Toespraak Defensieverkenningen

Gelegenheid: Toespraak Defensieverkenningen

Generals, ladies and gentlemen,

I am delighted to have this opportunity to talk to you today. At this important conference you are exploring the direction future defence policy should take. This morning, you discussed the theme ‘Interstate and institutional dynamics’, introduced by my colleague, Maxime Verhagen. You talked about shifts in global power relations, and the development of international organisations for peace and security. In my view, a logical starting point for a discussion about the future of the Dutch armed forces. How emerging powers like China and India are embedded in the international order will have a major influence on our children’s security and prosperity, as will preventing interstate conflict.

If anything, the recent conflict between Georgia and Russia has taught us that intra-state conflicts are here to stay. But there are other risks and threats, that may become even more important. The conflict between Russia and Georgia has been overshadowed by the financial crisis, that has an impact on the credibility and legitimacy of the growing but still fragile Russian economy. We live in a time where the use of force is being privatised and globalisation is occurring not only in trade, investment and technology transfer. Pandemics, scarcity of various kinds, climate change, terrorism and organised crime centring on drugs and human trafficking are all factors that contribute to instability within states. Instability that causes latent local conflicts to flare up and is exported across borders in many forms and shapes, as for instance refugee flows and international crime.

In the next two hours you will be discussing global security. I shall concentrate within this theme on fragile states, the threat they pose and the consequences for the future of the Netherlands’ armed forces. Later, three authoritative speakerswill discuss other aspects of global security. I am pleased that they could be with us today.

Ladies and gentlemen,

I have just returned from a visit to East Congo. This area has many of the features of what Robert Cooper calls a pre-modern state in his widely praised book The breaking of nations. In this book he identifies three types of states: modern states that underline the issue of sovereignty, the national state, and sometimes of the need for weapons of mass destruction to defend regimes or positions; post-modern states that give up some sovereignty to pool resources and work together, even in the field of defence; and pre-modern states like East Congo where the government no longer holds the monopoly over the use of force; basic services, such as education, health care, water supplies and sanitation are no longer being delivered; the economy is stagnating. The consequences of the on-going conflict are both appalling and terrifying. In Kibati refugee camp, six kilometres from Goma, tens of thousands of refugees live their lives, torn between hope and fear. They are too afraid to return to their own villages, due to fighting between the various militias. But during the night, these same militias move into the camp, carving a trail of plunder and rape.

Because the refugees in Kibati are unsafe, they have no opportunity to develop. They are entirely dependent on the international community for food and water. They cannot send their children to school, and are unable to develop any sustainable economic activity whatever. Human rights violations, especially against women, are commonplace. And the repercussions are being felt far beyond the region around Goma. Last week alone, thirteen thousand Congolese refugees crossed the border into Uganda. Some of these people have since died of cholera. The further spread of disease is a serious threat.

Congo is not the only country in the world to be confronted by fragility. It is to be found all over the world. And if we make no attempt to step up our efforts, it is here to stay. In his book, The bottom billion, British economist Paul Collier identified the close links between conflict, poverty, slow economic growth and dependence on export products. He calculated that no fewer than 730 million inhabitants of the world’s poorest countries have experienced – or are still experiencing – civil war. In these fragile states, a weak economy goes hand in hand with a weak state. Security is poor and economic growth and development cannot get off the ground.

Countries that balance on the edge of fragility need help in breaking out of this vicious circle. These states must not degenerate into the global village’s barrios. Otherwise they will fall back into conflict and strife. Poverty reduction in its broadest sense should be one of the priorities of our foreign policy, and that includes our security policy. It was in this light that the government sent its policy paper on security and development in fragile states to the House of Representatives a few weeks ago. This is not only an issue of morality, but one of self-interest. In an unequal world the soft underbelly of fragile states can form a multi-facetted strategic threat to our own well-being, social fabric and security.

Ladies and gentlemen,

In most cases the governments of fragile states lack the capacity to provide safety and basic utilities to their citizens. It is important the international community assists them in providing these services. Assisting - and I underline assisting - the rebuilding of states and a social contract is essential. If we fail, a security dilemma is bound to develop within these states. This would greatly increase the risk of conflict, amongst elites or from the grass-root level due to a disgruntled populace. In the post-Cold War era these types of conflicts are hard to contain: super power patronage has disappeared and the government has been weakened sometimes by the Washington Consensus that saw the government as part of the problem, rather than a part of the solution.

Confronted with widespread human suffering and serious instability, the international community cannot afford not to take action. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out, unless we take our responsibility for fragile states the world cannot enjoy peace and prosperity. I wholeheartedly support this view. We need to use a wide range of instruments. It will come as no surprise to you that at this conference I plan to concentrate on the judicious deployment of military instruments.

Military instruments can be used as a final resort, but they can also be deployed at an earlier stage. Past experience has shown that the preventive stationing of troops can make a serious contribution to stability. In the first months of the new Millennium, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was rescued from the brink of chaos thanks to the presence of western troops, among them a Dutch contingent. Now that country is a candidate for membership of the European Union. It seems that this experience is completely forgotten.

