



Annexes of HCSS-07-004r

**Evaluation of the Netherlands' financial
assistance for humanitarian demining activities
in 1996-2006: Cambodia**

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VIII Annexes

- Annex 1A Terms of Reference
- Annex 1B Composition of the Teams
- Annex 2 Schedule of activities
- Annex 3 Matrix for Analysis
- Annex 4 Site Selection Criteria and Site Visits
- Annex 5 Questionnaires
- Annex 6 Sample Summary Focus Group Interviews
- Annex 7 Bibliography
- Annex 8 Land Situation in Cambodia
- Annex 9 Main Types of MINES and UXO Found in Cambodia
- Annex 10 Netherlands Funded Programmes Outside HMA
- Annex 11 CMVIS Casualty Rates 1996-2006
- Annex 12 Chronological Overview

Annex 1A – Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference

Preparing the ground for a mine save world

An evaluation of Dutch efforts to control landmines and explosive remnants of war Terms of Reference for the evaluation of financial assistance for humanitarian demining activities in 1996-2006

1 Introduction

The Dutch government seeks to adopt an integrated approach to international issues, using an effective and efficient combination of policy instruments. This is the reason for the IOB (Policy and Operations Evaluation Department) evaluation of Dutch efforts to control landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW's). This evaluation will examine two types of policy instrument (political and financial) and how they interrelate. It will be made up of two distinct parts (study I and study II). Each of the two parts, which will be carried out separately, will focus on one of the policy instruments, including its nature, operation and effects. Study I will focus on political initiatives: the diplomatic efforts undertaken, in the various fora on conventional arms control, to expand, tighten and enforce existing international legal instruments. Study II will focus on the instrument of financial assistance, i.e. funds for mine clearance activities in countries with a mine problem, seen from the broad perspective of humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction. These Terms of Reference relate to study II.

2 Background

Scale and nature of the landmine problem

According to the latest (2005) edition of *Landmine Monitor Report*, in the world as a whole, there were 84 countries and 8 areas not internationally recognised as independent states that had a mine problem in 2005. The number of mines involved can only be estimated. Estimates in the literature range from 30 to 300 million. Yet what matters is not so much the precise number of mines, but the size of the contaminated area. The presence of just a single mine renders an area potentially hazardous, and even the mere suspicion that mines are present can severely disrupt local and/or regional ways of life. What ultimately matters, therefore, is the

impact of mines on the socioeconomic situation. The actual number of mines is largely immaterial.

There are enormous differences from one country to the next. In some, the location of minefields is known and they cause the civilian population little trouble. The Falkland Islands are a case in point. During the 1982 conflict, thousands of mines were laid on the beaches and moorland. According to the national authorities, there are more than 100 minefields covering 20 square kilometres and containing some 16,000 mines. These minefields are all clearly marked and fenced off, and are checked regularly (*Landmine Monitor Report 2005*). In other countries, the problems are overwhelming. In Afghanistan, for example, various army units and factions have been using mines for over twenty years, making it one of the worst affected countries in the world. Landmines and ERWs are scattered throughout the country. A Landmine Impact Survey conducted between November 2003 and November 2004 identified 4,514 risk areas (covering 715 square kilometres) in 2,368 populated areas. Some 4.2 million people live in these areas (15% of the total population), 1.6 million of whom in what the survey called 'high or medium-impacted communities'. The mines impede access to agricultural land and pastures, and hamper the reconstruction of roads, bridges, irrigation systems, schools and other public buildings. Every month, they claim between 150 and 300 victims.¹ In the 24 months preceding the survey, a total of 2,245 victims were recorded in 664 of the 2,368 populated areas identified.

The international community tends to see the mine issue as a humanitarian problem. Every year, an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 people are killed or injured in accidents involving mines, although exact figures are not available. Most casualties are civilians. The Landmine Monitor recorded 6,521 cases in 2005, including children (1,262 or 19%), women (239 or 4%) and military personnel (25%). Yet many mine-related accidents are not reported, because they take place in remote areas where no assistance or communication of any kind is available. Accidents occur in almost all regions of the world. In 2002 they claimed victims in 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in 15 countries in Southeast Asia, in 10 countries in the Middle East and North Africa and in 5 countries in Latin and Central America (*Landmine Monitor Report 2003: 39-41*).

¹ Progress in implementing Article 5: An overview of the mine-affected States Parties' problems, plans, progress and priorities for assistance, Background information compiled by the Implementation Support Unit of the GICHD to assist the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, 11 February 2004, p.3.

The landmine issue can also be defined as a socioeconomic problem:

- Mines and ERWs disrupt traditional ways of life. Social ties between relatives, families or communities are severed because roads, pastures, markets, schools, wells, riverbeds and other communal facilities and meeting places can no longer be used or can only be accessed via a circuitous route.
- Mines and ERWs impede economic development. The isolation of land, roads, bridges and markets can cut off existing local or regional sources of income. At the same time, the affected communities are confronted by a growing number of disabled people who are unable to provide for themselves. This places an increasing strain on the resources available for medical care. Not only are the operations that have to be performed immediately after an accident difficult and expensive, but also in the longer term the rehabilitation of victims demands constant medical care and attention.

Mines and ERWs pose the additional problem of hampering peacebuilding in post-conflict areas. After a conflict, refugees and displaced persons are unable or unwilling to return to their original homes because they know or suspect that the area is mined. This can slow down the process of reconciliation between the former warring parties.

Mine clearance jargon

‘Humanitarian demining’ usually refers to the sum total of activities relating to the clearance of mines and ERWs. These include: 1) examination of the nature and size of a minefield; 2) preparation of a general plan of action; 3) clearance of mines and ERWs; 4) marking of minefields; 5) follow-up inspections; 6) involvement of the local population in mine clearance activities; and 7) transfer of demined land (GICHD, 2004:64). Humanitarian demining should not be confused with military demining. The aim of humanitarian demining is to remove *all* mines and ERWs, so that it is safe for the civilian population to start living and working again in the affected areas. Military demining is designed to create narrow corridors through minefields for troops and equipment. Since speed is crucial to the success of a military operation of this kind, no attempt is made to clear all the mines. The risk of remaining mines is factored into the equation (House of Representatives, 24292, no. 1:16).²

² The UN norm for the accuracy of humanitarian demining is 99.6%. On the other hand, the Dutch military, for example, consider 80% accuracy to be adequate for military demining (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 8:6).

Humanitarian demining is only one component of what is referred to in international land mine parlance as ‘mine action’. Mine action is an umbrella term that covers a range of activities designed to reduce or completely eliminate the effects of landmines and ERWs on civilians in their living environment. These include: 1) victim support and social rehabilitation; 2) mine risk education and mine awareness for the local population; 3) mine clearance; 4) data management; 5) training for mine clearers; 6) technical research into better detection and clearance techniques (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 8:1).³

Development of the mine action sector

The international community’s activities in the field of mine action started out in Afghanistan. In October 1988, in view of the problems the country faced because of landmines, the UN called for funds for humanitarian mine clearance. Until then, mine clearance had been the exclusive preserve of national armed forces. In the case of Afghanistan, however, there was no functioning national army, and the retreating Soviet troops were unable or unwilling to clear the mines that had been laid. This prompted the UN to develop and promote activities of its own. Initially, the UN’s humanitarian mine clearance activities in Afghanistan were limited to providing demining training. Subsequently support was given by a number of mine-action NGOs specially set up for this purpose in Afghanistan. This initiative in turn triggered the establishment of the first international NGO for mine action (HALO Trust), and activities were extended to other countries with mine-related problems. These included Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Kuwait and Mozambique.

