

# MFS II EVALUATIONS

Joint evaluations of the Dutch Co-Financing System 2011 - 2015

*Civil Society contribution to policy change*

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## International Lobbying & Advocacy report

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July 2015

**SGE** Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties



Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research  
WOTRO Science for Global Development

## PREFACE

This report is one of a series of evaluation reports, consisting of ten reports in total, reflecting the results of the jointly-organised MFS II evaluation:

- eight country reports (India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Uganda, Indonesia, DR Congo, Liberia, Pakistan);
- a synthesis report (covering the eight country studies); and
- a report with the results of the international lobbying and advocacy programmes.

This series of reports assessed the 2011-2015 contribution of the Dutch Co-Financing System (MFS II) towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals, strengthening international civil society, setting the international agenda and changing decision-makers' policy and practice, with the ultimate goal of reducing structural poverty. On July 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2015, the reports were approved by the independent steering committee (see below), which concluded that they meet the quality standards of validity, reliability and usefulness set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

MFS II has been the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs). A total of 20 alliances of Dutch CFAs were awarded € 1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through partnerships with Southern partner organisations supporting a wide range of development activities in over 70 countries and at the global policy level.

The MFS II framework required each alliance to carry out independent external evaluations of the effective use of the available funding. These evaluations had to meet quality standards in terms of validity, reliability and usefulness. The evaluations had to focus on four categories of priority result areas, as defined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and comprise baseline assessments serving as a basis for measuring subsequent progress.

Out of the 20 alliances receiving MFS II funding, 19 decided to have their MFS II-funded activities evaluated jointly. These 19 alliances formed the *Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties (SGE)*<sup>1</sup>, which acted on their behalf in relation to the joint MFS II evaluation. The SGE was assisted by an 'Internal Reference Group', consisting of seven evaluation experts of the participating CFAs.

The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO/WOTRO) managed the evaluation and selected ten research teams to carry out the joint MFS II evaluation: eight teams responsible for carrying out studies at country level, one team responsible for the synthesis of these country studies, and one team responsible for the study of international lobbying and advocacy. Each study comprises a baseline assessment (2012) and a final assessment (2014). Research teams were required to analyse the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of development interventions funded by MFS II. An independent steering committee was appointed to verify whether the studies met with the required quality standards. In its appraisal, the steering committee drew on assessments by two separate advisory committees.

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<sup>1</sup> *Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties can be translated as Joint Evaluation Trust.*

The evaluation has been implemented independently. The influence of the CFAs was limited to giving feedback on the first draft reports, in particular to correct inaccuracies. The contents and presentation of information in this report, including annexes and attachments, are therefore entirely the responsibility of the research team and/or NWO/WOTRO.

However, as SGE we are responsible for adding this preface, the list with parties involved and a table of contents, in the cases that the report is a compilation of several reports.

In addition we would like to note that when reference is made to individual case studies, these have to be seen as illustrative examples, and not as representative for the whole partner portfolio of a CFA.

The Dutch CFAs participating in this unique joint evaluation are pleased that the evaluation process has been successfully completed, and thank all the parties involved for their contribution (see the next pages for all the parties involved). We hope that the enormous richness of the report will serve not only accountability but also learning.

Bart Romijn  
Chair of the 'Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties'

c/o Partos  
Ellermanstraat 18B  
1114 AK Amsterdam  
[www.partos.nl](http://www.partos.nl)  
info@partos.nl

## **Annex**

### ***Consortium MFS II - Programme 2011 – 2015***

#### *The authors of the International Lobbying & Advocacy report*

Dr. Margit van Wessel (project leader)  
Drs. Bodille Arensman  
Dr. Jennifer B. Barrett  
Ir. Arend Jan van Bodegom  
Prof. Dr. Dorothea Hilhorst  
Ir. Dieuwke C. Klaver  
Dr. Elisabet D. Rasch  
MSc. Wolfgang Richert  
Drs. Cornélie van Waegeningh  
Dr. Annemarie Wagemakers

#### *The SGE Consortia (and their lead organisations)*

Freedom from fear (PAX)  
United Entrepreneurship Coalition (Spark)  
Impact Alliance (Oxfam Novib)  
Communities of Change Cordaid)  
WASH Alliance (Simavi)  
People Unlimited 4.1 (Hivos)  
Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation (ZOA)  
SRHR Alliance (Rutgers)  
ICCO Alliance (ICCO)  
Connect4Change (IICD)  
Conn@ct Now (War Child)  
Woord en Daad & Red een Kind Alliance (Woord en Daad)  
Together4Change (International Child Support)  
Child Rights Alliance (PLAN Netherlands)  
Ecosystem Alliance (IUCN)  
Partners for Resilience (Nederlandse Rode Kruis)  
Press Freedom 2.0 (Free Press Unlimited)  
Fair Green and Global (Both ENDS)  
Kind en Ontwikkeling (Terre des Hommes)

#### *The SGE Board*

Bart Romijn (Partos/chair)  
Ben Witjes (Hivos)  
Harry Derksen (New World Campus)  
Jan Lock (Woord en Daad)  
Dianda Veldman (Rutgers)  
Lucia Helsloot (Partos)  
Marouschka Booy (independent consultant)  
Mirjam Locadia (Partos, until 09/2014)  
Alexander Kohnstamm (Partos, until 10/2013)



The SGE Internal Reference Group

Yvonne Es (Oxfam Novib)  
Rens Rutten (Cordaid)  
Karel Chambille (Hivos)  
Peter Das (ZOA)  
Ruth van Zorge (Rutgers)  
Dieneke de Groot (ICCO)  
Wouter Rijnveld (independent)

NWO-WOTRO Science for Global Development, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research

Dr. Martijn Wienia (programme coordinator)  
Dr. Gerrie Tuitert  
Sabine Zinsmeister  
Dr. Henk Molenaar (until 11/2014)  
Dr. Barbara Plavcak (until 09/2013)

Steering Committee

Prof. Wiebe Bijker (chair), Maastricht University, the Netherlands  
Dr. Gavin Andersson, Seriti Institute, South Africa  
Prof. Anita Hardon, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands  
Prof. John Rand, University of Copenhagen, Denmark  
Ms. Mallika R. Samaranayake, independent consultant, Sri Lanka  
Dr. Zenda Ofir, independent consultant, South Africa (until 10/2012)

Advisory Committee for the Evaluation of International Lobbying and Advocacy

Dr. Paul Engel, European Centre for Development Policy Management, The Netherlands (chair)  
Ms. Tanya Beer, Center for Evaluation Innovation, USA  
Dr. Harriet Birungi, Population Council's Reproductive Health program, Kenya  
Dr. Fred Carden, International Development Research Centre, Canada  
Prof. John Gaventa, Coady International Institute, Canada  
John Young, Overseas Development Institute, UK



# **MFS II Joint Evaluation of International Lobbying and Advocacy**

Endline Report

Bodille Arensman  
Jennifer B. Barrett  
Arend Jan van Bodegom  
Dorothea Hilhorst  
Dieuwke C. Klaver  
Elisabet D. Rasch  
Wolfgang Richert  
Cornélie van Waegeningh  
Annemarie Wagemakers  
Margit van Wessel

For further information:  
contact Margit van Wessel  
(project leader):  
[margit.vanwessel@wur.nl](mailto:margit.vanwessel@wur.nl)

Wageningen UR joins the forces  
of Wageningen University and  
specialised researched institutes.  
The domain of Wageningen UR  
consists of three related core  
areas: food and food production;  
living environment; health,  
lifestyle and livelihood.



## Acknowledgements

This endline report is part of a larger framework of evaluations of the Netherlands Co-Financing system known as MFS II and has been carried out by the Social Sciences Group of Wageningen University and Research centre (Wageningen UR)<sup>1</sup> and external consultants from the global South and North. Beyond the authors of the report, we would like to acknowledge Udan Fernando and Winnie Wairimu, who have conducted field work in different African and Asian locations and contributed reports that served as input for several of the Alliance chapters. We thank also Alfredo B. Mazive, Marloes Hofstede and Iris Bekius who contributed to data collection. We would like to extend our special appreciation to the MFS II alliances for their time, openness and feedback, as the evaluation would not have been possible without this level of interaction. In addition, we appreciate the external partners and experts who have so generously contributed through in-depth discussions with us on the relevant issues. The team would therefore like to thank all for their efforts to explain and elaborate on their work, for the time consuming and frequent meetings and interviews and for their feedback and critical questions posed to us as evaluators. Finally, we want to thank Martijn Wienia (project manager for this evaluation at WOTRO), the Advisory Committee and Steering Committee for this Evaluation, and Partos.

Wageningen, April 25 2015



## Executive summary

### Background to the evaluation

The Co-Financing System (Medefinancieringsstelsel, or 'MFS') is the 2011–2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFA). A total of 20 Alliances of Dutch CFAs were awarded €1.9 billion through the MFS II grants framework by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NL MoFA). The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. To meet these evaluation requirements, a joint evaluation programme was developed and approved by the NL MoFA. The overall purpose for evaluating MFS II-funded development interventions is to account for results and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions.

The MFS II has been evaluated through country studies. In addition, this evaluation of International Lobby and Advocacy (ILA) was commissioned as a thematic evaluation across the MFS II. This evaluation concerned the lobby and advocacy programmes of 8 Alliances. The specific aims of this ILA programme evaluation are 1) to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of ILA programmes funded by MFS II; 2) to develop and apply innovative methodologies for the evaluation of ILA programmes and 3) to provide justified recommendations that enable Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners to draw lessons for future development interventions. The evaluation covers the period 2011–2014.

The five main research questions have been formulated as follows:

1. What are the changes achieved in the three priority result areas through international lobbying and advocacy on the thematic clusters 'sustainable livelihoods and economic justice', 'sexual and reproductive health and rights' and 'protection, human security and conflict prevention' during the 2011–2014 period?
2. Do the international lobbying and advocacy efforts of the MFS II Alliances and their partners contribute to the identified changes (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. What is the relevance of these changes?
4. Were the efforts of the MFS II Alliances efficient?
5. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The Call for Proposals for this evaluation (issued by NWO-WOTRO), distinguished three priority result areas for this evaluation: 1) agenda setting, 2) policy influencing and 3) changing practice.

### Scope of the evaluation

The scope of the evaluation is determined by the thematic clusters and the priority result areas defined by NWO-WOTRO in the call for proposals. NWO-WOTRO distinguishes three thematic clusters for this evaluation: (i) sustainable livelihoods and economic justice, (ii) sexual and reproductive health and rights and (iii) protection, human security and conflict prevention. Under the responsibility of Partos and WOTRO, Partos' evaluation manager and two consultants developed and carried out the selection of programmes to be evaluated, in consultation with the Alliances. The selection process primarily focused on representativeness in terms of thematic focus. The three clusters were established so that each of the eight Alliances with an ILA component could be

represented in the evaluation in a theme that was prominent in their work. In consultation with the Alliances, a programme was selected for evaluation for each Alliance.

The scope of the selected programmes varied substantially across Alliances. In some cases, as is elaborated further in the cluster and Alliance chapters, evaluation sub-teams have had to place additional limits on the boundaries of the selected programmes for reasons of feasibility.

Thematic cluster	Alliances
Sustainable livelihoods and economic justice	Ecosystems Alliance Fair, Green and Global Alliance IMPACT Alliance Hivos Alliance, People Unlimited 4.1
Sexual and reproductive health and rights	SRHR Alliance
Protection, human security, and conflict prevention	Communities of Change Freedom from Fear Together4change

*Conceptualising ‘lobby and advocacy’*

Lobby and advocacy in international development interventions can be defined as a ‘wide range of activities conducted to influence decision makers at different levels’ towards the overall aim of development interventions to combat the structural causes of poverty and injustice. The concept of advocacy, however, goes beyond mere policy influence and aims for sustainable changes in public and political arenas, including awareness raising, litigation (legal actions) and public education, as well as building networks, relationships and capacity. Methods used to influence decision makers in this regard are 1) persuasion and cooperation (lobby) and 2) pressure (e.g. blaming and shaming) and confrontation (used in other advocacy strategies). Hence, lobby can be understood as one of the strategies for policy influencing, thus advocacy. Lobby is the influencing of policy makers by building relations, creating awareness and finding connections to build enthusiasm among policy makers for the chosen aim. Advocacy also influences decision makers in and through other arenas or channels, such as civil society, the broader public, the private sector and politics. Awareness raising and information sharing can be seen as key strategies to reach decision makers in these arenas.

The importance of networked advocacy was a theme that crosscut the evaluation questions as well as the three thematic clusters in this evaluation. Almost all of the Alliances in the evaluation accomplish their work through networks, but there is variation in the intensity and manner of cooperation. We focused special attention on identifying the role of networking and networked advocacy in the Alliances’ ToCs, overall missions and strategic approaches.

Advocacy interventions are oriented towards governmental, political and private sector actors like multinational corporations. Advocacy often seeks to take a systemic perspective and targets the

various related levels of influence: supranational, international, interregional, national and local. Advocacy directed at system level changes has been increasingly embraced by non-profit organisations, responding to the public and political calls for results that are more tangible and for accountability on public-funded development interventions.

Advocacy is pre-eminently a field where rapid changes in public, private and political arenas happen, with unexpected interactions, feedback loops and emergent systems generating both opportunities and threats. In this dynamic environment, the advocate moves between multiple layers of relationships and objectives, adapting and finding pathways that are nonlinear in nature, often using an extended time span to ultimately achieve results.

The three priority result areas of agenda setting, policy influencing and changing practice rarely take place in a linear fashion. Although they are often not consecutive, the priority result areas are seen as core to advocacy. Agenda setting is linked to strategic awareness raising in the public and private sector and in political arenas. Policy influencing focuses on creating a public constituency and changing public and political debate, leading to demonstrable change in policy by the lobby targets. The ultimate aim is to change practice, where the change in policy is realised in reaching development objectives.

### **Approach and methods**

This evaluation set out to do justice to the complexities of international lobbying and advocacy. Our methodological approach meant that we kept an open eye for the flexibility required for lobbying and advocacy, the multiplicity of relations involved, the long-term orientation needed when it comes to seeking change and the highly political nature of the work, with multiple forces often acting against one's objectives.

To answer the first evaluation question ('what are changes achieved'), we have focused our research on changes to which the Alliances claim to have contributed, allowing for consistency with evaluation questions 2–5. We sought to identify all such changes and to explain how the changes related to the three priority result areas, to the Alliances' own ToCs, to the objectives of the programmes under evaluation and to developments in the broader context and thematic and policy focus area of the Alliances. The identification of relevant outcomes was accomplished in cooperation with the Alliances. We have included all outcomes in the period 1 January 2011–1 October 2014.

To answer the second evaluation question ('do the ILA efforts contribute to the identified changes') the evaluation team sought to determine whether a credible (plausible) case can be made that the advocacy intervention contributed to the established outcomes. For this, we looked in-depth into the contribution of each Alliance to two selected outcomes (or closely related outcome 'clusters'). In addition, we assessed the contributions of the Alliances to other outcomes in more limited ways.

To answer the third evaluation question ('what is the relevance of these changes'), we assessed whether the ILA programmes and outcomes are consistent with the political and public needs and priorities as existing at the various levels: global, interregional, national and local. In answering this evaluation question, we examined whether the programmes under evaluation addressed the needs identified in the Alliances' ToCs and to what extent the changes addressed the Alliances' overall aims for ILA. We also examined whether programmes were relevant for the Southern partners and constituencies.



To answer the fourth evaluation question ('were the efforts of the MFS II Alliances efficient'), we developed an innovative methodology suitable for the specifics of ILA, centring in the 'theory of efficiency' of the ILA programmes. We asked Alliances about their theories of efficiency and endeavoured to evaluate its quality and how they performed against it. The key is that we have shifted emphasis away from an evaluator determining and scoring programme efficiency to establishing how Alliances build in and monitor optimal cost-effectiveness in their programmes.

To answer the fifth evaluation question ('what factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above) we focused analysis on the explanation of the identified outcomes and their relevance. This includes the explanation of contribution, as we only discuss outcomes to which the Alliances claimed to have contributed. In answering this question, we considered internal factors, external factors, their interactions and the nature of the issues addressed

To obtain the necessary data for our analysis, a range of data collection methods were used. These include in-depth interviews with Alliance members, partners and external experts; analysis of documents including internal Alliance documents and external documents; in-depth case-studies and (in one case) observation. Data gathering mainly took place in 2012 and 2014, while all through the evaluated period evaluators monitored programmes and gathered data on key developments as they took place, when feasible. Because of the complexity of the processes to be understood and the influences of multiple actors and factors that had to be synthesised to create that understanding, the data collected, and consequently the analytical methods used, were primarily qualitative.

### **Answers to the five evaluation questions**

In this summary, we provide answers to the five evaluation questions at a relatively high level of abstraction. For answers including further concretizations, we refer to chapter 17 (Conclusions, lessons learnt and recommendations).

### *Outcomes*

For all Alliances, many outcomes have come in clusters, crossing priority result areas. We find that almost all Alliances, to a larger or smaller degree, have contributed to changes in transnational policy processes around key development issues such as VGGT, UNSCR 1325, REDD+, EU Biofuels policy, RSPO, RTRS and the Post-2015 sustainable development goals. Alliances have thereby inserted civil society voices into ongoing policymaking, often crossing national/international levels, crossing civil society/state/private actor target types, and often also crossing themes such as environment/social justice, or peace/development. Such clusters of outcomes have typically included a range of different types of outcomes. They have often included organizing CSO collaboration relating to such processes and the provision of input into processes. In some cases, such clusters (also) included increased attention to certain dimensions of issues the uptake of positions by targets, and the incorporation of positions or recommendations into e.g. policy drafting, adjustments of plans, and company behaviours. To clarify their nature and significance, some key examples can be mentioned:

- The UN Committee on World Food Security's adoption of the VGGT (Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security) and the subsequent endorsement thereof by other actors like the World Bank and the Dutch government (Impact Alliance).
- The Communities of Change Alliance contributed to a cluster of outcomes around policy dialogues on financing UNSCR 1325 on international level, now developing in more concrete discussions to set-up a global discussion group on financing UNSCR 11325 together with UNWOMEN.
- Concerning the Renewable Energy Directive of the European Union: the Fair Green and Global Alliance contributed to changed policy in which the increase of the allowed mix of biofuels in fuels for transport is seriously limited now, while reporting on the way the biofuels are produced has become a serious policy issue. Targets that changed their position included the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Commission and the Dutch Government.
- ACPF contributed to the policy dialogue on inter-country adoption, influencing national policy processes across Africa and also beyond (Together4Change Alliance).
- Also with other forms of transnational institution such clusters of outcome have been attained, as with the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil: a set of outcomes including, among other things, its adopting of a policy for outreach to local NGOs and CBOs and its adoption of a dispute settlement facility to resolve community and company disputes (Ecosystem Alliance).

A few major clusters of outcomes were achieved primarily at (mostly Dutch) national level, as with the reaching of agreement on sustainability criteria for solid biomass among Dutch government, industry and NGOs (Ecosystem Alliance) or the continuation of support for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights by the Dutch government, in terms of priority and budget (Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance).

Not all clusters of outcomes pertained to existing policymaking processes. Three Alliances achieved major clusters of outcomes on issues through (partly) strategizing relatively independent from such processes. Impact Alliance has contributed to public awareness, issue uptake, adoption of positions and policy change pertaining to large food and beverage companies' behaviour, with regard to different themes including e.g. gender, land and small-scale food producers by its innovative 'Behind the Brands' campaign. ACPF, part of the Together4Change Alliance, achieved a range of agenda setting outcomes and also some policy changes concerning child rights in Africa, with the AU, UN, and African states, Inter-Agency Working Groups and CSOs, on the basis of its research, reports, expertise and reputation. GPPAC, of the Freedom from Fear Alliance, advanced the development of networks connecting CSOs and a range of other actors including states, RIGOs and international institutions to advance more inclusive and people-centred conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

While clusters of interconnected outcomes have been a prominent pattern, clearly found with, in particular, Fair Green and Global Alliance and Impact Alliance, a few Alliances have more predominantly achieved outcomes that form relatively smaller clusters of outcomes, and in some cases do not (yet) as clearly connect to a larger policy process, even though the themes addressed may be clearly related. This then may be at least partly the result of Alliance partners being involved in different sub-programmes simultaneously, and/or the geographic spread of activities, or of certain

(sub) programme being relatively limited in terms of size or success (Ecosystem Alliance, Hivos Alliance, Freedom From Fear Alliance).

The processes of change Alliances are involved in are long-term and highly complex. Individual outcomes, part of such clusters of outcomes, are naturally then mostly intermediate in nature, consisting of steps into the desired direction. Agenda setting outcomes like increased awareness of an issue among targets, or enhanced collaboration with targets, important for all Alliances, are often geared at intermediary target groups. In Clusters I and II, for example, Parliamentary questions, asked in the Dutch and European Parliaments, influenced the terms of debates, as when Dutch Parliament asks the government to do research on Investor-State Dispute Settlement system (Fair Green and Global Alliance). In clusters II and III, we see intermediate nature of outcomes also in relation to targets. Especially when collaborations with UN bodies or RIGOs are developed for the influencing of members states, as with the development of Alliance-like relations between Alliance partner GPPAC and the Human Security Unit at the United Nations for the advancement of Human Security within the UN context (Freedom from Fear Alliance). But also more generally, the intermediate nature of many outcomes is characteristic for most outcomes like, for example the outcome that The EU Commissioner for Development strengthened the EU policy regarding access to renewable energy by publishing a Green Paper that, amongst other things, addressed the issue of energy access (Hivos Alliance), or the outcome that Palm oil and wood pulp players made public commitments to avoid further expansion on peat (Ecosystem Alliance).

For all Alliances, at least some outcomes involve contributing to the articulating and conveying of civil society voices, and these outcomes have been diverse in nature. One such type of outcome concerns the organizing of civil society, including, for example, the facilitation of networked collaborations of civil society organisations. Such outcomes are, to a relatively large degree, geared towards advancement of Southern partner capacities. Outcomes also contribute to the articulation of views, interests and expertise on the nature of problems and solutions from civil society perspectives. Such (clusters of) outcomes have been attained with Alliance members in the lead, in collaboration with Southern partners, or with Southern partners in the lead within their national or regional contexts. Outcomes have also contributed to the building of connections and interaction between civil society and targets. Finally, outcomes have contributed to the organization and facilitation of platforms and other forms of mutual engagement in collaborative process that open spaces for civil society, facilitating dialogue and more inclusive policy processes in different national and regional contexts. In some cases, these different types of outcomes have contributed to further changes such as policy influence. In many cases though, this is not so (yet), though such influencing is aimed for.

When we consider how outcomes can be allocated to the three priority result areas, we see that they have been mostly achieved in the priority result area of agenda setting. Among many other things, they include outcomes pertaining to the development of advocacy itself, such as the development of strategies and positions amongst Alliance members and partners, and development of relations and collaborations with CSOs in North and South. Engaging with targets resulted in building of relations and collaborations with many amongst these, leading to many outcomes again, including, the gaining of attention for issues, positions and recommendations amongst targets and media; the opening of space for civil society voices in political and policymaking arenas; recognition amongst targets for the

offering of valuable contributions to policy; uptake of positions and recommendations in policy process; the influencing of public debate; mobilization of publics. For Cluster III, relatively many outcomes fall in this priority result area.

Also many instances of policy influence can be identified, including demonstrable policy changes, including, among others, the uptake of positions and recommendations in policy or draft policy, changes in accountability structures or normative frameworks, or enhanced commitment to specific policy amongst targets. The degree to which policy influence has been achieved varies considerably amongst the evaluated programmes. Some programmes were successful at attaining both agenda setting outcomes and policy influence outcomes, whereas some attained mostly agenda setting outcomes. Cluster I, and to a degree Cluster II, contributed to relatively many instances of policy influence.