But of course chaos and decline cannot always be prevented. Afghanistan, Somalia and East Congo are all underdeveloped areas, with poor governance. I believe that the geo-strategic risk they pose receives too little recognition. Terrorists were able to prepare their attacks on the USA in Afghanistan, and pirates threaten commercial shipping and aid convoys off the coast of Somalia. Fragility is at the heart of our security problem. Fragile states cannot be left to their fate. We need to do everything in our power to help them reduce security risks, achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and build good governance. The possible use of military instruments should not be rejected from the outset. On the contrary, integrated deployment of all the resources at our disposal is needed. For example in Somalia, where it is clear that the problem of piracy cannot be solved militarily at sea alone: to eradicate this phenomenon we also need to tackle the root-causes on the shore.

At the post-conflict stage, the primary role of the military is to create security and stability, as conditions for sustainable reconstruction when development workers come in. But soldiers have more tasks to fulfil. They help build up or reform the armed forces – from power projection to knowledge projection, if you will. This is no easy task in countries where democratic structures are weak, and where former opponents have to learn to work together after years of conflict. This calls for knowledge, skills and professionalism. Knowledge not only of building armed forces, but also of training, policy development and management and, at a given moment, of planning and budgeting. Professionals are needed, capable of carrying out these tasks quickly, and deployable for a long period. There are professionals like these in the Netherlands’ armed forces. I greatly admire them and the military profession that has developed so uniquely in our country.

Ladies and gentlemen,

What are the implications for the Netherlands’ armed forces in 2020? Let me outline the situation in military speak. We have launched an assault on fragility. Not the classic frontal attack, because our opponent is too sophisticated for that. We are attacking with combined joint units, on several axis with unknown depth. The enemy is ever changing, and so our forward units will have to rely on their own reconnaissance units. Success must be exploited immediately, so we will need to be creative. We will have to take risks as long as we don’t expose our flanks too much and stay synchronised with adjacent units. This operation is highly complex, requiring integration of our resources. Given this prospect, cooperation with defence and other partners is essential.

Ladies and gentlemen,

I shall continue in normal language. The Netherlands armed forces have come a long way since the fall of the Berlin wall. Initially, we wanted a smaller, expeditionary force. But soon discovered that the end of the Cold War did not mean that peace had broken out. Instead, numerous hidden conflicts surfaced. In hindsight the choice for an expeditionary force was right, but we did not fully anticipate that this not only meant being ‘deployable world-wide’ but also ‘deployable for many different tasks and in many different situations.’ Soldiers had to work closely together with other experts, which soon brought to light cultural differences. The military toolbox didn’t always contain the right tools. And there was little agreement internationally on how to deploy military resources. In fact, at the turn of the century many authors argued that the efforts of the international community with regard to fragile states was “too little, to late”, that the efforts were not integrated enough and that they were based on a wrong international mandate. In a presidential debate in October 2000, then presidential-candidate George Bush spoke out forcefully against “nation building”. This was, of course, before 9/11. Four years later the US were heavily involved in nation-building in Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti.

As far as the Netherlands is concerned: we have learned a lot in the past years. In the complex, dynamic situation in Afghanistan, the integrated approach is now yielding results. The various parties are working together in increasing harmony. To start with, soldiers, diplomats and development workers found it difficult to cope with each other’s organisation culture and working methods. Now they respond well to each other, and strengthen each other. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams are a good example. They will be placed under civilian leadership next spring. Not only is this a major step towards normalisation, but it is also a good example of increasingly closer cooperation between the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation.

We now need to build on these – and other – successes and lessons learned. For example by expanding our expertise in the field of security sector reform. By investing in knowledge of languages and armed forces development. Or by giving people the opportunity to gain experience, as is now happening in Burundi, where Dutch advisors have been seconded to the Ministries of Public Safety and Defence. But also by ensuring that our SSR experts can be deployed rapidly and efficiently. In this respect, it is important that the government-wide pool of experts should start operating as soon as possible. I believe that this will prove to be a crucial instrument running parallel to efforts to equip the armed forces for the future. The pool will make the Netherlands stronger – as regards both SSR, and the civil activities that are proving more and more important to operations.

Military operations are becoming increasingly complex. Apart from classic peacekeeping tasks, soldiers are often expected to perform police duties and carry out counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. In fragile states, they also have to contribute to reconstruction, demobilisation and SSR. These duties do not automatically conflict with the work of diplomats or development workers. In fact, the mission in Uruzgan demonstrates that soldiers, diplomats and development workers can work together in the field of reconstruction without “crowding the plate”. That is, as long as we respect each others strengths and weaknesses.

The complexity of military operations makes serious demands of the defence apparatus – especially of its staff, the backbone of the armed forces. A solid, modern personnel policy, providing support before and after missions as well as training opportunities will be needed to ensure a competitive position on the labour market. But demands will not only be made of personnel but also of materiel. We know that in the future the need for enabling support capacity – intelligence, logistics, self-protection and transport – will increase. To guarantee that the armed forces are still relevant in 2020, we need to make some clear choices now. That means taking account of extreme situations in which expenditure on materiel rises sharply. The danger of making large investments is that the organisation commits itself for years, and is unable to adapt to changing circumstances. We should try to avoid this by making smart purchases, building up good relations with the business community and contracting some services out to commercial organisations.