Not all demining activities were entirely successful. In the mid-1990s there was a growing realisation that, in order to discover why previous programmes had succeeded or failed, a common basis for the development of new programmes was needed. In 1997, a study by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was published which examined the factors underlying the success or failure of the first demining programmes in four countries. The study concluded that demining operations suffered from a chronic lack of organisation, commitment and vision. These conclusions, combined with proposals put forward by a

³ The UN defines mine action as ‘activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of mines and unexploded ordnance’. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) identifies five clusters of activities: 1) awareness and education; 2) humanitarian demining; 3) victim assistance and rehabilitation; 4) stockpile destruction; 5) advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines (GICHD, 2004:20).

number of working groups that had been dealing with the question of standardisation since 1996, led to the establishment in 1997 of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). Since then, UNMAS has been the central contact point within the UN for all landmine-related activities and initiatives. In 1997 it published its first list of standards, the International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations. At the same time, UNICEF devised the first series of international guidelines on education and awareness programmes.

Starting in the late 1990s, more attention was paid to: 1) changes and shifts in mine action procedures, practices and standards and how they are perceived; 2) streamlining of mine action in the wider context of sustainable development and capacity building. For example, the scope of the UNMAS standards published in 1997 was extended. In 2000 the first edition of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) was issued by UNMAS. IMAS contain more elements of mine action than the original standards, which dealt exclusively with mine clearance. Their aim is to make mine action more secure and efficient by defining a number of internationally accepted principles, procedures and minimum requirements for national authorities, international donors and organisations in this field. IMAS are reviewed every three years in order to incorporate developments in the field (GICHD, 2004:21-27; Policy Framework for Humanitarian Mine Action, 2004). Mainly because of its traditional isolation, the biggest challenge currently facing the mine action community is the streamlining of mine action (point 2 above). In the last few years, not only have initiatives been developed to incorporate mine action into specially devised national strategies, but there has also been more cooperation with actors operating in this area (GICHD, 2004:21-27; Danida, 2003:9).

International coordination of mine action activities

The international mine action network is made up of national, international and non-governmental actors. Mine action activities are coordinated by the following horizontal and vertical mechanisms:

- The Mine Action Support Group (MASG), which was set up in 1998, is the primary coordinating body for donors. It is an informal forum of 27 donors who meet three times a year in New York and Geneva to share information on mine action activities and humanitarian demining policy. In 2003 Norway initiated the establishment of the Resource Mobilisation Contact Group (RMCG) in the margins of the meeting of the parties to the Ottawa Convention. The RMCG provides an opportunity for international

consultations and the exchange of information between mine action donors and the principal stakeholders in the margins of the various meetings of the parties.

- UNMAS plays a pivotal role in UN mine action activities. A number of other UN bodies also operate in this area. These include UNICEF (mine risk education), UNHCR (mine risk education and safe food supplies), UNDP (socioeconomic consequences of the presence of mines), UNOPS (integrated mine action and capacity building programmes) and UNOCHA (humanitarian consequences of mines). The Inter-Agency Group on Mine Action is responsible for coordination between the various UN bodies. The Steering Committee on Mine Action coordinates the mine action activities of UN and non-UN bodies. NGOs (including the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)), the ICRC and the GICHD, among others, are represented on these committees.
- The most important umbrella organisation for NGOs is the ICBL. The ICBL owes its origin to an initiative by six humanitarian NGOs (Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Mines Advisory Group, Medico International, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and Physicians for Human Rights) who joined forces in the 1990s to work for an unconditional ban on the production, possession, trade in and sale of landmines and other remnants of war. Since the inception of the Ottawa Convention in 1996, the ICBL has worked to promote the universalisation of and compliance with this agreement. Over 1,400 NGOs in more than 90 countries are currently affiliated.
- The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was established in 2000 to support the UN's work. The GICHD is an independent centre of expertise that provides a platform within the international mine action network for international consultation and information exchange. It was the driving force behind the development, distribution and maintenance of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), which was introduced in mid-1999.

National organisation

In most mine-affected countries, demining activities are managed centrally by a national mine action authority. This is a national government body – a ministry, for example – that is responsible for the regulation, management and interministerial coordination of national mine action activities. In addition, there is generally a mine action centre (MAC) that acts as national operator. MACs have a number of tasks: managing the national database, adopting national mine action plans and priorities, accrediting non-governmental and commercial demining organisations, coordinating local mine action plans with the activities of demining

NGOs and other outside bodies and local deminers, drawing up national mine action standards and monitoring the quality of demining activities. In some countries, the national mine action centre is the equivalent of a national mine action authority (GICHD, 2004:118).⁴ Immediately after the end of a conflict, before a government has been installed, the MACs are run by the UN. They are subsequently integrated into the national government structure (Danida, 2003:57).

3 Dutch policy

Financial assistance for mine clearance operations has been part of Dutch government policy since 1992. At first the Netherlands' stand on the issue was a cautious one. On 25 August 1995, as part of the preparations for the first review conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the first policy memorandum on the problem of landmines was published. In it the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and the Minister for Development Cooperation acknowledged the gravity of the landmine problem and gave their backing to a total ban on anti-personnel mines in the long term, but argued that for the time being landmines were indispensable part of the Dutch army's arsenal. A general ban on the use of landmines would only be attainable, they wrote, once fully fledged, humane alternatives to landmines had been developed (House of Representatives, 24292, no. 1). In March 1996, however, defence minister Joris Voorhoeve announced that the existing stockpile of anti-personnel mines would be disposed of and that such weapons systems would not be used in the future (House of Representatives, 24292, no. 4:1). This decision cleared the way for the Netherlands to play a more active role in combating the problem of landmines in the framework of the CCW and the Ottawa process (House of Representatives, 24292, no. 15:2). On the basis of the decision, over a three-year period, almost 440,000 superfluous landmines (235,000 anti-personnel mines and 203,000 anti-tank mines) belonging to the Dutch armed forces were destroyed. The Netherlands retained up to 5,000 anti-personnel mines for the purpose of training mine clearers, studying better ways of detecting landmines and rendering them harmless, and testing equipment developed to do so (House of

⁴ The principal non-governmental demining organisations include: DanChurchAid (DCA), the Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust (HALO), the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) (LMR, 2003:25). Since the first Gulf War, various commercial organisations have also been active in the field of humanitarian demining. These include BACTEC, European Landmine Solutions, Mechem, Mine-Tech International, Royal Ordnance, Ronco and Dyncorp International (GICHD, 2004:22, Wikipedia, 2006) In some countries, demining is performed by a combination of NGOs and the national army or the police.

Representatives, 25000 V, no. 72:7). Although landmines had not been produced in the Netherlands for almost 20 years, the production of anti-personnel mines was prohibited by law at parliament's request in 1996.

Since 1996, the Netherlands has been one of the ten biggest donors in the field of humanitarian demining.⁵ Between 1996 and 2005, the number of countries to which the Netherlands donated funds varied between six and thirteen (see diagram 1). Since signing (3 December 1997) and ratifying (12 April 1999) the Ottawa Convention, it has also been obliged to contribute to efforts to clear mines across the globe and provide assistance for the care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of mine victims. Between 1996 and 1999, the Dutch government earmarked some NLG 20 million annually for humanitarian demining (House of Representatives, 26137 (R1620), no. 5:1). Until the end of 2000, financial assistance for humanitarian demining activities came under the budget article for emergency aid. In November 2000 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a separate article in its budget for humanitarian demining, and increased its annual contribution to NLG 30 million, to emphasise 'the importance of humanitarian demining to re-establishing a safe living environment in post-conflict countries and the Netherlands' specific expertise in demining and the contribution it can make' (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 6). In the autumn of 2003 the government decided to set up a Stability Fund in order to provide rapid, flexible support for activities at the interface between peace, security and development in countries and regions emerging from or at risk of sliding into armed conflict. The funds previously set aside for demining are now allocated to this Fund (DBV/CV-262/03).

