law or decree and consisting of one or more organs, which is tasked with the more or less permanent protection of common, public interests of state. International organisations are also referred to as interstate or intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). They can be categorised according to membership, geography, function and powers.

0224. One example of an organisation with **restricted membership** is the Benelux (comprising Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). Other organisations, such as the European Union, are, on the other hand, accessible to countries other than the existing members, but for expansion permission is required from all current member states; the founding treaty must be amended or supplemented by a new treaty which is ratified by all parties, including the new member state. It is different in NATO, where the member states can unanimously invite a country to join the organisation. Here, too, it is thus possible for one member state to veto the accession. These types of organisation are called **closed organisations**. Then there are the **open organisations**, to which any country may accede, subject to an independent decision by the leading body. An example of this type of organisation is the United Nations, to which a state may be admitted by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council.

0225. With regard to the geographical categorisation, we have global or universal and regional organisations. The United Nations is an example of a **universal organisation**, because the UN and its affiliated organisations aim for worldwide cooperation between all states (see Chapter 5, Figure 5-1 for a detailed summary and explanation regarding the main UN bodies). An organisation is termed regional if only a particular group of states can become members. One such organisation is the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Because of the commonality of their objectives, **regional organisations** are often more closely united than the worldwide organisations.


0226. With regard to the categorisation made on the basis of function, the objective of the organisation is the important factor. One can then distinguish general (political) and functional organisations. **General organisations** have objectives which in essence mean that they are

involved in virtually all aspects of international relations. Here, too, the UN is a good example. **Functional organisations**, on the other hand, have clearly defined and limited objectives. Examples of this category are the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (economic-monetary), NATO and the Western European Union (security) and the Council of Europe (cultural).

0227. The category based on powers means that organisations may have advisory, administrative or legislative powers. The powers of international organisations differ greatly. Some organisations may only give recommendations to their members. The participating nations are in this case not prepared to surrender their own sovereignty and the member states are the most important actors, not the organisation. An organisation of this type is called **intergovernmental**; NATO is one example. Other organisations are able to make decisions that are binding for their members, even if the latter have not agreed to the decision. The participating states have in this case surrendered part of their sovereignty to the international organisation. This is called **supra-national cooperation**. An example here is the European Union.

Figure 2-1: European security structures.

0228. In order to define the context in which peace operations are conducted, a number of organisations need to be looked at in further detail.



This applies mainly to the United Nations and the group of regional and functional organisations and in particular to NATO, the Western European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The development and relevance of the international organisations mentioned will then be examined. Figure 2-1 gives an outline of the European security structures.

The United Nations

0229. During the Second World War, the Allies laid the foundations for the United Nations. On 1 January 1942, twenty-six countries signed the 'Declaration by United Nations'. There were also conferences in 1944 and 1945 which were significant to the creation of the United Nations. The UN was to take over the role of the League of Nations, which was set up at the end of the First World War. After intensive preparations, some fifty countries participated in the founding conference in San Francisco at the end of the Second World War. The result of this meeting was the **Charter of the United Nations**, which came into effect on 24 October 1945. The General Assembly and the Security Council are the most important organs in the UN.

The Security Council is vested with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

Photograph: United Nations pictorial book



0230. The main objective of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security. The UN is a **collective security organisation**. The organisation may act against any state which jeopardises the security of one or more (member) states. Given that by far the majority of countries are members, this usually means that resolutions, measures or sanctions are taken against one or more member states.

The Charter states that the main objective of the UN is to 'maintain international peace and security'. It includes declarations about respecting human rights (Article I of the Charter). Article 24 then confers primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the Security Council. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are described in Chapter VI (Pacific settlement of disputes) and Chapter VII (Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression).

0231. Article 24 of the Charter confers primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the **Security Council**. Article 25, in which the member states agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council, grants the latter an exclusive and vitally important position of power: to make decisions which are binding for the member states. The official functions of the Security Council are:

- to make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of disputes
- to decide to take action - possibly armed - in the event of:
 - a threat to international peace and security
 - a breach of international peace and security
 - an act of aggression

0232. For the last few years, the Security Council has given an ever broader interpretation of 'a threat to international peace and security'. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism and intrastate conflicts (including civil wars and acute humanitarian emergencies) are now also regarded as such by the Council.

0233. The Security Council has fifteen members, five of whom are permanent (the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom and France) and ten non-permanent. The non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly for a period of two years. The **permanent members** of the Security Council have the right of veto. That right of veto has been used less frequently since the end of the Cold War than it was before. On the other hand, the number of resolutions passed by the Security Council has increased considerably since then and these have more and more often involved a peace operation.

0234. The UN may use all possible means, even military, in order to achieve its objective. Before it was founded, this right was reserved for sovereign states. This is, however, subject to the restriction that they may not intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a member state (Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter), although the United Nations itself determines whether a matter is covered by this Article. The UN can thus, by way of the Security

Council, indeed put intrastate conflicts which may jeopardise its objectives onto the agenda.

0235. The UN works according to a number of **principles**:

- All member states are sovereign and cooperate voluntarily. The UN does not have supranational authority. The Security Council may, however, make decisions which are binding for the member states.
- The member states shall fulfil their obligations in accordance with the Charter. The member states interpret these obligations themselves. There is no independent legal authority governing the member states.
- Member states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means.
- Member states shall refrain from the threat or use of force against other states.
- Member states shall give the UN every assistance in any action it takes. Members themselves will decide on the form of this assistance.
- The UN shall not, in principle, intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. In practice, however, it is the UN which decides whether or not this is the case, which means that independence disputes and violations of human rights can, despite their national character, still be addressed within the UN.

0236. Despite the possibility of using military measures to respond to breaches of international peace and security, the Security Council made virtually no use of it during the Cold War. During that period, however, the General Assembly did establish that it could, if necessary, take over the task of the Security Council. As a result, the General Assembly passed a resolution that called upon member states to make immediate use of military means. During the Korean War (1950-1953), the General Assembly passed a resolution ('Uniting for Peace Resolution', 1950), calling upon member states to make immediate use of military means. The paralysing situation in the Security Council during the Cold War was a direct consequence of the right of veto held by the permanent members of the Council in a polarised position of power.

0237. Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General from 1953 to 1961, introduced the possibility of conducting **peace operations** with the consent of the conflicting parties. This was based on Chapter VI of the Charter, thus circumventing the risk of a possible veto. After all, no member of the Security Council could, without loss of credibility, stop the use of military means if all the parties involved had consented. The Secretary-General thus created a realistic opportunity for conducting UN peace operations. He could now deploy forces, with the consent of the

belligerent parties, in order to separate the parties and thus pave the way for political solutions.

CHAPTER VI OF THE UN CHARTER (RELEVANT ARTICLES ONLY)

Pacific settlement of disputes

Article 33:

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34:

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

0238. In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali produced an in-depth report on the UN's perspective on peace operations. In this report, entitled 'An Agenda for Peace', and the supplement which followed, he described the possible **peace support measures** available to the UN. These measures are preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-building. With the exception of peace enforcement, these measures all fall under Chapter VI of the Charter. The deployment of military means in the context of this chapter does, however, require the consent of the conflicting parties. Peace enforcement falls under Chapter VII of the Charter and does not require consent from the conflicting parties.

CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER (RELEVANT ARTICLES ONLY)

Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression

Article 39:

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40:

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call

upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42:

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 51:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to maintain or restore international peace and security.

0239. **The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).** In virtually all (armed) conflicts, the civilian population suffers because of the activities of the (warring) parties. This often results in refugee movements and threats to human rights. In 1949, the UN assigned responsibility for refugees to the UNHCR. The latter is accountable to the General Assembly, which elects the High Commissioner on the recommendation of the UN Secretary-General.

In the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees, a ‘**refugee**’ is defined as ‘any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’.

As well as refugees, there are also ‘**displaced persons**’. A displaced person is one who is suddenly or unexpectedly forced to leave his home as a result of an armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights or a natural disaster or man-made emergency and who is in the territory of his own country.

0240. The UNHCR derives its *raison d’être* from the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and the accompanying Protocol issued in 1967. These are the main international agreements which deal with the protection of refugees. The most important element of the 1951 Convention is the principle of ‘non-refoulement’. This is often regarded as the cornerstone of international protection. It prohibits the return or expulsion of a refugee to a country where his or her life, freedom of personal safety would be threatened. Over the years, the principle has become an unwritten law.

The UNHCR's other activities include providing humanitarian aid.

Photograph: Media Centre

RNLA

(UNPROFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995)



0241. The main objectives of the UNHCR are to offer international protection to refugees and to seek permanent solutions to the problems they face. In the context of the first objective, the UNHCR propagates the processing of international norms for the treatment of refugees in national law and national procedures and supervises the application of these norms. The second objective is pursued by encouraging refugees to return voluntarily to reintegrate in their home country. If this is impossible, the UNHCR will make a case for reintegration in another country. Other activities of the UNHCR involve providing humanitarian aid, advice, training and legal support for refugees.

0242. The role of the UNHCR has expanded considerably over the years. The UNHCR is called upon to an increasing extent to offer protection, provide aid or to offer assistance in other ways for the benefit of the civilian population in intrastate conflicts. More and more activities are being conducted in close cooperation with **non-governmental organisations** (NGOs). In practice, the relationship between the UNHCR and NGOs is one of mutual dependence and unity. NGOs usually convert the plans developed by the UNHCR into direct action, whereby the NGOs are regarded by many as the 'operational arm' of the UNHCR. The UNHCR has neither large numbers of doctors who can provide medical care in the refugee camps nor the hundreds of trucks needed to transport relief goods to the often remote locations of the refugee camps. The joint NGOs, on the other hand, often do have enough personnel and equipment to provide adequate relief quickly and often have excellent sources of information at local level.

0243. The strength of the UNHCR is also the weakness of the NGOs: acceptance by many governments. While the UNHCR is, as a UN agency, an accepted negotiating partner for most governments, this is certainly not the case for all NGOs. It is for this reason that they are not always automatically allowed to enter conflict areas. One problem in the relationship between the UNHCR and NGOs is that most NGOs are uncomfortable with the dominant role of the UNHCR and they cherish their independent position. However, both the UNHCR and the NGOs are becoming ever more aware that the coordination of activities is essential for effective humanitarian aid. Experience has shown that, unfortunately, competition between the UNHCR and NGOs and between NGOs themselves all too often results in a duplication of effort and ineffective aid. The much-needed coordinating role will, therefore, increasingly be played by the UNHCR, with the consent of the NGOs and the international community.

Regional organisations

0244. Over the past few years, regional organisations have taken on an important role in the settlement of disputes with regard to peace and security and in the execution of peace operations. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter states that the Security Council must stimulate the development of regional organisations in order to resolve conflicts at regional level. Member states are specifically requested to refer a dispute to the Security Council only after mediation by a regional organisation has failed. The Security Council must make use of these regional organisation wherever possible to carry out enforcement action under its authority. Regional organisations are very diverse in nature.

0245. **Regional cooperation** takes the following forms:

- regional arrangements under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter
- security organisations
- civil regional organisations
- coalitions of countries which are willing and able to conduct peace operations (known as ‘coalitions of the able and the willing’)

0246. **Regional arrangements under Chapter VIII.** This category comprises a form of cooperation under which the activities are confined to a (designated) region or a geographically defined area. In effect, these regional organisations form a small-scale United Nations for the region in question, albeit without the authority or legitimacy of the United Nations itself. In principle, any country in a particular region may become a member (the non-exclusivity principle). Examples of such organisations are the Arab League, the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe is also regarded as a regional organisation as defined in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.

CHAPTER VIII OF THE UN CHARTER **Regional arrangements**

Article 52:

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.
4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53:

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter [ed: *this refers to the Axis powers (Germany, Italy and Japan)*].

Article 54:

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

0247. **Security organisations** are organisations which focus on the collective defence in a particular region, but which can also be used for operations by the United Nations. In general, these are organisations which, because of their exclusivity, cannot be classed as organisations under Chapter VIII but which have expressed a desire to support UN operations. NATO and the WEU belong to this group.

0248. **Civil regional organisations** are structural or ad hoc organisations whose activities are not confined to matters concerning peace and security. By virtue of the means and facilities at their disposal, they are able to offer support to the United Nations in the mediation in a (potential) conflict or in the execution of peace operations. One example is the European Union which, in close cooperation with the United Nations, is attempting to mediate in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council may also be able to play a similar role.

0249. **Coalitions of the able and willing** are ad hoc alliances of countries which are willing and able to help to resolve a conflict. A coalition of this sort does not have to originate in the same region but it does in principle focus on one specific region. They are generally created in order to enable an enforcement operation under the auspices of the General Assembly (Korea, 1950) or to conduct an operation on the basis of a Security Council mandate (Kuwait, 1990-1991). In operations of this type, one nation should ideally take on a leading role if any effectiveness is to be achieved.

0250. The sole purpose of involving regional organisations is to reinforce the actions of the UN. Firstly, the use of a regional organisation means that there is greater involvement and more knowledge about the area in which the conflict is taking place. Secondly, the United Nations is relieved of the political negotiations and can perhaps (initially) concentrate on other issues. Thirdly, added value is created in military terms, since the United Nations itself only has a very limited military

planning capacity (this role has in theory been allocated to the Military Staff Committee and the Department for Peacekeeping Operations; see Chapter 5) and no military command structure whatsoever. The UN also has a considerable shortage of logistic means; it will, therefore, ensure that the relevant regional organisation is closely involved in the decision-making process about actions with regard to the conflict. The UN will also, if possible, leave the execution of any peace operation to the regional organisation.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

0251. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was founded in Washington DC in the United States on 4 April 1949. A number of Western European countries and North American states thus created an alliance for the **collective defence** of the North Atlantic treaty area under the conditions set out in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (details given earlier in this chapter). The most important article in the NATO Treaty is Article 5. With this article, the member states guarantee the integrity of their allied territory. NATO can never be forced to participate in peace operations on the basis of this article. This is because NATO is not a supranational organisation, but an alliance of sovereign states which takes all its decisions in full consensus. The individual members will thus continue to strive for their own political objectives.

NATO TREATY

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

0252. Given that NATO's *raison d'être* had been assured since its establishment by the right of collective defence (in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Treaty) and the threat of the Warsaw Pact, the end of the Cold War was also a point at which the use and role of NATO in the international environment had to be reconsidered. The NATO member states were also aware that the danger of large-scale aggression against the treaty area had diminished greatly. With a view to the way in which NATO would function under these changed circumstances, in 1994 they decided to implement a number of external and internal changes. The **external adjustment** took the form of the Partnership for

Peace programme. This programme contributed to the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO in 1999.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

On 11 January 1994, the heads of state and government of the NATO member states presented the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and invited the countries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC: this consisted of the NATO countries and a number of European non-NATO countries) and of the OSCE to join the programme. The PfP programme had the following objectives:

- to facilitate transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes
- to ensure democratic control of defence forces
- to develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises
- to develop the capability for participating with NATO forces in peace operations, search and rescue operations and humanitarian relief operations.

The partners were invited to send permanent liaison officers to the NATO headquarters in Brussels and to the 'Partnership Coordination Cell' at SHAPE in Mons. In the context of PfP, the partners were invited to participate in political and military organisations within NATO.

The PfP does not cover Article 5 operations. It merely talks about 'consulting' with a partner if that partner perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security. The PfP may not, therefore, be regarded as an extension of the military alliance with member states with more or less equal rights, but as an individual cooperation programme based on partnership. Each partner determines the scope and pace of the desired cooperation.

ENHANCED PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

In 1997, work was started on the enhancement of the PfP in order to develop a partnership which would be directed at the entire spectrum of NATO tasks, including peace operations, and which would to a greater extent reflect the experiences of the cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those experiences endorsed the importance of a highly developed capacity for multinational military action and a partnership with a stronger political dimension to supplement more robust military cooperation.

Specific military initiatives of the Enhanced Partnership include the expansion of the PfP's military tasks (these now comprise all new tasks of the Alliance, in particular peace support operations) and the establishment of what are known as Partner Staff Elements (PSEs). These are found at various levels in the military structure, particularly where officers of partnership nations work with NATO officers and PfP activities are prepared and implemented.

0253. The **internal changes** focused on four elements:

- The Strategic Concept (1999) expresses what NATO stands for in this day and age and what its tasks and functions are. With regard to military tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping have been added to collective self-defence. It also provides direction for the Allies'

defence planning. The Concept focuses on NATO's fundamental security tasks and the conditions under which the armed forces may be deployed for operations.

- The development of the European Security and Defence Identity should result in greater responsibility on the part of the European Allies for security and stability in Europe. In this context, work is being done on a framework agreement for the transfer of NATO assets and capabilities for 'European' (peace) operations. Work is also being done to bring about closer cooperation with the Western European Union (WEU). In particular, the WEU is being involved in NATO Defence Planning and in the 'Military Planning and Exercises for Illustrative WEU Missions'.
- The so-called Long Term Study should result in changes in the command structure, infrastructure and the structure of armed forces. With respect to the command structure, agreement has been reached with regard to an organisation with fewer hierarchical levels. The review of the other structures will be carried out at a later stage.
- The development and implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept (see Chapter 5) is geared towards the formation of flexible command structures which would enable leadership of non-Article 5 operations. There are now specific indications that the concept can also be applied in some Article 5 operations.

0254. NATO has thus taken on board the desirability and the possibility of participating in peace operations. All member states and other relevant international organisations believe that NATO, precisely because of its military structure and years of experience in international cooperation, is ideally suited to conducting such operations. Given that NATO's *raison d'être* is primarily derived from the concept of collective self-defence in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and that NATO regards itself as increasingly able and willing to conduct operations which do not fall under that Article, one now talks within NATO about so-called 'non-Article 5 operations'.

EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL

In the context of the Enhanced Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was set up in 1997 as a consultative body for a wide range of political and security topics. The EAPC is the successor to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The following areas are particularly important for consultation and cooperation within the EAPC.

- The EAPC enables partners, if they so wish, to establish a direct political relationship with NATO, thus providing them with more flexibility and an extension of individual cooperation.
- The EAPC creates the framework which enables partners to become more involved in the decision-making regarding activities in which they participate. The consultations and cooperation between the Alliance and the

partners who take part in peace support operations with NATO are expected to become more straightforward as a result.

- The EAPC is the forum for discussions on an increasing number of topics. These may be political and security issues, but may also be regional matters. There is also scope for consultations and cooperation in such areas as defence planning, disaster relief, nuclear safety, defence-related environmental issues and scientific research.

Western European Union (WEU)

0255. On 17 March 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This treaty contained arrangements for a number of issues, including that of **collective self-defence**. The treaty thus led to the creation of an organisation known as the Western Union. With the Paris Agreement on 11 May 1955, this organisation was renamed the Western European Union (WEU).

The current objective of the WEU is to provide the possibility, in a European context, of using European and possibly NATO military potential.

Photograph: Dutch Press Agency (ANP)

0256. The current objective of the WEU is to provide the possibility, in a European context, of using European and possibly NATO military potential to contribute to stability and security in Europe. The WEU now appears to act as a 'hinge' between NATO and the European Union in this process. Within the European Union, efforts are directed towards a 'Common Foreign and Security Policy. Based on this policy, a 'Common European Defence Policy' could then be developed as well.



0257. The WEU has four types of **membership**:

- full members: members of NATO and of the EU (with the exception of Denmark, which is an observer)
- associated members: members of NATO but not of the EU
- associated partners: Central and Eastern European countries in so far as they are not members of NATO or of the EU
- observers: members of the EU but not of NATO

0258. The **Petersberg Declaration** (1992) contains the tasks on which the WEU concentrates. These lie mainly in the sphere of humanitarian and peace support operations, in which the WEU can use NATO's CJTF concept. The WEU member states have indicated which military assets they could supply for WEU-led operations. These are what are known as the Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU). Agreements are also being developed between the WEU and NATO, on the basis of which the WEU would be able to use NATO assets and capabilities.

0259. The WEU member states cater for the execution of both independent peace operations and joint operations with other OSCE or UN member states. The WEU will also, in principle, play a part in the context of a peace operation if it is asked to do so by the OSCE or the UN or if its offer to do so is accepted, certainly if it is a case of a European conflict or if **European security interests** are at stake. The decision to conduct a peace operation under the auspices of the WEU will be assessed on a case-by-case basis by the WEU Council of Ministers. The decision to take an active part in a WEU-led peace operation, however, remains a national responsibility.

During the 1990s, the WEU took part in a number of peace operations, such as mine clearance in the Persian Gulf, enforcing embargoes in the Adriatic Sea and on the River Danube and police operations in Albania and the former Yugoslavia.

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

0260. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe began as a forum with the aim of reducing international tension by, for example, formulating agreements on troop reduction and security-promoting and confidence-building measures. In the Helsinki Declaration of 1992, the OSCE member states declared their intention to strive for security and stability in Europe and for a peaceful settlement of disputes. So the OSCE has now developed procedures and arrangements to promote and ensure the peaceful settlement of a conflict in accordance with the UN Charter. As a regional organisation under



The OSCE, a forum with the aim of reducing international tension.

Photograph: Dutch Press Agency (ANP)

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the OSCE countries have expressed their readiness to take part in and lead operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. In such an event, personnel and units operate in response to a mandate accepted by the OSCE and, in principle, in accordance with NATO doctrine for peace operations. The member states decide on their participation in an operation on a case-by-case basis.

At the end of 1998, the situation in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo, where the ethnic Albanians were striving for independence, developed into an armed conflict. As a regional security organisation, the OSCE was assigned a leading role in resolving this conflict. After a cease-fire had been agreed between the Yugoslav government and the leaders of the Albanian independence movement, the OSCE deployed an observers organisation to monitor compliance with the cease-fire. However, these unarmed observers were only deployed after NATO had made a force (known as the 'extraction force') available to evacuate the OSCE observers from Kosovo in the event of an escalation of the conflict. The observers were withdrawn in February 1999 without the need to use the extraction force. Once the NATO peace force, KFOR, had been deployed in June 1999, OSCE observers were once again sent into the Yugoslav province.

Section 5 - Other actors

0261. As well as the international organisations referred to, there are other actors in the international environment in which peace operations are conducted. They play an important part, given that they are more and more often able to influence the political dealings of a country. The media has also been a growing factor of influence since the last decade.

Governmental organisations

0262. Governments are without doubt the main source of funding for peace operations. By means of their defence budgets, they 'pay' the military units which conduct the peace operations and also provide the 'sponsorship' of all manner of aid projects through their (diplomatic) representatives or agencies. The latter can be effected through national organisations (such as the government department for Development Cooperation) as well as IGOs (such as the OECD). There are fewer and fewer cases of direct government support to the government of the country in crisis. Organisations such as the UN, the EU the World Bank and non-governmental organisations are involved to an increasing extent. They are often better acquainted with the background of the conflict, have better local contacts and can usually provide more of a guarantee that the aid will in fact reach its intended destination.

An interesting development of the last few years concerns the involvement of the military in relief projects. In the IFOR/SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dutch military personnel were directly involved in the preparation, supervision and implementation of local projects funded by Development Cooperation. Apart from the fact that the local economy and employment opportunities in the Dutch mission area were stimulated, this also produced an operational spin-off: the local population's acceptance of the Dutch troops clearly benefited from this. One disadvantage of this way of working, however, may be that local people adopt a 'wait-and-see' attitude and barely take any initiative themselves. Examples of such projects are the restoration of electricity supplies in a particular area and the repair of roads and bridges.

Non-governmental organisations

0263. Many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are also active in crisis areas. From a legal point of view, NGOs differ from UN agencies and international organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). They represent a large group of non-commercial organisations driven by humanitarian or religious beliefs. In principle, they are independent of the government of their country of origin and the UN. There are several thousand NGOs, all widely diverse in terms of size, expertise, quality and tasks. NGOs are increasingly seen by national governments and international organisations as an effective and non-political response to complex crisis situations.

0264. NGOs normally set their own objectives, for which no international or national agreements are required. They are established in the private sector and have the same rights as individuals and private organisations. They cannot normally, therefore, claim the same

protection as governmental organisations. NGOs can have objectives that range from 'the alleviation of human suffering' to 'the support of health care in conflict areas'. An **objective of an NGO** is usually based on values or principles which guide the actions of personnel. Take, for example, human rights and the primary necessities such as water and food. Examples of NGOs are *Médicins sans Frontières*, CARE and Caritas.

0265. NGOs rely heavily on the sympathies of the international community. Once a conflict has arisen and they have identified a role for themselves, they will, therefore, try to mobilise the international community. They will not hesitate to use the media to bring the conflict to the attention of the public, the idea being that the pressure of public opinion will ensure that the conflict is put on the political agenda.

0266. In the area of operations, NGOs are usually at the scene before the peace force. Once the military unit arrives, it is important to make an immediate start on building good relations with these organisations. Normally, there is a difference in the way the problems are approached. There may also be communication problems or diverging interests. By establishing liaison early on and by ensuring that NGO representatives and military personnel talk to each other regularly, an unworkable and unproductive situation can be avoided. It is also important that the NGOs are treated on an equal basis and that coordination and harmonisation do not turn into orders given to the NGOs. The experiences in recent peace operations have shown that **effective cooperation** between military personnel and NGOs yields a better result.

NGO CODE OF CONDUCT

In many cases, the relief operations of the 'nineties can be regarded as useful and effective in the sense that a great deal of direct suffering was alleviated. The question remains, however, as to whether such aid is effective in the long term. The alleviation of suffering is one thing, but if it is accompanied by damaging and long-term socio-economic side effects (such as adverse effects on local production capacity as a result of the distribution of food and goods), the unnecessary continuation (or worsening) of conflict situations and the sustainment of the structures on which they are based, then the aid would appear to be no more than an important but temporary stopgap.

There are many differences between the various NGOs. For instance, one organisation may have a wider mandate than another. Some NGOs focus on particular sectors (health, providing food) and others on particular target groups (children, refugees). Some have international status and are affiliated to a (political) UN organisation, others operate completely independently. Despite these differences, there is growing agreement with regard to the method of operating. The United Nations and the international NGO community have taken initiatives to formulate norms for more effective

humanitarian relief. An example of these initiatives is the formulation of principles for relief organisations in the NGO Code of Conduct.

The main points of the NGO Code of Conduct embrace the following aspects:

- the aid should be adapted to and targeted at the local situation;
- local customs should be respected;
- local organisations should be involved;
- the recipients should play a role in planning and implementing the aid effort;
- the aid should be impartial and independent;
- the principle of proportionality should be applied;
- those providing the aid should be accountable to the donors and the recipients.

Recent initiatives have been aimed at formulating a 'Code of Best Practice' which would also include aspects such as training and the safety of aid workers.

(Source: Advisory Council on International Affairs: 'Humanitarian aid: redefining the limits', The Hague, 1998)

International Committee of the Red Cross

0267. The International Red Cross was founded in 1863 by five citizens of the city of Geneva as the 'International Committee for Relief to the Wounded'. The International Red Cross is now regarded as an **international organisation**, although it originally bore the hallmarks of an NGO. The Red Cross Movement consists of several sections:

- the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);
- the national Red Cross and Red Crescent organisations;
- the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Organisations.

The International Red Cross receives most of its funding from voluntary contributions by governments and by the national Red Cross and Red Crescent organisation and from private donations.

0268. The ICRC's objective is, on the basis of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, to protect and assist victims of armed conflict, natural disasters or other human tragedies. The operations of the ICRC are based on seven **principles**: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality. By helping and protecting people without discrimination, the ICRC has become a generally accepted discussion partner. The ICRC is, therefore, able to operate in virtually any conflict as a neutral mediator.

0269. The ICRC has the following **tasks**:

- to visit people deprived of their freedom (prisoners of war, political prisoners and civilians who have been imprisoned for other reasons) and to try to improve their living conditions
- to mediate in the exchange of prisoners and prisoners of war
- to search for missing persons and transmit messages to prisoners of war and detained civilians
- to provide support for the establishment of hospitals and safe areas
- to provide medical and other assistance to the civilian population



Help for the civilian population.

Photograph: ICRC

0270. The ICRC is also the driving force behind the development of **international humanitarian law**. This law offers protection for people who do not or no longer take part in the war. It is essentially defined in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols and forms the basis for the work of the ICRC. During armed conflicts, the ICRC monitors the observance of international humanitarian law.

0271. The Federation is the **umbrella organisation** of the national Red Cross and Red Crescent organisations. It provides assistance particularly in the event of a natural disaster. Together with the national organisations of the country in which the disaster took place, it looks after the distribution of relief goods. If necessary, people are sent out to assist the national organisation. The Federation also provides support for the reception of refugees outside conflict areas.

0272. Virtually every country in the world has a national Red Cross or Red Crescent Organisation. In the Netherlands, this is the **Netherlands Red Cross**. In wartime, the national organisation is active in providing assistance to all victims of the conflict, operating in support of the military medical service. In peacetime, the volunteers of the national organisation provide assistance in disasters, collect blood and assist in the provision of health care. National organisations work closely with the ICRC and the Federation. The Netherlands Red Cross regularly deploys people both to conflict areas and to assist in disaster relief all over the world.

The civil sector

0273. In this publication, the heading ‘civil sector’ refers to multinational concerns, financial institutions, civil companies and other **commercial organisations** which operate in the country or area in which a peace operation is conducted. These organisations can play a role in the post-conflict phase in particular. If the host country’s economy depends heavily on a particular resource and a multinational or major national concern is actively involved in processing that resource, this organisation can provide advice with regard to the economic implications of the plan for the peace operation. Taking this further, the realisation of a working economy will almost certainly require the involvement of financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as they ensure a stable financial situation for the private concerns which wish to invest or participate in the programmes for rebuilding and reconstruction.

0274. The involvement of the Dutch commercial sector or the investment of Dutch (government) capital can be coordinated locally by a Dutch delegate. Ideally, the commercial sector and the government are involved at an early stage in the formulation of the plan for the national contribution to the peace operation. The **civil contribution** to the peace operation may, for example, consist of the supply of services to the national contingent or to the NGOs active in the area of operations. The local economy can also be stimulated by hiring local personnel and by purchasing local products or services. Lastly, also worthy of mention in this context is the possibility of ‘sponsoring’ specific projects which benefit the local population, or at least a large part of it, such as the renovation of a hospital or projects with added cultural, economic or social value, such as the restoration of cultural heritage.

The media

0275. The role of the media in the international environment has increased sharply over the past few years. By means of communication technology, they bring human suffering, violation of human rights or a sense of danger straight into the living room. This development exerts great influence on politicians, society and the armed forces. **Public opinion** responds to press releases, articles or broadcast images and demands that something be done quickly. In such cases, political leaders may, under pressure from society, be forced to revise previous decisions. With their reporting, the media can also influence political opinion directly. The media has, after all, a growing interest in and influence on the way in which the armed forces function, especially during peace operations.

Military personnel at all levels are of interest to the media.

Photograph: Media Centre RNLA (SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996)



In his book, *‘Vom Kriege’*, Carl von Clausewitz describes how a military operation can only be successful if political opinion, society and the military apparatus all support the operation. The politicians see the need for an operation and give the assignment. Society must also recognise this need; its main interest is in the legitimacy and the sense of such an operation. Lastly, the military must be able to carry out the assignment. History has shown, says Von Clausewitz, that there is often friction between the three elements. The American intervention in Vietnam in the sixties and seventies was a prime example of such friction. The political leadership was strongly in favour of the operation in order to stop the spread of communism, the military believed they were able to perform the assignment, but the public did not, in the end, support the mission.

0276. Media interest is expected to grow over the coming years. Developments in the media world play a key role in this respect. Important aspects are the expansion of the media establishment with commercial broadcasters and the high levels of competition between the current affairs programmes. After all, current affairs programmes in particular focus on subjects such as world peace and humanitarian emergencies and the role of the armed forces in such matters. There has also been a sharp rise in the amount of regional news coverage, which means that military personnel are increasingly confronted by regional media representatives. This can apply to the situation in the Netherlands as well as the area to which an RNLA unit has been deployed as part of a peace operation. Military personnel must be aware that during both the preparation and the execution of a peace operation, they will be followed closely in the performance of their tasks and their actions will be under almost constant scrutiny.

0277. During a peace operation, the members of a force are confronted by media representatives from their own country as well as by the international and local media. Military personnel at all levels are of interest to the media. In the preparations, therefore, all members of a force must be primed for contact with the media. During the operation, information officers will issue **media lines** in the event of media-sensitive activities, thus ensuring that the peace force speaks to outsiders with one voice. In special circumstances, commanders may hold a press conference to clarify the role and the actions of the peace force. There must, however, be no attempt to influence the media in respect of their reporting of a peace operation.

0278. The media will always adopt an independent attitude, even if their lives are at risk and media representatives have to be evacuated. This **independent attitude** does not mean, however, that they will also adopt an impartial attitude at all times. Some media representatives are indeed biased and will 'colour' their presentation of certain events. Others will place great emphasis on a specific standpoint, such as greater involvement of the international community in the event of a humanitarian emergency. Whatever the media's reasons for urging the authorities to 'do something' or 'do more', the background to and motivation for such stands must be carefully analysed by the political and military leaders of a peace force. Media pressure must not be allowed to result in a situation in which the peace force is assigned additional or different tasks which cannot be performed within the confines of its mandate and composition.

0279. The Royal Netherlands Army itself benefits from good contact with the media and thus strives for **open and active information**. However, dealings with the media are not without obligation and are subject to certain rules. It may be the case that the planning and execution of a peace operation, or at least part of it, is secret. Generally speaking, however, it is important for the RNLA to promote its image in society and to create as realistic a picture as possible of the many activities performed by the RNLA in respect of peace and security.

The increased influence of the media in conflicts and wars was embodied by the emergence of the American news broadcaster, CNN. Since the coverage by this station during the Gulf War in 1990 and 1991 (Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*), literature now refers to the 'CNN war'. This imagery has since been reaffirmed by the role of CNN in Somalia in 1993, where its reporting was one of the factors which led to the withdrawal of the UN peace force, UNOSOM II. The actions of the media in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia have also endorsed the fact that the media can be a deciding factor in the development and even the outcome of a conflict. At the end of 1995, NATO intervened - under the pressure of public opinion - with ground and air forces and forced the parties to the negotiating table. The NATO operation was partly prompted by the horrific images of the civil war which were broadcast by the international media.

3 A general approach to peace operations

Section 1 - Introduction

0301. A general approach to peace operations is needed in order to gain insight into and understanding of such operations. This general approach produces principles which in turn produce a **frame of reference** for peace operations. Without this approach, the analysis of peace operations remains confined to superficial consideration, can lead to the wrong conclusions and result in the wrong lessons being learned.

0302. In peace operations, military actions focus on what the parties in the conflict do to hamper or prevent the accomplishment of the operation's objective. A force deployed in a peace operation must strive for an independent position and must avoid involvement as one of the parties in the conflict. Wartime operations, on the other hand, are primarily directed at a specific opponent and are thus by definition partial in nature. The use of military means dominates these operations; ultimately, this is the only way to achieve the strategic and operational objectives.

0303. Peace operations are normally carried out over a prolonged period. As a result, the planning horizon of commanders and staffs often extends beyond the deployment period of the formations and units involved in a peace operation. This often means that units do indeed start their operational tasks but will seldom complete them. Relief of these units is planned in advance, so the tasks are transferred to the relief unit.

0304. A peace force does indeed have means of force, but will in principle only use them for the purpose of self-defence. If there are appropriate provisions in the mandate, force can also be used to enforce compliance with a peace agreement or cooperation with a cease-fire agreement. In exceptional cases, armed intervention may be used to end a conflict which flares up between parties. Thus in peace-enforcing operations force is almost always used initially, sometimes even on a large scale.

0305. In peace operations, the use of military means is only part of a **range of measures** designed to lead to the desired end state. Political, diplomatic, social and economic means also help in this respect. The extent to which military means are used can also vary in the course of the peace operation. This is because peace operations usually take place in an atmosphere of tension and carry the risk of an escalation of violence. It is for this reason that this type of operation requires the deployment of well-trained military personnel, for whom it must be legally and physically possible to use force. In this case, special consideration must be given to the mandate, the rules of engagement, arms and equipment.

0306. In peace operations, military personnel must not only command the **basic military skills**, but are also expected to perform tasks which go against the nature of the armed forces as an instrument of force. There may thus be situations in which even the controlled use of force could have an adverse effect. Social and communications skills are thus crucial at all levels in the peace force. During a peace operation, the actions of an individual soldier, conducted with or without social skills, could have major repercussions in terms of the accomplishment of the operational objective. This has implications for such aspects as the specific (i.e. mission-oriented) training of military personnel.

0307. Once the political decision to deploy a peace force has been taken, special account must be taken of the **obligations and restrictions** in accordance with the mandate for the peace operation. The principles of the humanitarian law of war must also be borne in mind and the international nature of the operation can also be a restricting factor. The latter may, for example, affect the peace force's rules of engagement and the way in which it performs its tasks. The need to secure peace in the long term may also determine the way in which the peace operation is conducted as well as its legal basis.

Section 2 - The success of peace operations

0308. The ultimate aim of any peace operation is a firmly established peace. The extent to which this objective is achieved is the main **yardstick for the success** of the overall operation and thus also for the military contribution to it. One can make a distinction in this respect between military and political success, whereby the political objectives in the area of operations are achieved as well.

0309. An operation can be regarded as a **military success** if the peace force accomplishes its part of the operation's mandate. For the military component of the operation, the mandate will have been translated into



Military success does not necessarily mean that the operation is a success in all other respects.

Photograph: Media Centre RNLA (SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997)

concrete objectives or tasks, which means that it is (relatively) simple to measure.

0310. The **political success** of the operation is related to the desired end state in the area of operations, as defined by the international organisation which authorised the operation. In this respect, one needs to think in terms of creating a safe environment for the population in the conflict area and achieving an end state in which conflicts are no longer resolved by force. A description such as this is much more difficult to convert into measurable objectives and it is, therefore, not easy to establish whether one can talk about political success. Achieving such objectives is also often a question of 'staying power', whereby not only military but countless other means (including diplomatic and economic) are used. Political success will thus be measured against the overall result and not merely against the accomplishment of the objectives by the military component.

0311. Military success does not necessarily mean that the operation is also a success in all other respects. After all, the realisation of the military objectives in accordance with the mandate does not necessarily mean that there is also a lasting peace and a safe environment for the

population. Political success, on the other hand, does in principle also mean military success. If the hostilities have ceased and there has been a reconciliation between the warring parties, one would expect that the objectives in the military mandate have also been achieved.

0312. If the foregoing is ‘translated’ into **military-operational terms**, one can talk about success in a peace-enforcing operation if the task can be handed over to a peacekeeping force. The deployment of that peacekeeping force - in principle on the basis of a new mandate - is then designed to create the conditions for the civil authorities to tackle the underlying causes of the conflict. If this has been accomplished to a sufficient degree, the peacekeeping force has also been successful and can in turn be withdrawn and replaced by diplomatic, civil-administrative, humanitarian organisations or local agencies.

0313. A number of **conditions** are necessary for the successful execution of a peace operation. The greater the extent to which these conditions are met, the greater the chance of success for the peace force will be. The primary consideration in this respect is a combination of a clearly formulated mandate (the objective of the operation), the ensuing operational instructions from the civil or military leaders of the operation (the mission of the operation and the tasks of the peace force) and the mission-tailored organisation, equipment and arms of the peace force (the means for the operation). The last aspect is highly important in determining the credibility of the peace force and thus its ability to perform the operational task.

0314. The second important condition is that the peace force must be strictly **impartial**. The parties must not be given the impression that the peace force is taking the side of one of the parties. Lastly, another important condition for the success of the operation is that members of the peace force **perform their tasks professionally**. The most important elements in this respect are correct attitude and conduct, resolute and consistent actions and good cooperation within the multinational group which is conducting the operation.

0315. A specific condition for the success of most peace operations (an obvious exception being peace-enforcing operations) is the **consent** to the presence and objectives of the peace force on the part of the government of the country in question or of the leaders of the parties in the conflict. **Compliance** with the obligations usually imposed by the Security Council also plays a crucial role in the execution of a peacekeeping operation in particular. This also applies to the implementation stipulations of any peace agreement that has been reached. Section 5 of

this chapter looks in further detail at the meaning of and difference between consent and compliance.

0316. **Threats to success.** When conducting the operation, members of the peace force must be mindful of the factors which may reduce the chance of success. The first aspect to consider in this respect is the support for the operation on the part of the international community and in particular the national political leaders and a country's own people. Similarly, a lack of support among the parties and the local population in the area of operations can also pose a risk for the success of the operation. The field of tension that exists between 'normal' military operations and the required activities during a peace operation, cultural aspects (the cultural environment of the conflict area and the multinational nature of peace forces) and the great complexity of peace operations also play a major role.

0317. The role played by military units during peace operations in terms of creating conditions requires no less involvement and effort than is required during combat operations. There are also other aspects of actions in combat operations which apply to the effort involved in peace operations. During peace operations, too, it is important to keep the **initiative** and achieve a high operational tempo. This requires a concerted effort, a good deal of creativity and great stamina on the part of the participating troops.

The concept of '**operational tempo**' must be defined differently during peace operations, given that the use of force and offensive actions are only permitted on a limited scale. The peace force must endeavour to plan and conduct its activities so quickly that it is virtually impossible for the parties in the conflict to react. The activities of the various parties are thus performed too late, in the wrong place or have no effect at all. The parties will then realise that cooperation with the peace force and compliance with agreements will yield the best results for them too. The operation will then gain a momentum which can be translated at the political level into an irreversible peace process. Chapter 4 looks in further detail at the basic principle of 'perseverance'.

0318. The foregoing does not alter the fact that the role that military personnel have to fill in most peace operations is at odds with the **primary role** for which the military apparatus was established. In this primary role, military means are deployed so that a decision can be forced in the short term with the use of force. The culture of the military apparatus is thus a consequence of that role. Therefore the deployment of the military apparatus in a peace operation, in which no decision can be forced immediately and which is conducted over a prolonged period, by definition gives rise to tension. This intrinsic tension may increase

under the pressure of circumstances, which can be highly diverse in nature.

0319. It is thus conceivable that the **environment** in which the operation takes place will differ from the cultural background of that of the contingents of the peace force. ‘Western’ ideas about good and evil are not shared by everyone and are sometimes interpreted differently. This can lead to incomprehension and frustration on the part of the military personnel who make up the peace force. The cultural expressions of sympathy or hostility may be completely different from those to which the force is accustomed, which can lead to misunderstandings and confusion. Generally speaking, a lack of knowledge about the surroundings in which the operation takes place can have an adverse effect on the way in which the peace force functions. It is, therefore, vitally important that this aspect be covered in the (mission-oriented) training of military personnel.

Peace forces are virtually by definition made up of different nationalities.
 Photograph: Media Centre
 RNLA
 (UNOMUR, Uganda, 1994)



0320. **Cultural differences** and the ensuing tensions may also occur within the peace force. Peace forces are, after all, almost by definition made up of different nationalities. In general, commanders and staff

officials will, therefore, come from different countries, which can have repercussions for such aspects as command methods, discipline, etiquette, equipment maintenance, ideas about the deployment of female military personnel and so on. Given that multinational cooperation is inherent in peace operations, attention must certainly be given to this aspect in the preparations for the operation. First and foremost is that national points of view must sometimes be disregarded and military personnel must adapt to the culture of the country or countries with which they are working.

0321. Another aspect to be considered in this respect is the **internal tension** within the unit as a result of the need to live in close quarters over a prolonged period, the sometimes primitive working and living conditions, limited facilities in terms of hygiene and the sense of routine and boredom. It is in those very units which are made up from different parent units and for which there has been little time for team-building that this can lead to conflicts and dysfunction. It is for this reason that tactical units of battalion size and smaller should, if at all possible, retain their organic composition for participation in peace operations. Nevertheless, the addition of small, specialised detachments and individual specialists will almost always be necessary.

0322. The intrinsic tensions can also be reinforced by the lack of clear objectives. This may relate to the peace force's mandate or to the actual task that has to be performed. It is, therefore, essential that all levels have insight into the **context of the operation**. The lack of such insight can lead to a feeling of hopelessness and doubt as to the sense of the peace operation and can undermine the involvement and effort of the members of the peace force.

DERAILMENT OF A PEACE FORCE

A mandate which is not clear and thus gives rise to ill-defined tasks can lead to frustration among the military personnel in the peace force. The often long-term deployment and the lack of tangible results can also have an adverse effect on motivation. The confrontation with 'different' cultures in the area of operations can undermine involvement in the operation and lead to alienation. The cumulative effect of these processes may eventually lead to the derailment of individuals and groups of military personnel. These derailments can be diverse in nature and can sometimes take extreme forms.

Such a case arose in, for example, the operations in Somalia. The mandate was open to various interpretations and the assignment was equally ill-defined. On top of that, the deployment of successive peace forces hardly served to improve the situation. It thus seemed on occasion as if people did not want to be helped. An additional problem was the fact that local culture was vastly different from that of western military units. The behaviour of the Somali men, who frequently walked hand in hand (a sign of trust and friendship), was

seen as an indication of homosexuality. Also the way in which Somali men urinated - squatting in public - was regarded as effeminate and led to a sense of aversion. Cases of theft, often of personal property, and the hindrance of personnel in their tasks served to exacerbate the irritation. The subsequent derailments were sometimes extreme and resulted in, amongst other things, the maiming and death of innocent civilians. These atrocities were then widely exploited in the press. Various soldiers were prosecuted and convicted for their offences. One country even felt it necessary to disband one unit and formally abolish it.

Derailments affect the integrity of the peace force, reduce credibility and hamper the effective execution of tasks. They must, therefore, be avoided. This requires good preparation of military personnel, a clear task assignment, which is translated into concrete objectives that can be achieved in the short term, a high degree of discipline and, at all levels, an active and involved form of leadership.

Climatological and geographical conditions can transform the execution of even the simplest of tasks into a formidable challenge.

*Photograph: Media Centre
RNLA
(UNTSO, Golan Heights,
1991)*

0323. The **complexity** of the tasks to be performed in combination with the circumstances under which the operation takes place can also give rise to tension. There may, for example, be a large number of groups and factions (each with their own background and objective) which must be taken into account in the execution of tasks. This is in addition to the rules which apply to friendly actions, whether or not they relate to the use of force. The degree of complexity may be increased even further by climatological and geographical conditions, which can transform the execution of even the simplest of tasks into a formidable challenge. This complexity will place heavy demands on the stamina of the members of the peace force.



0324. **The road to success** is long and laborious in peace operations. The tensions described previously can seriously hamper the successful operation of the peace force and might even be to blame for the failure of a peace operation. The task of recognising these ‘pitfalls’ must, therefore, receive the necessary attention even during the preparations for a peace operation. Commanders at all levels must be aware of the potential tensions and the threat they pose to the ultimate success of the peace operation. By being mindful of the possible tensions and eliminating them at an early stage, commanders can contribute significantly to the overall success.

0325. The foregoing applies in principle to **all forms of peace operation**. With regard to the category of ‘other peace operations’, however, not all the aspects presented carry the same weight. An evacuation operation, for example, may be carried out as a national responsibility, whereby the multinational nature of the peace force will only have a minor influence. Furthermore, there is usually no mandate from an international organisation in an operation of this type and the aspect of ‘lasting peace’ is not directly relevant. On the other hand, factors such as professionalism, impartiality and credibility do indeed play a role and the question of whether or not consent is given for the presence of the peace force is even directly linked to a specific way of conducting an evacuation operation.

0326. The examination of success in this section is mainly intended to **provide insight** into the issues with which a peace force may be confronted in the execution of its tasks. It is clear that the environment is usually complex, while a large number of factors can pose a threat to the successful completion of the operation. It is important that all the levels involved - from the political-strategic to the tactical level - are aware of their role in the decision-making and implementation of the peace operation and of the way in which they can contribute to the success of the operation.


SOMALIA: ‘CROSSING THE MOGADISHU LINE’ (UNITAF AND UNOSOM II)

When is a peace operation considered a ‘success’? The answer to this question naturally depends on the extent to which the mandate for the mission has been fulfilled. This, however, is not easily ‘measured’. The international intervention in the civil war in Somalia from 1992 to 1995 is a good example in this respect. Two peace forces were operating in Somalia, one of which (UNITAF, Unified Task Force) was regarded, particularly by the Americans, as a ‘success’ and the other (UNOSOM, United Nations Operation in Somalia) as a ‘failure’. For the United Nations and the United States, UNOSOM has even become known as a traumatic experience. Everyone is familiar with the horrific

television pictures of a dead American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu.

Why did UNITAF get so much American approval and UNOSOM such severe criticism? The fall of the Somali President, Siad Barre, in January 1991, heralded the beginning of a period of total anarchy in the country. Rival clans were at each other's throats and there was widespread famine. The United Nations Security Council took action. In April 1992, the Council adopted Resolution 751, which laid the basis for the first UNOSOM operation (UNOSOM I). This can, incidentally, be categorised as a second-generation peacekeeping operation. UNOSOM's mission consisted mainly of bringing about an immediate cease-fire in order to facilitate political reconciliation and humanitarian aid.

Map of Somalia and the deployment of UNOSOM II (November 1993).



The Somali warlords and clans consented only with great reluctance to the arrival of UNOSOM I. The first group of unarmed UNOSOM observers arrived in August 1992, followed by a Pakistani battalion. Other countries also offered contingents, but because of the opposition of virtually all the local factions, particularly that of the most important warlord, Mohammed Aideed, the number of 'blue helmets' fell far short of the three thousand that had been planned. The UN eventually froze UNOSOM I at approximately seven hundred military personnel. In the meantime, the Pakistani battalion was suffering more and more casualties. Plundering and theft of UN property were the order of the day. Somali fighters regularly stripped Pakistani patrols of money and clothing. The UN also failed to set up an adequate logistic system in time.

Faced with this troublesome and painful start for UNOSOM I and with the harrowing images of widespread famine etched on their minds, the American government decided to send a powerful expedition force (UNITAF) which was to enforce order in Somalia. The launch of this operation, *Restore Hope*, in December 1992 attracted a great deal of media attention. The first marines came ashore at Mogadishu in the full glare of the television lights. The basic principle of the American government was overwhelming force: UNITAF had 37,000 military personnel, the bulk of which - 21,000 troops - came from the United States. France sent units from the Foreign Legion and Belgium and Canada supplied parachute battalions. UNITAF confiscated weapons, secured strategic points and escorted convoys. On 4 May 1993, when the American government considered the situation in Somalia stable enough, UNITAF was succeeded by UNOSOM II. This peace force, consisting of 28,000 military personnel, was to monitor the cease-fire and guarantee the distribution of humanitarian aid throughout the country. UNOSOM II also had the mandate to enforce order with the use of force. A quick response force was also assigned to the peace force; this consisted mainly of American military personnel and fell outside the actual UNOSOM chains of command.

UNOSOM II soon became embroiled in fighting with the militias of the Somali warlords, who, faced with the superior military force of UNITAF, had kept relatively quiet until 1993. On 5 June 1993, however, 24 Pakistani 'blue helmets' were killed in an ambush by General Aideed's militia in Mogadishu. After that, UNOSOM declared open season on Aideed and offered a reward for information regarding his whereabouts. On 3 October 1993, this manhunt resulted in heavy fighting between General Aideed's militia on one side and the American quick response force and UNOSOM units on the other. Eighteen Americans lost their lives and there were hundreds of casualties among the Somali militia (and civilians!). Almost immediately, the American government announced the withdrawal of its military personnel from Somalia. After this blood-letting, UNOSOM II soldiered on for a while in a highly volatile environment. Between May and October 1993, a total of 69 members of the peace force were killed and some two hundred UN military personnel were wounded. Most western countries withdrew from UNOSOM II at the beginning of 1994, leaving only Asian and African contingents. Any credibility in respect of the implementation of the UNOSOM mandate, however, was by then long gone. The last 'blue helmets' eventually left Somalia in March 1995.

So we return to the original question: why do the Americans in particular regard UNITAF as a (military) 'success' and UNOSOM II as a 'failure'? UNITAF and UNOSOM II were working on the basis of similar mandates, which incorporated humanitarian, political and economic components. Both missions had provisions for proceeding to enforcement of the mandate if the local parties did not cooperate. The fundamental difference between both operations, therefore, lay not so much in the mandate itself, but in its implementation in the complex

reality of Somalia. This difference stemmed from a difference of opinion between the United States and the United Nations in respect of what UNITAF and UNOSOM II were supposed to achieve.

The American government on no account wanted to become involved in a protracted African 'tribal war'. Such a Vietnam-type scenario would never be accepted by Congress (the American parliament) or the public and prolonged American involvement would also render the United States vulnerable to accusations of colonial and imperialistic behaviour. So the American government gave UNITAF a limited and clearly-defined objective: to guarantee a safe environment in (parts of) Somalia for the distribution of humanitarian aid supplies. No more, no less. In accordance with its military doctrine, the American government made an overabundance of military means available for the task. American diplomats and military personnel made it clear to the local factions in Somalia that, with UNITAF, the prestige of the United States itself was at stake. In short, under American pressure UNITAF limited the implementation of the mandate to a closely defined task: to restore order to facilitate humanitarian aid. The American government and the military commander thus brushed aside much of the political and economic component of the mandate. In this respect, the military 'success' of UNITAF was more or less guaranteed in advance.

The correlation between the closely defined objective, the available overwhelming force and the political will behind it which was so typical of UNITAF was lacking in the case of UNOSOM II. This operation was indeed charged with the implementation of the original, ambitious mandate, but had considerably fewer and more inferior means available than UNITAF. 'If the UNITAF plan was to do less with more, then the UNOSOM II mandate was the opposite', wrote an American expert later. The ambitious and complex set of tasks largely amounted to long-term nation building. But the political will to implement the UNOSOM II mandate energetically was absent from the outset. The resolution in question, 814, was produced without any satisfactory consultation between Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and his (American) Special Representative in Somalia. The Secretary-General had been unable to resist the American pressure to provide quick relief for UNITAF, although he did not believe that UNOSOM II would be fully capable of performing the task. His doubts were based mainly on the lack of cooperation by the militias. Moreover, enormous numbers of weapons were still circulating in Somalia and the UN Secretary-General felt that self-administration for the Somali people was in effect unfeasible in the short term. UNOSOM's objective, as stated in the mandate, could only be successfully achieved after an international presence spanning many years. Few UN member states cared for this idea.

If UNOSOM II had perhaps been hoping initially for a 'best-case scenario', it soon became clear that the security situation was just getting worse after May 1993 and that the smaller and more divided peace force did not have the power to restore order throughout Somalia. The implementation of the tasks which UNITAF had transferred to UNOSOM II did not, therefore, amount to much. The difference between the American approach (UNITAF) and that of the UN (UNOSOM) can be clearly illustrated by examining two of these tasks more closely: the disarmament and demobilisation of local combatants and the approach to the long-term nation building. This examination will show why UNITAF was considered a (military) success and UNOSOM was not.

UNITAF interpreted the disarmament of the Somali militias in a restricted local context and applied this policy selectively: disarmament only took place - and then at all times with overwhelming force - if the aid convoys or the local distribution of relief goods were threatened. The local militias soon got the hang

of UNITAF's game rules. They cooperated when they were faced with overwhelming force, but at the same time recognised that UNITAF was not actually affecting the fundamentals of their (local) power. The warlords even derived a certain political status from the American reluctance to actually attack their power base and from the UNITAF's willingness to negotiate. They thus saw themselves confirmed as the *de facto* leaders in their area. The Somali warlords also knew that the UN peace force which was to succeed UNITAF would have considerably less striking power and political determination. The signals were in any event clear: UNITAF began to wind down weeks before the planned handover to UNOSOM II.

Unlike UNITAF, UNOSOM II did not, partly in view of the broad mandate, want to confine itself to a limited interpretation of the disarmament and demobilisation clauses. However, UNOSOM II was given neither the staff capacity nor the means required to develop a clear and energetic disarmament policy. Boutros-Ghali's warning soon turned out to be well-founded: there was no secure environment outside the ports, supply lines and distribution centres. Furthermore, the food aid itself had by then become an important factor in terms of internal politics. Food was a source of income - and thus power - for the local factions, who, for that reason, plundered convoys and storage sites.

Immediately after the new UNOSOM peace force had been made operational, its determination was tested by the warlords. The militias of warlord Ahmed Omar Jess mounted a coordinated attack on the UN units in Kismayu. UNOSOM had no alternative but to switch immediately to offensive disarmament actions throughout Somalia. So even in the first few days following the departure of UNITAF, UNOSOM military personnel conducted show-of-force operations and disarmament actions throughout Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu. However, this quickly led to new confrontations with the unarmed militias; the process of escalation thus entered a new phase. After the death of 24 Pakistani blue helmets in Mogadishu on 5 June 1993, the Security Council gave orders for the perpetrators to be tracked down. Even Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali himself indicated his approval when he spoke of the 'physical elimination' of General Aideed. The subsequent manhunt for Aideed and his men by the independently operating American quick response force in Mogadishu culminated in the disastrous fighting on 3 October, in which eighteen Rangers and hundreds of Somalis lost their lives. After that, UNOSOM abandoned its enforcement-based disarmament programme and opted for a much more cautious approach, which was based mainly on the voluntary cooperation of local factions and combatants.

Whereas UNITAF had left the nation building programme to one side, UNOSOM II did make an effort to implement it. The growing resistance of the Somali warlords, however, meant that little came of it. In the first six months of its existence (from May to October 1993), UNOSOM II only conducted a few nation building tasks, with little success. Opinions also differed strongly among the participating countries in respect of the implementation of the mandate. Italy, for example, did not want to expose its soldiers to unacceptable risks and interpreted UNOSOM II essentially as a strictly humanitarian operation. The lack of will and resources needed to switch to enforcement meant, therefore, that the mandate had to be amended. Resolution 897 of February 1994 reduced UNOSOM II's tasks to the level at which the UN contingents were required to go no further than 'to encourage and assist the local parties to achieve disarmament and to respect the cease-fire'. In May 1994, however, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali conceded that UNOSOM II was barely able to perform even this limited task. The more the violence in Somalia intensified, the more impatient the international community became. As already mentioned, the last 'blue helmets' eventually left Somalia in March 1995.

In a strictly military-operational sense, UNITAF was thus a success. The core of the peace force was made up of a strong American expedition force, which was able to integrate contingents from other countries under a central command. UNITAF managed to restore a certain level of order (at least outwardly) in a Somalia ravaged by internal strife, thereby saving tens of thousands of civilians from certain death as a result of starvation. In the long term, however, and in a political sense, UNITAF was not a success. The American government and commanders, who did not on any account wish to sink into the quagmire of the Somali civil war and who gave priority to force protection, passed on all tasks which were not directly connected to food deliveries or local security to UNITAF's successor, UNOSOM II. Hampered by limited military means, a fragmented command structure and considerable discord among the participating nations, UNOSOM II had the task of imposing a lasting peace agreement on an unwilling population and implementing an ambitious rebuilding programme. This all had to be done in an environment which was becoming increasingly violent. When UNOSOM II attempted to arrest local warlords, including the powerful General Aideed, it lost its impartiality in the eyes of the local population once and for all.

The American government and Congress blamed the UN for the failure of UNOSOM II and for the death of the eighteen Rangers in Mogadishu. This 'accusation' does, however, need to be qualified somewhat, as illustrated previously. The United States did indeed wish to provide Somalia with humanitarian assistance, but not at too high a price. Urged by the United States, the Security Council put Somalia's fate in the hands of the UN mission, UNOSOM II, with disastrous results. The failure of UNOSOM II and, particularly as far as the United States were concerned, the horrific images of Somali civilians dragging a dead American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu, made many people doubt the sense of humanitarian intervention in chaotic and violent areas. Furthermore, the UN organisation did not turn out to be suitable for leading complex, second-generation peace operations. This forces the conclusion, therefore, that in respect of their ultimate political result, neither UNOSOM II nor UNITAF was a success.

Section 3 - Peace support operations

0327. **Peace support operations** are multifunctional operations which are conducted without choosing sides and with the objective of achieving a lasting political solution to a conflict. Military personnel and international organisations (sometimes including humanitarian agencies) work together in such operations in the implementation of a peace settlement. This occurs in principle on the basis of a mandate established by an international security organisation, such as the UN or the OSCE. It is, therefore, often a case of authorised intervention in regional or local armed conflicts. These conflicts may be of an interstate, intrastate or transnational nature.

0328. Peace support operations cover a large part of the conflict spectrum. They can range from **peacekeeping operations** to **peace-enforcing operations**. In the first case, the operation is conducted with the consent of all parties. This is not the case in peace-enforcing operations, in which the objective is, if necessary, achieved by combat.

0329. Besides peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations, there are also the following **forms of peace support operation**:

- conflict prevention
- peace making
- post-conflict peace-building
- humanitarian operations

These forms of peace support operation will not be discussed in this chapter. For closer examination, please see respectively Chapter 8 (Preventive deployment), Chapter 1 (Introduction), Chapter 8 of ADP II (Operational planning for post-conflict operations) and Chapter 17 (Humanitarian operations). The relation between the concepts of ‘preventive diplomacy’, ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘preventive deployment’ is explained in more detail in Chapter 1 and Chapter 8.

0330. These forms of peace support operation are, however, more a **political categorisation** of a series of activities to achieve a definitive peace than a characterisation of military operation. They are primarily derived from ‘An Agenda for Peace’ by the United Nations and supplemented and refined by NATO. All forms of peace support operation, including peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations, can be translated into various military-operational tasks, regardless of the political categorisation. These will be developed further in Part B of this publication.

Peacekeeping operations

0331. **Peacekeeping** refers to containing, reducing or resolving hostilities between or within states by means of intervention by an outside, impartial power. Peacekeeping operations are internationally led and, in principle, have the consent of the parties (at least at the political level). Military forces and civil organisations cooperate closely to support the political process to maintain or achieve peace.

0332. Peacekeeping operations are based on **operational tasks**, such as separating the parties, and **techniques**, such as negotiating and mediating. These operations are primarily geared towards promoting the broadest possible consent and cooperation. Although the UN Charter also allows for the use of force to implement the mandate in peacekeeping operations, it is in practice only used for the purposes of self-defence. The rules which apply in this respect will be carefully defined in the rules of engagement for the peace force. Apart from that, force extending beyond that required for self-defence may be used temporarily and locally in order to create a stable situation in a particular location. The rules of engagement must, however, allow for

this. Furthermore, constant consideration must be given on a case-by-case basis to the extent to which the use of force may have implications for preserving the consent.

0333. The **nature** of peacekeeping operations has changed considerably over the years. A distinction has thus been made between traditional ('first-generation') and new ('second-generation') peacekeeping operations. Incidentally, the term 'traditional' or 'first-generation' does not mean that this form is outdated. Such an operation may still occur in the future.

0334. **First-generation peacekeeping operations** are operations in which an international organisation deploys a force between two or more (warring) parties, who consent to this action. This gives the international community the opportunity to seek a political solution to the conflict. These operations are mainly confined to the operational tasks of 'observation, monitoring and supervision' (see Chapter 7) and 'interpositioning' (see Chapter 11). The activities of the peace force are mainly concentrated on the prevention of hostilities (for example, by setting up and guarding buffer zones) and, if possible, establishing a dialogue between the parties.

0335. **Second-generation peacekeeping operations** are usually operations in which troops are deployed, again with the consent of the parties involved, in support of a political solution and to supervise the observance of a peace settlement. In second-generation operations, the force operates throughout the conflict area and not just in a buffer zone.