Fewer outcomes have been achieved in the priority result area of practice change; this is also not what all programmes have focused on. Rather than seeking e.g. the furthering or improvement of policy implementation at lower, 'on the ground' levels, most programmes have focused on policy processes and normative frameworks in national and international institutional arenas. In some cases, programmes did seek changes in practice amongst governments, companies and other actors and, in a number of cases, achieved these.

Outcomes have been achieved with private, state and non-state targets. Most outcomes have been achieved at national levels in North and South, as well international levels. The Dutch government, and in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been a target with whom relatively many outcomes were achieved.

When it comes to the way outcomes relate to programmes' overall objectives: Alliances' ILA programmes have sought to advance a range of objectives, and these typically tend to be broadly formulated. A number of outcomes and outcome clusters clearly involve steps towards change in the behaviour of societal actors that may contribute to objectives as formulated. In other cases, contributions of outcomes to objectives are less clear, even when they evidently constitute desired changes, because such objectives are formulated in terms of impact that is relatively at a further remove.

We also see clear differences when it comes to the degree to which programmes have achieved outcomes towards overall objectives. All programmes seek to achieve changes lying in the domains of agenda setting, policy influence and practice change (generally conceived as interconnected and often also as mostly developing sequentially). However, some have mostly achieved outcomes within the domain of agenda setting, whereas others have also achieved policy influence and practice change. This does not necessarily mean that the programmes achieving mostly success in agenda setting are necessarily to be seen as less successful, since they may be operating in more difficult conditions with e.g. relatively much opposition, less attention or lack of opportunity for alignment with important targets. However, such differences do at least indicate relatively larger or smaller progress towards objectives, as conceived in programmes' own Theories of Change.

### *Relevance*

The achieved outcomes have been relevant in light of programmes' Theories of Change. This implies, more generally, that the outcomes contribute to giving shape and influence to civil society on a range

of key issues and objectives as selected for support by MFS II. In some cases, relevance of outcomes is very high. In other cases, achieved steps towards objectives were relatively minor, with the ultimate desired changes still far off.

It is not self-evident that achieved outcomes that fit into the Theories of Change are also relevant for the ultimate impact Alliances were aiming for. This impact is outside of the domain of influence of the advocates and the Theory of Change forwards assumptions on the relation between outputs and ultimate effect. Whether these assumptions hold and such relevance indeed exists cannot always be assessed. Achieved changes, also when they can be classified as policy influence, are often at a remove from local realities and implementation, and, importantly, in such cases policy influence often cannot be simply assumed to lead to the impact it seems to promise. This is not to downplay successes; the problem of assessing outcome relevance is directly rooted in the time-span of the evaluation that can be out of synch with the often longer-term advocacy processes Alliances are involved in. Also the complexity and non-linearity of politics and policy process comes in here. Civil society influence is but one among multiple factors in the attainment of often long-term processes of change.

Relevance also needs to be considered here as relevance to constituencies. The programmes varied in the level in which they built on, or involved Southern partners. In some programmes, Southern partners were highly involved; occasionally even leading. In other programmes, there was little involvement of Southern partners; Northern Alliance members in some cases largely acted independently. A higher involvement of Southern partners would not necessarily have led to more relevant outcomes. However, we need to note here that North/South collaborations in a number of programmes did not materialize as proposed or expected.

In the collaboration with Southern partners, attaining the quality and quantity of communication necessary to establish common ground was often difficult. Developing and maintaining commitment to shared objectives, the identification of common interests and the co-creation of activities did not always take place, leading to situations where problems arose in achieving shared ownership, commitment and/or coordination.

### *Contributions*

Outcomes are rarely achieved with Alliances as a sole contributor. Alliances tend to be part of coalitions and networks, sometimes involving many other CSOs. In many cases, contributions will also have been made by many other types of stakeholders, including e.g. politicians, national governments, international institutions, the public, media and private actors. Furthermore, outcomes showing influence on targets can in some cases be based in already existing alignment or near-alignment in terms of objectives, and results of CSO activities preceding MFS II and Alliance activity more broadly. It would therefore also be not correct to simply equate impressive outcome with impressive contribution.

This being said, we could often establish a plausible contribution to the identified outcomes. In many of the cases we could establish that an ILA programme had a role in the developing and shaping of policy processes and/or changes in policy, but not substantiate the exact magnitude or nature of that role. The evaluation allowed for identifying the qualities and nature of that role, in terms of participation and the nature and role of activities, and the response to these by other actors, including targets as well as other actors.

Programmes contributed mostly through insider strategies, seeking and developing collaborations with targets and partners. In many cases, strategies centred on the contribution of credible content (in the form of e.g. reports, policy briefs, positions, recommendations, testimonies), with this credibility based in quality research and expertise as also the legitimacy and evidence of providing local or constituency voices. In cluster I, outsider strategies were applied. In almost all these cases such strategies were combined with constructive engagement either within the programme itself or through cooperation with other NGOs. Alliances in cluster I were also the only ones that involved actors of the private sector in their strategies, either by targeting specific parts of a specific sector, or by targeting multi-stakeholders commodity initiatives, such as the roundtables for palm oil or soya.

Each of the eight ILA programmes in one way or another, contributed to civil society strengthening. All programmes developed or furthered cooperation and partnerships with Southern partners and in all cases, in one way or the other, this contributed to ILA efforts, although as mentioned above the extent of collaboration varied extensively.

The evaluation found that the relation between advocates and their targets at times shifted, and targets sometimes developed into allies. There have been Alliances working with multi-stakeholder platforms. These platforms deliberately bring together key decision-makers with implementers and stakeholders, in order to bring about inclusive policies. Although decision-making power in these platforms is rarely equal, the distinction between insiders and outsiders in these cases becomes blurred.

Capacity development, including funding and organisational and technical support also contributed to outcomes. NGOs and civil society in the South often have their own sphere of influence, and capacity development then gets additional meaning, not only rendering advocacy more effective, but also capacitating influential actors to become more responsive decision-makers. This falls outside of the gamut of insider/ outsider strategies.

The evaluation concludes that strategies in themselves cannot be judged as more or less effective. ILA is not a one-size fits all endeavour and each context and objective appears to require its specific mix of strategies. Often, strategies work complementary to each other. No matter which strategy is chosen, the success of ILA depends ultimately on the credibility of the lobby and advocacy. Insider, outsider and hybrid strategies were successful because of the credibility of the messages and materials produced and advanced. Credibility lay also in reputation: the perceived added value of organisations or programme staff, rooted in (perceptions of) experience, knowledgeability, expertise and the 'usefulness' to the targets. Credibility could also be attained by representing legitimate civil society views, and through the ability to link different levels of influence: bringing local voices to international tables and, vice versa, equipping local actors with knowledge on international policy. This latter type of credibility of the representativeness of international advocates can be compromised when collaborations with Southern partners become limited or problematic.

### *Efficiency*

All programmes under evaluation have systematic approaches to efficiency and accountability in place as part of their broader operations in which ILA is embedded. Activities for advocacy were accounted for according to these standard procedures. In this evaluation, we have investigated efficiency in relation to decisions and practices specifically pertaining to advocacy.

The 'theory of efficiency' of Alliances can thus be understood as balancing between effectiveness and efficiency, while ensuring the organisation's identity and principles, including the principle of pursuing a type of efficiency that is considered ethical and a way to retain credibility. All organisations are dealing with efficiency, as time and resources are scarce and ambitions are high, and it is thus embedded in their operations and organisational philosophies. It is understood by the organisations that you cannot always be efficient when you want to be effective, and balancing time, quality and resources plays a major role in decision making on tactics and activities.

While we positively conclude that efficiency is well-considered and practiced by the Alliances, there are certain setbacks as a result of the implicit nature of dealing with efficiency in advocacy decisions, i.e. that efficiency choices embedded in decisions on tactics and activities tend to disappear from accountability relations, and that efficiency considerations are rarely subject to systematic deliberation or systematic evaluation.

#### *Explanatory factors*

While many internal factors contribute to the explanation of findings, most importantly attainment of outcomes, we can establish some that stand out. First, the capability to develop, and commit, to a longer-term vision stood out, including also the capability to develop focus, take decisions, plan and translate these into organisational action. A closely related explanatory factor found of importance here is the capability to select and execute strategy effectively, based in a Theory of Change while relating to the context; this comes down to advocacy competence.

A closely related explanatory factor is staff's capability to monitor environments; adapt to or act relating to that environment and changes in it; build and maintain presence and visibility in arenas form factors that contribute to explaining outcomes. This capability involves continuous context analysis, employing a Theory of Change as guiding, adjusting over time; selection of strategies adequate for context, target and moment, and the using momentum to make the most of opportunities; these can be seen as advocacy competencies.

Such relating to environment always also involves targets. When it comes to relating to targets, explanatory factors involving the capability to relate include the capability to identify and engage relevant targets. We also found that the capability to build and maintain relations and collaborations with partner CSOs contributes to explaining success and failure in the development of relations with lobby targets and constituencies and hence to explain outcomes.

Programme staff's capability to adjust to environments and changes in it, were also found to explain outcomes as well as limits to these, in light of stated ambitions. This capability to adapt and renew also had an internal side. In some cases, programmes showed flexibility and a capacity to learn and adjust in the face of experiences; in a few cases, we saw a limited capability to question assumptions in ToCs. In these cases, programme starting points performed the role of a handbook or script by which to work, organising actors and activities, rather than being taken as points of departure for continuous reflection and reconsideration.

Some programmes worked through focused and coordinated action, contributing to their success. However, this same focus may risk implying a limited involvement and accommodation of diversity, especially with regards to Southern partners.

Finally, we identified the internal factor of maturity of networks involved with ILA as well as the maturity of the programme or programme funded through MFS II. Because building relations with CSOs and targets and the development of agreements on objectives and actions, as well as their execution, can take years to develop, we found that the amount of time that has passed since the initiation of programmes can be an explanatory factor for outcomes. Some results suggest that more mature programmes had an advantage over less mature ones in terms of attaining outcomes. Funding cycles lasting only a few years may in many cases work against effectiveness.

Apart from internal factors, external factors contributed to outcomes. It is important to see here that external conditions and dynamics provide openings or present barriers for Alliances that create opportunities to attain results or limit these. The behaviour of targets emerges as an explanatory factor in different ways. Important aspects in this sense include the target's agenda, positions on issues and their power to influence developments around an issue. Such explanatory factors often also related to the dynamics around targets: Personnel turnover within target organisations, power changes among targets (also positive) and the timing of policy processes were sometimes decisive for ILA opportunities.

Across the evaluated programmes, dimensions of context also emerged as explanatory factors. Political space for CSOs in specific geographic contexts impacted the possibilities to undertake activities, affecting the outcomes achieved. The cultural context of activities and of the issue or agenda on which ILA is conducted sometimes similarly influenced the opportunities to undertake activities and find a hearing or establish forms of collaboration. Institutional openness to civil society participation and influence also emerged as a factor. Changed conditions through wars and disasters too impacted the extent and nature of outcomes. Another contextual factor can be identified in the political support for ILA by CS, including budget and budget cuts for ILA.

Finally, the nature and context of the issues that the ILA addressed emerged as an explanatory factor in a range of ways. First of all, the way specific audiences (i.e. targets, publics and partners) relate to issues partly defined opportunities for programmes to achieve outcomes. The construction and resonance of issues within societies and with targets is a factor that explains Alliances' chances of success at attaining outcomes. Emergence of issues involves a complex process that programmes can influence only to a limited degree.

Issues can also be highly sensitive in specific contexts, and this can influence the possibilities for advocacy, as ILA on such issues may be considered controversial and may be countered by other actors including targets as well as other CS actors. Similarly, ILA on certain issues was controversial because it threatened vested interests; such situations had consequences for the space for ILA, also because opposition threatened the security of CS actors.

Finally, the complexity of the issues on which the Alliances conducted ILA may have implicated programmes' chances for achieving results. For example, an issue like 'human security' (the advocacy issue of one evaluated programme), involves multiple actors, understandings, agendas, institutions and levels to a degree that it may make the advancement of objectives much more challenging than in other cases, where understandings, problems and solutions are more clear and shared, and institutional and political contexts are more demarcated and relatively less conflict-ridden.



In conclusion: organisational capacity helps to explain the effectiveness of the evaluated programmes, and we could identify a range of capabilities that came out as important. However, these capabilities are only one factor among several that need to be taken into account while assessing programmes' effectiveness. The nature and contribution of different factors to explanation differ per programme. This implies that it is not possible, on the basis of this evaluation, to identify what 'works' and what 'doesn't work' in a general sense.

### **Lessons learnt and recommendations**

Based on the results of research focused on the answering of the five evaluation questions, the development and application of methodology, as also a range of unexpected learnings that could take place because of our close involvement with the Alliances' work over 2012-2014, the evaluation lead to the identification of a number of 'lessons learnt' that may further ILA effectiveness. It needs to be stressed that these lessons emerge from our study of the work of the Alliances, and are often based on good practices that were observed. The lessons form the foundation for a set of recommendations to funders, development and advocacy professionals and evaluators.

#### *Conceptualizations of advocacy*

The classical approach to advocacy implicitly takes advocacy as oriented towards the influencing of decision makers' understandings, views and actions. While this holds to a large degree, this approach does not explicitly conceptualize the realities of present-day governance that evaluated programmes engage with. Such realities include bilateral and multilateral engagements with intergovernmental, governmental, research, CSO, private sector, military and semi-governmental organisations. Combining outsider strategies and insider strategies often lead to hybrid approaches and influencing is done in collaborative structures, where 'target' of advocacy sometimes become 'allies'. A conceptualization of advocacy that explicitly does justice to these realities is due for ILA. To a large extent, the Alliances in this evaluation consciously work with such a conceptualization, whereas for some Alliances this is more tacit.

**Recommendation 1: Funders and evaluators, and to some extent Alliances, need to approach ILA with an eye for the complex realities of governance, where the nature of relations between CSOs, decision-makers and other actors often defies a simple relation of advocates influencing targets, and where engagements and interactions are diverse, dynamic, and often long-term.**

#### *Working with Theories of Change*

Some programmes employed Theories of Change effectively for articulation, organization, analysis, action, reflection, and adjustment on the base of experience. Such Theories of Change were specific rather than broad, and put to the test in the execution of programmes. This was not always the case, and sometime the Theory of Change figured as a script, rather than being taken as point of departure, for continuous reflection and reconsideration.

Relatedly, advocacy planning, monitoring and evaluation in a few cases turned out to be centred on activity and process rather than result-oriented strategizing. There is a clear tension here between the need to work in a structured fashion, and the ability to adjust to changing circumstances and to learn from experience. A major lesson stemming from the evaluation, is that ILA programmes should use the Theory of Change (or related tools) in an active way throughout the programme: revisiting Theories of Change and employing these as tools for introspection. This evaluation underlines the

importance of applying a tool like the Theory of Change for advocacy in such a way that the sphere of influence is clearly demarcated and assumptions regarding necessary interventions and expected outcomes towards the final objective are spelled out.

**Recommendation 2: Funders, advocates and evaluators can further learning, and thereby effectiveness, by systematically working with Theories of Change (or similar/related tools) as tools for developing and adjusting understandings and strategies.**

**Recommendation 3: Funders and advocates and evaluators can work with Theories of Change (or similar/related tools) for making explicit and assessing programmes' (potential) relevance in the light of constituency needs and priorities.**

#### *Assessment of outcomes*

In this evaluation, we have sought to uphold a nuanced understanding of effectiveness that does justice to the complexity of advocacy. Advocacy is often to be understood as long-term investment, with outcomes mostly consisting of steps towards desired outcomes, with agenda setting outcomes often understood as a step towards achieving policy influence or change in practice. Cases where policies or practices have demonstrably changed are much fewer. In some cases influence may be seen as possibly taking more time, with 'failure' to attain influence not automatically needing to be seen as ineffectiveness, considering the time needed for change and the fact that maintaining an issue in view can already be an achievement. With ILA, there is often a time to sow and a time to harvest, and this in unpredictable ways.

It is important for advocates to incorporate such process indicators in their monitoring, and avoid overly emphasizing results. Funding and evaluation cycles need to move away from a linear input-output-outcome approach to assessing effectiveness, and towards an approach that focuses on the qualities of programmes and processes and the ways they relate to the complex challenges of ILA. Internal and external monitoring systems and assessment needs to put more emphasis on organisations' capacity to analyse where strengths and opportunities lie for their programmes and the qualities of their acting on such analyses.

**Recommendation 4: Funders, advocates and evaluators should not establish effectiveness on the basis of achieved outcomes alone, but also on the merits of advocates' way of strategizing in the face of the complex challenges of the environment they operate in and seek to change.**

For the assessment of Alliances' contribution to outcomes, the evaluation team has done in-depth analysis of a limited set of outcomes. This was resource-intensive and evaluators could consider to aim for more overview-like analyses of contribution. While establishing contribution was often feasible in case of the priority result areas of agenda-setting, it was less doable for policy change or change in practice, especially in international arenas involving multiple CSOs, targets and institutional levels.

**Recommendation 5: Be realistic about the feasibility of contribution analysis for different types of outcome and adapt methods for contribution analysis accordingly.**

### *How to enhance effectiveness*

The evaluation concludes that strategies in themselves cannot be judged as more or less effective. ILA is not a one-size fits all endeavour and each context and objective appears to require its specific mix of strategies. Often, strategies work complementary to each other. Organizational capacities, external factors and issue-related factors, all in diverse ways, contribute to explanations of success and failure. Success therefore cannot be straightforwardly equated with effectiveness, and failure can happen in spite of high organizational capacities. The evaluation thus points to the need to consider different factors explaining effectiveness, in their interrelatedness, when assessing advocates and programmes.

**Recommendation 6: To further effectiveness, funders, advocates and evaluators need to consider internal, external and ‘issue-related’ factors together. By this they can identify organizational and programme strengths and weaknesses, see where challenges lie and learn how to handle these.**

### *Connecting ‘global’ and ‘local’*

Alliances commonly invested in relations with civil society in the South. In some cases, choices of partners were based on the added value expected from specific actors, while in a few cases, considerations of inclusiveness and openness were more central to the development of networks. Collaborations with Southern partners contributed to outcomes in important ways, and Alliances sought and often succeeded in developing relations, outputs and outcomes effective for the different actors involved. But this also turned out challenging. We sometimes found Southern partners experienced a ‘disconnect’ between Alliance efforts and local realities or priorities.

While relations and collaborations with Southern partners have been important for almost all programmes, we note that communication, collaboration and accountability structures in relation with Southern partners and constituencies have not been explicit issues for ILA under MFS II, or its evaluation. While this does not imply that CFAs and partners were not accountable to each other, this is a lacuna. Working with ‘partners’ as such is no guarantee for the constitution of a voice that reflects constituency views and priorities.

**Recommendation 7: To further inclusiveness of ILA outcomes, funders, advocates and evaluators need to make communication, collaboration and accountability structures in relation with Southern partners and constituencies integral to development, execution, monitoring and evaluation of ILA programmes.**

### *Ownership and effectiveness*

The networked nature of advocacy often added to effectiveness, and the diversity amongst Alliance members and partners was often fruitful. However, the diversity of networks sometimes also brought about problems. The most important of these were focus and ownership – with these two often being in tension with each other. Effectiveness and ownership can be in tension with each other, with potentially important trade-offs between these leading to sacrifices on either front in networks bringing together diverse actors. Balancing effectiveness and ownership emerged as a key tension in this evaluation.

**Recommendation 8: Funders, advocates and evaluators of ILA need to explicitly address potential tensions between effectiveness and ownership in the development, execution and evaluation of partnerships and programmes.**

### *Time-frames and effectiveness*

Achieving voice for civil society takes time. In some Alliances, depending, for example, on the 'age' of the issue and the existence of potential partners and coalitions at the start of the MFS II period, achieving outcomes such as credibility and recognition took several years. Only after having achieved recognition will invitations for further collaboration and expressions of interest come.

**Recommendation 9: To further effectiveness of programmes, donors and advocates need to consider the time frames required to develop a credible voice, recognition and relations. As time frames often exceed project durations, this asks for medium- to long term visions and funding strategies.**

### *Reflexive monitoring of efficiency*

All programmes under evaluation have systematic approaches to efficiency and accountability in place as part of their broader operations in which ILA is embedded. Activities for advocacy were accounted for according to these standard procedures. Our focus in the evaluation was how efficiency played a role in decisions and practices specifically pertaining to advocacy. While positively concluding that efficiency is well-considered and practiced by Alliances, we also observe that these considerations are not subject to systematic deliberation, or systematic evaluation. They are also not brought into accountability relations. With resources scarce and with effectiveness holding no direct and self-evident relation to spending, result-orientation as much as accountability across partnerships would be well served by inclusive and reflexive monitoring of efficiency choices and their outcomes.

**Recommendation 10: The field of ILA would be well served by the development and use of inclusive ways to monitor, reflect on and account for efficiency choices and their outcomes.**

With regards to this evaluation, we have two specific recommendation to take into account in designing future evaluations.

### *Evaluation of programmes*

This evaluation took up 8 very different programmes, and was carried out by a team of 12 evaluators. While the diversity allowed the emergence of a number of cross-cutting insights, the requirements of consistency and coherence across evaluated programmes was very challenging and time-consuming. The grouping of the 8 Alliances in three Clusters was useful as a structure for the evaluation team, but the requirement to submit Cluster-level assessments was unproductive, in the view of the evaluation team.

**Recommendation 11: For (possible) future joint evaluations, devise a structure that does more justice to diversity and seeks to develop cross-cutting analyses in more productive ways.**

### *Evaluation orientation*

The five evaluation questions and evaluation structure devised for this evaluation focus on assessment of effectiveness with most analysis taking place at the start and end of the funding cycle, which was not conducive to learning during the programmes. In hindsight, the evaluation team and the Alliances could perhaps have been more pro-active in incorporating a learning agenda. Nonetheless, inclusion of more learning oriented evaluation questions, and a more learning-oriented

process structure, is advisable for future evaluations. Such a setup might also facilitate trust-building better than the present setup.