In 2003 the government formulated the following central aim for humanitarian demining: 'Dutch policy focuses on clearing landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in order to reduce the number of mine accident victims and foster socioeconomic development. The Netherlands seeks to establish cost-effective mine-clearing operations that mobilise local workers and can be taken over by national bodies as quickly as possible.' (Policy Framework for Humanitarian Mine Action, Theme-based Cofinancing, 15 February 2003. In principle, only countries that have signed and ratified the Ottawa Convention (and actually comply with it) are eligible for Dutch assistance. Financial assistance for demining activities is channelled through the UN (UNMAS and UNDP) and NGOs (in particular the Mines Advisory Group,

⁵ During this period the Netherlands has fluctuated between sixth and tenth place.

Handicap International, HALO Trust and Norwegian Peoples Aid). Organisations that perform mine-clearing activities on a commercial basis are not eligible for assistance. The same applies to organisations that are – or used to be – involved in the illegal trade in anti-personnel mines or arms (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 8:6).

Demining programmes must comply with the following UNMAS mine action guidelines, which are to be coordinated at national level:

- promoting awareness of the presence of mines and UXO and reducing the risks to the inhabitants and users of the area concerned;
- carrying out surveys to determine the location and size of minefields and facilitate their marking and clearance;
- providing assistance to victims of accidents involving mines and UXO and fostering their rehabilitation and reintegration;
- stigmatising the use of landmines and supporting a total ban on landmines;
- building local capacity through education and training so that mine clearance can be transferred to a national agency;
- carrying out quality control checks on the above-mentioned activities.

In awarding grants, the Netherlands gives priority to: 1) actual mine-clearing projects in areas where landmines present the greatest risk to the population; 2) demining activities in countries with which it maintains bilateral aid relations, or in which it contributes to activities relating to human rights, peacebuilding and good governance; 3) the continuation of projects that have already received grants (as opposed to new activities); 4) capacity building and training so that mine-clearing operations can be taken over as quickly as possible by the national authorities in the countries affected (House of Representatives, no. 8:4-6). As far as techniques are concerned, manual detection is the preferred method. The Netherlands prefers the deployment of large mine-clearing teams to the funding of heavy machinery because of the resultant opportunities for engaging the local population and promoting employment. No grants will be made available for the development of new detection and clearance techniques (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 8:5-6).⁶

⁶ The Policy Framework for Theme-based Cofinancing became effective in 2003. Theme-based cofinancing is a system for awarding grants. Its aim is to use central funds to support initiatives pursued by specialised organisations (i.e. those specialising in a certain theme) that work together with local organisations. These initiatives should seek to build up civil society and achieve long-term reductions in poverty in several developing countries, while strengthening the local organisations with which the specialist organisations cooperate. Grant applications for demining programmes should be compatible with both the Policy Framework for Theme-based

Funding decisions are currently guided by whether an area has been accorded priority in the context of the Stability Fund (Stability Fund Assessment Framework). The priority areas are the Horn of Africa, the Western Balkans, the African Great Lakes region and Afghanistan.

4 The study: objective, evaluation criteria, questions and structure

Objective

The objective of study II is threefold:

- 1 to understand how Dutch policy on humanitarian demining was formulated in the period 1996-2006;
- 2 to assess the way in which mine-affected countries and humanitarian demining programmes eligible for financial assistance were selected;
- 3 to assess the effectiveness of Dutch financing efforts in this area.

Evaluation criteria

The study can be seen as a combination of a policy review and a product evaluation. The applicable evaluation criteria are the relevance and effectiveness of the policy.

Relevance: Relevance is gauged by the degree to which the activities in question help achieve the aim in question. The main aim of humanitarian demining is to prevent new mine-related casualties. From this perspective, the humanitarian demining programmes supported by the Netherlands are by definition relevant and the question of relevance can be disregarded in the study. In the case at hand, however, it is important to scrutinise the policy relevance of the humanitarian demining programmes supported by the Netherlands. It is necessary to ascertain whether the activities are a logical corollary of Dutch policy and whether they tie in with the policy of the recipient country. Both aspects of this question are covered in the study (see the first and second cluster of questions addressed by the study).

Effectiveness: IOB guidelines define the criterion of ‘effectiveness’ as follows: ‘Effectiveness concerns the degree to which the direct results of the activities carried out (i.e. the ‘output’) contribute to the sustainable achievement of the programme objectives (i.e. the ‘outcome’).’

Because of the nature of humanitarian demining, the effectiveness of humanitarian demining programmes supported by the Netherlands can be accurately measured in terms of outputs. Accurate data on the resources employed – both financial and manpower – (inputs) and on the number of landmines cleared, the number of hectares demined etc. (outputs) are recorded and published. Both the periodic progress reports of demining organisations and the annual reports by mine-affected countries mandated by the Ottawa Convention represent comprehensive, reliable and accessible sources of information. But less is known about the actual use of demined land and the extent to which humanitarian demining programmes benefit the communities involved (outcomes). For this reason, the evaluation method used here mirrors as closely as possible the one employed in previous evaluations incorporating land use.⁷

Efficiency: The IOB guidelines cite ‘efficiency’ as a third evaluation criterion after ‘relevance’ and ‘effectiveness’. Efficiency refers to the degree to which the results achieved (output) are in proportion to the cost of the resources used (input) and their application. This is a question that cannot be answered in the case of humanitarian demining (and indeed no attempt should be made to do so), since every mine that is cleared equals a human life saved. The evaluation will therefore only ask whether the humanitarian demining programmes supported by the Netherlands were completed on time and within budget. This is a narrow definition of ‘efficiency’, generally referred to in the literature as ‘cost effectiveness’ (see the third cluster of questions).

Questions

Based on its threefold objective, the evaluation will focus on the following three clusters of questions:

Dutch demining policy

- Underlying principles:

On what principles was Dutch policy based?

Was demining policy incorporated into general policy (e.g. development policy, humanitarian aid policy or post-conflict reconstruction policy)? If so, how?

- Objectives:

⁷ Of particular relevance in this regard are Danida’s evaluation ‘Danish Support to Mine Action’ (2003) and a GICHD evaluation of land use in Yemen which should be complete by the end of 2006.

What were the Netherlands' demining objectives in the period 1996-2006?

- Strategies:

How did the Netherlands endeavour to achieve these objectives?

- Activities:

Were the activities undertaken by the Netherlands a logical corollary of Dutch policy?

Selection of countries and programmes

- Consistency:

What criteria played a role in determining a mine-affected country's eligibility for financial assistance?

What criteria played a role in the acceptance or rejection of grant applications?

Was decision-making on this matter consistent?

Was decision-making on this matter transparent?

- Coordination:

Were the activities coordinated with other activities supported by the Netherlands?

Were the activities coordinated with other donors and/or aid organisations?

Did the demining programmes supported by the Netherlands meet national needs in the area of demining?

Effectiveness

- Nature and extent of the landmine problem:

How did the mine problem develop in the countries and regions assisted by the Netherlands between 1996 and 2006? In what respects has the problem lessened or deteriorated?

- Effectiveness of the programmes:

To what extent did the programmes supported by the Netherlands achieve their objectives?

Were the programmes carried out on time and within budget?

How did the programmes contribute towards the Netherlands' aims as regards capacity building?

Is land that has been cleared of mines being used again? If not, why not? If so, is it being used for the purpose envisaged?

What is the opinion of the national, regional or local authorities and the affected local communities on the effectiveness of the demining programmes supported by the Netherlands?

- Effectiveness of Dutch policy efforts:

Did the programmes supported by the Netherlands help reduce the annual number of victims of accidents involving landmines and UXO?

Have the programmes supported by the Netherlands contributed as envisaged to socioeconomic development?

Structure of the study

The study comprises both desk-based and field components.