When military operations are conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, one must beware of drawing too sharp a dividing line after the end of the Cold War. These operations have always come in all shapes and forms. The impression that purely peacekeeping operations in the strictest sense (first-generation or 'traditional' peace operations) were conducted during the Cold War and second-generation operations thereafter is a false one. Both types coexisted. Neither is it so that internal conflicts as a whole were not a matter for United Nations operations during the Cold War.

The first deployment of a multinational peace force took place in 1956 in the form of the UNEF, which supervised the truce called after the Suez crisis. This was peacekeeping in the strictest sense of the word. A few years later, the ONUC was to start in the former Belgian Congo. The operation conducted by this force can be classed as a peace operation with a mixed and multifunctional mandate. Troops were operating in a conflict which involved internal politics and in which coercive action was taken readily and the civil administration of the Congo was temporarily taken over by United Nations representatives. Another operation, UNFICYP in Cyprus, is, all things considered, a first-generation peacekeeping operation, which started in 1964 and is still going on today.

0336. The actions of the force are primarily directed at ending the hostilities and establishing a dialogue. In the course of the operation, the military component will increasingly assume a **supporting character**. In this context, the force can embark on humanitarian activities in order to gain support among the local population. Priority is given to protection against the violence of war and against hunger and climate. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and governmental organisations may also be involved in this respect.

Although both forms of peacekeeping operation are based on consent, second-generation peacekeeping operations have the following characteristics in which they differ from those of the first generation.

- They are not confined to a purely military mandate; a large part of the operation, or even most of it, may be non-military.
- They are highly complex and have many non-military functions, such as the temporary takeover and re-establishment of local civil government functions.
- They can be conducted in both interstate and intrastate conflicts.
- They have a wide diversity of actors, such as humanitarian aid agencies or financial organisations.
- They are usually dynamic in nature; the mandate and the ensuing tasks are variable.

Peace-enforcing operations

0337. **Peace-enforcing operations** also aim to bring peace to a conflict area. Such operations only take place after diplomacy has failed and are mainly conducted with military means. Military actions are largely intended to create a favourable starting point for the resumption of diplomacy, as a result of which political objectives can be achieved. Peace-enforcing operations are designed to get the parties to the negotiating table in order to reach a peace settlement. They can, however, also be designed to enforce compliance with a peace settlement that has already been reached.

0338. Peace-enforcing operations are **coercive** in the literal sense of the word. They are necessary if no consent has been given or if one or more parties are not expected to comply with the agreements that have been reached. This form of peace support operation is also inevitable in situations in which it is clear that the use of purely peacekeeping techniques will not put an end to aggression or violations of human rights and will not lead to the desired end state. Peace-enforcing operations are based on the implicit or explicit threat or actual **use of force** to restore peace and achieve the end state as defined in a mandate or a peace agreement. This form of peace operation may ultimately assume the nature of an outright combat operation. In that case, operations are conducted in

accordance with the Army Doctrine Publication Part II, ‘Combat operations’.

0339. In order to be **credible**, peace-enforcing troops must be willing and able to disable any (armed) resistance. Coercive measures must, however, be taken with as much restraint as possible and in combination with other techniques if a lasting peace is ultimately to be achieved. The force’s actions must focus on:

- promoting consent to the presence of the peace force, particularly from the political leaders of the parties
- compliance with the implementation stipulations of the peace agreement, particularly by the (para)military elements of the parties
- cooperation at all levels, with all agencies and in all possible areas

Both physically and mentally able to act cooperatively and coercively.

Photograph: Dutch Press Agency (ANP) (IFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996)

0340. When conducting the operations, the commander of the peace-enforcing troops must have the **authority** to coerce cooperation whenever he encounters resistance, armed or otherwise. A force must, therefore, be both physically and mentally able to act cooperatively and coercively during a peace-enforcing operation. It must also strive for impartiality at all times. It is, however, inevitable that one or more of the parties will see the force as biased, at least temporarily.



Relations between peace support operations

0341. Peace support operations are neither for nor against a particular party, but are designed to restore and support peace and ensure, **impartially**, compliance with the peace agreement. Impartiality must not be confused with non-involvement. A peace support force does not adopt an attitude of non-involvement, but is actively involved in the situation in the area of operations. This involvement does not, however, mean that the force takes the side of one of the parties. The imposition of sanctions and any use or threat of force by the leaders of the peace force is thus not intended to favour or disadvantage a particular party, but to ensure its cooperation in the observance of the peace agreement.

0342. A **mandate** for a peace support operation will not designate an enemy, nor will it establish a link with a military victory. A peace support operation is about restoring peace and security and the principles of the UN Charter, including those relating to human rights.

0343. It is vitally important to **involve the parties** in the formulation and subsequent realisation of the desired end state (regardless of whether this is a cease-fire or a peace settlement) and the accompanying conditions. If the parties are committed to the peace process, a more durable end situation will usually result. If an operation becomes more violent, however, the conditions of a peace plan may be imposed without consultation or agreement between the parties.

0344. The degree of **consent** in peacekeeping operations is in principle such that the force needs relatively few assets to make the parties cooperate. Even in peacekeeping operations, however, it may be necessary to threaten to or actually use force temporarily and locally. This possibility must thus be borne in mind when deciding which troops are to be deployed and what weapons they will take. For peace-enforcing operations, on the other hand, troops must at all times have sufficient means to coerce the parties to cooperate wherever necessary, regardless of their objections.

0345. Figure 3-1 is a diagram of the **frame of reference** for peace support operations. It shows the sort of military action, the type of force used, the classification of operations, the techniques applied and the relation to the UN Charter. Especially important in this context are the so-called 'consent divide' and the principle of impartiality, which signify the difference between a peace operation and war. Both concepts are explained further in this and the next section of this chapter.




Figure 3-1: Frame of reference for peace support operations (peace-enforcing and consent-promoting techniques are described in paragraphs 0360 - 0365).

0346. **Difference between peacekeeping and peace-enforcing.** As far as the desired end state is concerned, the distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcing is irrelevant. Both are, after all, intended to achieve the same goal: a stable situation with a good chance of peace for the long term.

0347. The **distinguishing criterion** is the consent to the presence of and operations by the peace force. This criterion would appear in itself to be clear, employable and measurable, but the situations in practice are usually less clear and difficult to assess. Thus there may indeed be consent at the strategic level (the national government or the leaders of a party) or at the operational level (local authorities and commanders of large units or formations), but at the tactical level (the local 'warlord', the mayor or the police), consent and cooperation may not be forthcoming as a result of a disturbed balance of power in one of the parties. There may also be a difference between the degree of consent which has been achieved at the political level and the extent of compliance with the peace agreement at the executive level. This means that the distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcing can be extremely blurred.

0348. A force which is only equipped for a peacekeeping task, in which the use of force is in principle restricted to self-defence, cannot apply coercive measures. If measures are nonetheless required in order to enforce compliance with the agreements reached, the consent may be lost and resistance to the operation may increase. Two options remain in that case: withdraw or turn the operation into a peace-enforcing operation. This is primarily a question of a **political decision**, whereby account must be taken of the risks for and the composition of the existing peace force. A peace-enforcing operation also requires a patently different legal basis and the mandate and the rules of engagement will have to be amended accordingly.

*Capable of robust action.
Photograph: Media Centre
RNLA
(SFOR, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 1997)*



0349. The peace force required for a peace-enforcing operation is not the same as the one that is needed for a peacekeeping operation. Moving up reinforcements will, however, sometimes be impossible or too time-consuming. When the peace force is assembled for a peacekeeping operation, therefore, the **capacity for robust action** (escalation dominance) must be incorporated and the operational concept must allow for a transition to peace enforcement. The transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement will almost certainly be accompanied by a considerable regrouping of the force and perhaps even the evacuation of observers and civil organisations. It will not always be possible to continue humanitarian activities. It will also mean a major change in the mental attitude on the part of the military personnel involved.

General Rose, Commander of UNPROFOR's BH Command in 1994, summarised the difference between a peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operation as follows: 'You cannot fight war from white painted vehicles'. After all, a lightly armed force, dispersed over a large number of (vulnerable) locations, is not in a position to act in a peace-enforcing capacity or conduct combat operations.

0350. Steps must in any event be taken to ensure that troops are not forced into such a transition **without preparation**. It is vital that the political leaders make a timely and conscious decision, based on military information about the local situation, to, if necessary, extend the peace force's mandate or the rules of engagement, reinforce the peace force or, in extreme cases, replace the entire peace force with peace-enforcing troops. It is also important that the peace force maintains its combat readiness at all times.

0351. Once the parties in a peace-enforcing operation are cooperating with the establishment and implementation of a peace settlement, peace-enforcing troops can **switch to peacekeeping tasks**. This transition will have to be made gradually, certainly if there is still local resistance to the agreement. Various forms of peace support operation are required for this transitional phase. If cooperation and consent are forthcoming, troops will act in a peacekeeping capacity. In areas where the stipulations of the peace accord are not fully observed, the operation will preserve its peace-enforcing character.

The NATO peace force, IFOR, which relieved UNPROFOR at the end of 1995 and which was mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, was able to lower its profile fairly soon after its deployment in view of the fact that the parties in the conflict were cooperating well with the implementation of the peace agreement. This did not alter the fact that IFOR retained the mandate and the means for a peace-enforcing operation. The proper use of consent-promoting techniques and the question of lowering or raising the profile of the peace force were left to the peace force commander.

See also ADP II, Chapter 8 (Operational planning for post-conflict operations) for a closer examination of this aspect.

0352. If a peace-enforcing operation does actually turn into a peace-keeping operation, it may be advisable to replace the force with another. It will, after all, mean a considerable change in the mind-set for personnel if they are to cooperate with members of the party which was obstructing the operational objective during the peace-enforcing operation. If the intent of the operation was initially to enforce compliance with the peace settlement with the use of force, the emphasis is now on consolidating peace by peaceful means. This is effected by, for example, restoring public order, rebuilding infrastructure and performing other tasks which result directly from recently terminated (combat) operations. Another important point is that the peace force, which behaved violently in the eyes of the local population and warring factions, will not immediately be regarded as impartial. This can have an adverse effect on the way in which the peacekeeping force functions.

Section 4 - Other peace operations

0353. The term 'other peace operations' is a **collective term** for those peace operations which cannot strictly be classified as peace support operations. These include military aid/support to civil authorities, humanitarian operations and non-combatant evacuation operations. The civil government is usually directly involved in and often responsible for the coordination and conduct of other peace operations. The operational tasks associated with these forms of other peace operations are described in more detail in Chapters 15, 16 and 17 respectively. They have no common **characteristics**. These forms of peace operation do, however, share the following similarities.

- Local authorities have proved unable to fulfil their role in respect of peace and security.
- They can be conducted with combat and peace support operations simultaneously in virtually any type of (armed) conflict.
- The degree of consent can range from full consent to no consent; this can also change in the course of the operation.
- The risk of violence can range from none to considerable.
- The deployment of a force is limited in time.

0354. **Military aid/support** to civil authorities will be provided until they are once again able to take on the tasks themselves. Military operations are, therefore, generally of a supplementary nature, as a

result of which the deployment of military personnel usually remains limited in time. Civil organisations thus take over these tasks as soon as possible.

0355. Each government is responsible for providing the primary necessities for its people and for maintaining order and authority. Should a country be unable to meet these responsibilities, the international community or an individual country may decide to conduct **humanitarian operations**. This will in principle take place at the request of the country in question. If civil organisations are unable to alleviate the suffering among their citizens, a decision may be made to deploy the armed forces to conduct a humanitarian operation.

0356. If Dutch nationals are in danger in a crisis situation, the Dutch government will see it as its duty to do its utmost to ensure their safety, even if they are abroad. In the event of a crisis in another country, the Dutch ambassador (or another government representative) will, if necessary, advise Dutch citizens to leave the crisis area. If they can no longer do so by civil means, the government may instruct the armed forces to conduct this **evacuation task**.

Section 5 - Consent in peace operations

0357. The doctrine for peace support operations is based mainly on the promotion of **confidence and cooperation**. Both aspects thus have a direct impact on the degree of consent to the presence of and actions by the peace force. Although the peace force's mandate and rules of engagement will, depending on the type of operation, allow the use of force to a greater or lesser extent, this is nonetheless limited by the need

*Promoting confidence
and cooperation.*

*Photograph: Media Centre
RNLA (IFOR, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 1996)*



to preserve general consent. Consent also features in other peace operations but, as these are often of shorter duration, the concept of 'consent' plays a less dominant role.

0358. A primary condition for consent is the possibility of clearly **identifying the parties** in the conflict. In other words, one has to establish which parties need to give their consent. Once the parties involved have been identified, the level of their consent will indicate their willingness to stop using force to resolve the conflict. If the parties do not consent to a peace operation, then the international community must decide whether to abandon the idea of an operation or whether to take coercive measures of a political, economic, military or other nature.

0359. **The level of consent.** At the political-strategic level, consent is in principle based on formal declarations and agreements. Consent at this level will, therefore, usually remain constant in terms of time. In the best-case scenario, this consent will also exist at lower tactical levels and will be translated into compliance with the implementation stipulations of the peace agreement. It may, however, be limited to a certain degree of tolerance in respect of the operation, which entails a certain element of risk for the peace force. At the tactical level, consent may be highly dependent on local events, public opinion and the influence of the local media. Consequently, the degree of consent can be subject to frequent and sudden change, which may mean that local actors fail to comply fully with any agreements that have been reached.

The consent divide

0360. If consent to the operation is doubtful, direct efforts must be made at all levels to **stabilise and promote this consent**. Ideally, this is done through dialogue and by peaceful means. A decision may, however, be made to expand the possibilities for the use of force by the peace force to enable it to continue its mission in a (more) robust manner. Political pressure, sanctions, the threat of force or the controlled use of force are thus options for the international organisation in charge of the operation. The use of these options may cause one or more of the factions to consent to the objectives of the operation. In effect this means that the consent divide is shifted, thus creating greater freedom of action in the implementation of the mandate.

0361. Once the boundary between peacekeeping and peace-enforcing has been crossed, the capacity for a credible degree of force is essential for the success of the operation. One must bear in mind, however, that this is a peace support operation and not a war. This means that any loss

of consent must be won back. This is extremely difficult to put into practice, which means that it will not be easy for the peace force to rebuild a bond of trust and good cooperation with the parties.

0362. A peacekeeping force which regularly conducts **peace-enforcing activities** seriously jeopardises the objective of the operation and the military personnel of the peace force. The legitimacy of the force will diminish as a result. Even if elements of the peacekeeping force take or appear to take sides or only use (excessive) force temporarily and locally, consent may be lost at the strategic level and the entire force could even lose its credibility as an impartial organisation. In that case, more of the available means must be used for the protection of friendly military capacity and, as a result, fewer and fewer means are can be used for activities connected with the actual objective of the operation. Such a situation will almost always lead to a loss of support among the local population, the loss of control of the situation and ultimately to what may be an uncontrollable escalation of the level of force. Consequently, political tension will increase and a solution to the conflict will become unattainable. For a peacekeeping power which has lost consent across the board, the chance of implementing the mandate is virtually non-existent; the only remaining option for the force is to withdraw from the theatre of operations.

Consent-promoting measures

0363. The **exchange of information** between the peace force and the parties, between the parties themselves and within the parties can be vitally important with regard to maintaining consent and complying

Cooperation with local authorities can have a positive effect.

Photograph: Media Centre

RNLA

(SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1998)



with agreements. Force commanders must be selective in the dissemination of information to members of the parties, not only to ensure the safety of their own personnel but also to maintain the impartial status.

0364. If the peace force conducts activities **in conjunction with** local authorities, international organisations and parties, this could have a positive effect in respect of the consent. This would after all stimulate compliance at the local level and all the parties involved would participate in the peace process. Such activities may include, for example, the repair of infrastructure (including communication facilities), medical aid projects and clearance activities, such as the removal of bodies, wrecked vehicles and so on. Ideally, other international organisations, UN agencies, NGOs and the government of the host country will also be involved.

0365. The peace force can promote cooperation between parties locally by stimulating activities which help to reinforce the peace process. For example, restrictions can be relaxed and support programmes and subsidies can be made more easily accessible. Setting up such activities is complex and does not fall under the 'normal' tasks of military personnel. Nevertheless, it offers such good possibilities for promoting consent and compliance that every opportunity to do so must be exploited.

4

A military approach to peace operations

Section 1 - Introduction

0401. **A military approach to peace operations** leads to the basic principles upon which military operations are based. These can be regarded as fundamental rules for the deployment of military means and apply to all levels of operation. Correct interpretation and awareness of these basic principles create an understanding of the diverse facets of military operations and thus contribute to the ultimate success of the operation. The following are considered to be basic military principles of peace operations:

- the fundamentals of military operations
- the rules of engagement and the use of force
- the functions in military operations
- the operational framework

0402. The basic principles of peace operations can vary considerably for each operation in terms of importance and relevance. They form a military **theoretical framework** for the planning and preparation of operations. This framework provides a foothold in the decision-making process and in the eventual allocation and deployment of means. It does not, however, form an exhaustive list of important points which, provided they are borne in mind during the planning, guarantee success. This theoretical framework also plays a key role during the operation itself, since an operation is seldom conducted as envisaged in the planning. Adjustments during the operation must also be based on these principles.


0403. There is a very real difference between **peace operations** and combat operations. The differences can be traced back to the nature and the objective of both main forms of military operation. Firstly, the approach to the use of force is different. Combat operations are about conducting battles, in which the use of force occupies centre stage. Peace operations are intended to reduce that very level of force. There are many possibilities in this respect, including the use of force. The use of force is not, therefore, the main feature of peace operations. The

differences are also expressed in the basic principles: as well as the basic principles which apply in general, both main types have a number of their 'own' specific basic principles. Finally, the operational functions of 'fire power' and 'manoeuvre' in particular have a different meaning in peace operations which extends beyond their traditional meaning during combat operations. The use of the operational framework can also offer added value. This too is often given a different interpretation than is the case in combat operations.

Section 2 - Basic principles of military operations

0404. The **basic principles of military operations** apply to both combat operations and peace operations. Depending on the type of operation, there may be more emphasis on certain basic principles or they may be given another dimension. A limited number of basic principles apply particularly to one of the two main forms of operation. Nevertheless, these specific basic principles can certainly prove their validity in another main form, both during a particular phase and in a more general sense. If, for example, battles must be conducted (locally and temporarily) during a peace operation, the principles of combat operations apply at that time.

Figure 4-1: Basic principles of military operations.



0405. **Internationally**, there is agreement in broad terms about most of the basic principles, although the terminology used does differ. In its crisis response operations, NATO thus maintains the principle of ‘restraint’, the features of which largely resemble the principle of the ‘minimum use of force’ used by the Royal Netherlands Army. Given that peace operations are almost always conducted in an international context, the terminology must be in keeping with the internationally relevant framework wherever possible. It is for this reason that this publication, in line with NATO and British doctrine, is introducing a new basic principle for peace operations which was not covered in ADP I: ‘**perseverance**’.

0406. The basic principles must always be considered **in relation to each other**. Complying fully with one principle may make it difficult to apply another. The application of the principles, therefore, goes hand in hand with an evaluation, in which account is taken of the intent of the higher commander, the mission and the objective, the actions of other parties involved in the conflict and the factors of time and space. The application of the basic principles can thus lead to choices or even dilemmas, in which risks must be taken or priorities set.

General principles

Security

0407. **Security** is an essential precondition for retaining own assets and freedom of action. Security is partly achieved through protection. Measures taken to prevent surprise also contribute significantly in this respect. This concerns, for instance, the physical protection of bases and logistic supply lines, guaranteeing freedom of movement (also in the airspace) and keeping reserves ready. Security also benefits from positive public support among the population in the area of operations.

0408. The ‘**protection**’ function is closely linked to the security of the force (force protection). An important element of this is operational security, which is used to deny the parties essential information about the order of battle, capabilities and intentions of friendly troops. The peace force may also be charged with the protection of civil elements of the peace operation or of the civilian population.

Too defensive an attitude on the part of the peace force can send the wrong signal to the parties. Take, for example, physical protection facilities (bunkers and so on), patrol methods, the uniform and the equipment. These are means for protection which could perhaps be used more effectively and efficiently to bring about the desired end state of the peace operation. There is thus a difference between effective protection and an excessive 'bunker mentality': the large-scale application of physical protection measures.

The physical protection of bases.

Photograph: Audiovisual Service, RNLN (IFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997)

0409. The **right of self-defence** is the starting point for the protection of friendly units. Force protection is also determined to a certain extent by an impartial attitude and respect for the parties. The credibility of the peace force can also contribute substantially to the safety of military personnel.



Concentration

0410. If a decision is sought, a **main effort** has to be established at the right time and in the right place. This is necessary in order to gain enough dominance to achieve the objective. In peace operations, **concentration** has a mental as well as a physical component. This means that the main effort in the operation will often target the hearts and minds of the political leaders of the conflicting parties and the population in the conflict area. Partly by means of information operations (see paragraph 0457), the objectives of the peace operation can be brought to the attention of these groups and their support obtained for the desired end state, namely a lasting peace.

0411. If the peace operation is to be completed successfully, it is necessary to concentrate not only combat power but also all activities (including civil activities) with the aim of persuading the parties not to rekindle the conflict. This means that military and civil organisations involved in the peace operation must harmonise their activities as much as possible. The minimum form of concentration is thus liaison and coordination with civil organisations and the maximum form is integral cooperation. Concentration also means that one has to accept relative weakness elsewhere, which entails a certain degree of risk. A good analysis of the available means (including civil assets), followed by a targeted and efficient deployment, can reduce this risk. This means that certain problems can be left to civil organisations, some to the peace force and others can be tackled jointly. The relative weakness of the military component can thus be compensated by the greater whole of all the organisations involved in resolving the conflict.

Talking to the non-military organisations in the conflict area at an early stage of the operation can help to cultivate a base of confidence, mutual respect and understanding, as a result of which the cooperation will take on a more concrete form. Setting up a CIMIC centre where civil and military organisations as well as representatives of the civilian population and the authorities in the conflict area can meet can also be a strong stimulus for better cooperation.

Objective

0412. Every military operation must be based on an **objective** which is unambiguous, clearly defined and attainable. If a force loses sight of what has to be achieved, the result will often be the failure of the operation. The higher levels can express the objective in guidelines or a directive defining the desired end state. At the tactical level, subordinate commanders derive their objective from the higher commander's intent and from their orders. These aspects occupy centre stage in the assessment of the situation, which ultimately leads to orders for the lower level. This leads to targeted handling at all levels involved in an operation.

0413. During the course of a peace operation, elements of a peace force may take on tasks which are not defined in the mandate. These are usually tasks which initially have only local significance, but which do contribute to the transition to a stable situation. In the event of such a shift, known as **mission creep**, there is a risk that the emphasis too will shift to achieving a quick success. It is also possible that, because of the availability of certain means, other, non-assigned tasks will be performed. It is not inconceivable that other tasks which at first glance seem to offer less chance of success will be neglected. They may

nonetheless be vital to the success of the peace operation. This phenomenon can be avoided by constantly weighing up the mission, mandate and tasks against each other.

0414. Mission creep must not be confused with a **well-considered adjustment** of the mission (known as ‘re-roling’), as may occur in the course of a peace operation with the aim of maintaining the focus of the operation. The normalisation of the situation in a conflict area takes a particular path on which the attainment of military stability is a first step towards creating the conditions for achieving political and social stability. Along this path, the peace force may be given tasks other than those which were originally envisaged.

There is a danger, certainly in peace operations conducted over a prolonged period, that the actions of the force will become less targeted. Standard operating procedures and standing orders then determine the actions of the peace force to an increasing extent and detract attention from the original reason for its presence. In the worst case, this can lead to feelings of indifference and a sense of everyday routine and thus to an unsatisfactory performance of tasks. This deterioration in performance can be prevented by rotating personnel and units in the area of operations and by giving them different tasks.

Economy of effort

0415. The most economic use of means, **economy of effort**, is achieved in a peace operation by ensuring that the international community is involved quickly. In this way the situation can be prevented from developing into a conflict which is complex and difficult to resolve or into a large-scale emergency. Timely political intervention, whether or not it is supported by (preventive) military deployment, might serve to contain the conflict at an early stage. This would also reduce the need for more radical military action.

0416. If **military intervention** is required, it is advisable to deploy a force which is able to move quickly to operations at a higher level of force and which can also perform other operational tasks relatively easily. This may be more efficient in the longer term than to form a unit that would first have to be reinforced in order to cope with extra tasks.

Wherever possible, specific functions or tasks should be performed by the civil and other government sectors, whereby the available military means can be used more efficiently. Military units are ideally suited, for example, to reconstruction activities. This is, however, a relatively costly use of means which are consequently not available for the military use for which they were intended. The deployment of large numbers of military personnel as part of an unarmed observer operation may in time have repercussions for the possible deployment of organic units in support of these observers.

Unity of effort

0417. **Unity of effort** is assured if the aim of the operation is established centrally and the powers and activities of the various actors (including the civil organisations) are harmonised as much as possible, although this is not often feasible in practice. Coordinated actions do, however, offer great advantages. They have a positive effect on the morale of the troops and on the credibility of the peace force as a whole. They will encourage the parties to seek a permanent solution and stop them putting a spoke in the wheel of cooperation.

0418. A large number of local, national and international (political) authorities may become involved in managing and resolving a crisis or conflict. From an operational point of view, their efforts need to be harmonised and the **political guidelines** for the force commander and civilian leaders of the operation must be consistent and feasible. The political guidelines must stipulate the desired end state in political, humanitarian and military terms. Without positive and consistent political leadership, operational military and diplomatic activities alone will not be enough to achieve the desired end state.

0419. Complex crisis situations demand an **integral approach** which is geared towards the management, limitation and ultimate elimination of the direct and underlying causes and symptoms of the conflict. This requires a strategy which is at least endorsed by the diplomatic and humanitarian agencies involved in resolving the conflict. The integral approach not only relates to the multidisciplinary method, which involves various organisations. It also requires a multifunctional role for the peace force. This force must be capable of enforcing peace, providing assistance and operating as a guardian of public order.

0420. The responsibility for achieving consensus and unity of effort in the area of operations rests primarily with the operation's civil leaders, who are appointed by the international organisation which authorised the operation. An additional problem in respect of the harmonisation of the activities of the actors in the conflict is the fact that many civil agencies are often already active in the conflict area before the military units become involved. These agencies will often remain active in the area of operations long after the peace force has departed.

Unity of effort can only be effective if there is a campaign plan which deals with all (military) facets of the conflict: the deployment in the conflict area, the lines of operation, the objectives, the centres of gravity, the exit strategy and the desired end state. The military operation plan must be in line with the overall civil peace plan, which in turn is based on a UN Security Council resolution or on a peace settlement agreed by the parties.

Simplicity

o421. As a result of the rapid succession of events and the complexity of military operations, chaos, stress and friction may arise in any type of operation. Plans which are complex and difficult to understand increase the risk of confusion at the lower levels. **Simplicity**, on the other hand, which manifests itself in clear and in particular comprehensible plans and orders, increases the chance of success. Given that great responsibility is placed at the lower levels of command in peace operations, commanders should be given clearly worded orders which leave them in no doubt as to what is expected of them.

o422. It is also important that plans and orders are simple and **unambiguous**; this requires a direct relationship between the objective(s) of the operation and the activities conducted by the peace force. Lastly, simplicity can also be benefited by a clear and, in particular, logical distribution of tasks among the various components of the peace force. Units and formations must only be assigned tasks for which they are trained or equipped.

The basic principle of 'simplicity' is also important in the formulation of the rules of engagement. They are not always as accessible to individual military personnel, especially when it comes to the explanation of the political and legal principles upon which they are based. A popular solution is the translation into what is known as an 'ROE card', the rules of engagement for the individual soldier. Combined with the application of the rules of engagement in exercise situations, this card defines the limits of the use of force even at the lowest level of the peace force. Ideally, therefore, an ROE card should be written in the personnel's own language; should be simple and accessible and must be easy to use in any situation.

Flexibility

o423. The specific characteristics of peace operations require that, within the confines of the mandate and the rules of engagement, a variety of operational tasks be performed, making use of a wide range of assets and (weapons) systems. A force must, therefore, have the **flexibility** to shift the emphasis in their tasks or even switch from one operational task to another within a short reaction time. In exceptional cases, combat actions will also be required. A peace force must already

have developed plans, preferably before the start of the operation, for the withdrawal of units from a conflict area, using force if necessary. Chapter 18 looks at this aspect in more detail.

Even if the objective of the peace operation does not have to change, it may nonetheless be necessary to adjust the operation plans if certain developments so demand. This means that the tasks can be more easily tailored to a different situation or troops can respond to an opportunity or threat which was not previously identified. This requires mental flexibility on the part of commanders at all levels, high anticipatory capacity on the part of the staffs of the peace force and the availability of means necessary to react to a new situation.

Credibility

0424. The **credibility** of the peace force is a reflection of the assessment of the parties of the ability and will of the peace force to implement the mandate and achieve the end state, as well as the impartial attitude portrayed by the members of the peace force. The degree of international support for the operation can also contribute to the credibility of the force. The political will to act resolutely in peace operations must not give rise to a situation in which the force concentrates exclusively on objectives which are known in advance to be unattainable in the short term. There is always a danger that the force will overplay its hand, which could seriously affect its credibility. This also applies to the use of force. It must be relatively easy to adapt the level of force to a new situation. If, however, the rules of engagement do not contain enough flexibility, this could have repercussions for the credibility of the peace force.

0425. From a **psychological point of view**, credibility plays a key role in the way the peace operation proceeds, particularly in the evaluation of friendly actions. Credibility contributes substantially to the self-confidence of military personnel. Even though the peace force must not represent a direct threat to one or more of the parties in the conflict, there may be no doubt as to the will and the capacity to act robustly if necessary. The force must, therefore, be well equipped, trained and prepared for the peace operation. The peace force must also act quickly and decisively in the event of an incident. A policy of 'zero tolerance' must be applied in the event of breaches of the peace agreement and violations of human rights. Personnel at all levels must meet the highest standards in terms of attitude, conduct and discipline and behave professionally both in the performance of their duties and during periods of relaxation. The impression that this makes on those around them should not be underestimated.

Credibility at the tactical level is mainly a reflection of four elements of military operations: a feasible operation plan, the right means, high morale and impartiality in the performance of tasks. The local media can also play an important role in assisting the peace force to gain credibility; wherever possible the impartiality and credibility of the force should be endorsed via the local media. One must realise, however, that the media, and particularly the local media, cannot be dictated to with regard to what they must write or broadcast. Nevertheless, the advantage of favourable (local) press is so great that appropriate and active cooperation with the media is well worth the effort.

Initiative

0426. A peace force will at all times try to keep or gain the **initiative** and thus freedom of action. A starting point must, therefore, be to control events rather than to respond to them. One method to achieve this is to impose stringent yet feasible objectives and time limits on the parties involved. A certain degree of pressure can thus be exerted on the parties to meet their obligations. Once the initiative has been won, the peace force must develop new, cohesive initiatives in order to keep up the momentum at the political-strategic level and to prevent stagnation of the peace operation.

The term momentum comes from physics, in which it indicates a body's degree of motion or impetus (mass times velocity). Similarly, when used in combat operations, the term has come to mean 'the product of velocity and thrust'. In the context of peace operations, it should be taken to mean the product of speed and initiative, whereby events occur at such a pace that developments become virtually unstoppable. The peace process can thus be stimulated by organising joint discussions, developing confidence-building measures (such as the mutual inspection of barracks and arms depots) and by advising and assisting parties in economic cooperation projects by companies on both sides of a separation line. This can create a situation in which the positive developments of the peace operation can no longer be stopped and the parties have no option but to meet their obligations in accordance with the peace settlement.

Legitimacy

0427. **Legitimacy** has a legal and a social component. The greater the legitimacy attributed to the peace operation by the international community and the parties involved in the conflict, the greater the chance of success. Military operations must be conducted in accordance with rules of Dutch and international law, in terms of both the letter and the spirit. This law provides a framework for military operations as well as rules for their execution. Dutch military personnel must always act in accordance with Dutch law, even when they are operating under the responsibility or command of an international organisation. Compliance with the principles of the humanitarian law of war is also essential for legitimacy.

0428. The **legal basis** can vary enormously in peace operations. A peace operation will often be founded on one or more resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. There may also be an agreement which has been concluded by the parties. A decision also has to be made for each operation as to which stationing rights, usually established in separate Status of Forces Agreements, and which rules of engagement are applicable. The mandate is not a separate document, but can be derived from the documents referred to above and supplemented if necessary with guidelines from the United Nations or NATO and (national) political guidelines. Correct and consistent conduct in accordance with the mandate and other applicable legal rules contributes significantly to the picture of a legitimate operation.

0429. The **social component** of legitimacy consists mainly of the support for the military operation from a country's own people and its political leaders. The majority of the population and the politicians must feel that the peace operation is right and justified. Local norms and values play a key role in this respect. Social legitimacy is thus a key condition for the continuation and completion of peace operations and helps to create broader support and possibly wider participation by international and non-governmental organisations. Support among the population in the area of operations is also extremely important. It increases the freedom of action and movement for the peace force and enables it to concentrate fully on achieving the objective(s) of the operation.

Support among the population in the area of operations is also extremely important.

*Photograph: Media Centre
RNLA
(UNOMUR, Uganda, 1994)*



The method of operating is one of the aspects which determine whether support is maintained. Unnecessary damage must thus be avoided. This may mean that certain weapons systems or vehicles will only be used on a limited scale, if at all. The ‘*Toetsingskader*’, which is a set of criteria drawn up and used by the Dutch government and parliament to decide whether or not to participate in a peace operation (see Chapter 5), takes account of social legitimacy as one of the criteria.

Basic principles specific to peace operations

Freedom of movement

0430. **Freedom of (military) movement** is vital if a peace operation is to be conducted successfully. The peace force’s freedom of movement will in principle be established in the mandate and the status of forces agreement. Apart from the practical limitations, the acceptance of any restriction of the freedom of movement will inevitably lead to a loss of credibility. Any attempt to limit the peace force’s freedom of movement must, therefore, be quickly and decisively quashed, if necessary by force in accordance with the rules of engagement.

Freedom of movement does not only refer to physical displacement. Equally important is to gain and keep mental freedom of movement or, in other words, the impression that the peace force is calling the shots rather than the parties. An excessively high level of force protection aimed to prevent losses can restrict the freedom of movement considerably. The reaction to provocation by the parties may also give off the wrong signal in respect of the peace force’s mental freedom of movement.

0431. Restriction of the freedom of movement is indeed a problem which is often faced by a peace force. A force which cannot move freely will seldom be able to accomplish its mission. This applies particularly to operations in an environment with a (potentially) high level of force, where consent is often dubious and the observance of the stipulations of any peace settlement is limited in terms of time and place. The parties may try to establish where the peace force has set its limits and thus take over the initiative.

Transparency

0432. A force must present its intentions and capabilities as **transparently** as possible, although a balance has to be found between transparency and operational security. It is important that the operational activities and the requirements imposed on the parties be correctly interpreted. A transparent peace force is more likely to

acquire impartial status, obtain consent from the parties in the conflict and enjoy international support. The reason for the peace operation, as well as the mandate and the objectives (political and military), must be made absolutely clear to the parties as quickly as possible.

The transparency of the peace force can be enhanced by a cohesive and focused information operation, possibly strengthened by a civil-military cooperation programme and a liaison network. The wrong message, or one which is misunderstood, can arouse suspicion and create an atmosphere of mistrust, as a result of which the credibility of the peace force and the mutual trust between the parties and the peace force may be damaged. It might even provide the parties with an excuse for non-compliance with the peace agreement.

Minimum use of force

o433. Two basic principles are important for restraint or minimum necessary force: **necessity** and **proportionality**. Necessity means that force may only be used if it is essential in order to achieve the military objective and other means are inadequate. Proportionality means that force must be kept to the minimum level needed to achieve that objective.

o434. Both principles set limitations on where, when and to what extent troops may use force. Unnecessary use of force has an adverse effect on the impartiality and credibility of the troops. Excessive force may jeopardise the consent of the parties in the conflict and the chances of long-term success.

If the situation so demands, troops must certainly not hesitate to use force.

Photograph: Military History Section RNLA (IFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996)



0435. These principles must not, incidentally, be taken to mean that troops should refrain from using force altogether. If the situation so demands, they should certainly not hesitate to use force. In any event, the right of self-defence applies at all times. Any use of force beyond this, for example to secure freedom of movement, must be authorised by the rules of engagement. Section 3 of this chapter looks at the use of force and the rules of engagement in more detail.

Impartiality

0436. Without **impartiality** there can be no prospect of preserving the trust or cooperation of the parties, nor of achieving the desired end state in the long term. It is not enough merely to *act* impartially, however; the actions must also be interpreted as such by all parties. The more complex the situation, the more often impartiality will be put to the test. This does not, incidentally, preclude actions directed solely at one of the parties. Any actions of this nature must, however, be transparent. The actions must also specifically target the party which is not complying with the peace agreement and they must be clearly related to the nature of the violation.

Impartiality must not be confused with non-involvement. An attitude of non-involvement limits the possibilities for developing initiatives and acting with flexibility, stimulates passiveness and, as a result, will fail to bring about the desired end state. Impartiality, on the other hand, requires an evaluation of criteria, a mandate, implementation stipulations of a peace agreement or a combination of these elements. To underline the difference between impartiality and non-involvement, international literature refers to 'active impartiality' and 'principled impartiality'. A peace operation, regardless of the level (strategic, operational, tactical) will always be conducted with impartiality and never with an attitude of non-involvement towards the parties.

0437. The loss of impartiality (either assumed or actual) can have serious repercussions. In the most favourable case, it will result in a short-lived decline in confidence in the peace force. In the worst case, it may lead to an escalation of violence, also against the peace force, or the loss of consent to the objective of the peace operation. An essential element of impartiality is **even-handedness**. This is the honest and consistent application of rules and sanctions. None of the parties may be given preferential treatment, even though the extent of cooperation with the peace force or the level of consent to its presence may vary. This means, therefore, that parties should not be treated as if they were the same but as equals.

Mutual respect

0438. **Mutual respect** must exist not only within the international force but also between the peace force and the political and military leaders of the parties in the conflict. Prejudice, chauvinism and a lack of consideration for sensitivities may lead to the loss of respect from the parties. This may also have an adverse effect on the successful completion of the operation. It is, therefore, necessary to take account of the customs and culture of the parties and the population in the area of operations. The acceptance of the actual position of the parties (without, incidentally, any value judgement with regard to these parties or their actions) can also help to foster respect for the peace force.

Respect for the force will increase considerably if the members of the peace force act professionally and correctly and do not allow themselves to be either provoked or manipulated. This underlines the importance of a good knowledge of the implementation stipulations of any peace agreement down to the lowest level in the peace force. The consistent application may initially cause irritation between the peace force and the parties but will ultimately result in improved 'cooperation'. It also means that the peace force must exercise caution in their contacts with the parties and the civilian population in the area of operations. Any misconduct by individuals may have repercussions for the image of the peace force as a whole.

Perseverance

0439. Peace operations require **perseverance** in the form of the long-term involvement of the international community and the peace force, even though some peace operations, such as non-combatant evacuation operations, are of relatively short duration. The way in which military deployment can help to achieve the desired political-strategic end state must, therefore, be established at an early stage. This means that account must be taken of, for example, the desired objectives in the longer term and the political and legal restrictions which the peace force may encounter in the course of the operation.

0440. Establishing the criteria against which the operation (including the military component) is evaluated is an important instrument in the hands of politicians and military planners. It will not always be possible to set a time limit for the military conduct of the operation. The underlying causes of most conflicts make it difficult to establish at the beginning of the military involvement how the conflict can be definitively resolved and how much time will be needed. Sticking rigidly to a completion date for the operation or a clearly defined end state can be counterproductive, as there is a danger that the initiative will thus, to a greater or lesser extent, be left to the parties.

The principle of 'staying power' must never turn into a sense that the conflict will never be resolved, as a result of which the peace operation would take on a permanent character. An unwanted *status quo* must not be given *de facto* legitimacy by the presence of the peace force. One aspect worthy of more attention in this respect is the motivation of the members of the peace force at all levels. The feeling that their efforts are ineffectual and pointless must on no account be allowed to take root. An attitude like this will ultimately damage the effectiveness of the peace force to its very core.

Section 3 - Rules of engagement and the use of force

0441. When force is used during peace operations, the principles of the **humanitarian law of war** must be observed. Thus a distinction must always be made between the civilian population and any combatants. The civilian population may never, collectively or individually, be the target of military force. Even in the event of attacks on military targets, civilian casualties must be avoided as much as possible. If force is used on a larger scale during peace-enforcing operations, not only the principles of the humanitarian law of war must be observed, but also the rules as laid down for an international armed conflict.

0442. **Rules of engagement** are established as a means of controlling military force and the related activities. They consist of guidelines and rules, which together determine the (operational) policy in respect of the use of force, as well as the specific instructions for the use of force for a particular operation. However, they also contain rules for activities related to the use of force, such as positioning and the use of

The soldier must use common sense to assess every situation.

Photograph: Military History Section RNLA (UNIFIL, Lebanon, 1979)



electromagnetic equipment. Rules of engagement are thus more than merely rules concerning the use of force. The authority responsible for the operation establishes specific rules of engagement for that operation on the basis of the mandate, in relation to the military operational planning and the (international) legal context of the operation. The aim of this document is to enable the political and military leaders to exercise their authority for the military operation.

o443. Rules of engagement are used in times of both peace and war as well as in peace operations. They may be set out in an annex to an operation plan or order or as a standard operating procedure. The rules of engagement usually consist of a series of guidelines and principles, followed by instructions, do's and don'ts. They are fairly general as it is impossible to define every conceivable situation. The soldier must, therefore, assess the situation with **common sense**, using the rules of engagement as a basis.

o444. The rules of engagement do not restrict the inherent right of **self-defence**: the right to use all necessary means and to take all appropriate steps to defend oneself and friendly troops. This right applies regardless of what is contained in the rules of engagement. Self-defence assumes an immediate need to act as a result of a threat or attack, which will not necessarily be the case in every hostile act or hostile intent. In cases where it is not a question of self-defence, the right to use force must then be derived from the rules of engagement. In all cases, the principles of subsidiarity (only using force if other means are inadequate) and proportionality (using no more force than is strictly necessary) continue to apply in full. They will be needed to help the commander in his decision about a suitable response.

The rules of engagement usually start with a description of the general principles and with a number of comments about the structure and application. The most important principles for the use of force are in any event included: proportionality, subsidiarity and military necessity. They then go on to define a number of specific rules for the operation in question, distinguishing (if applicable) between rules for actions by land, air and naval forces. In the case of a NATO operation, a selection is made from existing rules which are set out in a sort of catalogue. The rules of engagement can thus be precisely tailored to the nature and purpose of a particular operation and account can be taken of the available means. The definition will also include the procedure for any interim amendments to the rules of engagement that might be considered necessary as a result of a change in circumstances or new insights. The rules of engagement usually end with a number of definitions of the terms used.

o445. Lastly, the rules of engagement represent both a source of assurance and an **evaluation instrument** for friendly actions. Given the objective and the way in which they are produced, they provide

assurance in respect of the intended level of force during the operation. This also applies to the intentions of the authority responsible for the operation. On the other hand, one should be aware of the fact that the rules of engagement are, as previously stated, formulated in general terms. The principles for the use of force (subsidiarity and proportionality), together with the rules of engagement, serve as an evaluation instrument against which the soldier can weigh up his (intended) actions. The soldier remains individually responsible (and in extreme cases even criminally liable) for his actions. In most cases, however, criminal proceedings will take place in the soldier's own country (the sending state), in view of the fact that it is customary to draw up a stationing or status agreement with the host country prior to deployment. Immunity from local jurisdiction and the exclusive jurisdiction of the sending state are permanent features of such agreements.

The right of self-defence is the starting point for the protection of friendly units. When the rules of engagement are drawn up, one must take into account the different interpretations of the concept of 'self-defence'. The right of self-defence for the peace force can be defined differently in accordance with national legislation. During the IFOR operation in 1996, this gave rise to different interpretations of the rules of engagement in the British division, namely those of the British and the Dutch and those of the other nations. In multinational operations in particular, this situation requires a good understanding of the backgrounds to the national points of view and thorough harmonisation of the tasks. A situation such as this with rules of engagement which differ nationally should, however, be avoided wherever possible.

Section 4 - Functions in military operations

0446. The functions in military operations also apply to peace operations. By considering the functions as an integral whole during the planning and execution of a peace operation, **cohesion** is created between the conceptual, mental and physical components of military potential. This means that they serve as an aid for commanders and the military potential can be focused fully on the objective of the operation.

0447. The functions provide insight into all elements of **military actions** by friendly troops as well as by other parties. This makes it possible to determine how and with what the cohesion between the components of friendly military potential can be strengthened and that of others can be attacked or broken. The functions must not merely be considered in their most literal or physical sense. In some operations, certain functions do not appear to play any significant role. In a relatively static mission such as interpositioning, the function of 'manoeuvre' seems less important and in unarmed monitoring missions the function of 'fire power' does not appear to apply. Nevertheless,

giving due consideration to each function for every operation ensures that no aspect is overlooked and will improve planning and execution.

Command and control

0448. Command and control guarantees the **integration** of other functions in military operations, with the aim of achieving an objective. In the doctrine of the Royal Netherlands Army, a particular choice has been made for a mission command style. This is a style which is based on thinking in terms of objectives. Tasks are mainly formulated in terms of *what* must be achieved as well as *why*. The execution (the *how*) is left, within certain confines, to the unit commander. Commanders at all levels, therefore, in principle have a high degree of freedom of action.

Friction is a feature of every military operation. The uncertainty that this causes can be dealt with in various ways in the context of command and control. One way is to make decisions at the highest possible level, which reduces uncertainty at that level. At the lower levels, however, uncertainty will then increase, as there will be no freedom of action to respond to changing circumstances. Alternatively, a high degree of freedom of action can be allocated to the lower levels. The higher levels are then faced with the decision-making and the subsequent actions by the lower levels, without being able to exert much influence on them.

0449. Command and control is based on a number of **principles**, namely centrally formulated objectives and decentralised execution, unity of command, mutual trust and understanding and timely and effective decision-making. The style of command and control as well as these principles apply to every military operation. In peace operations, however, there are a number of factors of influence which make it necessary to explain these principles further.

0450. **Decentralised execution** is ideal for enabling a rapid response to changing circumstances and makes it easier to think and act faster than the other parties. However, decentralised execution is no simple matter. It requires clearly formulated objectives, unity of opinion, an organisational culture that is based on trust and understanding, units with a strong sense of team spirit and personnel with a high degree of professionalism. One disadvantage of decentralised execution is that it may lead to differences in the performance of tasks, which may have a confusing effect on the parties.

0451. A number of **factors** can have an effect on decentralised execution:

- **Political sensitivity.** The fact that actions at the tactical and operational levels have political implications may restrict the freedom of action at those levels.
- **Non-organic units.** A unit for a peace operation may be a tailor-made unit. This will often be formed a relatively short time before an operation. This means that attention has to be paid to the development of a strong sense of team spirit and unity of opinion in the unit before and during the deployment.
- **International cooperation.** There will usually be international cooperation down to the lowest level during a peace operation. Every soldier can thus be confronted by different organisational cultures and communication problems.
- **Leadership** during peace operations is characterised by a high degree of independence down to the lowest level. Because of the often basic working and living conditions, the (social) distance between commanders and their personnel will often be limited. Moreover, there is often a great deal of mutual dependence. Informal leadership is gaining ground in practice, but can also lead to responsibility problems.

Every soldier can be confronted by different organisational cultures and communication problems.

Photograph: Military History Section RNLA (UNTAG, Namibia, 1989)



0452. **Unity of command** is an essential requirement if unity of effort is to be guaranteed. This can be achieved by means of single leadership and clear chains of command. However, the unity of command in peace operations is complicated by a number of aspects:

- During peace operations, there will often be an **abundance of (civil) organisations** which are striving for different and **overlapping objectives**. The chain of command is by no means always clear. Neither is there any command relationship between the military commander and these organisations. However, because of its high degree of organisation, standard operating procedures and sophisticated communications equipment, the military unit is in an ideal position to coordinate and sometimes even direct the activities of the various organisations.
- There will always be **more than one chain of command** during peace operations. There is a multinational (operational) chain, but there will also certainly be a national (administrative) chain. The responsibilities and powers of the authorities and agencies in both chains must be clearly defined in advance.

0453. **Mutual trust and mutual respect.** The multinational and ad hoc nature of peace operations forces commanders at all levels to develop a 'feeling for the environment'. This requires an outward-looking and open attitude. Other organisational cultures and different ways of thinking and acting must be respected and accepted as a given fact and not regarded as a threat.

0454. **Timely and effective decision-making.** Making decisions faster than other parties helps commanders to keep the initiative. The following comments apply to peace operations in this respect:

- **Relation between action and effect.** The objectives of peace operations are often abstract and complex, which means that several related activities are developed. It is not always clear which activity to what extent leads to the accomplishment of the objective. Furthermore, actions often have an effect only after a considerable period of time. The absence of immediate results may lead to a situation in which hasty decisions are made to pursue other activities. This may ultimately have negative repercussions.
- **More than one party.** A decision may pose no problems for one party but have repercussions for the other parties, thus having an adverse effect. This means that a quick decision is not always advisable. A thorough analysis must first be made of the direct and indirect consequences of any decisions.

Manoeuvre

0455. **Manoeuvre** comprises all activities which lead to an advantageous position in relation to the other party or parties. This does not only refer to a position in a literal sense (for example geographical) but may

also indicate positions in a more figurative sense (for example a negotiating position). An advantageous position can be achieved by reinforcing the friendly position, but also by weakening that of the other party or parties. Naturally, a combination of the two methods is also possible. The aim is to convince the other parties that their position is so weak that there is no point in trying to obstruct the actions of the peace force. Both traditional and alternative manoeuvre assets can be used to achieve this.

o456. The use of traditional **manoeuvre assets**, such as tanks, mechanised infantry, armed helicopters and so on, is often subject to restrictions in peace operations. This may be due to the mandate, the rules of engagement or even the intensity of a conflict at any given moment. The psychological effect resulting from the presence of these assets, as well as the display of willingness to use them, can still produce the desired, relatively favourable position.

o457. To achieve his objective(s), the commander of the peace force may also use certain means in such a way as to include them in the manoeuvre. These are referred to as **alternative manoeuvre assets**:

- **Information operations** consist of actions which aim to influence the decision-makers. This is effected by attacking information, information-based processes, command and control systems and the communication and information systems of other parties, while friendly information systems are used and protected. All levels of the peace force can conduct information operations designed to gain information superiority. The intention is to prevent a conflict or the escalation of an existing one or to achieve such an advantage that a military operation can be successfully completed more quickly while the number of casualties is kept to a minimum.
- **Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)** can contribute significantly to the success of the peace force. It engenders confidence in the operation among friendly personnel. CIMIC can also help to improve relations with the civil authorities and the local population. Doubts are dispelled and the acceptance of the peace force is widened. As such, CIMIC is used to improve the friendly position and, in that sense, can contribute to the manoeuvre of the peace force. CIMIC can take two forms which, in practice, are virtually always combined:
 - * The cooperation may be geared towards supporting the military operation, for example with infrastructural facilities for billeting, supply of goods and services, and so on. This form of cooperation falls into the category of **CIMIC activities**.
 - * Cooperation may be designed to support civil agencies with military means, for instance mine clearance, repair of infrastructure

*International cooperation
down to the lowest tactical
level.*

*Photograph: Media Centre
RNLA
(UNTAC, Cambodia, 1992)*



and assistance with reconstruction. This form of cooperation is referred to as a **CIMIC operation**.

- **International cooperation** down to the lowest tactical level endorses the cohesion of a peace force. This enhances the image of the peace force and thus helps to improve its own position. International cooperation requires the meticulous harmonisation of the rules of engagement, standard operating procedures and so on.
- Creative and correct interpretation of the legal documents helps to achieve a relative improvement of position in respect of the opponent. In this sense, the **legal capacity** of the peace force can also be regarded as a manoeuvre asset. In the first instance, a clear mandate, based for example on a peace treaty or a Security Council resolution, creates a strong position for the peace force. Satisfactory status of forces agreements and associated implementation stipulations also help in this respect. Instructions to the Parties (ITP) constitute the more concrete translation of the peace treaty for the parties. These must provide with peace force with room to act. Clear and comprehensive rules of engagement are vitally important. The rules of engagement must be broad enough to allow them to be used flexibly.

Fire power

0458. **Fire power** is the capacity to impair the military potential of others. It is linked to the manoeuvre function. On the one hand, fire power is most effective if it is employed from a relatively favourable

position in relation to the opponent. On the other hand, fire power can be used to help to achieve that relatively favourable position. In peace operations, however, there are often other possibilities for influencing the military potential of the parties. It is precisely these possibilities which must be identified in the decision-making process. In a conceptual sense, therefore, fire power is deployed even if it is with assets which, traditionally, were never intended for this purpose.

o459. In the **traditional sense**, the function of ‘fire power’ is mainly translated as the deployment of assets which can deliver actual (physical) fire. The use of these assets is often subject to restrictions in peace operations, although this does not mean that they are less important. The presence of this type of asset generates a credible threat, which can reduce the will of the parties to use their military potential. Long-range assets in particular can play an important part in this respect.

o460. Fire power in peace operations is mainly **figurative in nature** and relates primarily to activities which target the mental component of the parties, the main aim being to change their opinion with regard to the peace force. In a more general sense, the aim is to dispel the idea that only the use of force will offer a solution to the prevailing problems.

The means that can be used in this context can range from humanitarian aid to media operations and from social patrols to support for the local authorities. Creative use of these assets will enhance the effectiveness of the peace force in a particular area. However, personnel must also have the necessary flexibility to perform these alternative tasks. To use this type of means, commanders must be able to identify with the problems and anticipate future situations. This can be translated as the ability to exploit opportunities and react quickly.

Protection

o461. The function of ‘**protection**’ focuses on the preservation of friendly military potential. In peace operations, the function of protection has a separate dimension. Firstly, more importance will be attached to this function. Casualties and substantial collateral damage will generally be unacceptable. However, passive measures to bring about a higher degree of protection (such as the use of shelters and camouflage) may have a counterproductive effect on the conduct of the mission. The success of a peace operation is, after all, usually based on the presence and thus the visibility of the peace force. Active protection measures must also be given careful thought before they are implemented. Because peace operations are often more static in nature, the possibilities for moving units to increase the degree of protection are limited. Vulnerability is increased as a result.

A different situation in terms of climate, infrastructure and hygiene.

Photograph: Media Centre RNLA (IPM, Haiti, 1995)



0462. A **characteristic** of peace operations is the often prolonged duration. Units function over prolonged periods in conditions which sometimes appear to be less threatening. Consequently, there is a danger that protection measures will be neglected more and more often, thus increasing the risk of casualties. Furthermore, peace operations are often conducted in areas in which the conditions differ enormously from those at home. Personnel may, for example, be faced with a situation which is very different in terms of climate, infrastructure or hygiene. These conditions may jeopardise friendly military potential.

0463. In a traditional sense, the function of 'protection' focuses mainly on friendly units. In peace operations, however, this function will often also extend to the protection of **others in the area of operations**, such as the civilian population and aid agencies. There must at least be a contingency plan for this. Given that protection always involves an allocation of means, a peace force may be faced with a choice between its own protection and that of third parties. There is also a danger that the peace force may be accused of partiality. This choice requires a good assessment of the situation, since the consequences may have a considerable effect on the conduct of tasks in the future.

The function of 'protection' will often present commanders with dilemmas during peace operations. They will have to choose between a degree of protection and the image which will be portrayed as a result. A high degree of protection in a seemingly safe environment may be seen as an excessive display of military power. A lower degree of protection, however, carries the risk of

casualties. This dilemma is a constant worry for commanders; they need to be highly skilled in identifying with the situation and there must be communication with the parties in order to make clear to them why particular measures have been taken.

Intelligence and military information

o464. The ‘intelligence and military information’ function is intended to create a picture of the environment to serve as a basis for the decision-making in an operation. This is always a **dynamic picture**: the idea of the ‘intelligence and military information’ function is to produce a film of the actual situation rather than a photograph. It is important to note that this picture will never be complete. One should not, therefore, strive for completeness, as this would lead to unacceptable delays in decision-making.

o465. The application of the ‘intelligence and military information’ function in the **traditional sense** is characterised by two aspects. Firstly, the collection of information is focused mainly on the terrain, the weather and the enemy. This information is processed into intelligence. Secondly, the flow of intelligence must be one-way: sensitive information must not be allowed to reach the enemy.

o466. In principle, the same **characteristics** apply to peace operations. However, the number of areas about which information has to be collected is larger and the environment more complex. The traditional information collection units are mainly geographically and materially orientated. They provide information about the terrain and the parties (intentions, objectives, locations, numbers and strength). They can also be used to identify any infringement of a truce or cease-fire. During peace operations, there is also a need for information about less tangible matters such as opinions, perceptions, feelings, tensions and so on.

o467. The **information flow** in peace operations must be two-way. It is in the interest of the peace operation that information about the peace force’s actions is available to all parties. This does not mean that there must always be complete openness, but it does mean that the truth must not be distorted in the information given.

Most intelligence and information in peace operations comes from human sources (human intelligence, or HUMINT). This information can be collected overtly as well as covertly. All members of the peace force can help to gather human intelligence overtly, for example by engaging the local population in conversation or by conducting ‘social patrols’. This overt gathering of

information must be structured by publicising the information requirement. The processing and interpretation of the information must also be well organised. The covert gathering of intelligence and information is a job for specialists.

Service support

0468. **Service support** is the range of activities aimed at bringing the military potential up to the required level in order to create the conditions necessary to achieve the desired end state. These conditions contribute to the military commander's freedom of action and are brought about by the conduct of service support activities.

0469. Service support activities are performed during every operation to provide support for friendly units (the organic task of service support units). During peace operations in particular, numerous service support activities are conducted which are not intended to support friendly units but which are in keeping with the main objective of the force, such as the provision of aid to the civilian population. Although the type of activity is similar, the **task of the service support unit** is in this case focused mainly on achieving the desired operational end state. The service support units in the force may, therefore, have a composition that differs in terms of quantity and quality from what is strictly necessary to support friendly units.

During the peace operation *Provide Comfort* in northern Iraq (1991), 11 Engineer auxiliary battalion used the medical company's aid stations for looking after refugees on the way from the mountains to refugee camps in the valley at Zakho. These logistic installations thus contributed directly to the realisation of the battalion's operational objective: to provide emergency aid to the Kurds. These facilities were called way-stations.

0470. There are two forms of service support: **peacetime service support** and **combat service support** (see ADP I, Chapter 5, Section 9). Although both forms play a role during the conduct of peace operations, the emphasis in the area of operations is on combat logistic. As well as a large number of similarities, there are several differences in the combat service support in peace operations compared to that in combat operations.

0471. Firstly, peace operations can extend over a **considerable period of time**, which has implications for the service support operation:

- Vehicles and many other pieces of equipment are used more intensively than may originally have been envisaged.

- There will be a need for semi-permanent infrastructure for the friendly units in the area of operations.
- Extra and non-organic (possibly civil) equipment will be specially allocated for the operation.



Vehicles and many other pieces of equipment are used more intensively.

Photograph: Media Centre

RNLA

(SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997)

o472. Peace operations can be conducted **worldwide**, which results in long lines of communications. This can have the following implications for the logistic support:

- Supplies should ideally be procured locally wherever possible rather than be moved up.
- It will often be necessary to hire civil capacity for strategic transport.
- Sustainability is defined prior to an operation. This is the sum total of the support assets required by the force in the area of operations.
- A buffer of support assets must be built up in the area of operations in order to cope with disruptions in supply.

o473. Peace operations often take place in areas with **reduced** or **primitive infrastructure**. Extensive preparatory measures are needed to make the area of operations accessible to friendly units. Extra measures must also be taken for the transport of personnel and equipment within the theatre of operations (in-theatre lift). The area of operations is opened up partly by the logistic preparation of the theatre of operations. The logistic preparations include the following activities:

- Identifying and setting up assembly areas, logistic bases and locations for headquarters for all friendly units in the theatre.
- Selecting and, if necessary, improving all installations, routes and facilities which together form the lines of communications.

0474. When peace operations are conducted, there are **peacetime conditions in the Netherlands**. This means that, for the operational task, elements of combat service support can be combined with elements of peacetime service support.

- Medical support in the area of operations must meet the (more stringent) peace norms. This means that heavier demands are imposed on the provision of medical treatment in terms of speed and quality.
- The area of operations falls under local environmental legislation, which will normally be less rigorous than that in the Netherlands. Efforts must nonetheless be made to adhere to the Dutch norms, which may mean that tasks become more difficult to perform.
- The operational-logistic procedures in the area of operations must be linked to the peacetime logistic procedures in the Netherlands.

0475. The combination of the prolonged duration of peace operations and the primitive conditions in which they are conducted means that extra attention is required for personnel support. Aspects of **personnel support** must be looked at both before and during the operation. This not only applies to deployed personnel, but also to those they have left behind, known collectively as the 'home front'. It is important that deployed personnel know that there is a 'safety net' in case of any problems at home. One source of worry is thus eliminated, which contributes to the welfare of the deployed troops. The basis for effective personnel support lies mainly in a good system of providing information for personnel as well as the home front.

0476. During the conduct of UN-led peace operations, units will be confronted with the UN support system in the area of operations. This system takes over the responsibility for part of the support chain from the national authorities of the countries participating in the peace operation.

0477. **Non-governmental organisations** may be present in the area of operations. They may call upon the military service support system, for example for the transfer of goods, services, assistance and so on.

Section 5 - Operational framework

0478. The operational framework is a conceptual aid for the planning and execution of military operations. It divides an operation into **three interrelated parts**: the deep operation, the close operation and the rear operation. The main difference between these operations is the objective; the secondary distinction is geographical.

- The **deep operation** aims to restrict the freedom of action of an opponent or party. It focuses on that section of the other party with which there is no direct contact.
- The **close operation** covers the direct confrontation with the belligerent parties and leads most directly to the objective of the overall operation.
- The **rear operation** is designed to preserve, regain or increase the freedom of action for friendly troops.

o479. In peace operations, therefore, the operational framework in principle has **no geographical significance**. Nevertheless, the operational framework can also be an effective aid to planning and execution in peace operations. Unlike the situation in combat operations, there is not usually a clearly identifiable enemy in peace operations. The ‘enemy’ in peace operations is actually everything which stands in the way of the objective. This makes the ‘enemy’ concept highly complex.

o480. The deep operation can be conducted in various ways in peace operations. Firstly, it may be an operation which is designed to have an effect in the long term. Secondly, it may be a deep operation in the literal sense, namely over a great depth. The deep operation may also be intended as an **indirect approach**, which focuses mainly on how the parties see the solution to the conflict. If it is conducted properly, the parties will be restricted in their freedom of action, not only physically but certainly also psychologically, since a number of options will no longer seem relevant or feasible. Influencing the opinions of the parties is often a lengthy process; deep operations will, therefore, almost always be conducted over a prolonged period. The degree of success, however, is difficult to establish.