**Recommendation 12: To facilitate learning, evaluation design needs to be better tailored to learning ambitions.**

## List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACERWC	African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Wellbeing of the Child
ACCP	African Charter Child Project (SIDA funded)
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
ACPF	African Child Policy Forum, Addis Ababa
ACRWC	African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
ADB	African Development Bank
AFFC	Africa Fit For Children
Ag	Agenda setting (or agenda set)
AMC	Africa-wide Movement for Children
ANPPCAN	African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect
AO	Algemeen Overleg (General Meeting)
APRODEV	Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe
APSP	African Platform for Social Protection
ARCW	African Report on Child Wellbeing
ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ASC	Aquaculture Stewardship Council
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASSET	Association for Security Sector Reform Education and Training
ASV	Aliansi Satu Visi
ASK	Access, Services and Knowledge
AWID	Association for Women's Rights in Development
AU	African Union
AWN	Afghan Women Network
BBE	Bio-based economy
BIC	Bank Information Center
BIT	Bilateral Investment Treaty
BPCR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
BtB	Behind the Brands
BTC	Bangsamoro Transition Committee
BU	Business Unit
BWP	Bretton Woods Project
CAO	Compliance Advisor Ombudsman
CAP	Common Africa Position on Post-2015 development agenda
CBD	UN Convention on Biodiversity
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCOE	Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence
CDA	Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal)
CDI	Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
CEDAW	Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFA	Co-Financing Agency
CFI	Child Friendliness Index

CIMIC	Civil-military interaction
CLPCs	Child Legal Protection Centres
CLT	Country Leadership Teams
CP	Changing practice (or changed practice)
CPD	Commission on Population and Development
CSM	Civil Society Mechanism
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSPPS	Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
CSW	Commission on the Status of Women
CO <sub>2</sub>	Carbon dioxide
CoC	Communities of Change
CREMA	Assumura Community Resource Management Area
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CU	ChristenUnie (ChristianUnion, Political Party)
D66	Democraten 66 (Political party)
DCI	Defence for Children International
DCI	(EU's) Development Cooperation Instrument
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
DFI	Development Finance Institutions
DGBEB	Directorate-General for Foreign Economic Relations
DMM	Multilateral Organisations and Human Rights Department
DSF	Dispute Settlement Facility
DSO	Social Development Department (Dutch MoFA)
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EA	Ecosystems Alliance
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	<i>Economic Community of West African States</i>
ED	Executive Director
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEPA	Europe External Policy Advisors
EIB	European Investment Bank,
EGPAF	Elizabeth Glaser Paediatric AIDS Foundation
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EJ CMT	Economic Justice Campaign Management Team
EP	European Parliament
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FBC	Food and Beverage Company
FCC	Food Company Campaign
FCPF	World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FFF	Freedom from Fear Alliance
FGG	Fair Green and Global Alliance
FI	Financial Intermediaries

FMO	Dutch development bank
FoEE	Friends of the Earth Europe
FoEI	Friends of the Earth International
FPIC	Free Prior Informed Consent
FPP	Forest Peoples Programme
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FQD	EU's Fuel Quality Directive
FY	Fiscal Year
GBP	Global Bioenergy Partnership
GLTN	Global Land Tool Network
GNWP	Global Network of Women Peacebuilders
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
HCVA	High-Conservation Value Area
HECA	Horn of East and Central Africa
HIRDA	Himilo relief and development association
IACA	International Advocacy and Campaigning Activities
IAP	Indoor air pollution
IAWG	Inter-Agency Working Group
IBoT	International Board of Trustees
IC	International Component (of EA's MFS II programme)
ICAN	International Civil Society Action Network
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
ICS	Investing in Children and their Societies
ICSID	International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
IDH	Sustainable Trade Initiative (Initiatief Duurzame Handel)
IDPS	Initiative for Dialogue in Peacebuilding and State building
IDI	International Development Initiative
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFC-CAO	International Finance Corporation -Compliance Advisor Ombudsman
IID	Initiatives for International Dialogue
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organization
ILA	International Lobbying and Advocacy
ILC	International Land Coalition
ILUC	Indirect Land Use Change
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMPACT	IMPACT Alliance
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (Dutch MoFA)
IPCs	International Policy Conferences
IPPF	International Planned Parenthood Association
IRBM	Integrated River Basin Management
ISDS	Investor to State Dispute Settlement
ISG	International Steering Group
ISS	Institute for Social Studies
ISRRC	International Sexual and Reproductive Rights Coalition



IT	Information Technology
IWHC	International Women's Health Coalition
IWRM	Integrated Water Resource Management
L&A	Lobbying & Advocacy
LAS	League of Arab States
LfN	Leaders for Nature
LMI	Low- and middle income
LSLA	Large Scale Land Acquisitions
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAR	Market Access Regulation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MBA	Mono River Basin Authority (in Togo and Benin)
MENA	Middle East North Africa Region
MENAPPAC	Middle East North Africa Partnership for Prevention of Armed Conflict
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MFF	(EU's) Multiannual Financial Framework
MFM	Multi-Stakeholder Financing Mechanism
MFS	Netherlands Co-Financing System (Medefinancieringsstelsel)
MFS II	Netherlands Co-Financing System (Medefinancieringsstelsel), 2nd term (2011-15)
MILF	Muslim Islamic Liberation Front
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPI	Multiparty Initiative
MPs	Members of Parliament
MSI	Multi Stakeholder Initiatives
NAP	National Action Plans
NAP 1325	National Action Plan Women, Peace and Security
NFR	Non-Financial Reporting Directive
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NL	The Netherlands
NL MFA	Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NNGO	National Non-Governmental Organization
NPC	National Programme Coordinator
NWO	Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO-WOTRO)
NCIV	Nederlands Centrum voor Inheemse Volken
NFC	New Forest Company
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OA	Oxfam America
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGB	Oxfam Great Brittan
OI	Oxfam International
OI EJ	Oxfam International Economic Justice Campaign
ON	Oxfam Novib
OPAPP	Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Processes
ORAM	Rural Mutual Support Organisation

OSAS	Observatorio Socio-Ambiental de la Soja
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P&C	Principles and Criteria
PI	Policy influencing (Policy influenced)
PIFS	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
PMC	Peace Monitoring Centre
PNoWB	Parliamentary Network on the World Bank
PO	Palm oil
PRAI	Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment
PRAs	Priority Result Areas
PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid (Dutch Labour Party)
PvdD	Partij voor de Dieren (Dutch Party for the Animals)
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RED	Renewable Energy Directive of the European Union
REDD+	Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (plus)
RfP	Request for Proposals
RIGO	Regional Intergovernmental Organisations
RIVM	Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu (National Institute for Public Health and the Environment)
ROI	Return on investment
ROSA	Rede das Organizações para Soberania Alimentar
RSB	Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels/Biomass
RSG	Regional Steering Group
RSPO	Round table on Sustainable Palm oil
RT	Round Table
RTRS	Round Table on Responsible Soy
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAM	Southern America
SE4All	UN Initiative Sustainable Energy for All
SEA	Strategic environmental assessment
SER	Dutch Social and Economic Council
S-G	Secretary-General of the United Nations
SI	Specific Outcome Indicator
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SMS	Single Management System
SOGI	Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
SOMO	Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen
SP	Socialistische Partij (The Socialist Party)
SRHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SW	Sawit Watch
T0, T1, T2, T4	The four different time periods as applied in evaluation
T4C	Together for Change Alliance
TEEB	The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
ToC	Theory of Change
ToE	Theory of Efficiency

ToR	Terms of Reference
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
TWh	Terra Watt hours
UFBR	Unite for Body Rights Program of the SRHR Alliance
UI	Uniform Outcome Indicator
UN	United Nations
UNAC	Uniao Nacional de Camponeses
UNCFs	United Nations Committee on Food Security
UNCRC	United National Child Rights Committee
UNCTaD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNECA/AU	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa / African Union
UNECE	UN Economic Commission for Europe
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNGASS	United Nations General Assembly Special Session
UNHRC	United National Human Rights Council
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSCR 1325	United Nations Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
UN WOMEN	United Nations organization dedicated to gender equality
US(A)	United States (of America)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAO	Vervolg Algemeen Overleg (Extended General Meeting)
VAT	Value Added Tax
VGGT	Voluntary Guidelines on Land and Natural Resources Tenure
VVD	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (The People's Party for Freedom and Democracy)
Wageningen UR	Wageningen University & Research Centre
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WIIP	Wetlands International Indonesia Programme
WB	World Bank
WBG	World Bank Group
WCF	World Cocoa Foundation
WDR	World Development Report
WEOG	Western European and Others Group
WHO	World Health Organization
WIIS	Women In International Security
WLPS	Women Leadership in Peace and Security
WO=MEN	Women Equals Men
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWF	World Wide Fund for Natur

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background to the evaluation

The Co-Financing System (Medefinancieringsstelsel, or 'MFS') is the most recent expression of a longstanding Dutch tradition of supporting civilateral development cooperation. MFS II, preceded by MFS I (2006–2010), is the 2011–2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFA) and is directed towards strengthening civil society in the South. The overall aim is to achieve sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 alliances of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion through the MFS II grants framework by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NL MoFA). The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. To meet these evaluation requirements, a joint evaluation programme was developed and approved by the NL MoFA. The overall purpose for evaluating MFS II-funded development interventions is to account for results and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions.

This evaluation report evaluates the International Lobbying and Advocacy (ILA) programmes of the eight alliances that implement 16 ILA projects in 15 different regions worldwide. Parallel to this evaluation of ILA programmes, an in-country evaluation on the MDGs, organisational capacity and civil society is being carried out in eight countries. The country evaluation data are synthesised by a synthesis team in charge of aggregating information obtained in each of the eight countries.

The specific aims of this ILA programme evaluation are 1) to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of ILA programmes funded by MFS II; 2) to develop and apply innovative methodologies for the evaluation of ILA programmes and 3) to provide justified recommendations that enable Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners to draw lessons for future development interventions. The evaluation covers the period 2011–2014. We have included all outcomes in the period 1 January 2011–1 October 2014.

The five main research questions and their sub-questions have been formulated as follows:

6. What are the changes achieved in the three priority result areas through international lobbying and advocacy on the thematic clusters 'sustainable livelihoods and economic justice', 'sexual and reproductive health and rights' and 'protection, human security and conflict prevention' during the 2012–2014 period?

This question was operationalised into the following sub-questions:

- To what changes do the alliances claim they have contributed?
- How do these changes relate to the three priority result areas?
- How do these changes relate to alliances' theories of change (ToCs)?
- How do these changes relate to the objectives of the evaluated programme as a whole?
- How do these changes relate to developments in the broader context and thematic and policy focus area of the alliances?



7. Do the international lobbying and advocacy efforts of the MFS II alliances and their partners contribute to the identified changes (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
  - This question was operationalised into the following sub-questions:
  - Is there a plausible link between alliance strategies and activities and identified pathways of change?
  - If so, how did activities under the alliances' control contribute to the outcome?
  - What inter-organisational interactions took place and contributed to the outcome?
8. What is the relevance of these changes?

This question was operationalised into the following sub-questions:

- Did the changes to which the projects under evaluation contributed address the needs identified in the alliances' theories of change, and at which levels?
  - To what extent did the changes to which the projects contributed address/comply with the alliances' overall aim?
  - To what extent does the relevance at a certain time period (T1, T2 and T3) relate to the earlier time period (T0, T1 and T2)?
9. Were the efforts of the MFS II alliances efficient?

This question was operationalised into the following sub-questions:

- What is the theory of efficiency of the ILA projects?
- How is the theory of efficiency translated and upheld in practice?
- How are the alliances improving and/or adapting their efficiency? (learning)

10. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

- This question was operationalised into the following sub-questions:
- How do internal factors explain findings?
- How do external factors explain findings?
- (How) did external factors impact (the importance of) organisational capacity?
- (How) does the nature of the issues explain the outcomes?

In the next chapter on methodology, we explain how we proceeded to answer these questions.

## **1.2 Scope of evaluation**

The scope of the evaluation is determined by the thematic clusters and the priority result areas defined by NWO-WOTRO in the call for proposals. NWO-WOTRO distinguishes three thematic clusters for this evaluation: (i) sustainable livelihoods and economic justice, (ii) sexual and reproductive health and rights and (iii) protection, human security and conflict prevention. Under the responsibility of Partos and WOTRO, Partos' evaluation manager and two consultants developed and carried out the selection of programmes to be evaluated, in consultation with the alliances. The eight alliances that engaged in lobby and advocacy had formulated a total of 23 ILA programmes. A key objective of this procedure was to include in the evaluation one programme of each of the eight alliances with an ILA component. The selection process firstly consisted of working towards representativeness in terms of thematic focus. The three clusters were established so that each of the eight alliances with an ILA component could be represented in the evaluation in a theme that

was prominent in their work. In consultation with the alliances, a programme was selected for evaluation for each alliance. In some cases, alliances had only one ILA programme, leaving no room for selection. In other cases, the selection involved the freedom to select one programme over another. WOTRO, Partos and consultants did not predefine criteria for selection here beyond thematic focus (such as representativeness for the ILA programme as a whole in terms of strategy, targets, organisational structure, programme size or stage of the programme). It is thus uncertain to what extent the evaluated programmes are representative for MFS II ILA as a whole, beyond the thematic spread of programmes. However, we do find among the evaluated programmes not only thematic spread but also spread in terms of targets, organisational structure, programme size and stage of the programme. A question that may arise is whether programmes were perhaps partly selected based on their success or potential for success at the time of selection, or other criteria that may bias the outcomes of the evaluation. Nevertheless, also when it comes to success, we find considerable variation. In addition, the selection took place at an early stage of MFS II, and in some cases, as noted above, an alliance’s entire advocacy component was taken up for evaluation, leaving no room for such considerations.

Table 1.1 Clusters and Alliances	
Thematic Cluster	Alliances
Sustainable livelihoods and economic justice	Ecosystem Alliance Fair, Green and Global Alliance IMPACT Alliance Hivos Alliance, People Unlimited 4.1
Sexual and reproductive health and rights	SRHR Alliance
Protection, human security and conflict prevention	Communities of Change Freedom from Fear Together4change

The ILA priority result areas defined by NWO-WOTRO for this evaluation are 1) agenda setting, 2) policy influencing and 3) changing practice. The evaluation team has addressed these priority result areas within each thematic cluster. However, as will be discussed in the methodology chapter, it is difficult to capture all changes and outcomes in this classification.

The scope of the evaluation further incorporates the interaction of the alliances with their dynamic environment. The evaluation considers lobby and advocacy an evolving process where activities are only partly steered by the original (*ex-ante*) formulation of desired change. Activities are shaped at the interface between internal actors and capabilities and external actors and factors, in response to the contextual complexities, opportunities and restrictions. The evaluation team took these dynamics into account in the analysis of activities and outcomes of the alliances. This allows for a more complete understanding of the outcomes and activities of the alliances and their programmes under evaluation in two domains. First, such an approach allows for taking into account how planned activities, strategies and tactics change because of internal and external influences. Alliances, to some extent, incorporate this and adjust their theories of change and planned activities. Second, it allows for discussing intended as well as unintended outcomes. Looking only at the chosen strategy of the lobbying and advocacy intervention might miss the unintended outcomes.<sup>2</sup> As such, both outcomes that are related to the objectives and outcomes not related to the programme goal can be disclosed.

**1.3 The topic: the complex field of international lobbying and advocacy**

This evaluation concerns International lobby and advocacy programmes. Although lobby and advocacy are often lumped together, lobby is more specifically a strategy to influence policy,

whereas advocacy is broader, encompassing lobby, and referring to raising awareness and changing attitudes in general. In what follows, we set out our understanding of lobby and advocacy in this evaluation and clarify what we include as being part of these processes.

Lobby and advocacy in international development interventions can be defined as a 'wide range of activities conducted to influence decision makers at different levels'<sup>3</sup> towards the overall aim of development interventions to combat the structural causes of poverty and injustice. This definition follows the wide consensus in the literature that NGO advocacy is a tool to combat causes of poverty or injustice and influence structural change, aiming to change social, political and policy structures while challenging power structures.<sup>4</sup> This broad definition suits the different aspects of and approaches to lobby and advocacy used in the advocacy programmes under the scope of this evaluation.

The concept of advocacy, however, goes beyond mere policy influence and aims for sustainable changes in public and political arenas, including awareness raising, litigation (legal actions) and public education, as well as building networks, relationships and capacity.<sup>5</sup> Methods used to influence decision makers in this regard are 1) persuasion and cooperation (lobby) and 2) pressure (e.g. blaming and shaming) and confrontation (used in other advocacy strategies). Hence, lobby can be understood as one of the strategies for policy influencing, thus advocacy. Lobby is the influencing of policy makers by building relations, creating awareness and finding connections to build enthusiasm among policy makers for the chosen aim. Advocacy also influences decision makers in and through other arenas or channels, such as civil society, the broader public, the private sector and politics. Awareness raising and information sharing can be seen as key strategies to reach decision makers in these arenas. According to Teles and Schmitt (2011), advocacy includes lobby, persuasion, research, activist journalism, coalition building, political activity and public relations. Leeuwis and Ringsing (2008) understand advocacy as campaigns, lobby and capacity building.<sup>6</sup>

In this evaluation, we distinguish between insider strategies and outsider strategies. These strategies have been verified by interviews with advocacy (lobby) experts within and outside of the alliances under evaluation. Insider strategies concern behind-the-scenes activities that are usually directed at cooperation and persuasion with decision makers. An example could be the organisation of a focused roundtable with politicians. Insider strategies can also be targeted towards audiences within an advocacy alliance, especially when these alliances are broad and international and where the partnership constitutes different types of agencies, as is the case in the MFS II alliances. Outsider strategies concern public activities and are usually directed at awareness raising, pressure and confrontation directed at decision makers. A public campaign is an example of an outsider strategy. International advocacy often combines these different strategies, and we as evaluators have a unique opportunity to better understand the developments, processes and relations underlying the implementation of advocacy strategies and its influence on decision makers. Both insider and outsider strategies intend to address informal or formal target groups in a systematic way to enhance the advocates' objectives in response to the ever-changing context. One of the returning strategies and characteristics of advocacy processes we encountered is the role of networks and networked advocacy.

Decision makers targeted by advocacy interventions are often governmental or political but can also be private sector actors like multinational organisations. Advocacy often seeks to take a systemic perspective<sup>7</sup> and targets the various related levels of influence: supranational, international, interregional, national and local. Advocacy directed at system level changes has been increasingly embraced by non-profit organisations, responding to the public and political calls for results that are

more tangible and for accountability on public-funded development interventions. Advocacy programmes under development cooperation raise public and political awareness, while drawing on the values of and experiences in international development. Advocacy actors seek legitimation by means of the strength of their cause (they aim to raise awareness and convince), often on behalf of their constituency (they aim to represent rightful populations).

Rooted in the observation that almost all alliances in the evaluation work through networks, an important element in our approach to advocacy is the idea of networked advocacy. There is a distinction between advocacy networks and networked advocacy. Advocacy networks are specialised and set up with the objective of forming a coalition for advocacy. There are also organisations that are not integrated in an advocacy network, but that nonetheless use networked advocacy for specific campaigns (opportunities) where they seek collaboration with advocacy networks. The positioning of the alliances regarding lobby and advocacy may thus be diverse and changing, depending on the moment and the objective: at times being organised as a network and at times working through networks.

Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) have gained ground within international development over the past decades.<sup>8</sup> They are part of a rapidly globalising world where transnational cooperation in multi-actor networks has grown and structural change is advocated by civil society through public and policy arenas rather than merely through development interventions.<sup>9</sup> TANs seek to link the local to the regional and global policy arenas and to integrate the 'local' voice (as well as using it to influence) in policymaking processes. Advocates working through TANs interact in different domains (public, political, civil society and private sector) with a multitude of stakeholders on various levels (national, regional, global). Studying these processes can provide more insight into the interconnected and interdependent dynamics underlying transnational advocacy.

Networking is crucial for advocacy. It can serve different objectives and can work differently for different aspects of advocacy. We have defined six areas in which networked advocacy works: 1) networked advocacy as a strategy to achieve change, 2) networked advocacy as a mission to link local to regional to global, 3) networked advocacy for legitimation and improved credibility 4) networked advocacy for broader outreach and public awareness, 5) networked advocacy to increase advocacy capacity and 6) networking as a means to facilitate interactions. This means that networked advocacy is a transversal issue that needs to be given attention in the three priority result areas.

#### **1.4 Lobby and advocacy in a dynamic world**

Advocacy is pre-eminently a field where rapid changes in public, private and political arenas happen, with unexpected interactions, feedback loops and emergent systems generating both opportunities and threats. In this dynamic environment, the advocate moves between multiple layers of relationships and objectives, adapting and finding pathways that are nonlinear in nature, often using an extended time span to ultimately achieve results. A key requirement for successful advocacy is the capacity to adjust strategies and activities to changing opportunities and threats without losing sight of the ultimate objectives of advocacy.

Some authors see advocacy as a relatively new phenomenon in NGO interventions,<sup>10</sup> while others state that advocacy networks were well established before the Second World War, as social movements and transnational networks go as far back as the Renaissance.<sup>11</sup> Today, advocacy has a strong position in global policy making. According to Teles and Schmitt (2011), 'Nothing big happens without advocacy', and Risse (2002) states, 'One can probably go as far as to argue that there has rarely been a new normative issue on the international agenda which has not been advocated by

transnational advocacy coalitions, INGOs or epistemic communities.<sup>12</sup> While today it is widely accepted that the role of advocacy in the development sector has expanded the last years, the debate on its role for development, as well as its added value and overall effectiveness, continues.<sup>13</sup> Several trends can be identified that influence these discussions on lobby and advocacy in the development sector and at the same time shape the context for the three thematic areas in this evaluation in particular: 1) re-definitions of state and non-state divisions as a part and consequence of globalisation, 2) continuing cycles of violence and 3) the contemporary importance of effectiveness and impact in the development debate.<sup>14</sup> We briefly discuss these trends below.

In a rapidly globalising world, the division between state and non-state is increasingly being re-defined and negotiated. Lobby and advocacy needs to navigate new complex realities of changing power relations, standards and expectations. The opportunities and challenges related to this process are threefold.

First, actors in the public and political arenas increasingly collaborate, interact and influence one another. This opens new spaces for advocacy. Change often depends on multiple actors or organisations, and advocacy networks increasingly comprise a range of different types of actors: public and private actors as well as civil society.<sup>15</sup> This trend also creates new challenges.

Second, while there are more opportunities for interaction, diffuse policy processes may complicate claim-making and influencing actual decision-making processes.<sup>16</sup> New communication channels, and especially the rapid development of social media, also bring about opportunities and challenges for advocacy. On the one hand, the possibilities for communication enhance networking. On the other hand, they can weaken networks because any person anywhere can engage directly in global discussions and thereby may implicitly challenge the ground for legitimation of advocacy as representing the voice of rightful people.

Third, international power relations change. We see a steady increase in voices against repression that aim to set standards in line with human rights and demand justice, but, at the same time, shifts in economic power may affect and increasingly challenge the global system built on universal values of human rights. While we see new economic powers emerge in Asia and Latin America, Western countries are entering economic crisis, which causes power structures and relations to change. Traditional donors withdraw, new donors (non-Western, corporate sector, private sector) arise and development paradigms are under pressure to reform.<sup>17</sup>

Another trend is that continuing cycles of violence, economic and food insecurity, inequality, lack of human rights and organised crime<sup>18</sup> pose crucial development challenges and have brought about the development of the concept and international instruments of human security. The global development agenda increasingly expresses concerns about poverty, conflict, insecurity, hunger and disease. The overall focus of major donors worldwide is on strengthening civil society, poverty alleviation and equality<sup>19</sup> but—in the Netherlands and in other countries—they are also concerned with trade promotion. This combination of policy priorities poses opportunities and challenges for advocacy.

Finally, the public debate on development cooperation has increasingly focused on effectiveness and impact.<sup>20</sup> This implicitly refers to the practice of development cooperation. Consequently, this debate includes also the effect of lobbying and advocacy for development and thus the future role of advocacy interventions. These rapid and significant changes and trends, in combination with pressing questions about development practice, have triggered sharp discussions on development interventions and given rise to new challenges and approaches to development.

## **1.5 Structure of the report**

This evaluation report is organised as follows. First, we elaborate on the evaluation approach and the methodology applied during this evaluation. We then go on to the evaluation of the separate clusters. The cluster reports each consist of, first, separate reports on the different alliances that are part of the cluster concerned, and, second, a synthesised cluster report. The alliance reports and the cluster reports fulfil different functions in evaluation. The alliance reports extensively discuss the work of the specific alliances in relation to the five evaluation questions and clarify how this is linked to the three priority result areas. Each cluster report ends with a chapter called 'Cluster level synthesis'. These chapters serve to 1) summarise the main findings of the concerned alliance reports in relation to the evaluation questions and priority result areas, 2) give an overview of emergent themes and patterns, going into similarities, linkages and overlaps related to the evaluation questions across projects and alliances and 3) formulate cluster-level reflections, including lessons learned and looking forward. The evaluation report ends with a synthesis on the level of the entire evaluation, that is, a synthesis of findings across the eight alliances.



## 2 Evaluation approach and methods

Evaluation of international lobbying and advocacy (ILA) remains an emerging field. In contrast to this large-scale ILA evaluation, most studies on advocacy focus on national advocacy or specific aspects of just one programme. This evaluation presented the opportunity to look at the multi-layered processes of advocacy in a multitude of cases transnationally, to contribute to an understanding of these processes and to improve the methodology for advocacy evaluation.

ILA is a unique domain, meaning that the methods developed for other types of evaluation may not always apply directly when evaluating ILA efforts. In designing our methodological approach to the evaluation, we drew on recent work specific to the ILA evaluation field, adapted and elaborated methods developed for other types of evaluation and, where necessary, crafted innovative approaches appropriate for ILA evaluation.