1. Desk-based research

The first phase of the study will give an overview of Dutch humanitarian demining policy and establish how countries and programmes eligible for financial assistance were selected on the basis of this policy. This will involve studying the relevant literature, examining parliamentary papers (policy documents, theme-based policy frameworks, committee reports, etc.) and consulting recent evaluation reports on humanitarian demining by other donors. The first phase will also include interviews with various stakeholders both at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (representatives of the Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department (DMV), the Security Policy Department (DVB) and the relevant regional departments) and external bodies (representatives from UNMAS, GICHD, donors represented in the Mine Action Support Group and others). The desk-based component of the study will be conducted by the IOB-evaluation team.

2. Field research

An international consultant will be contracted to perform field research at locations in three countries where programmes supported by the Netherlands are being carried out. The field research will focus on gathering information on the use of demined land. The remit of the team of evaluators that will perform the field research is twofold.

First, they will collect information on the envisaged use of the land that has been cleared of mines with Dutch financial assistance. They will be instructed specifically to:

- Prepare an overview of the various assessments of the nature and extent of the landmine problem that served as a baseline for the demining programmes. These include at a minimum the Landmine Impact Surveys, the General Mine Action Assessments or Level One Surveys, and the Technical Surveys or Level Two Surveys.
- Examine how the competent demining authorities determined which countries were eligible for mine clearance. To this end they will have to identify the selection procedures that were followed, the stakeholders involved in the selection procedures, and the data that prompted the demining authorities to initiate mine clearance activities.

Second, they will provide an overview of how, once a mine clearance programme has been completed, the land in question is actually being used. They will be asked to:

- Investigate what demined land is being used for in practice and collect written and photographic evidence of their findings. Investigate, if relevant, how intensively the land in question is being used for the purpose designated.
- Gauge opinion on the actual land use among representatives of the population groups and communities involved. Previous evaluations have shown that focus groups drawn from community leaders, users of demined land, women, children and mine victims constitute an important instrument in gauging opinions.

In the context of the field research, files will also be examined at the relevant embassies, and interviews will be conducted with representatives from 1) the Dutch missions in the countries concerned; 2) the demining organisations supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 3) public officials from the competent national ministries and regional and local authorities who are directly involved; 4) the national coordinating bodies in the area of humanitarian demining; 5) NGOs (e.g. ICBL and Human Rights Watch); 6) the ICRC; 7) UN bodies involved (including UNDP, UNOCHA and UNICEF); and 8) other donor countries.

Parameters and scope of the study

The field research to be undertaken was selected with reference to the following factors:

1. the scale of Dutch commitments to the recipient country;
2. the duration of Dutch assistance (continuous or ad hoc);

3. the method by which the Netherlands delivers its aid (direct to the demining NGOs and/or via multilateral channels);
4. the nature of the activities supported by the Netherlands (mine clearance only, or other forms of mine action, or both);
5. the scale of the problem in the recipient country (geographical, number of victims, urgency);
6. the nature of the mine problem in the recipient country (landmines and/or ERWs);
7. the organisation of humanitarian demining in the recipient country (UN-run mine action centre or national demining authority);
8. the political situation in the recipient country (e.g. relatively stable political situation and constructive climate for humanitarian demining vs. political instability);
9. whether the country has signed/ratified the Ottawa Convention;
10. whether the Netherlands has bilateral development relations with the country.

Based on factors 1 and 2 (see diagram 1), concise country analyses have been performed for Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Eritrea, Laos and Mozambique (see diagram 2). In consultation with DMV, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia have been selected for field research. The locations to be covered by the field research have to be selected by mutual agreement on the basis of an inventory of activities in Angola (see diagram 3), Bosnia & Herzegovina (see diagram 4) and Cambodia (see diagram 5).

5 Organisation

The study of how the Netherlands has employed the instrument of financial assistance is the second part of the IOB evaluation of the Dutch efforts to control landmines and ERW's. The evaluation is carried out under the responsibility of inspector Yvonne Kleistra. Michiel van Bokhorst, who worked on the preliminary study as an IOB trainee, will also work on study II, as a research assistant. A senior researcher is hired to conduct and supervise the evaluation in conjunction with the inspector.

An international team of highly qualified independent evaluators will be hired to perform the field research. The evaluation team should consist of a team leader and two team members. Given the nature of the subject, the team of evaluators will have to be multidisciplinary and should include personnel with professional background and extensive experience in humanitarian demining and humanitarian aid and/or reconstruction actions, the work of

national and international agencies, gender expertise, and experience in the countries covered by the field research. The team leader should have extensive experience in conducting evaluations of the provision of humanitarian aid and socio-economic reconstruction activities. The timetable for the evaluation work in the three countries selected for field research will require the creation of three separate field study teams. The team leader of the evaluation team and the two other members of the evaluation team each will direct a field study team. The field study teams should include local evaluation expertise. Part of the international consultant's remit will be to recruit local consultants for the field missions in the three countries selected.

It is estimated that the field research in the three countries selected may require nine person-months work. The evaluation team should conduct the field missions at least in part analogously and preferably on the basis of tested methods.

During the course of the field research the following outputs will have to be produced: three field mission reports, a draft final synthesis report of the field research to be submitted within one month upon completion of the field work. The draft synthesis report will be finalised following review by IOB. The results of the field research will be incorporated into the final IOB-evaluation report of study II.

A sounding board group has been set up including representatives of the policy departments involved and three outside specialists. The group will hold three meetings to give its opinion on study I, study II and the synthesis study of the IOB evaluation.

6 Proposal

The proposal to undertake the field research for this evaluation should be fully responsive to the Terms of Reference outlined above. The proposal should indicate clearly the methodological approach to be used, along with the rationale for the overall evaluation strategy. The proposal should furthermore indicate how questions and issues will be dealt with, as well as which sources of information will be used. It should also indicate clearly the strategy for involving the agencies implementing the humanitarian demining activities, local institutions and beneficiaries in the evaluation.

The review and assessment of proposals will be guided by four criteria: 1) quality of the evaluation team, 2) overall approach and evaluation strategy, 3) understanding of the assignment, and 4) the financial offer.

7 Reporting schedule field research

Submission of three field mission reports	June- July 2007
Submission of draft synthesis report	31 July 2007
Review of draft synthesis report	15 August 2007
Submission of final synthesis report	31 August 2007

8 Products

The evaluation will produce reports on studies I and II (incorporating the results of the field research) and a synthesis report. Studies I and II will be published as IOB working documents. The results of these studies will be incorporated into a synthesis report, which is primarily intended for parliament

Abbreviations:

CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HALO	Hazardous Area Life-Support Organisation
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
MASG	Mine Action Support Group
RMCG	Resource Mobilisation Contact Group
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UXO	unexploded ordnance

Annex 1B – Composition of Teams

Team leader of the field evaluation is Mr. Ferko Öry. Mr. Öry worked 20 years in international development cooperation, including evaluation of large projects in the field of humanitarian aid. He was 8 years a member of the board of *Medicine sans Frontieres (MSF)* and worked with MSF in six countries during armed conflicts. Ferko Öry was coordinator of MSF in Bosnia during the war. He was advisor to the Minister of Development Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands and worked from 1995-1998 as first secretary at the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Harare, Zimbabwe. In Harare Mr. Öry was responsible for the Netherlands' international development cooperation in health, population and nutrition in 8 countries in the Southern African region. During this assignment, he discussed with the Ministry of Finance the contribution of the BNP to the health sector and stimulated the use of Public Expenditure Reviews (PER) as an instrument to assess the influence of donor contribution to the distribution of financial means to the public sector and has experience in institutional assessment of government institutions and NGOs in low-income countries.

Bosnia-Herzegovina field team

Mr. Öry is team leader of the team in Bosnia Herzegovina.

Team members are Russell Gasser, Jacqueline Dees and locally hired expertise. Russell Gasser is an independent consultant and several evaluation for example in a global assessment of the European Commission's mine policy and action over the period 2002 to 2004. Jacqueline Dees holds a Bachelor Degree in "English Language and Culture" with a minor Conflict Studies and Human Rights. Currently, she is enrolled in Masters Programme in International Relations and is an intern at the HCSS since February. Suzana Srnica Vukovic has seven years experience in mine action. She worked for BHMIC, UNICEF and Handicap International (during the LIS.) Currently she research consultant for the Landmine Monitor reports in the Balkan region. Almedina Music has ten years experience in mine action. She worked for CARE International and Handicap International, (during the LIS). Currently, she is a Landmine Impact Survey Trainer for the Survey Action Centre.