When the British brigade commander was faced with the task of guaranteeing military security in a particular area during the IFOR operation in 1996, he analysed the problem as follows:

‘The main problem for military security is an early return of the civilian population to this area. The living conditions are still appalling and that combined with the harsh winter could give rise to life-threatening situations. Given that we (IFOR) are the only organisation in this area, this will be our problem. That means that we will have to use assets which we cannot then use for our actual mission: to guarantee military security. I shall thus focus my deep operation on influencing the civilian population, in the hope that they will decide not to return to this area until after the winter.’

o481. The close operation in peace operations concentrates on creating and maintaining a stable situation. This is usually manifested in direct (combat) contact, a short planning and execution horizon and a **direct approach**. The latter is expressed in, for example, regular monitoring of the military capacity of the parties. In this stable situation, it is possible

for all parties to work on their own objectives. There are many factors which can affect stability and they are all, therefore, part of the task of the peace force in one form or another. This means that, by definition, troops in a peace operation have a wide variety of tasks. Unity of effort must ensure that all these tasks ultimately contribute to the same objective.

0482. The rear operation in peace operations concentrates on a stable situation for the peace force itself, **both in the long and short term**. Herein lies one of the great dilemmas for peace operations. The tasks conducted as part of the rear operation strongly resemble those conducted as part of the close operation, which means that the same assets are often used. It is nonetheless important to distinguish between the tasks in relation to both types and to make this distinction clear to the parties. This could otherwise serve to create the wrong expectations, which could have an adverse effect on the image portrayed by the force to the parties.

The mine clearance which was carried out to ensure the freedom of movement (the close operation) during the IFOR operation in 1996 was conducted in the same way and with the same assets as the mine clearance which was undertaken to improve the safety of the population (the deep operation). Nevertheless, the British brigade commander laid great store by keeping these tasks separate. During the joint meetings with the commanders of the military units of the parties, the so-called Joint Military Commission (JMC), he always informed the commanders of the military units of the parties as to the context in which certain clearance activities were taking place.

5 Political decision-making and military command and control

Section 1 - Introduction

0501. Peace operations are usually ad hoc in nature and have many different forms. The decision to conduct a peace operation is taken by the international community, in particular by the international organisations discussed previously. Participation in peace operations, as well as the designation and deployment of individuals and units, is a **national responsibility**. In principle, participation occurs on the basis of a mandate, which defines the powers and responsibilities of the various command levels and describes the desired end state. The commander of the force in the area of operations has the command of military contingents and units. He 'translates', as it were, the mandate into concrete military orders and tasks in order to bring about the desired end state.

0502. It is clear from the foregoing that a large number of actors at various levels are involved in the decision-making about and direction of the deployment of military units as part of a peace operation. Broadly speaking, there are two distinct elements in this process: political (strategic) decision-making and military (operational) command and control. These elements will be discussed further in this chapter.

Section 2 - Strategic decision-making at international level

0503. The choice to conduct a peace operation stems in principle from a **decision by the United Nations or by another security organisation**. Often, non-governmental organisations or the media are also instrumental in identifying the need to intervene and they influence opinion with regard to the deployment of troops. Since peace operations are usually conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, this chapter will go on to look at the decision-making of this organisation in more detail. The last few years have also seen a more important role emerging for NATO in the decision-making with regard to peace operations. Although it was originally set up as a military alliance with a strictly defensive and regional character, NATO has been concentrating

increasingly on the conduct of peace operations since the end of the Cold War. In the NATO Strategic Concept, the conduct of peace operations in the Euro-Atlantic area has been upgraded to a core task (alongside the defence of NATO territory). The decision-making of this security organisation will, therefore, also be discussed.

The UN decision-making process


0504. The **General Assembly** and the **Security Council** are the main organs of the United Nations. The General Assembly meets once a year. The subjects discussed by the member states during this meeting almost always result in resolutions. However, the resolutions of the General Assembly are not binding. The Security Council, on the other hand, functions constantly and is responsible for issues relating to international peace and security. By means of binding resolutions, the Security Council can provide a legal mandate, on the basis of which a peace operation can be conducted. In practice, the Security Council rarely, if ever, involves itself in the (military) operational aspects of peace operations.

The Military Staff Committee (MSC) was set up to support the Security Council. This committee comprises the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Soon after it was set up, major differences between the members became apparent and people were not prepared to work together constructively in the framework of the UN to find a military solution to conflicts. The MSC still exists, but its effectiveness is limited.

0505. The **Secretary-General** of the United Nations is the head of the (permanent) Secretariat and thus the linchpin of the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York. He is also the figurehead of the United Nations for the international community and the official who, on behalf of the United Nations, conducts negotiations with government leaders and the leaders of parties in the event of a crisis or conflict. He is responsible to the Security Council for the organisation, conduct and direction of peace operations, both in the preparatory and the implementation phase. Furthermore, he may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which constitutes a threat to international peace and security (in accordance with Article 99 of the UN Charter). Member states are, incidentally, entitled to do the same. To do so, they must submit a draft resolution.

0506. The **decision-making about a peace operation** under the responsibility of the United Nations will in principle start with a report from the Secretary-General to the Security Council. After this report has been discussed (possibly after the Department for Peacekeeping

Figure 5-1: The United Nations. This diagram shows only a selection of UN organisations. On the right is a list of current peace operations (1999). The year in which the operation began is indicated between brackets.



Operations has been consulted), an official can be appointed to investigate the possibilities for a peace operation on behalf of the Secretary-General. This official is called the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSg).

The Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is one of the four permanent staff bodies of the UN Secretariat. The other three are the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department for Administration and Management (DAM). As well as two sub-departments, which are actively involved in the planning, preparation, execution and termination of peace operations, the DPKO also incorporates the Office of the Military Advisor to the Secretary-General. The first sub-department is the Office of Planning and Support, which consists of a Planning Division and a Field Administrative and Logistics Division; the heads of these elements are jointly responsible for the planning, preparation, support, military and technical direction and the completion of an operation. The second sub-department is the Office of Operations, which has three regional divisions. Each division is responsible for the military-operational supervision of the peace operations in its region. These divisions are actively involved in approaching potential troop-supplying

nations, 'translating' mandates into operational instructions, formulating the rules of engagement and writing situation reports for the Secretary-General. It is thus primarily the Office of Operations which, on behalf of the Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, constitutes the consultation mechanism referred to earlier.

0507. In the event of an operation on the basis of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, a peace agreement will be drawn up between states or between the United Nations and states. If an operation is conducted under Chapter VII of the Charter, there is (as yet) unlikely to be a peace agreement between parties and the Security Council may decide unilaterally to proceed with military intervention. The **decision for military action** is in all cases preceded by a definitive recommendation by the Secretary-General (in principle based on the information issued by the SRSG) and the Security Council will formally authorise the peace operation in a resolution. The mandate for the operation can then be established on the basis of this resolution.

0508. It may be the case that the mandate is not established in a separate document, but has to be derived from one or more Security Council resolutions and (if available) a peace agreement. In the event of the latter, specific **guidelines and instructions** can be included in an appendix for the military part of the peace operation. This may apply, for example, to the operational objectives of the operation, the rules of engagement and the Status of Forces Agreement.

Status of forces agreements are drawn up with the country or countries in which the operation is conducted, as well as with countries involved in the operation because their territory is used for lines of communications or assembly areas. A status of forces agreement is mainly intended to set out arrangements for the legal position of the participants in a force and in principle indemnifies their troops against prosecution in the country in question in the event of an offence or crime in the performance of their function, such as traffic offences or the use of weapons in a dangerous situation. This does not of course mean that the conduct of a member of a force is not subject to the (military) laws of his or her country of origin. If it is not possible to conclude a status of forces agreement with an internationally recognised government, other agreements may be reached in sub-areas. Protection can also be afforded under certain circumstances by the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the United Nations Convention of the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel.

0509. Once the Security Council has made the decision to conduct a peace operation, the General Assembly must approve the **budget** and a **force commander** must be designated for the peace force. The United Nations may ask an international organisation to conduct the operation and to designate a force commander. If the United Nations is to conduct the operation itself, member states will be requested to nominate candidates for the function of force commander. If a particular country

supplies a large contingent of military personnel or actively supports the United Nations in the planning and preparation of an operation, it is logical that this country provides the force commander.

0510. The force commander draws up a provisional plan as quickly as possible, thus producing an indication of the requirement for units. The member states can then respond to this **statement of requirements** by offering troops. Once all countries have indicated the form their contribution will take, the UN's Department for Peacekeeping Operations will, in consultation with the force commander, make a decision as to the definitive size of the national contingents, the command structure and the phasing of the operation. Implementation must, after all, proceed as soon as possible in order to optimise the peace operation's chance of success. The force commander of the UN peace force may also be personally involved in the formulation of the operation's mandate in order to ensure that not only the political but also the operational objective is stated clearly.

SHIRBRIG: MULTINATIONAL UN STAND-BY HIGH READINESS BRIGADE

One of the problems for the United Nations in peace support operations is that a long period of time is often needed to deploy a force. It is often the case that a conflict has already escalated too far by the time the first troops arrive. In order to cope with this disadvantage, a number of countries followed Denmark's initiative in 1996 and drew up the concept of a multinational High Readiness Brigade. The brigade was to be integrated in the UN Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS), which enables the UN member states to designate certain units exclusively for peace support tasks. Information is given at the same time about the strength, organisation, equipment and availability. This should enable the Secretary-General to put together a UN operation at short notice.


The SHIRBRIG concept is based on deployment under Chapter VI of the Charter, rapid availability in the area of operations (fifteen to thirty days after the political decision by the individual troop-supplying nations) and a deployment period of six months (no rotation, but termination of the operation or relief by another formation). On deployment, the brigade may consist of a headquarters, a staff company with a communications element, three infantry battalions (if necessary mechanised infantry), a reconnaissance company, and engineer battalion, a service support battalion, a clearing station, a helicopter detachment and a military police detachment.

This brings the strength of the brigade to approximately 4,500 personnel, although it is possible to reduce the scale. If the deployment of one or more of the SHIRBRIG units is vetoed by one of the member states, units from other member states must be made available through the UNSAS.

0511. The Security Council has the power to decide that a peace operation is to be conducted. The responsibility for the execution, however, rests mainly with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with the troop-supplying countries. For the purpose of improving the coordination between these countries, a consultation mechanism was set up

in 1995, in which the members of the Security Council, the troop-supplying countries and the UN Secretariat (in particular the DPKO) all participate. With this, the Security Council has endorsed the willingness to consult with the troop-supplying nations and guaranteed that consultations with the countries in question will take place well in advance of any definitive decision with regard to the declaration, extension, termination or amendment of the mandate.

Figure 5-2: The UN decision-making process.



0512. The **nature of the peace operation**. If diplomatic and other non-military measures have been unable to prevent the escalation of the conflict and a military response is deemed necessary, a decision first has to be made about the nature of the military operation. The degree of consent by the countries, or by the parties in the country in which deployment is to take place, is highly important in this respect. After all, in the event of a military deployment, an adequate estimate of the type of assets that are required has to be made in good time. Because of the multinational nature of a peace operation, the degree of political support by the participating countries also plays a key role. So many countries and so many opinions mean that there is a real possibility that each country has its own ideas about how to resolve the conflict, including the method of military intervention. The United Nations is thus faced with the onerous task of getting the member states to agree before the type of peace operation can be definitively established. In practice, this virtually always results in a form of compromise, in the worst case with a vaguely formulated mandate. To illustrate the complexity of the decision-making, we will now look at two essential aspects which occupy a dominant place in the process described above: the level of force and prioritisation.

0513. **Establishing the level of force**, in other words whether the operation will be conducted as a peacekeeping operation (in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter) or as a peace-enforcing operation (in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter), is crucial. The result of this decision is reflected in the mandate and in the rules of engagement, which sets out the possibilities for using force.

0514. Opting for **too high a level of force** may suggest a lack of trust in the parties to comply with the peace agreement and can be counter-productive with regard to accomplishing the objective. It will also increase the risk of casualties in the peace force, the parties and the civilian population, as a result of which the political support from the member states may dwindle. Choosing **too low a level of force** may lead to a situation in which it is virtually impossible to use more force (at least not without a new mandate from the Security Council), partly because the troops are not authorised to do so but mainly because they are usually insufficiently equipped to do so. If, as a result, the objectives of the operation cannot be achieved and human rights have also been violated, the credibility of the force and of the United Nations as a whole will very quickly be compromised.

0515. Mandates and rules of engagement must be carefully formulated in order to legitimise any **use of force** which goes beyond immediate

self-defence. If this is not the case, there is a danger that the peace force will receive a vague mandate which merely describes the grey area between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. Recent experience in peace support operations has led to the belief that they should be conducted more and more often in the context of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This does not mean that the operation will be one of enforcement from the outset, but it does offer the peace force greater flexibility to respond in the event of problems.

0516. **Setting priorities** The increasing call upon the United Nations to dedicate itself to maintaining peace and security in the world contrasts sharply with the limited resources available to the organisation. There are many conflicts, but the possibilities for intervening in each conflict, for instance with military means, are few. The conflicts throughout the world are too numerous even to be resolved by the United Nations, let alone by military intervention. The United Nations must, therefore, use the resources where they are most needed. There are no objective criteria for setting priorities and the Security Council will, therefore, have to decide on a case-by-case basis.

0517. This prioritisation leads to **ethical dilemmas**, certainly if any violation of human rights is involved, which means that one has to establish each time why one conflict warrants intervention and another does not. It should also be noted that the media exerts significant influence on the decision-making in this respect. In many cases, the level of attention given to a crisis or conflict by the (international) media influences public opinion and, as a result, often arouses more (or indeed less) interest in the matter in question. The decision-making in respect of a peace operation may gain momentum because of media interest, but may also disappear from the political agenda if that interest diminishes.

The NATO decision-making process

0518. NATO's cooperative apparatus consists of the Secretary-General, five decision-making fora and two strategic headquarters, as well as several other committees. A feature of the NATO organisation is its dual structure - a political one and a military one. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is a forum for consultation between the governments of the member states on all issues affecting their security. The Council is made up of permanent representatives from all member states and meets at least once a week. This Council is vested with the ultimate political authority and decision-making powers. Decision are only taken on the basis of unanimity. The Secretary-General chairs the NAC.

He is also the main spokesman of the Alliance, for the press and the public as well as in contacts with governments of (member) states and with other international organisations.




Figure 5-3: The civil and military organisational structure of NATO.


The NATO command structure is currently being reviewed and will, after approval by the NAC, be completed with effect from 1999. The new structure now has only three levels of headquarters, a large number of which are joint and all of which are, of course, multinational. There are two strategic commands:

- Allied Command Europe (ACE), under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
- Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT)

Both headquarters have a planning staff which carries out contingency planning, including the planning for peace operations. Under these are the regional commands. For ACE, these are the Regional Command North (formerly AFCENT) and the Regional Command South (formerly AFSOUTH).

0519. The **Military Committee (MC)** is the highest military organ of the Alliance and comes under the NAC. It comprises the Chiefs of Staff of the member states and has the task of drawing up recommendations for NATO's political authorities, both in relation to the allied defence of NATO territory and to NATO's efforts in the context of peace operations. There is a close relationship between the MC and the so-called 'integrated military structure' (the latter is also referred to as the 'command structure'). This provides NATO with the organisational framework for the defence of its territory and incorporates a network of military headquarters at various levels, covering the entire North Atlantic area.

Figure 5-4: The NATO decision-making process.



0520. If NATO is approached by another international organisation (the United Nations, for example) to conduct a peace operation under its auspices, the NAC will have to make a decision first. As soon as the request has been approved in principle, the MC will appoint a strategic commander for the operation. The regional division between ACE and ACLANT is in principle maintained when this authority is designated. The strategic commander (SACEUR/SACLANT) then designates an operational commander, to whom he assigns responsibility for the actual operational command and control of the peace operation. This may be, for example, a regional commander (such as the Regional Commander North) or a commander at a lower level (such as the commander of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps). This commander then works out the plan for the operation in close consultation with the planning staff of ACE/ACLANT and in principle develops several options. The ultimate

decision to start the preparations for the operation, including the task of getting the troops to a level of operational readiness, is made by order of the NAC, acting on recommendations by the MC. The actual implementation of the peace operation is initiated by means of a so-called activation order (ACTORD).

0521. Extremely important in the conduct of a NATO peace operation is the desired military end state, which is derived from the strategic end state. As soon as it has started the planning, NATO - or the international organisation at whose request NATO is conducting the operation - will try to establish the military end state as quickly as possible. Reaching a consensus about a **clearly defined strategic and operational end state** between NATO and the relevant international organisation will, therefore, be one of NATO's spearheads right in the initial phase of the operation. Furthermore, once involved in the conflict, it will in principle be difficult for NATO to abandon its responsibilities, since the premature termination of the operation would inevitably lead to a loss of face.

Section 3 - Strategic decision-making at national level

0522. Dutch national decision-making involves the government, parliament, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Commanders in Chief of the Services.

0523. **The government.** Each request for Dutch participation in a peace operation is submitted to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, given that they have primary political responsibility for the Dutch contribution to a military operation. Participation by Dutch military personnel in a peace operation must always fit within the foreign policy framework presented by the government to the Lower House. A request for participation by Dutch military personnel is, therefore, first analysed with regard to this aspect by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in close consultation with the Directorate of General Policy Affairs of the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Crisis Management Centre.

0524. **Parliament.** The government will in principle notify the Lower House at an early stage, through the intermediary of the Permanent Committee for Defence or the chairmen of the main parliamentary parties, about the request to supply Dutch military personnel for a peace operation and about the government's standpoint on participation. A fundamentally positive attitude with regard to participation will lead to further discussions with the Lower House and in any event to an assessment of any participation in the context of established foreign and security policy.

0525. The main instrument used by the government (and, albeit at a later stage, by the Lower House) in its analysis is the so-called ‘*Toetsingskader*’ (see box). This is a list of points which was presented by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence to the Lower House in June 1995. The ‘*Toetsingskader*’ is used to provide a better structure for the consultations between the government and parliament and to improve the quality of the decision-making.

THE CRITERIA OF THE ‘TOETSINGSKADER’

- national interest
- adequate legal basis
- clear mandate
- well-defined military tasks
- transparent command structure
- unambiguous rules of engagement
- solidarity and shared risks
- multinational operation
- public/parliamentary support
- sufficient units
- risks to personnel
- sharing the financial burden
- possible to direct from the Netherlands
- duration of the operation
- guaranteed relief

0526. At national level, the Dutch contribution to peace operations is led by the **Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)**. This single leadership means that he, on behalf of the Netherlands, has the ultimate **power of decision** with regard to **all military aspects of peace operations**, during the preparations as well as mission itself. Within the Ministry of Defence, the CDS is, therefore, the official who is directly accountable to the Minister for the way in which the Dutch contingent conducts the mission. From this position, he advises the Minister of Defence in respect of military-strategic and operational aspects of any participation by Dutch troops in a peace operation. In principle, he fulfils this responsibility in close consultation with the Commanders in Chief of the Services. He also maintains contact with the international security organisation conducting the operation and the commander of the peace force (if already designated) in order to develop (sub-)aspects of the operation further.

The Defence Crisis Management Centre supports the CDS in his decision-making and in his management of and supply of information to the national contingent. Permanent liaison officers from the Services, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from other organisational parts of the armed forces are appointed to the Centre; they look after the daily communication with the Defence Staff. The Centre’s organisation also includes liaison officers from several Allies on a reciprocal basis. This is intended to enable the countries involved to speed up the supply of information in the event of a crisis and to make it easier to establish some form of cooperation.

0527. **The Commanders in Chief of the Services** are responsible for preparing and maintaining deployed personnel and equipment and for providing aftercare. In his planning order, the Chief of the Defence Staff determines what type of unit will take part in the operation. On the basis of this decision, the Commanders in Chief designate specific units. In their selection, they take as much account as possible of the requirements of the international organisation which is responsible for conducting the peace operation, for instance in respect of the choice of equipment for the Dutch contribution. To support the decision-making, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Army has an Operational Staff, which is led by the Director of the Operational Staff (D-OPS). For the supply of information between the Netherlands and the RLNA component of the Dutch contingent, the CinC RLNA has recourse to the Situation Centre (SITCEN). The SITCEN also serves as a point of contact for relatives of RLNA military personnel on deployment.

For the supply of information between the Netherlands and the RNLA component of the Dutch contingent, the CinC RNLA has recourse to the Situation Centre (SITCEN). Photograph: Hennie Keeris, Media Centre RNLA (The Hague, 1997)




The decision-making process

0528. If an international security organisation deems military intervention necessary and has received sufficient political and public support in this respect, countries which are expected to be willing to contribute to this operation are first approached informally and later formally. In the case of our own country, this is done through the Netherlands Ambassador or the Netherlands (permanent) representative to the international organisation in question. The request for a military contribution is then transmitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs through the intermediary of one of those officials. If such a request is not rejected first by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on political grounds

(for instance, because participation is not in keeping with Dutch foreign policy), it is submitted to the Minister of Defence in order to establish the operational possibilities for participation. This marks the start of the **national decision-making process**, which will now be discussed in more detail. An example of this is shown in Figure 5-5.

Figure 5-5: The national decision-making process. The diagram shows only a possible course of events. It is conceivable that certain phases may be omitted and others added.



0529. Once the (informal) request has been received via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence conducts further analysis of the conflict and looks at how a Dutch military contribution could help to resolve it. The Defence Staff and the Directorate of General Policy Affairs in particular have a major input in this respect. In their analysis, they also call upon the expertise of the directorates-general, directorates and divisions of the Ministry of Defence. There are also intensive **consultations with the international organisation** which is to lead the operation and with the main Allies.

0530. The **general aspects of the peace operation** are also dealt with, such as the nature of the operation, the mandate, the rules of engagement and the duration (planned or estimated) of the operation. Additional arrangements can also be made at this stage in respect of specific implementation aspects which are particularly relevant for the Dutch contingent. These are aspects such as the place in the command structure, the composition and equipment of the Dutch contingent and the (planned) date on which the contingent will be available to the commander of the peace force. Discussions are also held in this phase with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with Development Cooperation in respect of any other Dutch contribution. Provisional arrangements can thus be made in respect of joint humanitarian aid projects and reconstruction programmes and common standpoints can be prepared for statements to parliament, the press and the Dutch people.

0531. In order to establish which units can be offered to the international organisation for participation in the peace operation, a **planning order** is issued to the Services as soon as possible after the Defence Staff has started its analysis of the possible mission. This concerns only those Services whose units or individual military personnel are suitable for participation. Some peace operations only lend themselves to participation by one Service, such as monitoring the observance of a no-fly zone or a maritime blockade as part of a trade embargo.

0532. If a planning order is issued to one or more Services, **conditions** may also be imposed. Such conditions might include, for example, a maximum response time (the time needed by the unit to prepare and move from the Netherlands to an assembly area or the area of operations), a rough indication of the (maximum) size of the unit (for instance 'company size' or 'approximately 100 troops') and qualitative requirements (e.g. 'military personnel must be able to speak English'). In the normal course of events, **negotiations with the Allies** will also take place immediately in respect of the possibility of reciprocal cooperation in both operational and logistic terms. These negotiations can take place both at ministerial and Service level and can be either bilateral or multilateral. It is, therefore, extremely important that these negotiations are coordinated nationally in order to avoid duplication or conflicting arrangements.

0533. Immediately after receipt of the planning order from the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Director of the Operational Staff issues a warning order on behalf of the Commander in Chief RNLA to the subordinate commanders who are directly involved. This is the start of the internal

RNLA decision-making process. The CinC RNLA then issues a formal planning order to the Senior National Officer (SNO) of I(GE/NL)Corps and, in some cases, also to the commander of the National Command (NATCO). This planning order also contains the guidelines from the CDS, possibly supplemented by guidelines from the CinC RNLA, as well as the conditions referred to earlier.

0534. The Dutch SNO from I(GE/NL)Corps assigns the actual implementation of the planning order, together with any supplementary guidelines, to the **coordinating authority (CA)**. This is, in principle, the commander of I (NL) Division '7 December'. His staff then works out the planning order. The Dutch SNO may also be represented. Staff officials from II Airmobile Brigade and the Command Support Brigade may also be involved in the planning process.

0535. **Points to consider** in the decision-making are in particular the availability of the requested or proposed unit, the sustainability (the ability to continue to conduct the operation over a prolonged period; in other words, is there relief capacity?), the required (and available) preparation time and any implications for operations already underway. Indications are also given as to the repercussions for other RNLA activities, such as peacetime management, provision of assistance and international obligations already undertaken. The financial implications of participation are, of course, also made clear in this phase.

0536. The details of the planning order are in principle presented by the subordinate commander in question to the Commander in Chief of the RNLA. In exceptional cases (for example, if the RNLA contribution only involves a few individuals), these details can be submitted to the Director of the Operational Staff. The D-OPS will advise the CinC RNLA in his decision-making for every planning order. If the operation is assigned to I(GE/NL) Corps, the coordinating authority will, after approval by the commander and the SNO, inform the CinC RNLA of the **possible options**. Partly on the basis of the advice of the D-OPS, the CinC selects an option (and possibly one or more alternatives) and formally notifies the Chief of the Defence Staff as to the feasibility of complying with the request for participation in the peace operation.

0537. The Defence Staff and the Directorate of General Policy Affairs integrate the analyses and capacities of the Services in a **proposal to the Minister**. If the latter approves the proposal, discussions are again held with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Both the international organisation and the troop-supplying Commanders in Chief are then informed about the intended participation, subject, of course, to political

approval. Once the international organisation which is conducting the operation has received the responses of all countries and developed the so-called force balance, a contribution is formally requested from the Netherlands. This may, incidentally, differ from the initial offer.

0538. Finally, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence send a joint letter to the Council of Ministers, after which a **government decision** is made and parliament notified by letter. The government will, in principle, hold discussions with parliament, also in earlier stages of the decision-making process. After approval by the government, the Chief of the Defence Staff orders the troop-supplying Commander(s) in Chief to ensure that the personnel and equipment are operational within the allocated preparation time.

0539. **Characteristics of the decision-making process.** The national decision-making process is generally characterised by a high degree of **uncertainty** because information is incomplete or not available in time. A contribution is often requested before there has been an opportunity to carefully consider all aspects of the '*Toetsingskader*'. Given that a decision to participate in a peace operation must not be taken lightly and that government and parliament demand well-founded advice from their military-operational experts (the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Commanders in Chief), this constitutes something of a dilemma. This is because a choice often has to be made between the full implementation of the planning process, resulting in a well-considered recommendation (which can mean a protracted procedure), and a planning process that has been squeezed into a short(er) period of time, resulting in incomplete advice. The **pressure of time** for the military planners is often further intensified by the unpredictable course of a crisis. One should also bear in mind that a sudden increase in **media interest** is a reason for accelerating the decision-making process even further.


0540. Because of the foregoing, it is now acknowledged that the decision-making process, including the operational planning, must be allowed to take place as early as possible and at several levels at once within the Ministry of Defence. This procedure, known as **parallel planning**, can bring about greatly reduced planning cycles while retaining a high level of quality. However, it relies entirely on good (informal) sources of information and considerable powers of anticipation among the military planners.

Section 4 - Operational command and control in the area of operations

0541. Once the planning phase has been completed, the next stage is the formation and movement of the Dutch contribution to the peace force, followed by the **handover of command to the multinational commander** (transfer of authority). This means that it is extremely important that the command relationship be agreed as soon as possible; in other words, what sort of orders can be given by the commander of the international force and which national responsibilities and powers will be transferred during the operation to the commander of the international force.

Figure 5-6: Command relationships and national responsibilities and powers during deployment. In some cases, there is no Dutch contingent command; the national administrative responsibility is then taken by an SNR (see paragraph 0554 onwards).

0542. Figure 5-6 shows the possible **command relationships**, whereby a distinction is made between the authorities outside and the actors inside the area of operations. On the right, the international operational chain of command is shown; the national operational chain of command is given on the left. This distinction is explained further in the following paragraphs.



Multinational aspects of operational command and control

0543. In principle, the countries participating in a peace operation will want to keep as much control over their national contingent as possible, without this being at the expense of the operational command and control and thus the effectiveness of the peace force. The starting point when establishing the **command structure** is, therefore, that countries retain Full Command (FULLCOM) over their national contingents at all times. On the other hand, it is unworkable for the force commander to have to consult the national authority before every operational task. Not only would this be extremely time-consuming, but it would also go against the unity of command principle.

0544. A common solution in recent peace operations has been to **transfer** part of the **authority** under full command to the force commander. This transfer of authority is temporary and takes the form of operational command (OPCOM) or operational control (OPCON), whereby it is possible to add any necessary reservations (caveats). However, the national government retains the power to intervene in the operational task of its own contingents or even to withdraw the contingent altogether.

Command relationships give commanders the authority to give orders and instructions to assigned units. The following command relationships can be applied:

- **Full command** (FULLCOM) is the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and exists only within national services.
- **Operational command** (OPCOM) is the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics.
- **Operational control** (OPCON) is the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned and to retain or assign tactical authority of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.
- **Tactical command** (TACOM) is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
- **Tactical control** (TACON) is the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
- **Administrative control** (ADMINCON) is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate units or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.

Besides these command relationships, there is also the **coordinating authority**. This means that there are consultations about previously agreed activities. It does not mean that agreement can be forced; if there is a difference of opinion, the higher level will be informed.

0545. If the peace operation is conducted under the auspices of the UN, the **operational chain of command** runs from the Security Council via the Secretary-General and the SRSG to the commander of the international force. In the case of an OSCE mission, there may be a Head of Mission (HoM) instead of an SRSG. In the absence of a Head of Mission or an SRSG, the Secretary-General can issue direct orders to the commander of the peace force. In reverse, the most senior civilian representative of the UN reports on a daily basis to the DPKO of the UN Secretariat about the state of affairs in the area of operations. It is not possible to give an unambiguous task description for the functions of the HoM and SRSG. The role of an SRSG, for example, is not always used; if it is, it is not necessarily the same in each operation.

0546. The **command structure** can be different in each operation. The following variations can in any event occur.

- Heading the operation is the Force Commander (FC) or, in the case of an observation operation, the Chief Military Observer (CMO). Both are directly responsible to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
- The overall leadership in the area of operations is in the hands of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General or a Head of Mission. The FC/CMO is accountable to them.
- There is an FC/CMO as well as an SRSG. The SRSG is not in the chain of command but conducts other tasks on behalf of the Secretary-General.

0547. In the case of a NATO-led peace operation which is conducted on the basis of a mandate from the UN or other international organisation, the operational chain of command runs from the head of the organisation (the Security Council and the UN Secretary-General in the case of a UN mandate) via the NATO-designated Strategic Commander (SACEUR or SACLANT) to the operational commander.

THE COMBINED TASK FORCE CONCEPT

During the NATO Summit in 1994, the government leaders of the member states decided to have a policy document drawn up, setting out how the Alliance would conduct its future operations, including peace operations. Greater effectiveness and flexibility in the response to crisis situations and an improvement in the potential cooperation with the PFP countries were the main requirements for the so-called Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)

concept. The member states later decided that operations based on a UN or OSCE mandate should also be conducted in accordance with the CJTF concept and that the concept should also apply to WEU-led peace operations if they involved the use of NATO assets. The activities eventually resulted in MC 389, the Military Committee's Directive for the Implementation of the CJTF Concept, which was presented to the member states at the end of 1996. A decision was made to test the concept during a series of exercises, known as the Exercise Trials. So in 1997 and 1998, such exercises as Allied Effort 97 and Strong Resolve 98 were held, in which a generic scenario was used to thoroughly test the deployment of a NATO-led peace force and the functioning of a headquarters in a peace support operation. The trials were also to incorporate NATO's experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the IFOR and SFOR operations. At the end of 1998, NATO's highest political organ, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), approved the recommendation of the Military Committee to regard the CJTF concept as the operational framework for all NATO operations (both Article 5 and peace operations) in the next decade. Together with NATO's new command structure, the CJTF concept will shape NATO's operational image from 1999 onwards.

Apart from confirming NATO's vision with regard to peace operations (MC 327, Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations), the CJTF concept defines in particular the construction, setup and work methods of the CJTF headquarters. The CJTF headquarters will be created from what is known as a Parent HQ. Within the NATO command structure, there are a (limited) number of headquarters, including land-based (Regional HQ North, the 'old' AFBENT, and Regional HQ South, the 'old' AFSOUTH) and sea-based (STRIKFLLETLANT), designated as 'Parent HQ'. These headquarters have a modular staff capacity, which is primarily concerned with the planning and preparation of non-Article 5 operations (approximately ten staff officers, the so-called Key Nucleus Staff). These headquarters have another hundred or so staff officers (the Nucleus Staff) who, besides their task within the Regional HQ for Article 5 operations, also perform a function within the Parent HQ in the context of non-Article 5 operations. Together, both elements form the core of the CJTF headquarters, which is further supplemented by staff modules, originating from the member states or the other NATO headquarters, and individual staff officers (known as 'augmentees'). A CJTF headquarters has no fixed size or structure and is composed according to the operation (level of force, size of area of operations, size of force). In principle, however, a CJTF headquarters will have some 350 to 400 staff officials from all Services and all member states. A CJTF headquarters is mobile and can, after a short preparation period, be deployed anywhere in the world. By deciding that the CJTF concept not only applies to non-Article 5 operations but also to the collective defence of NATO territory, NATO has gained greater flexibility in respect of the response to conflicts on the borders of the Alliance's territory. A threat such as this can, after all, be averted by means of the 'permanent' NATO command structure as well as by deploying a mobile CJTF headquarters.

0548. The **multinational character** of peace operations can be a complicating factor for the command structure of the force. NATO maintains three principles for the organisation and command structure of a multinational force.

- **Fully integrated**, whereby the force is made up of national components of varying size. The countries are represented proportionally in the fully integrated staff. The commander's function is normally held in rotation by the participating nationalities.

- **Binational**, whereby two countries have an equal input in the force and have equal representation in a fully integrated staff.
- **Framework nation**, whereby one country provides the framework for communications and logistics as well as the commander and a considerable part of the staff.

0549. Besides the operational activities, the **civil aspects** of any peace plan must also be coordinated. The activities of UN organisations in the area of operations and those of non-governmental organisations and other international agencies involved in resolving the conflict must be harmonised. The Secretary-General may appoint a special representative for this purpose (see Chapter 2), but can also designate a lead agency, the UNHCR for example, to fill this coordinating role. It may also be the case that several lead agencies are approached or designated for the various sub-areas of the civil part of the peace plan (for example, looking after refugees, repairing infrastructure or monitoring elections).

National responsibilities and authority in the context of operational command and control

0550. The Minister of Defence is **politically responsible** for the Dutch military contribution to a peace operation. As such, he is of course primarily accountable to the Netherlands, to the government and in particular to parliament. During the operation, he also works closely with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in maintaining contact with the international organisations which are responsible for or involved in conducting or leading (parts of) the peace operation. The Minister of Defence does not, however, have any direct involvement in the operational execution of the peace operation.

0551. New situations, for example a revision of the mandate, may cause the government to reconsider the Dutch contribution to the peace operation. The **national decision-making process** described in Section 3 of this chapter is then implemented once again. In extreme cases, the outcome of that decision-making process (and in particular the use of the '*Toetsingskader*') may lead to the withdrawal of the Dutch contribution to the peace operation.

0552. All peace operations are under the control of the **Chief of the Defence Staff**. He has the ultimate power of decision with regard to all military aspects, in so far as this has not been delegated to the Force Commander.

0553. The Chief of the Defence Staff transfers the **operational responsibility** for the deployment of units to the Force Commander. From that moment onwards, the national authorities - the Minister of Defence, the CDS, the relevant Commander(s) in Chief - no longer have any official powers in respect of the operational tasks conducted by Dutch military personnel.

0554. For each operation in which the Netherlands participates, the Chief of the Defence Staff, if necessary after consulting the Commander in Chief in question, designates a **Senior National Representative** (SNR). He may designate a **contingent commander** in larger operations. This is the representative of the CDS in the area of operations. He can combine this role with a function in the staff of the multinational force. If any significant changes occur in the task, the mandate, the rules of engagement or the composition of the force, the SNR or contingent commander is notified accordingly by the Force Commander. This Dutch serviceman is, after all, responsible for the supply of national information to the Defence Crisis Management Centre in respect of the course of the operation and the tasks being performed by Dutch military personnel.

0555. The SNR/contingent commander function cannot always be combined with a **(staff) function in the international peace force**. It is, therefore, sometimes necessary to include a separate official at the correct level, according to his rank, in the international command structure. In exceptional circumstances, however, this is impossible and an independent SNR/contingent commander is deployed to the area of operations. He must nonetheless endeavour to maintain (informal) contact with the direct operational commander(s) of Dutch military personnel or units. In major operations, or if the national contingents are dispersed over a large area, it may be necessary to assign a Senior National Officer (SNO) to several multinational staffs. In this case, this function should ideally be held alongside an organic function in the multinational staff.

0556. The SNR/contingent commander has **coordinating authority** over the units and individual military personnel in a number of aspects. This manifests itself in, for example, regular consultations with the commanders of the Dutch units and with the multinational force commander(s) with regard to the operational situation and the performance of tasks. He reports to the Chief of the Defence Staff on these matters. He also has **administrative command authority** in respect of administrative, logistic and disciplinary matters, as these remain in principle a national responsibility in a peace operation. He also reports

on matters relating to personnel and equipment, but in that case to the relevant Commander in Chief. The responsibilities and authority of the SNR/contingent commander are set out in what is known as the 'CDS Directives'.

0557. If Dutch participation in a peace operation involves a large contingent, a **national liaison cell** may be linked to the staff of the peace force. This will then be in direct contact with and headed by the SNR/contingent commander. Depending on the nature and size of the operation, the Netherlands will set up a **national intelligence cell** (NIC). The NIC is linked to section CJ2 of the peace force staff. The NIC's task is to supply the peace force staff with national intelligence and it maintains direct contact from the area of operations with the intelligence cell in the Defence Crisis Management Centre. The NIC also transmits intelligence from the area of operations to the Netherlands.

0558. The Defence Crisis Management Centre looks after the daily monitoring of the peace operation on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff. It is also the central point in the **supply of information** with regard to the operation for the purpose of providing the political and military leaders of the Ministry with accurate and timely information. The CDS may, incidentally, issue the commanders of units or detachments due for deployment with instructions regarding the way in which the supply of information should be set up. In order to acquire as complete a picture as possible, the Defence Crisis Management Centre maintains contact with the SNR/contingent commander in the mission area and with the operational staffs of the Services. If circumstances change, the Defence Crisis Management Centre issues recommendations to government officials, which could mean that the Services receive new planning orders. This may, for instance, be the case if the commander of the multinational force indicates that he wishes to assign new operational tasks to the troops at his disposal.

0559. During the operation itself, the Commander in Chief RNLA is exclusively responsible for **supporting and maintaining the deployed RNLA personnel and equipment**. The Director of the Operational Staff is responsible for this task on behalf of the CinC. The support tasks are mainly concerned with looking after personnel and equipment, the supply of information to and from the units on deployment, reporting to the home front, getting relief personnel and units ready in time and arranging aftercare for returning units and personnel. The situation centre within the Operational Staff plays a role in a number of these tasks. This applies particularly to the reporting in the event of a

problem with a relative of an individual on deployment or an accident or incident involving one or more Dutch military personnel.

6 Support in a multinational framework

Section 1 - Introduction

o6o1. During peace operations, units of the Royal Netherlands Army will always be deployed in a multinational framework. The participating nations usually continue to be responsible for the logistic support of their units, contingents or individual personnel. The possibilities for multinational cooperation with regard to support must be investigated during the planning, preparation and conduct of an operation. **Effective support** of the troops is always of paramount importance in this respect. Multinational cooperation is worthwhile if it also offers benefits in terms of efficiency or compensates for national shortcomings. An important condition for multinational cooperation is the standardisation of procedures and resources; if necessary, additional agreements must be made to this end.

o6o2. Multinational cooperation in respect of support offers significant **benefits**. The overall effort (including the cost) for the logistic support of the force is reduced and any unnecessary overlap of capacities is prevented. Multinational cooperation also sends a positive political signal. It is, however, not a goal in itself. There are also **disadvantages**, such as a greater requirement for coordination, the need to adapt to a different support system and a loss of exclusive control. National norms, for instance with regard to food, accommodation and medical care, may also differ considerably.

o6o3. The **aim** of this chapter is to provide an insight into the multinational context of the support in the area of operations for Dutch units and individual military personnel deployed in peace operations. The chapter focuses particularly on the deployment of units and formations of the Royal Netherlands Army. It should be stressed that the points of departure, principles and procedures in this chapter apply equally to small detachments and individual soldiers. National provisions for the support of units of the Royal Netherlands Army during peace operations are described in ADP I, 'Military Doctrine', and in ADP IV, 'National Operations'.

o6o4. Given that the Royal Netherlands Army will, in principle, operate in accordance with NATO doctrine, even if another international organisation is leading the operation, the multinational context is primarily defined on the basis of relevant NATO documents, such as the AJP-4 (Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine) and ALP-9 (Land Forces Logistic Doctrine). Because of the specific features of the logistic support provided in a UN context, this will be dealt with at the end of this chapter.

Section 2 - Support options

o6o5. The most common **support options** in international terms are:

- national responsibility
- lead nation
- role specialisation
- Multinational Integrated Logistic Support Units (MILU)

o6o6. **National responsibility** In this option, each nation takes full responsibility for the logistic support of its own troops. Short reaction times for the deployment of a hastily assembled force may mean that setting up national lines of communications (LOC) is the only 'safe' support option during the initial phase of the operation. Once a 'stable' situation has been achieved and the consequences of a prolonged deployment in terms of cost and personnel have become clear, the possibility of reducing costs by multinational cooperation can be considered. Even in this stable situation, certain goods or services will require national LOC. However, the multinational commander is still responsible for the overall coordination of the support activities, even if the troop-supplying nations only arrange support for their troops on a national basis.

o6o7. In the '**lead nation**' support option, one country is responsible for the coordination of the support activities. This will normally be a country that has a major share in these activities or in the force as a whole. Other countries can also provide units, personnel or equipment in order to implement the logistic support in the framework of the lead nation. The cost of the goods and services supplied is settled afterwards.

o6o8. **Role specialisation.** Service support may be supplied by a country or Service in a specific function area or a particular supply class, thus producing economies of scale or allowing the use of national capacities in which other countries are weaker. In this option, the service support is supplied with the assets of the role specialisation country. The cost of the goods and services supplied is settled afterwards.

0609. **Multinational Integrated Logistic Support Unit.** In this option, assets belonging to several countries are grouped in one organisation under the command of either the most senior officer of the largest national contingent or a designated multinational commander. This option is useful for nations which only supply small contingents, whereby the 'logistic tail' would be disproportionately large were it to meet all the requirements. Clustering the assets in a multinational integrated logistic unit reduces the burden for the cooperating countries in terms of personnel, equipment and costs. Multinational integrated logistic units may operate under the command of multinational formations and units or under that of a rear area command.

Section 3 - Sources of support

0610. The **assets required** for the support of the peace force can, besides being provided from the force's own supplies, be acquired in other ways. It is important that this be borne in mind during the preparations in order to avoid investing an unnecessary amount of time, money and effort in getting resources from the home base to the theatre of operations. This also ensures that no unnecessary claims are laid on the scarce infrastructure or transport and storage assets, such as transport ships and port facilities.

0611. **Mutual support agreements.** Especially for countries which only provide small contingents, it is possible to arrange support jointly by means of (prior) agreements allowing optimal use of each other's assets. Options include the joint conduct of strategic movements and the setting up of multinational integrated logistic units. The multinational force commander must be notified of any such agreements as he is responsible for the coordination of support activities.

0612. **Host nation support** is the civil and military support that a host country provides during an operation for troop-supplying nations or international organisations deployed in or moving through the territory of the host country. Agreements between NATO member states relating to host nation support are usually made in advance. Negotiations about the provision of host nation support have to be conducted with the national or local authorities during the preparatory phase of a peace operation. Such negotiations should ideally be conducted by the headquarters of the leading international organisation or by the intermediary of the multinational force. This will prevent a situation in which the various troop-supplying nations compete with each other for access to the scarce resources. If there is no authoritative government, host nation support is not an option.


0613. **Contracting.** If it is impossible to acquire the necessary means or services through a national or local authority, attempts can be made to contract them through the civilian market on a commercial basis. One must, however, avoid a situation in which scarce goods and services are thus no longer available to the local population. On the other hand, contracting can also provide an important stimulus for the local economy. Multinational coordination and timely preparation are again prerequisites for this option. A special form of contracting is the third party logistic support option. This entails the use of selected (major) suppliers on the basis of contracts drawn up prior to the start of the operation.

0614. **Third nation support.** If it transpires that the host country is unable to provide the necessary resources or that this is at the expense of services to the local population, an outside country may be approached, for instance one of the neighbouring countries. It might be possible to acquire the necessary resources there through the official (commercial or government) channels.

Section 4 - Support Support during the peace operation

0615. ADP I contains a general support concept. It also divides support into the strategic, the operational and the tactical level. These levels overlap somewhat, so it is not always possible to draw a clear dividing line between them. Figure 6-1 shows the **support system** which is created by linking these levels. This support system comprises the home base, the lines of communications and the theatre of operations.

Figure 6-1: General concept of the logistic system in a multinational context.



o616. The basis for the support system is made up of the support organisation in the **home base**. The home base contains mainly static support installations. Examples of these are civil suppliers, depots, workshops and hospitals. The points of embarkation (POE) mark the beginning of the strategic movement and the transport to the theatre of operations. These points are also involved in the return of personnel and equipment from the theatre of operations and then serve as points of disembarkation (POD).

o617. The **lines of communications** are maintained by civil and military organisations and allow the movement of personnel and equipment, using existing or purpose-built infrastructure. In a forward direction, the lines of communications serve as an 'artery' for the supply and throughput of personnel and equipment to the theatre of operations; in a rearward direction, they have the same function of moving personnel and equipment back to the home base.

The lines of communications are set up and maintained by civil and military organisations.

Photograph: Military History Section, RNLA (UNPROFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1993)



0618. **Theatre of operations.** The theatre of operations is the unbroken area in which the peace operation and the related support activities take place. From an operational point of view, it is divided by an imaginary line into communications zone and an area of operations, as shown in Figure 6-2.




Figure 6-2: Diagram of the theatre of operations.

0619. It is mainly the operational combat service support which is implemented in the **communications zone**. This includes storage of supplies, equipment management, movement of personnel and equipment and arranging contracts with local suppliers. The activities in the communications zone are twofold: on the one hand, personnel and equipment are moved from and to the home base and, on the other, personnel and equipment are moved to and from the deployed units. The communications zone contains the PODs for transport to the theatre of operations and the rear service support areas, which are set up by the national support element (NSE).

o620. In the rearmost part of the **area of operations**, the tactical combat service support is conducted by the service support units, which are organically assigned to the deployed tactical troops. If the distances or turn-around times become too great, parts of the national support element may be moved up to form a national support element forward (NSE FWD). The support activities in the area of operations are directed towards the front: the 'logistic tail' is not of immediate concern to the tactical commander. The principle of direct delivery will, therefore, usually apply here. There may be, for example, field hospitals and supply centres in the area of operations. These can be more or less mobile depending on the situation.

o621. The task of the **national support element** (NSE) is to fulfil the national responsibility in the theatre of operations for the logistic support of the units deployed in a multinational context. The NSE is regarded as a separate unit which, for administrative purposes, forms part of the national contingent. It thus supplies the external service support to all national units and individuals in the area of operations. This support supplements the internal service support provided by the organically assigned service support units.

o622. The activities performed by the NSE on behalf of the national units, contingents and individuals include the following:

- providing a command element and command and control system for the units assigned to the NSE
- receiving, transshipment, storing and distributing all supplies brought up from the home base
- if necessary, establishing and running a POD
- providing medical care and evacuation, for example by setting up an evacuation hospital or POE for medical evacuation at an airport
- supplying transport assets and services
- carrying out maintenance and recovery
- personnel management
- providing facilities in respect of relaxation and development, leave and recuperation, spiritual welfare and sport
- receiving and providing (temporary) accommodation for personnel arriving in or leaving the theatre of operations
- providing all services required by the units, contingents and individuals, such as supervising rotations, bathing and washing facilities, money and field post

The NSE's logistic capacity and supplies are under national control, unless other arrangements have been made beforehand in a multinational context. In practice, the (main) location from which the NSE conducts its tasks is known as the 'logistic base'. It may be the case that

service support is also supplied from there to elements of other Dutch Services.

Field post.

Photograph: Media Centre

RNLA

(SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1998)



Section 5 - Command and control and coordination

o623. The combat units and combat support units are always incorporated in a **multinational command structure**. In peace operations, certainly if they are conducted in a NATO structure, there will often be a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), consisting of, for example, a land, air and naval component. The contributions of the participating countries are combined in these components. The formations and units of land forces, including their organically assigned support units, fall under the command of the multinational commander of the land component (see Figure 6-3).




Figure 6-3: The place of the national support elements in the international command structure.

0624. Depending on the required **coordination effort** and the level at which this has to take place, one option is to set up a multinational joint logistic centre (MJLC) or a multinational logistic centre (MNL) for each component. A joint rear area command (JRAC) or, under the land component, a rear area command (RAC) may also be set up.

0625. As well as this **multinational command structure**, there is also a national command structure (see Chapter 5). In the theatre of operations, this runs from the national contingent commander to the national support element and from there to any forward national support element or the POD units. The NSE will coordinate with the MJLC or the MNL(L) and with the national support units, which are organically assigned to the combat units and combat support units. The contingent commander has authority and responsibilities in respect of logistic, administrative and personnel matters.

0626. The MJLC and the MNL(L) are primarily intended as **coordination centres** and will not exercise command. Coordination takes place in many disciplines which are related to the support function. Within the MJLC or MNL(L), therefore, there are several specialist coordination cells, which may receive function-related instructions from the various

staff sections. The contingent commander, the NSE and the deployed units may have dealings with any of these cells.

Section 6 - The logistic planning process

o627. At the same time as the decision-making at international and national level, as described in Chapter 5 and forming an integral part of the operational planning process, the **logistic planning process** will be carried out. This process is started at an early stage, as the logistic preparations for an operation must be completed before the troops can be deployed. This means, however, that when the logistic planning process is started, there is a great deal of uncertainty which gradually gives way to established facts in the course of the planning.

o628. The aim of the logistic planning process is to ascertain the **requirement for service support** and to determine how this requirement can be met. The starting point in this respect is the planned operational capacity which may, incidentally, also consist of logistic support units. The latter applies particularly to operations which are largely humanitarian. The logistic planning process is a cycle, in which all levels (national and international) are involved. However, the emphasis of the activities will shift during the process from high (creating conditions) to low (implementing) level.

o629. The logistic planning process in the staff of the Royal Netherlands Army starts officially with the receipt of a **planning order** from the Chief of the Defence Staff. However, as soon as a possible operation is announced, as much (logistic) information as possible is gathered in respect of the operation itself, the participating countries and organisations, the theatre of operations and the surrounding area.

o630. Starting points for the planning are the operational task and the **sustainability statement**. The sustainability statement is drawn up after consultations between the leading international organisation, the multinational force commander and the participating nations and must be incorporated in a planning order from the Chief of the Defence Staff. The sustainability statement is particularly important in determining the support effort. It indicates the capacities and the extent of logistic self-sufficiency and sustainability that are expected from the participating nations.

o631. First of all, a **support concept** will be formulated on the basis of the higher commander's operational plan, the sustainability statement and the (logistic) information that has been obtained. The service

The multinational service support options.

Photograph: Richard Frigge, Audio-visual Service, RNLN (UNPROFOR, former Yugoslavia, 1993)



support requirement is then calculated with the aid of this concept, the generic planning details and the envisaged strength of the contingent in terms of personnel and equipment. The planners will then look at the extent to which this service support can or must be provided with national assets and the extent to which multinational support options can cover the requirement. They will also consider what other sources of service support are available.


o632. The **multinational support options** are in principle developed during logistic planning conferences, which are attended by representatives of the multinational staffs which are to lead the operation and of the (military or Service) staffs of potential troop-supplying nations. The outcome of the logistic planning process is recorded in a support directive, a support order or an annex on support with the operation order.

Section 7 - Support in a UN framework

o633. Unlike the situation in a NATO context, in which support is a national responsibility, the service support in a UN context is in principle the **responsibility of the United Nations**. For this reason, the UN has a command structure which is partly geared to this responsibility. Nevertheless, support is often left to national support units for reasons of practicality. The supplying nations are, however, compensated for this. The support capacity available to the force as a whole is in principle supplied by the UN. This includes, for example, resources for medical evacuation (medevac) over long distances and assets for the supply of universal expendable supplies, such as food and fuel.

Figure 6-4: Possible organisation of the staff of the force commander in a UN operation.

0634. **Command and control.** In a UN-led operation, the staff of the force commander comprises not only the usual military staff but also a civilian staff (see Figure 6-4). This civilian staff is mainly concerned with administrative and financial matters. These aspects have an important relationship with the support activities, which are conducted under the leadership of the military staff.



0635. The UN headquarters appoints a Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), who is head of the **civilian part** of the staff. The CAO and his staff represent the force commander in the coordination of external support, including the task of keeping stocks at the required level. The CAO also acts as an intermediary between the peace force and the government of the host country or countries with regard to:

- procurement and local supply
- financial arrangements (payments and claims)
- civil transport
- employment of local civilian staff
- troop rotations
- use or rental of accommodation
- use of civil communications assets (radio and telephone)
- post and welfare facilities

o636. In the force's military staff, the Chief Logistics Officer (CLO) is responsible for the **support activities** for the peace force, which are performed by the multinational and national support units. All logistic functions are represented in the CLO's staff.

o637. The UN concludes agreements with the troop-supplying nations about the size of their contribution in terms of major equipment and personnel and about the degree of self-sufficiency. The countries are reimbursed for this agreed contribution. The UN has a **reimbursement arrangement** based on two lease systems for major equipment and for smaller items of equipment, supplies, personnel and services.

o638. The **lease systems** only apply to equipment items which the troop-supplying nations have agreed to bring with them (contingent-owned equipment). The lease systems do not apply to equipment supplied by the UN (UN-owned equipment) or equipment used by the troop-supplying nations in addition to what was originally agreed (nationally owned equipment).

o639. The two **main forms** of the lease system are wet lease and dry lease. Under the wet lease system, the troop-supplying nation is responsible for providing:

- the major equipment items
- the associated smaller items of equipment
- the workshop equipment and tools needed for maintenance
- spare parts and expendables
- maintenance personnel

The UN is responsible for providing the necessary accommodation, such as storage and work areas.

o640. Under the dry lease system, the troop-supplying country is only responsible for providing the major equipment items and the UN supplies the other assets. Different reimbursement tariffs apply to the two systems. Both parties (the troop-supplying nation and the UN) can also meet the obligations by making arrangements with other countries or civil suppliers. This does not affect the reimbursement provision.

o641. The UN will, in principle, provide various **services** for the troop-supplying countries. If the UN is unable or unwilling to do so, it will

request the troop-supplying nations to make their own arrangements for these services. Fixed tariffs have been established for this self-sustainment on the basis of the agreed personnel strength of the national contingent.

o642. In order to monitor compliance with the agreements, the following **inspections** are carried out:

- An **arrival inspection**, immediately after arrival in the theatre of operations and to be completed within one month of arrival. The type and number of equipment items are inspected and the countries must show that they are able to supply the services at the agreed level.
- An **operational readiness inspection** at least once every six months or if there is any doubt as to the quality of the contribution.
- A **repatriation inspection** before the contingent returns to its own country. This involves the inspection of the condition of the equipment which was brought in under the dry lease system. The inspection is also designed to ensure that no UN-owned equipment is being removed.

PART B
OPERATIONAL TASKS

7 Observation, monitoring and supervision

Section 1 - Introduction

0701. Observation, monitoring and supervision form an essential ingredient of virtually all peace operations. These operational tasks are designed to **gather information** in order to establish the extent to which the parties in the conflict comply with the treaties or agreements or to which they observe any sanctions or other stipulations. Observers can be regarded as the 'eyes and ears' of the contracting authority. This could also be a civil, non-security organisation, such as the European Union.

0702. The presence of observers has a primarily **preventive effect**: parties which have concluded a treaty or other agreement are less likely to violate it under the watchful eyes of the observers. If they do, observers may be used to collect evidence of the (alleged) violations.

0703. An observer operation can be carried out in one of three ways:

- as an independent **operation in itself**
- as an independent operation **alongside a peace force** operating in the same conflict area
- as an **integral part** of a larger peace operation (and peace force)

An example of the first category is the UN operation UNMOGIP (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan), which has been monitoring the cease-fire line between India and Pakistan in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir since 1949. The operation by UNMOs (United Nations Military Observers) and members of the ECMM (European Community Monitor Mission) in the former Yugoslavia since the beginning of the 'nineties alongside the UNPROFOR and IFOR peace forces is regarded as an example of the second category. An observer operation which forms part of a larger whole is UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation). UNTSO has been stationed in the Middle East since 1948 in order to supervise observance, in the Israeli border regions, of the truce between Israel and its neighbours. In southern Lebanon is the UN peace force UNIFIL, which guards the buffer zone between both countries. UNTSO observers have been placed under OPCON of the commander of UNIFIL; these observers man a number of observation posts and conduct patrols in areas in which there are no UNIFIL units.

0704. A larger peace operation will often begin with the deployment of observers. The further conduct of the operation can then be largely determined by the findings and recommendations of the observers. Observers can also be deployed during and after a larger peace operation. If an observer operation is conducted alongside another peace force operating in the same conflict area, there will at least be close liaison between the two.

Section 2 - Characteristics

0705. In **international terminology**, the terms *observation*, *monitoring* and *supervision* are, in relation to the conduct of peace operations, used alongside each other and interchangeably. This publication makes the following distinctions, in accordance with most official documents:

- **Observation** is the systematic surveillance of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means.
- **Monitoring** is a specific form of observation, designed to actively follow the activities of certain parties or events.
- **Supervision** is a specific form of observation, focused on compliance with agreements and treaties.

Monitoring is a specific form of observation designed to actively follow activities.

*Photograph: Media Centre
RNLA
(ECMM, former Yugoslavia,
1996)*



0706. These terms overlap to some extent and thus cannot be clearly separated. However, 'observation' is the most general concept of the three and the RNLA's definition most closely resembles the NATO definition for 'surveillance' in the sense in which it is used in this chapter. The term 'observation' is, therefore, used in this publication as the **generic term** while 'monitoring' and 'supervision' are used to refer to specific forms of observation.

0707. An observer operation is usually established as a result of an **agreement** or a **resolution**, the observance of which is monitored by a peace force. This force acts on behalf of an international organisation, which normally designates a supervising authority as well. In principle, this is the commander of the multinational force which is conducting the operation. Unless otherwise agreed, all observers fall under OPCOM of this official.

0708. In practice, the **orders to observers** can be highly diverse and cover a wide range of activities. Some examples are:

- observing buffer zones and cease-fire lines designed to provide early warning if the conflict breaks out or escalates
- observing the withdrawal of the parties' troops from a particular area
- monitoring the activities in a demilitarised zone between the parties
- supervising the implementation of elements of the peace accord, such as the exchange of prisoners or dead, supervising elections or arms control agreements
- monitoring the observance of human rights

Supervising the implementation of elements from the peace agreement.

*Photograph: Media Centre
RNLA
(UNTSO, Golan Heights,
1990)*



0709. Observers may also be asked to **maintain contacts** between the peace force and the parties and between the parties themselves. They may also be asked to negotiate or mediate on behalf of parties in the event of local tension. They may also be instructed to conduct an impartial investigation and to collect evidence in the event of a known violation of the peace agreement or of human rights. Ultimately, they will report their findings to the supervising authority, which is, after all, responsible for the conduct of all aspects of the peace operation.

0710. Observers may already be present in the conflict area. They may be asked to assist the peace force in the **enforcement of sanctions**. They may, for example, be requested to inspect industrial complexes in order to check the compliance with agreed or imposed restrictions on arms production. However, in view of the implications this verification task may have for their impartiality, it will only be performed by observers as an exception. On the other hand, impartial verification by observers may help to allay suspicions that parties may have about each other.



*The safety of the observers.
Photograph: Dutch Press
Agency (ANP)
(Dutch observers released
after being captured by
Bosnian Serbs in 1995)*

0711. Observers can be deployed **individually or in teams** and can operate in a national as well as an international context. It is also possible to order an observation mission to be conducted by organic units. They will then in principle conduct object or area surveillance by means of, for example, observation and listening posts and patrols.

0712. For their **safety**, observers are largely dependent on their impartial status. In some operations, an independent position with respect to the military peace force may indeed contribute to the safety of the observers. This is because too close a relation with the peace force, which cannot always rely on the sympathy of the civilian population, would quickly become counterproductive for observers in particular, as their success depends heavily on the extent of acceptance by the local people and their leaders.

During the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations exercised extreme caution in respect of the use of air power to force the parties to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and seek a political solution to the conflict. It was because of the risk to the (unarmed) observers and monitors of the United Nations and the European Union that it was not until the end of 1994 that, at the request of the United Nations, NATO planes conducted the first air strikes on Serb targets in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fear of reprisals proved founded when, in response to these air strikes, UN personnel were placed under house arrest. As the conflict continued, this method was used on several occasions as soon as the international community responded with force to actions by the parties. Observers and monitors were particularly at risk, as evidenced by the television pictures of an observer chained to a bridge. It was for this reason that the OSCE observers were withdrawn from the conflict area before NATO launched air strikes on Serb targets during the conflict in Kosovo in 1999.

0713. There is a direct link between the estimated **threat level** of the conflict and the **arming** of observers. If the threat level is low, observation can be conducted by unarmed personnel who operate individually or, preferably, in small teams. This task can also, incidentally, be performed by civilians. If the threat level is higher, or if consent to the operation is not guaranteed, the observers may be armed. The armaments must, however, be confined to personal weapons for self-defence and the protection of the driver or interpreter accompanying the observer. Lastly, arrangements will have to be made with any peace force operating in the area with regard to the provision of assistance or shelter, should the safety of the observers be compromised. Plans could thus be formulated for the evacuation or temporary protection (for example during movements or meetings) of the observers by peace force personnel in the event of increasing tension.

0714. The **success** of all observation activities is largely determined by the possibility of delivering accurate and timely reports. This requires reliable communications, secure or otherwise, and an efficient reporting system. Adequate arrangements must also have been made for the logistic and medical support of the observers, not least from the point of view of morale. Transport, food and drink, billeting, postal facilities, clothing and equipment are just some examples of aspects which must be well organised, particularly for an official as vulnerable as the observer. The international organisation charged with directing the observer operation will at least have to ensure a minimum level of facilities in the conflict area. However, the task of ensuring that the individual observer is well prepared, well trained and well equipped for participation in an observer operation remains a national responsibility.

0715. Observers are highly restricted in terms of ability and authority to act in the event of **contraventions or violations of the peace**

agreement by one or more of the parties. Negotiations with the leaders of local factions can, on the other hand, be productive and at least result in local compliance with agreements. Reports of contraventions or violations may, however, also lead to intervention by the supervising authority, the possibilities for which range from negotiating to imposing sanctions. Given that an observer's report of a local violation of the agreement could have repercussions for the attitude of the parties towards all observers and the military peace force, this places additional pressure on the observer to deliver an accurate and timely report. This further emphasises the need for clear instructions to the observer teams and a thorough knowledge on the part of the observers with regard to the peace agreement and any stipulations regarding implementation.