This chapter begins with an explanation of the overall approach to the evaluation and of the relevant evaluation guidelines and parameters. The second section provides a more detailed summary of the methodological choices made. Finally, the chapter concludes with an overview of our analytical approach to each evaluation question.

### 2.1 Evaluation aim and overall approach

#### 2.1.1 Evaluation aim and focus

The specific evaluation aims formulated by NWO-WOTRO led to three foci: a results-oriented focus, a learning-oriented focus and an analysis-oriented focus.

In terms of the results-oriented focus, in assessing results, the evaluation team explicitly took into account the outcomes to which the lobbying and advocacy programmes under evaluation contributed. These outcomes are seen as the result of the interactions (co-creations) of different actors including Northern and Southern partners, organisations in the regions/countries, national and international governments, and companies. All of these actors work in their own systems and have their own interpretations and interests regarding the context and its opportunities and threats and how to implement their projects. We approached outcomes as observable changes—intended or unintended—in the policies, practices, behaviour, relationships, actions, activities or mind-set of an individual, group, community, organisation or institution.

The learning-oriented focus involved both content and methodological development. Rather than perceiving the evaluation as the work of a ‘distant outsider’, we began with the assumption that the alliances would be eager to learn more about their own programmes and interactions (co-creations) and the complex environment in order to improve programme effectiveness. It was therefore important to collaborate closely and strive for a learning-oriented process and action perspective. Across alliances, where possible, we drew upon existing internal monitoring protocols as sources of information. Additionally, the larger evaluation team met twice with representatives from the alliances to discuss our approach: once at the beginning of the evaluation process and again just before the endline data collection (April 2014).

Regarding the analysis-oriented focus, this evaluation sought to learn about pathways and mechanisms leading to the changes that were observed. We endeavoured to uncover how changes come about in the interplay between actors and their environment, what role the alliances’ theories of change play in this process and how issues of capacities, power and conflicting views within the alliances affect change. In short, we strove to determine *how* the changes observed came to be, while fully acknowledging the complexity of the processes and contexts investigated.



### 2.1.2 Theory of change

Throughout the evaluation, theory of change (ToC) is a key aspect of our approach to answering the evaluation questions. We find the ToC important because it helps us to reconcile the linear evaluation tradition of comparing outcomes at a certain moment in time against a set of objectives with evaluation traditions that acknowledge complexity and recognise the adaptive capacities of programmes. ToC refers to the understanding that an organisation, project, network or group of stakeholders has about how political, social, economic and/or cultural change happens and how they themselves can contribute to such a change process. A ToC can be a tool for planning, implementation and/or evaluation. It aims to define all of the building blocks required to bring about a given long-term goal and to describe the types of interventions that will bring about the outcomes depicted in a schematic illustrating the pathway of a change. Each expected outcome in the pathway of change is tied to an intervention or intervention strategy, revealing the often-complex web of activity that is required to bring about change.<sup>21</sup>

ToC is a frame used to guide the evaluation process. As such, ToC is fundamental to our approach, playing a role at multiple points in the evaluation process, from informing decisions about data collection to shaping the analysis and presentation of results. Working with ToCs allowed us to gain insight into the internal organisational processes underlying advocacy as well as the alliances' adaptability to (changing) external factors and actors. Through our use of ToCs, we were also able to obtain an understanding of the changes to which the alliances seek to contribute, how they seek to do this and on the basis of what assumptions. Having an awareness of the ToCs an alliance works with also enabled us to identify which actors, activities and outcomes to include in the evaluation.

We approached ToC from the actor orientation adopted throughout this evaluation. This means that we viewed the ToC as a negotiated social construction rather than a given, concrete, unchangeable object. ToCs evolve over time to adjust to changes in the environment and in response to insights gained in monitoring or other learning processes. Across the phases of data collection, we sought to establish changes that took place in how the alliances understood change to happen (the ToCs) as the ILA programmes developed. As an evaluation team, we were open to the possibility of finding multiple ToCs active in an alliance or multiple interpretations of a particular ToC. Instead of ignoring this diversity, we endeavoured to explore these differences and to bring them out as potential explanatory factors in the change process. In practice, no major differences within the alliances' programme staff were found, but differences in focus are discussed where relevant in the cluster- and alliance-specific sections of this report.

As used in this evaluation, a ToC includes several elements: 1) context, including social, political, institutional and environmental conditions, the current state of the issue the project is seeking to influence and other actors able to influence change; 2) the long-term change that an alliance seeks to support; 3) the anticipated process/sequence of change, for both the change overall and the contribution of the alliance to this; 4) the assumptions an alliance has regarding how change may happen and 5) a diagram and narrative portraying the ToC.<sup>22</sup>

Each of these elements was important for answering the different evaluation questions (EQs). The context and how it changed between the beginning of the ILA programmes and the endline data collection provided data for EQ 1 on changes. Knowledge about the long-term change the alliances sought to support was needed to understand how outcomes fit the broader aims of an alliance as well as the intended strategy and the underlying assumptions, informing the answers to EQs 1, 2 and 3 on changes, contribution and relevance. The identification of the pathway of change informed our answers to EQ 2 on contribution, EQ 3 on relevance and EQ 5 on explanatory factors. The articulation

of the different steps to be undertaken by the alliance and/or other actors/factors was helpful in understanding of the contribution that an alliance saw for itself in this process, identifying certain outcomes as interim steps towards higher goals and assessing where in the pathway of change identified outcomes have had a role, or, in other words, how relevant they were in light of the overall objective. Drawing out, making explicit and assessing the alliances' assumptions inherent in the ToCs was also part of our examination of contribution (EQ 2). The visual depictions of the ToCs were intended to help to visualise the complexity of the social changes being discussed, and both the narrative and the visual descriptions of the ToCs were used as tools to discuss changes in the ToCs between the beginning of the ILA programmes and the endline data collection as well as differences and similarities between different segments of the alliances.

Methodologically, the decisions about how many ToCs needed to be reconstructed, and at which levels, were made per alliance. For most alliances, separate ToCs were reconstructed for each project or campaign. For one alliance (the Ecosystem Alliance in Cluster I), the numerous campaigns and projects under evaluation made it unfeasible to reconstruct a complete ToC for each of them. For this alliance, the ToC was reconstructed at programme level.<sup>23</sup>

In all cases, we worked with the alliances and used multiple sources of data to reconstruct the relevant ToCs. At the beginning of the evaluation process, few of the alliances had a complete ToC that was suitable for our purposes. In general, there was an overall ToC for the alliance, but the selected ILA programme or programmes were just one part in that. To be useful for this evaluation, it was necessary to focus on the ILA component and include a higher level of detail.

Across alliances, the evaluators followed the same basic steps to reconstruct the ToCs. Beginning in 2012 during the baseline assessment, we surfaced the ToCs (and changes that had already occurred in them) through reviewing the alliances' MFS II documentation and through in-depth interviews. The documentation varied in its usefulness for reconstructing the ToCs, and multiple interviews with alliance staff members were generally very important. For the endline assessment in 2014, the evaluators conducted further interviews to identify changes in the ToCs since the baseline. In line with the learning-oriented focus of the evaluation described above, the ToCs reconstructed for each period were checked with the alliances through additional interviews, discussions over email and/or reviews of the baseline report. The process for reconstructing the ToCs, including data collection methods and important data sources, is elaborated per cluster and per alliance later in this report. It should be noted here that not all ILA programmes constructed a ToC or worked with a ToC prior to or during the MFS II period. Moreover, working with a ToC was not a requirement by MFS II.

The reconstructed ToCs represent the alliances' understanding of how change happens, although they were usually not previously formulated by the alliances in this format in full. The ToCs show what the alliances thought, assumed and planned. The evaluator was a facilitator in the process of reconstructing the ToCs, responsible for ensuring that all elements and relations came to the table.

### *2.1.3 Priority result areas*

The Call for Proposals for this evaluation (issued by NWO-WOTRO), distinguished three priority result areas for the ILA evaluation: 1) agenda setting, 2) policy influencing and 3) changing practice. These priority result areas were intended to illustrate the various phases that can be distinguished in advocacy interventions and/or in achieved outcomes, yet they rarely take place in a linear fashion. Although they are often not consecutive, the priority result areas are seen as core to advocacy. Agenda setting is linked to strategic awareness raising in the public and private sector and in political arenas. Policy influencing focuses on creating a public constituency and changing public and political

debate, leading to demonstrable change in policy by the lobby targets. The ultimate aim is to change practice, where the change in policy is realised in reaching development objectives.

For each priority result area, the evaluation team defined uniform outcome indicators (used across the evaluation) and specific outcome indicators (focused indicators used within the clusters or individual alliances). Uniform outcome indicators considered under each priority result area are as follows:

- Agenda setting: the extent to which 1) within the programme, the relevant members of an alliance determine, share and keep up to date their policy positions and strategies; 2) alliance and other actors become aware of issues at stake, organise themselves and adhere to the position of the ILA programme; 3) lobby/advocacy targets react upon the positions taken by the ILA programme; 4) relevant NGOs and/or other stakeholders involved in the programme are invited to participate in meetings (or organise meetings) relevant for the issue(s) by lobby/advocacy targets on public/private sector policies or those of international institutions and 5) the terms of the public debate are influenced: New civil society perspectives and alternative approaches are introduced into the policy debate.
- Policy influencing: the extent to which 1) demonstrable changes (including adoption of new policies and prevention of undesired policy changes) take place by lobby/advocacy targets and 2) a demonstrable shift takes place in the accountability structure for governmental actors or other authorities.
- Changing practice: the extent to which there are 1) concrete changes in practices of lobby targets regarding policy formulation and 2) concrete changes in practices of governments, institutes and/or targeted companies as to implementation of policies (=practice) in the 'field'.

The specific outcome indicators, defined per cluster or per alliance, were nested within these broad uniform outcome indicators. The specific outcome indicators were initially defined at the beginning of the evaluation process and were then refined during the baseline study in discussion with the alliances. As is the case with the uniform outcome indicators, the specific outcome indicators were clustered under the three priority result areas and were used to classify observed outcomes by priority result area.

Throughout the evaluation process, it has been acknowledged that 1) Not all alliances at all times aim to achieve results in all three priority result areas, 2) The priority result areas are useful analytical distinctions but are not always clearly bounded in practice and 3) Results may also be achieved entirely within alliances (In the case of broad alliances, the emergence of a common agenda may, for example, in itself be considered an important result for agenda setting). One objective specified in the baseline report was to test the applicability and relevance of the distinction of the three core result areas.

#### *2.1.4 Networking as a crosscutting issue*

As was already mentioned in the introductory chapter, the importance of networked advocacy was a theme that crosscut the evaluation questions as well as the three thematic clusters in this evaluation. Almost all of the alliances in the evaluation accomplish their work through networks, but there is variation in the intensity and manner of cooperation. In the course of conducting this evaluation, given the overarching importance of advocacy networks and networked advocacy, we considered carefully how best to treat these issues methodologically. Therefore, we focused special attention on identifying the role of networking and networked advocacy in the alliances' ToCs, overall missions

and strategic approaches (including strategies to build legitimacy, increase public awareness and develop advocacy capacity).

Being attentive to the multifaceted roles of networking in the ILA projects under evaluation had several implications for our methodological planning and practice. In (re)constructing the relevant ToCs, we explicitly included networking as an aspect of advocacy in our discussions with the alliances, ensuring that relevant aspects of networking were incorporated into the ToCs. In terms of changes achieved, we included questions about networking, where relevant, in uncovering how the changes came about. We also endeavoured to assess the assumptions underlying networking that might otherwise remain untested. Also related to networking was our effort to uncover which actors and stakeholders (including important networks and partners for cooperation) were involved in what manner in the advocacy processes. The networked nature of advocacy was considered regarding each of the different evaluation questions, querying, for example, whether the relevance of an activity was similar across all levels of advocacy and examining how the links between the local, national, regional and global levels affect the relevance of changes achieved; the extent to which working through networked advocacy was an effective strategy; the efficiency of working in networks and the role of an alliance's approach to networking as either a positive or negative explanatory factor.

## **2.2 Analytical approach, data and methods**

Acknowledging the three types of focus of the evaluation and achieving each dimension of the evaluation aim were the guiding force behind our methodological choices. In designing the evaluation methodology, the evaluation team as a whole was conscious of two competing interests: sensitivity to specific contexts and comparability across alliances and clusters. To ensure comparability across alliances and clusters, we developed a joint evaluation approach including the analytic models, and all evaluators shared a core evaluation design. Our selected methods consciously allowed for flexibility and recognition of contextual differences within clusters and within alliances to assess the outcomes in appropriate ways and to achieve the maximum possible learning. This demanded constant revisiting of the methodological frames and tools selected for data gathering and analysis and regular peer review on the evaluation process as such.

The evaluation team used the phase of the baseline assessment (2012) to design and test the evaluation methods. In 2013, we revised and elaborated the methodology, also adding those parts that were not yet needed during the baseline, such as the ultimate approach to the evaluation questions on contribution (EQ 2), efficiency (EQ 4) and explanatory factors (EQ 5).

This section reviews the basic parameters for the evaluation methodology and introduces the decisions made regarding data collection and analysis.

### **2.2.1 Scope and timeframe**

The evaluation measured outcomes against ToCs from 2011 to 2014, and we distinguish four different moments in that period. As the programmes began some time prior to our baseline evaluation research, the first round of data gathering (for the baseline assessment) needed to capture two moments: T0 and T1. T0 is the baseline as described in the alliances' MFS II proposals and their further planning documents (second half 2010 through early 2011). T1 is the moment of data gathering for the baseline assessment (late 2012). T2 represents our interim data collection between the baseline and endline reports. T2 data were collected through monitoring exercises on particularly poignant processes and indicators per alliance, generally covering developments in 2013. T3 comprises the moment of data gathering at the end of the evaluation (March–October 2014).

### 2.2.2 *Unit of analysis*

As is set out in the Call for Proposals, a pre-selection for this evaluation resulted in certain alliance ILA programmes in each of the three thematic clusters being subject to evaluation. Within the selected programmes, several projects were identified for each alliance.<sup>24</sup> The ILA project, as defined by NWO-WOTRO, was the unit of analysis of this evaluation. The scope of the selected projects varied substantially across alliances. In some cases, as is elaborated further in the cluster and alliance chapters, evaluation sub-teams have had to place additional limits on the boundaries of the selected projects for reasons of feasibility. We focused specifically on results at the ILA project level and were also able to draw conclusions at programme level. At cluster level,<sup>25</sup> and for the evaluation as a whole, we also include sections synthesising results across alliance programmes.

### 2.2.3 *Data collection methods*

Data gathering focused on the relevant ToCs, organisational dynamics, adaptations in strategies, interactions between actors and externalities that influenced the ILA activities. To obtain the necessary data for our analysis, a range of data collection methods were used. Most crucially, across the evaluation team, we used semi-structured interviews, both with alliance staff and with external knowledgeable persons, and the analysis of internal and external documents.

Several variations in data collection emerged because of differing alliance accessibility, ways of working or data requirements of evaluation sub-teams. All alliance sub-teams in Cluster III also used observation as a data collection method, to varying extents. They were able to add this method because alliance members granted access to the evaluators. In one case, GPPAC (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict), the alliance member leading the evaluated programme, granted the evaluators access to their internal meetings, offering the unique possibility to observe processes usually closed to direct observation by the evaluators. GPPAC's willingness to open their working process in this way created the opportunity to observe meetings that were not accessible to other evaluation sub-teams, maximising the learning potential for the evaluation. In the other two cases in Cluster III, observation was conducted at public events, as well as formal and informal meetings with partners and targets in the advocacy processes. For the evaluation of the IMPACT Alliance, a survey was used to assess relevance, and a pattern analysis between Facebook and Twitter reactions to public campaign moments was added.

### 2.2.4 *Data sources*

Across the evaluation, a large number of in-depth interviews were conducted with alliance members, partners and external experts. (See Appendix 1 for a list of interviews conducted per alliance.) In cases where observation was used, this focused on a variety of national- and international-level meetings. Documents analysed included internal alliance documents (e.g. MFS II proposals, meeting minutes, annual and mid-term reports, memos, other communications, websites, partner-level documents, research, reports and campaign materials) and external documents (e.g. legislative documents, external stakeholder websites, other public documents, UN meeting outcome documents and media reports). (See Appendix 2 for a list of documents reviewed per alliance.)

Across alliances and clusters, there is some variation in the number and type of data sources used. Differences between the alliances and programmes under evaluation in terms of size, organisational structure and degree of access granted to evaluators accounted for some of the variation. In terms of external interviews, evaluation team members experienced different levels of responsiveness and encountered different numbers of informed experts, depending on the specific topic of the interview. There was also some variation in the availability of personnel across the evaluation team.<sup>26</sup>

These factors, where relevant, are elaborated in the following chapters reporting on each cluster and alliance.

### *2.2.5 Data analysis*

Because of the complexity of the processes to be understood and the influences of multiple actors and factors that had to be synthesised to create that understanding, the data collected, and consequently the analytical methods used, were primarily qualitative. Quantitative data is included where relevant, but it is important to stress that often across this evaluation, pure quantification would have led to a reductionist approach to the evaluation that would have been unable to capture the essence of the ILA work being done. For example, providing counts of contact moments with decision makers provides little or no information about the content or contextualised importance of those interactions. Similarly, in terms of outcomes, one large or weighty policy change can be more important and relevant than five smaller policy changes. Across the evaluation, it was necessary to collect rich, qualitative data to be able to assess the situations in depth and to gain true insight into the processes being assessed.

In designing the qualitative data analysis, we acknowledged from the planning stage the need to incorporate an appropriate amount of flexibility to gain understanding about a very diverse set of alliances. This flexibility included the extent to which coding was used. Variation in the use of coding (using NVivo) resulted from differences in the data collection format (for some alliances, data were collected in a highly structured format that made explicit coding of material less essential) and personnel availability, as well as differences between the alliances themselves. This aspect of implementation of the analytical approach is addressed separately in the cluster- and alliance-specific chapters.

## **2.3 Case studies**

To answer multiple evaluation questions, it was necessary to gain an in-depth understanding of a range of key processes in the ILA programmes. We recognised that the programmes and projects under evaluation were wide-ranging and that it was not possible to study at a sufficient level of depth all actors engaged in all activities across all contexts. Therefore, we purposively selected cases for in-depth study to produce meaningful and useful insights.

For each alliance, cases were selected where the phenomenon of interest (broadly defined as processes identified through the ToCs relevant to the alliances under evaluation) could be observed. Depending on the situation within each alliance, there was some variation in the nature of a 'case', but these were most often physical places (e.g. countries). Cases can also be particular organisations, groups, networks or events.

Our case studies focused on a project, specific ILA activity or campaign implemented under MFS II and traceable in its outcome. Implementation under MFS II meant having a traceable financial link and/or being implemented through partnerships with MFS II alliance members (the Dutch CFA) working towards programme goals.

Based on the desire to achieve an in-depth understanding of the ILA projects under evaluation, the evaluation team selected two cases for each alliance. The selection of the two case studies per alliance took place at alliance level and in cooperation with alliance staff. We have selected cases of relevance to, and those provide learning opportunities for, the MFS II alliances under evaluation. The desired types of learning opportunities were decided in discussion with the alliances. After seeking input from the alliances, the evaluation team made the final determination about case selection. Where appropriate for a specific programme under evaluation, non-European cases were selected.

The core criteria for the selection of these cases were 1) usefulness in terms of assessing the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of ILA programmes funded by MFS II; 2) usefulness in terms of learning for the alliance and 3) feasibility of data collection. In all instances, we sought to identify cases that would yield insight into the three priority result areas and contribute to answering the five evaluation questions.

Within this frame, several differences can be observed in the case studies carried out across this evaluation. Cases were identified after the evaluation team had developed a sufficient level of understanding about the nature of working of the alliances through document analysis and interviews. Differences in the complexity of the projects under evaluation led to different time-scales regarding how quickly it could be determined which cases would be useful. For some alliances (e.g. Ecosystem Alliance, IMPACT Alliance), one of the case studies initially planned was not carried out because of practical problems or because changes in the alliances' planning reduced or eliminated the relevance of the initially selected case. Case studies were carried out at country level, regional level or supranational level, depending on the scope and nature of the alliances' goals and activities.

Differences between the projects under evaluation resulted in the case studies also having roles that varied significantly across this evaluation, and this is reflected in the presentation of the cases across the individual alliance-level evaluations in this report. In particular, as is explained in more depth in the Cluster II report, the international cases made up only a small part of the overall ILA work of the SRHR Alliance. Additionally, variation in the level of integration of the case-level outcomes into the relevant ILA programme ToC(s) are reflected in variation in the extent to which outcomes from case studies are fully integrated in each chapter or presented separately.

All of the key partners of the five alliances represented in Clusters I and II were based in the Netherlands. Although these groups are to a greater or lesser extent embedded in global networks, the key partners and staff were based in the Netherlands, and some of the policy processes focused upon Dutch or EU policies. In these clusters, the partner processes in Southern countries were assessed in detail primarily through the case studies. As is elaborated in the cluster- and alliance-specific chapters, the case studies should be given variant amounts of weight in the different alliance reports based on differences per alliance in the relative distribution of efforts geographically. Because of the nature of the alliances evaluated in Cluster III, in this cluster, cases were selected to follow particular processes (at regional or global level). Further details of the specific cases selected and the rationale for this selection are given in the cluster- and alliance-specific chapters of this report.

## **2.4 Triangulation**

Through all stages of the evaluation, from data collection to analysis, we used triangulation to maximise the quality of our findings. Triangulation describes the process of incorporating multiple data sources, evaluators, methods or theories. Triangulation contributes to the robustness of findings through increasing the reliability and usefulness of the conclusions and reducing bias. This approach allowed us to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the ILA programmes under evaluation and an increased awareness of the diversity of values, perspectives and positions from which key informants view certain issues or contexts.

In this evaluation, triangulation was accomplished through the use of multiple methods, sources and evaluators. As described earlier in this section, we drew on multiple methods and types of data sources to answer the EQs, allowing us to view the issues from multiple perspectives. In the case of this evaluation, where 'achievements' can be a subjective matter and the primary information comes

from the organisations under evaluation, it was especially important to find external sources to substantiate the data from the alliances. Working in teams for the data collection and analysis of each alliance further contributed to the triangulation of findings. Additionally, at the stage of data analysis, we used a system of peer review within the evaluation team to draw in the perspectives of evaluators from different thematic clusters.

## **2.5 Team configuration**

With the goal of triangulation of findings in mind, the principle set-up of our team was that each alliance was evaluated by a team of two evaluators. The roles and specific responsibilities between the two varied per alliance. As planned, Southern consultants also worked as part of the team. These consultants were primarily involved in the case studies geographically located in Asia and Africa. Two Southern consultants were involved in the larger evaluation team from the time of the original proposal. Because of difficulties with communication and conflicts in scheduling this work, it was necessary to contract a new consultant in Africa during Phase 2. This change influenced some of the case studies in the evaluation (for two alliances in Cluster I). For the fieldwork in Asia, scheduling conflicts for the consultant led to changes of plan for case studies for two other alliances (one in Cluster I and one in Cluster II). Where relevant, these changes are discussed further in alliance-specific chapters.

## **2.6 Specific approach to each evaluation question**

Guided by the approach and analytical framework proposed above, the evaluation team developed a specific methodological approach to answering each of the five evaluation questions.

### *2.6.1 Changes*

What are the changes achieved in the three priority result areas through international lobbying and advocacy on the thematic clusters ‘sustainable livelihoods and economic justice,’ ‘sexual and reproductive health and rights’ and ‘protection, human security and conflict prevention’ during the 2012–2014 period?

For this question, we have focused our research on changes to which the alliances claim to have contributed, allowing for consistency with evaluation questions 2–5.

We sought to identify all such changes and to explain how the changes related to the three priority result areas, to the alliances’ own ToCs, to the objectives of the projects under evaluation and to developments in the broader context and thematic and policy focus area of the alliances. These changes are almost always part of a process. Even if an intended final outcome is achieved, the process in which that outcome is a relevant change normally does not end. Therefore, in this evaluation, we did not explicitly distinguish between final outcomes and interim or intermediate outcomes. The ToCs elaborated for the alliances’ programmes under evaluation should clarify the intended role of each outcome in the change process.