Angola field team

Team leader of the Angola team is Mr. Arnold Schoolderman. Arnold Schoolderman is a senior researcher and project and programme manager for TNO Defence, Safety and Security. The majority of his projects deals with mines and current and future sensor technologies. His projects on humanitarian demining are part of the Work Plan of International Test and Evaluation Program on Humanitarian Demining (ITEP).

Team members are Guus Meijer, Haweya Abdillahi and locally hired expertise. Guus Meijer works as a freelance consultant and has more than 20 years of professional experience in post-conflict peacebuilding, particularly in Africa and former Portuguese colonies. In recent years, he has been working on various policy evaluations in Africa (a.o. Angola, West Africa, DR Congo, CAR) and Europe (the Netherlands and European Commission). Haweya Abdillahi, holds a Bachelors degree in Dutch law and is currently a Master student International Public Law at the University of Utrecht.

She has relevant work experience in the field of small arms and light weapons, due to an previous internship at the Security Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Cambodia field team

The team leader of the Cambodia team is Mr. Govert Gijsbers. Govert Gijsbers is a senior advisor with the TNO policy innovation group. He has extensive experience undertaking evaluations, including for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, developing impact assessment methods, project management and rural – and institutional development for the EU and the UN.

Team members are Adrian Sprangemeijer, Tim Sweijs and locally hired expert. Adrian Sprangemeijer is a senior researcher with 16 years of experience in research on mines and humanitarian demining. He was an army officer with experience in mine clearance and explosive devices. Tim Sweijs is a recent graduate of King's College where he earned a MA-degree in War Studies. Mao Vanna has been involved in the in the Cambodian HMA field for many years, working for CMAC and Geo Spatiale International. He is an expert in the integration on demining and development.

Annex 2 – Schedule of Activities

Date	Organisation	Person	Position	Place
19-06-2007	UNDP	- Mr. Steve Munroe	Programme Officer	Phnom Penh
	CMAC	- HE Heng Rattana	Deputy Secretary General	Phnom Penh
	AVI	- Mr. Andy Kervell	MAPU Programme Officer	Phnom Penh
20-06-2007	Worldbank	- Mr. Daniel Adler	Programme Officer	Phnom Penh
	NPA	- Mr. Luc Atkinson	Country Manager	Phnom Penh
	NPA	- Ms. Anna Roughly	Programme Officer	Phnom Penh
	NPA	- Mr. Phen Vandy	Monitoring Officer	Phnom Penh
21-06-2007	Austcare	- Mr. Oun Sang Onn	Programme Director	Phnom Penh
	HKI	- Mr. Aminuzzaman Talukder	Country Director	Phnom Penh
	ZOA Refugee Care	- Ms. Cho Cho	Financial Officer	Phnom Penh
	SNV	- Ms. Anna Maria Akela	Senior Tourism Advisor	Phnom Penh
22-06-2007	CMAC	- HE Heng Rattana	Deputy Secretary General	Phnom Penh
	UNDP	- Mr. Hans van Zoghel	Local Development Officer	Phnom Penh
	CARE	- Mr. Brian Agland	Assistant country Director	Phnom Penh
	World Vision	- Ms. Rovenia Jimenez Cruz		Phnom Penh
	NPA	- Mr Phen Vandy	Monitoring Officer	Phnom Penh
25-06-2006	Cambodian Government	- HE Ouk Vong	Deputy Governor Battambang province and Chairman of the Provincial Mine Action Committee (PMAC)	Battambang
		- Mr. Nuom Chayruom	Chief of the Mine Action Planning Unit (MAPU)	
	CMAC DU2	- Villagers	Beneficiaries	Battambang Rattanak Mondol district
26-06-2007		- Villagers	Beneficiaries	Sam Lout District
27-06-2007	CMAC DU 1			Bantey Meanchey
		Villagers	Beneficiaries	Malai district
28-06-2007		Villagers	Beneficiaries	O'Srov District
29-06-2007	CMAC DU4			Siem Reap
02-07-2007	HALO Trust	- Mr. Tim Porter	Country Manager	Siem Reap
		Villagers	Beneficiaries	Anlong Veng district
03-07-2007		Villagers	Beneficiaries	Anlong Veng district
04-07-2007		Villagers	Beneficiaries	Prasat Balang district
05-07-2007		Villagers	Beneficiaries	Chhuk district
06-07-2007		Villagers	Beneficiaries	Dong Tong district
09-07-2007	CMAA	- HE Sam Sotha	Secretary General	Phnom Penh

Annex 3 – Matrix for Analysis

	RELEVANCE	EFFECTIVENESS	EFFICIENCY	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p>WHO ?</p> <p>Suited to priorities and policy of: - target recipient - donor</p>	<p>Attains objectives? - Are objectives likely to be achieved soon ? - What are/were key blockages/problems and success factors?</p>	<p>Outputs + inputs, time</p> <p>+ve and -ve changes</p>	<p>Longer-term effect of Humanitarian Demining activity</p>	
POLITICAL (DONOR and UN, etc)	<p>NL FOREIGN MINISTRY</p> <p>How does Humanitarian Demining fit in with overall policy priorities of NL gov and NL-govt integrated approach (if any)? What is duration, scale, method of Humanitarian Demining assistance ?</p>	<p>What are the objectives of Dutch Humanitarian Demining activities? (implementation Dayton, return and resettlement, peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, sq. Km clearance etc.)</p>	<p>How does NL ensure that Dutch funding for Humanitarian Demining is used efficiently? Is there a favoured mechanism for the use of funds for this activity?</p>	<p>Is there a feedback mechanism so that NL foreign ministry - can identify sustainable practice in Humanitarian Demining - can use field experience to improve strategy for sustainability?</p>	
COUNTRY LEVEL STRATEGY (RECIPIENTS)	<p>NL Embassy, UN agencies, National Govt, National Mine Action Authority, National Civil Protection, etc</p> <p>Is there a clear and well-understood authority for Humanitarian Demining in the country? What is its structure? What is the division of responsibilities? How does this authority link to authorities for reconstruction and development?</p> <p>Is Dutch Integrated Approach reflected at country level? How? What are the national policy priorities in the area of Humanitarian Demining and how are these determined? How do Dutch funded activities suit policy priorities of the host country?</p>	<p>Are the NL policy objectives in the area of Humanitarian demining known and understood in country? Are they different from other donor objectives?</p> <p>Analysis question: was local understanding of NL objectives same as NL understanding ?</p>	<p>Do efficiency considerations determine policies at the national level?</p>	<p>Has Dutch funding for Humanitarian Demining contributed to a national strategic and/or legislative framework for Humanitarian Demining? What are the developments/trends over the 10 year-period?</p> <p>Is Humanitarian Demining part of a strategy of national peacebuilding, or return of IDPs-refugees?</p>	<p>Has sustainability of Humanitarian Demining been included in national policy? How does the policy define "sustainability"? Are there any identifiable lasting results of Humanitarian Demining policies, programmes and projects? Has capacity been build at the national level? What were the major factors influencing the sustainability of Humanitarian Demining activities?</p>
IMPLEMENTING A MINE ACTION PROGRAMME IN COUNTRY	<p>NMAA, National and Regional Authorities in country, major NGOs, etc</p> <p>What are priorities used to select/define programmes and how are these determined? Decisionmaking authority? How do NL-funded activities suit regional or local programme priorities? Are Humanitarian Demining programmes linked to reconstruction and development programmes?</p>	<p>What were the objectives of Humanitarian Demining programmes? Have they been achieved or will be soon? What were key problems/hindrances and success factors to achieving these objectives? Were results of action as expected at policy level? If not, – what was not attained? – Key mitigating factors?</p>	<p>Was efficiency considered at programme level? Was efficiency a criterion in selecting projects?</p>	<p>What impact is the programme aiming to achieve? (purely technical, return, reconciliation, stimulating economic activity, etc.) How is impact measured? Who has decided on impact criteria (local/national/donors/others) ?</p>	<p>Is sustainability included in programmes? How does prog. define "sustainability"? Has there been any lasting effect or impact of the Dutch-funded programmes in the 10-year period? What were the major factors influencing the sustainability of Dutch funded Humanitarian Demining programmes?</p>