0716. When conducting their tasks, the deployed observers must maintain intensive contact with all parties in the area of operations. In the event of a violation of the peace accord, they must also avoid taking sides. An **impartial status** thus guarantees the protection of the observers to a considerable extent. The added value of the deployment of observers for the purpose of enforcing sanctions (see Chapter 9) must, therefore, be weighed carefully against the risks involved in such activities, as impartiality and thus the effectiveness and personal security of the observer could be put under pressure.

The outfit.

Photograph: Media Centre

RNLA

(MFO, Sinai, 1983)



0717. If the observers' **freedom of movement** is restricted, it usually becomes impossible to continue to perform the assigned tasks effectively. This freedom of movement can be improved in various ways. These

include an impartial attitude, respect for the representatives of the (belligerent) parties and also intervention in word and deed by the military peace force with which the observers are working.

Section 3 - Aspects of planning and execution

0718. During the planning phase, the following aspects at least must be clearly established in order to facilitate the decision-making with regard to an observer operation (not in order of priority):

- the consent of the parties involved to the stationing of observers (or a force)
- the boundaries of the area of operations in which the observers and units in question will operate
- the supervising authority
- the tasks, powers and responsibilities of the supervising authority and the observers
- the extent of the freedom of movement of individuals and units, including the use of roads, airspace, waterways, airports and seaports
- whether or not personnel have the right to carry weapons
- the uniform and equipment of the observers
- duration of the operation

These aspects can be covered in an appendix to the peace accord, the status of forces agreement or the mandate. Rules of engagement for the observation operation will usually be issued as a separate document.

0719. During the decision-making process for an observer operation, a decision must be taken in respect of:

- the composition of the observer operation (account must be taken of all aspects relevant to the conflict area, such as religious, cultural, political and ethnic factors; this may mean that certain countries will not be asked to supply observers)
- the influence of the features of the area of operations (terrain and weather) on the operations of all parties and the equipment required by the force which is to be deployed
- the risk of an outbreak of hostilities or a further escalation of the conflict
- contingency planning for the situation in which the armed conflict flares up again (on a large scale), including an evacuation plan for the observers
- the structure of the command and control system and the use of communications assets
- the use of local or national interpreters, as well as their protection/status
- the organisation of the logistic support

- sustainability in relation to the duration of the operation

0720. If observing is just one of the tasks of a peace operation, the force may set up a **separate observer organisation**. This organisation may be centrally assigned to the staff of the Head of Mission, under the command of a Chief Military Observer. In a decentralised deployment, the observers are in principle placed under OPCOM of the units operating in a particular area.

0721. An important aspect in the planning of and decision-making about the observer operation is the size and geography of the observers' area of operations. The following can be established on the basis of the analysis of the area of operations:

- the operational division of the area of operations (area coverage and sub-division into, for example, sectors)
- the command structure (including the location of the Chief Military Observer)
- the requirement for communications assets
- the turn-around distances and times in respect of service support

0722. An important aspect which has to be analysed during the

*Communications assets
and other equipment.
Photograph: Military
History Section RNLA
(MFO, Sinai, 1983)*



planning process is the **identification** of the other international organisations and NGOs active in the area of operations. In this respect, particular attention must be paid to other observer operations as well as to a force which could, if necessary, contribute to the safety of personnel and evacuate the observers if the conflict escalates. One should also ascertain what arrangements have already been made with other international organisations or local agencies in respect of cooperation or establish the areas in which cooperation or coordination of tasks will increase the chances of a successful observer operation.

0723. Lastly, the number of observers required and any specific qualifications (military or civilian, previous education and so on) must be made clear as soon as possible. A further point to be established is who will be supplying the equipment. The international organisation leading the operation must indicate whether the participating countries are responsible not only for personnel but also for the vehicles, communications assets and other equipment or whether these will be provided by the organisation itself. The international organisation will issue instructions and guidelines on, for instance, the calibre of the weapons, the type of equipment and the observers' uniforms. The observers' arms and personal equipment will, in principle, always be a national responsibility, although most observer operations are conducted by unarmed personnel.

0724. An observer operation may be reinforced by assets for observing specific activities, such as radar systems for artillery and mortar detection and for aerial observation. Another option is to use assets suitable for observing large areas (incidentally or otherwise). Examples are the deployment of tactical air reconnaissance, helicopters and (unmanned) ground sensors.

0725. An observer operation can be conducted with **high-tech equipment**, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), air-based observation systems and satellites. However, the information produced by these systems is normally directly available at strategic and operational level only. These systems also have limitations (number of systems available, duration of use, cost of use, effects of weather, etc) and supplementary observation on land or at sea will almost always be necessary. Thanks to the use of such technical systems, however, the deployment of observers on the ground can be more targeted. In this way, for example, inhospitable and less accessible areas can be observed with the aid of these systems, while other areas with, for instance, large population concentrations and military complexes can be covered by ground-based observation.

Examples of high-quality air-based surveillance systems are JSTARS (Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System) and AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System). JSTARS is ideal for monitoring ground-based troop movements, while AWACS plays a key role in observing and registering flight movements and monitoring the observance of no-fly zones.

0726. The nature of the (potential) conflict and the geographical conditions in the conflict area may mean that **air and naval forces need to be deployed** to conduct monitoring and supervising activities. Monitoring the observance of an embargo against an area on the coast will thus in principle be conducted by maritime units. In vast areas, air forces in particular are able to conduct (photographic) reconnaissance flights in order to, for example, register troop concentrations and movements.

0727. While the assigned tasks are being conducted, it is important that the leaders of the operation receive **periodic and incidental reports** in order to keep abreast of events in the area of operations. Accurate and objective reports are essential to the leaders of the operation to provide timely warning of developments which could jeopardise the conduct of the peace operation (growing tension between the conflicting parties, restriction of the freedom of movement, a decline in or even complete loss of consent).

0728. The **situation reports** by the observers are, in the event of treaty or cease-fire violations, an important source of information which helps to determine which party is responsible. Strict (electronic) security measures are applied in the transmission of the situation reports. The information passed between the observers in the area of operations and the headquarters of the peace force or the observer operation must not be allowed to fall (prematurely) into the hands of a third party (one or more of the parties, the media), as this could seriously hamper the actions of the peace force or the observer operation. It is also important that the reports are purely factual; they must not contain any value judgements.

0729. In **interstate conflicts**, observers may be deployed when combat units are withdrawn from the front lines to the rear areas of the armed forces concerned. In such circumstances, observers can act as liaison officers at the parties' headquarters. They can also serve as escorts or guides in the regrouping and withdrawal of isolated units. Observers can be redeployed at a later stage in the zone of separation (the buffer zone) between the parties. They can then provide the communication between the parties and inspect any agreed military presence in the zone

The lines of communications are set up and maintained by civil and military organisations.

Photograph: Military History Section, RNLA (UNPROFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1993)



in question.

0730. Observers in an **intrastate conflict** will usually operate in a less structured environment. In such circumstances, one or more parties refuse to acknowledge the authority of the local government. The parties cannot always be identified and do not always operate overtly. In the initial phase following a cease-fire or truce, observers have a wide range of tasks. Their primary focus is on improving communication between the parties, the local authorities and the local headquarters of the UN or other lead organisation. Observers can also supply impartial and reliable information on how the situation is developing to the international organisations involved in resolving the conflict.

0731. In subsequent phases, observers can supervise the regrouping and disarmament of the parties and report on this process to the leaders of the observer mission. In the **rebuilding phase following the conflict**, their tasks may be extended to include supervision of elections and the observance of human rights and establishing liaison with the parties' headquarters and with the international organisations which are also active in the theatre of operations.

0732. The mandate, which sets out the tasks of the force, entails the

implementation of a large number of **activities**. These include at least the following:

- reporting and registering (specifically or otherwise) events in the area
- manning observation posts or checkpoints
- conducting patrols
- maintaining liaison with the parties in the conflict and with international organisations
- investigating allegations of truce violations

0733. The task of the observers remains mainly confined to reporting on incidents or monitoring compliance with the peace agreement. They may also offer to act as **advisers and mediators**. It may be the case that the mandate is widened in the course of the operation and that the force can thus operate more actively. The activities of the observer mission can then be augmented by:

- supervising specific events or activities, such as the exchange of POWs, clearance of arms depots, demobilisation and elections
- mediating between the parties
- supporting the peace force in the enforcement of sanctions by, for example, inspecting military or industrial complexes

MISSION OF THE CHAMELEON: ECMM, UNAVEM AND MFO

Observers do it in white, blue, green or bright orange and, depending on the situation, with or without weapons, as civilians or military, on land, at sea or in the air. Although the task of an observer is relatively easy to define in theory, in practice it is often dynamic in the extreme: no two operations are the same and no operation stays the same over the course of time. Observers are often the first to arrive in a conflict area and are, more often than not, also the last to leave. They personally experience all the stages a conflict goes through in between.

The observers of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), for example, know all about that. This mission stemmed from the very first involvement of the current European Union (EU) in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. At the beginning of July 1991, a delegation of European Community negotiators managed to persuade Slovenia and Croatia (who had declared themselves independent states the previous month) to sign the so-called 'Brioni Accord' with the federal government in Belgrade. A truce between the Slovenian militia and the Yugoslav army formed part of this settlement and it was agreed that international observers would monitor compliance. The operation reflected the cautious approach which was at the time still being taken with regard to the Yugoslav civil war. Initially, the task of the observers was accordingly modest: observe and report. There was no authority for any mediation. The observers had civilian status, worked in three-man teams which were international and constantly changing in terms of composition, were unarmed and dressed completely in white - 'ice-cream men' and 'butchers', as they occasionally called each other with a sense of self-mockery. The observers came from EU countries as well as from countries affiliated to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

They reported to the European Union, the governments of the participating nations and the OSCE Secretariat in Prague.

However, the situation needed a more active approach. At the end of July 1991, therefore, without any relevant provisions in the mandate, the observer teams made their way to the conflict areas in Croatia. Once there, they attempted, with mixed results and in a considerably more dangerous environment, to uphold the local cease-fire agreements by means of mediation, confidence-building measures and their physical presence. In September 1991, the Serb president, Milosevic, agreed to the extension of the ECMM to include Croatia. The following month, Bosnia and Herzegovina was also added to the ECMM area. The size of the mission grew accordingly; having started with 48 observers, it already numbered more than 325 at the end of 1991. The teams also began to interpret their tasks ever more widely, able to do so because of a further agreement on 8 October 1991. Looking back, a Dutch monitor would describe himself as someone who 'was a doctor one minute, a postman or diplomat the next and most definitely a soldier ...'.

At the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993, three of Serbia's neighbours, namely Albania, Bulgaria and Hungary, asked the ECMM to extend their activities to cover their territory. In this way, the three countries intended to make it clear to the belligerent parties that they were complying with the stepped-up embargo and sanction regime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They were thus gaining no advantage from the war and wished to underline their impartiality. By doing so, they hoped to protect themselves against any spread of the war to their territory. In Croatia, the ECMM became involved in the operations of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the autumn of 1992. There, the United Nations were trying to demilitarise four Serb-inhabited protected areas (UNPAs) to allow refugees to return to their homes. Around these areas were the so-called pink zones, from which Serb militias and the Yugoslav army were supposed to withdraw. The Croatian administration could then be restored in the region. The monitoring of this process was assigned to the ECMM. Its members were also to monitor the military traffic from Croatian airfields. This was in connection with the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina which had been announced by the United Nations on 9 October 1992.

It was gradually becoming clear, however, that it was not going to be possible to control the Yugoslav conflict with innocuous measures such as the deployment of observers. In an increasingly violent environment, the influence of the European countries on the course of events in the Balkans continued to decline. All the parties involved were waiting for new political initiatives or (more) vigorous military solutions.

Many observers in the former Yugoslavia became acquainted with the risks of working in a war zone: ambushes, mines and shootings, the intended targets of which never became clear. Those who went on to Angola were to discover that things could get even worse. There too, the effectiveness of the observer mission was highly dependent on the security situation. The first UN operation in Angola still gave cause for a certain degree of optimism. On 22 December 1988, Angola, Cuba and South Africa signed an agreement which was to put an end to the Cuban and South African intervention in the Angolan civil war. The United Nations then set up the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) to supervise the withdrawal of the Cuban troops. Apart from a few violent incidents directed at Cuban soldiers, the operation did not run into any major difficulties and was completed at the beginning of June 1991.

In the meantime, the war between the army of the governing party, the

Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the troops of the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) had also come to an end, thanks to the Estoril peace settlement (in May 1991). The UN operation in Angola then continued as UNAVEM II. The mission was to supervise the ceasefire between and the demobilisation of the MPLA and UNITA troops, as well as the subsequent establishment of the new Angolan army. UN troops were also to monitor the legitimacy of the police actions. Finally, UNAVEM II was to supervise and provide technical assistance for the elections for a new parliament and a new president.

Whereas UNAVEM I had managed with some seventy military observers, its successor, with its much broader mandate, was to expand to almost 450 observers, excluding staff and support. Twenty-five countries, including the Netherlands, provided a contribution. Although it had expanded enormously, the size of UNAVEM II was in stark contrast with the tens of thousands of military personnel who were to be deployed a year later in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and Cambodia (UNTAC). Furthermore, the size of the country (thirty times the size of the Netherlands) undoubtedly justified an even larger operation. UNAVEM II was plagued by problems from the outset. The first observers to arrive in the country were left very much to their own devices. In a poor, tropical country, which bore the scars of thirty years of (civil) war, personnel lost a great deal of time making arrangements for their own accommodation, food, hygiene and health. In the towns, the situation was somewhat easier in this respect, but there were other problems there, namely widespread criminality. Another problem was that the poor road network and the presence of mines on all sides imposed major restrictions on the observers' freedom of movement. Furthermore, the internal organisation of the operation did not help; many observers complained about the uncooperative staff at the headquarters in Luanda.

The greatest danger, however, lay in the mistrust between the parties which had previously been in conflict. The UNITA was suspected of sabotaging the demobilisation and carrying out covert preparations to resume the conflict. This suspicion was eventually confirmed in the autumn of 1992. The UNITA lost the elections on 29 and 30 September 1992 and the violence erupted again with great intensity a month later. Mediation attempts by the observers had at best a temporary effect, a truce was violated and, at the end of January 1993, the fighting spread throughout Angola. From that point on, UNAVEM personnel regarded themselves as 'war observers'. The logistic support for the outposts collapsed, some local people adopted an aggressive attitude towards the observers and UN posts were even attacked and plundered. Under these circumstances, the UN reduced the strength of UNAVEM II to some eighty personnel, consisting of 50 military and 18 police observers and a few medical personnel, all concentrated in Luanda.

However, their presence had a primarily symbolic significance: a signal that the UN, despite everything, did not want to abandon the war-torn country. Not until a new accord between the UNITA and the MPLA, signed on 20 November 1994, looked as if it would hold up did the Security Council dare to bring the observer organisation back up to its original strength. Furthermore, the mission, now known as UNAVEM III, was augmented by a 6500-strong international peace force. In 1997, the hope that the formation of a government of national unity would finally bring the civil war to an end proved a vain one. Since 30 June of that year, the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (UNOMA) has been continuing the work of UNAVEM III, with approximately half the strength of its predecessor.

Observers represent a vulnerable type of peacekeeper and in a violent environment they can, despite the best intentions, easily become the hostages of one

Map of the Sinai with the zones according to the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreements of 1978.



of the parties. Elsewhere in this chapter, we recall the fate of UN and ECMM observers in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the run-up to the crisis in the east

Bosnian enclaves in June/July 1995. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai is an example of the other side of reality. When this peace force was established in 1982, Israel and, to a lesser extent, Egypt regarded it as their 'captor' in any subsequent political or military crisis. The MFO, in which the United States played the main part, had after all assured them that this major power would not remain neutral. The United States, for its part, relied on the view that Egypt and Israel would not take up arms again lightly. Up to now, despite this 'hidden' agenda, the operation has proved both risk-free and successful.

The peace treaty signed by Israel and Egypt in Camp David (the American President's retreat) still assumed that the UN peace force which was already there, the United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) formed after the October War of 1973, would supervise the staged Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. The observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which had been active since 1948, would also be able to make themselves useful in this respect, as they were already working closely with UNEF II. After the withdrawal, the Sinai was to be divided by the Israel Defence Forces into three zones. In the westernmost A zone, the Egyptian army was to be permitted to station a maximum of 22,000 soldiers and in the central B zone no more than 4,000 lightly armed soldiers. International observers were to monitor compliance with the peace accord in both zones. An international force was provided in the form of an interpositioning operation in the eastern C zone. Finally, Israel would be allowed to keep a maximum of 4,000 lightly armed military personnel on its side of the border, in the narrow D zone.

In the Security Council, however, the continuation of UNEF II came up against what was in fact a Russian veto. To Israel's great delight, the United States once again felt obliged to take the lead. Israel had been distrustful of the UN since the Security Council had withdrawn UNEF I in 1967. The many condemnations voiced by the Council against the Jewish state also played an important part in the Israeli attitude towards the UN. Israel now set its sights on a US-dominated peace force with an observer mission in order to physically bind the powerful ally to the peace settlement. There was, incidentally, already a precedent for this in the form of the American Sinai Field Mission, which had been monitoring the situation at the Egyptian and Israeli electronic surveillance stations on both sides of the Giddi and Mitla passes since 1975. These positions would be fiercely contested in every future armed conflict. Egypt, although less enthusiastic about the end of UNEF II, did eventually see the advantages of a permanent American involvement in the peace settlement. In August 1981, Israel and Egypt signed the protocol whereby the MFO was set up. The United States acted as a witness and took responsibility for most of the initial costs. It was agreed that thirty American civilian observers would check the numbers present in all zones. Zone C also contained three infantry battalions, with the permanent inclusion of one American battalion: alternately a battalion of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Division. With units of this quality, the United States emphasised once again the importance it attached to the matter. The Fiji Islands and Colombia supplied the other two battalions. Their main task was (and still is) to ensure that no Israeli or Egyptian armed units appeared in zone C. To this end, they man checkpoints and observation posts and send out ground and air patrols. Lastly, they supervise free passage through the Strait of Tiran. The MFO never intervenes in the event of a violation, but merely reports to both Israel and Egypt at the same time. Besides the United States, Fiji and Colombia, another seven, mostly European, countries participate with support units in the MFO. The Netherlands supplied a signals unit and a military police detachment until 1995.

When the MFO started, success was by no means guaranteed. After all, Israel and Egypt had been on a war footing with each other for decades. Seen in those terms, the MFO stood a realistic chance of ending up on a battlefield. With hindsight, however, it must be said that the determination of Israel and Egypt to keep the peace got the upper hand. It is also important to note that this concerns a settlement between stable nations who behave in accordance with the rules of the game of international politics. This is in stark contrast to many other conflict hot spots in which observers have found themselves since the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the end of the MFO is not yet in sight. Peace there may be, but it is no more than a fragile one.

8 Preventive deployment

Section 1 - Introduction

0801. In the context of peace and security, too, prevention is better than cure. Preventive actions can prevent a crisis developing into an armed conflict. **Preventive measures** can serve to stabilise and perhaps improve the economic and social situation in an affected area and prevent suffering. The United Nations refers to the diplomatic measures taken in this respect as 'preventive diplomacy'. This form of diplomacy comprises all activities designed to avert a developing crisis and prevent the violence expected to accompany it. These activities can range from diplomatic measures and efforts in the cultural or economic sphere to the deployment of military assets.

0802. **Military activities** can be an important part of preventive diplomacy. Examples of such activities are an increase in the level of combat

*Show of force.
Photograph: Photographic
flight Soesterberg
(IFOR, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 1996)*



readiness, a show of force and preventive deployment. These military activities are referred to as 'conflict prevention' and are designed to demonstrate the determination to reach a peaceful solution and, at the same time, the willingness to use any necessary force to enforce a peaceful solution.

o803. Preventive deployment is the actual deployment of a peace force in the area of operations and is one of the measures that may be taken as part of conflict prevention. Such a radical step will only be taken if, in an **interstate or transnational crisis**, there is a sizeable risk that an armed conflict will break out. Preventive deployment is designed to prevent the vertical and horizontal escalation of a crisis. This distinguishes preventive deployment from other operations. Preventive deployment is intended to lend weight to the diplomatic process with military means prior to a potential armed conflict. Normally, force will only play a minor, if any, role.

There are various forms of escalation. If there is a geographic expansion of a conflict, this is known as horizontal escalation. This may be the case if various countries are involved in an intrastate conflict or, for example, if a transnational conflict turns into an interstate conflict. During the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, there was a constant danger of horizontal escalation to, for example, Kosovo and Macedonia. The UN had stationed troops in Macedonia in order to prevent escalation. Vertical escalation refers to an increase in the intensity of violence during a conflict. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia escalated vertically, in fact deliberately, when NATO bombed Serb targets in 1995 to force the Serbs to the negotiating table. This temporary vertical escalation ultimately resulted in a peace settlement and the deployment of a NATO Implementation Force (IFOR).

o804. The peace force will, as a rule, deploy its units on the border of an area in which there is **growing tension**. The deployment of units in the context of preventive deployment does not have to be based on an agreement between all the parties involved. All that is required is the permission of or a request from the state on whose territory the peace force is deployed.

o805. The role of preventive deployment gives rise to three task elements, which are often an extension of each other and which may overlap.

- In order to create time for supplementary diplomatic, humanitarian and military activities, the **early identification** of a threat or the outbreak of an armed conflict is vital. This means that commanders at all levels must concentrate their intelligence collection units on potential crisis hot spots in their area of operations.

- Constant **surveillance** of the area of operations will help to prevent the undermining of the peace by one of the parties. Effective surveillance is thus one of the main preventive activities. It can be conducted by means of, for example, patrols, inspections and observation posts.
- Certain arrangements and jointly undertaken activities can help to reduce tension in the area. They will be the first step towards the end state. These measures designed to build **confidence** could, for example, comprise the following activities:
 - * setting up and maintaining a liaison and communications network with and between all parties
 - * conducting simultaneous and balanced demobilisation activities
 - * setting up and monitoring inspection zones for the deployment of weapons and personnel
 - * reciprocal reporting of military activities and exercises
 - * conducting common inspections of contested areas

Section 2 - Characteristics

0806. It is clear from the context described above that the main function of preventive deployment is to send a **signal**. The international community thus wishes to make it known that it is actually prepared to use military intervention to prevent an armed conflict. The credibility of the international community with regard to this willingness must not be compromised in the process. This means that the peace force to be deployed must have sufficient combat power to nip a (re)developing conflict in the bud. At least part of this combat power must exist within the deployed peace force. Other parts may consist of external support by a (multinational) force, including air and naval forces.

0807. Given that preventive deployment is primarily a signal from the international community to the parties, the operation must in principle be conducted by a **multinational force**. This force may operate under the flag of the United Nations or a regional security organisation. It is also important that the peace force has a broad composition. A one-sided composition could be counterproductive in respect of the end state that is ultimately to be achieved, as it could have a polarising effect and contribute to a further escalation of the conflict.

0808. In order to act with **credibility**, one or more permanent members of the UN Security Council should ideally participate in any preventive deployment. Not only does the international community thus send a message indicating that it has enough military assets to add weight to

its intentions, but it will also have sufficient continuity to switch to another operation or to support the deployed force.

o809. Preventive deployment will arouse the interest of the **media**. This offers an ideal opportunity to focus attention on the determination and the intentions, in both the preparatory phase and the execution phase. Furthermore, media interest will put pressure on the parties to settle their differences by means of negotiation. The media can, therefore, play an important, if indirect, role in the operation.



The media can play an important, if indirect, role in an operation.

*Photograph: Dutch Press Agency
(Kurd refugees, 1998)*

o810. The multinational force always needs **consent** to be deployed in the territory of a sovereign state. This may be a state which is involved in the conflict, but it may also be a third country which is not a party to the conflict, for example a country in the same region. If a peace force is deployed in sovereign territory without consent, this cannot be called preventive deployment. In that case, it would be a peace-enforcing operation or a humanitarian intervention.

o811. The main principles in a preventive deployment are **credibility** and **economy of effort**. It will be more difficult than in other operations to determine and realise the optimum composition and size of the

peace force. If a multinational force is too large, it may be seen as a threat and may lead to further escalation of the conflict. If it is too small, it will not lend sufficient weight to the intentions of the international community and may affect the credibility of the force. It must be said in this respect, however, that preventive deployment must be carried out quickly, which means that a relatively small force will initially have to suffice.

0812. The force must present its activities and intentions openly, in order to avoid misinterpretation. It is precisely because preventive deployment focuses particularly on the **mental component** of the parties that the implications for the parties if they allow the conflict to escalate must be made clear. By making clear the objectives and the capabilities of the preventive deployment force, problems with the performance of tasks can be avoided.

Section 3 - Aspects of planning and execution

0813. **Tasks.** A preventive deployment force has the following tasks:

- observing and reporting activities of the parties in the area of operations
- patrolling and guarding a border or demarcation line
- demonstrating its presence in order to deter a potential aggressor
- acting locally and on a limited scale against infringements of existing peace agreements
- mediating between the parties

0814. Preventive deployment is intended to prevent further escalation of a crisis. A rapid response is essential in this respect. This means that the need to decide between precision and speed produces more tension in the planning of preventive deployment than it does in other operations. It is also difficult to assess the extent to which the parties are prepared to use force.

0815. When planning a preventive deployment, the following aspects in particular must be considered:

- the desired effect
- deployment time
- combat power
- sustainability

0816. The **desired effect** must be the key factor in a preventive deployment. As indicated previously, the primary aim of preventive deployment is to send a political signal to the parties. This means that

a measured use of this method is a condition for the success of the operation. Sound and comprehensive information about the need for the operation is also essential if the operation is to be interpreted correctly by the target group(s). The success of the operation, a containment of the conflict instead of further escalation, is closely related to this.

o817. The required or available **deployment time** is a crucial factor. The international community will, after all, benefit from the containment or prevention of a crisis. If the decision-making delays the deployment of units, it may be the case that preventive deployment is no longer feasible or that the need for it has been overtaken. In view of the available time and the desired effect, rapidly deployable and thus mainly lightly armed units will, at least initially, generally be used.

Rapidly deployable and thus mainly lightly armed units are normally used.

Photograph: Media Centre

RNLA



o818. A peace force conducting a preventive deployment will usually have limited **combat power**. Given the short response time with which a preventive deployment must be conducted, the use of extra ground troops in support of the peace force will not always be possible. The deployment of air forces could in that case contribute to the credibility and protection of the force. Naval forces could also play an important role in this respect.

o819. In order to avoid a situation in which the preventive deployment of a unit has an escalating effect, the rules of engagement will only allow force to be used on a limited scale: for self-defence or to allow the conduct of the assigned surveillance tasks. Nonetheless, consideration will have to be given to the possible side-effects of each activity and to whether the anticipated effects are in line with the political objective: the support of preventive diplomacy.

o820. In the planning of the operation, account must be taken of the **continuation** of the operation, possibly in another form. In that case, the peace force will have to be issued with a new mandate. The problem here is that the unit deployed initially will not usually have the necessary equipment, either in terms of quantity or type. In that case, another force will have to be deployed.

o821. Preventive deployment is regarded as **successful** if the parties reach a political solution to the conflict and stability in the region is preserved. Given the complexity of a crisis, however, it is usually impossible to establish clearly whether this objective has been achieved. This means that preventive deployment is considered successful if it has created the conditions in which other measures lead to the desired end state and the presence of military assets is ultimately no longer required.

WORTH REPEATING: UNPREDEP IN MACEDONIA

The brief clashes in Slovenia in 1991 between the Yugoslav (Serb) Federal Army and the Slovenian armed forces and the subsequent fierce fighting in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were a source of great concern to the international community. This was because there was a danger that the war would spread even further, not just within the borders of the former Yugoslavia, but also beyond them. The ethnic tensions which were already growing in the Serb province of Kosovo and in the (autonomous and independent) Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM, referred to from this point onwards as Macedonia), led the Security Council to put the situation on the agenda at the end of 1992. The advice of the Secretary-General was followed by means of Resolution 795: '...requests the Secretary-General to establish a presence of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as recommended by him in his report'. It was clear from this resolution that the Security Council was worried about the stability

and territorial integrity of Macedonia. It was estimated that the peace force would need to be approximately the size of a battalion. The first UNPROFOR troops were deployed in Macedonia at the beginning of January 1993.

In 1995, the Security Council used Resolution 983 to turn the UNPROFOR operation in Macedonia into the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). Since 1995, the strength of the peace force has ranged from about 1,000 to 1,250. In 1998, UNPREDEP consisted of some 900 military personnel and about 75 international civilian workers and police officers from more than 25 countries. UNPREDEP also had approximately 100 locally-engaged workers. The military component included an international headquarters, a 'NORDIC' infantry battalion with detachments from various countries around the Baltic Sea, an American infantry battalion, an Indonesian engineer platoon and a detachment of UN Military Observers (UNMOs).

On 25 February 1999, the Security Council had to decide on the six-monthly extension of the mandate. However, the People's Republic of China voted against it, thus bringing UNPREDEP to an end. The official Chinese argument was that UNPREDEP was no longer required and that its capacity could be put to better use elsewhere in the world, although it was more likely to have been a reaction to the diplomatic recognition of the (Chinese) republic of Taiwan by Macedonia. At midnight on 28 February 1999, UNPREDEP ceased its activities. The participating troops left the country in the following weeks.

UNPREDEP was deployed in Macedonia's territory in an area along the 420-kilometer border with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro, the FRY). This area contained 20 to 30 permanent check-points from which the border was kept under observation. In addition, some

*Deployment of UNPREDEP
in June 1998.*



30 observation posts were temporarily established at changing locations and patrol activities were conducted in the entire area. One of UNPREDEP's first activities was to make arrangements with the border control units from Albania and the FRY in respect of a military patrol boundary in the border area. Regular contact was then maintained with the border control units of the three countries in the border area. UNPREDEP also mediated in the event of political and ethnic problems and other activities were developed to reduce tension in the area. To this end, there was close cooperation with, for example, the OSCE, the UNHCR, UNICEF, the ICRC and numerous NGOs in the area.

The operation can be regarded as a success. Despite the increase in tension and conflicts in the region, particularly in Albania and Kosovo, the conflict was prevented from spreading to Macedonia in the period in which UNPREDEP was deployed. As a UN peace support operation in the form of a preventive deployment, UNPREDEP was also the first (and for the time being the only one) of its kind. In view of the developments in the region, the question that must be asked is whether the operation was terminated prematurely. Another question is why, given the success in Macedonia and the relatively low costs of preventive deployment compared to, for example, a large-scale operation such as IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, preventive deployment is not used more often. It is difficult to give a straightforward answer to these questions, as a number of aspects are involved. First of all, because of the considerable and often unpredictable risks, few states are 'automatically' prepared to participate in a peace operation. Only under the pressure of public opinion and the media will a country normally decide to participate in a peace operation. The problem is, however, that a crisis in which preventive deployment could be used is not usually (as yet) under the spotlights of the international media. Public and media attention is usually only focused on conflicts that have actually broken out, often stimulated by dramatic television reports.

This also gives rise to a second problem. Preventive deployment can only take place in the early stages of a crisis or before a military conflict has broken out. If preventive deployment is to have any effect, the threat must be identified at an early stage. There is often neither the time nor the inclination for the necessary deliberations in the United Nations. The countries which may be willing to participate in such an operation also need time for national decision-making and preparations.

A third and final aspect applies particularly to this specific example. Macedonia found itself in a somewhat exceptional situation, as the international community had been unable to prevent the conflicts in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina or even bring them to an end. The European Union and the United States were, however, determined to prevent any spread of the conflicts in the region. European stability could, after all, be threatened and the national, vital interests of the countries of the European Union and the United States were thus at stake. Although Macedonia itself was not yet involved in the conflict, public opinion had already been mobilised by the recent dramatic developments in the neighbouring countries. Furthermore, a peace force (UNPROFOR) had already been deployed in the region and, by reorganising the existing troops, a unit could be made available quickly.

Experience has now shown that peace forces are only deployed if a government is under considerable public pressure or if national, vital interests are at stake. In the absence of both these conditions, peace operations will not take place. The reverse is equally true, however: if national interests so demand, an otherwise successful mission can be sacrificed. Preventive deployment, which at first glance appears highly appealing and efficient, is no exception.

9 Enforcement of sanctions

Section 1 - Introduction

0901. A **sanction** in this context refers to a measure taken by a state, a group of states or an international organisation against one or more states or parties which have contravened an international law. Sanctions are therefore established and enacted by the political-strategic level. They may be economic, diplomatic, cultural or military in nature. They can consist of the denial of goods, diplomatic and trade privileges or a restriction of the freedom of movement within or indeed from a particular area.

An example of a sanction imposed by one state against another is the stopping of food supplies to the Soviet Union by the United States as a result of the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. An example of a sanction imposed by an international organisation against a state are the economic sanctions by the EEC (now the European Union) in 1982 against Argentina as a result of the Falklands War.

0902. Although states and in general all international organisations can institute sanctions, particular attention is given in this publication to measures taken by the United Nations Security Council. Sanctions instituted by the UN Security Council must be observed by the member states. The stipulations of the UN Charter, which defines the function and powers of the Security Council (including Article 48, see box) form the **legal basis** for this. Observance of the sanctions can also be enforced by military means. The active enforcement of sanctions stems in principle from a Security Council resolution. The operation may, incidentally, be conducted by an organisation other than the United Nations, for example a regional organisation.

ARTICLE 48 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

0903. In accordance with Article 41 of the UN Charter (see Chapter 2), the Security Council may take measures without the use of military means. Examples of such measures are a boycott and an embargo. A boycott may apply to economic, cultural and social activities as well as to diplomatic relations. An embargo consists of economic measures. **Military action** under Article 42 refers to demonstrations, blockades and other operations by air, sea and land forces. The operational task of the 'enforcement of sanctions' relates to activities which can be conducted both in the territory of states or parties and outside it.

Sanctions imposed because of a violation of a peace agreement are of a different order. In the event that parties do not comply with stipulations or obligations from the agreement, it may be the case that countries, an international organisation or the commander of the peace force have the authority under the agreement to take steps against the party or parties in question. An example of an agreement in which such authority is incorporated is the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 in respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina. From the IFOR Commander to the level of division commander, troops had the authority to, for example, restrict (firing) exercises, movements, (military) parades and the participation of military personnel in commemoration ceremonies.

0904. The enforcement of sanctions may take place in a **complex environment**. Simultaneous operations could thus be conducted on land, at sea and in the air, with the aim of enforcing a sanction imposed by the United Nations Security Council. It is also conceivable that, in the same theatre of operations, other peace operations will be taking place on the basis of a different mandate and thus with an objective that is completely different from the enforcement of a sanction. A good awareness of the political context in which the operation is conducted and coordination in the performance of tasks can contribute substantially to the success of the peace operation.

A good example of the complexity of different peace operations (including sanction operations) in the same theatre of operations is the situation in the former Yugoslavia at the end of 1995/beginning of 1996. Seven peace operations, closely linked by the various objectives and mandates, were conducted simultaneously. These were:

- the UN operation UNPROFOR, which changed to the NATO peace operation IFOR at the end of 1995, in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- the UN operation UNTAES in eastern Slavonia and two other Croatian provinces
- the maritime NATO/WEU sanction and embargo operation *Sharp Guard* in the Adriatic Sea
- the NATO operation *Deny Flight*, which changed to the IFOR operation at the end of 1995, in the airspace above Bosnia and Herzegovina
- a WEU embargo operation on the River Danube along the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
- a civil police operation by the WEU in Mostar (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- a civil police operation by the UN (International Police Task Force, IPTF) in Bosnia and Herzegovina

0905. An important effect of the enforcement of sanctions is the influence on the mental component of the parties. Sanctions can be designed to have a **direct** or an **indirect effect**. The implementation of a sanction may thus have the direct aim of forcing a particular course of action. The indirect intent in this respect may be to produce an effect in additional areas. Economic sanctions will mainly affect the civilian population, but will thus also have an (indirect) effect on the mental component of the military potential of the party in question. Military sanctions will, in principle, be focused primarily on the physical component of the military potential of the parties. An example of a military sanction with an objective such as this is the destruction of arms depots.

0906. Sanctions can be related to various areas:

- the production and export of goods, including semi-manufactured articles, NBC agents and weapons
- the export and import of weapons, oil, medicines, food and so on
- the conduct of business and financial transactions
- traffic across a national or international border
- crossing an agreed (separation) line
- entering or leaving certain areas

0907. Other sanctions can be specifically aimed at restricting the **military capacity of parties**, such as:

- the quantity and type of equipment and weapons systems
- the size of the armed forces
- exercise and training activities
- the use of military complexes, terrain and routes
- stock levels

0908. **Cooperation with other Services** may be necessary for the effectiveness of the operation. It is precisely in this operational task that working with allies will offer a significant added value in operational terms. The coordination and mutual dependence of the various activities could be a particular reason for joint or multinational action. Border controls on land are pointless if they are not carried out in the air and at sea at the same time. It may thus be the case that land forces conduct a peace-enforcing operation while at the same time maritime assets are deployed to enforce the imposed sanctions.

*Maritime assets are also
deployed simultaneously.
Photograph: Audio-visual
Service RNLN
(Operation Sharp Guard,
Adriatic Sea, 1996)*



Section 2 - Characteristics

0909. The enforcement of sanctions occurs within a cyclical process which consists of:

- **checking and supervising** compliance
- **identifying** and reporting any violations
- **responding** in a manner which is indicated in the mandate

The first two tasks focus on achieving the objective of the operation; the 'response' task is the specific 'enforcement' element. The organisation and composition of the peace force must be geared to the execution of these tasks.

0910. **Checking and supervision** are necessary to oversee compliance with the sanctions imposed. This could mean that a particular area, a (ground-based) line, a border or a specific location is checked. In practice, this means that checkpoints and observation posts are set up and patrols are conducted.

0911. There is a close relation here to the operational task of 'observation, monitoring and supervision'. Observers already present in the area may be called upon to monitor the observance of the imposed

sanctions. This does not happen automatically, however, since these observers are operating on the basis of a different mandate. If these personnel are required to perform an additional verification task, there may be implications for the way in which the party or parties view the impartiality of the observers. What is more, observers do not have the military means to enforce the sanction, should this become necessary, and they are also extremely vulnerable. Such a combination of observation and verification will, therefore, only occur in exceptional circumstances.

0912. Verification may result in the **identification** of violations. It is vital that such violations are carefully recorded and reported in detail. These reports form the basis for a subsequent decision on a possible response.

0913. Once a violation of a sanction has been identified, a **response** may follow. This response may be applied directly or indirectly. Before the operation begins, the Force Commander or the Head of Mission must be granted authority to respond to violations.

If, for example, it has been agreed in the peace accord that the parties will clear land mines and one of the parties does not engage in any activities in this respect, the Force Commander may decide to respond by, for instance, not allowing exercises to take place (on a temporary basis). A similar method was used in 1996 by the commander of the IFOR peace force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when the Bosnian Serbs did not meet the obligations stipulated in the Dayton Peace Agreement in respect of mine clearance.

0914. The **form of the response** depends on the mandate. A clear distinction between inspection and enforcement elements or means can contribute positively to the image held by the parties with regard to the impartiality and thus the safety of the inspectors. Apart from the safety element, this distinction yields another advantage: as long as confidence in the impartiality of the observers is assured, they can continue to perform their tasks.

0915. This distinction is, however, not always possible. Some violations require a **direct response** in order to avoid giving the impression that the sanction can be circumvented. Immediate action is needed in such cases to enforce the sanction. Examples of such action are the immediate confiscation of prohibited goods if these are discovered during an inspection or the shooting down of an aircraft if a no-fly zone is ignored.

0916. In other cases, there is time to consider a response. In these situations, there will first be a report of the violation, after which a

decision can be taken with regard to a suitable response. Characteristic of this **indirect response** is that the identification of the violation is separate in terms of time and usually space from the action to bring about observance of the sanction. There is not necessarily a relation between the violation and the target of the action. The symbolic value of the action is often more important than the physical elimination of the target.

0917. If indirect responses are carried out with **military means**, they can take various forms. The existing military control may thus be stepped up and extended to cover more aspects. A disciplinary measure may also be imposed. This may take the form of bombardments, the (temporary) occupation of an area, the confiscation or destruction of military equipment, the apprehension and internment of opponents or a combination of these activities.

0918. If a decision is taken to carry out an indirect military response, particular account must be taken of the relation between the **objective** to be achieved and the **means**. Because of the indirect nature, this is no easy matter. The response must result in a situation in which the sanction that was originally imposed can be better enforced. Military action must not, therefore, be allowed to create a situation in which the original sanction is more difficult or even impossible to enforce. This would then necessitate an additional indirect response. If the peace force is unwilling or unable to meet this requirement, it will lose credibility and the sanction will be even more difficult to enforce. In effect, the mission has then failed.

One option is to conduct unannounced inspections of the object or area in question, which increases the effect of surprise. This will also increase the chances of getting a realistic picture of the situation. The inspecting unit must have the right expertise and (technical) means to recognise and identify any violations of the sanction imposed. In the planning, consideration must be given to whether the inspectors need physical protection or (military) assistance. The checking of the ban on arms production may require the deployment of individuals or small groups of military specialists. Usually, their only protection will be political agreements and the threat of further military action. An example of an operation of this kind was the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq, which, from 1991 to 1998, performed inspections of the production and availability of chemical and biological weapons and of missile installations. UNSCOM also supervised the destruction of these weapons. When Iraq refused to cooperate with the inspections by UNSCOM personnel in 1998, the United States and the United Kingdom decided, on the basis of a Security Council resolution, to deploy air forces to force Iraq to cooperate. This operation (*Desert Fox*) had no effect and, at the end of 1998, the United Nations decided to withdraw UNSCOM personnel from Iraq. The reason for this was not only that it was no longer possible to carry out inspections, but also that the safety of the personnel was in doubt.

0919. All **types of unit** are in principle eligible to carry out this task. If, however, it is going to be necessary to actually use force to enforce a sanction, units with the appropriate means are required. Particularly suitable in this respect are (mechanised) infantry and reconnaissance units, possibly augmented by specific capacity for intelligence collection. If the measures focus more on inspection and surveillance tasks, the addition of (military) police elements would be useful. The deployment of combat helicopters may also be advisable, in view of their (manoeuvre) speed, good observation capacity in various conditions and their great diversity of weapons. The units referred to above are, by virtue of their training and equipment, ideal for the more or less permanent enforcement of sanctions designed to restrict the freedom of movement. Sanctions can also be enforced by conducting isolated actions of short duration in the parties' area. Special units are suitable for such operations. They are also ideal for the covert observation of suspect locations or individuals over a prolonged period.



For the inspection aspects of sanction enforcement, additional expertise may be necessary.

Photograph: René van Bakel (WEU mission on the Danube, 1993)

0920. For the inspection aspects of sanction enforcement, **additional expertise** may be necessary. This may be, for example, specific expertise in the field of engineering, information technology or chemistry, as well as expertise in the production of (semi) manufactured products needed for the assembly or production of 'prohibited' articles and goods.

0921. Timely and accurate **intelligence** is essential in every operation and an adequate intelligence structure is thus a primary requirement for

the successful performance of tasks. In this operational task, the main emphasis is on monitoring the effects of the sanction. After all, only if the sanction is producing the desired effect, direct or otherwise, will it contribute to the achievement of the higher (political) objective. The credibility of the operation may be jeopardised if there are no visible or demonstrable results. An accurate assessment of the effect makes it possible to shift the main effort of the tasks temporarily or locally.

0922. As in all peace operations, the **use of force** for the enforcement of sanctions must at all times be proportional. This basic principle is important in this respect, given that this 'enforcing' task can be performed in virtually the entire spectrum of 'peace, armed conflict/war and post-conflict'. This means that the level of risk with which the peace force is confronted can vary enormously. This applies equally to the available assets. Although it is also true in this case that the clearly visible presence of weapons can have an escalating effect, the success of the operation is largely dependent on the capacity to enforce the sanction in any situation.

0923. The enforcement of sanctions may complicate a future or current peace support operation. The party against which sanctions are imposed will not usually consent to the measure; enforcement of the sanction may also have (unintentional) side-effects on other parties or population groups. In the interests of **transparency**, the purpose of the measures taken must be made clear. Although this does not always mean that there is complete openness with regard to the method and time of inspection or intervention in advance, it does mean that the peace force is at least accountable afterwards. The objective and the expected effects of the sanction must, therefore, be discussed and pursued clearly and credibly.

0924. The **legitimacy** must also be assured, especially in the eyes of the public. The enforcement of sanctions can have a negative effect on public opinion and thus on political and public support. This aspect is particularly important if the sanctions do not directly affect a military object or military group but have a negative effect on the civilian population.

Section 3 - Aspects of planning and execution

0925. The **military planning** of the operation begins with the receipt of the (political) orders. Given the specific nature and the possible consequences of this operational task, the rules of engagement will in principle be restrictive. Cooperation with other civil and military

organisations (in particular with elements of the other Services) forms an important part of the task. Specific conditions may be set for the execution; the enforcement measures to be taken immediately in the event of non-compliance may be described in particular detail.

0926. In the planning phase, the aspects which play a role in the conduct of the mission are taken into consideration in the context of the operational decision-making process. The **response time** and the **available means** are two of the aspects which are important in this operational task. The rules of engagement indicate which direct measures are permitted if a violation is identified. The organisation and equipment of the enforcing troops must be tailored to this eventuality. As regards the available response time, the political decision-making for the enforcement of sanctions might not proceed as quickly or as vigorously as the leaders of the peace force would like.

Coordination with the activities of other Services.
Photograph: Media Centre
 RNLA



0927. The **coordination** and **harmonisation** with other units and elements involved in the operation are extremely important. This refers to the harmonisation with the activities of other Services, other national contingents and, if possible, other international organisations such as NGOs. As well as good communications, the establishment of (mutual) liaison officers is indispensable in this type of complex mission. Consideration must be given in this respect to which parties, for example civil groups, should be incorporated in the information supply process.

0928. Coordination must also take place with civil and military units and elements which are not directly involved in the conduct of the operation. If they are kept informed of the (possible) actions of the force, they can take them into account when planning and performing their own tasks. This could be particularly important for observers and monitors deployed in the area.

0929. For the security of friendly troops and equipment, account must be taken of possible **reprisals** by the parties or organisations against which a sanction is imposed. Protection measures, both active and passive, must be prepared. Important equipment and vulnerable units or installations in particular must be well protected even in the early stages.

0930. Three **main forms** can be distinguished in the conduct of this operational task. They are closely related to the geographic task and also focus primarily on the control function:

- area control
- border control
- control of a particular locality

0931. The **control of an area** does not just involve checking the movement of equipment and personnel. The control of activities which are prohibited as a result of the sanction and of the use of certain facilities will be particularly important in determining how to implement the task. In this case, the enforcement of the sanction will require an anticipatory approach. This could, for example, consist of the threat of force, blocking objects and through-roads or cutting off certain facilities.

0932. The usual option is to monitor the area by means of patrols or aerial reconnaissance. In the event of a violation, part of the peace force which can be moved quickly and which has sufficient combat power can then be deployed to take corrective action. The unit could also be deployed right from the start in the area under surveillance. If the threat of force is lower, one option is to split the unit into a large number of small units of, for example, platoon or group size. A larger area can thus be covered and, in the event of a violation, direct action can be taken. The headquarters of the peace force will in principle be located at a point from which centralised direction of the operation is possible. In this method of operating, the subordinate commanders will be allocated their own sectors.

0933. **Border control** deals mainly with the regulation of the movement of persons or goods. The mission will in principle be to guard a border, whereby instructions are given as to what movements are permitted or indeed prohibited. There could thus be a ban on the movement of certain goods, such as weapons or chemicals. All movements of people belonging to a particular party could also be prohibited. Certain locations, such as border crossing points, passes, bridges and so on, can be physically occupied by means of checkpoints. The peace force's units

may be positioned some distance from the border and conduct their mission with the aid of helicopters and vehicles. The position of the peace force's headquarters will in principle be in the centre of the area of operations, but preferably not in the area being monitored by the sanctioned party. Friendly sub-units will be given responsibility for part of the area of operations.

Inspecting the production and storage of goods.

*Photograph: UN
(UNSCOM, Iraq 1997)*



0934. In the **control of a particular locality**, a location or object is observed; the task can also, however, relate to villages, towns or areas of limited size. As in the case of area and border control, the mission may be in connection with the restriction of movement of certain goods or persons. However, the task is supposed to be geared to the control of the production and storage of goods.

A BITTER-SWEET SUCCESS: OPERATION *SHARP GUARD* AND THE WEU DANUBE MISSION

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is one of the countries which has been faced with many sanctions and embargoes since the end of the Cold War. Sanctions and embargoes were among the first measures taken by the United Nations with the aim of ending the civil war in the Balkans. Almost four months after the fighting broke out in Croatia, the Security Council called upon the member states, by means of resolution 713 of 25 September 1991, to observe a 'general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment' against Yugoslavia. However, this had no effect on the fighting. This was because the international community made no attempt to enforce the embargo, as the wish at this stage was to try to reach a peace agreement by diplomatic means. In November 1991, however, the European

Community increased the pressure on the Yugoslav government by imposing economic sanctions. These sanctions were originally directed at the entire country and later, from December 1991, at the FRY, the federation of Serbia and Montenegro, only. However, neither this nor the activation of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in February 1992, was able to prevent the war from spreading to Bosnia and Herzegovina in April of that year. But the Security Council now took a step further and, on 30 May 1992, imposed a series of economic sanctions on the FRY in respect of trade, flight connections and scientific, sporting, cultural and technological exchanges. For the first time, compliance was also monitored, at least at sea. NATO ships, supported by AWACS aircraft, arrived in the Adriatic Sea in July and interrogated freighters about their destination and cargo. They also checked whether the freighters actually reached the port they had indicated. The operation was called *Maritime Monitor*, an appropriate name as it entailed no more than the monitoring of ship movements. The Western European Union (WEU) also sent a group of warships to the Adriatic Sea at the same time, with the same mission and under the name of Operation *Sharp Vigilance*.

Nevertheless, it seemed that nothing could bring the Bosnian war to an end: not the sanctions, not UNPROFOR and not even the negotiations about the so-called 'Vance-Owen' peace plan. So the sanctions were stepped up even further. In November 1992, the Security Council extended the list of prohibited deliveries to cover strategic products such as crude oil, fuel refined from it and coal. Equally important was the fact that the Security Council declared that Chapter VIII of the UN Charter applied to the situation in the former Yugoslavia. States and regional security organisations were now in a position, as stated in the relevant resolution, 'to use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary [...] to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation' (from the resolutions of September 1991 and May 1992). With effect from 22 November 1992, boarding teams from NATO and WEU warships boarded the freighters in the Adriatic Sea whenever necessary. In the event of doubt, the ships were even taken to ports in Italy for further inspection. The names of the operations were changed to *Maritime Guard* (NATO) and *Sharp Fence* (WEU).

Attempts to break the embargo led to a further tightening of the sanctions. On 17 April 1993, a total embargo, enforceable on land, at sea and in the air, came into force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The ships of *Maritime Guard* and *Sharp Fence* were to be permitted to pursue suspect vessels into the territorial waters of Montenegro. This meant that the blockade-breakers were no longer able to seek refuge in the ports of Kotor and Bar. The 'leak' in the embargo regime was also plugged. This had been the River Danube, where it formed the border between Serbia and Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The WEU took on the enforcement here with an operation in which members of the Royal Marechaussee and the Dutch state police participated. This mission was known as the Police and Customs Mission on the Danube.

It was the Bosnian Serbs who, not for the last time, once again managed to frustrate the hopes of a political solution. On 5 May 1993, their parliament in Pale was the only one of the parties involved to reject the 'Vance-Owen' peace plan. The war flared up again and the diplomatic community licked its wounds. One of the reactions of the international community was to heighten the effectiveness of the sanctions by merging the operations *Maritime Guard* and *Sharp Fence* under a joint operational command of NATO and the WEU. This operation was given the name *Sharp Guard* and took effect on 15 June 1993.

In the meantime, the international diplomatic community continued to search tirelessly for a territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina (linked to a

federative state structure) which would be acceptable to all parties. The main stumbling block was still the Bosnian Serbs who, at the end of July 1994, were once again the only ones to reject a partition proposal out of hand, this time that of the 'Contact Group', active since 25 April 1994. Because of their attitude, the Bosnian Serbs were now forfeiting the support of Serbia, or at least the support they received publicly. At the beginning of August, Serbia severed relations with Karadzic and his supporters. The sanction regime was now also focusing on the Bosnian Serbs. On 23 September 1994, the Security Council held out the prospect of a partial and temporary relaxation of the economic sanctions against the FRY as soon as there was sufficient evidence that the country had closed the border with Serb Bosnia to all goods and services, with the exception of food, clothing and medical aid. The FRY obliged and the international community posted a 150-strong civilian observer mission along this border in order to supervise compliance. This operation, in which the Netherlands also participated, took effect under the responsibility of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), which had been meeting since August 1992. This conference was in effect the umbrella under which all diplomatic efforts by the UN and the European Community took place in respect of the former Yugoslavia.

For the rest of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the sanction and embargo regime remained unchanged. When the Dayton Agreement was reached on 21 November 1995, the Security Council suspended the arms embargo and the various sanctions. The Council held out the prospect of a full lifting of sanctions after the elections, which were to be held in Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with 'Dayton'. The sanctions were to be lifted in full by 1 October 1996 at the latest. This also meant the end of Operation *Sharp Guard*, the WEU mission on the Danube and the ICFY.

Did the arms embargo and the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have the desired effect? There is no simple answer to this. The first complicating factor is that the international community was itself vague and divided with regard to the intended result. The embargo and sanction regime was intended to stimulate the belligerent parties, in particular Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs, to cooperate in achieving a political rather than a military solution. But what form that political solution was to take, the UN and the European Community were themselves only to discover in the course of the diplomatic negotiation process among themselves and with the parties in the conflict. As long as the arms embargo and the sanctions did not pinch too tightly, the belligerent parties were able to continue fighting and negotiating at the same time, in search of an acceptable outcome. A second complicating factor is that it was a long time before the measures were actually enforced. Only then was any effect felt. The turning point was in the spring and early summer of 1993, when the 'leak' on the Danube was plugged and Operation *Sharp Guard* took effect in the Adriatic Sea. Both operations were in themselves successful and show impressive figures: tens of thousands of ships were interrogated, boarding teams performed inspections on almost six thousand occasions, 1480 ships were seized and maritime patrol planes and AWACS aircraft flew thousands of sorties. From April 1993 onwards, not one ship succeeded in breaking through the blockade. A similarly positive judgement can be passed on the mission on the Danube. The strongest evidence to this effect is that shipping on this river came to a virtual standstill in April 1993.

The economy of Serbia and Montenegro collapsed gradually; at least the official economy, as smuggling and the black market flourished, bringing a gradual criminalisation of the economy. As easy as it was to set up a maritime blockade, so difficult was it to close the land borders of the FRY, particularly those with Albania and Macedonia. The UN Secretary-General suggested to the

Security Council on more than one occasion that border observers be stationed along the entire border. But the Council was never willing to make the decision to augment UNPROFOR with the 10,000 military personnel which would have been needed for this. However, one cannot deny that as time progressed, the sanctions had a devastating effect on the Serb economy. Nevertheless, it was to be another three-and-a-half years before the desired political effect (a peace settlement for Bosnia and Herzegovina), towards which the sanctions and the arms embargo were to supposed to contribute, was reached. The decision of the Serb president, Milosevic, in August 1994 to withdraw support from the Bosnian Serbs can be regarded as the first indication that Serbia was beginning to recognise the need to rid itself of the sanctions. This was seen by the democratic opposition in Serbia as a sign of hope, but at the same time there was more to it.

The sanctions had varying effects in the different parts of Serbia. Generally speaking, the agricultural countryside suffered the least and the effects in the cities, with their more highly developed social structure and the dependence on external sources for food, were much more noticeable. In the towns, those worst hit were the middle classes, professionals and intellectuals. This was the very social stratum upon which the relatively democratic and liberal opposition to Milosevic's government relied. Among the rural population, Milosevic's traditional power base, the support for his leadership, sanctions or no sanctions, remained more or less intact. What is more, the Serb nationalistic political mobilisation, initially so profitable for the president, began to get out of hand in these areas. Nationalists of a more extreme cut than Milosevic, such as Seselj, were no longer satisfied with the position of man of straw and became a political risk for the president. Equally ominous was the increasingly headstrong behaviour of the nationalistic extremist Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs.

The political effect of the economic sanctions was, all in all, paradoxical. On the one hand, they forced Milosevic to make the best of a bad job. Thanks to the ultimately hard line in this respect, the international community had at least one ace up its sleeve in Dayton. Without sanctions, 'we would have begun the negotiations with almost no bargaining chips', as the American negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, later remarked. But on the other hand, the sanctions had seriously weakened the very political forces from which the West could expect most in the future. Economic sanctions are an indirect means to achieving political objectives. However, taking a society hostage, as it were, against its own leaders may produce adverse effects. The international community will nonetheless continue to use this method, as sanctions and embargoes are flexible instruments which can be easily adapted to changing political circumstances. Moreover, even in their mildest form (imposed but not enforced) they also demonstrate the readiness to take action against a state without consent, in other words under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

10

Establishing and maintaining protected areas

Section 1 - Introduction

1001. A decision may be made to establish and maintain a protected area in order to safeguard a (threatened) community against violence. The term 'protected area' refers to a **geographic area** in which a peace force can provide people with protection and humanitarian aid. The area is normally chosen on the basis of existing infrastructure and the community living there. Both the terms 'safe area' and 'safe haven' are also used internationally.

As well as the general concept of 'protected areas' presented here, the humanitarian law of war also contains other stipulations, in which provisions are made for the protection of particular towns and areas as well as their civilian inhabitants and the sick and wounded. These are the so-called 'undefended locations' (an effect of the 'open-town doctrine'), demilitarised zones, hospitalisation and security areas and neutralised zones. These towns and areas are in principle established by agreement. An undefended location may, however, also be declared unilaterally.

1002. A geographic area might be designated as a crossing area to allow refugees or displaced persons to return to their homes. A transition area such as this, also known as a **protected zone**, will contain refugee camps, where humanitarian and medical aid can be provided and refugees and displaced persons helped on their way.

1003. Establishing and maintaining a protected area could be part of a peacekeeping, peace-enforcing or peace-building operation. The distinct **humanitarian nature** is a hallmark of this operational task. A protected area can be determined, established and maintained with or without consent from the parties in the conflict. The location and precise boundaries of the protected area can be established with or without consultation with the parties.

1004. The planning and execution are to some extent similar to those in the operational tasks of '**forcible separation**' and '**interpositioning**'. This is because the peace force, when conducting these three tasks, takes up positions between the parties. The operational task of 'establishing



Medical aid.

Photograph: Media

Centre RNLA

(UNTAC, Cambodia, 1992)

and maintaining a protected area' is, however, distinguishable from the other two tasks with regard to two specific, basic principles for peace operations. Firstly, the protection of one particular community may give the parties the impression of partiality. It is, therefore, extremely important that the peace force continues to demonstrate its impartiality. Secondly, in performing the operational task described here, it is likely that the peace force will have to conduct its task from an isolated position. To make this possible, the force commander must, therefore, have sufficient freedom of movement.

Section 2 - Characteristics

1005. An important aspect in the conduct of this operational task is the **consent** of the parties for the peace operation. If the parties consent to the establishment of a protected area, the role of the peace force will in principle be to guard the area. Account must be taken of the fact that the consent may evaporate, albeit temporarily, and that the force level of the conflict could thus increase. The peace force must, therefore, have sufficient combat power to be able to act against a threat to the people under protection. The means available to the peace force are partly tailored to the military support which can be expected from external sources.

1006. If any of the parties do not consent to the establishment of a protected area, the peace force must have more combat power. This can then be used to protect the population in the protected area from violent actions. In extreme cases, the peace force must, with the support of external military assets, be able to proceed to the active defence of the protected area.

1007. The choice of the **geographic location** of the protected area is primarily determined by the objective of the operational task: the protection of a particular community or group against violence by a third party. This is why the area is usually established in or around the place in which the community to be protected is already (or still) situated. The decision-making surrounding the establishment of protected areas normally takes place in an international context, usually in the context of the United Nations. Both political and military considerations play a part in determining the choice of location, certainly if the idea is to establish the area with the consent of the parties. It is for this reason that the geographical boundaries of the protected area might not be precisely defined when it is established. So the choice of geographical location does not necessarily have to be the most obvious from the military-operational and tactical point of view, although the exact location may form a point of contention between the parties.

The community to be protected can be highly diverse in terms of composition.
Photograph: Hennie Keeris, Media Centre RNLA (UNPROFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1994)



1008. The **community to be protected** can be highly diverse in terms of composition. As well as the original inhabitants, there may also be refugees and displaced persons in the area. The peace force must also take account of the arrival of more refugees and displaced persons during the operation, certainly if it is proceeding successfully. Because of the nature of the operation, various aid agencies are bound to be present in the area too, both governmental and non-governmental.

1009. **Military elements** of the parties in the area must be disarmed. Once they have been disarmed, these troops may stay in the area, but might not be recognisable as military personnel; they can disappear as individuals in the community. The peace force must, however, bear in mind that these military personnel may try to regroup, possibly covertly, from that situation. In that case, the protected area could be used as a base of operations for (para)military activities outside. If the peace force does not take action against this immediately, the credibility of its presence may be seriously affected. The mandate must, however, contain provisions for such action.

1010. In order to perform its task successfully, the peace force must have sufficient **freedom of movement**, both inside the protected area and in respect of land and air transport (the latter in the form of helicopters, for example) to and from the area. One or more parties may have settled around the protected area. It is also possible that the area, with the peace force inside it, is partly or mostly surrounded by minefields. This could restrict the freedom of movement of the peace force, for instance in the event of a relief action. The peace force's supplies and reinforcements could also be hampered or even blocked altogether. In this situation, the peace force may become isolated or even completely cut off. When determining the extent of the peace force's logistic self-sufficiency, this must, therefore, be taken into account.

1011. The decision to protect a particular community may be regarded by one or more of the parties as an indication of partiality, despite the fact that the peace force in principle maintains an impartial attitude. Even if all parties have consented to the establishment of the protected area, it is conceivable that parties will see the decision to protect one as the rejection of another. The peace force must, therefore, endeavour to achieve **transparency** as much as possible in the performance of its task.

Section 3 - Aspects of planning and execution

1012. The nature of the task and the circumstances in which it is conducted mean that the peace force in the protected area is highly dependent on the conditions created by the higher command levels to make impartiality and freedom of movement possible. The planning for the establishment and maintenance of a protected area is done with the knowledge that the 'freedom of movement' may be denied and the 'impartiality' may be brought into question. The planning of the operation must, therefore, focus on the implementation of measures and the selection of a method of operating, whereby as much account as possible is taken of these potential developments.

1013. The actual analysis of the mission is based on a good translation of the resolution and the mandate for the military mission. If the unit is directed by an organically superior **operational command level** (for example, brigade level if there is a battalion in the area), the operational task would be expected to be conducted on the basis of an operation order. The operation order is then a military translation of the mandate in the form of an operational assignment. It may, however, be the case that the commander of the protected area falls directly under the highest military command level of the UN (the Force Commander or the Head of Mission) or another international organisation. It is conceivable in such a situation that no operation order would be issued but that the commander of the protected area would have to interpret the mandate as the higher commander's intent. The commander would then use it as the basis for a military assignment and submit this to the Force Commander or the Head of Mission for approval.