The identification of relevant outcomes was accomplished in cooperation with the alliances. In general, outcomes were identified through a combination of document review and interviews with alliance members. The existence of these outcomes was then verified by further (external) document review and interviews with external informants. For three alliances (Fair, Green and Global; the Ecosystem Alliance [partly, for some of the projects under evaluation] and Freedom from Fear), documents describing the outcomes suitable for evaluation purposes were provided directly by the alliances. Where needed, these written descriptions were supplemented through internal interviews. In all cases, the detailed descriptions of all outcomes were reviewed or discussed with alliance members and then revised. This process was first conducted for the baseline report (2012) and then



repeated in full for the endline report (2014), with 'lighter' data gathering in the interim period (2013).

We approached EQ 1 as a question that mainly elicits a descriptive answer, which is a stepping-stone to answering the subsequent evaluation questions. In answering this question, we described the claims made. In answering EQ 2, we assessed the contribution of these claims, to the extent feasible.

### 2.6.2 *Contribution*

Do the international lobbying and advocacy efforts of the MFS II alliances and their partners contribute to the identified changes (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

The evaluation team worked to assess the realised intended and unintended outcomes and the value added by the MFS II alliances, giving due recognition to the complex dynamics in the field. As a consequence of this complexity, attribution between MFS II input and the outcome can often not be established. Contribution is the determination of whether a credible (plausible) case can be made that the advocacy intervention contributed to the established outcome.<sup>27</sup> Part of assessing the effectiveness is the establishment of contribution as opposed to attribution. Effectiveness as defined by NWO-WOTRO relates the outcomes (changes) of policy objectives to the output of alliances and other partners.<sup>28</sup> In this ILA evaluation, we assessed effectiveness in terms of the plausibility of the association of inputs and outputs with outcomes, while acknowledging that an alliance may use different pathways of inputs–outputs to achieve one outcome.

Assessing the contribution of advocacy, especially in an evaluation of this scale, is to some extent 'uncharted territory'. After considering several approaches, the evaluation team decided to use a specific method of contribution analysis to inform our assessment of the contribution of the MFS II alliances to the identified outcomes. We selected this method because of its potential to compile an evidence-based, in-depth understanding of the processes leading to a change.

Because of the time-intensive nature of this method, it was recognised that it would not be feasible to assess the contribution to all of the identified outcomes in depth. Based on expectations of feasibility, we decided to look in depth into the contribution of each alliance to two selected outcomes (or closely related outcome 'clusters'), though this represented a significant limitation to our ability to address this evaluation question and meant that our findings could not necessarily be generalised to the selected ILA programmes in their entirety.

Although we limited the use of the full contribution analysis method to two outcomes or outcome clusters, we were able to assess the contributions of the alliances to other outcomes in more limited ways. First, outcomes often come in clusters, connected with the implementation of parts of alliances' programmes, so the results of our contribution analysis for the selected outcomes are often part of the substantiation required to assess the contribution of additional outcomes. Moreover, in the course of our data gathering, we collected additional information on contribution, and we integrated this contribution-oriented information into our report as much as possible. Finally, for all included outcomes, we maintained the minimum validation that 1) the outcome was an observable fact and 2) the activities that the alliance claimed contributed to the outcome were a fact, and their contribution is plausible in the assessment of the evaluation team and in light of the pathway of change. For a number of alliances, these contribution claims were further substantiated by external written sources, with lobby targets explicitly referring to contributions made by the alliance or reacting to these, or by external resource persons confirming contributions made and the role of the alliance towards achieving the outcome (e.g. IMPACT Alliance; Ecosystem Alliance; Fair, Green and Global and Hivos). In this way, contribution analysis involved triangulation and seeking

hard evidence, taking the analysis beyond the two outcomes or outcome clusters selected for the more in-depth contribution analysis.

For each alliance, the two outcomes (or outcome clusters) for which we answered the contribution question were selected based on the importance/relevance of the change according to the alliance, the change's relation to the priority result areas and the importance/relevance of the change in the larger ToC. Where feasible, we also considered the amount of MFS II money that went into activities and outputs leading up to the change. As the selection of the two outcomes for contribution analysis was made separately by each alliance sub-team, and as the alliances varied significantly, the selected outcomes vary in scale and scope, although all were selected using the above criteria. For example, for some alliances, the selected outcomes were identified entirely through the case studies (e.g. all Cluster III alliances). For other alliances, a contribution analysis was conducted for all of the outcomes of one campaign (e.g. IMPACT Alliance).

As our starting point for answering this question, we tried to work with Mayne's<sup>29</sup> contribution analysis framework, also integrating other methods to establish evidence of contribution (e.g. process tracing). In our efforts towards accurate evidence, it was necessary to balance the need for accuracy and evidence with the resources available to us. We were also aware that different contexts and alliances would present us with different possibilities and barriers, and that we would therefore have to address the question of contribution flexibly.

Our ambition for this evaluation question involved setting out the cause-effect issue to be assessed; elaborating the theory of change explaining the postulated cause-effect relationship, also identifying risks and rival explanations; using the existing evidence to assemble and assess the contribution claim and challenges to it; seeking out additional evidence; revising and strengthening the contribution story and making a final assessment of the overall contribution. For the ILA programmes under evaluation, efforts to further explain the nature of the relation between causes and effects were informed by Mayne's contribution analysis.<sup>30</sup> In most cases, the use of this method helped to collect and analyse data for systematically answering EQ 2.

In practice, even with the reduced set of outcomes selected for contribution analysis, we faced multiple challenges related to the availability of evidence. In some cases, the nature of the outcomes selected meant that there was little objective evidence accessible to our team. In other cases, evaluators were faced with an information overload. In both cases, the amount of work required to search for the appropriate evidence to verify contribution claims was extensive.

Differences are to be observed in the way contribution analysis was done across the alliances. In Cluster III, the contribution analysis was part of the in-depth cases studied and started with outcomes achieved as part of a process considered key to the ILA work. The outcomes were selected based on their typical character for the ILA programme and were analysed by taking into account the key processes and relations shaping them (e.g. budgeting for children in Africa advanced in the policy agendas at AU and UN; A civil society network to further pan-African child rights; a working relationship with the UN Human Security Unit; working relations on UNSCR 1325 financing with UN bodies and local civil society in Colombia). By tracing these outcomes achieved as part of a process, space was provided to identify (hidden) outcomes that were otherwise not included (e.g. budgeting for children on the agenda at the UN and contributions to the post-2015 discussions on this subject; the Mindanao peace process in the Philippines). In Clusters I and II, the starting point for the analysis consisted of outcomes achieved, for which contribution was then established. The outcomes selected in Clusters I and II mainly represent changes in policies and practices of lobby targets, whereas the

outcomes in Cluster III predominately refer to changes with regard to agenda-setting processes, concentrating on networked advocacy processes such as building capacities, networking, 'coalitioning' and developing relations and rapport with policy targets, possibly making it more difficult to identify rival explanations for the outcomes achieved. Clusters I and II were able to identify rival explanations in many cases, although this was not always easy. Both approaches have their limitations: Those starting with outcomes achieved have a bias towards selecting positive outcomes, but seem to have more possibilities for identifying rival explanations, whereas those aiming to trace outcomes through key ILA programme processes provide more opportunities to identify several outcomes relating to one output or hidden outcomes, after which it would perhaps be possible to also identify rival explanations. Additionally, where more feasible outcomes were available, certain identified outcomes were not selected for contribution analysis because of the large number of actors involved in lobbying one lobby target. For example, this situation was encountered with outcomes claimed by the IMPACT Alliance, Hivos and the Ecosystem Alliance as a result of extensive consultation rounds. In these cases, many actors were involved and, prior to conducting a contribution analysis, a social network analysis (at global or European level) would have been necessary to attempt to clarify the relations between actors and their stakes before the evaluation team would have been able to assess contribution.

### 2.6.3 *Relevance*

What is the relevance of these changes?

We conceptualised relevance in light of the relevant ToCs, as our basic point of reference. Relevance is understood as the assessment of whether the ILA projects and outcomes are consistent with the political and public needs and priorities as existing at the various levels: global, interregional, national and local. This is a minor deviation from the NWO-WOTRO definition that speaks of 'beneficiaries' requirements'.

In answering this evaluation question, we examined whether the projects under evaluation addressed the needs identified in the alliances' ToCs and to what extent the changes addressed the alliances' overall aims for ILA. We operationalised changes as outcomes that were identified in answering EQ 1. It was fundamental in our approach to understand that the relevance of, for example, a policy change, is subjective. It is therefore important to choose a more objective reference. This reference was the alliance's ToC. Within the ToCs, the most important elements to use for this assessment were the *objectives* and *expected outcomes*.

Substantiation of the relevance took place in different ways. First, in interactions between the evaluators and alliance staff, the alliance staff members were asked to explain the alliance's view on the relevance of each outcome. The evaluator, having a good understanding of the issue and the context, as well as the alliance's ToC, had the task of assessing whether this 'claim of relevance' was plausible. The second level of substantiation incorporated the view of external respondents on the relevance individual outcomes or clusters of outcomes.

### 2.6.4 *Efficiency*

Were the efforts of the MFS II alliances efficient?

The NWO-WOTRO Call for Proposals defines efficiency as 'a measure of how economically resources (inputs) of the MFS II Alliance or their (Southern) partners are converted to direct results (outputs)'. This definition reveals that efficiency is mostly seen in the economic terms of outputs in relation to inputs. With regard to the efficiency of the efforts of the MFS II alliances, we developed a methodology that centres on the 'theory of efficiency' of the intervention.

Most evaluations on lobby and advocacy do not deal with issues of efficiency, deeming these either irrelevant or immeasurable. To give a brief example of the difficulties involved, how do you judge the efficiency of holding a meeting in a five-star hotel? What if that is the only way to convince your primary lobby targets to participate? Efficiency in lobby and advocacy cannot be measured unless the story behind expenditures is understood.

After considering several other methods and determining them to be unsuitable for this evaluation,<sup>31</sup> to respond to the evaluation question on efficiency, we developed an innovative methodology suitable for the specifics of ILA, where outcomes are often intangible and contribution difficult to assess, and where the capacity to adapt to changing contexts is key to good practice. We also wanted to develop a methodology that was coherent with the general methodological approach that judges ILA efforts against a ToC, considering that coherence is a requirement of quality evaluations.

The original MFS II Call for Proposals requested that efficiency be addressed in terms of 'value for money', giving due regard to the relation between the quantity of financial means (applied for human resources/extra expertise, time, materials, campaigns, etc.) and quality results achieved in a certain time frame, including arrangements to verify efficiency. Hence alliances/partner organisations supposedly have working protocols (procedures) to enhance (or uphold) the efficiency of interventions as well as protocols to monitor efficiency. Together, these protocols could be considered their theory of efficiency (ToE).

Our method for assessing efficiency centres on the ToE of the ILA programmes. We asked alliances about their ToEs and endeavoured to evaluate the quality of the ToE and how they performed against it. The key is that we have shifted emphasis away from an evaluator determining and scoring programme efficiency to establishing how alliances build in and monitor optimal cost-effectiveness in their programmes. The entry point for the ToE was the ILA programmes under evaluation.

In addition to the considerations presented above, we also consider the methodology attractive because it has the potential to improve practice. Compared with efficiency statements that give an absolute or relative score to practice, this method will generate insights into theories and practices of efficiency that can be used by alliances to improve their efficiency.

We drew upon both (internal) interviews and documents in our reconstruction of the ToE and in assessing how the alliances performed against this in practice. In some cases, teams needed to conduct additional interviews and seek out additional documents to perform these assessments, and in other cases, the sources used in answering the other four questions were sufficient for answering this EQ.

We would like to emphasise that it is an experimental method that we have developed for the purpose of this evaluation. Developing or testing methods was part of the objectives of the evaluation. However, the need to focus on efficiency only came about after the baseline. The ToE method was developed and subsequently applied without having been piloted or tested. This means that the findings are not highly comparable as they partly display differences in the understanding and level of internalisation of the method by the different evaluators. The findings are nonetheless relevant in drawing out patterns in the ways that alliances deal with efficiency and in providing clues for future evaluations of the efficiency of lobby and advocacy.

### 2.6.5 *Factors explaining the findings*

What factors explain the findings?

In operationalising our approach to this question, we first had to define which findings should be explained. We focused this analysis on the explanation of the identified outcomes and their relevance. This includes the explanation of contribution, as we only discuss outcomes to which the alliances claimed to have contributed. Put simply, we assess factors potentially explaining success and failure.

In answering this question, we considered internal factors, external factors, their interactions and also the nature of the issues addressed. Internal factors can have an important role in explaining the outcomes of lobbying and advocacy. To assess the role of internal factors, we drew upon the concept of 'organisational capacity', operationalised in line with the five capabilities (5Cs) framework.<sup>32</sup> Organisational capacity is the sum of five capabilities, and through the five capabilities (5Cs), we sought to make an assessment of the organisational capacity. The 5Cs framework distinguishes *capacity* defined as 'producing social value' from *five core capabilities*, which, by themselves, do not necessarily contribute to social change. We employed the five capabilities: 1) to act and commit, 2) to deliver on objectives, 3) to adapt and renew, 4) to relate and 5) to achieve coherence. We adapted the 5Cs model to increase its applicability to lobbying and advocacy evaluation. Our approach to the 5Cs, therefore, contributes not only to explaining why changes happened but also to understanding how the 5Cs can be read in the context of ILA.

Specifically, each of the five capabilities was understood as follows:

- 'The capability to act and commit' involves strategic intent and the organisational ability to act on this intent within alliance or the wider network. Specifically within ILA, this includes the ability to mobilise constituency, public, resources, allies/'champions' or the media and the ability to articulate constituency views and needs into language and images that can find hearing while realising representation.
- 'The capability to deliver on objectives' concerns the organisation's capability to achieve access to financial resources, knowledge and information sources, human resources, facilities and standards on measures of performance, embedded in a results-orientation and logic. Specifically within ILA, it also concerns the ability to relate to decision-making actors, arenas and processes, and includes the ability to mobilise financial resources and to plan and perform campaigns and activities.
- 'The capability to adapt and self-renew' is about the ability to learn internally and to adjust to changing contexts. This is influenced by internal openness to learning, the ability to analyse important external factors, flexibility and openness to change, and it could be argued that this is the core capability required for ILA. Specifically within ILA, this capability may include the ability to adapt lobbying and advocacy to external actors and factors (changing the ToC), having knowledge of shifting contexts and relevant trends, involving network partners in learning and decision making, having a culture of learning and self-reflection and being able to make use of opportunities and adapt the scope of the issue to the changing context.
- 'The capability to relate' concerns the building and maintaining networks with constituents and allies as well as with external actors. Specifically within ILA, this may include the translation of constituency understandings, viewpoints and interests into an agenda that resonates with them; the ability to address a broad audience and engage with a growing

number of members; the ability to frame lobbying/advocacy issues in a way that fits with relevant networks; maintaining appropriate communication with the larger network; maintaining clarity about relations with relevant networks; the ability to deal with tensions in the broader network and the ability to adapt the scope of the issue to be relevant for the broader network.

- ‘The capability to balance diversity and achieve coherence’ includes the simultaneous engagement with diversity and need for coherence within the organisation. This capability is expressed in the vision, strategy and practices, achieving coherence while engaging with internal diversity. In ILA, typically building on large networks, this may include internal processes of participation and clarity of roles; the inclusion of different layers and geographical areas represented in agenda-setting, policy influencing and changing practice; the inclusion of different layers and geographical areas in the representation of the alliance and ILA activities and the ability to deal with diverging opinions, voices, interests and objectives within an alliance

To answer this evaluation question, it was also important to assess the role of *external factors* that may explain the findings. A survey of lobbying and advocacy evaluation literature resulted in an overview of external factors, broadly formulated, that can help to explain outcomes obtained through lobbying and advocacy work. These factors include 1) characteristics of the targets, including their agenda, opposition to the issue, power with regard to the issue and openness to influence; 2) characteristics of the issue context, including the presence and capacity of organised opposition against or support for the lobbying and advocacy goal on a particular issue; 3) characteristics of the public in terms of their support for or opposition against the alliance’s position on an issue, the congruence of the ILA objectives with societal values or agendas and the role of mass media and social media and 4) characteristics of the general context, including the socio-political, socio-economic and socio-cultural context and the political or legal space for CSOs.

Additionally, where relevant, we worked specifically to identify how external factors might impact organisational capacity (or the importance of particular organisational capabilities) and how the nature of the issues addressed might explain the outcomes identified. Literature on lobbying and advocacy consistently points to the issue as an independent factor explaining results (Carpenter 2011, Wong 2012, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Mahoney 2007), identifying, for example, the scope of an issue, the degree to which an issue can be related to directly identifiable victims and the complexity of an issue (including the multiplicity of actors that need to be targeted) as explanatory factors.

In practice, we identified explanatory factors through interviews with alliance staff and with external resource persons and through reviewing internal and external documents.

## **2.7 Overall methodological reflection and lessons learned**

This evaluation set out to do justice to the complexities of international lobbying and advocacy. To a degree, we have succeeded in capturing important dimensions of this. Our methodological approach meant that we kept an open eye for the flexibility required for lobbying and advocacy, the multiplicity of relations involved, the long-term orientation needed when it comes to seeking change and the highly political nature of the work, with multiple forces often acting against one’s objectives. At the same time, the complexity of the programmes and processes studied was so high that it was difficult to do justice to them with the means (time, human resources and funds) available to the evaluation team. However, aside from available resources, it would never be possible to observe everything, and evaluations, by definition, present snapshots of the relevant processes underway. It would never have been possible to reproduce in full the complete picture of the complexity inherent

in the programmes under evaluation and their working contexts. Through a shared sense for the complexity of the evaluation context, as an evaluation team, we worked to take advantage of the opportunities available to elucidate the relevant aspect of ILA processes.

Regarding the specifics of our general methodological approach, an important conclusion is that it was useful to use a specific definition of outcomes, focusing on observable changes in other social actors. This decision was, in fact, crucial for gaining a good understanding of the lobbying and advocacy programmes and was fundamental in the design of the entire evaluation approach. The definition was also the basis for adopting a theory-based evaluation methodology that acknowledges the complexity of change processes through lobby and advocacy, instead of other evaluation designs that assume linear change processes.<sup>33</sup>

Whilst embracing complexity of change, especially in Cluster III, some alliance evaluation sub-teams faced challenges with regard to capturing the complexity of collaborations and processes that make up the networked, multilevel advocacy of some of the programmes and projects under evaluation: It was difficult to do justice to them, especially with the means (in terms of time, human resources and funding) available to the evaluation team. With the evaluation centring on outcomes to which alliances contributed, the political context in which these emerged could be made part of the evaluation only to a limited degree, affecting our ability to assess the validity of the strategies we evaluated within specific contexts. This has also influenced our ability to assess the added value of these strategies in the face of activities and outcomes of other civil society organisations or NGOs active on the same issues—sometimes multiple organisations advancing similar or closely-related messages to the same targets.<sup>34</sup> A high degree of complexity was also found in the alliances' own ways of working, with partners, targets, activities, arenas and outcomes involving multiple sites often crossing country and continental borders and consisting of intense moments embedded in long-term processes.

Another way of embracing complex change processes that was not well developed in our methodology consisted of identifying tipping points, emerging patterns and system-wide change: Some examples have been found where outputs delivered by the alliance or outcomes achieved helped to reach other outcomes without further efforts of the alliance. In the light of increased attention for development effectiveness and efficiency, in particular with regard to the new strategic partnership programme between the Dutch government and Dutch NGOs, more attention to those tipping points or emerging patterns might be helpful. The Fair, Green and Global Alliance outcome where the president of Ecuador warned other Latin American countries about the negative consequences of investor-state dispute settlement and the investors and food and beverage companies targeted by the IMPACT Alliance that, after having been targeted, became allies of the campaigners and took action, are some examples that highlight the fact that an alliance has triggered change, which, in turn, triggers further change. Well-informed understandings of the pathways of change and the necessary strategies to achieve organisational goals, which can be reflected in well-designed ToCs, are key to such change processes.

Identifying all outcomes of an ILA programme is nearly impossible in the case of very large programmes, covering many countries where partners are contributing towards the same change. Therefore, the outcomes identified for some of the alliances present in the first place those changes achieved at international level and in the Netherlands and to a lesser extent those achieved in other countries. In the evaluation of the Ecosystem Alliance, for one of the programmes (themes) under evaluation, only two projects were included in the evaluation as a way of illustration, and not all

outcomes achieved at country level were documented for the Together for Change Alliance, the IMPACT Alliance or the SRHR Alliance.

Several issues emerged through working with the priority result areas. In a discussion of the priority result areas during the April 2014 learning day, alliance representatives urged the evaluation team not to lose sight of the ‘building block’ outcomes that often occur prior to the priority result areas. Examples of these outcomes mentioned included the strengthening of local voices, capacity development and networking. Correspondingly, in evaluating the work of some alliances, the priority result areas as defined were found to be restrictive. This was especially the case for the Protection, Human Security and Conflict Prevention Cluster (Cluster III), in which the alliances generally had a particularly strong focus on networked advocacy. Evaluators found it difficult to do justice to the complexity of the advocacy in the cluster while remaining within the three priority result areas. Certain important foundational outcomes (e.g. those related to capacity building, developing and maintaining relationships and networks, facilitating interactions and convening stakeholders) could be included in the priority result area framework only through a somewhat artificial broadening of the priority result categories.

The Economic Justice Cluster (Cluster I) and the Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Cluster (Cluster II) experienced similar difficulties with the three priority result areas and with the uniform outcome indicators developed during the baseline study. Some of the outcomes achieved by the alliances could fall under different priority result areas, depending on the contextual explanations given to the outcomes. Apart from this, Cluster I implicitly worked with a stricter definition of outcomes, in particular searching for observable changes—intended or unintended—in the policies, practices, behaviour, relationships, actions, activities or mindsets of *lobby targets*, rather than considering changes for any individual, group, community, organisation or institution. Based upon this definition, but also based upon the outcomes as identified by the alliances themselves, outcomes related to capacity building, networking, coalition forming and similar changes were only identified to a limited extent. For example, Cluster I does not report any outcome related to the first standard indicator: ‘Within the programme, the relevant members of an alliance determine, share and keep up to date their policy positions and strategies’. However, many outcomes have been classified under the second indicator: ‘Alliance and other actors become aware of the issues at stake, organise themselves and adhere to the position of the ILA programme’.

Although the approach of developing specific outcome indicators nested within the uniform outcome indicators allowed for flexibility in defining the substantive content of the priority result areas, this exercise at times pushed the definition of the categories to the extent of altering their intended meaning, indicating that this system of classification deserves further consideration to maximise its usefulness for summarising such outcomes. It would also be useful to apply future efforts to developing a clear understanding of how the three priority result areas relate to each other—whether this is linearly or in a different fashion. More specifically, it would be fruitful for future work to consider how to assess situations where it is found that the three priority result areas do not relate to each other in a linear fashion. Based especially upon the experiences of Clusters III and I, key issues to further explore with regard to working with priority result areas and standard indicators require reflection as to whether progress being made in terms of capacities being built, networks and coalitions being formed amongst CSOs and NGOs should be considered intermediate outcomes towards changes in lobby targets, or as outputs of ILA programmes. With regard to ILA programmes, the relation between outputs (e.g. conferences, research documents, courses delivered) and



outcomes with lobby targets can sometime be challenging and less straightforward, because most often intermediary steps like seeking allies, networking and coalition forming are needed.

