Toespraak Koenders bij International Conference on Whole of Government Approaches to Security System Reform
gesproken woord telt
Welcome
It gives me great pleasure to welcome you here today. I would like to welcome Ross Mountain in particular, who came all the way from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to be with us. As you know, that is still a major logistic feat. I would also like to say how pleased I am that so many professionals from ministries, intergovernmental organisations and NGOs are attending this conference. I welcome NATO in particular as a newcomer to the OECD DAC debates on Security Sector Reform. The fact that they draw so much attention from such a wide and diverse group of actors underlines their importance. And it demonstrates the need to discuss the opportunities and challenges of joint approaches to Security Sector Reform. It holds, above all, great promise. I am already looking forward to seeing the results of your work over the next day and a half.
Introduction & purpose
I am very pleased with this opportunity to address you here today because Security Sector Reform is crucial to making development efforts effective, in particular in the broader context of fragility and post-conflict reconstruction. In my mind, there can be no sustainable development without stable, effective and democratically accountable security institutions. The global consequences of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the plunder in the Great Lakes region and the lawlessness in Darfur show convincingly that this is also in our own immediate interest. So here we have two main reasons for helping to develop and strengthen security institutions in developing and fragile countries. For their benefit and for ours. Yet the political undertaking we call SSR can only succeed if development principles underpin our efforts. We don’t all have this mindset yet, at least not all of the time. But I would suggest that we now have sufficient evidence to show us that we need it. Engaging in SSR has to go further than counterterrorism or counter-narcotics agendas.
I am therefore pleased that the challenges of Security Sector Reform have been taken on board by OECD DAC. This has culminated in the publication of a widely appreciated OECD handbook on security and justice. However, we all know that handbooks are only a first step. Now, the focus of our attention and energy must shift to applying the knowledge that we have gained. We have to become more effective at the policy, planning and implementation level. This challenge cannot be taken on by a single ministry or government agency. It is a joint undertaking. I am confident that this conference, with a mix of all key SSR players, will contribute to taking this next step.
Overview of fragile states: facts, figures & Dutch policy
Before I offer you some more food for thought on the challenges that lie ahead of you over the next day and a half, allow me to give a brief outline of the factors from which SSR derives much of its relevance. On becoming minister, I made fragile states one of my policy priorities. Although only nine per cent of the world’s population live in fragile states, they represent around thirty per cent of the world’s poorest people. Patterns of conflict also give cause for concern. At this moment, an estimated 33 conflicts are raging, a third of them in Africa. Together they have claimed more lives than all other conflicts combined. Most worrying, however, is that after conflict ends, there is a 44% chance of relapse within five years.
These facts and figures make it quite clear to me that development efforts must take the likelihood, occurrence and legacy of conflict more seriously. A more political approach is needed, not development business as usual.
Dutch policy
We all subscribe to the idea that human security matters, that fragile states pose a significant risk to our own wellbeing and security and that security will remain elusive as long as the gap between us and the bottom billion increases. We also agree that our national security is best served by addressing these challenges. If, however, we only address these challenges from the security perspective, we will run the risk of looking for quick fixes that do not exist. Counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics activities can only bring about superficial improvements. Sustainable change requires a development perspective.
So we need to look for deeper solutions. In order to enable the MDG agenda, for instance, Dutch policy on fragile states aims to contribute to the stability needed in our partner countries. This requires substantial efforts in the fields of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and state building. And stronger international responses to challenges in the fields of peace, security and fragility. Strong, timely, efficient multilateral responses are often the best responses. They call for effective cooperation and a willingness to follow an international lead. We also have to be aware of our own role and the potentially negative effects of our activities. While the exploration of natural resources or the arms trade may both be perfectly legitimate and desirable, such activities may not be allowed to fuel conflict. This is why the EITI, a possible UN arms trade treaty and the likes of the Kimberley process deserve our strongest support.
As part of the search for deeper solutions, I have put security sector reform high on the Dutch policy agenda on fragile states. In fact, I consider it a crucial component of Dutch development efforts and of the human security agenda. Yet, effective implementation of SSR activities requires us to revisit our own approaches and policies. Before we engage in SSR as donors, we also have to assess our own capabilities and limitations. This challenge is at the heart of this conference: how to establish close collaboration between the ministries and agencies in our capitals that are key to SSR.