1014. A good analysis of the assignment relies on the constant awareness that the operational task of 'establishing and maintaining protected areas' is indeed conducted in a **political context**. It is not just about an operational task, but also (in accordance with the resolution containing the decision) about a signal from and a stance by the international community. It is partly for this reason that, certainly in the initial phases, the protected area will attract almost constant attention from the media. The military-operational possibilities when maintaining the area are defined by this political context. There is also the possibility that the international community is or will become divided over decisions, military or otherwise, made in respect of maintaining the area. The peace force will then find itself in a dependent and thus vulnerable position in the protected area.

1015. If the operational task is conducted in a relatively peaceful and stable situation, the time margins for **decision-making** will normally be broad. If the conflict escalates or there is another reason for fast decision-making, it is precisely in this operational task that a discrepancy may arise between, on the one hand, the fast decision-making required from the military-operational point of view and the often protracted political decision-making time on the other. Events and developments of the moment may force the peace force commander to act immediately, while the actual permission to act from the higher level is delayed by the political decision-making process. This would involve, for example, the consultation of higher command levels and the process of reaching consensus between political authorities with regard to the possible action. In the analysis of the mission, this potential discrepancy must be recognised as one of the possible dilemmas faced by the commander of the military unit in the protected area. In all cases, this local commander must be able to communicate with his senior command levels; he must, therefore, have access to good and guaranteed communications. The formulation of contingency plans can simplify the decision-making.

1016. The **political end state** which constitutes the objective of both resolution and mandate can be none other than the withdrawal of the status of the protected area. The protection of the community is then no longer necessary. It goes without saying that the commander of the peace force in the protected area only plays a subordinate role in establishing the accomplishment of this end state. A large number of factors which influence the desired end state are, after all, outside his sphere of influence. For the peace force, therefore, the planning of the operation must focus mainly on the role played by the unit in relation to the higher political objective. Apart from the physical steps which must be taken to perform the operational task, this role can be described in generic terms as one of stabilising, maintaining and, if possible, improving relations between the parties within the sphere of influence of the peace force in or near the protected area.

1017. Careful evaluation of the location and characteristics of the area of operations is an important condition for the successful performance of tasks. With the possible dependent and isolated position of the unit in mind, the approach routes to the area must have been reconnoitred and must be familiar. There must also be detailed knowledge of the infrastructure and movement possibilities in the protected area. A careful estimate of **time and space** factors in relation to supplies, reinforcement and relief is also important, based on both relatively favourable and unfavourable weather conditions. Account must also be taken of

dwindling cooperation, albeit temporary, from the parties, which could result in further complications.



Time and space factors in relation to the supply process.

Photograph: Hennie Keeris, Media Centre RNLA (UNPROFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1994)

1018. A crucial element in the planning is an insight into the **number and type of actors** who are in any way involved in the conduct of the operational task. A typical feature is that this specific operational task has to be conducted amid a large and diverse group of actors with different and partly conflicting interests, demands, desires and requirements. Take, for example, the community to be protected, with its administrative officials, people in the area who, on the grounds of their position and influence, could play a meaningful role; then there are the expected refugees and displaced persons, the parties in and around the protected area and their leaders as well as representatives of governmental, non-governmental or aid organisations.

1019. As well as guarding and, if the need arises, defending the area and providing humanitarian aid or assisting in the aid effort, the force is responsible for supervising compliance with the agreements made with and between the parties in the conflict. To do so, the peace force will conduct specific **military tasks**, such as:

- establishing and monitoring weapons exclusion zones
- establishing and inspecting weapon collection points
- occupying the area
- controlling approach routes
- conducting patrols and searches

- setting up checkpoints
- manning observation posts

If possible, these tasks will cover the situation inside the area as well as outside it.

1020. The **composition of the peace force**, the national contingent or the unit must be tailored to the tasks identified initially. Account must also be taken of the possible developments in the conflict. This could mean, for instance, that a need arises for forward air controllers (FAC) for the deployment of air support, special units for monitoring tasks and special reconnaissance, a helicopter detachment for aerial reconnaissance, supply and medical evacuation, as well as specialists in the field of mine and explosive ordnance disposal.

1021. The level of the peace force's available combat power (independent or externally supported) and the extent to which it can actually be deployed determines the credibility of the peace force and thus the **successful conduct** of its mission. When endeavouring to reach a balance between transparency and protection, it is essential that the parties be clearly informed as to what steps the peace force will take if agreements are broken, cease-fires are violated or the freedom of movement of the population or the peace force is restricted or denied. In the implementation itself, therefore, it must be made clear to the representatives of the parties what is and what is not permissible and they must be informed of the consequences. It goes without saying that, if these agreements are nonetheless violated, the necessary action must be taken in accordance with the measures announced, regardless of which party is responsible.

1022. The demonstration of impartiality by the peace force also relies on visible and demonstrable contact with all parties. Subject to the scope provided in the mandate, the presence of the peace force must, if

Visible and demonstrable contact with all parties.
Photograph: Operational Staff of the Commander in Chief RNLA (SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997)



possible, be demonstrated not only inside but also immediately outside the protected area. **Promoting dialogue** between the parties and bringing the parties together endorses the active, impartial role of the peace force.

1023. The **impartiality** of the peace force can be affected in many ways. The physical position of the peace force may lead parties to believe that the peace force is protecting one party and (therefore) not another. One party might thus use the peace force's locations to protect its own operations. If members of the protected party undertake action outside the protected area, the peace force will be blamed for the fact that, although infiltration may be strictly controlled, the control of exfiltration leaves a lot to be desired. The surrounding party may also try to entice such actions. In its operation, the peace force must, therefore, assume that it will virtually always be accused of partiality in the course of this operational task.

1024. **Maintaining contact** and **negotiating** with the parties are responsibilities of the commander of the unit. He decides which negotiations he will conduct himself and which he will delegate to his subordinate commanders or liaison officers. The negotiations must take place against the backdrop of the political activities taking place in connection with the termination of the conflict. The standpoint of the peace force must be in keeping with the search for a permanent political solution to the conflict. The commander is ideally suited, as he can 'translate' this broader perspective into local activities and guidelines. If negotiations are conducted by peace force officials other than the commander himself, they could be played off against each other by the parties. The commander must have reliable interpreters in order to maintain contacts.

1025. The **aid agencies** present in the area will in principle have the same objective as the peace force. However, each organisation has its own intentions and priorities. It is important to harmonise the activities as much as possible in order to ensure that assistance is provided in the most effective way possible. Cooperation with these organisations must, therefore, be based on trust, mutual understanding and clear agreements in respect of the division of tasks and responsibilities.

PROTECTED AREAS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS WITH VARYING SUCCESS

The issue of protected areas is closely related to the issue of international humanitarian interventions. Protected areas are, after all, virtually always a response to humanitarian emergencies, in which large numbers of victims of

war and famine, together with the (non-)governmental aid agencies working in the area, need the protection and care provided by an international military force. Protected areas are an interim measure and can thus only ever be temporary.

There have been various experiments with protected areas since the end of the Cold War. The UN, international aid agencies and governments, mainly western, have shown an increasing willingness to place the interests of the victims of war and famine above state sovereignty. Where necessary, the protected areas had to be enforced even without the consent of the country in question or the local parties. However, the theoretical framework remained vague. That is explained by the fact that a protected area is almost always an ad hoc reaction to a specific crisis situation. The precise form will, therefore, differ greatly from case to case. This is also illustrated by the varied terminology that has been used in addition to 'protected areas' since 1991: safe havens, security zones, (semi-)protected areas and safe areas.

It was Operation *Provide Comfort* (also known under the name of the British-Dutch contribution, Operation *Haven*) which sparked off the discussion about the enforcement of protected areas in 1991. *Provide Comfort* was the first major humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War and its success looked promising for the future. Never before had so many military personnel (23,000 from thirteen countries) and aid agencies offered safety and care to refugees in a protected area on such a large scale. *Provide Comfort* took place in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War (Operation *Desert Storm*) against Iraq. At the end of February 1991, the coalition, led by the United States, managed to drive Saddam Hussein's troops out of Kuwait and inflict heavy losses on his armed forces. But once the American president had stopped the ground offensive after one hundred hours, various Iraqi divisions (including a few from the Republican Guard) were able to escape. Saddam Hussein proceeded to use these units to quell uprisings by the Kurds in northern Iraq and by the Shiite population in the south of the country. In northern Iraq, the Kurd uprising caused a political vacuum, without local administration, medical care or economic activities. In fear of retaliation by Saddam Hussein's troops and the dreaded secret police, more than half a million Kurds fled to the mountains along the borders with Turkey and Iran. The conditions there were inhuman. The temperatures were still extremely low, there was no shelter or water and there was a constant danger of epidemics.

The acute emergency in northern Iraq placed enormous pressure on the members of the anti-Iraqi coalition to 'do something'. The coalition was, after all, partly responsible for this impending humanitarian disaster, as they had urged the Kurds and the Shiites to rebel against the Iraqi regime. It was mainly for this reason that the anti-Iraqi coalition established a temporary safe haven for the hundreds of thousands of Kurd refugees in northern Iraq in April 1991. The refugee organisation, the UNHCR, took on the responsibility for the humanitarian aid in this area, situated to the north of the 36th parallel and approximately five thousand square kilometres in size. The Netherlands was one of the thirteen coalition partners which took an active part in *Provide Comfort*. The Netherlands supplied an engineer support unit to set up and maintain a number of refugee camps around the town of Zakho, a Marine Corps combat group for security, a light field hospital, several Alouette helicopters, an F-27 and a Royal Marechaussee detachment. Most of the Kurd refugees returned to their homes during the summer, which meant that *Provide Comfort* could be terminated at the end of September 1991.

The coalition units were relieved by the much smaller UN force, UNGCI (UN Guards Contingent in Iraq). UNGCI consisted of five hundred UN guards, who normally guarded UN buildings all over the world. They were now responsible

for the protection of the remaining humanitarian aid workers, the aid convoys and the UN infrastructure in Iraq. UNGCI itself had no peace-enforcing (or even peacekeeping) tasks. If Iraq obstructed the humanitarian aid to the Kurds, then the real peace-enforcement would come from outside, namely from the Allied air fleet stationed mainly in Turkey (Operation *Poised Hammer*). For this reason, the coalition had declared the whole of northern Iraq a no-fly zone. This zone, incidentally, is still in force today. Saddam Hussein's regime hits out every now and then by, for example, activating air defence radar. Over the past few years, this has thus led to reprisals from the air on more than one occasion.

The United States, the United Kingdom and France - the main western powers in the anti-Iraq coalition - justified the setting up of a safe haven in northern Iraq mainly as a purely humanitarian measure. In a strictly legal sense, *Provide Comfort* was in any event not uncontroversial. The coalition based itself on the Security Council's resolution 688. This demanded that Iraq cease its repression of the Kurd and Shiite minorities immediately and requested 'immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq'. Resolution 688 defined the large flow of Kurd refugees towards the borders with Turkey and Iran as a threat to international peace and security and called upon all member states and humanitarian organisations to support an emergency relief operation. The resolution did not, however, make explicit mention of the establishment and enforcement of a safe haven in northern Iraq on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The United States, the United Kingdom and France reasoned nonetheless that resolution 688 provided sufficient legal justification for the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq. The enforcement of a safe haven was also the only practical way to enable the provision of rapid emergency aid for the hundreds of thousands of Kurd refugees.

Provide Comfort achieved its immediate humanitarian objective - to save many thousands of Kurd lives - and a trend thus appeared to have been set. Between 1992 and 1995, the international community proceeded to conduct four major international humanitarian interventions: in Somalia (1992-1995), the former Yugoslavia (1992-1995), Haiti (1993-present) and Rwanda (1994). In two cases, protected areas were established to protect threatened groups of civilians from more suffering: in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.

A wave of ethnic violence washed over Rwanda in April 1994. Radical Hutus killed hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The UN, scared off by the debacle in which their previous intervention in Somalia had resulted, lacked the resolve needed for military intervention. The peacekeeping UNAMIR mission (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda) which was already present had too little manpower to actually do anything. In the end it was France which, in June 1994, took action in the form of a humanitarian intervention: Operation *Turquoise*. This took place with the approval of the Security Council and on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter. The French legionnaires and paras set up a 'safe zone' in southwestern Rwanda for the Tutsi population. The area bordered on Burundi in the south and could be supplied relatively easily from nearby Zaïre. The French military protected the safe area for two months, after which they were relieved by UN units (Operation *Gabriel*).

Two experiments took place in the former Yugoslavia, in the so-called (semi-) protected areas and safe areas. These were not, however, to prove successful. On the contrary, the fate of the protected and safe areas in the Balkans once again dashed the hope that the combination of humanitarian interventions and safe areas represented an effective enforcement instrument for the international community.

Protected areas and safe areas in the former Yugoslavia 1992-1995.



At the beginning of 1992, the UNPROFOR peace force was tasked with the protection of four United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs). These were situated in Croatian territory and were intended to protect the insurgent Krajina Serbs there. But even before the first UNPROFOR contingents had arrived, the Serbs occupied several more zones just outside the UNPAs. These quickly became known as semi-protected areas or pink zones. UNPROFOR was, as stated in the mandate, 'required to ensure that the protected areas (and 'pink zones') remained demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack'. This protection task extended mainly to the monitors of the ever-vulnerable cease-fire between Croats and Krajina Serbs and of the withdrawal of the Croatian army and militias from the zones. The peace force also had to keep an eye on the rights of the minorities, the restoration of local authority and, more generally, the upholding of public order. As long as the local parties kept each other in some kind of equilibrium in military terms, the situation remained relatively calm in the UNPAs. In 1995, however, the Croats felt strong enough to attack the Krajina Serbs. In May 1995, the Croatian army drove the Krajina Serbs from one UNPA and later from two more UNPAs in August (Operation *Storm*). East Slavonia, the only remaining UNPA, fell into Croatian hands without violence after consultation with Serbia.

The second UNPROFOR experiment with protected areas took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina and involved the so-called safe areas. These areas were also a direct reaction to an acute humanitarian emergency and were intended to prevent further casualties, ethnic cleansing and refugee movements. The Bosnian Serb attack on the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica in March 1993 led to the establishment of - ultimately - six safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla and Zepa. The Security Council did not, incidentally, think much of this new extension of the already complex and virtually unworkable UNPROFOR mandate. What is more, many UN military personnel certainly did not think much of the idea of maintaining totally isolated Muslim areas against a Bosnian Serb force of superior strength. The idea behind these safe areas was in fact to conduct a preventive deployment to stop any further ethnic cleansing by the Bosnian Serbs. However, the Security Council did not provide the personnel or equipment needed for a credible defence of the safe areas. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali asked for 36,000 'blue helmets' for this task, but the Security Council would not provide more than seven thousand. In the end, only some three thousand UN military personnel were to be actively deployed in the six safe areas. Partly because of this, the UN, despite the fact that the Security Council resolutions ordered the demilitarisation of the six areas, in practice allowed armed Muslim forces to operate in the safe areas, to the fury of the Bosnian Serbs.

It was seldom peaceful in and around the safe areas. Sarajevo was, as before, under constant Bosnian Serb fire and General Ratko Mladic's troops conducted heavy attacks, in particular on Gorazde (April 1994) and Bihac (December 1994). The Muslims in turn used the safe areas to carry out raids on their besiegers. UNPROFOR was barely able to implement its protective mandate and, from the beginning of 1995, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was seriously considering withdrawing the 'blue helmets' from the six safe areas. Just before he could do so, the Bosnian Serbs launched a final offensive against the three East Bosnian enclaves. In July they overran Srebrenica and Zepa; Gorazde too almost fell into Bosnian Serb hands. This signified an enormous blow for the UN, both politically and in terms of morale, which was exacerbated even further when it transpired that Mladic's troops had killed thousands of Muslim men from Srebrenica. The western powers felt compelled to respond to this Bosnian Serb humiliation of UNPROFOR. This response took the form of the deployment of a French-British-Dutch rapid reaction force and the NATO bombing offensive, *Deliberate Force*. The Bosnian Serbs eventually had to back down. The end of 1995 brought the Dayton Agreements, which formed the basis for the 'green' peace force, IFOR (and its successor, SFOR), and formed the new state structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Srebrenica, incidentally, fell to the Bosnian Serbs as a result.

The fall of Srebrenica and Zepa thus contributed significantly to the decisive 'green' intervention by the international community and the subsequent Dayton Agreements. This does not, of course, alter the fact that the experiment with the safe areas was in itself a fiasco. Where a safe haven in northern Iraq was feasible in military terms and thus viable, the safe area policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina failed. The reasons for this difference between success and failure centre around three aspects: the cooperation by the local parties in direct relation to the available means, the geographical location of the area and the structure and work methods of the protecting force.

Both the safe haven in northern Iraq and the safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina had the voluntary or enforced consent of all the parties involved. The major difference between the two types of protected area lay in the way the parties cooperated in practice. Saddam Hussein's regime had no option but to agree to the conditions imposed by the coalition, as Iraq, following Operation *Desert Storm* no longer had the military means to challenge the

coalition any further. The execution of *Provide Comfort* thus had nothing whatsoever to do with the government in Baghdad. The coalition defined the location and the boundaries of the safe haven and determined how long the aid operation was to last.

When it came to the cooperation and trust of the local parties, the situation in and around the safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina was somewhat less predictable. Karadzic and his cohorts did not want a multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina but a 'pure' Bosnian Serb Republic. Muslim enclaves naturally had no place in this Bosnian Serb line of reasoning. But the Bosnian Serbs, unlike the Iraqi regime, did have the military means to impose their will on the Muslim enclaves and the 'blue helmets' stationed there. Given the isolated location of the six safe areas, this was no difficult task.

Furthermore, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the protectors barely even managed to win the trust of those they were supposed to protect. The coalition force in northern Iraq commanded the respect of the local population and combatants. The Muslims in the safe areas, on the other hand, did not think much of the idea of putting their fate in the hands of the depleted UNPROFOR contingents and refused to allow themselves to be disarmed. In some cases, the Muslims even denied the 'blue helmets' access to certain 'sensitive' areas within the safe area! And the Muslim fighters in turn tried to manipulate UNPROFOR by conducting armed actions from the safe area to provoke a reaction from the Bosnian Serb besiegers against the 'blue helmets', in the hope that this would eventually lead to a large-scale international military intervention. A complicating factor in all this was that the agreements about the safe areas were not detailed enough. In contrast to the safe haven in northern Iraq, there was thus a great deal of uncertainty as to where the enclave boundaries actually lay.

The geographical location also constituted an important, probably even decisive factor for the success or failure of the protected areas. The anti-Iraqi coalition benefited to a great extent from the fact that the safe haven bordered on Turkey to the north, a NATO ally with a good infrastructure. The Allied air force was able to operate from bases in eastern Turkey. The French had also had a considerable advantage during Operation *Turquoise* as a result of the location of their safe zone in southwestern Rwanda, on the border with Burundi and nearby Zaïre. The situation surrounding the safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina was much less advantageous. The Muslims and the 'blue helmets' were surrounded and extremely vulnerable to reprisals by the Bosnian Serbs. Then there was the lack of manpower: over three thousand 'blue helmets' for the six safe areas instead of the 36,000 which had initially been requested by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali! For these reasons alone it was virtually impossible to separate the local parties effectively (and if necessary by force). Even a 'simple' interpositioning was often too much to ask.

In the end, the structure and (political) will of the intervening force determined whether the protected area would be an efficient and credible construction. The coalition forces which conducted Operation *Provide Comfort* in northern Iraq had a clear command structure. The operation was under American leadership and was based on clear and familiar NATO procedures. The coalition also stressed that any Iraqi infringement of the safe haven would be punished immediately. In this respect, the initial situation for the UNPROFOR-controlled safe areas was not really that bad, at least on paper. UNPROFOR was authorised to use force if the mandate was jeopardised. Just as the coalition forces in northern Iraq, UNPROFOR could, if necessary, fall back on air support.

But here, too, the difference lay in the practical application of the mandates. UNPROFOR did not have the resolve to enforce the security of the safe areas

with force and thus endanger the entire operation. In particular the UN member states which provided troops for the safe areas were considerably more cautious in the use of force against the Bosnian Serbs, a fact which only served to increase the divisions within UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR did not manage to find a workable compromise between, on the one hand, a passive, 'non-provocative' attitude on the part of the 'blue helmets' on the ground and an 'active' threat of reprisals from the air on the other. Because of all the compromises, the decision-making procedure for air support was complex and time-consuming. Both the UN and NATO had to give their approval and the imploring that surrounded this 'double key' was for many an illustration of the failure of UNPROFOR as a credible peace force. The incidental air support barely had any effect and failed to solve the main implementation problems. There was a constant danger that the Bosnian Serbs would seal off the safe areas completely in retaliation or take hostages among the vulnerable 'blue helmets'. Ironically enough, the presence of the UN personnel in the safe areas played straight into the (military) hands of the Bosnian Serbs. As long as the UNPROFOR member states with troops in the safe areas were calling for restraint, Mladic and Karadzic had no need to worry that the hawks among the UN member states - with the United States at the forefront - would win the day.

Only when the Bosnian Serbs clearly overplayed their hand in the summer of 1995 - by blocking virtually all UN operations, by attacking the East Bosnian safe areas of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde and by the horrific killing of thousands of Muslim men - did the goaded international community intervene. This was an insult which could not go unpunished. It must be said, however, that it was precisely the departure of the 'blue helmets' from the three Muslim enclaves which considerably simplified the international choice for a punitive expedition against the Bosnian Serbs, by way of the deployment of the rapid reaction force and the *Deliberate Force* bombing offensive. After all, Mladic's troops could no longer take any UN units hostage in the three former safe areas. The doubts as to whether the threat of air power is in itself enough to, in combination with a small and in practice purely peacekeeping presence on the ground, guarantee that protected areas can be maintained thus continue to exist.

A few remarks by way of conclusion. Protected areas are primarily intended to safeguard groups of people in emergency situations from further suffering. Protected areas can, therefore, be no more than a temporary solution. They have saved many lives, but in none of the three cases described above has the international intervention succeeded in removing the (ethnic) roots of the conflict which made the protected areas necessary in the first place. The safe haven in northern Iraq (enforced by the Allied air force) still exists and will continue to exist as long as Saddam Hussein wishes to 'solve' the Kurd problem in his own violent manner. The tensions between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda also persist. The Muslims from Srebrenica and Zepa are still living as exiles in the Muslim-Croat 'entity' of the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only an extremely radical, all-embracing political and geographical arrangement for these areas could really take the sting out of the conflict and thus preclude the need for new protected areas in the future.

11

Interpositioning

Section 1 - Introduction

1101. Interpositioning is the deployment of a peace force in a **demilitarised zone** with the consent of the parties. This zone can be enforced during a conflict or, once the conflict has ended, established by mutual agreement. In the first case, the interpositioning is preceded by the operational task of 'forcible separation of the parties' and only later can there thus be any question of consent. The peace force will, therefore, be of a different size and composition, at least initially. Interpositioning is an operational task which stems from first-generation peacekeeping operations.

The peacekeeping operations conducted by the UN before the end of the Cold War are referred to as first-generation peacekeeping operations. A typical feature of these operations was that they were only conducted with the full consent of the parties involved in the conflict. The peace force did not, therefore, have the military means to take enforcing action. Consent was thus a precondition for the success of the operation. This meant that a peace force could only be deployed in the event of deadlock or if the conflict had begun to stabilise and the political will to seek an alternative to the use of force was gaining the upper hand. Chapter 3 looks at first- and second-generation peacekeeping operations in more detail.

1102. The parties consent to the deployment of a force, which, following an armed intervention or an agreed **cease-fire** or **truce**, is thus placed between the belligerent parties. The interpositioning is thus combined with the withdrawal of troops behind a certain line or from a particular area. Interpositioning is sometimes preceded by the concentration of troops by the parties in areas which have been agreed for that purpose.

Section 2 - Characteristics

1103. Interpositioning is only feasible if the parties involved in the conflict **consent** to it. This consent may not be forthcoming at first. This is the case if an international organisation decides to intervene in a (potential) conflict and proceeds to forcibly separate the parties. An operation of this sort will, if successful, usually be followed by an

interpositioning operation, thus with the consent (in any event *de facto* at first) of the parties.

1104. A force which is deployed between the parties must above all use its authority to prevent violence and to encourage consultation between the parties. The most important function of a force such as this is thus to **anticipate armed force**. There are conceivable circumstances in which a force must be prepared for situations which require more combat power than is required purely for self-defence. When the mandate is drawn up, this requirement must be taken into account in the organisation, the weaponry and the equipment of the peace force. The peace force can also, if the need arises, be given external support in the form of readily available reinforcements and fire support.

1105. An interpositioning operation may be conducted in order to control a **local crisis** in the short term. Speed is thus an important factor if the situation is to be kept under control. If a local crisis arises, elements of the force which is to be tasked with the interpositioning can be placed between the parties at an early stage. The leaders of the peace force can also be authorised to negotiate with the leaders of the parties at local level.

Conducting patrols.
Photograph: Military
History Section RNLA
(UNIFIL, Lebanon, 1979)



1106. An interpositioning operation can be **phased**. If the situation so demands, only rapidly deployable units can be deployed in the first instance. These units, which will be small and will only have a limited amount of combat power, must form a 'screen' between the belligerent parties. Such units could, for example, be small, independently operating elements which conduct patrols or observation or inspection tasks. Examples are a mechanised infantry group or reconnaissance team, a tank or armoured vehicle, or even a ship, helicopter or reconnaissance plane. The interpositioning operation is then conducted as quickly as possible in order to prevent further skirmishes or the violation of a fragile truce, whereby the initial risks for the unit (limited combat power and operating in isolation) have to be accepted.

1107. Interpositioning may also be preceded by a **peace-enforcing operation**: the forcible separation of the parties. In that case, account must be taken of the intensive use of force to achieve the objectives of the military operation. If an interpositioning operation follows an operation in which the parties have been forcibly separated, the peace force tasked with the interpositioning must focus its main effort on obtaining consent to its presence and objectives among the people in the area of operations as well as their leaders.

1108. **Impartiality** plays a particularly important role in peace operations such as interpositioning as without it there can be no prospect of preserving consent or of cooperation with the parties. It is not enough for peacekeepers to act impartially; their actions must also be interpreted as impartial by the parties. During an interpositioning operation, this impartiality will be constantly challenged and threatened. The more complex the situation, the more difficult it is for the peacekeeper to remain impartial and to preserve the consent of the parties.

1109. **Credibility** is also essential for the success of an interpositioning operation. This means that the force must be considered capable of continuing to conduct its task even in the event of an escalation of the conflict, if necessary until the arrival of external reinforcements and support. This does not mean that combat operations are conducted against one or more of the parties, but that the peace force, by its presence, continues to create a certain degree of security for the civilian population. The presence of the peace force can have a stabilising effect on the warring parties, whereby an upsurge in hostilities can usually be prevented or kept to a minimum.

THE PEACE FORCE AS A HOSTAGE: UNIFIL


In the early 1970s, Lebanon was still a popular holiday destination. This came to an end in 1975, when countless internal tensions came to a head and civil war broke out. In changing coalitions, Christians, Druses and various (Sunnite and Shiite) Muslim factions struggled for power. It didn't end there, however. Just as in Cyprus, a combination of internal differences and external interference made for a complicated situation. The presence in Lebanon of large numbers of Palestinians, who had been driven out of Jordan not long before that, also played a key role. Given that the Lebanese government could no longer exercise any effective authority in large parts of the country, radical Palestinian factions were able to use southern Lebanon as a base of operations for their terrorist attacks on Israel.

The presence of the Palestinian bases in Lebanon was a thorn in Israel's eye. From these bases, the Palestinian fighters could, after all, conduct their operations against Israeli military and civilian targets virtually unhindered. In March 1978, after a new wave of terrorist acts, including one in which the victims were a number of Israeli school children, the Israeli government decided to hit back hard. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) invaded southern Lebanon with vast superiority in order to take out the PLO bases. Within a few days, the Israelis managed to achieve their operational objectives and had occupied virtually the whole of southern Lebanon as far as the Litani river. Only the area around the port of Tyrus (the Tyre pocket) remained in Palestinian hands.

The Israeli invasion led to a formal protest from the Lebanese government to the Security Council. On 19 March, the Security Council ordered Israel (in resolutions 425 and 426) to cease all military operations and to withdraw the invasion force. A UN peace force was to be set up to supervise the withdrawal of the Israeli troops, restore order in the area and help to restore the authority of the Lebanese government in the south. Israel accepted the Security Council resolutions and promised to cooperate. As early as 23 March, the first troops for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) arrived in the area of operations.

It soon transpired, however, that Israel had a hidden agenda. To the consternation of UNIFIL, the IDF handed over a strip some ten kilometres wide along the border with Israel not to the UN peace force but to a pro-Israeli Lebanese militia. These troops were under the command of Major Saad Haddad and were indeed regarded by the UN as the De Facto Forces (DFF). The DFF-controlled zone (the 'enclave') also contained Naqoura, where UNIFIL's headquarters was based. In the eastern part of the UNIFIL mandate area, the DFF even controlled the whole area between the border with Israel and the Litani; the PLO and the DFF were separated only by the river. UNIFIL was still active in the north of this area, but the Norwegian and Nepalese battalions deployed there were severely isolated. UNIFIL did, however, eventually succeed in setting up a few observation posts in the DFF-controlled area too. With the handover of the border region to the DFF, UNIFIL was presented with a *fait accompli* and was in fact from the outset unable to implement its mandate fully and to the letter. The tasks of the peace force were still further complicated by the hilly terrain, in which the many deep, dry riverbeds (wadis) offered plenty of opportunities for infiltration. On top of that, the local population (mainly Shiite Muslims) in the UNIFIL-controlled area by no means remained uninvolved. Among the locals, various militant factions were active, such as the Syrian-backed Amal movement and later the pro-Iranian Hezbollah. Although these Muslim groups often fought amongst themselves and with the Palestinian factions, the common hatred of Israel and the Israeli-backed DFF often united them.

Map of southern Lebanon and the deployment of UNIFIL (January 1980)



YP408 armoured vehicles, TOW anti-armour weapons and 120 mm mortars, Dutchbatt was UNIFIL's most heavily armed battalion. In practice, Dutchbatt's fire power turned out to be a useful weapon for impressing the parties and making it clear that UNIFIL meant business. So Dutchbatt organised regular fire power demonstrations, which were usually incorporated in the normal exercise programmes, for delegations from the local parties. Because of its heavy weaponry, Dutchbatt also provided the core for the Force Mobile Reserve (FMR), which was available to the Force Commander as a rapidly deployable unit. Like the other UNIFIL battalions, Dutchbatt too wrestled with the question of how to keep the difficult terrain under observation. Dutchbatt took over a large number of posts situated on high ground from the French, but they did not provide sufficient visibility of all approach routes. It was possible to keep the few roads in the area under reasonable control with a number of checkpoints, but an extended network of observation posts was needed to prevent the infiltrations on foot through the wadis. For this

purpose, the Dutch battalion also set up (mobile) posts in the low-lying areas of the terrain.

The UNIFIL battalions not only had to acquaint themselves with the terrain, but also with the local population and parties. The former did not usually prove too difficult, but the latter did. Despite repeated promises, the parties often refused to cooperate at crucial moments. Their own interests and the desire to inflict damage on their opponent often proved to outweigh the will to cooperate in the quest for a lasting peace. What is more, UNIFIL had to avoid giving any impression of taking sides. It was for this reason that Palestinian infiltrators, who were intercepted by UNIFIL and then sent back to their own zone, were given back their weapons within a few days. The parties also did all they could to compromise UNIFIL. A proven method was to install their own roadblock right next to a UNIFIL checkpoint under the pretext of assisting the UN peace force in the execution of its task.

UNIFIL had to operate with extreme caution in order nonetheless to, within the confines of the mandate, force a decision with the necessary resolve in a crisis situation. That applied to, for example, the 'battle of At Tiri', a village in the Irish sector. Although At Tiri itself was of little strategic importance, the DFF saw it as a springboard for gaining control of hill 880, which was occupied by the Irish UN soldiers and which commanded the terrain for miles around (including the town of Haris in which Dutchbat's command post was based). The 'battle' began on 6 April 1980, when a DFF column broke through a UN checkpoint and occupied the village. The Irish UNIFIL soldiers then reinforced the checkpoint, closed the road in the direction of hill 880 and tried to persuade the DFF to leave the village. The DFF commander in question was obviously playing for high stakes and gave the order to open fire on the UN soldiers, killing an Irish soldier. UNIFIL soldiers occupying posts in the DFF enclave were also held hostage for a while.

In the days that followed, the tension increased, partly because Israeli armoured vehicles were taking up positions in the immediate vicinity. Initially, the Irish did not return the fire of the DFF fighters in the hope that this would prevent any escalation of the conflict. But that soon proved untenable. Only by answering force with force did they succeed in preventing the DFF from capturing an Irishbat post in the village. A second UNIFIL soldier was killed in these firefights. The conflict took a peculiar turn when the DFF told children to stone the UN troops while also serving as a shield behind which the DFF could deliver fire on the UNIFIL positions. Under these circumstances, the UN soldiers on the ground, by now reinforced by the FMR under Dutch command, had to keep their cool. UNIFIL eventually decided to take offensive action. Using the protection and fire power provided by the available armoured vehicles (including the Dutch YPs), the FMR finally rolled up the DFF positions. According to the Force Commander, the Ghanaian General Erskine, this was the first time that UNIFIL had bared its teeth. The DFF had to leave At Tiri and the surrounding area; the 'battle of At Tiri' had been won by UNIFIL.

Almost immediately, however, the DFF took their revenge for this defeat. The UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura, which lay in the DFF-controlled enclave, came under heavy DFF fire. Although only one UNIFIL soldier was wounded, the material damage was immense. The damage to several helicopters posed a particular danger to UNIFIL, as they were supposed to be used to evacuate casualties from the area of operations. Barely a week after the shelling of Naqoura, there was a second act of retaliation, this time directed at the Irish UNIFIL battalion. This was because Irish soldiers had killed a DFF fighter during the battle of At Tiri. The DFF captured three Irish UN soldiers, two of whom were shot in cold blood and the other seriously wounded. Although there was no doubt as to who was responsible, UNIFIL was unable to take any action against this violence.

There had also been a similar incident in 1979 involving Dutch military personnel. On that occasion, three Dutchbatt soldiers and an UNTSO observer were captured because UNIFIL and the Dutch government (!) refused to pay 'compensation' after the death of a member of the DFF. The fact that this victim had been killed during an attack on the UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura did not seem to matter. Holding the hostages, the DFF brought the UN peace force, and in this case even the Force Commander in person, to its knees. The 'compensation' was paid and the UN soldiers returned safely. Although UNIFIL managed to achieve resounding success from time to time, as in At Tiri, the peace force as a whole was in fact the hostage of all the parties involved.

Because UNIFIL did not succeed in preventing PLO infiltrations to the south, Israel decided to invade Lebanon once again in 1982. This operation was given the somewhat euphemistic name of *Peace for Galilee*. The IDF troops had been told to ignore the presence of the UN soldiers, who did not have the equipment or the manpower to stop the Israeli invasion force. The lightly armed UNIFIL peace force could do nothing against the heavily armoured IDF units, even though the peace force was officially authorised to use force if the implementation of the mandate was put at risk. The soldiers of the peace force could do little more than stand by and watch the Israeli columns advance to the north. With a total of some 50,000 men and 1,800 tanks, the IDF advanced through UNIFIL's area of operations.

Under these circumstances, UNIFIL as a whole was no longer able to implement the mandate. In numerous locations, UN troops who tried to position themselves between the belligerent parties came under fire. Something the UN soldiers could do, however, was to try to protect the local population as best they could against the violence. By doing so, UNIFIL in effect ceased to be an interpositioning operation and took on the character of a humanitarian operation. The blue helmets embarked upon this new task with vigour and with a certain amount of success. In any event, the humanitarian aid also concerned the countless refugees, who had had to flee their homes because of the Israeli invasion.

Unlike what happened in 1978, in 1982 the Israeli army did not stop at the Litani river. The Israelis advanced to Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, and thus realised their operational objectives in a short space of time. Internationally, however, they suffered a considerable loss of face. In Beirut, an American-led Multinational Force (MNF) quickly took over the Israeli positions, but the IDF was to occupy southern Lebanon for another three years. UNIFIL also stayed in place, but was in effect completely powerless. Various countries felt that the peace force's mandate was now meaningless and wanted to withdraw their contingents from UNIFIL. As early as October 1982, the Nepalese battalion left Lebanon. Noises were also being made in the Netherlands about bringing Dutchbatt home. Given that such a decision was politically sensitive and the Netherlands did not wish to distance itself too much from the UN policy, which was sticking doggedly to UNIFIL, in 1983 the Netherlands first reduced its UNIFIL contribution to a company, Dutchcoy. This was, however, the first step in the direction of a full withdrawal from the UN peace force, which became a reality in 1985.

In the same year, the Israeli army pulled out of the occupied area in southern Lebanon. The IDF and the DFF did keep a security zone along the border to protect the north of Israel against terrorist attacks. For UNIFIL, this in fact meant a return to the situation as it was before 1982, the difference being that the situation in the area of operations had just become even less transparent. Nor has the recent exit of the PLO as a player in the conflict led to any reduction in the tension, given that the Hezbollah has turned out to be at least as fanatic a party in the conflict. Separation of the parties is, in the present

circumstances, virtually impossible, since the power base of the Hezbollah and the Amal movement is well established in the countless villages and spread throughout UNIFIL's area of operations. In the second half of 1998, UNIFIL counted nearly four hundred incidents directed against the IDF and the DFF in the area of operations. Israel, for its part, put up a good fight by, amongst other things, conducting air strikes above southern Lebanon. A political, long-term solution to the conflict in Lebanon is, however, still a long way off.

Although the UNIFIL operation was originally intended as an interpositioning operation, this did not in fact turn out to be the case. UNIFIL still wrestles every day with the reality of the various factions which appear to take scarcely any notice of the presence of the UN peace force. In the case of UNIFIL, therefore, it is not even a question of just a military success.

Section 3 - Aspects of planning and execution

III0. The force must be deployed in such a way that it can monitor all aspects of the truce or peace agreement and can if necessary enforce compliance. During the conduct of the interpositioning operation, it is extremely important to be able to respond quickly to a local crisis and contain it in good time. Speed of action is also essential in order to avoid any escalation of such a crisis. For this reason, the peace force must have **physical and mental freedom of movement**. The peace force must, therefore, endeavour to ensure this freedom of movement from the beginning of the operation.

III1. One of the measures used to ensure sufficient freedom of movement is the **protection of movements** of units or elements of the peace force and any other international (aid) organisations active in the area of operations. It is also important to take measures for the protection of vehicles, supplies and personal equipment. Important parts of the traffic infrastructure (bridges, viaducts, intersections) in the area of operations must also be protected. The freedom of movement can be further enhanced by assigning sufficient road repair, mine clearance and logistic capacity to the peace force.

III2. Much use will be made of **local infrastructure** in an interpositioning operation. The hiring of local infrastructure must be assessed in relation to the task to be performed and is weighed up against the pros and cons of using military accommodation. The use of 'hard' civil infrastructure normally offers more protection, more comfort and better facilities for conducting logistic activities. On the other hand, the use of civil infrastructure may be at the expense of the flexibility of the unit. It may also have an adverse effect on the credibility of the unit, certainly if the living conditions of the local population are poor.

III3. If a peace force has to conduct an interpositioning operation after another force (which might, for instance, have forcibly separated the parties) has been operating in the same area of operations, the following aspects are particularly important in the **transfer of area responsibility**:

- the official moment of transfer
- the Transfer of Authority of units which are moving from one peace force to another
- the exchange or transfer of intelligence and military information
- information about current aid operations, such as the repair of bridges and roads
- the transfer of established communications and liaison networks
- the coordination with the international and non-governmental organisations present in the area
- the transfer and allocation of supplies still in the area

III4. The peace force is positioned between the parties in a particular area in what is known as a **buffer zone** (also referred to as a zone of separation). This demilitarised area can be established by mutual agreement, for instance by a peace treaty, a cease-fire or a truce. It can also be enforced, once the operational task of 'forcible separation of the parties' has been conducted. A buffer zone will often be situated along the former **confrontation line** which formed the front between the warring parties during the conflict. Territorial boundaries and ethnic divisions can also play a key part in establishing a buffer zone.

*The buffer zone
is bordered by
separation lines.*

Photograph:

Media Centre RNLA

(UNFICYP, Cyprus, 1998)



1115. The buffer zone is bordered by **separation lines** (also known as buffer lines). The parties must leave the area and withdraw behind the separation lines. The area thus created is neutral; the airspace above the area also makes up part of the buffer zone. The breadth of the area is mainly determined by the fields of observation and fire of the weapons held by the parties. A buffer zone should ideally be broader than these fields of observation and fire as this will prevent a situation in which firefights break out nonetheless. There may, incidentally, be people living or working in a buffer zone. It may also contain, for example, agricultural land and public facilities. The peace force will normally monitor access to and passage through the buffer zone in accordance with the instructions of the supervising authority designated in the treaty.

1116. **Control zones.** These are the areas on either side of the buffer zone. In the control zones, restrictions may be imposed on the parties in respect of the number of troops and the type of equipment they have. Weapons systems with a range long enough to deliver fire in the buffer zone, the opposite control zone or even further are kept out of the control zone. The total width of the buffer zone and the control zones must, therefore, be fixed according to the maximum range of the weapons systems in the organisation of the parties' military units. When a control zone is established, account must also be taken of the possibilities offered by the terrain for clear demarcation of the area.

1117. These coordination measures are combined in Figure 11-1 in a diagram of an interpositioning operation. This is, of course, merely a **possible variant** of such an operation. The actual execution must naturally be based on the result of the planning process by the commander and staff of the peace force and must in particular be related to the deployment of the military units of the belligerent parties.

1118. To be able to conduct an interpositioning operation actively and successfully, the following **conditions** at least must be met:

- the use of a map recognised and authenticated by all parties
- the formulation of an accurate and detailed definition of the cease-fire line with coordinates agreed between the parties (preferably a line which is also easily identifiable in the terrain)
- the physical and permanent marking of the confrontation line, the separation lines and the agreed corridors and routes through the buffer zone

- the signing of the agreements between the parties in respect of the demarcation of the terrain (preferably as an annex to a peace treaty or cease-fire agreement)
- keeping said coordination lines and areas under observation (as much as possible)
- maintaining contact with local party commanders (preferably at meetings at which all parties are represented)




Figure 11-1: Diagram of an interpositioning operation

1119. An interpositioning operation will in principle be conducted by setting up a **surveillance system** in the buffer zone. This area surveillance is mainly conducted by means of observation posts and patrols; personnel of the peace force's units operate in principle from permanent base camps. The core of a peace force responsible for conducting interpositioning is ideally made up of (mechanised) infantry or reconnaissance units. Troops from other arms may also be deployed for this role.

1120. The peace force tasked with an interpositioning operation may also be given **other tasks** which were not (originally) incorporated in the mandate. This may mean that the peace force has to be (temporarily) reinforced with specialist personnel in order to perform these tasks. Possible other tasks may include:

- assisting the local authorities to maintain public order (including crowd and riot control)

- assisting the local authorities to combat criminal activities in the buffer zone
- supervising the withdrawal and demobilisation of (para)military factions
- guarding surrendered or stored weapons

CYPRUS: THE BACKYARD OF GREECE AND TURKEY

Since the end of the nineteenth century, Great Britain wielded the sceptre over the island of Cyprus where, for centuries, Greeks (some 80 percent of the population) and Turks (about 20 percent) lived alongside one another. In the 1950s, the calls for the end of the British rule in Cyprus grew louder. During this period of resistance, sometimes armed, against the British colonial rule, it also became clear that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot population groups had different goals. The Greek-Cypriot majority wanted to unite with Greece (this aim is known as *enosis*), while the Turkish minority wanted to divide the island into two independent states (*taksim*). Both parties were supported in their aims by their respective 'mother countries'. Intensive negotiations, led by Great Britain, between Greece and Turkey led to a compromise in 1959. In 1960, Cyprus became an independent state, in which special constitutional provisions protected the interests of the Turkish minority against the Greek majority. Great Britain, Greece and Turkey also reserved the right to intervene, jointly or individually, if the stability of the new state was threatened. This, however, together with the right of Greece and Turkey to station a small military contingent on the island, served to curtail the sovereignty of Cyprus. Finally, Great Britain secured its strategic interests by establishing two military bases on the south coast (the Sovereign Base Areas Akrotiri and Dhekelia), which thus in effect became British territory.


At the end of 1963, proposals for reform by the Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios, led to an outbreak of violence on the island. The military contingents which Greece and Turkey had stationed on the island thus got ready to come to the aid of their respective communities. In the meantime, Turkish planes and naval vessels were making it clear by their presence in Cypriot airspace and waters that Turkey was ready to play for high stakes. In the last days of 1963, a provisional agreement was reached between the parties involved, in anticipation of a political conference which was to be held in London. With the approval of the Cypriot government, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey also set up a peacemaking force, which was to monitor the observance of the cease-fire. Soldiers from this force were to, amongst other things, patrol the neutral zone between the warring parties in the capital of Nicosia (the so-called Green Line). In practice, however, this task was left almost entirely to the British contingent. Once it became clear that the London conference had not produced any real results, the fighting flared up again in January 1964. Under these circumstances, the Cypriot government and Great Britain decided to ask the Security Council to intervene. On 4 March 1964, therefore, the Security Council passed resolution 186, which made provisions for the formation of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The Security Council also called upon all member states to refrain from any action that might be detrimental to the interests of the sovereign republic of Cyprus.

The first (Canadian) UNFICYP troops arrived on 13 March and, two weeks later, the peace force had enough troops to be made operational. The last contingents arrived in April and May, bringing the total strength of UNFICYP

to almost 6,500. The participating nations were Great Britain, Canada, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Austria; civil police units from a large number of countries were also deployed in Cyprus as part of UNCIVPOL. Greece and Turkey kept their military contingents on the island (950 and 650 men respectively); despite the insistence of the UN, they were not placed under the command of the Force Commander. This also applied to the British troops in both the sovereign base areas.

The situation facing UNFICYP was in many respects atypical. UNFICYP was officially intended to prevent further bloodshed in a civil war between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and to support the central authority of the Cypriot government. However, the presence of the peace force was also intended to deter both 'mother countries', Greece and Turkey, from intervening on behalf of one of the two parties. Yet under the agreements of 1959, Greece and Turkey (as well as Great Britain) reserved the right to intervene jointly or unilaterally if the state of Cyprus was threatened. In addition, there was, besides the Green Line in Nicosia, virtually no clear demarcation line for the peace force to monitor. Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived all over the island and even in villages with a hybrid ethnic composition. Wherever the parties had occupied reinforced positions, UNFICYP was there to position themselves between the parties in a crisis and thus prevent further escalation of the conflict. The deployment of the UNFICYP contingents did, however, follow the local provincial boundaries in order to simplify contact with government agencies and local leaders. Nevertheless, the peace force was barely able, if at all, to set up a cohesive network of observation posts, which meant that, in the event of a crisis, the freedom of movement and the protection of friendly personnel was at risk. A large part of the peace force thus had to be kept aside as a mobile reserve.

Map of Cyprus and the deployment of UNFICYP



During the first ten years following the establishment of the peace force, the situation in Cyprus was reasonably stable, partly because of the presence of UNFICYP. UNFICYP maintained contact at all levels with the parties involved, as a result of which some progress was made every now and then. The UN soldiers also tried to get life back to normal as much as possible. They thus provided protection for farmers during harvesting and made sure that municipal amenities were indeed accessible to all parties. UNFICYP also supervised the import of weapons by both parties. Despite doing so, however, the peace force was unable to prevent them from stepping up their armaments considerably. The parties nonetheless remained hostile towards each other and were not prepared to give up their reinforced positions. The conflict flared up again from time to time, whereby UNFICYP soldiers often ended up right in the line of fire. After 1968, a new complication arose in the conflict which was already so complex. President Makarios was making a stronger and stronger case for an independent Cyprus, which refused to be tied to Greece's apron strings, and was making overtures to the Soviet Union. As a result, the pro-*enosis* movement, which sought affiliation with Greece, adopted a more militant stance. This even led to a (failed) assassination attempt on the president in 1970. This militant Greek-Cypriot group was given support from the 'mother country', where a right-wing military *junta* (the 'colonels regime') had seized power from the democratic government. With their support, the Greek-Cypriot National Guard staged a coup d'état, as a result of which President Makarios was ousted.

In the days following the coup, UNFICYP was severely put to the test. The peace force was brought to the highest level of readiness to protect the Turkish-Cypriot minority and to do all it could to prevent the outbreak of violence. Despite the fact that UNFICYP's involvement managed to prevent any major confrontations, Turkey nonetheless decided to intervene. Using the stipulations of the agreements reached in 1959, the Turkish government sent a sizeable invasion force to the island on 20 July 1974. Within three days, the Turkish army, supported by Turkish Cypriot militias, managed to take about a third of the island from the north. Despite the superiority of the Turkish invasion force in terms of equipment, the Greek Cypriots put up fierce resistance. The advance of the Turkish troops thus proceeded more slowly than expected. It was unclear how the weakened UNFICYP troops should react to the Turkish invasion. There were various opinions among the parties as to the legitimacy of the Turkish interference and UNFICYP's mandate was merely intended to keep the ethnic groups apart. Furthermore, the rules of engagement only permitted the use of force for self-defence. After consulting the UN headquarters in New York, the Force Commander, General Prem Chand from India, decided to deploy his troops to protect the civilian population from the acts of war as best they could. This applied in particular to the Turkish Cypriot enclaves in the west and south of the island, which were beyond the range of the Turkish invasion force and were a target for attacks by Greek Cypriot units. In many places, UNFICYP managed to convince local commanders of the need for a cease-fire.

After three days of fighting, a cease-fire was implemented on 22 July at the insistence of the Security Council, but it was soon violated. On 23 July, the Turkish troops thus advanced again to the airport at Nicosia, where UNFICYP had in the meantime entrenched. Greek Cypriot units had taken up positions in the vicinity. For the first time, there was a threat of an armed confrontation between the Turkish invasion force and the UN troops. However, the UN Secretary-General managed to persuade Great Britain to place some of the British troops on the island, stationed in the sovereign base areas, under UNFICYP's command. This meant that the peace force not only got a substantial reinforcement in terms of numbers, but it also had access to a large

number of armoured vehicles and anti-tank weapons with which it could put up better resistance against the Turkish tanks. Great Britain also promised to provide air support if necessary, but did not make it immediately available to the Force Commander.

The combination of intensive, high-level, political negotiations, during which the UN and NATO put Turkey under extreme pressure, and the active willingness of the reinforced UNFICYP troops to defend the airport proved sufficient to get the Turkish government to the negotiating table. But after the unsuccessful negotiations were terminated on 14 August, the parties resumed hostilities. UNFICYP continued in its efforts to restore order, despite the fact that the peace force was forced to evacuate the observation posts at various locations. In Nicosia, UNFICYP managed to persuade the local commanders to declare a cease-fire on two occasions so that non-combatants could be evacuated. Turkey once again came under heavy diplomatic pressure. On 16 August, the day on which a Security Council resolution officially condemned Turkey for its actions against the Republic of Cyprus, a new (and this time definitive) cease-fire was declared.

Although UNFICYP's mandate continued to apply in full even after 1974, the Turkish invasion had created a completely different situation. Most of the UN peace force was from then on deployed along the front line which had marked the advance of the Turkish troops up to the moment of the cease-fire. Today there is still no formal agreement in respect of the boundaries of the security zone which was created. The military status quo of 16 August 1974 thus determined the boundaries of the UN buffer zone, a 180-kilometre ribbon which stretches throughout Cyprus and of which the width ranges from less than twenty metres in Nicosia to a maximum of some seven kilometres elsewhere. In this buffer zone, UNFICYP is responsible for supervising the cease-fire in anticipation of a formal political agreement. Local adjustments have, however, been made to the course of the demarcation line, following consultations with the parties, to prevent potential conflicts and to simplify the task of UNFICYP. UNFICYP had its greatest success in 1989, when both parties undertook to vacate their forward positions in Nicosia. Because the buffer zone was narrowest at this point, this was where the most incidents occurred. Where the buffer zone was at its widest, UNFICYP made a case for the return of farmers in order to cultivate the land, which is among the most fertile in Cyprus. Here, too, UNFICYP was ultimately successful.

Given the fact that large numbers of Cypriots had had to leave their homes during the fighting, Cyprus faced a serious refugee problem after 1974. In order to cope with this, UNFICYP expanded its activities in respect of humanitarian aid. The UN peace force also did its best for Greek Cypriots (also known as 'Maronites') who remained in the northern part of the island and for the Turkish Cypriots in the south. In 1987, the Turkish Cypriot population of the Turkish-occupied northern part of the island proclaimed the independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is, however, only recognised by Turkey. This had no further implications for the task of UNFICYP.

The funding of UNFICYP was a particular problem from the outset. A substantial part of the funding was borne by the troop-supplying nations, which meant that participation in UNFICYP was a costly business. As a result, many countries withdrew from the force after a while, or reduced their troop numbers. The lack of any prospect of a definitive political solution also played a role. Because of the continuing weakening of the peace force during the period from 1977-1992, the credibility of UNFICYP was brought into serious doubt. The Force Commander felt obliged to concentrate an ever greater proportion of his troops in the buffer zone and to rely more on mobile patrols than he had in the past. In 1993, the troop strength was even in danger of

falling below one thousand, which would mean that the peace force was no longer at the required level of operational readiness. The idea of turning UNFICYP into an observer mission was thus considered, but the Security Council remained firmly in favour of the presence of a peacekeeping force. Only when the funding of UNFICYP was revised in 1993 and regular UN assets were made available was there more certainty for the peace force. Since then, the strength of UNFICYP has stabilised and even increased slightly.

In the 1990s, the UN intensified its efforts to bring about a permanent solution to the situation in Cyprus. However, these initiatives, along with confidence-building measures (such as the re-opening of Nicosia airport), amounted to nothing. The Turkish Cypriots in particular continue to block UNFICYP's attempts to bring the two population groups closer together. While the Security Council continues to cling to the restoration of the unity of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent, federative state, the Turkish Cypriots demand recognition of their Republic of Northern Cyprus. Another constant source of concern is the continuing modernisation of the arsenal and the increase in troop numbers by both parties. This was clearly illustrated by the turmoil which resulted from the installation of modern air defence missiles by the Republic of Cyprus.

The UNFICYP area is currently divided into three sectors, each of which is assigned to an infantry battalion of some 350 personnel (a battalion like this consists of two companies). Since May 1998, the Netherlands has also been supplying troops to UNFICYP, which are completely integrated in the British contingent (BRITCON) responsible for central sector 2. A Dutch infantry platoon has been assigned to each of the two infantry companies of the British battalion. Various Dutch military personnel also hold functions in BRITCON's staff and headquarters company. A third Dutch infantry platoon has been incorporated in the Force Reserve. As well as the British-Dutch contingent, Argentina (sector 1) and Austria and Hungary (sector 4) have also contributed large units to UNFICYP. Ireland, Slovenia, Canada and Finland supply smaller numbers of military personnel. Finally, Australia and Ireland have sent civil police (UNCIVPOL) to Cyprus. In addition, UNFICYP's staff numbers nearly fifty civilian employees from the UN and more than two hundred local employees.

Two examples of interpositioning operations in practice have been examined in this chapter, namely UNFICYP and UNIFIL (Lebanon). Although the UNFICYP operation was not originally intended as an interpositioning operation, it in fact turned out to be one. This is in contrast to the UNIFIL operation, which was intended as an interpositioning operation, but which did not turn out to be one. In practice, UNFICYP has the situation well under control locally and, in military terms, can thus be regarded as a success. UNIFIL, on the other hand, still wrestles every day with the reality of the various factions which appear to take scarcely any notice of the presence of the UN peace force. A political, long-term solution to both conflicts, however, still seems to be a long way off.

12

Forcible separation of parties

Section 1 - Introduction

1201. Forcible separation of parties is the termination of hostilities in a conflict, **without consent** and, if necessary, with the use of force, by positioning combat units between the belligerent parties. The objective is to achieve and maintain a stable situation in order to create the conditions for a lasting peace. This task can be performed in the context of both an interstate and an intrastate conflict.

1202. Forcible separation of parties is the most extreme method of terminating hostilities between two or more parties. It may only be used if there is a serious threat to peace and security or if genocide has occurred and then only if other methods have failed. It should, however, be borne in mind that nations and states have an inherent right to use force for self-defence or to protect their national interests. An international intervention between warring states or parties may, therefore, in their eyes be meddlesome and inappropriate.

1203. In a conflict, a considerable amount of force may be necessary to forcibly separate parties which have no intention of ending the conflict of their own accord. One must not, however, lose sight of the ultimate **aim of the operation**; it is not, after all, about defeating (one of) the parties, but about achieving a situation in which the hostilities have ceased. This does not alter the fact that elements of the belligerent parties may have to be defeated locally. If a decision has been made to separate the parties with a military operation, it does not mean that activities will no longer be undertaken in other areas to end the hostilities. Diplomatic efforts must thus continue unabated.

Section 2 - Characteristics

1204. A separation of the parties has the **character of a combat operation**. Especially at the beginning of the operation, the level of force may be high, as the parties will want to have achieved as favourable a position as possible before the conflict is 'frozen' by the actions of the peace

force. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that the mere threat of force by the peace force will be enough to make the parties back down.



A separation of the parties has the character of a combat operation.

Photograph: Dutch Press Agency (ANP) (IFOR, ribbon bridge over the Sava, 1996)

1205. This type of operation will in principle be conducted in a **multinational** and **joint context**. Speed and flexibility of actions are crucial to end the conflict as quickly as possible and to respond appropriately to changing circumstances. Moreover, there will often be unfavourable ratios of combat power. For these reasons, the forcible separation of parties will have to be supported to a considerable extent by the deployment of air forces.

1206. There is a close relationship between the operational tasks of ‘forcible separation of the parties’ and ‘interpositioning’ (see Chapter 11). This is because both tasks aim to create a stable situation by positioning a force between the parties. However, the two tasks may merge into one another. The forcible separation of parties is never an isolated action and will almost always be followed by an interpositioning operation. This transition is in many ways similar to the post-conflict operation as described in ADP II, ‘Combat operations’, Chapter 8.

1207. Conversely, it may also be the case that, as part of an interpositioning operation, a decision has to be made to separate the parties by force, for instance after a deliberate **violation of a cease-fire**. Certainly if the interpositioning operation has been in progress for some time and the peace force is organised and equipped exclusively for that task, a different type of unit will be needed. In that case, it may be necessary to relieve the peace force tasked with the interpositioning operation by troops which are able to separate the parties by force.

A show of force may be enough to deter the parties from continuing the hostilities.
Photograph: Media Centre RNLA (IFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996)

1208. In the forcible separation of the parties, the principle of the **minimum use of force** is particularly important. It is, after all, highly likely that the operation will be continued as a peace operation of a different nature, for example an interpositioning or observer operation. The long-term success of the follow-up operation will depend heavily on the extent to which force is used in the separation of the parties.



1209. The force tasked with the operation must in any event be **transparent**, in other words open. The objective and intentions of the peace force must be clear to all parties, so that in the most favourable case the show of force is enough and actual force is used as little as possible. A good supply of information to the leaders of the parties and the local population is extremely important in this respect.

1210. The **credibility** of the peace force tasked with the separation of the parties will also affect the extent to which the force encounters resistance. If the peace force is large and strong enough, the mere threat or show of force may be enough to deter the parties from continuing the hostilities. Once the parties have been separated, the peace force must ensure that the damage incurred as a result of the operation is repaired as quickly as possible and that no further damage is incurred. If necessary, the peace force will also have to help to expedite the humanitarian aid to the local population and the repair of the infrastructure and public amenities.

Once the parties have been separated, efforts must be made to use as many of the peace force's assets as possible to provide relief and military assistance without losing sight of the actual task. Support for the peace force among the local population (the so-called hearts and minds campaign) must not, after all, be promoted at the expense of the aim of the operation, namely the separation of the parties and the termination of hostilities.

Section 3 - Aspects of planning and execution

1211. The leaders of the force which is ordered to separate the parties by force must be aware that they will have to contain the violent actions of the parties. Ideally, no force will be used in the process; if necessary, however, the military potential of the parties will be attacked or even (partially) destroyed. The parties may in turn try to attack the military potential of the peace force. In order to keep the use of force to a minimum in the operation, the actions of the force must focus particularly on the **mental component of the parties**. The challenge for the peace force leaders is to convince the parties that there is no longer any point to the fighting and that a cease-fire is in their own best interest too.


1212. The mandate for the operation must indicate clearly what is expected from the peace force; it must in particular state the **estimated duration** of the operation and what **decisive points** have to be reached. The rules of engagement must be geared to a high level of threat and the use of force must be fully covered in a legal sense prior to the operation. The force's assets must also be suitable for conducting combat operations. It may also be advisable to ensure that elements which, once the parties have been successfully separated, can conduct CIMIC operations are incorporated in the organisation of the force from the outset.

1213. With regard to the parties, points which have to be established are the extent to which they can rely on support from the local population or from the neighbouring countries, the type and quantity of weapons systems they have and what their strong and weak points are. It is

particularly important to determine the parties' **centre of gravity** so that the peace force can then focus its actions accordingly.

They have to pull back behind the separation lines.

Source: IFOR/SFOR (1998)




1214. The peace force will normally separate the parties by taking possession of a corridor between the parties' military units. Vital areas (the key terrain) must thus be physically occupied by the peace force. To this end, an approach march must be conducted, preferably not along the confrontation line between the parties because of the possible presence of minefields. This operation is in effect a **combat operation**, the execution of which is described in ADP II, 'Combat operations'.

1215. Once the peace force has the situation in the corridor under control, it must proceed with the establishment of a **buffer zone**, whereby the parties are forced to leave this zone. They must pull back behind the separation lines which border the buffer zone and get their military units to assembly areas in the control zone or outside it. The situation thus created is the same as that in an interpositioning operation.

1216. Figure 12-1 is a diagram which shows how the parties *could* be separated by taking possession of a corridor between the parties and subsequently establishing a buffer zone. This is, of course, merely a **possible variant** of such an operation. The actual execution must of course be based on the result of the planning process by the commander and staff of the peace force and must in particular be related to the deployment of the military units of the belligerent parties.

Figure 12-1: Diagram of the forcible separation of parties



SEPARATION CAUSES NO SORROW: IFOR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Forcible separation of parties and interpositioning are closely related forms of peace operation. Although it is easy to make a distinction at a theoretical and abstract level, it is more difficult to do so in practice. The aim of a forcible separation is generally an interpositioning, while the latter operational task could again turn into a forcible separation if conflicts flare up between the parties. Moreover, it is often impossible to predict whether the parties involved will maintain their consent to an interpositioning operation. However, the expectations in respect of the level of force with which a peace force is likely to be confronted have major implications for its mandate, its size and its equipment; in short, whether the peace force should be 'blue' or 'green'. By the middle of 1995, the experiences with the 'blue' UN operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina had not been very positive. Certainly after the fall of the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, it became clear that the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina were taking little notice of a traditional 'blue' peace force. From August 1995, the UN and NATO showed more resolve, partly with the NATO air

offensive, Operation *Deliberate Force*. This was the response to a Bosnian Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo, which had been declared a safe area by the United Nations. This operation also involved the UN Rapid Reaction Force, which had taken up position on Mount Igman near Sarajevo.