As already described above, applying the specific contribution analysis method was not always possible, in particular when networked advocacy processes have taken place such as is the case with Cluster III or when many actors influence the same lobby target, representing different or overlapping constituents with converging or diverging agendas (Clusters I and II). Nevertheless, attempts to identify rival explanations using contribution analysis were made for five of the eight alliances, with outcomes most often reflecting policy or practice changes. Contribution analysis is, however, a time-consuming effort, and other methodologies for measuring the contribution of lobby and advocacy efforts appear to be as time intensive as is contribution analysis.

**THEMATIC CLUSTER 1: ECONOMIC JUSTICE CLUSTER**



## 3 Overview of the Economic Justice Cluster

### 3.1 Economic Justice Context

In the past decade, many actors in development, scholars and scientists have criticised the existing economic models that create social and economic disparities.<sup>35</sup> Profound changes are needed in the global political and economic system.<sup>36</sup> The global food system will also require major adaptations if over nine billion people will need to be fed in 2050. Competition for land, natural and mineral resources, water and energy will be intensified, and conflicts will increase between populations whose livelihoods depend upon those resources and international companies from industrial countries.<sup>37</sup> At the same time, greenhouse gas emissions leading to climate change have become more than ever a global concern for many actors.

#### 3.1.1 *Multilateral Institutions and fora*

Although multilateral institutions have the mandate to orchestrate global answers to the above concerns that would then need translation into national policies, many of these institutions have failed to formulate appropriate answers. After proposing a global agriculture and food security programme to strengthen resilience to food price spikes and to boost smallholder productivity in 2008 and the introduction of a results-based payments system in agriculture in 2012, the G20 failed to address systemic food security and climate change issues whilst being responsible of 80% of global greenhouse emissions.<sup>38</sup> Global activists were also very dissatisfied with the Rio+20 declaration of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 that they thought lacked the ambition necessary to address the challenges posed by a deteriorating environment, worsening inequality and a global population growth.<sup>39</sup>

In another policy field, the declaration of 2014–2024 as the decade of sustainable energy for all (UN SE4All) underscores the importance of ensuring access to sustainable energy sources for all people.

Apart from these multilateral institutions where legally binding agreements are being negotiated, agendas are moving faster in those settings where both civil society organisations (CSOs) and the private sector have a say, such as, for example, the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS). After endorsing the 2012 Voluntary Guidelines, which currently set the global standard for land and natural resources governance, the CFS recently also endorsed the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investments, which take the Voluntary Guidelines into account.

Since the 2013 baseline study,<sup>40</sup> the UN Global Compact has also managed to formulate 10 principles that aim to guide multinationals in how they do business. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines for multinational enterprises are perhaps even more important.<sup>41</sup>

Other non-binding standards are set by the roundtables of different commodities. Limited progress has been observed with regard to these roundtables.

#### 3.1.2 *Geopolitical changes*

Geopolitical power relations are shifting and are increasingly being felt in global decision-making arrangements such as those in the World Bank Group and the WTO (see the influence of the G33–G46 developing countries). In 2013, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa created the New Development Bank as an alternative to the United States- and European Union-dominated World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Four of these BRICs countries together represent 41% of the global population and 25% of the world's land area and account for more than 25% of global GDP. Increasingly, these countries will set international standards, and traditional donor countries in

Europe, the United States and Canada will see their bargaining position as standard-setting countries decrease.

### *3.1.3 Developing countries*

According to the World Bank governance indicators, no particular changes occurred in the 2010–2013 period in most continents, apart from the Middle East, which saw a decline in political stability. Although no changes are observable in the World Bank governance indicator for voice and accountability, other sources, such as CIVICUS (2013), observe that the space for civil society is increasingly being constrained.<sup>42</sup> The lack of transparency and accountability around land deals and tenure titles between national and international companies and developing countries has been documented by the World Bank. Recent studies have shown that environmental or forestry legislation is regularly undermined, control mechanisms are weak and information about the valuation of land is imprecise and often absent. Generally speaking, local populations experience fewer employment opportunities, a decreased natural resource base and the loss of household revenues,<sup>43</sup> and communities or people exercising their rights are increasingly threatened.

### *3.1.4 The Netherlands*

In the Netherlands, the Dutch political situation has changed. The work of the Minister for Development Cooperation changed scope. The Minister is now Minister for International Trade and Development Cooperation, with a shift of sections of the Department of Economic Affairs to this Minister. This has created new dynamics with more possibilities to relate international trade to development cooperation in governmental policies and vice versa.

## **3.2 The four alliances under evaluation**

This cluster assesses the efforts and effects of four alliances that tried to contribute to changes of agendas, policies and/or practices related to existing power relations, within the context described in the previous paragraphs, in favour of sustainable livelihoods for smallholders, local communities and the ecosystems and natural resources upon which they rely.

### *3.2.1 The Fair, Green and Global Alliance (FGG)*

This alliance comprises ActionAid Netherlands, Both ENDS, Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC, not evaluated), Milieudefensie (including Friends of the Earth International [FoEI] and Friends of the Earth Europe [FoEE]), SOMO and the Transnational Institute (TNI). It aims to ‘contribute to poverty reduction and to socially just and environmentally sustainable development by enhancing the capacity of civil societies in the South’. It is convinced that systemic changes and sustained development can only be reached by bottom-up and community-led initiatives, but it acknowledges that change at global level is also needed. This evaluation looked at two interventions of FGG.

- The efforts of SOMO, Both ENDS, FoEE and TNI and their partners to influence international trade and investment agreements in relation to food security and land issues, investor obligations and universalised services or common goods that should be accessible to everyone. The focus is on trade agreements with ASEAN and Latin America and African countries on one side and with the EU on the other side. This evaluation illustrates FGG’s efforts to influence, amongst other things, international trade and investment agreements.
- The efforts of Milieudefensie and ActionAid to ensure that Dutch companies and Dutch government policies do not contribute to environmental pollution, nature devastation and destruction of natural livelihoods resources in the South. Both organisations developed different theories of change that mutually reinforce each other. The evaluation illustrates

Milieudefensie's efforts to change policies, for example, through a deeper exploration of a biofuel case in Indonesia.

Coordination within FGG is lean and mean and based upon subsidiary principles.

### 3.2.2 *The Ecosystem Alliance (EA)*

This alliance aims to 'improve the livelihoods of the poor and create a sustainable economy, through inclusive and transparent governance mechanisms that foster local ecosystems and landscapes that accommodate multiple uses by different actors'. The three partners, IUCN NL, Both ENDS and Wetlands International, designed a common framework that aims 1) to strengthen the livelihoods and ecosystems in developing countries; 2) to change the policies and practices around four global commodities (palm oil, soya, biofuels and products resulting from mining) in favour of local communities and their ecosystems and; 3) to ensure an enabling policy environment at international level that reduces greenhouse gas emissions at global level and ensure appropriate climate change adaptation and mitigation mechanisms. The Alliance works with separate projects on both ILA and country programmes. In its theory of change, the EA assumes that positive international and bilateral policy changes, particularly in relation to global public goods, will influence national policies (in the South) and benefit the reality for local communities, and that local realities and experiences are crucial to underpin their lobby at international and bilateral levels.

Compared with the baseline, the unit of analysis (i.e. the number of projects under evaluation) has been downsized: Two projects under the livelihoods and ecosystems theme were included, all commodities and the climate change mitigation through the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Collaboration between the three partners in the EA intensified during the baseline study when they decided to join forces on three geographical areas in 2013. Apart from this, the partners each have their own but complementary identity, organisational culture, track record and lobby and advocacy approach.

### 3.2.3 *Hivos, People Unlimited 4.1 Alliance*

Hivos, the consortium lead of the People Unlimited 4.1 Alliance, carried out an international lobby and advocacy programme that aims for 100% sustainable energy, as quickly as possible and at global level. The evaluation looked at two components of this programme: 1) increasing access to energy for poor people and shifting to sustainable energy in developing countries, with a particular focus on the UN initiative 'Sustainable Energy for All' (SE4All) including the opportunity of interaction between the SE4All process and policy processes in developing countries, and on the EU and the World Bank, and 2) the 100% Green IT campaign in the Netherlands that aims to reduce the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of Dutch data centres. The latter was developed because Hivos believes that changes are also needed in developed countries. Hivos is the only Alliance partner involved in this programme, and it works with Southern partners. Two interventions were examined in depth: one targeting the World Bank on its energy policy during an international forum, and the other on Uganda where Hivos' partners lobbied for access to sustainable energy sources in line with the UN SE4All initiative, which since the baseline study gained in importance in Hivos' theory of change.

### 3.2.4 *Oxfam Novib, Dutch IMPACT Alliance*

Oxfam Novib, consortium lead of the Dutch IMPACT Alliance, is the only Alliance partner that implements the GROW Campaign, together with 16 other affiliates of the Global Oxfam Confederation that works globally in some 90 countries. The GROW campaign is implemented in some 40 countries. Two components within the GROW campaign were evaluated: 1) the land grab

campaign that aims to stop land and water grabs by powerful corporations and countries and 2) the Behind the Brands campaign that targets the 10 biggest food and beverage companies to change their policies and practices regarding seven themes.

Public campaigning on land that started in September 2011 has now been reduced significantly, but continues through lobby activities, and the Behind the Brands campaign has been public since February 2013. The baseline study already assessed several campaign strands of the land grab campaign and continued looking at the last campaign strand targeting the World Bank Group. With regard to the Behind the Brands campaign, the evaluation assessed two campaign spikes: women and land grabbing. Oxfam Novib played a leading role in the design of both campaigns under evaluation. Oxfam Great Britain and Oxfam America have been playing leading roles in these campaigns, followed by other affiliates that contributed during campaign launches and spikes. As a part of the land grab campaign, a case study was done in Mozambique, where Oxfam, together with Oxfam in Brazil and Oxfam Japan, are trying to influence an agribusiness development programme to be implemented by the governments of the three above-mentioned countries. A case study in Pakistan was cancelled because the office decided to contribute to other parts of the GROW campaign.

### *3.2.5 Budgets*

As to budgets available for the different programmes for the 2011–2015 period: The programme under evaluation implemented by the FGG Alliance is in total €3,029,952. For Hivos (People Unlimited 4.1), the total budget of the two programmes under evaluation is €1,528,489. For the EA, the budget for the programme under evaluation is more difficult to establish: 23% of the total budget of €39,736,957 is allocated for the international component. The estimation is that some 75% of this international component, or €6.8 million, is within the scope of the evaluation.

For the Oxfam Novib programme under evaluation, the MFS II budget mentioned in NWO-WOTRO's call for proposals (€23,400,000) is available for the GROW campaign and for other activities that contribute towards achieving economic justice. It is, however, impossible to allocate the budget to the five GROW campaign objectives, in particular those related to the land grab and Behind the Brands campaigns. Apart from Dutch funding, both campaigns also received funding through the other Oxfam affiliates.

### *3.2.6 Thematic issues covered by the alliances*

In terms of the thematic cluster that clubs together these four alliances, we observe that the programmes are very distinct with only a limited overlap. The right to sustainable livelihoods for local communities is being addressed by means of advocating changes in trade and investment agreements and biofuel policies to ensure they do less harm to local communities' livelihoods and their environment (FGG); by securing ecosystems for local communities and influencing social and environmental standards roundtables (EA); by increasing local communities' access to sustainable energy sources (Hivos); by securing access to land rights (Oxfam, FGG) and by mainstreaming gender in supply chains (Oxfam). FGG, the EA and Hivos all have addressed policy issues related to climate change and adaptation, with a particular focus on the palm oil sector in Indonesia and Africa. (However, for FGG themselves, the relation is with biofuels and land rights, not with climate change and adaptation). Most lobby and advocacy interventions targeted national governments, the EU (as an umbrella organisation of national governments) and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank Group and the UNFCCC. Apart from targeting public sector actors, the EA and Oxfam have also explicitly targeted private sector organisations and private sector initiatives such as the roundtables. In addition, one of Hivos' campaigns directly aims at changes in one economic sector: data centres in

the Netherlands. Furthermore, FGG targeted investors and to a limited extent private sector companies that are within the scope of this evaluation. Beyond the scope of this evaluation, it also develops more activities targeting the private sector, as well as activities on land governance.

This evaluation only focuses on parts of the programmes developed by the four alliances. Sometimes different alliances have worked towards the same outcomes. Most issues under evaluation can be categorised as follows:

- Land, land grab and, related with these issues, biofuels and biomass.
- Climate change—always aiming also at other changes such as sustainable livelihoods or development, wherein the CSOs focus on specific aspects like sustainable energy and REDD+.
- Trade and Investment—sector-specific and at the level of trade policies and investment treaties.
- Mainstreaming themes such as gender and land in the supply chains of the biggest food and beverage companies.





## 4 Impact Alliance

### 4.1 Introduction

This assessment looks at two campaigns, the land grab campaign and the Behind the Brands campaign, that are part of the GROW campaign (2011–2015) implemented by Oxfam Novib together with the Oxfam Confederation in more than 90 countries. The GROW campaign aims at creating a better future where everyone has enough to eat. Five operational objectives were formulated for the 2011–2015 period: 1) help grow movements to build a better future where everyone always has enough to eat; 2) stop land and water grabs by powerful corporations and countries, which seize the land and water that women and men living in poverty depend upon for their food; 3) win a global deal on climate change that stops excessive greenhouse gas emissions from devastating access to and production of food by people living in poverty; 4) invest in the productivity, resilience and sustainability of small-scale food producers, particularly women, who produce much of the world's food and 5) respond to global food price crises and provide a fast and fair response.

The first campaign that is being looked at is the land grab campaign, which aims to stop land grabbing, and the second is the Behind the Brands (BtB) campaign that targets the food and beverage sector. Like the land grab campaign, the BtB campaign is subdivided into public campaign spikes, and this evaluation assesses two spikes specifically, one on women in the cocoa sector and the second on land grab.

Oxfam uses the land grabbing definition as formulated in the Tirana Declaration by the International Land Coalition as a reference for its campaign.<sup>44,45</sup> Important elements in this definition are the recognition of land rights as a human right for men and women and the acknowledgement that land rights not only comprise individual land rights but also user and access rights, including collective rights, as formulated in formal laws and customary law. Important elements and principles that, according to Oxfam, prevent land grabbing from taking place are included in the adherence to the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for all affected communities, not only for indigenous people. This includes thorough impact assessments (prior to land acquisition), the full disclosure of land deal contracts and the acceptance of full-chain responsibility by investors and buyers of land. At the same time, developing countries should enhance their capacities to ensure good governance of land and tenure rights.

#### 4.1.1 *Changes in the context*

The term 'land grab' was first used by GRAIN<sup>46</sup> when it drew attention to the phenomena of non-transparent land deals between wealthier food-insecure nations and investors on the one side, with mostly poor, developing countries on the other side, as a strategy to produce crops and extract minerals for export. Since 2000, 1000 land deals representing 37.5 million hectares of land have been concluded, according to Land Matrix.<sup>47</sup> However, many large-scale land acquisitions are not disclosed, and therefore exact figures are not available. Most land acquisitions take place in countries with weak land governance or tenure arrangements and with poor respect of human rights and where local populations depend upon land for their social, economic and spiritual livelihoods. Most known deals are being concluded on the African continent.<sup>48</sup>

- In 2011–2014, land grabbing received increasing attention on the *agenda* of international fora, and in many places it has become a shared concern that better land governance and tenure arrangements are needed. A number of stakeholders, including several donor governments, UNHABITAT, the International Land Coalition (ILC), Oxfam, Rights and Resources Institute and others, are currently calling for the integration of land rights into the Sustainable Development Goals beyond 2015.<sup>49,50,51</sup> In this same period, the focus seems to have broadened from discussing only land grabbing into respecting the land and natural resource rights of local communities.
- In terms of policies, a major milestone was the endorsement of the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (VGGT) by the UN Committee on World Food Security (UN CFS) in May 2012. This was the first global normative instrument on land governance ever to be adopted. In October 2014, the same committee endorsed the Principles on Responsible Investments in Agriculture (PRIA), which now includes a principle on the respect of tenure of land, fisheries, forests and water. These are the result of negotiations between private sector organisations, civil society and national governments. While it is too soon to tell what role the PRIA will play, the VGGT are setting the global standard for many other fora where land is an issue.
- In terms of changing practices, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has started to assist development countries with the promotion and the implementation of the VGGT.<sup>52</sup> The FAO and the African Union (AU) will, for example, join forces to improve the governance of tenure in line with the VGGT and the African Land Policy Frameworks and Guidelines.<sup>53</sup> These African Frameworks and Guidelines were already endorsed by the Heads of States and the government of the African Union in 2009 and are currently being mainstreamed into the programmes of regional African organisations. The ILC compared both guidelines and identified 12 common messages that help to integrate both frameworks in land reform processes in Africa.<sup>54</sup> Meanwhile, the World Bank (WB) has used its Land Governance Assessment Framework to support countries in the strengthening of their land governance and tenure system; the WB has published some 50 assessments.
- In 2013, a new Global Donor Working Group on Land was created, comprising the already existing EU Working Group on Land, as well as the FAO, JICA, IFAD, MCC, USAID, CIDA, UNHABITAT, WB and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Most important interventions aim to operationalise the VGGT. This intention was again reinforced when the G8, under the UK Presidency, launched a 'Land Transparency Initiative' in 2013. All of these initiatives at the same time mobilise resources to implement the VGGT.
- All of these changes clearly show that governments, multilateral institutions and the private sector are taking the risks of large-scale land acquisitions more seriously than before 2011 and that concrete steps are being taken to address land grabbing.

#### 4.1.2 *Changes in the Alliance*

The GROW campaign is being implemented by the Oxfam International Confederation (OI) that has affiliates in 17 countries and works in more than 90 countries. Oxfam Novib (ON) is one of the 17 affiliates and is part of the IMPACT Alliance that became eligible for MFS II funding in 2010. IMPACT Alliance partners are SOMO, the 1%Club, Butterfly Works and Himilo Relief and Development Association. Apart from SOMO, which plays a minor role in the GROW campaign, the other three partners are not involved in this campaign but are involved in other interventions of the MFS II programme.

GROW is managed by the Oxfam International Campaign Management Team. Since its campaign structure was designed in 2011, it has changed in line with the nature of the campaigns and lessons learned: Apart from adjusting its structure to the functions, it has become lighter so as to enable smaller country offices and Oxfam affiliates to fully participate in the implementation and management of the campaign and to ensure a stronger representation of African, Latin American and Asian country offices. Staff regularly change roles and functions within the campaign structure to reflect changing priorities and staffing needs. A substantial part of the staff, however, has worked together intensively in past international campaigns. This is valid in particular for ON and Oxfam Great Britain (OGB), followed by Oxfam America (OA), which together play the most prominent roles in the global GROW campaign in terms of staffing and funding. ON has played a central role in designing the land grab campaign and the BtB campaign and is also heavily involved in and leading their implementation on behalf of Oxfam International.

Oxfam changed its internal monitoring and learning system for the GROW campaign as of January 2013 as a consequence of the availability of staff capacity and the time-consuming quarterly reporting system in place until then. Previously, quarterly and consolidated progress reports provided an overview of all GROW interventions and outcomes achieved at national, regional and international level.

#### *4.1.3 Changes in the focus of the evaluation*

Originally, this assessment meant to assess the global land grab campaign and the BtB campaign, which comprises the land grab campaign launch in October 2011, Oxfam's work on the UN CFS and its land freeze campaign; ON's interventions in the Netherlands; the ON field offices in Pakistan and Mozambique and Oxfam Brazil, which receives ON funding. Because of time limitations, no assessment has been done of Oxfam Brazil or of outcomes achieved at in-country level. This evaluation does, however, look at the ways in which land grab case studies from Brazil featured in the BtB campaign. During the baseline study, the evaluator was not able to work with Oxfam's most important Pakistani partner on land issues, SCOPE. Possibilities to include Pakistan in the BtB evaluation were again dropped when Oxfam decided not to continue this campaign. The baseline study of Mozambique did not fulfil the terms of reference, and a decision made in 2013 to focus on a case for the BtB campaign had to be revised when Oxfam decided not to take this case forward. The country office is now focusing on a tripartite arrangement between the governments of Japan, Brazil and Mozambique to invest in an agribusiness scheme called the ProSavana programme, which is now part of the unit of analysis of this evaluation. Oxfam colleagues and partners in the three countries have joined efforts to ensure the land rights of local communities are respected.

##### *4.1.3.1 Case selection and the role of the cases in the report*

As mentioned above, since the baseline, in collaboration with Oxfam, efforts have been made to select two countries in which Oxfam is working with partner organisations to implement parts of the land grab campaign and/or the Behind the Brands campaign. Selection criteria used were the willingness of the Oxfam office to take part in the evaluation and security issues for Oxfam partners and their office. At that moment, Pakistan and Mozambique were selected because in both countries ON was preparing contributions to at least one of the campaigns. The objective of the case studies was to obtain further insights about the integration of a 'Southern' perspective in both campaigns, in terms of contributions made to the international campaign and relevance. In 2012, as mentioned above, the evaluator was not able to work with SCOPE, the most important partner on land issues for ON at that moment. Instead, he worked with another ON partner that, however, was not directly linked to the campaigns. At that moment, plans in Mozambique to align with the land grab and the

BtB campaigns were only starting. Although both countries had plans to contribute to the BtB campaign by documenting land grab cases, further research by ON led to the non-continuation of these cases. Whilst pursuing the aim to include a Southern perspective, including Southern partners, a decision was made to use an online questionnaire to obtain information regarding relevance of three important changes made, as well as regarding coordination issues. Apart from this, a consultant was hired to conduct a case study in Mozambique to assess collaboration between Oxfam Mozambique and Mozambican civil society, and between Oxfam Mozambique, Brazil and Japan to prevent land grabbing from taking place within the framework of the tripartite agribusiness ProSavana programme. It proved, however, to be too ambitious to assess the tripartite collaboration in relation to the evaluation resources available. The assessment does, however, provide insights into the relations between Mozambican civil society and Oxfam Mozambique. This collaboration fits into the land grab campaign, because it addresses large-scale land acquisitions by Brazil in Mozambique. Evaluation findings are, however, limited.

#### 4.1.3.2 Data sources and analysis

For the assessment of both campaigns, diverse methods for data collection were used. These are presented here for each evaluation question.

With regard to changes, the evaluator made a first inventory of outcomes claimed by Oxfam based upon written information made available by Oxfam and completed with publically available information. After this, evidence was collected for both the outcomes achieved and the contributions made by Oxfam, based upon both public and confidential written information. Completed with a first description of the relevance of the outcome, the document was sent to the ON teams for the land grab and the Behind the Brands campaign for comments and further completion, followed by an interview in July 2014 with the evaluation team to confirm the findings in the document, to complete the list of outcomes and to seek further evidence of contribution and relevance. When necessary, the ON team consulted with other Oxfam members of the campaign team by e-mail. The findings of this approach are presented in the annex, presenting the outcomes and their relevance and including a quick contribution analysis for each outcome. This approach considerably decreased ON's time needed to write down outcomes, their contribution and relevance.

The same interview was also used to reflect with the teams on outcomes achieved versus outcomes planned, in particular for those related to the land grab campaign. Classifying the outcomes achieved into the priority result areas and standard indicator categories was done by the evaluator. With this approach, we have been able to answer the questions in the evaluation methodology related to the changes to which the Alliance claims to have contributed, their relation to the three priority result areas and their relation with the ToC in terms of progress being made.

With regard to the contribution question, during the same interviews with the ON teams, the selection of outcomes to be included for a full contribution analysis were discussed, followed by a reflection on the pathways of change that explain the outcomes achieved. With regard to the land grab campaign, two outcomes that reflect changes in policies and practices of the International Finance Cooperation were selected because they were recent outcomes achieved and had not yet been evaluated by a mid-point evaluation commissioned by Oxfam to assess the GROW campaign, including the last land grab campaign spike targeting the World Bank Group. The suggestion to assess an outcome related to the World Bank's revision of the Environmental and Social Safeguards was rejected because the change was too preliminary and because a contribution analysis would hardly be possible, given the fact that the first WB consultation round already involved more than 2,000 persons from 40 countries and during which 81 position papers were submitted with 1,257 signatory

organisations.<sup>55</sup> With regard to the BtB campaign, instead of assessing the contribution to one outcome achieved with one food and beverage company that committed to zero tolerance for land grabbing in its supply chain, all outcomes achieved with food and beverage companies were taken into account as a means to test the pathways of change and underlying assumptions in the ToC.