SSR: requirements for success
Before exploring our Whole of Government challenges in more detail, I would like to outline two requirements that I consider essential for successful SSR. To start with, we have to address the needs of the countries in question. In other words, it doesn’t matter what we want and have to offer; what matters is what they need and want. This calls for a very careful examination of who they are, and of the concept of local ownership – a difficult task, especially in post-conflict situations. Ross Mountain will no doubt have more to say on this matter. Second, we need to focus our support not only on strengthening operational capability and managerial capability, but also on governance.
In fact, sound governance of the security sector is crucial, not only for stability, but also for the success of democratic consolidation and sustainable economic and social development. Indeed, in too many countries, politicised or ineffective security bodies and justice systems are a source of instability and insecurity, blocking economic and political development. Poor governance is mainly responsible. This is particularly salient given recent events in Zimbabwe – a clear example of a country where, after decades of personal rule, development of adequate governance, the rule of law and the appropriate security institutions may well represent one of the major challenges for future SSR.
In addition to governance, it is also essential for the quality of security to create a safe and secure environment for the state and its entire population. To be more precise; there is growing agreement that security also needs to be approached from the perspective of human security – protecting individuals and communities from violence. One of the main findings of participatory poverty assessments – the World Bank’s ‘Voices of the Poor’, for instance – is that the poor identify the lack of physical security as one of their major concerns. Women’s security needs in particular often go unaddressed, because women lack a voice or are not listened to. Yet, more than anyone else, in armed conflict women are victims, dependents and participants. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo I witnessed and spoke to women who were the victims of gruesome crimes. The culture of lawlessness that enables this must also be targeted by our SSR efforts.
From this perspective, it is important to understand that in many developing countries the state fails to provide adequate security and justice services. The vast majority are privatised and delivered by non-state actors. This is not just the case in post-conflict countries like Sudan and Afghanistan, but in Uganda and Kenya, for instance, private security companies have mushroomed over the past few years and have become the main providers of security, and – arguably – of justice.
All of this suggests that our SSR efforts should not be limited to the security of the state or to the role played by state security agencies.
Let me return to the need for Whole of Government approaches to SSR and effective engagement. Realities on the ground show that we need to engage in activities in settings that are far from perfect. In fact, the R of reform may be replaced by the D of development. Because that is what we are trying to do in most cases: to develop the security sector. Developing security and justice systems requires the patience to build local ownership and capability, to accept complexity and setbacks and to be satisfied with a situation that is totally different from the one back home.
This is not going to be easy. Over the past few weeks, for example, colleagues from the Ministry of Defence and my own staff have had to overcome significant differences in their points of view on how best to build on existing Dutch SSR efforts in Burundi. It was clear to all of us that we had different points of view and that the way our organisations were structured and operated suggested different approaches. But we have to learn how to deal with these challenges and to accept the roles and added value of different parties. We also have to be willing to engage with new and difficult local actors, for instance security or intelligence services – not the most likely activity for development actors. We may also have to accept that there are limits to what we can achieve in the short term, and focus on concrete activities, like training, building or providing equipment. However, our aim should always be to respond to local needs, and where necessary help local counterparts to identify them. This demands political skill, intensive deliberation and a readiness to engage quickly.
Positioning SSR: three key milestones
The good news is that we are not starting from scratch. Over the last few years, progress has been made that has resulted in achievements on which I hope you will build today. I will mention three such achievements.
To start with, the past few years have seen a number of countries and institutions making significant progress in creating and expanding their SSR toolkits. For example, the UK has created its Stabilisation Unit and Security Sector Development Advisory Team; Canada now has START and Canadem, the EU its African Peace Facility and here in the Netherlands we have been using our Stability Fund to great effect. There are many more examples that I do injustice in not mentioning. However, all of them show me that you and I are serious about this agenda. They have also made it crystal clear that only a Whole of Government approach can result in effective SSR.
In 2007 my colleagues and I signed off on the OECD’s handbook on Security & Justice. You are all aware of this landmark publication, with practical policy guidelines and plenty of operational entry points. It is serving as a vehicle of engagement and dialogue as I speak. At the same time, however, we must realise that the handbook is very much a product of the development community. It is now appropriate and necessary to take the next steps and to link up with other key actors to implement the SSR agenda. The handbook will serve as a very useful platform for this purpose.