	RELEVANCE	EFFECTIVENESS	EFFICIENCY	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
PROJECT PLANNING	<p>Regional and Local authorities in country, project implementers, local Civil Protection, etc</p> <p>NMAA, National and Regional Authorities in country, major NGOs, etc</p>	<p>What were objectives of project? Have they been achieved or will they be soon? Key problems/ hindrances and success factors to achieving objectives? Were results as expected by planner? If not, – what was not attained? – key mitigating factors?</p>	<p>Was efficiency considered in planning the activities? Would another approach have been more efficient?</p>	<p>What impact is the project aiming to achieve? (purely technical, return, reconciliation, stimulating economic activity, etc.) How is impact measured? Who has decided on impact criteria(local/national/donors/ot hers) ?</p>	<p>Has sustainability been included in project design? How? What were the major factors influencing the sustainability of Humanitarian Demining projects?</p>
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION	<p>Project implementers, local community, etc</p> <p>NL-govt integrated approach reflected at this stage? How do demining activities fit the priorities, needs, wishes of affected communities? Are humanitarian development projects linked to reconstruction and development activities by other organisations?</p>	<p>Has implementation of the project lead to use of the cleared land? Has land-use and users changed as compared to before clearanc? What were the major factors negatively or positively influencing the achievement of the objectives over time? Was the project implemented in the most effective way given the local situation?</p>	<p>Was implementation of the demining activities on schedule? Within budget? Cost-effective? Key problems for efficient implementation? Were demining activities implemented in the most efficient way given the local situation and possible alternatives?</p>	<p>What has been the actual or expected impact on land use? Food production, agriculture, infrastructure, retrn/resettlement, reconciliation, sense of security, relations with neighbouring communities, peacebuilding, social, livelihood etc. How was this measured?</p>	<p>To what extent did the benefits of the project continue after the project has been completed? Is sustainability due to - inherent nature of activities? - planning and design? - implementation? - local circumstances? Key obstacles to sustainability? Key successes in sustainability?</p>

Annex 4 – Site Selection Criteria and Site Visits

1 **CMAC – UNDP** **Battambang**

Additional selection criteria for Battambang:

In the the area of Sam Lout large numbers of refugees, demobilised soldiers and their families plus migrating people from other provinces have been resettled.

2 **CMAC – UNDP** **Kampot**

Additional selection criteria for Kampot:

Kampot was one of the strongholds of the Khmer Rouge, in addition to the north-western provinces. Kampot, being a southern province, was also selected to ensure country-wide coverage of sites visited.

3 **CMAC – UNDP** **Kampong Thom**

Additional selection criteria for Kampong Thom:

Kampong Thom is and used to be a key province for the supply and control of the northern provinces where the Khmer Rouge had a strong presence. The capital, Kampong Thom, is located near the junction of National Roads # 6 and # 12. National Road # 12 was heavily mined to prevent access to Preah Vihear province in the north. Part of the National Road # 6 near the Siem Reap provincial border was mined and inaccessible. Minefields in Kampong Thom caused thousands of IDPs.

4 **CMAC Demining Unit 1- NPA** **Banteay Meanchey**

Snoul Tret, Banteay Thmei, Boeng Takoun villages (O’Beichoun commune; O’Chrov district; Banteay Meanchey province; O’Chrov, Malay, Svay Chek and Thmar Pouk districts.)

5 **HALO Trust** **Oddar Meanchey**
Anlong Veng

Additional selection criteria for Oddar Meanchey and Banteay Meanchey

The K5-belt, along the Thai border, is one of the most of heavily mined areas in Cambodia. The majority of the mine related accidents take place in the K5-belt.

Minefields visited:

MF-ID	Location			
	Village	Commune	District	Province
CMAC				
M3500	Neang Lem	Sdao	Rattanak Mondol	Battambang
M 2610	Tasanh	Tasanh	Samlot	Battambang
M 6492	Chheu Teal	Ou Sralao	Malai	Banteay Meanchey
M 4317	Kandaol (93)	Ou Sralao	Malai	Banteay Meanchey
M 4130	Banteay Thmey	Obey Chean	Ouchrov	Banteay Meanchey
M 3321	Chhnoul Treat	Obey Chean	Ouchrov	Banteay Meanchey
M 1842	Sala Visai	Sala Visai	Prasat Balang	Kampong Thom
M 1843	Sala Visai	Sala Visai	Prasat Balang	Kampong Thom
M 2993	Sala Visai	Sala Visai	Prasat Balang	Kampong Thom
M 2994	Sala Visai	Sala Visai	Prasat Balang	Kampong Thom
M 2500	Srae	Sala Visai	Prasat Balang	Kampong Thom
M 2890	Trapeang Chrey	Chhuk	Chhuk	Kampot
M 2099	Prech	Boeung Nimol	Chhuk	Kampot
M 0549	La-ang	La-ang	Dong Tong	Kampot
HALO				
1 st site	Romchek area	Romchek	Anlong Veng	Oddar Meanchey
2 nd site	Romchek area	Romchek	Anlong Veng	Oddar Meanchey
1 st site	Nhoeng	O Kro	Anlong Veng	Oddar Meanchey
2 nd site	Nhoeng	O Kro	Anlong Veng	Oddar Meanchey

Annex 5 – Questionnaires

Initial information about the community and when the demining took place.

- 1 What demining is going on or has been done (including mine action of all types)?
- 2 Were local people listened to (heard and what they said taken into account)?
- 3 Was the demining related to IDPs and was resettlement an important issue? Were refugees consulted before demining?
- 4 How was the consultation done about (a) choosing area (b) choosing what to do (clearance – survey – marking)? Were the opinions of local people heard and listened to?
- 5 Prioritisation process – what it was and how it worked – was “why is this land being cleared?” What was the role of the MAPU/LUPU?
- 6 Has there been a change in land status ? (i.e. has former hazardous land status changed (now non-hazard or marked)
- 7 How is the demined land being used, or is land planned to be used in near future (less than one year)?
- 8 Key problems/difficulties encountered in new use of land after it was cleared (e.g. no funding for seeds or animals, no funding for proposed building, administrative issues, conflict over ownership or use, etc).
- 9 Status of the land? Has land grabbing been an issue? Have provisional land certificates been issued?
- 10 Is there any linkage of mine action to development of economic activities?
- 11 What is the “feel of the community” regarding security, relations with neighbouring villages, peace building?

Annex 6 – Sample Summary Focus Group Interviews

Visit to Tasanh village, Tasahn Commune, Samlot District, Battambang Province.

This was a minefield (M2610) of 66 ha. cleared in 1999 by CMAC at the time that the Netherlands contributed to the UNDP Trustfund. On each side of the road a zone of 45 m wide was cleared (about 6 km long) in order to provide families with a plot of 5500 m²: a safe place to build their homes and to establish a household garden. At the time of the clearance only 6 families lived in the area. The village was cleared to provide space to resettle internal migrants, some of them demobilised soldiers. Following mine clearance 90 families lived in the village and at present 147, mainly families of the migrants. The area was one of the last strongholds of the Khmer Rouge. CMAC started mine clearance very soon after the conflict was over. They recovered 320 APM, 70 ATM, 527 UXO and 940,000 fragments.