After the selection of outcome (packages), interviews were conducted with external resource persons, and documents were consulted to identify rival pathways that explain the outcome and to collect additional information. The last phase of data collection for this evaluation question comprised interviews with both Oxfam staff and external resource persons, as well as Internet searches to complete information to confirm or reject pathways. Key elements taken into account to increase the plausibility of contributions beyond listing interventions consisted of looking at patterns between interventions and outcomes; the sequence of interventions leading to outcomes; confirming or rejecting that interventions took place; and the extent to which lobby targets adhered to key messages of the Oxfam campaign.

An MSc student did an internship with CDI to assess Oxfam's use of social media during the BtB campaign, gaining insights that were used to assess the contribution of these to the achievement of the outcomes, in particular those related to the first BtB campaign spike on women and cocoa. Together with the quick contribution analysis of the other outcomes, as mentioned above, a rather complete overview has been obtained of all contributions made by Oxfam, answering the questions in the evaluation methodology that search for causal explanations for the changes achieved, a plausible relation between the interventions of Oxfam and these explanations. A question regarding inter-organisational interactions that explain the outcome has been dealt with whilst answering the efficiency question below.

With regard to the relevance of the changes achieved, in the first place, a general overview was made as described above when changes achieved were identified, assessing the relevance of changes in the wider ToC of the campaigns. The information sources used for this general overview are a combination of information obtained from ON and the evaluators' assessment. However, an additional online questionnaire was administered to obtain the opinions of staff working in the headquarters of the Oxfam affiliates, staff working in country offices and Oxfam partners about the relevance of three selected outcomes for their own work and their own country. Ten of the 19 respondents invited sent in their answers, four of which represent the outsider view of partners Oxfam is working with in Indonesia, Mozambique, Pakistan and on the African continent. These answers provide insight into for whom and where these outcomes are relevant. The online questionnaire became an option when field work in Pakistan as a case study became irrelevant because of changing plans within the BtB campaign.

Information collected in relation to the efficiency question has in the first place been collected through interviews with ON staff following the three questions. When this information was insufficient to answer the three questions formulated in the evaluation methodology, ON consulted with more members of the campaign teams from other Oxfam affiliates to complete the missing information by mail. No written information was made available. The online questionnaire used to obtain information on relevance also contained information regarding coordination issues within the Oxfam confederation and helped to get a more nuanced idea about efficiency, but substantiation of these findings is still limited. The findings answer the questions in the evaluation methodology: the theory of efficiency of the campaigns, how it works in practice and how the Alliance is improving its efficiency.

The evaluation question regarding explanatory factors was mainly answered without collecting additional information but was based upon the analysis of all information already available. The most important factors that we looked at are internal factors within Oxfam that explain the findings, external factors and the interface.

#### 4.1.3.3 Sources consulted

This assessment has used the following data sources:

- Oxfam made available documents that described strategic plans and the internal evaluations of different campaign strands and spikes. Oxfam provided evidence of meeting dynamics with food and beverage companies (FBCs) and with investors that helped to assess Oxfam's direct lobby activities for the BtB campaign. Such information was hardly made available for the land grab campaign, because Oxfam considered these too sensitive to share with the consultant.
- Information found on the Internet completed the evidence of outcomes achieved as well as contributions made. Some 190 sources were used for this purpose, of which 26 originate from Oxfam.
- Interviews with 21 respondents of Oxfam offices and 40 external resource persons provided more detailed information on outcomes achieved, for the contribution analysis and the relevance of the outcomes achieved. These interviews include those held during the baseline study. Unfortunately, World Bank staff working with Oxfam did not agree to an interview, because some of the land grab cases described by Oxfam are still being monitored by the Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman of the International Finance Corporation (CAO-IFC) to ensure that decisions are being correctly implemented by the IFC. A number of interviews were conducted face to face, but the majority of interviews was held by Skype. Most interviews were recorded and transcribed.
- An online questionnaire was used to obtain the opinions of staff working in the headquarters of the Oxfam affiliates, staff working in country offices and Oxfam partners about the relevance of selected outcomes achieved for their own work, as well as to obtain information regarding the coordination of the GROW campaign. Ten of the 19 respondents invited sent in their answers, amongst which were four responses from partner organisations with which Oxfam is working.
- A consultant worked on the Mozambican ProSavana case study and interviewed nine resource persons in person. Additional data were gathered through the Internet.
- An MSc student did an internship and assessed the role of the social media used during the first spike of the BtB campaign on women and cocoa.

#### 4.1.3.4 Limitations

Triangulation:

Generally speaking, most information obtained from either respondents or written information was triangulated with other information sources to the extent possible. Triangulation occurred between information provided by ON and other Oxfam affiliates, and between Oxfam and external information sources. Triangulation has been most obvious for answering the evaluation questions on changes and contribution, however the following observations need to be taken into account:

- The contribution analysis for the land grab campaign mostly relied upon external resources (respondents and written materials) rather than inside information from Oxfam. Interviews with external respondents, mainly representing civil society organisations, provided a

consistent contribution story, but as mentioned, it was not possible to include the perceptions and opinion of different actors from the WBG. Additional information provided by them, as well as more inside information from Oxfam might have enriched the contribution story.

- The contribution analysis for the BtB campaign on the contrary, relied to a great extent upon internal documents from Oxfam, with triangulation of information from different Oxfam staff, NGOs, private sector experts and roundtables. However, more information coming from Food and Beverage Companies themselves might possibly have enriched the contribution analysis. The evaluation team however also decided to abstain from interviewing lobby targets themselves, which in itself would increase the risk of obtaining biased information.

Triangulation of information for the relevance and the efficiency question is less obvious, but the online questionnaire helped to obtain some more in-depth information from other Oxfam affiliates, Oxfam offices and their partners, which helped to increase the reliability of findings. Some external resources such as a mid-point evaluation team also helped to check findings.

#### Possible biases:

The outcomes achieved only comprise positive outcomes, intended or unintended, and no traces were found within Oxfam documents of negative outcomes that required additional action.

Biases with regard to contribution were as much as possible limited by using the motto:

“the more likely Oxfam is explaining the outcome, the harder you have to find rival pathways contesting this” (inspired by Bayesian logic).

#### Other limitations:

Not all outcomes seem appropriate as a starting point for a contribution analysis. One example already given is the influence Oxfam has exerted during the first global consultation round regarding the WBG Environmental and Social Safeguards. Too many stakeholders have been involved in these consultations, of which an unknown number may have explicitly addressed land governance issues during consultations at different places. Assessing contribution on this occasion might have started with a social network analysis of those 2000 persons attending the consultations in 40 different countries in order to map networks that are typically addressing land issues and how these relate the Oxfam network as a means to identify rival pathways.

A similar approach might be worthwhile attempting when assessing Oxfam’s contribution towards the adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines in May 2012. Oxfam supported the Civil Society Mechanism that is an official body to the UN Committee on Food Security and that represents 11 different constituents (farmers, fisherfolk, landless, etc.) all around the world. Apart from this, Oxfam applied another strategy, that of influencing national governments on land issues, who in turn were in the position to adopt the Voluntary Guidelines.

These examples are beyond the scope of this evaluation.

## **4.2 Evaluation questions 1 and 3: Changes and relevance**

This section presents the original Theory of Change (ToC) of the land grab campaign, as well as that of the BtB campaign. There is a partial overlap between both campaigns, because one of the campaign spikes of the BtB campaign looks at large-scale land acquisitions in the supply chains of the 10 biggest FBCs in the world, based upon their global overall revenue and their position in the Forbes 2000 annual ranking.<sup>56</sup> Other themes addressed by BtB do not overlap with the land grab campaign.



After the description of the ToCs in 5.2.1, this section continues with an overview of the most important outcomes achieved by both campaigns.

#### 4.2.1 *Theories of change for the land grab campaign and Behind the Brands*

##### 4.2.1.1 How Oxfam works with Theories of Change

Oxfam drafts strategies, which include ToCs, for all its campaign work, be it for global campaigns, for separate campaign strands, for campaigns in Oxfam countries and the like. ToCs represent the general orientation of the campaign in a visual manner, comprising loose relations between outcomes and main strategies, including a description of assumptions and a narrative.

At the start of MFS II, ON and the Oxfam Confederation prepared an operational plan for the GROW campaign covering the 2011–2013 period.<sup>57</sup> A ToC for the entire campaign was elaborated to provide strategic direction, which was reconfirmed in its next operational plan for 2013–2015.<sup>58</sup> The GROW campaign ToC has been approved by the Economic Justice Campaign Management Team. The visual representation of the ToC for the land grab campaign in this report was constructed during a meeting with ON in 2012 and follows the detailed description of the land grab campaign in the operational plan, which presents outcomes, intermediate outcomes and strategies. The operationalisation of the ToC mainly occurred by means of the development of campaign strands at global, national and regional level. Where appropriate, Oxfam developed for each campaign strand a separate ToC as a means to orient the campaign teams. One example of such a ToC is that of the landfreeze campaign, which has been visualised in Figure 5.3 as one of the pathways to explain Oxfam’s contribution to changes in policies and practices of the International Finance Corporation. ToCs that provide further guidance during the implementation of the GROW campaign also require a sign-off by the Economic Justice Campaign Management Team for Oxfam Confederation-wide campaign strands.

In the 2011–2013 operational plan, the Food Justice Index was part of the GROW campaign and partially integrated into the land grab campaign. The Food Justice Index further evolved into the Behind the Brands campaign. ToCs for this campaign changed during the design of the campaign but not after the campaign was launched. The ToC of the last version is represented in this section and was signed off by the Economic Justice Campaign Management Team.

Generally speaking, we observe that Oxfam’s ToCs for GROW and for the landgrab and the BtB campaigns have not changed during implementation. They are reviewed at regular intervals, but they remained valid, so they have not changed but serve to provide strategic guidance and are reviewed by strategic decision makers periodically. This also applies for ToCs for campaign strands. The teams implementing the campaigns use these ToCs to guide their interventions and operations, as well as to monitor progress towards outcomes. Campaign teams are flexible in deciding about the right mix of actions to implement towards achieving these outcomes.

##### 4.2.1.2 The land grab campaign

The original ToC for the entire land grab campaign, which already included parts of the BtB campaign related to land issues, is as follows:

1. Policy changes and their implementation in developing countries strengthen the land and natural resource rights of women and other small-scale food producers. This will happen if:
  - changes in regulation and legislation in seven developing countries take place that strengthen land policies for women and men;
  - strong regional land policy frameworks and guidelines inform the design and implementation of national processes and

- the UN CFS adopts strong Guidelines on Land and Natural Resources Tenure (VG) that inform national policies.
2. Companies and investors adopt responsible investment policies and practices in relation to irresponsible large-scale land acquisitions. This will happen if:
    - those who are directly or indirectly involved in land grabs are investigated and named where appropriate;
    - institutions and norms that influence companies' and investors' behaviour are held to high standards in relation to land and natural resources and
    - a number of commodity chains adopt responsible investment policies and practices in relation to land.
  3. Some of the world's most powerful FBCs engage in a 'race to the top' to improve sustainable agricultural sourcing policies and practices. This will happen if:
    - empowered publics pressure FBCs in a more 'GROW' way and
    - FBCs, investors, retailers and progressive business groups improve their policies and practices to add to the pressure for positive change coming from the public.

At the time (2011), the third objective was still in the design process and was internally referred to as the Food Justice Index. Later, this was internally referred to as the Food Company Campaign and was finally made public as the BtB campaign.

4. Within this ToC, Oxfam affiliates on behalf of Oxfam International and country offices developed and implemented different campaign strands over time. The most important campaign strands at the international level were the following:
  - The global land grab launch, which started in September 2011.<sup>59</sup> Its primary objective was to profile land grab as a major global issue in which a complex web of interrelated actors are (unwittingly) complicit. Its aim was to achieve redress for the communities affected by land grabs and to work towards global systemic change by researching and publishing four to five cases that highlight how interrelated actors (public, private, international), policies, rules and regulations facilitate land grab.
  - The campaign strand targeting the UN CFS, which aimed at building a global movement for a new agricultural and ecological future and an accountable global governance mechanism in which the UN CFS takes the lead. The main focus on land issues was that of having strong Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (VGGTs). A second objective was that of strengthening the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM) in such a way that it would be capable of addressing other GROW campaign themes at the UN CFS and to ensure that this mechanism and the UN CFS organise outreach at regional and national level.
  - The campaign strand targeting the World Bank Group (WBG), calling for a freeze of its involvement in large-scale land acquisitions, was launched in October 2012.<sup>60</sup>
  - The BtB campaign that was launched in February 2013, and that has had a particular strand on land grabbing by large FBCs and investors since October 2013.<sup>61</sup>
5. Oxfam International affiliates support these campaign strands in different ways: Either they implement part of the international campaign or they organise national campaigns that feed into the international campaign. Examples of these include the following:

- Lobbying the respective governments where Oxfam affiliates are settled as to ensure that their government representatives have a similar voice in the UN CFS or in the WBG Board of Directors.
  - Upon request of 'Eerlijke Bankwijzer' and financed by ON, Profundo researched the land policies of 11 Dutch banks. This research was used by ON to lobby these banks to change their policies by means of direct engagement as of October 2011, followed by a public campaign in February 2012.<sup>62</sup>
  - As part of the October 2013 international BtB land spike on land, Profundo, financed by ON, published a report highlighting the involvement of Dutch banks and pension funds in one of the land grab cases highlighted during the campaign spike.<sup>63</sup> With this action, ON managed to inform Dutch citizens about land grabbing another time as well as the Dutch government and parliament, not only by means of the report, but also by means of a national television broadcast.<sup>64</sup>
  - Other affiliates organised similar activities in their own countries.
6. Oxfam country offices are also involved in different campaign strands or implementing their own additional national campaigns in the following ways:
- Field offices raise the awareness of local organisations and their partners to form strong coalitions to address national land governance policies and practices.
  - Field offices support local communities and partners to resolve local land issues.
  - Field offices and their partners use global advocacy to solve large-scale land grab cases in terms of seeking remedy for the populations involved, changing the policies and practices of the corporates or investors involved and changing the standards of international institutions.
  - Regional campaigns.
  - South–South campaigns such as the collaboration between Oxfam Mozambique, Oxfam Japan and Oxfam Brazil to jointly address issues of large-scale land acquisition in the ProSavana Triangular Programme between Mozambique, Japan and Brazil.

Campaign strands and their content have developed over time, taking into account outcomes achieved during previous campaign strands. Therefore, these strands do not focus on one particular outcome at a time, but on different outcomes simultaneously.

Oxfam's strategies to reach these outcomes consist of research activities, direct engagement with lobby targets, building alliances with social movements that claim their rights, producing briefing papers to attract the public attention of global media and motivate global audiences to engage with the campaign through social media, using and challenging existing complaint mechanisms and influencing multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). Oxfam also envisioned the development of a Food Company Campaign Index, which later turned into the BtB scorecard.

Within the land grab campaign, the baseline study already assessed the outcomes achieved for the 2011 campaign launch, the VGGT work with the UN CFS and the Dutch banking campaign. The last campaign strand is the land freeze campaign targeting the WBG, which will be assessed in this report, together with the BtB campaign.

#### 4.2.1.3 Behind the Brands campaign

The BtB campaign is embedded in the general ToC of the land grab campaign as far as land issues are concerned. It is, however, to be considered a separate campaign for other themes. Campaign design

started in 2011 and continued until February 2013, when the campaign was launched publicly. At the heart of the campaign is a scorecard that ranks the biggest FBCs on seven themes (women, small-scale food producers, workers, land, water, climate and transparency). This scorecard is updated two times a year to both show progress and to increase pressure on FBCs to improve their scores and engage them in a race to the top on all seven themes. In addition to the scorecard, Oxfam engages directly with the 10 FBCs, their investors, NGOs and other relevant stakeholders. The 10 FBCs are PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, Mars, Kellogg, General Mills, Danone, Unilever, Nestlé, Mondeléz and Associated British Foods (ABF).

Apart from engaging with all 10 FBCs on all seven themes, three particular campaign spikes have been implemented so far (on women's position in value chains focusing on the cacao sector and women in the cocoa sector, on land issues with a particular (but not exclusive) focus on the sugar sector and on climate change mitigation). This evaluation assesses the first two campaign spikes on gender and on land. Both campaign spikes, apart from the six-month period when they receive extensive exposure to consumers, global publics and media, follow the ToC of the general campaign, which is visualised in Figure 5.1.

The BtB campaign ultimately aims to ensure that small-scale producers and their communities will have increased opportunities to enjoy greater food security, income, prosperity and resilience. Its specific outcome is achieved when at least eight of the 10 FBCs, two multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI) and two certification organisations engage more actively in the public debate and publicly commit to policies in line with Oxfam's ultimate aim.

The first pathway represents Oxfam's ToC and is visualised through the **green arrows** and **the orange ovals**. It has four lobby targets and different pathways:

1. Ten FBCs become aware of their impact on small-scale food producers, workers and rural communities in developing countries. As a consequence, they acknowledge the need to develop better policies and to become more transparent in their sourcing practices. Oxfam's most important strategy is to engage with the FBCs.
2. Global and local media are mobilised by publishing campaign materials such as the updated BtB scorecard and the briefing papers and media briefs that accompany the campaign spikes to inform the wider public about progress being made by the FBCs with regard to new commitments made. Media will put the 10 FBCs in the spotlight and under pressure.
3. Global publics hold the FBCs to account (including via social media actions and offline stunts) and put public pressure on them for better policies and practices. Oxfam therefore uses similar information as that being developed for the media and develops both online and offline stunts that mobilise consumers to engage with the campaign. These actions target the brands of the FBCs. Oxfam uses these brands as a means to stimulate peer competition between brands (and ultimately between the companies).
4. Allies (NGOs, investors groups, friendly contacts of the 10 FBCs, shareholders) work with Oxfam to increase the pressure on the 10 FBCs and other key private sector actors (at least two MSIs and two certification organisations). Oxfam therefore engages directly (and sometimes co-strategizes) with these actors, works with them to develop public campaign activities and provides information on the BtB scorecard, campaign materials and approach.

The second pathway is that other NGOs, the sector itself and MSIs that work closely with the FBCs already address these issues before or during the BtB campaign. As a result of this, the FBCs change their policies and practices. This is visualised by the **dark blue oval** and the **blue arrow**.

This ToC contains several assumptions: 1) that FBCs are brand competitive and are in competition with each other to obtain better scores (race to the top), 2) that policy changes that are made public by the FBCs lead to changing practices, 3) that transparency and disclosure of information on the FBC’s policies, their suppliers and their sourcing countries provide opportunities to other actors to take action, 4) that FBCs are sensitive to consumer pressure and 5) that consumers care about the products that they buy.




Figure 4.1 ToC of the BtB Campaign

4.2.2 Changes achieved

This section briefly describes the outcomes realised to which Oxfam’s land grab campaign and its BtB campaign have contributed in general. For both campaigns, the outcomes are organised according to the priority research areas: agenda setting, policy influencing and changing practice.

Uniform indicators (UI) were formulated for each of the priority result areas. These are presented in Table 4.1.

<b>Table 4.1 Uniform indicators per priority result area</b>
<p>Agenda Setting</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Within the programme, the relevant members of an alliance determine, share and keep up to date their policy positions and strategies. UI 1.1</li> <li>- Alliance and other actors become aware of the issues at stake, organise themselves and adhere to the position of the ILA programme. UI 1.2</li> <li>- Extent to which lobby/advocacy targets react upon the positions taken by the ILA programme. UI 1.3</li> <li>- Relevant NGOs and/or other stakeholders involved in the programme are invited to participate in meetings (or organise meetings) relevant for the issue(s) by lobby/advocacy targets on public/private sector policies or those of international institutions. UI 1.4</li> <li>- The terms of public debate are influenced: New civil society perspectives and alternative approaches are introduced into the policy debate. UI 1.5</li> </ul>
<p>Policy Influencing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Demonstrable changes (or prevention of policy changes, including adoption of new policies) take place by lobby/advocacy targets. UI 2.1</li> <li>- Demonstrable shift in accountability structure for government and private sector. UI 2.2</li> </ul>
<p>Changing Practice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Concrete changes in practices of lobby targets as to policy formulation. UI 3.1</li> <li>- Concrete changes in practices of governments, institutes and/or targeted companies as to implementation of policies (changing practices) in the 'field'. UI 3.2</li> </ul>

The following sections will present the outcomes achieved according to these uniform indicators for the land grab campaign, the BtB women and cocoa spike and the BtB land and sugar spike. This presentation is in line with the requirements of the terms of reference of NWO-WOTRO. After this presentation, the outcomes of the land grab campaign and those of the BtB land and sugar spike will be presented in light of the ToC.

#### 4.2.2.1 Land grab campaign

The outcomes listed below do not provide the entire picture of changes achieved through the land grab campaign.

In the first place, no comprehensive overview is available of outcomes achieved with regard to national land policies and governance in the 90 countries where Oxfam works (policy influencing), nor of outcomes achieved that relate to the concrete resolution of conflicts between companies and local communities (changing practice). O'Neil and Goldschmid<sup>65</sup> conclude, based upon document review, that 'Policy changes on land rights at the national and regional levels were less prevalent with advances reported in the African Union, the Philippines, the Netherlands and Vietnam, although this evaluation could not assess the extent of Oxfam's influence in these countries/regions. Instances were also reported where Oxfam was directly involved in tackling land or water grab cases. For example, in South Sudan, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh and Guatemala...' Oxfam's monitoring, evaluation and learning system does not enable the compilation of such a comprehensive review, and this is also to be explained by the decentralised operation procedures for the GROW campaign at the affiliate level.

In the second place, the outcomes achieved do not yet include those of the BtB spike on land issues, which, as will be seen below, contributed considerably to the second objective of the land grab campaign: Companies and investors adopt responsible investment policies and practices in relation to irresponsible large-scale land acquisitions.