The show of force by the international community had the desired effect on the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly the Bosnian Serbs. The military offensive on the ground and in the air was accompanied by a vigorous diplomatic offensive, mainly from the United States, which eventually yielded tangible results. In October 1995, the parties agreed a cease-fire, which was also actually observed afterwards. A few weeks later, on 21 November 1995, came the 'consummation'. The parties involved, including Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, initialled a peace agreement which contained a definitive settlement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. This Dayton Peace Agreement (named after the town of Dayton in the United States where the negotiations were held) was formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. Under the agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina was to become a sovereign, federative state, in which Croats, Muslims and Serbs would be represented. Within this federative context, the first two parties worked closely together in the Muslim Croat Federation; the Bosnian Serbs set up their own (federal) republic. This Republika Srpska covered 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Muslim Croat Federation held the remaining 51%. Sarajevo was not included in this division: here, the three population groups were to set up a joint administration.

The boundaries of the Republika Srpska and the Muslim Croat Federation were stipulated in Dayton and took as much account as possible of the ethnic distribution of the population. Roughly speaking, the Bosnian Serbs got the north and east of Bosnia and Herzegovina, two separate areas which were linked by a narrow corridor at the town of Brcko. The Muslims in turn had an enclave in the middle of the Bosnian Serb Republic; this was Gorazde, which was also linked by a narrow corridor to the rest of the Muslim Croat Federation.

The Dayton Agreement also contained a number of military clauses, involving strict deadlines, which were mainly intended to create the conditions for the peace process. The principal aspect here was the separation of the parties' troops by the establishment of a buffer zone along the boundaries of the Muslim Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. The parties also had to demobilise the bulk of their troops and hand in their heavy weapons. Naturally, there also had to be an end to any form of external interference (particularly from Croatia and Serbia).

In order to guarantee that the parties involved would keep to the agreements of the Dayton Peace Agreement, a multinational peace force was to monitor compliance. Given UNPROFOR's lack of success in the previous years and the expectation that the parties, despite the signing of a peace settlement, would not automatically be prepared to actually lay down their arms and honour every part of the agreement, preference was given to a highly robust peace force. Both the mandate, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and the composition and equipment of the peace force were based on a high level of force. This order, formalised by Security Council resolution 1031, was given to NATO, which was to deploy an Implementation Force (IFOR) in the region. IFOR's operation fell within the limits of the Bosnian peace agreement and thus relied on the consent of the parties involved. Nevertheless, the robust character and the mandate, which authorised IFOR to enforce compliance with the stipulations of the peace treaty, by force if necessary, justified putting this operation in the category of 'forcible separation'.

Under the name Operation *Joint Endeavour*, IFOR was to deploy approxi-

mately 60,000 military personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first of the force's advance parties arrived in the area of operations on 2 December 1995, but the rest had to wait for the signing of the peace treaty (14 December 1995) and the Security Council resolution giving IFOR its mandate (15 December 1995). On 20 December 1995, IFOR had reached the stage at which it could take over the area responsibility from UNPROFOR. Although most of the IFOR troops came from NATO member states, participation was also open to other countries. Crucial from a political point of view was the participation of a Russian brigade, which had special status within IFOR. The other participants from outside NATO were mainly countries which were linked to the Atlantic Alliance through the Partnership for Peace programme. IFOR's air and maritime components were, however, supplied entirely by NATO. The high command was held by NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). IFOR was split into three divisions, the cores of which were supplied by the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Each of the divisions was assigned part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was divided roughly in two by the separation line (Inter-Entity Boundary Line) and the adjoining buffer zone (Zone of Separation) between the Muslim Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. The bulk of the Dutch IFOR units - a mechanised battalion, a logistic battalion, a mortar company, an explosive ordnance disposal detachment and, from March 1996, a helicopter detachment - was assigned to the Multinational Division South West, which was under British command. Finally, Dutch commandos were also at the disposal of the IFOR commander. The headquarters of (NL) Mechbat was set up in Sisava in the Muslim Croat Federation; the three teams from the battalion based their command posts in Novi Travnik and Jajce in the Muslim Croat Federation and in Skender Vakuf (Knezevo) in the Republika Srpska.

IFOR's first task was to separate the parties by establishing and occupying a 4 km-wide buffer zone. This task was to be completed by 19 January 1996 (D+30 or, in other words, 30 days after IFOR had assumed area responsibility). Somewhat contrary to expectations, IFOR encountered little resistance from the parties in this operation. Although short-lived resistance by local leaders at various locations placed heavy demands on the powers of persuasion of IFOR's personnel, it was not necessary to use force anywhere. It required more effort to clear the buffer zone of the countless minefields, barricades, bunkers and other field fortifications which had been set up by the parties. By doing so, IFOR was not only guaranteeing its own freedom of movement, but also helping to ensure that normal movement between the two parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina would once again be possible in the long term.

IFOR made it clear to the parties from the outset that it meant business. IFOR troops immediately devoted a great deal of attention to intensive patrolling of the buffer zone (notably with the tanks that UNPROFOR had not had at its disposal) and only after that to the rest of their sector and to building up good contacts with the local population. There was barely any question of so-called 'social patrols' during that period. Because the IFOR soldiers spent most of their time in their own, well-protected base camps and were always heavily armed outside them, the danger that they could be used as hostages by the parties was minimal. This enhanced IFOR's credibility considerably.

Nor was it necessary for IFOR to use force for the following deadlines of the peace treaty. On D+45 (3 February 1996), the parties had to vacate several areas which, under 'Dayton', were to be part of the territory of one of the other parties. Some six weeks later, on 19 March 1996 (D+90), IFOR completed the handover of these areas. As a result, the Zone of Separation and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line were adjusted at a number of points. The fact that the parties - in any event locally - were sometimes still as hostile towards each

Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the deployment of IFOR



other as they had been before ‘Dayton’, and that the threat of force by IFOR was, therefore, still necessary, became apparent when the ‘scorched earth’ policy was applied locally during the evacuation of the areas to be transferred. Another indication of the fact that there had not yet been any reconciliation between the parties was the lack of progress in the reciprocal release of prisoners of war, one of the treaty’s few agreements which IFOR was not authorised to enforce. IFOR troops also had to turn out regularly to stop the parties deploying their police force outside the area they controlled. Regarding this last point, cracks were also appearing in the Muslim Croat Federation and particularly in Mostar the discord between Muslims and Croats was leading to conflicts.

The last date mentioned in the military clauses of the Dayton Agreement was D+120 (18 April 1996), the date by which the parties were to have concentrated their troops and heavy weapons in specially designated cantonment areas. Most of the military personnel were then to have been demobilised and the heavy weapons registered by IFOR. The parties failed to meet this deadline, not, incidentally, because they were unwilling, but mainly as a result of many practical problems. IFOR thus adjusted the deadline, whereby the parties were given two months’ grace until 27 June 1996 (D+180). After this ‘relaxation’, the parties were indeed able to comply with the stipulations of the peace agreement. Nevertheless, the highest level of vigilance was still required. At the beginning of August, IFOR troops discovered over 250 tons of ammunition and mines which the Bosnian Serb army had managed to keep outside the agreed registration. Despite protests from the Bosnian Serbs, IFOR troops confiscated

the explosives and destroyed them. At the same time, IFOR also came into conflict with the Bosnian Serbs elsewhere. The latter were denying IFOR troops access to an ammunition depot which was supposed to be inspected by the peace force. The refusal may have been in connection with the fact that General Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb commander, who was wanted by the Yugoslav Tribunal in The Hague, was present at the complex. However, the Bosnian Serbs climbed down once NATO had made it clear that IFOR would not hesitate to use force. To this end, all IFOR troops in the Republika Srpska were confined to their well-protected bases and the security regulations were tightened (Operation *Fear Naught*). This meant that the Bosnian Serbs were unable (as in the UNPROFOR era) to take military personnel hostage and thus impede the use of force by the peace force.

Although shootings and other incidents were still the order of the day in Bosnia and Herzegovina, IFOR was able to ease off a little in the second half of 1996. The tanks remained at the bases more and more, while the IFOR soldiers began to show their faces in the villages and towns more and more often. In effect, IFOR had thus become a regular interpositioning operation (in particular a peacekeeping operation of the second generation), although the available means of force were still impressive. The emphasis now lay on the civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement, such as the organisation and protection of the national elections (which were held on 14 September 1996) and the return of refugees to their homes. The reconstruction of the country by means of CIMIC activities and aid projects sponsored by the international community (including the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation) gradually took on a more important role in the tasks performed by the military. The international community still believed that the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina could only progress if NATO kept a sizeable 'green' force in the region. After operating successfully for a year, IFOR was, therefore, replaced by the so-called Stabilization Force (SFOR). SFOR has a similar mandate to that of IFOR but is (slightly) smaller. Even more than its predecessor, SFOR is focusing on the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the return of refugees and displaced persons.

13

Guaranteeing or denying freedom of movement

Section 1 - Introduction

1301. The primary form of freedom of movement is the opportunity to physically move freely and unhindered. A unit, party, organisation or group must have freedom of movement in order to perform activities at a time and place of its own choosing. For a peace force, freedom of movement is so fundamental that it is even one of the basic principles.

1302. Other groups and organisations, such as individual observers, an international police force or aid agencies, also depend on freedom of movement in order to be able to perform their tasks. This is why a peace force may be ordered to **guarantee their freedom of movement**. This can be done by ensuring the unhindered use of roads. To do so, it may be necessary to clear mines or remove barricades or illegal checkpoints. The provision of transport support or the repair of infrastructure can also improve the possibilities for movement, as can the setting up of movement control, traffic control and route security.

Repair of infrastructure too.

Photograph: Military History Section RNLA (SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997)



FROM THE REPORT OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN
SECRETARY-GENERAL, 11 JULY 1997

'Freedom of movement remains an overriding commitment in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution and the Peace Agreement. It is a key factor opening up the economy, access for the elections, and for returns. I can report that there is a gradual improvement in some areas. However, more has to be done to create confidence in travelling throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina'.

1303. The peace force can also impose **restrictions on the freedom of movement**. This may be necessary, for example, as part of the de-escalation of the conflict or to allow observers or aid agencies to operate. Examples of the denial or restriction of the freedom of movement are the separation of parties by the establishment of a buffer zone, the cantonment (assembling in specially designated areas, villages and so on) of parties, the setting up of checkpoints on roads and the imposition of a curfew.

1304. The guarantee or denial of freedom of movement may be essential for the effective conduct of the peace operation. It must be possible to derive from the mandate which parties, organisations or parts of the population are to enjoy (some) freedom of movement. The part of the area of operations which is not accessible to everyone must also be clearly defined. The rules of engagement must indicate how the guarantee or denial of freedom of movement can be enforced.

1305. The physical freedom of movement is not confined to land and sea routes; it also includes the unrestricted use of the **third dimension**. Air traffic must be able to move safely above the area of operations in order to reach certain areas. This could apply to the whole of the airspace above the area of operations as well as to certain air corridors. No-fly zones may also be established to prevent a threat from the air.

1306. In a **broader context**, however, guaranteeing or denying freedom of movement takes several forms. These may include the freedom of choice of location in the area of operation, for example to set up polling stations for elections. The free use or indeed restricting the use of the electromagnetic spectrum also falls under this category. A radio transmitter could thus be prevented from making any more transmissions or a jammer could be neutralised. On the other hand, the peace force could, for example, provide the radio communications for an aid agency.

In 1996, the IFOR peace force supported the OSCE in the organisation of the general and presidential elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. IFOR reconnoitred the routes to the polling stations and cleared them of any mines, so that local people and international observers could reach them safely. IFOR

also guarded the polling stations and provided protection for the transport and the counting of the votes. IFOR also provided the OSCE with communications assets. This meant that shortcomings could be reported quickly and measures taken in good time, so IFOR was able to provide a great deal of practical assistance. The close cooperation between IFOR and the OSCE was further underlined by the fact that liaison officers from IFOR were posted temporarily to most of the OSCE stations. Arrangements were also made in respect of the provision of assistance (protection, evacuation and accommodation) to OSCE personnel in the event of incidents.

Section 2 - Characteristics

1307. Guaranteeing or denying the freedom of movement benefits the execution of the other tasks of the peace operation. Guaranteeing or denying the freedom of movement may also be the main task, for instance of a unit which has to act as a rapid intervention force. Such a force would be deployed if the success of the operation were threatened to such an extent that the peace force was no longer able to impose its will on the parties by itself. It would then be the job of the rapid intervention force to relieve the peace force (guarantee its freedom of movement) or neutralise the belligerent parties (deny their freedom of movement).

The mandate of the UNTAC mission in Cambodia (end of 1992) was based on traditional peacekeeping. However, the peace force did not have sufficient means to deny the Khmer Rouge freedom of movement. This resulted in a situation in which the observers in Pailin, the centre of the Khmer Rouge area, were in effect under house arrest and the peace force was unable to do anything about it.

1308. Denying the parties and the local population a certain amount of freedom of movement will often form part of the **initial phase of the operation**. The restrictive measures can then be aimed at keeping the parties apart. This will ensure freedom of movement for friendly units and the organisations whose freedom of movement the peace force has to guarantee. Freedom of movement cannot usually be denied altogether or over a prolonged period, given that this would completely dislocate the local community and would be counterproductive in terms of achieving the objectives of the operation. The return of refugees can thus only be considered successful once they resume economic activities after repatriation. Full freedom of movement for all parties and organisations in the entire area of operations must be the ultimate aim.

1309. Operations with the enforcement or guarantee of freedom of movement as their objective are precarious, given that there is a constant danger that the conflict will escalate. This applies particularly during the initial phase of the operation. In order to avoid a (further)

heightening of tension, the intentions behind restricting or indeed guaranteeing the freedom of movement must be clear to all parties.

1310. The restriction of the parties' or the civilian population's freedom of movement may give rise to opposition and damage the legitimacy of the operation and the consent for the presence of the peace force. Measures which restrict the freedom of movement must, therefore, be implemented with **restraint** and must in principle be clearly linked to a previous occurrence of inappropriate behaviour. There is a risk that the peace force will be seen as an occupation force.

Section 3 - Aspects of planning and execution

1311. The enforcement or denial of freedom of movement must be in keeping with the mandate of the operation. It is the responsibility of the peace force to apply the relevant provisions from the mandate resolutely and consistently. If, however, the freedom of movement of the peace force depends on the consent of the parties, the operation is bound to fail.

1312. The **threat analysis** will produce specific threat scenarios, such as the location of minefields and other obstacles, the locations at which major routes may be blocked and the avenues of approach by air. Consideration must also be given to the extent to which the local authorities have control of (parts of) the area of operations as well as the extent to which the parties control their units. The latter is particularly important in terms of establishing whether there is any possibility of groups conducting irregular operations.

The location of minefields.

Photograph: Media Centre

RNLA

(SFOR, Bosnia and

Herzegovina, 1997)



1313. The **threat posed by the parties** is an important factor in the decision to restrict or deny the freedom of movement. This threat may consist of putting up resistance to the implementation stipulations of the peace agreement by failing to stick to agreements made and by conducting subversive activities. If the local administration does not have complete control of part of the area of operations, the peace force may be confronted with splinter groups. Operations against these groups may take the form of a combat operation against an irregular enemy force. A solution will usually be sought in a combination of negotiation and a demonstration of the willingness to use force if necessary.

1314. The peace force will normally be faced with such a large area of operations that it would be impossible to monitor the entire area with a **physical presence**. Assets for air reconnaissance and electronic warfare can supplement ground-based systems in such cases. The commander will also have to identify main efforts and set priorities.

1315. The analysis of the terrain should reveal what **movement possibilities** there are over land, over water and through the air. When identifying them, priority must be given to the routes needed by the peace force and the other international organisations for their task. The outcome of this analysis must lead to conclusions about available routes, obstacles, commanding ground and also potential refugee movements or main efforts for the work of aid organisations.

1316. The ways in which freedom of movement is realised always vary enormously. It may be done **passively** by allowing others joint use of the peace force's facilities, such as communications equipment for message transmission. More **active support** may be required, such as escorting (refugee) convoys or providing transport support.

1317. It might be the case that certain organisations or groups value their **independence** so highly that they refuse any support from the peace force. NGOs in particular are wary of losing their independent status. Only as a last resort will they call upon the support or protection of the peace force.

1318. The peace force must be able to act credibly; in other words, they must be able to act coercively if necessary. This is mainly about the **mental influence**. Because of their speed and combat power, attack helicopters are ideal for emphasising the coercive nature. If the unit in the area of operations does not itself have the means for robust action, it can be reinforced by a (rapid) intervention force. In this case, the emphasis for the unit on the ground will be to observe and report.

Because of their speed and combat power, combat helicopters are ideal for pressing home the coercive nature of the operation.

Photograph: Soesterberg photographic flight (SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1998)



1319. If the conflict escalates or if the parties refuse to honour the agreements made, attempts will be made by means of **negotiation** to make them toe the line. If this fails, the peace force may restrict the freedom of movement, temporarily or otherwise, as a sanction. The parties may see such a sanction as a breach of the impartiality of the peace force. Measures for the denial of the freedom of movement must be lifted as soon as possible if the situation becomes stable and the parties (again) honour the agreements made.

1320. Mines and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) constitute a restriction of the freedom of movement. For this reason, UXOs must be pinpointed as accurately as possible and registered in a **database**. The clearance of mines and other unexploded ordnance is primarily the responsibility of the party which laid them or left them behind. The peace force can provide support in this respect by training local personnel in explosive ordnance disposal. By training personnel from all parties, the peace force can emphasise its impartial position.

1321. There is also an **operational requirement** for the peace force to perform clearance activities itself. Mine clearance is also necessary for billeting and logistic installations. Mines and UXOs which form a direct threat to aid agencies or the civilian population can sometimes be cleared or at least marked by the peace force itself. The peace force can provide support in the event of accidents in clearance operations by the

parties or if observers or members of aid organisations stray into a minefield.

The peace force can provide support by training local personnel in explosive ordnance disposal.

Photograph: Media Centre RNLA (UNTAC, Cambodia, 1993)



1322. The peace force could provide a **Mine Awareness Programme** for its own troops, aid agencies, the civilian population and the parties. If there are large numbers of mines and other explosives and there is a substantial need for coordination in the clearance thereof, a programme such as this may be provided by a specialist unit: a so-called Mine Clearance Task Force. A Mine Action Centre may also be set up.

During the UNTAC operation in Cambodia, UN personnel were warned by means of the awareness programme not to move around between sunset and sunrise. The reason for this was that the local people were in the habit of protecting their villages and agricultural land at night from bandits and plunderers by laying mines. Before UN personnel were able to use a particular route again the next morning, they first had to establish whether the locals had already used it themselves.

1323. In order to simplify movement control in the area of operations, the peace force may impose an assembly ban or a curfew. Certain groups may be exempt from the curfew, such as administrators, police officers or doctors. Such **restrictive measures** could also, incidentally, apply to humanitarian aid workers in the interests of their own safety.



The peace force may impose a curfew.
 Photograph: Media Centre RNLA
 (UNFICYP, Cyprus, 1998)

HIGH STAKES: OPERATION *DENY FLIGHT*

In the just under two and a half years of its existence (from 1993 to 1995), the NATO air operation *Deny Flight* showed both the strength and the limitations of air power. Air superiority above an area of operations is by itself not enough to deny unwilling parties freedom of movement completely or to guarantee freedom of movement for a vulnerable peace force (or humanitarian organisations). *Deny Flight* had the task of supporting the UN peace force, UNPROFOR, in the implementation of its mandate. The NATO air operation had essentially two objectives. On the one hand, it had to deny the belligerent parties freedom of movement in the airspace above Bosnia and Herzegovina. To this end, the UN and NATO established a no-fly zone above the theatre. On the other hand, *Deny Flight* planes were used from the summer of 1993 in an attempt to enforce the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR personnel on the ground and to deny the belligerent parties (the Bosnian Serbs in particular) freedom of movement in certain areas. The latter played a particular role when the UN declared a number of Muslim towns safe areas and later added the concept of heavy weapons exclusion zones.

Until the end of 1995, Operation *Deny Flight* represented the most significant involvement of NATO in the war in the former Yugoslavia and in the UN operations conducted there. The air operation was not, incidentally, an official part of UNPROFOR. However, NATO was the only organisation which was able to provide the necessary command structure, technical assets and personnel for *Deny Flight*. It was in the context of this operation that NATO planes actually started to shoot down 'enemy' aircraft for the first time and conducted bombing campaigns. The UN and NATO hoped that the threat of air power - and the actual use of it - would force the warring parties to cooperate. In practice, however, this turned out to be anything but simple. Operation *Deny Flight* could not go ahead 'at full speed' as long as no-one could answer the one recurring question: would the attempts to enforce the freedom of movement

by means of air power not have precisely the opposite and escalating effect? There was always the chance that the Bosnian Serbs in particular would decide to take 'blue helmets' hostage, namely those for whom *Deny Flight* was supposed to enforce freedom of movement!

At the beginning of 1992, the civil war erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In October of that year, the Security Council decided to establish a no-fly zone above the country. The no-fly zone was, according to the Security Council, meant as a 'decisive step' towards ending the hostilities and as an 'essential precondition' for the conduct of humanitarian aid operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The no-fly zone, therefore, was also supposed to help enforce humanitarian aid, by force if necessary.

Although UNPROFOR was authorised to use force to enforce the no-fly zone, the zone was merely monitored at first. As part of Operation *Sky Monitor*, some 75 observers who had been assigned to UNPROFOR were stationed at thirteen airports in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). NATO provided AWACS aircraft so that *Sky Monitor* could be conducted more efficiently. The 'loan' of the AWACS was perfectly in keeping with NATO's policy to take on new tasks in the field of peace operations now that the Cold War was over.

Map of Deny Flight's area of operations



However, Operation *Sky Monitor* was not a success. The 75 observers could not get a good enough overview of the flight movements, mainly because the parties had no desire to cooperate. UNPROFOR reported more than five hundred violations of the no-fly zone during the first six months of *Sky Monitor*. Most of these did indeed involve aircraft which were not directly involved in the combat actions on the ground, but this situation soon changed. In March 1993, three unidentified fighter planes bombed several villages to the east of Srebrenica, after which they disappeared in the direction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Never before had the no-fly zone been so blatantly violated. No-one had been able to identify the origin of the three fighter planes with any certainty, but, according to the Security Council, everything pointed to an action by the Bosnian Serb air force. The Council demanded an explanation from the Bosnian Serbs and ordered an investigation into the possible use of airports in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for air operations over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the Bosnian Serb leaders denied everything, the Security Council was not satisfied. The bombing near Srebrenica was too serious a violation of the no-fly zone to let it pass without further action. At the end of March 1993, the Security Council thus opted (by means of resolution 816) for enforcement of the no-fly zone and asked NATO to take on the task.

The enforcement of the no-fly zone above Bosnia and Herzegovina took effect on 12 April 1993 under the name Operation *Deny Flight*. Ultimately, twelve NATO countries were to take part in *Deny Flight*, with more than two hundred planes and 4,500 military personnel. Where NATO had operated largely independently in the enforcement of the UN blockade on the Adriatic Sea, *Deny Flight* required close cooperation between NATO and the UN, if only because of the thousands of 'blue helmets' on the ground. Within one year, some 8,500 missions were to be conducted as part of *Deny Flight*.

Deny Flight had its problems from the word go. The UN and NATO initially conducted the operation with a great deal of restraint. Because most of the missions were flown by reconnaissance planes and AWACS aircraft, one could say that the implementation of *Deny Flight* was more or less symbolic. This was attributed to a number of political and practical reasons. To start with, several countries which supplied troops for UNPROFOR (in particular France and the United Kingdom) were afraid that the Bosnian Serbs would seek revenge on UN personnel as soon as *Deny Flight* aircraft went into action. It was for this reason that the rules of engagement were highly restrictive. NATO pilots were only permitted to shoot down military aircraft 'as a last resort'. Only if an intercepted plane ignored repeated requests to land could they open fire. They were not permitted to open fire on civilian aircraft under any circumstances. The same applied to the defence artillery or radars, even if they posed a threat to the NATO planes. NATO and the UN also regarded helicopters as targets which were not 'important' enough to be shot down. Up to March 1994, however, helicopter flights were responsible for more than 1,400 violations of the no-fly zone.

There were also many technical and operational problems. It was extremely difficult to trace small, slow and low-flying aircraft over the inhospitable terrain of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fact that UN aircraft and transport planes from the troop-supplying nations or humanitarian organisations also flew over Bosnia and Herzegovina exacerbated this problem even further. NATO and the UN thus failed to deny the parties all freedom of movement in Bosnian air-space. The most serious incident occurred almost a year after the no-fly zone had been established. On 28 February 1994, two American F-16s shot down four *Galeb* bombers over Bosnia and Herzegovina. A total of six *Galebs* were conducting a bombing mission in the vicinity of Banja Luka when the

F-16 pilots gave two warnings 'to land or face the consequences'. These warnings were ignored, whereupon the American pilots shot down four of the six *Galebs*. It was the first time that NATO planes had opened fire on other aircraft during an operational mission. NATO stressed that this was a strictly neutral action. The fact that the origin of the six bombers was not known when the F-16s attacked served to substantiate this standpoint. However, no-one was surprised to discover later that they were Serb aircraft.

The violations of the no-fly zone continued after the aerial battle at Banja Luka. Nevertheless, NATO and the UN maintained that the no-fly zone was an effective way of containing the battle on the ground. After all, the patrols by NATO aircraft prevented Bosnian Serb fighter planes from taking an active part in the war. The main objective of *Deny Flight* was thus achieved, according to NATO. It was also, just as the Adriatic Sea blockade, a relatively 'stand-off' enforcement operation. Troops were able to conduct it with great superiority in terms of assets and professionalism. *Deny Flight* soon became routine with relatively little risk for the NATO pilots. Only the 'small fry', NATO reasoned, were still able to slip through the embargo net.

Much more worrying was by now the situation on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There, the conflict flared up with a vengeance in the summer of 1993. The Bosnian Serbs in particular were blocking UN convoys and making it virtually impossible to conduct humanitarian aid operations. The Security Council complicated the UNPROFOR mandate even further by declaring six Muslim towns which were under serious threat (Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla and Zepa) safe areas in April and May 1993. However, only some three thousand blue helmets were made available for the protection of these besieged areas, while UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had initially requested 36,000 military personnel. The Bosnian Serb besiegers soon made use of the blockade weapon to deny the UN personnel in the closed, protected areas their freedom of movement.

In an attempt to improve the untenable and humiliating situation surrounding the safe areas and the humanitarian aid operations, in the summer of 1993 the UN and NATO reached for the most obvious enforcement instrument: the air fleet of Operation *Deny Flight*. Given the paralysing lack of manpower on the ground, this appeared to be the most credible way to enforce the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and the aid convoys. This meant, of course, that *Deny Flight* was entering an entirely new phase: from a relatively 'pure' mission (the denial of the belligerent parties' freedom of movement in the airspace above Bosnia and Herzegovina) to direct support for the UNPROFOR peace force on the ground, with all the inherent operational complications.

The extension of the task of Operation *Deny Flight* proceeded in two stages. On 22 July 1993, NATO decided to make *Deny Flight* aircraft available to UNPROFOR for close air support as well. The second stage followed quickly, at the beginning of August in fact. It soon became clear that close air support was not going to have a great deal of effect on the course of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The close air support was primarily intended to relieve 'blue helmets' under immediate threat, for example if they came under artillery fire. For a chronically dramatic situation such as the one around Sarajevo, close air support was too limited a method which could only be used on an ad hoc basis. If UNPROFOR and NATO really wanted to end the Bosnian Serb stranglehold on the safe areas and the endless obstruction of international humanitarian aid, they would have to resort to more robust methods. On 2 August 1993, the Security Council therefore decided to add air strikes to the tasks of Operation *Deny Flight*. NATO could conduct air strikes to defend the safe areas, to deter new offensives against these areas or to punish the parties for their opposition. The Security Council's decision was directly related to the fighting

around Sarajevo. There, Mount Igman was on the point of falling into Bosnian Serb hands, thus closing the last supply route to Sarajevo. Initially, the threat of air strikes did indeed appear to have the desired effect. On 18 August, the Bosnian Serbs halted their offensive against Mount Igman and withdrew.

The UN stressed that the addition of the air strike weapon to its political-military arsenal did not mean that UNPROFOR had given up its neutrality. But this could not hide the UN's uncertainty in respect of the vulnerable position of the safe areas and the 'blue helmets'. The United States, which did not have ground troops in UNPROFOR, had pleaded strenuously for air strikes. As far as the Americans were concerned, the credibility of the Atlantic Alliance was now at stake. France and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, who both supplied large UNPROFOR contingents, were more thoughtful in their approach to the use of air power. A more robust method such as air strikes could, after all, also have more serious repercussions. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali acknowledged this dilemma. Characteristically, he delegated the decision to use close air support to his special representative in the Balkans, the Japanese Akashi. For air strikes, however, the Secretary-General wanted prior permission from both the Security Council and the North Atlantic Council.

It was this sort of complication and deliberation that led to a situation in which the Security Council's air strike decision was also applied with the necessary restraint for the time being. Enforcing sufficient freedom of movement for the 'blue helmets' and the aid convoys thus continued to be a problem. It was particularly in the safe areas where, as before, this problem was most apparent. At the beginning of 1994, NATO called upon the UN and UNPROFOR to resolve the three most urgent safe area problems, if necessary by means of (the threat of) air strikes. The idea was to break the Bosnian Serb siege of Sarajevo, relieve the exhausted Canadian UN contingent in Srebrenica with a Dutch battalion and open the airport at Tuzla for humanitarian flights. But it was again a serious incident which led to the next definitive step in Operation *Deny Flight*. On 5 February 1994, a grenade exploded at a market in the centre of Sarajevo. Sixty-eight people were killed and two hundred wounded; never before in the 22 months of war had one grenade left such a bloody trail. The international community clamoured for retaliation. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali requested air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions around Sarajevo in order to prevent further shelling of civilian targets. This was then approved by the North Atlantic Council. The first air strikes against Bosnian Serb artillery positions at Sarajevo followed on 9 February. NATO was also looking for a way - by means of (the threat of) air strikes - to restore freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and the aid agencies in and around Sarajevo by denying the Bosnian Serbs that same freedom. NATO opted for the method of weapons exclusion zones. The Bosnian Serbs were given an ultimatum: they had to remove all their heavy weapons from a 20-kilometre exclusion zone around the centre of Sarajevo within a few days. Weapons which were not removed from the exclusion zone had to be handed in at one of seven UN weapon collection points. NATO also instructed the Muslims to place their heavy weapons under UNPROFOR's control, but this was enforced a good deal less vigorously in view of their precarious, besieged position. By putting virtually the entire air fleet of Operation *Deny Flight* in the highest state of readiness, NATO made it clear to the Bosnian Serbs that the ultimatum was to be taken seriously. The Bosnian Serb leaders eventually decided to back down. They agreed to the removal of their heavy weapons from the exclusion zone around Sarajevo and to the cease-fire around the city. UNPROFOR was promised complete freedom of movement within the exclusion zone. In response, NATO decided not to conduct any more air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions for the time being.

The success of the 'Sarajevo model' boded well for the other safe areas and for the enforcement of the freedom of movement for UNPROFOR troops there. The Bosnian Serbs themselves indeed took the sting out of the NATO threat of air strikes by complying - just enough - with the demands of NATO and UNPROFOR. They allowed the relief of the Canadian battalion in Srebrenica and agreed to humanitarian flights to Tuzla airport. A new 'test' of the resolve of NATO and the UN came two months after the Sarajevo episode. At the beginning of April 1994, the Bosnian Serbs mounted a heavy attack on the protected area of Gorazde. When several UN observers came under artillery fire, UNPROFOR requested close air support. On 10 and 11 April, NATO planes bombed Bosnian Serb artillery positions at Gorazde. It was the first time that NATO had provided close air support for UN personnel. It did not, however, have the desired effect: the shelling of the safe area of Gorazde just carried on. The North Atlantic Council then announced, after a request from Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, that NATO would use air strikes to protect all safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO also established a heavy weapons exclusion zone of twenty kilometres around Gorazde. Furthermore, the Bosnian Serb besiegers were to withdraw from a zone of three kilometres around the centre of Gorazde within three days, allow UN convoys to enter and guarantee full freedom of movement to all 'blue helmets' in the protected area. The Bosnian Serbs gave in on 23 April.

In the confrontations in Sarajevo and Gorazde, the UN and NATO had finally shown the necessary resolve, at least that is how it looked to the outside world. Nonetheless, the Gorazde episode had, at the same time, once again revealed a number of fundamental weaknesses in the air strike concept. All heavy weapons were still in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. UNPROFOR still had insufficient manpower for a strict inspection regime. NATO's promise to set up exclusion zones for the other four safe areas (Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla and Zepa) turned out to be an empty one. Furthermore, the UN was more willing than NATO to give the Bosnian Serbs the benefit of the doubt with regard to the way in which they met the ultimatums. The Bosnian Serbs had been a little too slow in their incomplete meeting of the deadlines. They blamed this on, for example, bad weather or provocation by the Muslims. However, the UN wanted to get medical support and extra 'blue helmets' to the besieged safe areas as quickly as possible, so they chose to give the Bosnian Serbs the benefit of the doubt. This led to discussions with the NATO commanders, who wanted strict and credible observance of the exclusion zones. No large-scale air strikes resulted in the end, but it was clear that the procedure whereby both organisations had to approve air actions, the so-called 'double key', could cause major problems in future incidents.

In any event, the threat of air strikes and the imposition of weapons exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde barely had any effect on the course of the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the summer of 1994, the fighting merely became more intense. The ethnic cleansing continued unabated, there were frequent casualties among UN personnel, the Bosnian Serbs stepped up their blockades of the safe areas (including Srebrenica) even further and Sarajevo airport had to be closed regularly because of the fighting. Only in two cases, both again around Sarajevo, did NATO opt for the air strike method. On 5 August, NATO planes bombed positions of the Bosnian Serbs after they had taken heavy weapons from a UN weapon collection point. On 23 November, NATO bombed a tank after a Bosnian Serb attack on a UN vehicle in the weapons exclusion zone.

In the meantime, yet another extension of the *Deny Flight* mandate had been announced. In the middle of November 1994, the Security Council and the North Atlantic Council decided that the four UN protected areas in Croatia should also come under the protective umbrella of *Deny Flight*. The blue

helmets there were highly dispersed and thus extremely vulnerable. Shortly after that, on 25 November 1994, NATO forces bombed the air field at Udbina, which lay within UN Protected Area South. The Krajina Serbs had used the air field earlier that month for air strikes on Bihac. Thirty-nine NATO aircraft were involved in the attack on Udbina. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali nonetheless spoke of a 'proportional deployment', as only the runway was hit. Aircraft and buildings were deliberately avoided to keep casualties to a minimum. The attack on Udbina was above all a political signal rather than an attempt to take out the air field definitively.

The effect on the course of the conflict was, again, minimal. What is more, operational problems continued to plague the conduct of *Deny Flight*. This was again apparent at the end of November, when UNPROFOR requested close air support during a heavy Bosnian Serb attack on Bihac. NATO planes circled above the area for an hour, but had to return without having done anything because of the risk that UN personnel and civilians would also be hit.

And so Operation *Deny Flight* stumbled on. Despite a further deterioration in the situation around the safe areas and continued ethnic cleansing, the UN and NATO still made scarcely any use of air power until the spring of 1995. A great many differences of opinion and problems were dividing NATO and the UN. UNPROFOR in particular was worried about the negative effects of new NATO bombing campaigns. There was always a great danger that the Bosnian Serbs would take 'blue helmets' hostage or break off the delicate negotiations. When, after a while, it turned out that approximately 150 Bosnian Serb soldiers had assembled in the three-kilometre zone around Gorazde, UNPROFOR abandoned the idea of retaliation from the air. It was in any event virtually impossible to 'measure' precisely the extent to which the parties were observing the cease-fire and the exclusion zones. UNPROFOR also lacked the manpower for this. Furthermore, close air support could only, according to the general rule, be used against 'smoking guns' (firing tanks, artillery or troops). That opportunity seldom arose.

All these considerations and complications were very real. On 25 and 26 May, NATO aircraft conducted air strikes on ammunition depots near the Bosnian Serb town of Pale, not far from Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs responded with the capture of just short of four hundred 'blue helmets'. Although the threat from the air formed the core of the safe area concept, air strikes were not used during the Bosnian Serb offensive against Srebrenica in July 1995. The close air support by two Dutch F-16s on 11 July came too late to prevent the fall of the protected area. Shortly afterwards, Bosnian Serb forces also overran the nearby enclave of Zepa.

Operation *Deny Flight* was only able to break free of its operational and political chains when, in the second half of 1995, the situation on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina changed completely. With the fall of the East Bosnian safe areas and the withdrawal of most of the 'blue helmets', the risk of hostage-taking disappeared. Added to that was the fact that the Serbs had suffered heavy losses on the battlefield against the Croats and the Muslims. But it was another dramatic incident - again in Sarajevo - which led directly to a new (and, as it turned out later, definitive) phase in Operation *Deny Flight*. On 28 August 1995, the Bosnian Serbs again shelled the market in the centre of Sarajevo. This time, 37 civilians were killed and more than 80 people were injured. The NATO bombing offensive, *Deliberate Force*, started two days later. This consisted of a series of air attacks on Bosnian Serb military targets, such as artillery positions, air defence artillery, ammunition dumps and command posts. NATO made it clear that the air strikes were also intended to prevent

further attacks on the remaining safe areas and to guarantee full freedom of movement for UNPROFOR personnel. NATO was now operating independently and using its own rules of engagement.

Faced with the rapidly turning tide on the battlefield, the Bosnian Serbs gave in to a new NATO ultimatum. On 20 September 1995, therefore, the Alliance decided to suspend further air strikes for an indefinite period. Free of its restrictions and re-cast in the robust form of Operation *Deliberate Force*, Operation *Deny Flight* had finally been able to prove its worth. *Deny Flight* was officially terminated on 20 December 1995. The NATO air fleet continued to control the airspace above Bosnia and Herzegovina, but now with the support of the 'green' NATO implementation force, IFOR, in Operation *Joint Endeavour*.

14

Demobilisation operations

Section 1 - Introduction

1401. Once a conflict has ended and a peace settlement or treaty has been concluded, measures must be taken (quickly) to consolidate the peace. In this respect, it is important to focus initial attention on demobilisation and demilitarisation and thus reduce the chances of any resumption of hostilities. Disarming the parties is a measure which could contribute significantly to the peace process in this context.

The term 'demilitarised zone' is used in the humanitarian law of war (in Article 60 of the Additional Protocol of 1977). Parties in a conflict may, by agreement, accord an area the status of demilitarised zone. Neither troops nor military operations are permitted in such an area.

1402. **Demobilisation** consists of activities undertaken by a peace force to reduce the size and equipment of armed forces in the area of operations to the levels agreed in a peace settlement. The terms demilitarisation and disarmament are also used in this regard. **Demilitarisation** means that military personnel and equipment are relieved of their military function. **Disarmament** is a sub-process of demilitarisation. It refers to the (controlled) removal of weapons from armed forces. One could say that demilitarisation and disarmament take place as part of demobilisation operations.

Section 2 - Characteristics

1403. Security is a precondition for a lasting peace. An **elementary security structure** is thus required as a basis for peace-building operations. After all, without a certain minimum in terms of security, it is unlikely that the actions of the peace force will be successful in the long term. Demobilisation operations thus in effect often relate to the first (implementation) phase of a peace settlement or treaty. It is for this reason that these operations represent such an important part of the peace-building process.

In 1995, in his 'Supplement to An Agenda for Peace', Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali focused attention on such aspects as the importance of disarmament in the context of peace-building measures. The Secretary-General used the term 'micro-disarmament', with which he referred to the disarmament within the context of conflicts in which the United Nations is involved as a security organisation: 'Micro-disarmament is practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands. The contemporary significance of micro-disarmament is demonstrated by the enormous proliferation of automatic assault rifles, anti-personnel mines and the like. Competent authorities have estimated that billions of dollars are being spent yearly on light weapons, representing nearly one third of the world's total arms trade. Many of those weapons are being bought, from developed countries, by developing countries that can least afford to dissipate their precious and finite assets for such purposes, and the volume of trade in light weapons is far more alarming than the monetary cost might lead one to suspect.' (Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, 3 January 1995).

1404. Demobilisation will usually form part of a **comprehensive peace settlement**. This is a settlement in which parties undertake to end the conflict and to start work on the rebuilding of the conflict area. Military personnel and equipment will be demilitarised, for example by sending the majority of personnel home and collecting the equipment at storage sites. The size of the armed forces a party may have is established and checked in consultation. This could be done by an international organisation such as the UN, but also, in the context of confidence-building measures, by the other parties.

And collecting the equipment at storage sites.

Photograph: Media Centre

RNLA

(UNTAC, Cambodia, 1993)



1405. Demobilisation may also be among peace measures taken as part of an **interim truce**. In this case, it would not usually be full demobilisation. The measures often remain limited to disarmament or demilitarisation. The size of the available armed forces is generally not discussed and it is difficult to monitor the demobilisation. Given that it is an interim truce, there is always a chance that mutual suspicion will be rife, as will be the inclination to keep possession of weapons.

1406. Demobilisation operations occur in **connection with other operational tasks**. As part of interpositioning, demilitarisation may take place within a geographically defined buffer zone. When safe areas are established, combatants in those areas may also be disarmed. Disarmament may be necessary in the context of humanitarian tasks in order to create a certain amount of security for the performance of those tasks. Demobilisation may also be required as a stabilising measure in the context of a preventive deployment.

1407. The execution of a demobilisation operation can only be successful with the **consent** of the parties involved. Parties are, after all, going to be relieved of one of their main instruments of power. Demobilisation without consent is really only possible with the use of (considerable) force.

1408. When conducting demobilisation and disarmament operations, it is important to know what role weapons play in a country's **history and culture**. Operations might be conducted in countries in which weapons are part of everyday life. Weapons may be symbols of pride and power, so one cannot assume that they will just be handed in automatically. If the peace force takes this into account, they may be able to command respect and exert a positive influence in respect of the success of the operation. The distinction between personal weapons and the weapons of a unit is also vitally important. However, none of this alters the fact that the peace force must not indulge in any bargaining. If the mission is to confiscate all weapons, a cultural background does not constitute a reason for partial or complete failure to do so.

1409. The **credibility** of the demobilisation operation depends entirely on the extent to which the peace force is able to provide and guarantee security. If this fails, the parties' willingness to cooperate will diminish. The credibility will also be measured against the ease with which the peace force can ensure that the demobilisation operation proceeds simultaneously and evenly for all the parties involved.

1410. **Unity of effort** in a demobilisation operation focuses on more than just achieving cohesion in the operation. Unity of effort must also be sought with other international organisations involved in the implementation of the peace settlement. This will bolster credibility and thus promote confidence in the operation. Since the parties in a demobilisation operation are actively involved, the course of the operation must be coordinated with them. Especially where parties are themselves responsible for certain infrastructural or logistic facilities that are required, coordination with them is essential.

Section 3 - Aspects of planning and execution

1411. When planning demobilisation operations, the following aspects in particular must be considered:

- the context in which the operation will take place
- the desired end state
- time factors
- the willingness of parties to cooperate

1412. The **context** in which the demobilisation operation is conducted influences the planning and the way in which it is conducted. The nature and content of the settlement are deciding factors in this respect, as are the circumstances in which it was reached. If parties are put under pressure to demobilise, cooperation will be difficult. This also applies to a settlement in which the demilitarisation of one party is a condition for the approval of another.

1413. If a demobilisation operation forms part of a **comprehensive peace settlement**, the operation must be planned and conducted in conjunction with other peace-building measures, such as the reconstruction of the economy and the re-establishment and training of the police apparatus. Economic measures will help to provide job opportunities for former military personnel. This will offer them some future prospects and increase the willingness of the parties to cooperate in the demobilisation operation. Unemployment is also a major cause of social unrest, which can undermine the success of the operation.

1414. A well-functioning police apparatus will create a sense of security among the population. This in turn helps to build confidence in the new community and offers possibilities for the future. A special operation is set up, usually by the UN, for the reorganisation of the police apparatus. The execution is assigned to an international police organisation consisting of civil police monitors and trainers. These personnel do not normally have executive police authority, nor are they armed.



Re-establishment and training of the police apparatus.

Photograph: Directorate of Information, Ministry of Defence (WEU-UPF, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mostar, 1995)

1415. In the context of an **interim truce**, there are often no other measures for the purposes of reconstruction. There will, however, be humanitarian relief activities. The cooperation of the parties in the demobilisation will be limited, as there will (as yet) be no solid basis for stability. It may also be the case in these circumstances that one of the parties has only reluctantly agreed to the demilitarisation. A possible consequence is that in practice there is little sign of consent, especially locally, and compliance with the demilitarisation measures is minimal.

In 1993, the UN Security Council declared six areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina safe areas, with the consent of the belligerent parties. The UNPROFOR peace force was given the task of supervising these areas. A condition for the Bosnian Serbs to consent to this was the demilitarisation of the areas. The local UNPROFOR units were tasked with the disarmament and demilitarisation of the combatants.

1416. The chance of success will be further enhanced if there is consent and cooperation from neighbouring countries. If they do not cooperate with the settlement, there is a chance that weapons will enter the country illegally by way of these countries. It is important for the peace force to take this into consideration and to take additional steps independently of the situation. Such steps may, for instance, be to post observers on approach roads, at ports or airports which provide opportunities for the movement of goods from the neighbouring countries.

1417. The **desired end state** depends partly on the context in which the demobilisation operation takes place. If it occurs as part of a comprehensive peace settlement, it must result in a situation in which weapons

are collected and placed under the control of the peace force, troops are billeted in barracks and the demobilised military personnel are reintegrated into the community. The aim in this case is to create a security structure which will guarantee safety and stability and will benefit the further development of the peace process.

1418. In the event of demilitarisation or disarmament as part of an interim truce, it will be difficult to determine the desired end state. The measures will often be confined to the disarmament of the parties in established protected areas or other designated areas in the conflict area which are placed under the control of a peace force. Because the cooperation of the party or parties involved is uncertain, it may be difficult to establish whether full demilitarisation or disarmament has been achieved. There is a considerable likelihood that there will appear to be no more weapons but that, at the same time, weapons are being kept in secret so that parties are ready to resume hostilities.

1419. In a demobilisation or disarmament by force, for example as part of a peace-enforcing operation, the operation is mainly limited to the disarmament of the parties. In this case, there is often no full demobilisation initially. The main objective is thus primarily to create a certain degree of security for the conduct of other operational tasks or for the humanitarian relief by aid agencies. Once peace has been established by a peace-enforcing operation, attempts can still be made to conclude a peace agreement. The desired end state is then similar to that of a comprehensive peace settlement, as described earlier in this chapter.

When UN personnel became the target of attacks by belligerent parties in Somalia in 1993, the Security Council issued a resolution. This enabled the UNOSOM II troops to use force to disarm General Aideed's militias. This example is a perfect illustration of the risks of such a unilateral measure; the UN's credibility was damaged as a result and the operation later had to be terminated as a failure.

1420. Arrangements for demobilisation within a peace agreement or a cease-fire are often difficult for parties to accept. For this reason, it is important that, once a settlement has been agreed, the peace force is **deployed rapidly and in good time** in order to take advantage of the fragile agreement and consent. The positive political climate must not be allowed to deteriorate as a result of a slow deployment, nor must resistance to the presence and objective of the peace force be allowed to occur at a low level in the parties.

1421. The success of a demobilisation operation depends on the **cooperation of the parties**. The efforts of the peace force must at all times be focused on gaining and preserving the cooperation of the

parties. This can be achieved by giving the parties an active role in the peace process, for example by setting up a consultative structure in which they are represented. They could also conduct reciprocal inspections under the supervision of the peace force. This will help to build confidence in the execution of the mutual demobilisation.

UNTAC was a UN operation in Cambodia in 1992 and 1993 in which demobilisation and disarmament constituted important aspects of the peace agreement. It was later concluded that the delayed deployment was one of the reasons for the limited success of this operation. A strong military presence immediately after the signing of the peace agreement would probably have kept the Khmer Rouge more involved in the process. A Mixed Military Working Group was set up to keep the parties as involved as possible in the peace process. This consultative body was chaired by the UNTAC Force Commander and involved all Cambodian parties. Initially, only military matters were discussed here, but it gradually became a forum in which all sorts of conflicts could be discussed and resolved.

1422. A full demobilisation operation is **conducted** in several stages:

- bringing about a peace settlement
- establishing and managing a cease-fire
- the withdrawal and assembly of the parties
- disarming the parties
- dispersing and, if possible, reintegration of the parties

1423. A **peace settlement** is brought about after negotiations about the calling of a truce or as a result of a peace-enforcing operation. The agreement concerning demobilisation is in principle made on the basis of approval by the parties involved. The peace settlement must include details about the procedure for establishing and maintaining the cease-fire. In this phase, the peace force is mainly occupied with the preparations. Only if there has been a peace enforcement operation will the peace force proceed immediately to an enforced demobilisation.


1424. In an agreed **cease-fire**, arrangements are usually made with regard to a geographical demarcation and a timescale for the implementation. The circumstances under which a cease-fire is agreed and implemented may be particularly violent. In this phase, the peace force deploys in the area of operations and is mainly concerned with checking compliance with the cease-fire.

1425. In order to be able to monitor the cease-fire, direct supervision is needed on both sides of the cease-fire line. This could be carried out by observers or patrols on the ground and in the air. The agreement in question must also give definite instructions with regard to powers and responsibilities in the context of investigation, arbitration and the possibility of sanctions.

1426. A firm and vigorous response to violations of the cease-fire is essential. A delayed or inadequate response to violations reduces the value of the cease-fire, has an adverse effect on the security situation and damages the credibility of the peace force. The rest of the demobilisation operation may suffer serious complications as a result.

1427. Before it is possible to proceed with full demobilisation, the military units of the parties must leave the conflict area and withdraw to agreed areas. Terms such as **regrouping** and **cantonment** are used in this context. Regrouping means that parties withdraw their units and assemble in assembly or regrouping areas. This is primarily a responsibility of the parties themselves. The peace force monitors the assembly areas and will escort the parties from there to the cantonment areas. The location of the cantonment areas is established by agreement between the parties and the peace force. Cantonment areas are administrative centres for the temporary accommodation, disarmament and demobilisation of military personnel.

Figure 14-1: Diagram of the withdrawal and assembly of the parties.



1428. From the point of view of security and impartiality, the withdrawal and assembly occurs in principle at the same time throughout the area of operations. For this, a strict **time and activity schedule** must be drawn up by the peace force staff and coordinated with representatives of the parties. Good arrangements for reception and

efficient logistic support are absolutely indispensable for the success of such an operation. The parties themselves are responsible for the preparations and logistic facilities in the cantonment areas. In this phase, the peace force is tasked with the overall supervision, reporting on progress, the registration and storage of weapons, monitoring the area of operations and assisting in or supervising the demobilisation operation. The peace force can also make a start on registering the locations of heavy weapons.

*Collection of weapons.
Photograph: Media Centre
RNLA
(IFOR, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 1996)*



1429. In the cantonment areas, the parties' military units will be **disarmed** and **demobilised**. The success of the disarmament depends on the trust placed by the parties in the demobilisation process in general and in the ability of the peace force to guarantee the overall security in particular. It is not just about the surrendering of weapons, but also about the collection of weapons in storage depots, ammunition stocks and the denial of supply routes. It is in this respect essential that confiscated or surrendered weapons and equipment are guarded and registered efficiently.

1430. In the context of the **reintegration** of demobilised military personnel, individuals will be selected for the future security units of the (new) authorities; the remaining personnel will be prepared in the best way possible for reintegration in the community. Personnel destined for reintegration will be registered as such in the cantonment areas, issued with a demobilisation certificate and given provisions (food, money, transport) for the return to their homes.

1431. Personnel who are to form part of the new armed forces or police units will remain in the cantonment area until a pre-arranged date. This phase is mainly the responsibility of the civil authorities and must be implemented in conjunction with other government agencies. The peace force's primary task in this phase is to **support the civil authorities**. As an exception, the peace force will assist in the instruction and training of new security units.


UNTAC: THE SUCCESS OF A FAILED DEMOBILISATION

UNTAC, the UN operation in Cambodia in 1992 and 1993, defied many of the 'rules' of peace operations and is nonetheless regarded as a success. UNTAC was originally supposed to be a 'blue' operation under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. But even before the deployment of the first UN troops, one of the parties, the Khmer Rouge, withdrew its consent to the operation and refused the UN troops access to the area under its control. Moreover, the Khmer Rouge violated the agreed cease-fire at will and refused to cooperate in the disarmament and demobilisation. The United Nations was thus forced, contrary to all intentions, to allow the deployment of the units to precede the setting up of logistic facilities, with all the inherent risks. The UN even briefly considered using force to enforce access to the area controlled by the Khmer Rouge. They then continued the peace process without full demobilisation and themselves eventually largely undid the disarming of the parties who had stuck to the agreement. However, this risky approach by the United Nations turned out all right in practice. After eighteen months, when the mandate expired, Cambodia was in a better position than it would have been without UNTAC.

That UNTAC could not fail had been established right from the word go. The UN Secretary-General appointed in January 1992, Boutros-Ghali, had written his 'Agenda for Peace' just before the start of UNTAC. This report, presented in July, was to be the UN's guide for the further development of peace operations. In UNTAC, therefore, it was not only Cambodia's future which was at stake, but also that of the United Nations and the new Secretary-General. This also justified the considerable size of the force and the high cost of the operation. In all, some 20,000 people worked for UNTAC in Cambodia over a period of eighteen months, including 16,000 military personnel. According to the official UN statement, the costs amounted to 1.6 billion dollars and brought the organisation to the brink of bankruptcy.

Nonetheless, UNTAC's success cannot only be ascribed to the UN. The end of the civil war in Cambodia was mainly due to the end of the Cold War, which prompted the major powers to withdraw their support for the belligerent parties. Because of a lack of resources and mainly against their will, the parties were thus forced to end the conflict. The credit due to the UN is for the fact it did not fail to take advantage of this opportunity. However, the peace process

Map of Cambodia and the deployment of UNTAC troops during the demobilisation



and the demobilisation operation in particular suffered constantly as a result of the negative motivation for the consent to UNTAC.

The four parties which were to be put in cantonment areas, disarmed and reintegrated in the civilian community in the demobilisation had all come into being in the course of the civil war. The Cambodia which had been destabilised by the Khmer Rouge, an orthodox communist guerrilla movement supported by Peking. After taking control of the capital Phnom Penh in April 1975, the Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, began a reign of terror. Only an armed intervention by the now united Vietnam, supported by the Soviet Union, put an end to Pol Pot's regime. The Khmer Rouge then withdrew to the virtually inaccessible jungle in the north and west of Cambodia, along the border with Thailand. Vietnam and Thailand had already vied with each other in the past for power in Cambodia; the Vietnamese invasion thus drove Thailand and the Khmer Rouge closer together.

Two new anti-Vietnamese guerrilla movements also appeared on the scene. Firstly there was the non-communist but Peking-backed Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (known as the 'Khmer Blanc'), founded in 1979 by the former premier, Son Sann. In addition, there was the *Front uni pour un Cambodge indépendant neutre pacifique et coopératif* (FUNCINPEC), supported by the United States and communist China, founded by Norodom Sihanouk, the king exiled in 1970. These three parties united in 1982 and eventually made life so difficult for the Vietnamese that Hanoi withdrew its troops in 1989. This left a Moscow-backed government and government forces behind. In the meantime, Thailand had become further involved in the civil war as some 400,000 Cambodian refugees had sought refuge in camps in Thai territory just across the border. Food, money, weapons and other military equipment found their way, partly through Thai territory, to the Khmer Rouge, the Khmer Blanc and FUNCINPEC. These movements also infiltrated the refugee camps to recruit new members and get their share of the international humanitarian aid. After the end of the Cold War, the Khmer Blanc and the FUNCINPEC were forced to end their fight against the similarly weakened

government forces. The Khmer Rouge was less affected than the other movements by the disappearance of foreign support. This was because the Khmer Rouge had a considerable financial reserve and exploited the economic resources of the controlled area in true capitalist fashion, working with the Thai army and Thai businesses and banks.

In April 1991, the four parties agreed to a cease-fire. In order to give the new peace process a chance, the UN sent the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to the country. The mission, initially comprising some three hundred personnel, was to use a network of liaison officers to get consultations going between the four warring factions down to the lowest level. UNAMIC was also to set up a mine awareness programme for the civilian population and reconnoitre and prepare the encampments for the peace force which was to be deployed, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

On 23 October 1991, just two weeks before UNAMIC became operational, the parties had signed a peace agreement in Paris. One of the stipulations contained in the agreement offered the UN the opportunity to act as a transitional authority. Together with the Supreme National Council (SNC), in which all four Cambodian groups were represented, the UN was to take charge of the demobilisation of the armed forces, the return of the refugees, the holding of elections, the approval of a constitution and the accession of a new, legitimate government.

UNTAC was thus faced with a task which was not to be underestimated and which was to be completed within a mandate period of eighteen months. The military part of the operation alone was complex and extensive. According to the factions themselves, they had a total strength of some 200,000 men at around 650 locations. Most villages also had their own militias with a combined strength of around 250,000. It was estimated that the disarmament process would cover 350,000 weapons and more than 80 million pieces of ammunition. In order to avoid endangering the precarious and frequently violated cease-fire any more than was necessary, Boutros-Ghali, immediately after his appointment in January 1992, developed a plan to deploy UNTAC with the utmost urgency. At the end of May 1992, the full-strength military component was to be present and operational. At the end of September 1992, 70% of the demobilisation was to have been completed and the next phase of the operation, preparing for and holding the elections, ready to start. UNTAC's military strength could then be halved.

Boutros-Ghali originally designated 325 regrouping areas and 317 cantonment areas for the demobilisation operation, but these figures turned out to be unrealistic. They were soon reduced to 95 and 55 respectively, half of which were intended for the government forces, a third for the Khmer Rouge and the remainder for the two smaller factions. To keep the demobilisation in 'normal' proportions, the UN abandoned the idea of regrouping and cantonment of the militias; they would thus merely be disarmed and could stay where they were. The first phase (the deployment of UNTAC) commenced on 15 March 1992 with the arrival of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Japanese Akashi, and the Force Commander, the Australian General Sanderson, in Phnom Penh. Their first action, the setting up of a consultative structure with the SNC, went well. After that, however, things soon started to go wrong. At the end of March, the commanders of the Khmer Rouge decided not to support the peace process any longer. This decision was immediately 'translated' into an increasing number of violent incidents and a growing lack of cooperation. At the beginning of June, this stance was confirmed in the SNC with the refusal to cooperate with the disarmament and to allow UNTAC to enter the area controlled by the Khmer Rouge. The reason the faction gave for

this was that the deployment of UNTAC was proceeding so slowly that it could not guarantee the safety of the population. The Khmer Rouge also accused UNTAC of partiality, as not all foreign (read Vietnamese) troops had yet left Cambodia.

The first accusation was not completely unfounded. The deployment of UNTAC got behind schedule, partly because of the time-consuming procedures in the United Nations in New York. At the end of April, the Force Commander had just over 3,500 troops. Ultimately, it would not be until mid-July 1992 that all twelve battalions were up to their operational strength. The UN had in any event increased the tempo of the deployment by not waiting for the end of the logistic build-up operation. The second accusation was, to put it mildly, far-fetched. The entire Vietnamese army had, after all, left the Cambodian 'wasps nest' in 1989. The only foreign units in Cambodia, therefore, belonged to the Thai army, with which the Khmer Rouge had collaborated in its own territory.

UNTAC's Dutch battalion was to bear the full brunt of the problems faced by the operation in this phase. This was, however, no accident. The UN had been pleasantly surprised when the Netherlands had offered a Marine Corps battalion for the operation in Cambodia. From the Dutch point of view, this was the most logical offer, as this Corps consisted mainly of professional personnel, unlike the Royal Netherlands Army, most of which was still made up of conscripts. Moreover, because of its level of training and readiness, the Marine Corps was perfect for the operation. Because of their high quality, the Dutch and French contributions in particular stood out from the other commitments to UNTAC. The two European battalions were, therefore, assigned the most troublesome sectors: the French got the most difficult terrain and the Dutch got the sector with the strongest bastion of the Khmer Rouge. This was an area in the western part of Cambodia, along the border with Thailand.

This area was of great financial and economic value to the Khmer Rouge. It was rich in tropical hardwood, which the Khmer Rouge exploited by giving generous felling concessions to Thai contractors in return for a share in the profits. The wood then reached the world market through Thai territory. The Khmer Rouge used the same method to cash in on the supply of precious stones in the ground. At the beginning of the nineties, Bangkok became the centre of the world market in this field, with an 80% share in the global supply. Approximately one third of this came from the part of Cambodia under the control of the Khmer Rouge, especially from the area surrounding the town of Pailin, in the middle of the sector destined for the Dutch battalion.

With this ace up its sleeve, the Khmer Rouge was able to continue its usual strategy, even without foreign support, to ensure the allegiance of the population. Since their banishment from the central part of Cambodia to the less developed border areas, Pol Pot and his followers had tried to entice the rural population into their area. First, the areas outside the Khmer Rouge-controlled territory were made more dangerous; socio-economic aid programmes were then used to offer the refugees a new life under the protection of the Khmer Rouge. Against this background, the appearance of UNTAC was an outright disaster. Where the UN promised peace and security, the Khmer Rouge regarded the operation as nothing more than a threat to its strategy and financial base.

The commander of the Dutch battalion soon found out how the land lay. His reconnaissance group did manage to enter the Dutch sector at the beginning of May 1992, although the troops were only granted freedom of movement by government forces and the Khmer Blanc. When the commander himself

arrived from Thailand at the border with his 35-strong advance party on 27 May 1992, however, the barrier remained closed. Personal intervention by Akashi and Sanderson in Pailin three days later was to no avail. When the deployment of the main force started at the beginning of June, it was thus confined to those parts of the sector which were under the control of government forces and the Khmer Blanc.

What the Dutch experienced was typical of the attitude of the Khmer Rouge throughout Cambodia. It was around this time, therefore, that Akashi came up with the idea of using force to enforce access to the Khmer Rouge's area. Dutch marines were thus to be brought by helicopter from Thailand into their sector. However, this operation, called *Dovetail*, found no favour in the eyes of the Force Commander. He considered the units tailored to a 'blue' operation unsuitable for a combat operation such as this. He also foresaw that the Asian UNTAC participants who had not yet sent their units would turn their back on the operation if it looked likely to become 'green'. *Dovetail* was subsequently scrapped.