Finally, the draft UNSG’s report on SSR was recently released for discussion. It is a timely and very welcome report because it represents the cornerstone of an integrated UN approach to SSR. This naturally requires close cooperation between UNDP, DPKO, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the member states. We can look to an integrated UN for coordination, leadership, and, of course, greater accountability.
SSR WoG challenges ahead
Recognising the need for Whole of Government approaches to SSR is only the first step. We now have to find ways of putting them into operation. Allow me, for the purpose of this conference, to outline four key challenges in the field of SSR. You may decide to rework them into recommendations that can be taken forward after the conference.
First, we need to become more political and accept high risks
Development actors have to be willing to accept a more political approach. SSR is a politically highly sensitive undertaking with high risks – in particular when we enter into dialogue with unsavoury figures. The intensely political nature of SSR implies that the stakes are high for all actors involved. International actors have to be aligned and must be willing to play political hardball with local actors to avoid being played off against each other. We should, however, also focus on the political dimension at home. We will have to convince parliaments, our colleagues across government and the taxpayer of the urgent need for long-term engagement. We can surely learn lessons from the MoU which the UK concluded with the Government of Sierra Leone in 2003. In my mind it is clear that whatever we do has to be evidence-based, taking local needs and risks seriously, with local actors in the lead where possible.
Second, we need to be clear on coordination and leadership.
Given the scope and complexity of SSR, Whole of Government approaches are no luxury but a necessity. SSR also demands clear agreement on the donor ministry or actor that has the political lead to play hardball. At international level, it raises the question of who has the mandate, the courage and the capability to do so. Can the UN or EU take on this job? If not, what can we do, as their member states, to empower them? Or is perhaps the lead nation approach a sufficient answer?
Third, we need to invest in staff, structures and finances
Dedicated Whole of Government approaches require not only policies, but also the tools to implement them. I suggest that this toolkit should comprise at the very least an empowered high-level SSR decision-making forum, a dedicated SSR unit, flexible, mixed funding and practitioners pooled for effective mobilisation. Creating such a toolkit is no rocket science, but cross-governmental toolkits may prove to be more of a problem. The precise form and function of such instruments will naturally depend on what is most appropriate in the light of the traditions of government in your countries. An excellent example of an efficient pool, for example, is CANADEM – with experts available for swift deployment. I am delighted that CANADEM is represented at this conference today.
Fourth, accept realities on the ground and work with them, not around them.
Non-state actors are estimated to provide 80% of security and justice needs in most fragile states. This varied group of actors consists of neighbourhood vigilantes, local market associations, private security companies, NGOs, militias and many others. For example, in the town of Yei, in South Sudan, the local taxi drivers’ association provides much of the daily security in town. They work together with the police and seem to be quite effective. Engaging with these actors is both necessary and risky. But we need to be prepared to take this risk. However, in order to do so responsibly we need an excellent analysis and sound understanding of the context. We need highly qualified staff that can work in such circumstances. In the long run we seek to support state building. Yet in the short run we must support what matters most.
Conclusion
To conclude, ladies and gentlemen, permit me to highlight a few final issues. The Netherlands aspires to address the challenges I have highlighted as well as possible. I and my colleagues in government are committed to this. Security and development are closely linked, and they need to be addressed cohesively.
This is also why we have just set up a new unit in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the explicit aim of making more of a difference by operationalising and implementing a Whole of Government approach to fragile states. At its head is Koen Davidse, your chair for this conference. He’s got quite a job on, since his unit will have an important role to play within the Dutch government on issues like peacebuilding, fragile states and SSR. And it will put the results of this conference into action in Dutch policy and practice.
This conference is important because it contributes to putting donors’ houses in order by discussing responses to existing challenges for action. This is also the reason why our partner countries have not been invited. This is not because we do not value them. It is because we must aspire to meet their needs as best as possible. And that requires upfront preparation on our part first.
This conference is therefore a crucial step. Yet it is only a step. I would warmly welcome your support in carrying the results forward into other forums, such as the EU, the OECD – in particular the autumn meeting in Accra – the UN, the AU, NATO and many others.
I wish you the best of luck. I look forward to seeing the results.
Thank you.