The evaluation team heard different stories about the number of mine victims. 14 people were reported injured before mine clearance. There was agreement that (as expected), in the cleared area no further casualties happened. In the non-demined area beyond the roadside zone casualties did continue to happen, reported one death and two injuries. However at the group meeting the evaluation team counted three amputees.

The land received after mine clearance was not enough for crop production. Since agriculture provides the only livelihood for the people, they had no alternative but to go out and farm in mined land. The evaluation team could observe fairly intensive agriculture in the zone immediately beyond the cleared area. It is there that mines continue to make victims.

People have titles to their land (home and garden plot). Originally, since this was Khmer Rouge land, the titles were collective. In recent years land ownership has become individualised. The title is some sort of a certificate issued by the commune and recognised by the district. People are also trying to get ownership of the agricultural land in the mined area – there is a list that is registered with the police, but not yet any certificates of ownership.

People cultivate land in the mined areas simply because they have no alternative way to make a living. Most families own 2-5 ha of suspected land from which on average they obtain a gross annual family income of \$800. Asked about their main problems the responses were very clear: 1) They need to expand the agricultural land as there is no alternative employment, and 2) they need much better technical advice from the Department of Agriculture, which provides theoretical lectures, but cannot offer practical advice on how to treat for example the fungal disease that affects the banana groves. 3) Low prices received for crop from middleman are another important issue.

Asked whether they have put in a request for their agricultural land to be demined they answered that they think this is unrealistic as there are so many areas that will be higher on the priority list.

When asked about the relationship between demining and post conflict reconstruction there was agreement that the situation has improved very much. Asked in various ways about the relationship between the different groups in the village (different origins and

factions) was a problem, the answer was consistently that relationships were rather harmonious. The main problem was a general rise in crime especially theft of bicycles and motorbikes – like everyone else the villagers seem to want more police on the street!

Visit to Chheu Teal Village, Ou Sralao commune, Malai district, Banteay Meanchey Province.

This was a minefield (nr M 6492) of 6 hectare, right at the border with Thailand, cleared by CMAC DMU1 in 2006. We talk to a female village chief and a group of villagers. The land at the border is cleared. It was requested through the communal level and the MAPU-process. It's only a small piece of land. Seventeen families received a portion of the cleared land. Before 2006, they used to cross the border and go to Thailand to work in factory jobs. After the clearance of the field, they have started cultivating the land and cultivate corn soy beans and vegetables since March 2007. They did not have any experience with farming. There are no land conflicts as the land had already been divided before the clearing. They don't have land-entitlements yet, but are awaiting the certificate of the governor, which has already been requested. Although people come from all over the place, there are no problems or rivalries between the different groups. Reconciliation doesn't seem to play a key role here. The villagers cultivate the land individually. They were assisted and advised by the district department of agriculture and development who told them what to grow and how. In addition, they copy the practices of other farmers who live in very muddy area. Demining and development were thus integrated to a certain extent. There was some development assistance provided by the district department of agriculture and by the NGO Ponleu Komar an organisation that helps little girls by providing books, clothes and bicycles. They don't remember any other names of NGOs. Judging from the fact that we talk to a female village chief, who is well respected, there is some form of gender equality in this village. Before the mine clearance, both women and men used to cross the border to Thailand to look for work. After the mine clearance, both women and men work on the land. If there is spare time left, the men still go to Thailand sometimes. Women only join the men if they do not have any young kids. Demining has thus clearly had a good Impact on family-life. The kids go to school, some in the morning, some in the afternoon. The girls (and the boys as well) get MRE at school. Over the last decade mobile MRE teams have regularly visited the village. The last accident took place in 2004, in which one person died. The people don't live in minefields, I am told. They are afraid for their small children walking into the minefield, which lies on the other side of the village and tell them not to.

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Annex 8 – Land situation in Cambodia¹

Land Ownership Situation in Cambodia

Prior to the French protectorate (1863-1953), all land belonged to the Sovereign with usufruct rights issued to individual farmers. During the French protectorate era, land tenure shifted towards private ownership. However, during the Democratic Kampuchea regime (1975-1979), private ownership of all property was abolished and all cadastral records were destroyed; farmland was reorganised to fit in with a massive irrigation system.

After the end of the Democratic Kampuchea regime, land was redistributed under the rule established by the People's Republic of Kampuchea (1979-1989), on the basis that farmers in each village received an equal share of land according to household size and the condition that they collectively form a farmer group (or 'Krom'). However, whilst residential, ricefield and farm ('chamkar') plots were distributed amongst the general population, there remained vast areas of land that were classified as state land. During this period, most farmers and village communities were not interested in or conscious of having land surveyed to conduct proper demarcation of boundaries.

During the transition to a market economy that began in 1986 and was further accelerated in 1989, much of the state land areas have gradually come under private control. Furthermore, during the 1980s much of the northwest of Cambodia was still engaged in civil war and therefore the agricultural land was not available for allocation and cultivation, and was kept under the control of the various military groups. Presently, some of these land areas are still under such control.

Subsequent to the peace agreement brokered in 1990, land areas in the northwest of Cambodia were allocated to refugees, IDPs and others by the controlling groups and local authorities. This process continued even after the promulgation of the new 2001 Land Law, which does not allow such an allocation approach. The 2001 Land Law Article 29 stipulates '...any occupation for possession shall cease when this Law comes into effect'. All social land concessions should instead be allocated under the provisions of Sub-decree 19 (Social Land Concession).

The System of Land Registration and Titling

During 1989-94, the Department of Cadastre was part of the Ministry of Agriculture. The provincial and district offices of the Department of Cadastre carried out the cadastral work and the provincial Governor was the final authority to issue land certificates² for both agricultural and residential land.

During 1995-98, the Department of Cadastre was moved to the Council of Ministers; the final authority for issuing land certificate shifted from the Provincial Governor to the Director of the Department of Cadastre.

In 1998, the Department of Cadastre (now referred to as the General Department of Cadastre and Geography) was again moved, this time to the newly established Ministry

¹ This annex was written by Mao Vanna, the local consultant of the evaluation team.

² The Government issued over 4 millions certificates, with 10-20% overlap of ownership, according to H.E. Lim Hor, Deputy General Director of General Department of Cadastre and Geography in an interview at his office, 7 February 2007.

of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC). One of the main tasks of this Ministry is to undertake a comprehensive survey, mapping and registration of all land in Cambodia.

To date, there have been land registration activities in all provinces, however only some provinces have undergone systematic registration. The LMAP has implemented systematic land registration in Phnom Penh, Kandal, Takeo, Kampong Speu, Kampot, Sihanoukville, Kampong Thom, Kampong Cham, Siem Reap and Battambang provinces, issuing a total of approximately 1,000,000 titles.

CIDA/GeoSpatial International Inc (Cambodia) and Mclhanny Ltd. had implemented systematic registration in the project 'Land Administration in Mine Affected Areas (LAMAA)' in Svay Check District of Banteay Meanchey Province: in four villages in Svay Check commune and one village in Treas commune; with a total of approximately 4,000 land titles issued in 2003.

The Provincial department of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction and Norwegian People's Aid (PLMUPC/NPA) have implemented a sporadic land registration at Prachea Thom Village, Poipet Commune, O'Chrou District, Banteay Meanchey Province, with a total of 1,407 land titles issued.

After all of these activities, the majority of land holdings in Cambodia still do not have formal legal titles associated with them.

Land Rights Issues in Poor and Mine Affected Areas

Land is one of the most basic of all resources available for the social and economic development of Cambodia. As a result of years of war and civil unrest, landlessness in Cambodia is widespread and a major cause of poverty. Securing title to land for the landless poor is therefore of vital importance to Cambodia's development. By assisting the process of land allocation, and strengthening land tenure rights of the landless poor in mine affected areas, organisations can work to promote social stability and reduce the vulnerability of Cambodia's poorest communities.