The slow deployment of UNTAC and the obstruction by the Khmer Rouge were of course sources of concern to Boutros-Ghali; the operation was in danger of losing its momentum. The second phase of the operation had officially started on 13 June 1992, namely the cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of the parties. Indeed, only four of the twelve battalions were operational at that time, but UNTAC was virtually up to strength a month later. By the middle of June, there were 13,512 military personnel in the cantonment areas and not one of them was a member of the Khmer Rouge. It was clear that the attitude of the Khmer Rouge had frightened the other parties. Boutros-Ghali suggested to the Security Council that either the disarmament be suspended pending the consent of all parties or that preparations be made for the next phase (the elections) without having achieved anything like a successful disarmament. The UN could then but hope that the Khmer Rouge would be deterred by political pressure from disrupting the elections. The Security Council eventually chose the second option and stipulated the suspension of the disarmament and the date of the elections (May 1993) in resolutions of 13 October and 30 November 1992 respectively.

The disarmament and demobilisation, once praised by Boutros-Ghali as 'essential elements both for the cease-fire and for the achievement of the other objectives of UNTAC', had failed. The unruliness of reality, expressed by personnel in statements such as 'it was a nice idea, but I have not seen it work anywhere' and 'everyone cheated everyone else', was thus clearly illustrated. While the Khmer Rouge created unrest with renewed guerrilla actions, the cantonment stopped at 55,000 men, just over a quarter of the total. Some 40,000 of them were in any event permitted to go home on harvesting leave, on condition that they would respond immediately to any call to report for duty. UNTAC never saw them again. The Force Commander felt that this remarkable end of the demobilisation was actually a blessing in disguise. The detention of 200,000 young men, who were used to the undisciplined life of the guerrilla, in primitive cantonment areas and without any prospect of work would undoubtedly have led to unmanageable situations in a short space of time. There was still the problem of the safety of the local population, especially during the elections. Here, too, the UN opted for a pragmatic solution. The units of the three factions which had cooperated with the demobilisation were to work with UNTAC to provide security during the elections. For this reason, they were given back some of their surrendered weapons on the eve of the elections (which took place from 23 to 28 May 1993). In September 1993, UNTAC further strengthened the ties with these three

factions, now unified in the Cambodian National Armed Forces, by paying their troops. This move, known as Operation *Paymaster*, not only allied the three factions to UNTAC, but also ensured their loyalty to the new government. After UNTAC's departure (mid-November 1993), this army was to prove strong enough to stand up to the Khmer Rouge. The main military problem in Cambodia was thus solved, albeit in an entirely different way from that envisaged in UNTAC's mandate. All in all, an example of thinking in terms of objectives.

15

Military aid/support to civil authorities

Section 1 - Introduction

1501. Military aid/support to civil authorities (subsequently referred to as 'military assistance') is the **supportive actions** of a peace force at the request of a government or of a regional or local authority. If there is no effectively functioning authority or government, military assistance may consist of direct support for the civilian population. Military assistance of this sort is also regarded as part of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and can, therefore, be described as a CIMIC operation. Military assistance is provided by military units, possibly in conjunction with civilian specialists. Military assistance also incorporates the sale, donation or loan of (military) assets.

Military aid also incorporates the sale, donation or loan of (military) assets.

*Photograph: Media Centre
RNLA*

*(SFOR, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 1998)*



1502. Military assistance can be provided in a national as well as an international context. The national form of military assistance (military support) is dealt with in ADP IV. This chapter describes military assistance in the context of peace operations and concerns, therefore, the multinational form. Given that military assistance can come in many shapes and sizes, the section entitled 'Aspects of planning and execution' in this chapter looks exclusively at the aspects which apply in general terms.

Section 2 - Characteristics

1503. The **objective** of military assistance is to get a country out of a crisis and enable its people to live a normal and independent life in peace. Military assistance is provided to restore and maintain:

- the sovereignty of the state
- order and authority
- public amenities

1504. Restoring and maintaining the sovereign state form the framework for all activities performed in the context of military assistance. Public order and legitimate authority are essential if an effective form of civil administration is to be created and the internal security of the state improved. If there is no legitimate authority, a peace force could fulfil this role until the legitimate government and the civil police are in a position to take it on themselves. The unit providing the military assistance thus temporarily forms the 'strong arm' of the civil authorities. Effective armed forces are also indispensable with regard to maintaining sovereignty. Military assistance can, therefore, also focus on restoring and maintaining well-trained and well-equipped armed forces which are properly anchored in the democratic institutions of the state.

1505. Military assistance is in principle provided in a relatively stable security situation with a low force level. As indicated in Chapter 8 of ADP I, military assistance will normally be provided in the **post-conflict phase** of peace operations. Military assistance may be preceded by an operation to enforce public order, which would pave the way for installing a legitimate government. Military assistance will normally be part of a larger peace operation. It is also conceivable, however, that military assistance could take the form of an independent operation.

1506. Characteristic of a military assistance operation is that the peace force, local authorities and organisations and even the parties in the conflict operate jointly. This cooperation can have a positive effect on the level of consent for the operation. Military assistance, therefore,

does not only benefit from consent (as do all operational tasks during a peace operation), but can also help to obtain it.

1507. The basic principles of **impartiality** and **transparency** are particularly important in the implementation of military assistance. This is because the presence of military personnel to support the administrative apparatus may give the impression that the peace force is in fact also operating on the instructions of the civil authority in question. A country's own (para)military factions may also have acted repressively during the conflict. There may be an atmosphere of mistrust. Openness about objectives and impartiality in the performance of tasks are thus recommended and may lead to a situation in which the civilian population consents to the presence and tasks of the peace force.

1508. Military assistance comprises a great many activities which are also diverse in nature. The **following activities** can be distinguished:

- supporting the election process and supervising the transition to a democratically elected form of government
- forming local police and security units
- clearing mines and training local people
- administrative matters
- maintaining public amenities
- protecting individuals, groups and installations
- supporting the civil administration in the coordination of humanitarian aid operations

Supporting the election process.

Photograph: Audio-visual Service RNLN (UNTAC, Cambodia, 1993)



1509. Supporting the election process and supervising the transition to a democratically elected form of government. Restoring order and authority and creating a safe environment are essential conditions for success in organising elections. Military assistance in elections may consist of:

- setting up and protecting polling stations
- monitoring the progress of the elections
- protecting and transporting ballot boxes and the election staff
- providing specific material support, such as setting up a communications network

1510. Forming local police and security units. Police and security units have often used repressive measures to uphold law and order during the conflict. The military assistance will focus primarily on supporting the international civil police organisation which is tasked with forming a well-functioning police and security apparatus. Only in exceptional cases will the aid also consist of training and equipping units.

1511. Clearing mines and training local people. The Netherlands adheres to the principle that the country in question is itself responsible for mine clearance. In principle, therefore, Dutch military personnel do not perform any activities in respect of mines or explosives. The aid focuses on the distribution of information about mines and explosives, informing local people with the aim of making them aware of the danger of mines, training the required personnel and possibly setting up a national mine centre.

1512. Administrative matters. Military assistance in administrative matters is desirable in the absence of a well-functioning government apparatus. The aid may consist of providing support and advice in relation to public administration. It may be in connection with legal matters or it may be to do with providing communications and transport support. In extreme cases, a temporary military administration may be installed. The provision of support must be geared towards enabling the legitimate administrative apparatus to perform its administrative tasks independently as soon as possible.

1513. Maintaining public amenities. Public amenities such as water, energy, public transport, communications facilities and medical care constitute an essential part of the daily life of a community. If the

government apparatus is no longer functioning, it will no longer be able to bear the responsibility for maintaining these public amenities. It is also possible that these amenities will have been damaged or destroyed as a result of the conflict. Military assistance could help to restore, maintain or (temporarily) supply these services.

1514. **Protecting individuals, groups and installations.** Such tasks are, in principle, the responsibility of the civil police. During the transition to a stable situation, military personnel of the peace force may be used to perform these tasks. They may also be required to support the civil police force in the performance of its tasks. A role such as this will be particularly appropriate for the Royal Marechaussee in conjunction with other similar (gendarmerie) units. This could be the case in what is known as the ‘third force concept’.

The ‘third force concept’ refers to the deployment of a unit for tasks which are conducted nationally by a mobile police unit or for tasks which are indeed police oriented but which must be performed at a high force level. In this way, the ‘gap’ between military assets and unarmed police monitors without executive powers can be filled. This provides the international community with ‘police’ assets which do have these powers and which can act robustly.

1515. **Supporting the civil administration in the coordination of humanitarian aid operations.** If military assistance follows a protracted conflict, considerable support will probably be needed from civil aid organisations. Units may be asked to support the civil administration in the coordination of humanitarian relief or even to take on the whole of this relief task. In this case, the military assistance could involve setting up a military communications network, liaising with aid agencies or conducting reconnaissance for the purpose of assessing the humanitarian emergency. The peace force may also be deployed immediately to alleviate human suffering. This would then be classed as a humanitarian operation, the characteristics of which are described in Chapter 17.

Section 3 - Aspects of planning and execution

1516. The analysis of the assignment must produce a clear picture of the end state which the military assistance is meant to achieve. Restoring and maintaining the sovereign state, which can independently provide public order and legitimate authority, remain the **intent of the military operation**. The method and time of transfer of the tasks to the existing or future authorities will have to be made clear.

1517. Given that a large number of tasks (such as administrative tasks) do not fall within the primary domain of military personnel, one must

ensure that the necessary expertise is available within the peace force. A command of the language spoken locally, a thorough knowledge of national politics, history and cultural aspects of the country and the region are also extremely important in the execution of these tasks. It may be the case that the Royal Netherlands Army does not have combat-ready personnel with the required skills. The use of **reserves or contractors** may offer a solution with regard to providing the required personnel.

1518. As well as regular units, special CIMIC units may also be assembled to conduct military assistance operations. The expertise required to perform the tasks is combined in these units. Another possibility is that organic units are tasked with the provision of military assistance. They will then have to be reinforced by specialist personnel. Another possibility is that the Netherlands deploys specialist personnel as a contribution to multinationally assembled CIMIC units.

1519. When conducting a military assistance operation, the commander must have contingency plans and a reserve for the purpose of supporting the public administration in **dealing with disturbances** such as riots, terrorism and the eruption of violence of a more structural nature. The possibility to react is essential for balanced actions and the opportunity to influence the situation. In this respect, the commander must weigh the requirement for protective measures against the need to deploy his reserve in unforeseen circumstances.

Support in dealing with disturbances.

Photograph: Operational Staff CinC RNLA (SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1998)



1520. Military assistance may also relate to the **restoration of order and authority** in the area of operations. This restoration could play an important role in the civil rebuilding of the country. It is possible that the civil police force is no longer of any significance and that it has lost its power because of the disappearance of the central authority. There may be corruption and abuse of power within the police apparatus. In a situation like this, the international community may set up a police force, which could help to train the local police by giving advice and assistance. The peace force often works with an international police force such as this by providing protection in dangerous situations and exchanging information.

As part of the process of restoring and maintaining order and authority, a peace force may be confronted with riots or disturbances involving the local population. Such incidents may be organised by the parties in the conflict and could restrict the peace force's freedom of movement. It would be unacceptable to use military assets in such a situation. As a result, there is often what is known as a crowd and riot control (CRC) unit. It may be the case that every national contingent has its own CRC unit, or that the peace force has such a unit at central level.

1521. Commanders must use every opportunity to shift the responsibility for the execution of tasks to the civil authorities as soon as possible. The criterion for the **transfer of a function** is the ability of the civil authorities in question to conduct the task themselves without support. Such decisions are sensitive and require balanced judgement. A premature handover could lead to an unstable situation, even a return to the situation before the crisis. Prolonged support can be just as damaging, as it could lead to a 'wait-and-see' attitude, a lack of initiative, insufficient resolve and a loss of confidence in one's own abilities. Withdrawal must be flexible and in keeping with the political developments.

1522. There are three forms of withdrawal:

- **Rapid withdrawal**, as soon as there is a prospect of a successful handover.
- **Phased withdrawal**, in which the phases can be accelerated or slowed down. The phases can be linked to functions or regions.
- **Partial withdrawal** by turning direct aid (whereby troops perform tasks themselves) into indirect aid, whereby advisers are deployed.

1523. During military assistance operations, it may be necessary to take **collective control measures** at first, such as a curfew, patrols or searches of premises. These measures will not be popular with the locals and will have to be carefully prepared, supervised and explained. The aims of these measures are:

- to provide a deterrent to violence and crime
- to restrict the possibilities for demonstrations
- to reinforce the function of the local administration
- to limit the illegal transport of weapons and smuggling
- to take wanted persons into custody
- to identify subversive activities and to obtain information

IN SUPPORT OF A SHAKY DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL POLICE MONITORS IN HAITI

The police apparatus plays a key role, certainly if a state wants to trade in its dictatorial past for a democratic future. The new, democratically elected leaders will at the very least want to thoroughly purge and restructure the old police apparatus. Even better would be to disband the entire organisation in order to rebuild it from scratch, with, incidentally, all the inherent tensions. In the 1990s, the international community intervened in sovereign states more readily than in the past to get the process of democratisation on the right track. It goes without saying that careful international control and intensive monitoring of the legal system form part of such an intervention. Given the substantial interests, this is obviously a sensitive and complex matter. This proved to be the case in Haiti in the first half of the 1990s. The democratic government which came to power here had to deal with a legacy of nearly two centuries of dictatorial rule. An American-led international force, the Multinational Force (MNF), ensured a relatively stable security situation in Haiti in Operation *Uphold Democracy*. The new, democratically elected government was thus able to get off to a credible start. At the same time, International Police Monitors (IPM) were to help the restructured Haitian police force achieve independence and a democratic attitude. A Belgian-Dutch detachment (the BE/NL Police Monitor Unit) was part of the IPM organisation in 1994 and 1995.

The international military assistance in the transformation of the old Haitian police apparatus was by no means straightforward. Haiti has a long history of poverty, corruption and incompetence, during which military interventions by the United States alternated rapidly with military coups d'état. One of the most notorious Haitian dictators came to power in 1957: François 'Papa Doc' Duvalier. In 1971, he handed power to his son, 'Baby Doc' Duvalier. Their *Tonton Macoute* militia in particular earned itself an appalling reputation of brutal repression.

The first signs of a change for the better became visible in the course of the 1980s. International criticism of the poor human rights record in Haiti and severe internal unrest led to the hasty departure of 'Baby Doc' Duvalier in 1986. A new period of internal unrest and military coups ensued until free elections could finally be held under international supervision in December 1990. Two-thirds of the Haitian population voted for the charismatic priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. He formed a government, but was ousted by army leader General Raoul Cedras within a year. Aristide then fled to Venezuela in October 1991. The Organisation of American States (OAS) and the United Nations sharply condemned Cedras' coup d'état, but it was actually the problem of the tens of thousands of Haitian boat people which put the Haiti issue on the American (and thus international) agenda.

To put pressure on the Cedras regime, the United States made a strong case in the Security Council for a partial international embargo against Haiti. Although this had no effect initially, in June 1993 the Security Council adopted resolution 841. This acknowledged that the worrying situation in Haiti, particularly the refugee problem, was a threat to international peace and

security. The resolution also imposed a full oil and arms embargo against Haiti. This time it looked as if General Cedras would back down. On 3 July 1993, Cedras and the exiled President Aristide signed the Governor's Island Agreement. The main elements of this agreement were the return of Aristide as the legitimately elected head of state (planned for October 1993), amnesty for those who had staged the coup of 1991, a thorough reorganisation of the army and the police with the help of the United Nations and the lifting of all sanctions against Haiti. To support President Aristide, the Security Council sanctioned the setting up of a UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Cedras, however, showed no signs of leaving. When the American warship, USS Harlan County, put into port in the capital, Port-au-Prince, in the middle of October 1993 with the first two hundred American UNMIH military personnel on board, armed gangs were waiting for the UN contingent on the quayside. The Americans did not want to risk a bloody confrontation, so the Harlan County turned back with nothing to show for its pains.

This humiliation, plus the difficult problem of the boat people, served to make the American government more resolute. This time the United States called for even more robust measures: a complete maritime blockade of Haiti. When Cedras once again refused to give in, preparations began for yet another military intervention. At the end of July 1994, the Security Council approved the setting up of an American-led Multinational Force (MNF) to enforce the Governor's Island Agreement, if necessary with force. After the military intervention, the MNF operation (to be conducted on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter) was to be replaced by the UNMIH peacekeeping operation (under Chapter VI of the UN Charter). UNMIH was to continue the supervision of the process of democratisation. A few hours before the planned invasion by the MNF, Cedras and his followers decided to make the best of a bad job. A last-minute attempt at mediation by an American delegation led by former president Carter was successful. This time, the rebels finally accepted the provisions of Governor's Island Agreement and left. The first American MNF units landed on 19 September 1994 and the Aristide government was able to get to work by the middle of October 1994.

Disarming the old, repressive security apparatus, purging 'contaminated' officials and setting up a new, democratically trained Haitian police force formed an important part of the international intervention. More than eight hundred International Police Monitors (IPMs) from twenty countries supervised the 're-educated' Haitian police. The peace-enforcing MNF operation and the IPM deployment thus took place alongside each other.

The Carter mission had prevented a forced entry by the MNF, but at the same time had inadvertently produced an extra complication. The departure of the Cedras regime and the peaceful arrival of the MNF meant that neither the Haitian armed forces (which included the national police) nor the hated 'Attachés' (the successors of Duvalier's *Tonton Macoute* militia) with their abundance of military assets could be eliminated. This elimination was one of Aristide's priorities as he badly wanted to start with a 'fresh' security apparatus. However, the United States and the MNF did not now dare to tackle the immediate and radical elimination of the still largely intact and armed security apparatus, afraid as they were of the unrest which would undoubtedly arise as a result. Especially during the first few weeks, this was manifested by enormous restraint on the part of the MNF in respect of the existing police force. Often, MNF military personnel did not intervene if Haitian civilians were suffering abuse at the hands of the police or the army. This passiveness-by-necessity indeed served to reduce the credibility of the MNF and the IPM among the local population. Only after a few serious incidents and a tightening up of the rules of engagement did the MNF succeed in bringing

about a reduction in the political violence and criminality.

The return of law and order did not yet mean, however, that a smooth transition to a new and democratic police apparatus was possible. Because the MNF considered the rapid and total dismantling of the old police apparatus too risky, they opted for a pragmatic solution in the form of a temporary Interim Public Security Force (IPSF). This consisted mainly of the more 'reliable' members of the old police force and army. However, the IPSF officers had virtually no civil police skills. They did receive rapid training as part of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program provided by the American Ministry of Justice, but this consisted of 42 training hours in all. Experts agreed that this was by no means enough to purge an establishment with such strong authoritarian roots. The IPSF was also poorly motivated. Its members feared that there would be no place for them in the reformed and purified National Police. This fear was justified, given the fact that President Aristide wanted to exclude all members of the old security apparatus from government posts for at least a year to begin with. With his sharp rhetoric, Aristide fuelled the profound suspicion of 'the terrorists of old' even further. The protection of the IPSF against the rage of the vengeful population thus turned out to be a major task for the IPM police force!

The distrusted IPSF thus damaged the credibility of the Multinational Force and the International Police Monitors among the population. But President Aristide's new National Police also had to earn the respect of the population. The recruitment of the required five thousand officers was difficult at first. The United States organised a short period of training, but there was at that point no time for a thorough and time-consuming training programme. Moreover, the new police force was still, as it were, up in the air to some extent because of the absence of a good legal system (courts, legal profession, jails and so on).

It was within this highly demanding framework that the BE/NL Police Monitor Unit (as part of Operation *Columbus*) had to operate. In September 1994, the Dutch government had indicated its willingness to contribute fifteen Royal Marechaussee personnel to the IPM force. This offer was combined with the Belgian contribution of thirty members of the military police. The language problem (the official language in Haiti is French) was largely solved by the presence of the Walloons in the monitor unit. The special status of the IPM officers was in any event apparent because of the fact that they, unlike the 'blue' police forces of the UN, wore yellow caps and were not spread throughout the organisation but operated as national contingents.

Each IPM detachment was in charge of a district, the size of which depended on criminality statistics and the population density. The BE/NL Police Monitor Unit was first assigned the presidential district in Port-au-Prince, but the discussions in the Lower House about the potential risk for the Marechaussee personnel caused such a delay in their deployment that by the time they arrived in the Haitian capital they were no longer needed there. The Belgian-Dutch unit was then assigned the northwestern town of Port-au-Paix in the middle of November 1994. There, in contrast to the rest of Haiti, it was relatively quiet. The MNF contingent in Port-au-Paix consisted of ten soldiers from the American Special Forces, who, incidentally, found it somewhat difficult to hand over their tasks after being responsible for the area for weeks. The locals were in any event happy about the presence of the MNF and IPM personnel, which meant that the use of 'non-persistent chemicals' (such as pepper spray) was not required for keeping the peace.

When performing their tasks, the Belgian and Dutch monitors were also confronted with the intractable legacy of the old repressive establishment, the pariah position of the interim police force, IPSF, and the teething troubles of

the new National Police. Although in practice the monitors gave a great deal in the way of advice and instructions, structural training tasks fell outside their mandate. The IPM concentrated mainly on the daily supervision and support of the local police force. The fearful IPSF officers normally preferred to stay in the relatively safe surroundings of the barracks. There were also too few patrol vehicles, which meant that the Belgian and Dutch monitors spent a great deal of their time ferrying the Haitian officers around. Perhaps the most important police procedure that the Haitian officers had to learn was keeping records up to date. Under the old Haitian legal system, it was all too easy to arrest and detain suspects. The local jails were also badly in need of improvement. After a number of escapes, the Dutch Marechaussee personnel thus took the initiative in 1995 in the building of new cells.

The first members of the new National Police arrived in the Belgian-Dutch district around Port-au-Paix in December 1994. Some of those involved were the so-called Guantanamo trainees: trainee officers who had been recruited by the Americans from the thousands of Haitian refugees in the huge camp at Guantanamo naval base (an American enclave in Cuba). The members of the National Police were reasonably well motivated and disciplined, but they only had a few days of training behind them. The local IPSF officers treated their successors with great suspicion, a logical attitude in view of the fact that they themselves were facing an uncertain future. That same month, the IPSF force was, therefore, disarmed by American special forces on the orders of President Aristide. The IPM played no role in this, given that the task of disarmament fell outside their mandate. It was some time before the National Police managed to win the trust of the population, partly because they started off by wearing the uniform of the old, much-hated police force. The BE/NL Police Monitor Unit invested a great deal of time in explaining its own role and that of the National Police to the people of Port-au-Paix.

The Dutch Marechaussee personnel and the Belgian military police worked with the same mandate, the same rules of engagement (which permitted armed force for self-defence; in any event, the Belgians were armed with rifles, the Dutch with pistols) and the same investigative powers. In general, the BE/NL Police Monitor Unit was relatively restrained in its actions. They avoided risky night patrols and individual movements as much as possible. Nevertheless, the actions of the Dutch differed from those of their Belgian IPM colleagues in a number of areas. As general investigating officers, the Dutch Marechaussee personnel had more experience in dealing with the civilian population than did the Belgian military police, whose work sphere was confined to the armed forces. The Belgians, for their part, acted on reports more independently than the Dutch. They intervened themselves wherever possible, while the Marechaussee personnel preferred to get a Haitian police patrol to the scene first. The only serious shooting incident in the Belgian-Dutch sector occurred on 8 January 1995 when a patrol of four Belgian MPs opened fire on a suspect who was resisting arrest.

In January 1995, the Security Council declared the situation in Haiti sufficiently 'safe and secure'. This cleared the way for the departure of the MNF and the takeover by a renewed UNMIH mission. The transition period, in which the IPM police force was relieved by a new CIVPOL operation, commenced at the beginning of March 1995. The first CIVPOL officials arrived in Port-au-Paix in March 1995 to take on the task of supervising the local police force. The Marechaussee contingent eventually returned to the Netherlands on 17 March 1995. The MNF formally handed over its responsibilities to the 6,000-strong UNMIH peace force on 1 April 1995.

Was the IPM force's military assistance to the new, democratically elected

Haitian government of President Aristide a success? In the shorter term, the IPM - including the BE/NL Police Monitor Unit in the already relatively peaceful Port-au-Paix - improved the upholding of law and order within the 'safe and secure environment' created by the MNF. The military assistance helped to reduce criminality and to ensure a calm run-up to the elections, which were held under the auspices of UNMIH three months after the departure of the IPM force. These were considerable successes, especially in view of the legacy of almost two centuries of political and military violence and a complete absence of any form of democracy whatsoever. Whether the military assistance by the IPM monitors (and after March 1995 by CIVPOL) will sustain its positive effect in the long term will depend on the question of whether the new Haitian leaders succeed in anchoring the purged and restructured police apparatus in a democratic order. The quality of the current establishment has indeed undergone considerable improvement, but it is, as before, centrally controlled and thus open to abuse. Furthermore, large sections of the legal system (particularly the courts and the jails) are still in their infancy. It is unlikely that even a highly-motivated and well-trained Haitian police corps will be able to develop properly in such a situation.

16

Non-combatant evacuation operations

Section 1 - Introduction

1601. A non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) is an operational task conducted to evacuate **civilians** or **unarmed military personnel** from the crisis or conflict area to a safe or safer environment. An NEO involving units of the Royal Netherlands Army will in principle be intended to rescue Dutch citizens or citizens of allied nations for whom the Dutch government feels responsible.

The term 'non-combatant' is used here to refer to civilians and unarmed military personnel, in principle holding Dutch citizenship. Refugees, civilians and unarmed military personnel of other nationalities may also be regarded by the Dutch armed forces as non-combatants but must in that case be designated as such by the Dutch government. Although the evacuation of a country's citizens will always remain a national responsibility, an international evacuation operation may be organised in such a way that Dutch citizens are evacuated by units of other countries or that Dutch units also evacuate citizens of other countries. Agreements have been made within the European Union to the effect that first a country's own citizens and then citizens of another EU member state are eligible for evacuation. Only then will citizens of other (friendly) nations be evacuated.

1602. An evacuation operation could, however, be conducted to get **refugees** from a crisis or conflict areas to a safer environment or to escort them on their way to it. Such an operation could be conducted nationally, in close cooperation with the other Services (as a joint operation). The evacuation of refugees will in principle be conducted in a multinational context. This chapter deals mainly with the doctrine for a non-combatant evacuation operation.

1603. A **military evacuation** is considered if the local authorities can no longer guarantee the safety of the non-combatants. A military evacuation may also be the solution if there are serious doubts as to whether non-combatants will be able to leave the country under their own steam. There might be so many evacuees that civil transport facilities cannot meet the requirements. In that case, military assets may be used as well. It may also be the case that the quality of the infrastructure available (airfields, ports) necessitates the use of military assets.



The evacuation of refugees will in principle be conducted in a multinational context.

*Photograph: Dutch Press Agency (ANP)
(NEO, Albania, 1997)*

1604. A military unit which conducts an NEO (the so-called evacuation formation) must provide the evacuees with protection, transport, medical care and the initial reception and escort them to a safer place. The evacuation operation is only conducted for those who want to be evacuated. In order to prevent any legal action against the Dutch government after the operation, any pressure on potential evacuees to be evacuated must be avoided. In a relatively safe situation, the evacuees will leave the area themselves using civil assets. If the situation deteriorates, there will come a time when a safe independent departure is no longer possible and military assets will have to be used to conduct an evacuation operation.

Section 2 - Characteristics

1605. The **responsibility** for the safety, the protection and, if necessary, the evacuation of Dutch nationals outside Dutch territory lies primarily with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The local Dutch representative, the Ambassador or the Consul (the usual generic term is *Chef de Poste*) draws up the necessary plans and organises the evacuation if the need arises. If the host country can no longer guarantee the safety of Dutch nationals and the *Chef de Poste* cannot arrange sufficient (civil) transport capacity, he may request support in the form of military assets. The

Chef de Poste nonetheless remains responsible for the smooth running of the evacuation of Dutch nationals from the country or conflict area in question.

1606. The Dutch *Chef de Poste* will have prepared a **(civil) evacuation plan**, which is constantly updated. This evacuation plan describes the way in which information will be relayed from the *Chef de Poste* to the Dutch nationals in the country in question in the event of a crisis. The plan also describes the procedure which must be followed for an orderly evacuation. The plan is based on a system of civil defence wardens; these are regional and local volunteers who provide the communication between the *Chef de Poste* and the members of the Dutch community. Wardens also advise and assist the *Chef de Poste* in the preparation and execution of the evacuation, particularly at the initial reception at the 'reception points' and in the supervision of the flow of refugees through the evacuation chain.

1607. If possible, an evacuation is conducted **in an international context**. There are in principle two options in this respect:

- An **international security organisation** (for example NATO or the WEU) is tasked with the planning and preparation and is in charge of the execution. The member states may make a contribution consisting of units for the command and control, the protection of non-combatants, their transport and logistic support, including medical support. A joint force is thus formed. The decision-making is in principle sanctioned at government level, after which the conduct of the operation is mandated to the relevant security organisation.
- A number of countries join each other to form an **ad hoc coalition** to conduct the evacuation operation (known as a 'coalition of the able and the willing'). The coordination of the planning and preparation as well as the leadership during the execution is thus in principle a joint responsibility of the national diplomatic representatives in the country in question. One country could also operate as a framework nation and look after the coordination between the national *Chefs de Poste* and the leaders of the force conducting the NEO. The military-operational control of the NEO will of course remain the responsibility of the force commander.

An example of the second option is the evacuation operation in Albania in April 1997 (Operation *Alba*). The collapse of Albania's financial system at the beginning of 1997 marked the start of an uprising against the government, which led to serious disturbances and soon degenerated into complete chaos and anarchy. The flows of refugees created as a result of this intrastate conflict caused major problems in Italy in particular. After approval by the United

Nations Security Council, a decision was taken to form a peace force (led by Italy) to evacuate European nationals. The peace force then received orders to protect the aid transports coordinated by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Italy, France, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Austria and Denmark participated in the force.

1608. Account must be taken of **international organisations**, such as the United Nations and the International Red Cross, and multinational commercial concerns which may have personnel in the conflict area. These organisations and concerns are also likely to have their own evacuation plans. The point at which they implement these plans will be one of the factors influencing the decision of countries to evacuate their citizens. Intensive and timely coordination by the relevant civil and military authorities with these actors, both in the Netherlands and in the theatre of operations, is of vital importance. One should be aware, however, that coordination such as this could be sensitive, especially if the autonomy of these organisations and concerns is at stake.

1609. An evacuation operation could be conducted **nationally** (as a joint operation) if an evacuation becomes necessary at extremely short notice. In that case, international decision-making does not always guarantee the necessary speed of action. An important aspect in this respect is the assessment of the gravity of the situation. Countries will often have different interpretations of the situation in the country or conflict area in question and will by no means always advocate the more or less simultaneous implementation of their (civil) evacuation plans. Moreover, countries are not always willing to delegate to other countries the responsibility for the evacuation of their citizens.

1610. In extreme cases, evacuation operations could thus be conducted **simultaneously by several countries**. The consequences of such a scenario must not be underestimated; where national forces operate alongside each other, dangerous situations may arise. Troops may also compete with each other for the use of air- and seaport facilities, infra-structure and so on. This means that in the event of simultaneous NEOs, the actions of the national contingents operating in the country of conflict area in question must at all times be coordinated and every attempt must be made to avoid any disharmony. This could mean that the leaders and units of the national evacuation formations work closely together in practice, even though there is no formal arrangement for cooperation.

The collapse of the regime of Jean Claude ('Baby Doc') Duvalier in Haiti in 1986 led to anarchy on the island. In response to this, the American government decided to order the headquarters of the forces in the Caribbean (Joint Task Force 140) to start planning an NEO. During the planning and preparation for this operation, it turned out that the French Antilles Command was also getting ready to evacuate French nationals. Although the NEO was never conducted, the limited sea- and airport facilities in Haiti would certainly have led to problems if each formation had conducted its own operation without any form of coordination.

1611. Under the applicable **international law**, an evacuation operation should ideally be conducted with the consent of the government of the host country. Without consent, such an operation could, after all, be seen as an act of aggression. Consent from the host nation government can also provide the necessary support in respect of the availability and use of infrastructure and facilities. Also with regard to intelligence and military information and protection, the consent of the authorities in the area of operation can contribute to a successful NEO. Lastly, it may also increase the level of acceptance (or at least the chances of cooperation) by the local population.

1612. The **environment (i.e. permissive or non-permissive)** to which the evacuees or the evacuation formation are exposed will determine the way in which the operation is conducted. This environment can:

- differ per location or region in the country or conflict area in question
- differ in time per location
- stem from the violent conflict in the region or focus directly on the evacuees or the evacuation formation
- cause the conflict to flare up again

1613. The government of the country in which the conflict takes place may indeed consent to the evacuation of foreign nationals but, because of the **actual situation in the country**, might not be able to exert its authority in all areas. As a result, a locally and temporarily dangerous situation may nonetheless arise for the evacuees or the evacuation formation in spite of the government's cooperation and consent. There may also be cases where the host government has not consented to the evacuation but where the local situation is so stable that the evacuees are in relatively little danger. All this illustrates the fact that the environment in which the NEO takes place is a deciding factor in respect of the form the operation is to take.

1614. A distinction is made between two types of evacuation operation:

- **Permissive evacuation.** The government of the host country has given permission to a (limited) force to evacuate non-combatants

and can to some extent guarantee the safety of the evacuees and the troops. Military support may remain limited to the provision of facilities such as communications, transport and logistic support.

- **Non-permissive evacuation.** The government of the host country has not given permission to a force to conduct an evacuation operation. It also has little or no control over the political or security situation within its national borders. Account must be taken of the possibility of covert or overt armed resistance to the NEO. The scale of the operation can vary, but in the worst case it may be necessary to conduct a full military operation with all elements of combined arms. A specific example of such an operation is the liberation of hostages.

On the basis of the situation assessment as established during the planning phase, an evacuation operation may be planned on the basis of a permissive environment. However, the unstable political or military situation in the host country or conflict area which has made an NEO unavoidable may quickly result in a non-permissive situation. The planning for an evacuation operation must, therefore, always incorporate contingency plans for a deterioration in the situation. This means, amongst other things, that the force commander must always have units or assets which enable actions at a higher level of force, even in a permissive evacuation. Within NATO, this has led to the doctrinal principal that an NEO should always be planned on the basis of a worst-case scenario.

1615. The fact that it is considered necessary to evacuate civilians or unarmed military personnel means that there is a certain (military) threat. If a force is to have any chance of conducting a successful NEO, it will have to have at least the same, but preferably superior **military capacity**. This is because the environment can deteriorate so quickly that it will not be possible to bring up extra units or equipment. On the other hand, if too much force is used too soon, the legitimacy of the operation and the support of the government and the local population may be forfeited. It is precisely in an NEO that the aim will thus be to indeed have sufficient assets in reserve in or near the area of operations, but to in principle conduct the operation without the use of force and with as little show of force as possible.

1616. An evacuation operation also requires a great deal of **transparency**. The objective of the force must be absolutely clear and discussed in good time with all parties in the conflict, the local population and the international media. It must be stressed that the only concern is the safety of the (foreign) civilians, unarmed military personnel and any refugees. As soon as they are safe, the force will withdraw and will undertake no further activities in the conflict area. Also in keeping with this aspect, however, is absolute clarity about the force's military

capabilities and rules of engagement. After all, an accurate assessment by the parties in the conflict with regard to the capabilities and intentions of the force will have a deterrent effect and thus improve the safety of the troops and the evacuees.

1617. Lastly, **impartiality** is an absolute precondition in the case of an evacuation operation in a conflict involving several parties. All parties in the conflict, including the (elected) government of the country in question, must see that the peace force does not identify with the objectives of any of the parties but determines its own independent position. This could be a problem in an NEO, given that cooperation with and from the government of the country in which the conflict is taking place is indispensable, certainly in the event of a permissive environment. This could be seen by the other parties in the conflict as evidence of support for the governing regime. It is even possible that the evacuation operation will be seen as a precursor to a military intervention. Only by treating all parties in the conflict honestly, consistently and (in so far as it is possible and relevant) even-handedly can the force hope to conduct the NEO successfully.

In the event of an evacuation operation necessitated by a situation of the government's own making, it goes without saying that the condition of impartiality no longer applies. Two examples of such NEOs are the Israeli rescue operation in Entebbe (Uganda) in 1978 and the American attempt, aborted in the initial phase, to free hostages from the Iranian capital, Teheran (Operation *Blue Light*, 1980).

Section 3 - Aspects of planning and execution

1618. The **national decision-making** for an evacuation operation is a combined action of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, whereby the Minister of Foreign Affairs has the ultimate decision-making authority in respect of the conduct of an NEO. It is also possible, however, that the Prime Minister will personally involve himself in the decision-making about an NEO. The Minister of Defence is ultimately responsible for the military-operational conduct of the evacuation operation. Figure 16-1 shows the main activities of both Ministries in relation to each other.

1619. Although the *Chef de Poste's* **civil evacuation plan** is intended to conduct an evacuation using civil assets, it contains the basic information needed by the military planners in the event of a non-permissive evacuation. A civil evacuation plan will contain at least the following information:

- the address of Dutch nationals who have registered with the Dutch diplomatic representation
- the location of reception points to which evacuees should make their way independently, should the need arise
- the warning and information system for the Dutch community
- an inventory of the commercially available transport facilities for a possible evacuation
- the organisation for leading and coordinating the evacuation (task allocation, responsibilities, powers)




Figure 16-1: Diagram of activities in a non-combatant evacuation operation

1620. The civil plan makes provisions for an **evacuation in four phases**, the starting point of which is the decision by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to recommend no further travel to the country in question.

• **Phase 1: Increase vigilance**

The Dutch community in the country in question is informed about the - possibly impending - crisis and advised to prepare for a possible evacuation.

• **Phase 2: Reduce**

Dutch nationals (particularly women and children) who have no pressing reason to stay are advised to leave the country independently. The rest are advised to take steps to facilitate evacuation at short notice.

- **Phase 3: Assemble**

The remaining Dutch nationals are advised to report to specially selected and prepared reception points where it is easier to guarantee their safety.

- **Phase 4: Evacuate**

Those members of the Dutch community who are still present receive advice and assistance to leave the country or conflict area.

1621. The task of **announcing these phases and advising Dutch nationals** abroad in respect of an evacuation is a responsibility of the Dutch *Chef de Poste*. He decides, therefore, whether or not an evacuation operation should actually be conducted or indeed terminated. Sometimes the ‘assembly’ preceding the actual evacuation will be either impossible or unnecessary and the only decision is whether or not steps should actually be taken for departure. The tasks of recommending the departure of family members and assembling the Dutch community are preceded by consultations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, unless of course the situation escalates so rapidly that there is no time for this.

1622. If the situation deteriorates, the *Chef de Poste* may ask for support from individuals or units from the armed forces. These may include:

- a **liaison officer from the Military Intelligence Service**, who can advise the *Chef de Poste* about the military situation in the country of conflict area
- detachments of **special forces** to provide:
 - * the critical information required by the political and military planners in the Netherlands and by the *Chef de Poste* and his staff
 - * assistance for the *Chef de Poste* and his staff in their own evacuation
- a **security detachment**, which can advise on and actually provide protection for the *Chef de Poste* and his staff

1623. The Minister of Foreign Affairs submits the request for support to the Minister of Defence. The subsequent decision-making procedure has already been described in detail in Chapter 5. If the situation deteriorates further and the need for an evacuation operation becomes genuine, a **reconnaissance and liaison team** from the evacuation formation may be deployed to provide direct contact with the Ministry of Defence and the Commanders in Chief of the Services. This liaison team could also make the military-operational preparations for the evacuation operation. All officials and units designated for this purpose must have secure communications equipment, in so far as this is not already available to the Dutch diplomatic representation.

1624. The Dutch armed forces have military planning documents for the execution of NEOs, which are prepared and updated by the Defence Crisis Management Centre. These documents are as follows:

- **Generic NEO plan.** This contains general information and describes the procedures to be followed in the planning, preparation and execution of an NEO by units of the Dutch armed forces. The document serves as a basis for the more detailed planning of an NEO in the event of a crisis.
- **Specific NEO plans.** These contain more specific information and are developed with a particular region in mind. A document such as this contains, for example, detailed information about the capacity of sea- and airports in the region and may set out agreements with allies about cooperation or support. These documents must first be updated in the event of a developing crisis.
- **Operation plans.** An operation plan contains sufficient detailed information to allow a specific operation to be conducted almost immediately. They must be updated regularly and are therefore only made for operations with a high degree of probability and what is expected to be a short warning time. Operation plans have been developed mainly for countries or regions with unstable governments and sizeable Dutch communities.

1625. In an **operational directive from the Chief of the Defence Staff**, the commander of the evacuation formation receives the order to start planning the NEO and stand by for the order to conduct it. To help him in his planning, he will have access to the military planning documents referred to previously and he can call upon the expertise available within the Defence Crisis Management Centre. An operational directive like this from the CDS can include the following aspects:

- objective and desired end state
- instructions for reconnaissance and liaison with the local Dutch representation
- the available troops and units (if already known) and the command relationship
- information or arrangements in respect of cooperation with troops of other nations
- agreements regarding the (delegated) responsibility for the evacuation of civilians or military personnel from other countries
- instructions for the (approximate) location of a forward mounting base in the vicinity of the area of operations
- the rules of engagement
- logistic arrangements for the evacuation formation, including medical support
- instructions for communications and reporting

1626. An important factor in the planning of the evacuation operation is the **number of evacuees**, as the force's various capacities (of which the transport capacity is probably the most crucial) must be tailored accordingly. However, the task of determining the number of evacuees with any accuracy is complicated by the following factors:

- It is not compulsory for foreign nationals to register with the diplomatic representative or keep him informed of their address, so there may ultimately be more evacuees than initially assumed.
- Citizens cannot be prevented from leaving the country under their own steam, even if no evacuation has been advised. Neither is it possible to make it compulsory to report to anyone in the event of voluntary departure. This could mean that there are fewer evacuees than initially assumed.
- Evacuation takes place on a voluntary basis. If Dutch nationals do not feel that the situation is dangerous, they will prefer not to leave the country.
- The number of evacuees may increase (until just before the actual evacuation) as a result of a request from another country to evacuate its citizens too.

The local staff employed by Dutch agencies or international organisations constitute a special category in an evacuation operation. On the basis of their work, they will feel that they too could or should be evacuated if, for instance, they are in danger. This will not happen in all cases. Possible reasons for this could be capacity problems (the priority for evacuation will always be given to Dutch nationals) or a different assessment of the risk by the *Chef de Poste*. An example which illustrates this perfectly is the evacuation of the American Embassy in Saigon (Vietnam) in 1975, when only a limited number of South Vietnamese employees were evacuated.

1627. Another planning aspect crucial to an evacuation operation is the time planning. The choice of the moment at which the NEO is conducted largely depends on the timeliness and accuracy of the **intelligence** obtained from the conflict area. The diplomatic representation in the country in question could play a vital role in the gathering of this intelligence. Good cooperation with the liaison officer(s) of the evacuation formation or the Defence Crisis Management Centre could substantially increase the relevance of the intelligence and the speed with which it is collected.

1628. The importance of good intelligence and military information applies particularly to **geographical and logistic aspects** of the area of operations. Examples of such aspects are as follows:

- the accessibility and feasibility (in particular the availability and state of the road system, air- and seaports as well as their infrastructural capacity)

- the distance of the home country to the area of operations and from the forward mounting base (FMB) to the area of operations
- the movement times (both in respect of the strategic movement and the movements in the area of operations), whereby account must be taken of the degradation of the infrastructure

Lastly, any requirement for units, equipment and (specialist) personnel, including civil equipment and personnel to be hired, must also be established in the planning process.

A forward mounting base is an air- or seaport to which troops are brought from the Netherlands. It may be in the country in which the evacuation operation is to be conducted, in a neighbouring country or at sea. Once the FMB has been set up, the evacuation formation will secure landing sites from there (for air and sea transport) in order to conduct the NEO.



*Including air transport.
Photograph: Operational
Staff of the Commander in
Chief RNLA
(Bonaire, DART, 1998)*

1629. The **evacuation formation** tasked with conducting the evacuation operation is in principle put together as a **task force**. Units from several Services may form part of the evacuation formation. The formation must include:

- command and control and communications elements
- units which provide protection for the evacuees, the transport assets and the evacuation formation itself (including its logistic installations)

- transport units, including air and sea transport if necessary
- units for logistic support, including the medical support, for both the evacuation formation and the evacuees

1630. The **commander of the evacuation formation** is designated by and in principle comes under the command (OPCOM) of the Chief of the Defence Staff, who gives him his orders through the Defence Crisis Management Centre. Depending on the local situation and the threat level, the headquarters of the evacuation formation could be located:

- in the country or conflict area in question
- in the forward mounting base or at another location outside the country or conflict area in question
- at sea on board a command ship

1631. An evacuation operation could be conducted **at the same time as other operations**, such as a peace support operation. In that case, the force conducting the other operation in the country in question could also be tasked with conducting the NEO. To this end, extra units will if necessary be placed under OPCON of the Dutch Contingent Commander or the Senior National Representative.

1632. In a military evacuation operation, there are normally **four phases**, each with its specific characteristics and activities:

- **Phase 1: Strategic deployment**
 - * setting up a headquarters and a forward mounting base
 - * deploying the first elements of the evacuation formation and, if necessary, special forces
 - * establishing liaison with the Dutch *Chef de Poste* and evacuation formations of other countries in order to avoid any conflict in the national plans
- **Phase 2: Preparations**
 - * deploying the rest of the evacuation formation to the forward mounting base
 - * setting up and if necessary protecting one or more forward operating bases (FOBs), thus increasing the range of the operation
 - * establishing and if necessary protecting evacuation points (EPs) in the vicinity of the threatened communities
 - * conducting further reconnaissance and practice runs if the situation permits
- **Phase 3: Evacuation**
 - * tactical deployment of the protective units to the FOB and the EPs
 - * if necessary ensuring the safety of the movement of evacuees from the reception points (RPs) to the EPs


- * ensuring the safety of the movement of evacuees from the EPs to the evacuation handling centre (EHC)
- * the safe transfer of evacuees from the evacuation handling centre
- **Phase 4: Return**
 - * dismantling the FOB and return of the deployed troops to the FMB
 - * return of the evacuation formation to the home base

Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence maintain four distinct phases in an evacuation operation. As shown in the foregoing description, these phases are not the same: the military phasing is mainly geared towards the conduct of the actual evacuation. To stay in line with the official documents of both Ministries, both structures are described alongside each other in this publication.

1633. The actual **conduct of the evacuation operation** begins with the deployment of the protective units and the transport units to the FOB and possibly to the evacuation points. This moment must, if possible, coincide with the evacuation instruction from the Dutch *Chef de Poste*. The presence of foreign troops not actually deployed for the evacuation could, after all, be seen by the host country as provocation. On the other hand, one must avoid a situation in which evacuees are left unprotected for any length of time.

1634. As already shown in the presentation of the phasing, an **evacuation chain** will be established and maintained in close cooperation with the Dutch diplomatic representation in the host country.

Figure 16-2: Diagram of the evacuation chain



This will consist of:

- reception points (if any) located near the place in which the Dutch nationals live
- evacuation points, which are centrally located in respect of the reception points
- an evacuation handling centre, which is located in a safe area (or perhaps even in the home country), where the evacuees can receive medical treatment and from where they can make their own arrangements for their onward journey

1635. The **evacuation handling centre** is in principle set up in the same place as the FMB. They will often be located in the immediate vicinity of a sea- or airport, certainly in the event of an evacuation operation outside Europe. Military personnel may help to look after the evacuees, also providing medical treatment if necessary, before they continue their journey to the country of their choice. An important condition in the choice of location for the evacuation handling centre is that there must be sufficient logistic facilities and infrastructure available for the reception of the evacuees.

Personnel of the Dutch diplomatic representation are responsible for the identification and registration of the legitimate presence of the evacuees in the evacuation chain. This means that the diplomatic representatives will in principle set up a registration and identification office as part of the evacuation handling centre. Here, Dutch citizens will also be able to get a temporary passport and possibly a loan. Citizens of allied nations can be issued with visas.

1636. Depending on the threat level, units are designated to provide protection for the evacuees during the movement from the evacuation points to the evacuation handling centre. In principle, (motorised) infantry or mechanised infantry units are assigned to this. The emphasis in this respect will be on the **protection** of the evacuation points and only in exceptional cases on the protection of the reception points. There may also be certain objects which play an essential role in the evacuation and which must, therefore, be protected. These could include friendly command posts, civil and military airspace control facilities, fuel supply installations and locations of personnel of the diplomatic representation.

1637. **Speed** is an important factor when conducting the operation, as protection can also be achieved by keeping the time spent in the host country as brief as possible. However, the force is in this respect dependent on how quickly the evacuees come forward and on the speed with which they can be moved. The Dutch *Chef de Poste* decides, together with the commander of the evacuation formation, when the operation is to be terminated.

1638. The crisis in the country or area in question which has led to the evacuation is likely to arouse a great deal of interest from the (international) **media**. One should not forget that this will also apply to the conduct of the evacuation operation. Consequently, there is also the possibility that, if the conflict escalates, the media representatives will also have to be regarded as evacuees.

THE BELGIAN OPERATION IN THE CONGO IN 1959: A PYRRHIC VICTORY

Until 1959, the independence of the Belgian colony of the Congo had never been discussed. That year, however, disturbances in the colony brought the Belgian government round to a new way of thinking. Consultations with Congolese leaders resulted in the decision by Belgium to grant independence to the Congo as early as 30 June 1960, which meant that there was hardly any time to give the colony, which numbered some 14 million inhabitants, a crash course in self-government.

Because of the paternalistic attitude which Belgium had always maintained in respect of its colony, the Congo lacked a properly developed 'upper layer'. The standard of living in the Congo was indeed relatively high, but hardly any influential positions in either the civil service apparatus or the army were yet held by the Congolese. The entire officers' corps of the *Force Publique*, the Congo's army which numbered more than 20,000 men, consisted of Belgian soldiers who had stayed in service in the Congo on a voluntary basis. There were only 30 Congolese soldiers among the NCOs.

After the declaration of independence, unrest grew in the *Force Publique*. The Congolese soldiers could not understand how the state government could be entrusted to their fellow countrymen but that the officer functions in the *Force Publique* remained out of reach for them. On 5 July, the military rebelled against this situation. They demanded more money, better promotion prospects and the replacement of the commander of the *Force Publique*, the Belgian General Janssens, by a Congolese officer. The mutinous soldiers were not only imprisoning their Belgian officers, but were also soon committing acts of aggression against other Europeans.

Despite attempts by the Lumumba government to appease the military and to restore order, the disturbances spread unchecked across the entire country. The troops were now out of control and had embarked on a frenzy of pillage and rape. Complete panic broke out among the 80,000 or so European inhabitants of the former colony. At first, many went to Léopoldville to seek the protection of the Belgian Embassy, but on 9 July a mass exodus began, both overland towards the neighbouring countries of Congo-Brazzaville, Rhodesia and Angola, and by air direct to Belgium. The international press reported the 'heart-rending scenes' which ensued, not least because of the virtually total collapse of the national transport facilities. The Belgian airline, Sabena, therefore used all available resources to set up an airlift so that the evacuation could take place as quickly as possible. The departure of the Belgian civil servants and engineers in turn contributed further to the chaos in the country, given that countless vital facilities no longer functioned without the Belgians.

Under these circumstances, the Belgian government urgently requested Prime Minister Lumumba to authorise Belgium to deploy its troops in the country to restore order, but Lumumba refused. The Prime Minister did, however, accept an offer from the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, to send military advisors to the Congo. For the Belgian government, however, this did not go far enough. Because Belgium believed that the Congolese government was no longer able to guarantee the safety of the European residents, it decided to intervene unilaterally. From 9 July onwards, Belgian paras were

operating in numerous places throughout the country to protect Europeans against the mutinous Congolese troops. To this end, extra troops were flown in from Europe to reinforce the Belgian army units which were already in the Congo under the agreement which Belgium had concluded with the young republic (but which had, incidentally, never been ratified or worked out in further detail).

As early as 9 July, Belgian troops from the Kamina base managed to bring the mutinous garrison of Elisabethville, the capital of the province of Katanga, back into line. The next day, paras who had been dropped over Luluabourg, the capital of the Kasai province, liberated no fewer than 1,200 Belgians who had been imprisoned by the rebels. Units from the other Belgian military base in the Congo, Kitona, were also operating in the port of Matadi. On 13 July, Belgian soldiers arrived in Léopoldville and occupied both the European district and the airport.

Despite the sometimes fierce fighting with the Congolese army, by now

Map of the Congo (1960)



renamed the *Armée nationale Congolaise*, the Belgian troops managed to achieve their operational objectives without too much trouble. The ultimate goal of the operation was, however, anything but clear. Nonetheless, the Belgian actions created the conditions in which the evacuation of Europeans from the Congo could be conducted with the utmost vigour. Ten days after the disturbances had begun, more than 25,000 Europeans had left the country; almost 10,000 of them had used the Sabena airlift to do so. On 16 July, the Belgian government decided to intensify the efforts in this area even further. However, the actions of the Belgian military in the Congo went much further than merely supporting the evacuation. They also tried to restore law and order in the country, which meant that the operation largely resembled a

military intervention. The attitude of the Belgians was, therefore, anything but transparent. Neither was there any question of unconditional consent to the Belgian operation. The military action by the former colonial power aroused a great deal of opposition among the Congolese population and was a thorn in the government's side. President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba felt that the Belgians were thus violating the sovereignty of the state of the Congo. After all, the Treaty of Friendship, Support and Cooperation signed by Belgium and the Congo stated that 'any military intervention by Belgian armed forces [...] may only take place at the express request of the Congolese Ministry of National Defence'. The Belgian government, however, was quick to point out that several Congolese politicians had expressed their approval for the intervention.

In one province, the Belgians were even operating at the request of the local authorities. That was in Katanga, which, because of the extensive mining industry (including copper and uranium), was the richest province in the Congo. Belgian and other international concerns thus had substantial economic interests in this region. One day after the Belgian troops had been called in to the province to assist, the head of the provincial government, Moïse Tshombe, proclaimed the independence of Katanga, whereby the situation in the Congo became even more confused. From Katanga's point of view, the Belgian military deployment, which had quickly restored peace in the province, was more in the nature of military assistance. However, the new administration in Katanga received no recognition whatsoever. Belgium also continued to recognise the sovereignty of the Congo as a unitary state, but that did not alter the fact that Belgium was cooperating closely with Tshombe.

The identification of the Belgian intervention with the secession of Katanga aggravated the attitude of the national Congolese government. On 12 July, a decision was made to request the assistance of the international community. Belgium was accused of meddling in national Congolese affairs and the Congolese government asked the UN for military assistance to counter this foreign aggression. During the night of 13-14 July, the Security Council decided to respond positively to the Congolese request. In resolution 143, the Security Council called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo. It also announced the formation of a UN peacekeeping force, which was to assist the Congolese government in restoring law and order. This peace force was to operate under the name *Opération de Nations Unies au Congo* (ONUC). The Belgian government expressed its wholehearted support for the Security Council resolution and undertook to withdraw its troops from the Congo as soon as the UN units were able to guarantee the safety of the European citizens in the country. Because Prime Minister Lumumba (and the Soviet Union) was putting pressure on the UN to end the Belgian military presence as quickly as possible, the UN Secretary-General ordered the force to deploy first in the areas in which the Belgians were active. In doing so, ONUC immediately encountered opposition in Katanga, where Premier (and later President) Tshombe refused to allow the UN troops to enter.

Once the first ONUC troops had arrived in the Congo on 15 July, Belgium began the withdrawal of its troops almost immediately, first of all from Léopoldville. UN personnel took over the control of the airport from the Belgian soldiers and thus the supervision of the Sabena airlift. In accordance with the agreements made with the UN, the Belgians completed their withdrawal from the area surrounding Léopoldville on 23 July. By this time, half of the Europeans (some 40,000 people) had left the country. In two weeks' time, Sabena had flown 152 flights and evacuated more than 25,000 civilians. At the same time, incidentally, Belgium continued to reinforce its troops elsewhere in the Congo (particularly in Katanga). More paras were also dropped in Kasai to

the south of Luluabourg to protect Europeans threatened by ethnic unrest. For Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General of the UN, it was vitally important to increase ONUC's strength as quickly as possible. This was because the Belgian government was sticking to the principle that the UN had to be able to fully guarantee the safety of the Europeans in the Congo before Belgium withdrew its troops from the country. As a gesture of goodwill, Belgium decided to make a start on the withdrawal of its forces from the Congo on 1 August. Over a week later, the Belgian units had left five of the six Congolese provinces, with the exception of Kitona military base in the far west. However, the Secretary-General was unable to gain the cooperation of the Katangese premier, Tshombe. Because Tshombe was threatening to use force if necessary to keep the UN troops out, Hammarskjöld had to postpone the deployment in Katanga, which had been set for 6 August.

On 9 August, the Security Council adopted a new resolution regarding the situation in the Congo, which called for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops. The Security Council also instructed the UN peace force to deploy in Katanga. With this mandate behind him, Hammarskjöld himself flew with 300 Swedish ONUC personnel to Elisabethville in Katanga on 12 August. For the Congolese Prime Minister Lumumba, however, this breakthrough was by no means enough. He had demanded that the UN troops bring the disaffected province of Katanga back into line, but the peace force was, of course, unable to comply.

Against this background, the withdrawal of the Belgian units nonetheless progressed steadily. By 12 August, when the first UN troops arrived in the province, there were only 3,600 of the 8,600 Belgian soldiers who had been stationed in Katanga at the beginning of August. The Belgian government had promised Hammarskjöld that it would repatriate the remaining soldiers as quickly as possible, with the exception of the technical troops at the Kamina and Kitona bases, who were for the time being indispensable. This operation was to be completed by 29 August at the latest. The withdrawal of the Belgian contingent eventually became a reality around 5 September, thus with a delay of approximately one week.

Even after 5 September, however, dozens of individual Belgian soldiers were still at Katanga's disposal. Although there were many thrill-seekers and mercenaries among them, the group also contained a considerable number of regular Belgian military personnel. The Belgian government had originally made them available to the Congolese government, but they had sided with Tshombe soon after the secession of Katanga. Both the national government and various separatist movements, which had become more prominent (and more violent) since August, made use of their services. Attempts by the UN to terminate their presence, however, ran aground, partly because the Belgian government itself made no significant effort to get its citizens to end their interference in the Congo. Not until the end of 1961 was there any improvement in the situation.

Obviously, the departure of the Belgian troops from the Congo did not mean that all the problems were solved. During the months of August and September, the situation in the Congo was complicated even further by the outbreak of tribal wars and the rift between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba. The latter almost resulted in another large-scale evacuation of nearly 2,000 Europeans from the Eastern Province in December. The provincial authorities there had declared the European residents of Stanleyville hostages in order to lend weight to their demand for the release of the now imprisoned Lumumba. It did not come to that, but the violence kept the Congo firmly in its grasp. In February 1961, the UN troops were even given the mandate to use force if necessary to prevent a civil war. It was 1964 before the

international community felt that the national government was strong enough to maintain law and order and that ONUC could be terminated.

Looking back at the events of July 1960, it is no easy task to pass judgement on the Belgian actions. Even before the month was over, there was a growing opinion in Brussels that, given the actual events, the panic among the Europeans in the Congo had been somewhat excessive. The mass exodus had only served to exacerbate the problems in the country. The evacuation was thus something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The fear, however, remained undiminished and it is doubtful that the Belgian government would have been able to halt the exodus. The deployment of Belgian troops, on the other hand, certainly aggravated the crisis surrounding the Congo even further.

In conclusion, the Belgian operation in the Congo cannot be placed neatly into a particular category of the military doctrine for peace operations. Depending on the angle or time of evaluation, the operation can be regarded as a non-combatant evacuation operation, a military intervention or a military assistance operation. It failed completely to meet the requirements of transparency and impartiality. The storm of criticism which erupted throughout the world, despite the fact that some western countries (France in particular) were able to raise some sympathy for the Belgian intervention, was thus a direct consequence of that failure.

17

Humanitarian operations

Section 1 - Introduction

1701. This chapter describes the conduct of humanitarian operations outside the Netherlands. These operations are designed to alleviate human suffering. **Humanitarian operations** are conducted as part of a broader peace support operation. **Humanitarian operations in non-PSO scenarios**, on the other hand, have the alleviation of human suffering as their main objective. Both are conducted under circumstances in which the competent authorities are unable, and in some cases unwilling, to assist in providing adequate aid to the population. The nature of the activities to be conducted is the same; the scale, on the other hand, may differ. In this chapter, the generic term of 'humanitarian operations' will be used wherever possible for both types of operation.

Over the last few years, the definition of humanitarian aid in Dutch government policy has been widened. In 1998, the Dutch government defines humanitarian aid as all activities geared towards:

- direct relief following an acute disaster
- long-term aid to refugees, displaced persons, those who remain in a crisis area and population groups in the primary reception region who suffer directly as a result of a substantial influx of refugees and displaced persons
- assistance in the initial rebuilding
- repatriation programmes, including demobilisation and mine clearance
- being better prepared for and the timely identification, prevention and alleviation of the consequences of serious humanitarian emergencies.

These emergencies could result from natural causes or from complex crises. (Letter from the Minister for Development Cooperation to the Lower House on 9 April 1998)

1702. If there is a **humanitarian emergency** which the responsible authorities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are no longer able to solve on their own, the Dutch government may decide to provide support in the form of a humanitarian operation. Such an operation will usually be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations or another international organisation. However, the Netherlands might also conduct an operation of this sort independently. As soon as the authorities in the area of operations, possibly in cooperation with the NGOs, are once again able to take on the relief task, the role of the military unit in this respect will come to an end.

1703. The conduct of **humanitarian tasks at home** falls within the framework of military assistance or support and is described in ADP IV, ‘National Operations’.

Section 2 - Characteristics

1704. There are different **types of humanitarian operation**. Moreover, the activities of a military unit during a humanitarian operation can in turn be subdivided into main tasks and specific tasks. Figure 17-1 shows the terms used and how they relate to each other.




Figure 17-1: Terms and relationship between humanitarian operations.

1705. The main objectives of humanitarian operations are:

- to save lives
- to alleviate human suffering
- to offer the prospect of resuming a dignified existence

The desired end state is, therefore, normally defined in terms of ending human suffering and moving towards acceptable standards (given the local conditions) in respect of the provision of the primary necessities.

1706. The **military contribution** to a humanitarian operation will in principle take the form of support for the civil aid agencies. In 1994, the United Nations (through the former Department of Humanitarian Affairs, now renamed the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) issued guidelines for the deployment of military personnel in humanitarian operations:

- humanitarian organisations will determine which situations require the deployment of military personnel
- military assets should only be used if there is no civilian alternative
- the humanitarian operation will retain its non-military character
- military personnel will respect the humanitarian principles and the NGO Code of Conduct (see Chapter 2)
- large-scale military involvement must be avoided
- the humanitarian operation will retain an international character

If the authorities in the conflict area do not consent to the humanitarian operation, it then becomes a question of a humanitarian intervention. This is defined as the use or threat of force by one or more states within the territory of another state, the main objective being to prevent or stop serious violations of fundamental human rights. An operation of this sort is characterised by a wide objective; the aim is not only to distribute humanitarian aid to the population, but also to put a stop to violations of human rights. Another aim of the humanitarian intervention could be to provide military protection for aid workers and to enable and support humanitarian operations. The peace operations in northern Iraq (*Provide Comfort*, 1991) and Somalia (UNOSOM 1, 1992) could also be classed as humanitarian intervention operations. In general, however, the guidelines for humanitarian aid adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1991 apply. They require that the country in question consents to the humanitarian operation. They thus reflect the primacy of the principle of non-intervention and respect for the domestic jurisdiction of a state, as stated in Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations.