It is clear that the answer is not just more money. I know that these policy surveys are not held with the intention of anticipating the financial choices that will need to be made. So I will not do that either. But I would like to point out that this government has allocated more money to the armed forces. And given the many cuts defence has had to make in the past, I think that is quite justified. It is impossible to deliver quality on a shoestring. Having said that, I do want to warn against using the development budget to make up for shortfalls in the defence budget. That would be extremely unwise, certainly in relation to fragile states. It is because security and development go hand in hand in these countries that we need to use our aid money to reduce poverty, achieve the Millennium Development Goals and get development off the ground. And this government is doing just that: this year alone we have spent almost 245 million euro on fragile states. The largest recipient of these funds is Sudan with almost 70 million euro, followed by Afghanistan (~58 million) and the Palestinian territories (~34 million). In addition to this we have allocated 228 million euro, mainly through the Stability Fund, for activities in the field of regional stability and crisis-management. Essential if we are to prevent countries and regions from sliding into fragility. The development budget should remain just that: a budget for development. If even we can’t get this straight, there is little hope that anything will ever happen to change the disgraceful fact that worldwide ten times as much money is spent on defence than on development.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Fragile states pose their own specific challenges on the Dutch armed forces – in terms of organisation, personnel and special skills, such as SSR. Another important issue I should like to discuss today is international cooperation in fighting fragility.

I am concerned that the UN is not taken seriously enough when it comes to peace missions. Isn’t it remarkable that western countries have an important voice in the Security Council in mandating missions, but that it is usually left to countries like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh to carry them out? Of course, I am aware of the shortcomings of the UN missions of the past. But don’t you think they were partly caused by the political, financial and material support that the organisation was denied?

Fortunately the Netherlands is a committed, reliable partner. We now work more frequently than in the past in the EU framework, but we also take part in UN, NATO, and OSCE missions. Increasingly, ESDP missions support UN operations, for instance during the elections in Congo, and in Chad, where an EU operation prepared the way for a UN peacekeeping mission. Support of this kind is essential, because the UN can’t be everywhere at once. To improve the effectiveness of cooperation between the UN, the EU and NATO, we need to learn from the lessons the past has taught us, and analyse where the problems lie.

Ladies and gentlemen,

In a collection of articles published last week to mark the 25th anniversary of the Clingendael Institute, the researchers Edwin Bakker and Kees Homan sketch two scenarios for the future of the Dutch armed forces. In the first, Venus, they are equipped only to carry out peacekeeping operations in relatively stable environments. Soldiers rarely need to engage in combat and spend their days supporting civil operations, private parties and NGOs. In the second scenario, Mars, they have the capacity to operate with allies at the highest level of combat. Participation in peacekeeping and reconstruction missions is not entirely ruled out, but is not the main consideration when it comes to decisions on the capacities to be developed. What matters is power projection.

I am aware that these scenarios oversimplify reality. But because we are here today to brainstorm about the future of the armed forces, I should like to share my views on this issue with you. My personal preference is for a Venus-plus option. That means that in 2020 we should have modern, affordable armed forces that can be deployed in crises and for peacekeeping, and can take part in operations for an extended period. Well-trained soldiers, equipped with the right materiel and, if necessary, able to act at the middle level of the spectrum. We should make the choices needed to achieve this. That means clearer choices within and between the armed forces themselves. We should, for example, invest in our intelligence gathering capabilities. Operations in fragile states, like the one we are currently undertaking in Uruzgan, rely heavily on solid intelligence. Furthermore we should ask ourselves the question whether our materiel is really suited for deployment in crisis situations: do we honestly need the current numbers of submarines in the future? Can we not cooperate more efficiently with our partners in this field? At this moment Dutch units are part of both EU battle groups and NATO ‘Reaction Forces’. These joint ventures are supposed to be more than the sum of national contributions. They should form the overture to far-reaching cooperation in the fields of training, materiel and even the specialisation in certain capacities. If today we reach the conclusion that the NFR is not used to its full capability, can we engage our partners to find a more efficient use for it? Finally we should be looking at relations between the various branches of the armed forces. Surely, a formula for distributing resources cannot be allowed to stand in the way of efforts to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness?

Ladies and gentlemen,

Let me conclude. If we fail to act, fragility is here to stay, with consequences for the future functioning of all our aid instruments. The Ministry of Defence’s future policy survey and this conference provide a good platform for us to discuss the future of the Dutch armed forces. I have just described the threats I feel we will face in the future. And I have pinpointed a number of changes that need to be brought about. Change means thinking ahead, focusing on our shortcomings, and deciding what we need to do differently. I would also urge you to look very carefully at what doesn’t need changing. Hold on, in particular, to your mental flexibility and diversity – your ability to act fast and support or provide command structures so that you can restore order from chaos. Let us cherish the professionalism Dutch soldiers of every rank have demonstrated during missions abroad. If we can hold on to all of those things, the armed forces will have the same relevance in 2020 as they have now.

Thank you.