Access to agricultural land for the poor and vulnerable is limited in many of the poor villages, particularly those more remote villages near the Thai border, due to a number of reasons: fragmentation as a result of population pressure, forced sale of land as a poverty reduction coping strategy, limited land tenure, land grabbing, and contamination by landmines. Many villagers, especially new internal migrants, newly married couples and the poor, do not have access to land or they have very limited areas of land upon which they can farm.

Land grabbing has been reported in several areas cleared of landmines, which deprives the poor who live in these villages of agricultural land. This land grabbing may have been a result of the inability of the Government bodies (namely, the Ministry of Land Management (MLMUPC) and its Provincial Department, and the MAPU) to officially allocate and demarcate cleared land, the majority of which is state private land, and failure of the appropriate government authorities to enforce allocation. Such state private land should be allocated to the poor under the Social Land Concession Sub-decree 19; however, to date the criteria and requirements for allocation under this sub-decree have not been integrated into the MAPU process managed under Sub-decree 70 on the Socio-Economic Management of Mine Clearance Operations.

Annex 9 – Main Types of MINES and UXO Found in Cambodia

Main Types of MINES and UXO found in Cambodia												
Ser	Type	Model	Ser	Type	Model	Ser	Type	Model	Ser	Type	Model	
1	AP Mine	72 A	31	AT Mine	M7A2	62	Bomblet	BLU24/B	97	Rifle Grenade	Heat MOD-50	
2		72 B	32		PTMIK	63		BLU24A/B	98		M9A1 Heat	
3		B40	33		STM1	64		BLU24B/B	99		Rocket	102 mm Model 488
4		BMV78A1	34		TM46	65		BLU24C/B	100		107 mm Type 63	
5		BMV78A2	35		TM57	66		BLU26/B	101		120 mm T10	
6		Baby Claymore	36		TM62M	67		BLU27/B	102		122 mm DB2 or DD2	
7		DH10	37		TMK41	68		BLU3/B	103		122 mm DBI-A	
8		M14	38		Type 72ID	69		BLU36/B	104		122 mm Vietnam	
9		M16A1	39		Type 72MT	70		BLU39/B	105		132 mm M-13UK	
10		M18A1	40		Artillery	105 mm mod		71	BLU59/B		106	160 mm HBF
11	MD82B	41	115 mm BM-6	72		BLU61A/B	107	200 mm				
12	MN79	42	122 mm BK-6M	73		BLU66/B	108	200 mm MD-20F				
13	Mon 50	43	130 mm 482M	74		BLU66B/B	109	240 mm F-961U				
14	NOMZ2B	44	130 mm BR-482B	75		Hand Grenade	Frag	110	406 mm Frog-4			
15	Number 8	45	130 mm PB-42	76			Frag chaped charge	111	415 mm Frog-5			
16	OZM3	46	130 mm SP-46	77			Frag reverse version	112	57 mm S-5M			
18	OZM72	48	23 mm	78			Heat M-113	113	58 mm PG-16			
19	PMD6	49	30 mm	79			RPG 43 copy	114	65 mm PG-18			
				80			RGD-33	115	81 mm PG-2			
20	PMD6M	50	Bomb	1000 lb	81		RKG-3EM	116	813 mm Frog-1			
21	PMN	51		2000 lb	82		RKG-3M	117	82 mm OG-82			
22	PMN2	52		500 lb	83		RKG-3T	118	82 mm PG-82			
23	POMZ	53		750 lb	84		RPG-6	119	87 mm Type 135			
24	POMZ2	54		Incendiary 750 lb	85	Stick Apers	120	87 mm Type 241				
25	POMZ2M	55		Frag 20 lb	86	Stick Blast	121	B40				
26	PPMISR	56		MK 81	87	Stick Tear	122	B40AC				
27	PSM-1	57		MK 82	88	Mortar	120 mm - S 843	123	B40AP			
28	Q10	58		MK 83	89		60 mm	124	B62			
29	Type 66	59		MK 84	90		82 mm - B1	125	B63			
30	Type 69	60	SUU	91	Recoilless		107 mm 883 A	126	PG 7			
		61	SUU 14	92		107 mm BK-883	127	Small Arms (Calibre)	0.5 mm			
				93		107 mm PBK-883	128		12.7 mm			
				94		66 mm Type L	129		5.56 mm			
				95		82 mm BK-881	130		7.62 mm			
				96		82 mm DK-82	131		9 mm			

Annex 10 – Netherlands Funded Programmes Outside HMA

Type of project(s) ³	Period
Forestry resources inventory	1996-1998
Forestry regulation	1996-1998
Contraceptive project	1997-1998
Rural development, poverty alleviation on the countryside and pest management	1997-2000
(Technical) Assistance in the health sector	1997-2002
Support to organisations aimed at empowerment of women through NGOs and the Ministry for Women Affairs	1997-2003
Election support	
Reproductive health care	1999
Combating of sexual abuse of children	1999-2003
Judicial capacity building	1999-2004
Humanitarian assistance to World Vision, ICRC and WFP after floods	2000
Small poverty reduction programmes	2000
Regional trafficking programme	2000
Promotion of democracy	2000
Support to a Muslim organisation for the Cham	2000
Demobilisation of military	2000-2002
Support for labour organisations	2000-2002
Capacity building Ministry of Finance	2000-2003
Support to Cambodian decentralisation policy	2000-2003
Support to documentation centre (a.o. for Khmer Rouge information)	2000-2005
Small arms and light weapon destruction	2001-2002
Support to human rights commission of the senate	2001-2002
Election support	2001-2003
Establishment of the Khmer Rouge Trail	2004, 2006
ORET (Export transactions relevant to development))	2004-2005
HIV/AIDS (regional SE-Asia)	2004-2005
Police training	2006

³ *Annual Plan 1999*, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, MFA, Bangkok, 1998, pp. 35-39. *Annual Report 1998*, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Bangkok, 1999, pp. 17-19. *Annual Plan 1999*, MFA, The Hague, 1998, p. 2. *Annual Plan 2000*, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, MFA, Bangkok, 1999, pp. 11-22. *Annual Report 2000 & Annual Plan 2001*, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, MFA, Bangkok, 2001, pp. 13-16, 21-29. *Annual Report 2001 & Annual Plan 2002*, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, MFA, Bangkok, 2002, pp. 6-16. *Annual Report 2002 & Annual Plan 2003*, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, MFA, Bangkok, 2003 pp. 7-15. *Annual Report 2003 & Annual Plan 2004*, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, MFA, Bangkok, 2004, pp. 8-18. *Annual Report 2004 & Annual Plan 2005*, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, MFA, Bangkok, 2005, pp. 5-10. *Annual Report 2005 & Annual Plan 2006*, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, MFA, Bangkok, 2006. *Annual Report 2006 & Annual Plan 2007*, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands MFA, Bangkok, 2007.


Annex 11 – CMVIS Casualty Rates 1996-2006

Population	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Boy	330	279	265	232	189	178	232	232	240	215	109
Girl	74	66	50	62	53	38	48	51	37	52	31
Man	3717	1815	1745	794	561	541	514	443	547	525	284
Woman	199	138	90	65	55	69	53	46	74	83	26
total	4320	2298	2150	1153	858	826	847	772	898	875	450

Device	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Mine	3025	906	1632	731	467	405	367	362	340	365	191
UXO	1295	1392	518	422	391	421	480	410	558	510	259
Total	4320	2298	2150	1153	858	826	847	772	898	875	450

Injury_type	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Amputation	443	665	753	361	233	227	215	156	195	173	93
Injured	2966	1107	966	542	447	417	484	501	532	534	296
Killed	911	526	431	250	178	182	148	115	171	168	61
Total	4320	2298	2150	1153	858	826	847	772	898	875	450

Annex 12 – Chronological Overview



Annex 12 – Chronological Overview