1707. An additional problem in the conduct of a humanitarian operation is that there may be a great many factors of influence; for example, the geography, the climate, the threat level and the number of actors. It is usually a question of a **complex emergency**, which makes the performance of tasks difficult. This is because it will not be possible to concentrate solely on the relief effort, as a disproportionately large share of the available personnel and equipment will have to be used to provide security and support for the troops and the civilian aid workers.

1708. **Legal basis.** The legal basis for a humanitarian operation will usually be expressed in an agreement with the state in which the operation is to be conducted - the acceptance of an offer of assistance may be sufficient - or in a request or resolution from the United Nations Security Council. As for a humanitarian operation which takes place in the context of an armed conflict, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols of 1977 are also important. This is because these Conventions and Protocols contain clauses which relate to the protection and care of military and civilian casualties of inter-state and intra-state conflicts. In general terms, these clauses can be regarded as international unwritten law. This means that all parties in a conflict must abide by these regulations.

1709. A large number of **non-military organisations** will also be involved in most humanitarian operations. These could be (parts of) the United Nations as well as a large number of governmental and non-governmental organisations. Examples of such non-military organisations are the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the UN, the UNHCR, the International Red Cross, *Médecins sans Frontières* and the International Rescue Committee.



A large number of non-military organisations will also be involved.

*Photograph: ICRC
(Save Lives, Croatia, 1996)*

1710. Often, the responsibility for the **coordination of a humanitarian operation** will be taken on by or assigned to a civil organisation. As a result, humanitarian tasks may be performed by military units on the basis of specific guidelines, authority or conditions set out by a civilian lead organisation such as this. This means that the performance of tasks during a humanitarian operation such as this may differ from that of the other military tasks referred to in this publication. It is also possible that the coordinating role may indeed be played by the military organisation. The structure and assets of military units are after all ideal in this respect. They also have a great deal of experience in coordinating and directing a wide variety of activities.

1711. There are generally two distinct tasks for military units which participate in humanitarian operations, namely **disaster relief** and **refugee assistance**. These tasks may overlap partially or even entirely. The fact that large groups of people are in need may be the result of a natural disaster (such as an earthquake, floods, famine or drought), of a man-made

disaster (such as an industrial disaster resulting in, for example, radio-active or chemical contamination) or of combat actions. Large groups of people may also flee from political, ethnic or religious prosecution, thus creating a need for a humanitarian operation.

1712. **Disaster relief** is intended to alleviate human suffering and save lives in the event of a disaster. This could mean, for example, that emergency arrangements are made to provide the primary necessities for the disaster victims. The protection of property is also a key aspect in many cases. Although every disaster has unique elements, analyses of previous disasters and the ensuing disaster relief can serve as a guide for the planning by local authorities. This means that (preparatory) measures can be taken, such as the storage of mobile water purification installations, non-perishable food, tents and blankets.




Figure 17-2: Disaster relief activities. Military involvement is mainly limited to phases 1 and 2.

1713. The **phases of disaster relief** may overlap each other to some extent. The implementation of these phases is primarily the responsibility of the local authorities, possibly supported by international and non-governmental organisations. In general, military assistance is requested for support during the first two phases: rescue and relief. However, each phase has its own characteristics and requirements in terms of personnel and equipment. Military and civilian planners must, therefore, be fully aware of the phase they are in if they are going to deploy military units.

1714. **Refugee assistance** is intended to provide the basic necessities to sustain life (water and hygiene, food, shelter, fuel and medical care, including what is known as ‘reproductive health care’, which is intended for women and children) for large groups of people who have

left their homes, voluntarily or otherwise. This humanitarian task may become necessary in the event of a disaster or a conflict situation. An official distinction is made here between refugees and displaced persons. The difference is explained in Chapter 2.

1715. **Refugees and displaced persons** usually head towards areas which they or their leaders consider to be safer. However, these areas will not necessarily increase their chances of survival in the long term. People often flee from villages and towns to remote and isolated areas. Sometimes the movements start spontaneously, but they could also be ‘orchestrated’ by the leader(s) of the population group in question or even by the authorities in the crisis area. If help cannot be provided on the spot because of the consequences of the disaster, the conflict or, for instance, inadequate infrastructure, attempts will be made to direct the threatened group to a location at which this help can be given. The choice of location for a refugee camp is one of the factors which will influence the direction of the flow of refugees. Agreement must be reached beforehand between the international organisations involved, the local authorities and the representatives of the population group itself. In the worst case, if a great many refugees find themselves in an area in which it is difficult to provide aid, it may be necessary to evacuate them to a safer environment. The conduct of an operation of this sort is described in Chapter 16.

They often flee from villages and towns to mountainous or desert areas.

Photograph: Hennie Keeris, Media Centre RNLA (Zaire/Rwanda, 1998)



1716. If, in the event of an emergency abroad, the (local) relief is inadequate and there is a sudden need for military support for a limited period, the Dutch government may decide to provide assistance. This would then be **humanitarian aid**, which is a basic package intended to provide the primary necessities to sustain life. This applies exclusively to a deployment outside the Netherlands, whereby the point of departure is that this humanitarian aid must reach the area of operations as quickly as possible. The organic capacity of military units in terms of command structure, transport, communications, medical and engineer support in combination with their rapid availability makes them ideal for this task. The deployment of units for humanitarian aid is set out in the Chief of the Defence Staff's 'Generic Plan for Humanitarian Aid by Defence' and is worked out more specifically for the Royal Netherlands Army in an Operation Plan of the Commander in Chief of the RNLA.

A distinction is made, therefore, between humanitarian aid and humanitarian operations. Humanitarian aid involves disaster relief or refugee assistance of a maximum duration of about six weeks. Humanitarian operations are normally conducted over a prolonged period. Furthermore, the warning time for a regular humanitarian operation is normally around thirty days, whereas in an aid operation this would be three days (in both cases calculated from the moment that the order is given to the point at which the units must be ready for deployment). Lastly, the humanitarian aid package during an aid operation is only intended to provide the basic necessities, whereas a regular humanitarian operation normally has a much wider purpose. An aid operation could turn into a humanitarian operation.

1717. The Dutch armed forces have what are known as **military humanitarian aid units**, which are formed from units kept by the Services on standby specifically for the purpose of providing humanitarian aid. These are mainly units with capacity in terms of engineer support, supply and transport, medical support and security. The mission of the military humanitarian aid unit starts with the deployment of (parts of) the so-called **disaster assistance response team (DART)**. This team is kept at a level of readiness, known as 'notice to move', of 24 hours. The DART's warning time starts on the instructions of the Defence Crisis Management Centre, once the Minister of Defence, after consultations with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and for Development Cooperation, has decided to deploy Dutch military personnel for the provision of humanitarian aid.

1718. The **size and composition** of a military humanitarian aid unit depends on the assigned tasks and in particular on the findings of the DART. A military humanitarian aid unit will initially be formed from specially designated units. These aid units are on a notice to move of 72 hours. Should the occasion arise, the warning time for an aid unit starts at the same time as that of the DART. If, during the conduct of the

operation, a need arises for other specialist units, they can still be added to the military humanitarian aid unit. The total strength of such a unit will in principle be no greater than three hundred personnel, while the duration of deployment will be limited to a maximum of six weeks. The operation will, however, be terminated as soon as the primary requirement for aid has been met or the aid activities have been taken over by international organisations (such as NGOs) in the area. The deployment could also be terminated if the aid operation turns into a regular humanitarian operation which is conducted by other military units.

1719. Extremely important in the planning and conduct of any humanitarian operation is **unity of effort**. The activities of the peace force and of the civil organisations in the area must be harmonised with each other as much as possible and actions should ideally be conducted jointly. In the performance of the task, this unity of effort could result in a clear demarcation of the relief effort and tasks could be allocated on the basis of the relative strengths of the various organisations. It is thus conceivable that, for example, *Médecins sans Frontières* will take on the medical treatment and that the peace force will look after the distribution of relief goods. The coordination of the tasks may also result in separate actions in geographic terms, whereby the peace force takes responsibility for all aspects of the humanitarian operation in areas made unsafe by the parties and that civil organisations do the same in the safer areas. In any event, situations in which military and civil aid workers compete with each other must be avoided. The cooperation between military and civil organisations can be enhanced if the international community (usually embodied in the United Nations) appoints an official who is put in charge of the coordination of all aspects of the humanitarian operation.

1720. The chances of success for a humanitarian operation could be increased if the military and civil aid organisations adopt a strictly **impartial** attitude in the performance of their tasks. This means that aid will be provided for as many victims as possible, regardless of their ethnic origin or support for a party. The humanitarian aid must not be used as an instrument to influence the outcome of the conflict. Caution is also needed when dealing with alleged violations of a peace accord or of human rights; public statements via the media in response to such cases are normally best avoided. Especially in the case of armed conflict, such as a civil war, the reporting of atrocities can have an adverse effect. The aim of the operation, to alleviate human suffering, depends after all on the approval and cooperation of the parties and these aspects could

be jeopardised by the quest for publicity. If the humanitarian operation being conducted as part of a peace support operation is compromised, the commander may even decide to use force.

Section 3 - Aspects of planning and execution

1721. During the planning phase of the humanitarian operation, the **local situation** in the area of operations is, if possible, investigated (in principle by the DART) and in any event thoroughly analysed. The main purpose here is to determine the conditions in which the aid will have to be provided. This will involve information about such aspects as the geography, the climate, the environment (permissive or non-permissive), the possible presence of disease, the available infrastructure, the political situation and the civil aid agencies already present in the area. When conducting the analysis, use is made of the armed forces' knowledge about the area of operations and of information from the Dutch diplomatic representation in the country or region in question. Contact will also be sought with the main civil aid agencies with a view to exchanging as much information as possible about the area of operations. The composition and size of the force will be determined on the basis of this analysis. The Dutch contribution to a force conducting a regular humanitarian operation is known as a military relief unit.

1722. A **military relief unit** can be made up of units from the four Services. The organisation is based on the requirement stated by the lead international organisation and the units available in the Services. As well as a command group, a military relief unit could also consist of, for example, a transport unit, a medical unit and a security unit. A water purification unit or engineer unit may also be added to the relief unit. The core of the relief unit's command group is in principle formed by the DART.

1723. Once the relevant order has been issued by the Chief of the Defence Staff (through the Defence Crisis Management Centre), the DART, or part of it, will be deployed to the area of operations. The **tasks of this reconnaissance element** include:

- conducting a supplementary risk analysis and determining the actual requirement for aid, tailored to the assets available in the Netherlands
- making contact with national and international aid agencies
- making contact with local authorities
- preparing the deployment of the military relief unit

On the basis of the DART's reconnaissance results, the original requirement can be adjusted if necessary.

1724. The specific **tasks of a force** in charge of a humanitarian operation could be:

- transport, supply and distribution
- water supplies and hygiene
- medical care
- food supplies
- shelter and clothing
- construction and repair of traffic infrastructure
- protection of the population, aid workers and relief goods
- marking and clearing mines ('humanitarian de-mining')

1725. The force will often be allocated a combination of these tasks. Depending on the type of humanitarian operation, it is more likely that a certain specific task will be conducted. So in virtually every humanitarian operation, there will be a requirement for transport, supply and distribution. The requirement for food supplies will mainly arise in an aid operation and to a lesser extent in a humanitarian operation as part of a PSO. In reverse, mine marking and clearance is more likely to be needed in the case of a humanitarian operation as part of a PSO than during an aid operation. Figure 17-1 shows these differences in emphasis in the form of a diagram.

1726. If **transport, supply and distribution** have to be provided, there will usually be a capacity problem in these areas. Relief goods may fail

Transport, supply and distribution.

Photograph: Military History Section, RNLA (UNPROFOR, former Yugoslavia, 1994)



to arrive at their destination either in part or in their entirety, for instance because the available transport assets have not been deployed correctly if at all, the infrastructure is poor or seriously degraded or because of a false picture of the situation in the area of operations. There may also be a shortage of fuel and spare parts and the possibility of making up for any shortages locally may be limited. There is always the possibility of an existing distribution system, but this may be (partly) under the control of one of the parties, which will not always be prepared to make it available. Military units have a wide range of transport assets which can be used in virtually any sort of terrain. If there is a need to cross substantial distances in inhospitable terrain, air transport (helicopters and transport planes such as the C-130 Hercules) may offer the best solution, while naval ships can be used in coastal areas and on rivers. Account must be taken of the fact that goods transport, storage sites and distribution points could form targets for theft, looting and attacks and troops may also be faced with bribery and corruption. The most prominent international organisations involved in transport, supply and distribution in humanitarian operations are the UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP).

1727. With regard to **water supplies and hygiene**, the supply, production and distribution of safe drinking water for people and animals and the prevention of the spread of disease are the most important activities. Particular examples are measures to improve standards of general hygiene, such as the installation or repair of water mains and sewerage systems, the improvement of living conditions by means of, for instance, information programmes and the removal of household refuse. International organisations which are also involved in water supplies and hygiene in the event of a humanitarian emergency include the World Health Organisation (WHO), *Médecins sans Frontières*, the International Red Cross and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF).

Supply, production and distribution of good-quality drinking water. Photograph: Military History Section, RNLA (drilling wells in the Sudan, 1974)





Medical tasks.

Photograph: Media Centre

RNLA

(Zaire/Rwanda, 1998)

1728. A force which is responsible for **medical tasks** will endeavour to achieve a level of medical care similar to that which existed in the area of operations before the disaster or emergency occurred. Problems in relation to medical care in the area of operations could be a (local) shortage of (para)medic personnel and assistants, facilities, equipment, ambulances, medicines and bandages. There may also be a great many war or disaster victims in the areas in which the humanitarian aid is needed. This could place a considerable burden on the capacity of the medical unit, at least temporarily. Account must also be taken of the possible outbreak of epidemics. Vaccination programmes must be implemented to prevent such an eventuality. The main international organisations with which cooperation will be necessary are the WHO, *Médecins sans Frontières*, the International Red Cross and UNICEF.

In virtually any humanitarian operation, there will be a need for (extra) medical care. This may be a direct consequence of the (armed) conflict or the natural disaster or an indirect consequence of the risk of epidemics, which is increased when large groups of people find themselves in what are often primitive conditions. Military medical units are particularly suitable for providing high-quality basic medical treatment for large numbers of casualties at short notice. They could, for example, be put to good use in large-scale vaccination programmes to supplement the civilian medical teams and the military medical transport capacity could also be used in a wide range of conditions. Without adjustments in terms of personnel or equipment, they are of course less suitable for the intensive treatment of babies, children, pregnant women and the elderly. This is because the organic composition of medical units, personnel training and the composition of medical supplies and equipment are primarily geared to the treatment of the diseases and war wounds of military personnel.

1729. If the force's task is to restore or maintain **food supplies**, there may have been acute food shortages. Shortages may also be expected in the foreseeable future. There may be cases of malnutrition and a lack of resources for the preparation of food. Military units will normally be deployed for the transport (both to and inside the area of operations), storage and distribution of food supplies. Other organisations which may be involved in the relief effort are the WFP, the Food and Agriculture Organization and UNICEF.

1730. **Shelter** for refugees or displaced persons will probably be limited or non-existent in the areas in which a humanitarian operation is conducted. There will be a particularly important role for military personnel in the planning, setting up and running of refugee camps. There will also be a great need for blankets, clothing and other items, as many refugees will have left their homes in great haste and will have had to leave most of their personal possessions behind. The UNHCR in particular should be mentioned as an example of an international organisation which will certainly be involved in the operation. It will usually take a coordinating role in the provision of shelter, clothing and non-expendable items for refugees. The UNHCR will in that case establish the size and structure of the refugee camps, decide which agencies will set up the camps and indicate how long they must be kept running. As well as the UNHCR, most of the medical aid agencies mentioned earlier will also play a role in an operation of this sort.

Shelter.

Photograph: Media Centre

RNLA

(Operation Luis Caribe, St Martin, 1995)



1731. **Construction and repair of traffic infrastructure** may be necessary, as it could have been damaged as a result of the conflict or the disaster. It may also be necessary because the infrastructure in the area of operations is poor anyway and the relief operation would otherwise have little chance of success. It is unlikely that this task will form the main effort or the only aim of the operation; it will almost always be conducted in conjunction with one of the other sub-tasks. Particularly useful in this respect are (construction) engineer units, as they have the necessary expertise, experience and specialised equipment. As regards the international organisations with which the force may be confronted, particularly important are commercial companies which specialise in the (re)construction of infrastructure and houses in conflict areas. An example of such a company is the American firm Brown and Root, which has worked with military units in a number of operations. The money for such projects could come from international financial institutions such as the World Bank, from international organisations such as the European Union or from individual countries.

1732. The peace force may also be given the task of providing **protection** for the population, the aid workers from other international organisations and the relief goods. Providing protection relates in this case to ensuring safety, in terms of both human rights and physical safety. If the safety of refugees or displaced persons cannot be guaranteed by protection from their own authorities, an international force may have to be deployed. This principle forms the basis for the concept of international protection. This is intended as a temporary measure, until the official or *de facto* authorities in the conflict or disaster area are once again able to take over this function. International protection can be divided into passive and active protection. The presence of military personnel as observers can have a stabilising effect and provide passive protection. Patrolling in conflict areas reduces the risk of aggression towards minorities or refugees. Other measures could also lead to the passive protection of a population group, such as a presence in the vicinity of public institutions (hospitals, schools and religious establishments).

1733. The role of active protection during a humanitarian operation relates mainly to the protection of the military personnel conducting other relief tasks, the aid workers of other international organisations and the relief supplies in the conflict or disaster area. The protection of the aid workers of other international agencies (including the United Nations) is primarily the responsibility of the official or *de facto* authorities in the area, assuming that consent has been given to the presence of these aid workers. However, the authorities in the conflict

or disaster area are not always able (or willing) to protect these personnel or their equipment. Arrangements for the use of military assets to protect other aid workers and their equipment must be clear from the start of the operation; both the mandate and the rules of engagement must allow for this.

1734. The need for a military **escort of convoys** with relief goods may indicate the (local) absence or complete disappearance of the consent to the relief operation. It may also suggest an inadequately functioning police apparatus, giving criminals a free rein. When deciding whether an aid convoy should be escorted, the opinion of the international organisations conducting the humanitarian operation will be the deciding factor; they might oppose any military escort of their convoys because of their beliefs.

A number of civilian aid agencies has in the past pointed out that placing too much emphasis on the protective function by the military units masks the absence of a political or military objective of the operation. This could jeopardise the humanitarian nature of the operation. A member of *Médecins sans Frontières* said on this matter: 'The real danger for humanitarian workers lies in blurred political objectives, in operations without a real aim, in which protection of aid workers — who never asked for it — becomes a substitute for thinking clearly about what is to be achieved by armed intervention' (Jean-Cristophe Rufin: The paradoxes of armed protection, in: 'Life, death and aid, The *Médecins sans Frontières* Report on World Crisis Intervention', 1993).

1735. The use of military assets to escort convoys of aid supplies has **advantages and disadvantages**. Potential attackers could be deterred by the use of military vehicles and weapons. The use of armoured vehicles means that non-military personnel can also be protected in the event of an attack on such a convoy. On the other hand, military equipment (armoured vehicles and weapons in particular) may simply serve to provoke the aggression of the parties and cast doubts as to the humanitarian and impartial nature of the operation. The peace force must anticipate the pros and cons when the escort is assembled. In this way, a choice can be made between a minimal escort consisting of personnel in wheeled vehicles and an escort comprising armed, armoured vehicles. Factors of influence in this respect are above all the expected force level, the available assets, the rules of engagement and the directives from the higher commander in respect of the image that the force is supposed to project.

1736. **Marking and clearing mines ('humanitarian de-mining')**. The experiences of the past few years have shown that the presence of land mines in a (former) conflict area constitutes a serious threat to the population for a long time. There may be great numbers of

unregistered or unmarked mines. Furthermore, the documentation of minefields is often unavailable or incomplete. Above all, the local people do not usually have the skill or the capacity to solve this problem themselves. The efforts of the force must focus on increasing local expertise in marking and clearing mines by conducting instruction and training programmes. Initially, the emphasis must be on making people aware of the dangers of mines. Mines which, because of their position, pose a serious threat to large groups of people and the peace force itself are marked and cleared. Local mine clearance personnel are then trained and advice is given about the organisation of de-mining operations. Engineers are particularly suitable for this sub-task; this does not, in principle, mean organic units but specialists who have been deployed on an individual basis. Commercial companies are also becoming increasingly involved in such operations; these are often the same companies as those involved in the construction and repair of infrastructure. The funding too will normally be arranged in a similar way.

Recent conflicts have proved the value of a central coordination of all activities relating to the marking and clearing of mines, the collection, analysis and distribution of information about the position and composition of minefields and the implementation of information campaigns about the dangers of mines. So-called Mine Action Centres (MAC) can be set up nationally, regionally or locally in the area of operations to carry out these functions. An MAC issues general instructions about marking and clearance tasks and supervises the activities undertaken by the parties in this respect. As much information as possible is collected through the parties in respect of the position and composition of minefields; it is then analysed and, if necessary, assessed in terms of accuracy and then distributed among the population. The MAC sets up schools at which local personnel are trained to clear mines and issues recommendations in respect of the mine clearance programme which is to be implemented once the peace force has left.

1737. **Coordination with civil aid organisations.** The importance of unity of effort between the peace force and the civil organisations involved in the humanitarian operation has already been explained. The required unity of effort can be promoted by taking coordination measures. Possible measures could be:

- central consultation and harmonisation
- collocation of staff elements
- exchange of communications equipment and liaison
- joint briefings and discussions

1738. **Central consultation and harmonisation.** Ideally, the cooperation with the other organisations will be coordinated by a central agency. The latter must try to reach agreement quickly in respect of the responsibilities and the objectives of all organisations participating in a particular humanitarian operation. Two problems may arise in this respect:

- Civil organisations could already be active in the crisis area, as a result of which a great deal of time and energy will be needed to harmonise the working procedures.
- Because the structure, culture and powers of most civil and military organisations differ enormously, it may be difficult to achieve cooperation at all organisational levels.



Exchange of communications assets and liaison.
 Photograph: Media Centre
 RNLA
 (SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997)

1739. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the various participating organisations could contribute towards a clear understanding and demarcation of the responsibilities and objectives. The process needed to arrive at such a document can in itself clarify the responsibilities and objectives of the various organisations and also defines the means necessary to achieve those objectives. Above all, a positive experience during a previous humanitarian operation on the basis of an MOU such as this can enhance future cooperation. The agency in charge of the coordination must take the initiative in formulating an MOU.

1740. **Collocation** (or locating in each other's area) **of staff elements** or headquarters of the military and civil organisations promotes good communication and coordination. It also allows, within the confines of the mandate, some degree of protection to be afforded to the members of the civil organisations.

1741. For good communications between military units and civil organisations, it is vital to have interoperable **communication systems**.

There could if necessary be a mutual exchange of communications equipment, or the peace force could make communications assets (temporarily) available to the civil organisation. Here, too, a central agency could provide the solution by coordinating the distribution of communications assets and the frequency allocation. Cooperation between the peace force and civil aid agencies can also be improved by establishing (mutual) **liaison**.

1742. **Joint briefings and discussions** between the military and civil organisations can also be beneficial to cooperation. Such discussions must be held at all command levels and have as their main objectives the further clarification of each other's objectives, the presentation and harmonisation of plans, the evaluation of current activities and the exchange of information. A central Civil-Military Operations Centre, which can be set up by the peace force but is ideally established jointly in conjunction with the civil aid agencies, could create the necessary conditions. Although the leadership of such a centre will not necessarily be granted any decision-making authority, it can serve well as a point of contact when taking stock of any requests for military support.


NECESSITY KNOWS NO MANDATE: UNIFIL'S HUMANITARIAN OPERATION AFTER THE ISRAELI INVASION OF 1982

In a traditional peacekeeping operation, a humanitarian operation in principle takes a secondary position. The starting point for such an operation is, after all, that the situation in the area of operations is relatively calm and that the local people can provide their own basic necessities. Nonetheless, an outbreak of violence in or near the peace force's area of operations could suddenly produce refugee movements and acute emergencies. That same peace force would then be obliged to concentrate temporarily on humanitarian relief. A good example of this shift from incidental to structural relief occurred in the summer of 1982 in the area of responsibility of UNIFIL, the UN peace force in south Lebanon. Operation *Peace for Galilee*, the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon, initially swept away the already shaky foundations for UNIFIL's presence in southern Lebanon. However, the invasion also resulted in large refugee movements to the relatively safe UNIFIL zone. In the weeks following *Peace for Galilee*, the peace force took on the humanitarian relief for the many thousands of refugees in south Lebanon more or less independently.

The interposition peace force, UNIFIL, had been deployed in March 1978, after the Israeli armed forces had first tried to rid southern Lebanon of Palestinian guerrillas. The Netherlands participated in UNIFIL from March 1979 with 44 Mechanised Infantry Battalion '*Johan Willem Friso*'. Dutchbatt took responsibility for the southwestern battalion sector. The mission was extremely difficult from the start. The Palestinian infiltrations continued unabated and the IDF (Israeli Defence Forces) hit back hard nearly every day with raids and bombardments. A Palestinian attempt to assassinate the Israeli ambassador in London in June 1982 formed the reason for a second IDF invasion in the Lebanon. As a traditional, static buffer force, UNIFIL confined itself to symbolic resistance in the face of the Israeli military superiority. The 'blue helmets' could do little more than report in detail on the many hundreds of

Israeli vehicles that were heading north through the UNIFIL area. The IDF drove the Palestinian forces ahead of them to the capital, Beirut. The Israelis halted in the outskirts of the city, wary as they were of 'house-to-house' fighting. This gave the PLO the chance to evacuate thousands of fighters from Beirut under the protection of a hastily formed Multinational Force (MNF 1). However, radical Islamic terrorist organisations such as Hezbollah and Amal took the place of the PLO. Israel thus became embroiled in a bloody occupation of southern Lebanon which lasted for years. The IDF finally left Lebanon in 1985.

Map of southern Lebanon and the deployment of UNIFIL (January 1980)



After the Israeli invasion of June 1982, UNIFIL was thus operating in occupied territory. Furthermore, Israel relied partly on local militias to create a particularly deep security zone along the northern border. The UNIFIL mandate of 1978 (to supervise the withdrawal of the IDF, restore law and order in southern Lebanon and assist in the transfer of authority to the Lebanese government) was thus by now virtually irrelevant. The United Nations nonetheless decided to keep UNIFIL at its original strength of approximately six thousand. There were three reasons for this: firstly, to serve as a sign of 'moral reproach' towards Israel, secondly to obstruct a *de facto* annexation of southern Lebanon and thirdly to restrict the activities of the pro-Israeli militias in the area.

There was, however, another practical and more urgent reason for UNIFIL not to leave southern Lebanon immediately after *Peace for Galilee*. In the weeks following the start of the Israeli attack, the 'blue helmets' were able to provide humanitarian aid for the tens of thousands of Lebanese and Palestinian nationals who, fleeing from the fighting, headed for the UNIFIL zone. Once the main Israeli force had passed through, it was not long before a relative calm once again descended on the UNIFIL area, certainly compared to the chaotic situation in the rest of Lebanon. From the besieged Beirut in particular, thousands of civilians were fleeing to the south of the country. UNIFIL was in effect the only organisation there to provide humanitarian relief and to bridge the period until the arrival of international aid agencies. However, organisations such as the Red Cross and UNICEF first concentrated their efforts on the

severely stricken Beirut. What is more, there was little to be expected in the way of aid from the Lebanese authorities. The years of civil war had resulted in a complete absence of a workable local authority structure. The Lebanese government already had enough problems trying to exert its authority in and around Beirut.

In the first few days after the Israeli invasion, about one hundred thousand refugees sought refuge in the UNIFIL area. This was because it remained relatively quiet in the Dutch battalion sector after the Israeli columns had passed through. The population in the Dutchbatt zone doubled by about twenty thousand refugees, most of whom found shelter with family and friends or in public buildings. Dutchbatt did all it could to provide the refugees with the basic necessities. Because humanitarian relief had always been a secondary element in their set of tasks, however, Dutchbatt did not have much in the way of specially assigned personnel or transport capacity. For the 'blue helmets' on the scene, therefore, that meant hard work and improvisation.

A typical example was the relief action performed by Dutchbatt in the small town of Kafra on 15 August. On that occasion, eleven Lebanese families from Beirut were provided with food, mattresses and blankets within three hours of the first call for help. The families had found shelter in the spartan basements of the town hall. The Dutch soldiers noticed, incidentally, that the cultural background of the refugees could be a complicating factor in the distribution of aid supplies. After the supply platoon had delivered the relief goods to the basements, not one of the refugees lifted a finger to start with. 'We had already noticed', recounted one of the Dutchbat soldiers, 'that the distribution of relief supplies was not something you could leave to the people themselves. The same thing happened again here. They really kept an eye on whether one person was getting more than another. You see, that's totally unacceptable here.' The Dutchbat soldiers took the initiative themselves. 'But I can tell you that it's really difficult to share out a sack of rice fairly. As far as that's concerned, it's a lot easier to give out mattresses and blankets', said the same Dutch soldier.

The problems arising from the lack of a properly functioning local authority and, in relation to that, the poor local infrastructure, were more serious. Several villages had already been without running water and electricity for some time. Large cracks were also appearing in the health care system. So Dutchbatt concentrated mainly on providing medical care for the thousands of refugees. As well as the mobile surgeries, this took place at three main locations: the battalion aid station in Haris and the aid stations in Dayr Amis and Mazra'at Al Mushrif. The station in Dayr Amis, incidentally, was in an area which, until the Israeli invasion, had been called the 'Iron Triangle'. There were sometimes hundreds of PLO fighters staying here under the very noses of the Dutch battalion. Dutch medical personnel treated about a hundred cases a day at the three aid stations. Dutch doctors also assisted in the hospital at the UNIFIL headquarters in Naqourah. The number of civilian patients here soon exceeded the number of UNIFIL military patients. Dutchbatt also set up vaccination programmes in a number of remote villages.

There were also problems in respect of logistics. Supplies via Lebanese territory got held up, mainly because of the heavy fighting in and around Beirut (where a UNIFIL logistic team was operating). But the main factor obstructing UNIFIL's humanitarian operation was still the IDF. Again and again, Israel denied UNIFIL access to the zones which bordered directly on the UNIFIL area. This was a typical example of a situation in which one of the local factions uses humanitarian aid as a 'weapon' in the battle. The PLO had also manipulated the provision of humanitarian aid with some regularity, but in

the case of the Israelis, it was a structured approach. The furious Chief Humanitarian Officer of UNIFIL tried to explain the Israeli opposition in a report to the Force Commander: 'They [UNIFIL] met with important difficulties caused by the IDF who did not want to appear as invaders but as liberators for the Lebanese population. Besides, IDF wanted to prove that UNIFIL was a useless organization in all circumstances, so they stopped all actions such as medical assistance, clearing bombs and shells, etc.'

The fact that UNIFIL was not granted full freedom of movement by the IDF to conduct humanitarian relief operations, if necessary outside their own zone, caused a great deal of ill feeling among the UN soldiers. This irritation was mainly focused on the situation in Tyre and the nearby Palestinian refugee camp (and former PLO training centre), Al Rashidiyah. The IDF had delivered heavy fire on both locations in the opening phase of *Peace for Galilee*. The UNIFIL personnel in the Tyre barracks had seen the battlefield and the thousands of desperate refugees who were bivouacking on the beach in the most appalling conditions. UNIFIL planned a major aid operation, but the IDF blocked it for a while. UNIFIL suspected that the IDF saw the action as too much of an 'all-out' effort. The peace force was also prohibited from transferring medical supplies from the hospital in Naqourah to the crisis area. Dutchbatt was, however, allowed to deliver relief goods to Tyre for use by the Red Cross and UNICEF, but these two organisations did not have sufficient manpower or distribution assets. Initially, UNIFIL was also denied access to the other Palestinian camps, because the Israeli army first wanted to destroy all ammunition, emplacements and suspect houses. All this meant that three medical teams from Swedmedcoy (the Swedish medical company) and Dutchbatt were forced to attend to most of the refugees in the open air.

Neither the Israeli invasion in June 1982 nor the subsequent refugee crisis led to a serious international appeal for a humanitarian intervention in South Lebanon. Neither did the United Nations see any point in a robust enforcement of the mandate by UNIFIL itself. The local superiority of the Israeli military and the close American-Israeli ties precluded any such vigorous action from the start. Moreover, the refugee problem in South Lebanon caused by *Peace for Galilee* got somewhat snowed under in world opinion, which was focusing most of its attention on the simultaneous drama in Beirut and the evacuation of the PLO.

From August 1982, the situation improved slowly but surely. At the beginning of September, there were still around 12,000 refugees in the Dutchbatt area, but this number fell quickly. Most civilians returned voluntarily to their homes or to the camps they had left in July. UNIFIL did not, therefore, need to initiate a repatriation programme. The implementation of any such programme would in any case have been extremely difficult, since UNIFIL had already been shown to have no authority whatsoever outside its area of operations. The peace force would at the very least have needed the approval and cooperation of the Lebanese government and Israel. However, the former was powerless and the latter unwilling.

UNIFIL nevertheless stayed in South Lebanon (and, incidentally, remains there to this day). The UN Secretary-General acknowledged that UNIFIL 'had to implement its mandate in an unsatisfactory manner', but did not suggest any alternative to continuing. The Dutch government and the Lower House endorsed this point of view. UNIFIL's main task was now to protect the local population against violence by the IDF, the pro-Israeli militias and the Islamic resistance organisations. From September 1982, this mission gained the upper hand in respect of the humanitarian relief task. Dutchbatt also changed down a gear to small-scale relief activities, such as doctors' surgeries or help with the building of schools.

18

Operating in transitional situations

Section 1 - Introduction

1801. This chapter describes the way in which movements can turn into operational tasks and vice versa as well as the way in which various operational tasks can switch from one to the other. There are four **possible transitional situations** in this respect:

- deployment in the area of operations
- switching from one operational task to another
- relief
- termination of an operation

1802. Operating in a transitional situation is never an operation in itself, but always lays the foundations for the next phase. Uninterrupted action in a transitional situation not only benefits the tempo of the operation but is also important for the successful conduct of the peace operation.

1803. The basic principles for peace operations, as discussed in Chapter 4, apply to all transitional situations. Only if a peace operation is terminated prematurely do certain basic principles deserve special attention (see Section 5).

Section 2 - Deployment

1804. The deployment will be preceded by a **strategic movement** between a POE in the Netherlands and a POD in the theatre of operations. The strategic movement takes place under the responsibility of the National Command (NATCO) and is conducted by the National Support Command (NSC). After arrival at a POD, there will be a movement to a concentration area. The movement to the concentration area is the responsibility of the commander of the formation or unit. This movement is supported by the national support element (NSE). The transfer of responsibility to the commander of the multinational force will take place in the concentration area at a previously agreed time.



A strategic movement.

Photograph: Hennie Keeris, Media Centre RNLA (UNPROFOR, Croatia, 1994)

1805. The efficient deployment of the peace force in the area of operations lays the basis for tasks to be performed quickly and competently. This means that the **planning of the peace operation** and the mission it includes must be more or less ready before the plan for the deployment can be made. A provisional plan for the termination of the operation, including an evacuation plan, must also be made, as this could reveal factors which will need to be taken into account in the deployment phase.

1806. The deployment must be seen as a **separate phase** of the operation. Partly on the basis of reconnaissance, consultations with other units of the peace force and instructions from the commander of the multinational peace force, the commander of the formation or unit to be deployed will ultimately decide on the method of deployment.

There is, in practice, an area of tension between the often prolonged political decision-making about participation in a peace operation and the military desire to proceed with reconnaissance activities as soon as possible. It is important that members of the peace force are able to gather information as quickly as possible with regard to the local situation and to make contact with other military units and representatives of international organisations, including NGOs. This will enhance the peace operation's chances of success. The results of this reconnaissance can also help to improve the quality of the political decision-making.

1807. Deployment in a peace operation embraces all activities from the arrival in a concentration area to the occupation of locations in the area of operations so that troops can begin their tasks. The performance of tasks cannot follow on from the movement automatically. After arrival in the area of operations, attention must first be given to providing sufficient security, setting up adequate communications and sufficient logistic facilities before proceeding with the performance of the operational task. Immediately after arrival, however, the first contacts can be made and reconnaissance and possibly patrols conducted in a show of presence.

1808. The **deployment plan** must in any event pay attention to the following aspects:

- order of deployment
- method of tactical operation during deployment
- force protection
- routes
- logistic aspects
- civil-military cooperation

1809. In general, the **order of deployment** is as follows:

- (parts of) units for minimal protection
- command and control elements
- forward logistic elements
- operational task elements
- main body of the unit or units
- containers and supplies

The order and strength of these elements can vary, depending on the threat analysis, the geographical situation in the area and whether or not there are already any logistic facilities available. The established order must be coordinated nationally and internationally between the commander of the multinational force, the commander of the formation or unit, the NSC and the NSE.

Aspects of planning and execution

1810. The deployment usually takes place shortly after a peace treaty or cease-fire has been agreed. The presence of the peace force is intended to ensure that the parties will stick to the agreements. The method of operating during the deployment depends mainly on the threat level in the area of operations. In the worst case, it will be conducted in the form of an advance.

1811. Even in the event of a limited threat, the peace force must be **combat ready**. This enables the most flexible response to unforeseen circumstances and offers a high degree of protection. The deployment must also proceed quickly and without interruption. After all, the rapid appearance of a peace force will often be urgently needed. The use of air forces could play an important role in this respect.

1812. During the deployment, attention must be paid to **force protection** in the form of security and protection measures during the movement. The local inhabitants may be extremely interested in the deployment of the peace force. They might be hostile towards the peace force, which could have implications for the deployment method. Account must also be taken of the traffic safety in the area of operations, as the roads may be of a poor quality and also used by local traffic.

1813. The **choice of routes** for the deployment will be partly determined by the availability of suitable routes and the need for speed. Depending on the size of the unit, several routes may be used. In any event, alternative routes must be planned in order to be able to keep up the pace of the deployment in unforeseen circumstances.

1814. The **logistic support** must meet the direct needs of the user units during the deployment and at the same time be geared to the first twenty-four hours after arrival in the area of operations. For this phase, user units must, if possible, be completely self-sufficient. It is not inconceivable that the commander of the multinational peace force will have made logistic arrangements for the deployment phase.

Section 3 - Transition to another operational task

1815. A peace force could be faced with the transition to **another operational task** in the following cases:

- a change in the mandate for the operation
- a change in the tasks of the unit within the operation
- deployment elsewhere in the peace force's area of operations
- a radical change of circumstances in the area of operations

1816. In the event of a **change to the mandate** and the transition to another operational task, the peace force may find that the composition of the troops is no longer suitable for the new task. As well as this problem in terms of the physical component, the commander must give due consideration to the effects on the mental component. Both a change from peacekeeping to peace-enforcing and from peace-enforcing

to peacekeeping will require a different attitude on the part of the peace force in respect of the parties, the local population and the aid agencies.

When the first IFOR troops deployed in the former Yugoslavia at the end of 1995, there were still troops in the area of operations operating under the UNPROFOR mandate. The troops that stayed in the area of operations transferred to the IFOR peace force. The nature of the operation changed drastically, however. The UNPROFOR operation had been more of a peace-keeping operation with light assets tailored accordingly. The IFOR operation was a peace-enforcing operation with a mandate for robust action. Units which had to change to another operational task clearly had adjustment problems.

1817. A vital condition to enable the transition to a new operational task is **flexibility**. This will enable the unit to make the necessary adjustments in the physical and, in particular, the mental component. The transition to another operational task can often involve a different arrangement of units and formations. This means that units and logistic installations must remain as mobile as possible when they are deployed. For commanders, it means that they have to be able to think fast to respond to a changed situation in the area of operations.

Aspects of planning and execution

1818. The full decision-making process must be followed in the transition to a new operational task. This process may reveal that **different or additional assets** are needed for the new operational task. The peace force must be given the opportunity to prepare physically and mentally for the new operational task. This might mean that units of the peace force are temporarily accommodated in assembly areas. If no additional assets can be provided, the mission will have to be adjusted or the

The full decision-making process must be followed in a transition to a new operational task.

Photograph: Media Centre RNLA (SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997)



higher commander will have to order relief by a unit which is better equipped for the new operational task.

1819. The transition to a new operational task in **the same area of operations** must proceed in such a way that there is no disruption of the peace process. When planning the transition, a decision may be taken to use phasing. The method of conduct of the new task must serve as the point of departure in this respect. The transition could be incorporated as a separate phase in the plan for the new operational task, but a separate plan could also be made for this if necessary.

Section 4 - Relief

1820. Relief encompasses all activities which are needed to transfer the operational task to another unit. A relief action could be necessary for various reasons, although there will be virtually no difference in the method of conduct.

- **The performance of the task is at risk**, for instance because of deterioration of the environment in the area of operation, whereby the unit's assets are no longer adequate for a suitable response. The performance of the task could also be jeopardised by, for example, personnel losses as a result of incidents or combat actions.
- **The performance of tasks is not at risk**. In this case, it would be a question of reorganising the order of battle or a relief action as part of a rotation.

1821. A **transfer of tasks** will take place in the form of a relief action to maintain the required level of performance during the operation. At a certain point, the responsibility for the mission is also transferred. The responsibility must be transferred in such a way that the operational effectiveness remains assured during the relief. It is important in this respect that clear arrangements are made about the exact moment at which the responsibility for the mission will actually be transferred.

1822. There is **increased vulnerability** during and immediately after the relief action.

- The relief action normally takes place in phases. Clear arrangements should prevent the creation of a power vacuum, which could be abused by parties. In the event of relief because of the pressure of operational circumstances, the gravity of the situation may mean that the time available for the transfer is limited.
- There will inevitably be a concentration of assets of two units in the area, while at the same time there will also be a relatively large number of movements.

- Parties and local authorities which have been involved in the peace process for years may be suspicious of (yet another) new unit. Furthermore, one cannot rule out the possibility that parties will ‘try out’ the new unit.
- In most cases, the incoming unit will not yet be able to judge the threat or danger in the area of operations. The outgoing unit can do so, however, which means that day-to-day actions seem routine. There is a risk that this routine action may be taken over by the incoming unit.

Aspects of planning and execution

1823. The relief action may be conducted in **phases** or **in one go**. In a phased relief, parts of the new unit keep arriving in the area as parts of the old unit leave. Personnel from both units must perform integrated tasks during the relief to ensure a smooth transfer of tasks and responsibilities. This means that expertise and experience can be passed on and the new unit can get used to the conditions in the area of operations. The situation will still be unfamiliar to personnel from the new unit, so they will have to be supervised. A relief action can be conducted in one go if there is no time for a phased relief.

1824. Particular attention must be paid in the relief action to the **transfer of tasks** from key officials such as commanders and liaison officers. The contacts with parties, local authorities and aid agencies must also be transferred with care. Local customs and the way people behave towards each other must also receive the necessary attention.

1825. The **plan for the relief** will be drawn up jointly by the outgoing and incoming commanders. The requirements of the incoming commander take precedence. The incoming commander will usually conduct reconnaissance, as a result of which the first arrangements for the relief can be made. The outgoing commander is responsible for the detailed arrangements for the transfer of tasks.

1826. The plan for the relief must contain arrangements for aspects such as the following:

- the timetable and relief schedule
- the time at which the responsibility of the outgoing commander is transferred to the incoming commander
- intelligence and military information
- the transfer of assets
- the transfer of contacts

- security measures
- logistic matters

Section 5 - Termination of a peace operation

r827. The termination of a peace operation involves more than just the termination of the performance of tasks. The unit must have sufficient **freedom of action** to be able to leave the area of operations. The termination of the performance of tasks also means the termination of humanitarian activities, but these will be continued as long as possible.

r828. In the termination of a peace operation, a distinction is made between completing and aborting the operation:

- An operation can be regarded as **completed** if the desired end state has been achieved.
- In the event of a premature termination, before the end state has been achieved, the operation has been **aborted**. This can take place either:
 - * **with the cooperation** of the parties, whereby support from other troops is not required;
 - * **in the face of opposition** from the parties, whereby support from other troops is necessary.

Return to the Netherlands.
 Photograph: Hans van
 Pijkeren, Audio-visual
 Service RNLA
 (UNPROFOR, Croatia,
 1994).

In an international context, if the parties object to the operation being aborted, the term 'extraction' is used. This is defined in British doctrine as: 'In operations, urgent removal of an individual or a group of individuals or material from a threat.' A unit deployed in support of a peace force which has to abort its mission in the face of opposition is called an evacuation force.



1829. Once the operation has been completed or aborted, the formation or unit will normally return to the Netherlands. Prior to the return to the Netherlands, there will be a transfer of responsibility in a concentration area from the commander of the multinational peace force to the commander to whom the Commander in Chief RNLA has assigned responsibility for the return.

1830. It is difficult to plan a premature termination of a peace operation. The decision to abort the operation will always be a political decision, in which the following considerations could play a role:

- The **mandate expires** before the end state has been achieved. A mandate is usually limited in time. If the mandate is not extended, because no political consensus can be reached, the operation will have to be aborted.
- **One or more parties no longer consent to the peace operation.** For those peace operations for which consent to the actions of a peace force is required, the chances of success will be reduced drastically in this case.
- **The conflict may flare up again** and escalate to such an extent that the mandate under which the peace force was deployed no longer applies and the desired end state has become virtually unattainable.
- **A political decision** has been made to withdraw the troops, for instance because the authorities in question are no longer willing to provide any.

Security Council resolution 814 (26 March 1993) formed the basis for UNOSOM II in Somalia. This operation followed on from UNITAF. Resolution 814 allowed for the possibility of, if necessary, enforcing the implementation of stipulations from the mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The main stipulation was the creation of a safe environment throughout Somalia, including the northern region which had declared its independence. The United States had made up a large part of UNITAF and had a smaller share of some 4,500 personnel in UNOSOM II: a Quick Reaction Force of around 1,100 personnel and logistic support.

The far-reaching UN mandate and the presence of the large multinational force constituted an ever-growing threat to Mohammed Aideed's tribe. This led to a crisis and an even more far-reaching Security Council resolution, 837, whereby a mandate was issued to pick up Aideed. After a number of confrontations between Aideed's militias and the American Quick Reaction Force, the most bloody took place on 3 October 1993 and resulted in the death of 18 Americans. This led to the decision by the American President to withdraw the American units without having achieved the desired end state. Furthermore, until the end of the withdrawal, the only action by the Americans was to take force protection measures.

1831. The principles for the **use of force** also apply in the event that the operation is aborted. Despite the fact that the conduct may be more in the nature of a combat operation, this does not legitimise the unrestricted use of force. The rules of engagement may be adapted for this phase. It is not inconceivable that the unit may encounter ethical dilemmas if the mission is aborted. The local population may try to prevent the departure of the peace force or try to leave the area as well under the peace force's protection. The safety of the peace force must not be compromised in the process. Alternative and non-lethal means of force could provide a solution here.

1832. **Freedom of movement** while an operation is being aborted focuses mainly on the peace force's own ability to leave the area of operations safely. Plans must be flexible enough to allow a response to terrain and weather conditions and to actions by the parties and the local population. They should, for example, include alternative routes, guaranteed communications, suitable formation of units and the mobility of commanders and their command posts.

1833. **Freedom of action** for the whole unit is absolutely vital if it is to be able to leave the area safely when a peace operation is aborted. This means that the security measures must be geared towards that, as a result of which various circumstances must be taken into account. The security measures will mainly be intended to prevent the unit being surprised while the operation is being aborted. The very existence of plans for the termination of the operation already goes some way towards providing a certain amount of protection. Protection is crucial while the operation is being aborted, partly to keep up the morale of the troops.

Aspects of planning and execution

1834. A **completion plan** must be drawn up to finish off the operation. The completion plan must in any event include the following aspects:

- the transfer of tasks to others, such as aid agencies and local authorities and organisations
- the arrangements in respect of the transfer of the infrastructure that was used (this could prevent claims)
- the transfer of equipment being left behind

1835. The plan for aborting a peace operation must, if possible, be ready before deployment. Although the operation is geared towards achieving the end state, one must not automatically assume the most favourable outcome when planning the termination. Other options must thus be

prepared in case the operation has to be aborted in unfavourable conditions; these are incorporated in **contingency plans**. These plans must be constantly updated in the course of the operation.

1836. The contingency plans must in any event pay attention to the following **aspects**:

- the circumstances in which the plan has to be implemented
- rules of engagement
- movements
- communications
- arrangements for locally-engaged personnel
- logistic measures
- arrangements for equipment to be taken home or left behind
- supply of information to the Netherlands

1837. With regard to certain aspects in the planning for the deployment, account must be taken of the possible need to **abort under unfavourable circumstances**. These aspects are as follows:

- location of units and installations
- retreat routes
- reserves
- use of infrastructure

1838. If the peace force encounters opposition when aborting the operation and it does not have sufficient assets to be able to abort independently, it may be necessary to deploy troops from outside the area of operations to support the peace force. The commander of the **evacuation force** is responsible for formulating an operation plan for this eventuality. The plans made by the units of the peace force must be based on this plan. Given that troops usually work against the clock when aborting an operation, the operation plans must be prepared down to the lowest level. The commander will have to decide on the extent to which all details must be known down to the lowest level.

1839. The **other actors in the area of operations** must be taken into account. Tasks will come to a fairly abrupt end and activities will not normally be taken over by anyone else. Aid agencies will no longer be able to use the facilities or services of the peace force. It is not inconceivable that these aid agencies will also wish to leave the area and link their departure to that of the peace force.

1840. Arrangements must be made for **locally-engaged personnel**. Their status and protection form part of these arrangements. Setting out these arrangements will mean that neither the locally-engaged

personnel nor the unit is in any doubt and will avoid arousing any expectations that cannot be met if the operation has to be aborted prematurely.

1841. Since a unit will not be able to take all **equipment** and **documents** with it if the operation is aborted, arrangements will have to be made for this too. Decisions will have to be made about what is to be taken, left behind or destroyed. The general rule is that medical supplies and food may never be destroyed or rendered unfit for use.

Glossary

1. This glossary contains some of the terms used in this publication. The definitions are derived mainly from:
AAP-6: NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 1995
AJP-01(A), Allied Joint Doctrine, 1999
A number of other official publications were also used, including the British JWP 3-50, 'Peace Support Operations'.
2. Internationally, there is as yet little agreement about common terminology in respect of peace operations. The active developments of NATO doctrine publications, however, would seem to herald a change in this regard. Partly because of the importance which the Netherlands attaches to operations under NATO, including peace operations, this publication in principle uses the NATO definition. In some cases, however, a term is used for which no internationally agreed definition is available. In such instances, the RNLA has formulated its own description or definition. This is indicated in the glossary by the abbreviation 'NL'.
3. Four terms have already been included in an earlier Army Doctrine Publication with a different definition. In the case of 'relief' and 'theatre of operations', the definition applies specifically to peace operations. The definitions for 'CIMIC activities' and 'host nation support' have been refined on the basis of advances in perception and thus apply to all forms of operation.

abort an operation

To terminate the peace operation prematurely before the desired end state has been achieved.

administrative control (ADMINCON)

Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.
(AAP-6)

buffer zone

A demilitarised area along the former confrontation line which formed the front between the warring parties during a conflict.

cantonment area

A location at which parties are temporarily accommodated, disarmed and demobilised (in the context of demobilisation operations).

centre of gravity (COG)

NL: The element of the enemy's capability which, if attacked, destroyed or neutralised, will lead either to his inevitable defeat or to his wish to pursue peace through negotiations.

AAP-6: Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.

Chef de Poste (CDP)

Term used by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the head of a Dutch embassy or consulate abroad.

CIMIC activities

Military activities during military operations geared towards accomplishing a military mission by supporting the responsible civil authorities and/or international or non-governmental organisation in attaining their objective or civil activities with the aim of achieving civil objectives by assisting in the accomplishment of a military objective.

CIMIC operation

A military operation primarily designed to support a civil authority, the population and/or an international or non-governmental organisation, which ultimately leads to the accomplishment of the military objective.

civil evacuation plan

The Chef de Poste's plan for the evacuation of Dutch citizens in his allocated country or countries.

civil regional organisations

Structural or ad hoc organisations whose activities are not confined to matters of peace and security. They can use their resources and facilities to offer support to the United Nations in the mediation in a (potential) conflict or in the conduct of peace operations.

civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)

The resources and arrangements which support the relationship between commanders and the national authorities, civil and military, and civil populations in an area where military forces are or plan to be employed. Such arrangements include cooperation with non-governmental or international agencies, organisations and authorities. (AAP-6)

closed organisation

An organisation in which unanimity is needed before member states can invite another country to join.

coalitions of the able and the willing

Ad hoc alliances of countries which are willing and able to help to resolve a conflict.

combat search and rescue (CSAR)

The deployment of specialist teams in combat conditions to rescue personnel who have run into difficulties during an operation.

combat service support (CSS)

NL: The process designed to maintain units prior to, during and after operations.

AAP-6: The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics.

combating terrorism

A police task for which the armed forces may be able to provide support.

communications zone

The rearmost section of the theatre of operations.

completion of the operation

Termination of the peace operation once the desired end state has been achieved.

conflict prevention

All military measures designed to avert the development of an interstate or intrastate conflict.

confrontation line (CL)

The line which forms the front between the warring parties during a conflict.

contingency planning

The planning process in which options are incorporated in order to anticipate opportunities or setbacks.

contracting

Obtaining the means needed for an operation from the civil sector by drawing up contracts on a commercial basis.

control zone

The areas on each side of the buffer zone, in which restrictions may be imposed on the parties in respect of the number of troops and the type of equipment they have.

coordinating authority

The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority. (AAP-6)

counter-drug operation

An operation designed to prevent the possession, transportation or trafficking of drugs.

crisis response operations (CRO)

NATO's conduct of and participation in the full spectrum of operations to include those in support of peace (PSO) and others as directed by the North Atlantic Council. (MC 327).

crowd and riot control

Support provided for the local authorities to maintain public order.

demilitarisation

The process whereby military personnel and equipment are with-drawn from their military task.

demobilisation

Reducing the level of armed forces personnel and equipment present in the area of operations to the levels agreed in a peace settlement.

disarmament

The process whereby armed forces are relieved of their weapons (in a controlled manner).

disaster assistance response team (DART)

A team which can be deployed after an extremely short response time to prepare for a disaster relief operation.

disaster assistance unit

Specially designated units that must be deployable within 72 hours. A military humanitarian disaster assistance unit is made up of such units.

displaced person

A person who is suddenly or unexpectedly forced to leave his home as a result of an armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights or a natural disaster or man-made emergency and who is inside the borders of his own country.

doctrine

NL: The formal expression of military thought, valid for a particular period. It describes the nature and characteristics of current and future military operations, the preparations for these operations in peacetime and the methods for successfully completing military operations in times of crisis and war.

AAP-6: Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.

enforcement of sanctions

An operational task designed to force a country to comply with international law or a UN resolution. Examples of the enforcement of sanctions are maritime interception operations, customs and police operations on rivers and the enforcement of no-fly zones.

evacuation formation

The military unit which conducts an evacuation operation.

evacuation handling centre (EHC)

The location situated in a safe area (or possibly even in the home country) where the evacuees receive medical care and where they make their own arrangements for their onward journey.

evacuation point (EP)

An area which is located centrally in respect of the reception points and from which the evacuees are transported to the evacuation handling centre.

first-generation peacekeeping operations

Operations in which an international organisation deploys a force between two or more (warring) parties who have consented.

forward mounting base (FMB)

An air- or seaport in the country in which an evacuation operation is being conducted, in a neighbouring country or at sea, to which troops are moved from the Netherlands.

full command (FULLCOM)

The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. (AAP-6)

home base

The area from which the units in the theatre of operations receive reinforcements and supplies.

horizontal escalation

An escalation of the conflict in a geographic sense.

host nation support (HNS)

Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis and war by a host nation to Allied forces and NATO organisations which are located on or in transit through the host nation's territory. (AAP-6)

humanitarian aid

The provision of military assistance over a limited period in the event of a foreign emergency.

humanitarian de-mining

All activities relating to the marking and clearing of mines, collecting, analysing and distributing information about the location and composition of minefields and the implementation of information programmes for the local population, as well as training programmes for humanitarian de-mining.

humanitarian intervention

A humanitarian operation conducted without the permission of a sovereign state.

humanitarian operation

The task of a unit, within the framework of a peace support operation, designed to alleviate human suffering.

humanitarian operations in non-PSO scenarios

Operations conducted to alleviate human suffering.

information operations (INFO OPS)

All activities in the information field, both offensive and defensive and at all levels of the spectrum of force, designed to influence decision-makers. This influence serves to support the accomplishment of political and military objectives and is achieved by the manipulation of the information of an adversary or a third party, while at the same time protection and using one's own information.

international organisation

An organisation which is formed by states under international law or decree and incorporating one or more bodies and whose task is to more or less permanently look after the common public interests of those states.

interpositioning

The positioning of a peace force between parties, in principle after they have settled a conflict, with the aim of achieving a more stable situation, thus creating the conditions for a lasting peace.

interstate conflict

A conflict between one or more countries.

intrastate conflict

A conflict within the national borders of a state in which population groups within the state come into conflict with each other or with the government.

lead nation principle

Organisational form of a multinational force, whereby one nation leads and the headquarters is staffed mainly by personnel from that country. The lead nation is responsible for the coordination of the support activities.

lessons learned

The operational experiences which are recorded, analysed and, if necessary, worked into current doctrine.

lines of communications (LOC)

All the land, water and air routes that connect an operating military force with one or more bases of operations and along which supplies and reinforcements move. (AAP-6)

mandate

The authority and order issued by an international security organisation (UN, OSCE) for a force to operate in a conflict. The mandate guides the peace operation in terms of task, powers and restrictions.

media lines

Instructions from public information officers about how to deal with events which may interest the media.

military aid

Assistance given by a peace force to a civil government.

military relief unit

A unit tasked with a regular humanitarian relief operation.

mission creep

A shift in the mission whereby there is a risk that the emphasis will be moved to activities which lead quickly to success or that, because of the availability of assets, other non-assigned tasks will be conducted.

monitoring

Observing and subsequently following particular activities.

mutual support agreement

The possibility for countries to arrange joint service support by means of (prior) agreement, whereby optimum use can be made of each others' assets.

national responsibility

The arrangement whereby each nation takes full responsibility for looking after its own troops.

non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO)

An operation conducted to evacuate civilians or unarmed military personnel from the crisis or conflict area to a safe or safer environment.

observation

The systematic surveillance of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other assets.

open organisation

An organisation to which all states can apply to join; the leading body makes decides independently about accession.

operational command (OPCOM)

The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. [...] (AAP-6)

operational control (OPCON)

The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. [...] (AAP-6)

peace operations

Military operations in the form of peace support operations, military assistance, evacuation of non-combatants or humanitarian operations.

peace support operations (PSO)

Impartial NATO military operations arising from an internationally recognised organisation's request for military assistance to retain, establish or enforce peace in an area or region (MC 327)

peace-enforcing operations (PE)

Operations conducted to restore peace between warring parties which, in principle, do not all consent to the intervention of a peace force.

peacekeeping operations (PK)

Operations which, in principle with the consent of the warring factions, support political activities to maintain or achieve peace.

peacemaking

A process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful consultation in order to end a conflict.

peacetime service support

The contribution to the realisation or restoration of an intended level of military capacity under non-operational circumstances.

point of disembarkation (POD)

End point of a strategic movement.

point of embarkation (POE)

The starting point for a strategic movement.

post-conflict peace-building

Operations conducted after an armed conflict to consolidate a fragile peace, with the aim of ensuring that the conflict does not flare up again immediately after the departure of the intervening troops.

preventive diplomacy

Diplomatic steps which are actually taken before an impending crisis and which are intended to remove the cause of the conflict. The aim is to prevent the use of force.

protected area (PA)

A geographic area in which people can be provided with protection and humanitarian aid by a peace force.

protected zone

A geographic area set up by a peace force as a transit area to allow refugees or displaced persons to return to their homes.

reception point (RP)

The area which evacuees reach independently so that they can then be taken to the evacuation point with the assistance of Dutch diplomatic representatives or the evacuation formation.

refugee

A person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (1951 Convention on refugees)

refugee relief

A humanitarian task with the aim of providing the primary necessities (water and hygiene, food, shelter, fuel and medical care, including what is known as ‘reproductive health care’, which is intended for women and children) for large groups of people who, under coercion or otherwise, have left their home environment.

regional accords

Agreements which are confined to a (specified) region or a geographically defined area.

regional security organisation

An organisation which focuses on the general defence in a particular region but which may also be used for operations conducted by the United Nations.

regroup

To withdraw units and assemble in assembly or regrouping areas.

regular warfare

Operations characterised by the usually open, structured, large-scale and coordinated deployment of units, normally in accordance with established doctrine.

relief

All activities necessary to transfer responsibility for an operational task to another unit.

re-roling

The well-considered adjustment of the mission, as may occur in the course of a peace operation and which aims to preserve the efficiency of the operation.

role specialisation

An option whereby service support is provided by a country or Service in a particular function area or particular supply class, resulting in economies of scale or the opportunity to use national capacities in areas in which other countries are weaker.

rules of engagement (ROE)

NL: Rules for the application and use of force by military means, established for a specific operation.

AAP-6: Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.

search and rescue (SAR)

The deployment of specialist teams to rescue personnel who have run into difficulties; for example, crews of crashed aircraft or (small) military units which are unable to return unaided from an isolated position.

second-generation peacekeeping operations

Operations in which troops are deployed with the consent of the parties involved to support a political solution and to supervise the observance of a peace accord. In second-generation operations, the force operates throughout the conflict area and not just in a buffer zone.

spectrum of conflict

A scale denoting the nature of the relations between population groups or states: peace, (armed) conflict, post-conflict.

supervision

A specific form of observation geared towards compliance with agreements and treaties.

sustainability

The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. (AAP-6)

sustainability statement

A declaration in which the participants in a multinational operation specify how the logistic effort is to be distributed.

tactical command (TACOM)

The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. (AAP-6)

tactical control (TACON)

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (AAP-6)

theatre of operations


The area in which the operation and the related support activities take place. From an operational point of view, the theatre of operations is divided by an imaginary line into a communications zone and an area of operations.

transnational conflict

A conflict which originated in a common and cross-border problem for two or more states, without it leading directly to an interstate conflict.

vertical escalation

The escalation relating to an increase in the intensity of force during a conflict.



Military operations require good planning, preparation, execution and completion. For a military operation to be successful, not only common sense is needed, but also professional expertise. This official manual of the Royal Netherlands Army will help to further the unity of opinion regarding the methods of operating.

‘Peace operations’ is a collective term for peace support operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, military assistance and humanitarian operations. This book is primarily intended as a manual for commanders and staffs at formation and battalion level who are responsible for the planning, preparation and execution of peace operations. It is also meant for all those who wish to look at the background and characteristics of this type of operation in further depth.

This doctrine is based partly on events experienced during peace operations in, for example, the Lebanon, Cambodia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The book also describes a number of examples from these and other operations in order to illustrate the theory and practice of peace operations as well as the field of tension that exists between the two.