**Table 4.2 Outcomes achieved: land grab campaign****Agenda setting**

- As a result of the launch of the land grab campaign, a wider audience has been reached at the global level to stop land grabbing (numbers as yet unknown), and the 'Land and Power' report is being circulated and referred to in at least the High Level Panel of Experts of the UN CFS, the World Bank and the RSPO, and is quoted and covered by renowned news agencies such as BBC World Service, BBC World TV, Voice of America, CNN Spanish, Canada Broadcasting Corporation, Al Jazeera, the Wall Street Journal, Brazil's O Valor, France's Le Monde and The Australian. Oxfam's land 'teaser video', 'Glen, Gary & Ross', picked up 10,000+ views on OI and OGB channels. (UI 1.2)
- In October 2012, the Dutch government discussed the WBG's role in land grabbing with Vice President Rachel Kyte: the Dutch government understands Oxfam's concerns but agrees with the WBG that not all 21 large-scale acquisitions are to be classified as land grabs.<sup>66</sup> This is later followed by a debate in parliament.<sup>67</sup> (UI 1.2)
- In October 2012, at the launch of the land freeze campaign, the WBG reacted two times publicly by stating that it shared Oxfam's concerns but would not agree with a land freeze.<sup>68,69,70</sup> (UI 1.3)
- The WBG reacted to several social media campaigns in the October 2012–April 2013 (video with music by Coldplay and 600 tweets to stop land grabbing);<sup>71</sup> online petitioning with 50,000 signatures/200,000 expected that did not lead to a reaction. (UI 1.3)
- The Civil Society Mechanism (CSM), an official structure within the UN CFS, was very effective in the negotiation process and managed to improve the VGGT significantly. It is the largest international mechanism of civil society organisations in the world, and since its official recognition, governments' attitudes have changed tremendously in that they started to respect the technical expertise of civil society.<sup>72,73</sup> Oxfam is one of the many actors that were involved in the CSM. (UI 1.4)
- Land continues to be on the agenda of the WBG since July 2012 (before the land freeze campaign publicly began), and after the public campaign of October 2012, only becomes public when needed. Several public statements were made by the WBG. (UI 1.4)
- The UN CFS is now being recognised as a global governance mechanism on land and natural resources and starts working on responsible agricultural investments, monitoring and resilience in the coming two years. It has become a more important platform to discuss agricultural investments and land tenure issues than an earlier non-inclusive process on Principles of Responsible Agriculture Investment (PRAI) initiated by the WB, IFAD, UNCTAD and FAO. Oxfam is one of the many NGOs and CSOs involved in the process. (UI 1.5)
- In April 2013, before the annual Land and Poverty Conference, the WBG publicly stated that land access for poor people is critical, endorsed the UN CFS VGGT to inform the safeguards review, highlighted the importance of strengthening the capacities of national governments for improved land governance and committed to making basic information about land transfers public.<sup>74</sup> (UI 1.5)
- The WB draft version of the safeguards contains two specific safeguards (ESS1 and ESS5) with regard to land acquisition and tenure and involuntary resettlement.<sup>75</sup> (UI 1.5)

**Policy influencing**

- The Voluntary Guidelines have been adopted and include the recognition of a wide variety of different types of land tenure and reaffirm the importance of human rights in relation to the governance of land tenure. They also include the principle of free, prior and informed consent (for indigenous communities) and use quite progressive language on consultation for non-indigenous peoples, equal access for women and men to land, fisheries and forests. Oxfam has been one of the many contributors of these guidelines. (UI 2.1)
- The Dutch government publicly committed itself to work towards the adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines and to comply with these when Dutch-based multinationals breach these guidelines, in particular for those that receive public support for private sector work (FMO, IDH, etc.).<sup>76,77</sup> (UI 2.1)
- In 2012, three out of 11 Dutch banks targeted by the campaign 'Eerlijke Bankwijzer' changed their policies with regard to land issues: Delta Lloyd,<sup>78</sup> SNS Asset Management,<sup>79,80</sup> ACTIAM<sup>81</sup> and ABN AMRO.<sup>82</sup> AEGON followed when it was again targeted during the BtB campaign in October 2013. (UI 2.1)
- In the period September 2013–September 2014, the IFC has introduced new regulations and practices with regard to lending through financial intermediaries (FIs). More changes are yet to come in the coming months.<sup>83,84,85,86</sup> (UI 2.1)
- In the period January–April 2014, the IFC's policies and intentions with regard to large-scale land acquisitions funded by the IFC changed in a number of ways.<sup>87</sup> (UI 2.1)
- By the end of 2012, the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation had begun to play a more prominent role in addressing land issues both in the Netherlands and outside. Land grab issues are more frequently discussed in the Dutch parliament since 2013, including a hearing organised in February 2013 that also involved the WB. In 2014, the Minister launched a land governance Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue to strengthen land governance in countries where Dutch actors are intervening. Oxfam participated in lobbying the Minister, together with ActionAid, Both Ends, ICCO, Milieudefensie and NCIV.<sup>88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95</sup> (UI 2.2)

#### Changing practice

- A land grab case is under mediation with the grievance mechanism at the RSPO and to date 10 of the '14 demands' are resolved and the remaining demands are mainly related to land matters, which involve local government/authorities and are beyond the company's jurisdiction.<sup>96,97</sup> (UI 3.2)
- A land grab case in Honduras, including human rights violations, is about to be solved. The IFC had to revise its management response to the CAO-IFC audit after a huge outcry from civil society. It currently implements its Consultation Draft Enhanced Action Plan,<sup>98</sup> and the Action Plan is regularly revised based on Oxfam's advice. (UI 3.2)
- A land grab case in South Sudan was solved by the local communities themselves in August 2011, and before it was published in Oxfam's report.<sup>99,100</sup> Different actors, including Oxfam,<sup>101,102</sup> claim to have contributed to solving the case. (UI 3.2)
- A land grab case in Uganda was solved and the CAO is still monitoring progress with the implementation of the agreement between the company, which received some of its funding from the IFC, and the communities. (UI 3.2)
- A land grab case in Guatemala was solved for 140 of the 769 families concerned by the government of Guatemala.<sup>103,104</sup> Different actors, including Oxfam,<sup>105,106</sup> claim to have solved the case. (UI 3.2)

Generally speaking, the outcomes in the above table show that Oxfam has been able to put land grabbing and the need to improved land governance mechanisms on the agenda of a wide range of fora (agenda setting). Most importantly, Oxfam has contributed, with many other NGOs and civil society organisations, to the VGGTs (policy influencing), and these VGGTs are now being used by Oxfam and others to lobby other organisations, such as the WBG and the private sector. No information is available that shows how Oxfam has been using these VGGTs to influence policies of developing countries; this will probably happen in the years to come. Oxfam and other NGOs have been successful in influencing policies of the IFC of the WBG, as well as the first draft of the Environmental and Social Safeguards of the WBG that are currently under review. Particularly with regard to the IFC, the land grab case in Honduras has triggered the WBG to start changing its policies and practices. This case associated IFC investments with land grabbing and human rights violations. The Uganda case, also under mediation with the CAO since 2011, has now been resolved, improving the livelihoods of thousands of families with secure land titles.

#### 4.2.2.2 Behind the Brands Campaign

The tables below show the outcomes achieved for both the women and cocoa spike, targeting Nestlé, Mars and Mondelez publicly over February–June 2013, and the land and sugar spike, targeting Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and ABF from October 2013 until April 2014. It is important to observe that, apart from the public campaign spikes, the regular update of the BtB scorecard and direct lobbying also introduced changes on other themes, such as water, climate change, working conditions, transparency of information provided by the FBCs and farmers. These outcomes are not presented in the tables below.



<b>Table 4.3 Outcomes achieved: Behind the Brand campaign, Women and cocoa spike</b>
<p>Agenda setting</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Between 26 February and 8 March 2013, 1,237 supporters (1,000 were planned) participated in a ‘thunderclap’ telling Mars, Mondelez and Nestlé to respect women and cocoa farmers with an outreach of 1,065,000 persons.<sup>107</sup> (UI 1.2)</li> <li>• 114,000 persons signed the online petition to ask Mars, Mondelez and Nestlé to respect women and cocoa farmers. (UI 1.2)</li> <li>• 1.1 million persons viewed the general BtB website, and 350,000 persons engaged in the women and cocoa campaign by sending comments on the campaign, sharing or liking posts on Facebook or by retweeting messages. (UI 1.2)</li> </ul>
<p>Policy influencing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nestlé (March 2013), Mars (March 2013) and Mondelez (April 2013) fully committed to Oxfam’s asks.<sup>108,109,110</sup> This implies that they will conduct third-party assessments and publish the data, that they have adopted a corresponding ‘plan of action’ to address the findings of these assessments and that the three FBCs will engage with and influence other powerful public and private actors including governments and cocoa certifiers to address gender inequality. (UI 2.1)</li> <li>• Within one year (February 2013–2014), seven of the 10 FBC had changed their scores on gender (PepsiCo, General Mills and Danone did not). In addition to Nestlé, Mondelez and Mars, Coca-Cola, Kellogg, Unilever and PepsiCo subscribed to the UN Women Empowerment Principles. (UI 2.1)</li> </ul>
<p>Changing practice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nestlé, Mars and Mondelez conduct a gender impact assessment and publish a gender action plan.<sup>111,112,113</sup> (UI 3.1)</li> <li>• Mars, Mondelez and Nestlé exert influence regarding gender upon other companies and governments: They joined the World Cocoa Foundation (WCF) CocoaAction initiative that was published in May 2014 in which gender parity is one of the issues. Ten other companies adhere to this CocoaAction plan, and an agreement was signed with the government of Ivory Coast to implement the plan.<sup>114</sup> (UI 3.1)</li> </ul>

The launch of the women and cocoa spike coincided with the general campaign launch.

Table 4.3 shows that global consumers started to engage with the women and cocoa spike by signing petitions, but also shows contributions through directly targeting the FBCs, requesting them to change (agenda setting). Mars, Mondelez and Nestlé committed within two months of the launch of the campaign, and others that were not targeted also followed (policy influencing). Apart from producing their own gender action plans (that are expected to be implemented), the three FBCs all integrated gender in the CocoaAction plan of the World Cocoa Foundation (WCF) that aims to secure cocoa supplies in a sustainable manner (changing practice).

<b>Table 4.4 Outcomes achieved: Behind the Brand campaign, Land and sugar spike</b>
<p>Agenda setting</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 35 investors worth over 1.4 trillion USD published a statement in support of the BtB campaign in September 2013.<sup>115</sup> (UI 1.2)</li> <li>• 18 million followers on Twitter and Facebook of 47 NGOs (out of 90 NGOs), allies of Oxfam, have been reached in the first two months of the land and sugar spike October–November 2013. (UI 1.2)</li> <li>• A few NGOs, allies of Oxfam, have provided meaningful information to Oxfam with regard to engaging with FBCs. (UI 1.2)</li> <li>• More than 700 consumers joined a ‘thunderclap’ Twitter action targeting PepsiCo, Coca-Cola and ABF (UI 1.3)</li> <li>• Consumers sent 27,000 emails to PepsiCo in one day. (UI 1.3)</li> <li>• 150,000 consumers joined Oxfam’s movement to change the way FBCs impact people and planet in the period October 2013–February 2014. (UI 1.3)</li> <li>• Six Dutch investors all publicly reacted to the ‘Nieuwsuur’ broadcast on 2 October 2013 in which they were alleged to be associated with a land grab case in Brazil.<sup>116</sup> (UI 1.3)</li> <li>• Two Brazilian land grab cases<sup>117</sup> were brought to the attention of the Brazilian government by Oxfam as well as the Dutch government in response to the ‘Nieuwsuur’ broadcast on 2 October 2013. These remain unresolved, but substantial progress has been made. (UI 1.3)</li> </ul>

<p>Policy influencing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and Nestlé adhere to the UN CFS VGGTs. (UI 2.1)</li> <li>• Between February 2013 and February 2014, ABF, Mondelez, Kellogg and General Mills also included the principle of FPIC in their supplier codes. In total, eight of 10 FBCs improved their BtB scores for land in that period. (UI 2.1)</li> <li>• ABF's subsidiaries Illovo and Twinings improved their own codes of conduct and in particular included the principle of FPIC for all communities. (UI 2.1)</li> <li>• Coca-Cola (November 2013), PepsiCo (March 2014), Unilever (April 2014) and Nestlé (August 2014) declared zero tolerance for land grabbing in their supply chains.<sup>118,119,120,121</sup> (UI 2.2)</li> <li>• The Dutch government engaged directly with four Dutch banks and two pension funds after these were linked with a trader allegedly being involved in land grab in Brazil. The Minister also addressed the issue with the Brazilian government and the Dutch embassy and reported back to the Dutch parliament.<sup>122</sup> (UI 2.2)</li> <li>• Shareholders of PepsiCo and ABF filed resolutions together with Oxfam that led to policy changes with regard to land grabbing. (UI 2.2)</li> </ul>
<p>Changing practice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coca-Cola and PepsiCo started their independent assessments in top sourcing countries to better understand land grabbing risks in their supply chains. Coca-Cola discusses the issue with the government of Cambodia and along with PepsiCo investigates the cases in Brazil and Cambodia. (UI 3.2)</li> <li>• Coca-Cola is investigating a Cambodian land grab with which it is associated in Oxfam's briefing note with the assistance of an independent auditor hired by Coca-Cola.<sup>123</sup> (UI 3.2)</li> <li>• Coca-Cola actively participates in the Private Sector Mechanism of the UN CFS with regard to land rights.<sup>124</sup> (UI 3.2)</li> <li>• NGOs in Cambodia identified one other Cambodian land grab case in which Coca-Cola is allegedly involved when the FBC had disclosed its top three supplying countries and suppliers (Mitr Pohl, for instance, is a case where Coca-Cola is now engaging in Cambodia as a result). (UI 3.2)</li> </ul>

In comparison with the women and cocoa spike, far more global consumers have been reached during the land and sugar spike. Additionally, investors who attended webinars and meetings organised by Oxfam in the first half of 2013 began to align with Oxfam's general BtB campaign, and Dutch investors were forced to publicly react after a television broadcast declared an alleged association between these investors and land grab in Brazil (agenda setting). Eight of the 10 FBCs improved their BtB scores for land, in most cases by introducing the FPIC principle into their supplier codes. Four FBCs committed to zero tolerance for land grabbing in their supply chains (policy change), implying that they also commit to addressing these (changing practice), as can be witnessed when assessing the outcomes achieved under the heading of changing practice.

#### 4.2.2.3 Outcomes achieved in relation to objectives set

The previous overview of outcomes achieved does not reflect the reasoning behind the original ToC and objectives of the land grab campaign, which at some points achieved outcomes for agenda setting, policy influencing and changing practice with the same set of interventions. This also applies for the BtB campaign, whose ToC also does not distinguish between agenda setting, policy change and changing practice. Therefore, this section briefly highlights which outcomes have been achieved against the ToC of the land grab campaign, which also integrates the outcomes of the BtB land and sugar spike.

<b>Table 4.5 Outcomes achieved in relation to the original land grab ToC</b>	
<b>Outcomes planned</b>	<b>Outcomes achieved</b>
Policy changes and their implementation in developing countries strengthen the land and natural resource rights of women and other small-scale food producers.	The adoption of the VGGT is a major milestone that currently informs the bilateral cooperation agenda of donor countries and, as is the case in the Netherlands, helps donor countries to hold their private sector accountable for large-scale land acquisitions that do not respect these VGGTs. The Global Donor Working Group on Land (established only in 2013) states that it currently implements 554 projects in 125 countries (landgov.donorplatform.org). This is to be considered the direct effect of the adoption of the VGGTs by the UN CFS, to which Oxfam contributed with many other NGOs and civil society organisations.
Changes in regulation and legislation in seven developing countries take place that strengthen land policies for women and men.	During the campaign, at least seven land grab cases have been researched, published and (partially) solved. These are Uganda, Indonesia, Honduras, Guatemala, South Sudan, Brazil and Cambodia. These cases have, however, not resulted in changes in regulation and legislation. Oxfam is running land programmes in Vietnam, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Myanmar, the Philippines, Guatemala, Pakistan, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Paraguay, Uganda and other countries to improve land governance. The adoption of the VGGTs has considerably increased donor support to developing countries, and in a more coordinated way.
Strong regional land policy frameworks and guidelines inform the design and implementation of national processes.	The FAO and the African Union (AU) will join forces to improve the governance of tenure in line with the VGGT and the African Land Policy Frameworks and Guidelines (FAO, 2014). These African Frameworks and Guidelines were already endorsed by the Heads of States and the government of the African Union in 2009 and are currently being mainstreamed into the programmes of regional African organisations. This is a direct effect of the adoption of the VGGTs by the UN CFS, to which Oxfam contributed with many other NGOs and civil society organisations.
The UN CFS adopts strong VGGTs that inform national policies.	The VGGTs have been adopted, and these provide strong guidelines. At the same time, the UN CFS is now being recognised as a global governance mechanism on land and natural resources and has obtained the legitimacy of many actors to address the PRIA, which were endorsed in October 2014. The CSM is being respected for its technical expertise in many of the negotiations.
Companies and investors stop their engagements in irresponsible large-scale land acquisitions.	Coca-Cola (November 2013), PepsiCo (March 2014), Unilever (April 2014) and Nestlé (August 2014) declare zero tolerance for land grabbing in their supply chains.
Those who are directly or indirectly involved in land grabs are investigated and named where appropriate.	Two land grab cases involving international private sector organisations have been solved (South Sudan) or partially solved (Guatemala). Different actors, including Oxfam, claim to have solved the case. Three land grab cases (Honduras, Uganda, Indonesia) involving the IFC and the RSPO have been completely or nearly solved. Six Dutch investors all publicly reacted to the 'Nieuwsuur' broadcast on 2 October 2013 in which they were alleged to be associated with a land grab case in Brazil. Two old land grab cases in Brazil have been addressed by the Brazilian government: One case will be solved because the contract between the trader and the farmers comes to an end, and the status of the other land grab case is pending. At least two cases of land grab in Cambodia are being addressed by Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, together with the Cambodian government.
Institutions and norms that influence companies' and investors' behaviour are held to high standards in relation to land and natural resources.	The WBG draft version of the safeguards contains two specific safeguards (ESS1 and ESS5) with regard to land acquisition and tenure and involuntary resettlement (WB, July 2014). In the period September 2013–September 2014, the IFC has introduced new regulations and practices with regard to lending through FIs and large-scale land acquisitions. The mediation mechanisms of both the IFC (the CAO) and the RSPO were tested by bringing up cases of Uganda, Honduras (IFC) and Indonesia (RSPO).

<p>A number of commodity chains adopt responsible investment policies and practices in relation to land.</p>	<p>The BtB land spike targeted the sugar sector, the palm oil sector and the soya sector; major changes are to be reported at the level of individual supply chains. Apart from Danone and Mars, all FBCs targeted by the campaign have improved their land policies. Apart from this, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, Unilever and Nestlé committed to zero tolerance for land grabbing, which implies they will address potential land grab cases. Evidence is available that Coca-Cola and PepsiCo are investigating land grab cases in which they are allegedly involved in a number of countries, including Cambodia and Brazil.</p> <p>A number of traders have also improved their own codes of conducts and in particular include the principle of FPIC for all communities (Illovo, Twinings). Big traders like ADM (January 2013) and Cargill (July 2014) also have improved their codes of conducts.<sup>125</sup> This implies that a momentum is being created to get entire supply chains land grab free.</p>
<p>The world's 10 biggest FBCs improve policies and practices and begin a 'race to the top' within the food and beverage sector. This will happen if:</p>	<p>All of the ten FBCs have proved sensitive to Oxfam's campaign, which looked at seven issues (land, gender, workers, farmers, climate change, water, transparency). As a consequence, they have improved their policies and it is assumed consequently their practices.</p>
<p>Empowered publics pressurise FBCs for more transparent, sustainable and equitable agricultural supply chains.</p>	<p>Millions of followers on Twitter (most specifically) and on Facebook (to a lesser extent) have been reached through messages sent by NGOs that are allies of Oxfam. Apart from these, more consumers than expected signed online petitions, participated in 'thunderclaps' addressing the FBCs publicly targeted or sent emails to FBCs (27,000 emails in one day to PepsiCo). Presently, more than 700,000 persons have joined the BtB movement to change the way food companies do business.</p> <p>Apart from this, in at least one case in Cambodia, NGOs are now identifying land grab cases and addressed these when Coca-Cola and PepsiCo disclosed their top three supplying countries and suppliers.</p>
<p>FBCs, investors, retailers and progressive business groups improve their policies and practices in response to pressure for positive change coming from the public and consumers.</p>	<p>A number of FBCs have become Oxfam allies in the sense that they exert influence upon governments and other actors in their supply chains. Examples are Coca-Cola and PepsiCo regarding land, and Mars, Nestlé and Mondelez regarding gender in the cocoa sector.</p> <p>35 investors worth over 1.4 trillion USD published a statement in support of the BtB campaign in September 2013, and four Dutch banks have included the principle of FPIC in their policies. Shareholders of PepsiCo, ABF and Mondelez have filed resolutions together with Oxfam that led to policy changes with regard to land grabbing and gender.</p>

Generally speaking, many outcomes in the original ToC have been achieved, except for changing policies and practices in developing countries, which are in the process of being achieved not only by Oxfam, but by many other actors.<sup>126</sup> With regard to the BtB land spike, unintended outcomes were achieved: Whereas Oxfam planned that only one FBC would commit to zero tolerance for land grabbing, four FBCs made this commitment. Other intended but ambitious changes achieved consist of FBCs, previously targeted by Oxfam, turning into allies and taking responsibility for chain-wide changes. The same applies for other actors in the BtB campaign, in particular media, global audiences and investors who became allies in this campaign. With respect to the overarching objective to stop land and water grabs, this water-related part of the objective was not explicitly dealt with in the campaign. With regard to the BtB women and cocoa spike, outcomes have been achieved as foreseen and the FBCs publicly targeted also turned into Oxfam allies.

#### 4.2.3 Relevance of outcomes achieved

The assessment of the relevance of outcomes achieved for both campaigns addresses the extent to which these outcomes contribute to the achievement of other planned outcomes in the ToC and its ultimate objective. An online questionnaire helped to obtain information regarding the relevance of outcomes achieved as perceived by respondents representing Oxfam International, its affiliates, field offices and its partners in Indonesia, Pakistan, the African continent, Mozambique and Cambodia.

Apart from this, the timeliness of the campaigns were assessed in relation to the readiness of the lobby targets.

The land grab campaign managed to put large-scale land acquisitions and the risks for local communities on the agenda of both international institutions and national governments in both developing countries and donor countries. The relevance assessment concentrates in particular on the endorsement of the VGGT by the UN CFS, the outcomes achieved at the level of the WBG and those achieved as a result of the BtB land spike as depicted in the ToC of the land grab campaign in Figure 5.2.

#### 4.2.3.1 Relevance of the campaign targeting the UN CFS

Figure 5.2 visualises the relevance of the VGGT that were endorsed in May 2011 in the ToC of the land grab campaign (orange rectangle and arrows). The VGGT are currently *the* standard for land governance and tenure, and they are being integrated in other standards such as the WBG Safeguards and the African Union Land Policy Framework and Guidelines. Private sector fora, such as the UN Global Compact, also take up the VGGT and make these operational for their constituencies. The UN Global Compact, for example, is planning to use Environmental, Social and Governance reporting systems that will help to incorporate the VGGT into business reporting.<sup>127</sup> The endorsement of the VGGT also increased the *legitimacy* of the UN CFS to negotiate other global standards such as the recently adopted Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investments (PRAI). The WBG publicly committed to using the VGGT in their standards, which will have the potential to strengthen land governance and tenure systems in development countries, but it is too soon to predict the final outcome of this Safeguards Review.<sup>128</sup> The IFC improved the implementation of its performance standards with regard to land issues, but a lot needs to be done before it will effectively influence corporates' and financial intermediaries' (FIs) behaviour as was assumed in the ToC. In addition, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and Nestlé publicly committed to adhering to the VGGT, and they are addressing land issues in their top supplier countries and value chains. Apart from all these spin-offs, the Global Donor Working Group on Land has synthesised all of their land-related work in a global database,<sup>129</sup> which claims 554 projects in 125 countries with a total value of 4.6 billion USD. Every project is coded by which parts of the VGGT they are supporting. The FAO alone is running VGGT promotion in 30+ countries. The EU spent €35 million this year and €45 million in 2015. These efforts will also bring the African Union and the VGGT land frameworks together. According to the principles of the VGGT, these projects will be multi-stakeholder and address the needs of marginalised men and women. The inclusion of land issues in the Sustainable Development Goals will inform the future development framework for all development cooperation until 2013.




Figure 4.2 Relevance of three major outcomes

The 10 respondents who filled in the online questionnaire, representing Oxfam International, its affiliates, field offices and its partners in Indonesia, Pakistan, the Africa continent, Mozambique and Cambodia, state that the VGGTs are very relevant (8 persons) and relevant (2 persons) because these are a reference for civil society and are being used to influence national governments (in both developing and donor countries), as well as private companies, to align with the VGGTs.

The timing of Oxfam’s focus on the negotiation process for the VGGT was appropriate. Oxfam was part of the CSM’s working group on land working on the draft of the VGGT from the very beginning in July 2010, and it played a constructive role in supporting the movements that were involved.

#### 4.2.3.2 Relevance of the land freeze campaign

The WBG outcomes (see Figure 5.2 blue rectangle and arrows), (i.e. the first draft of the WBG Environmental and Social Safeguards), as well as those related to the IFC, have the potential to influence national policies of developing countries that receive grants, investments and technical advice from the WBG. They also have the potential to influence the standards of other development banks, credit agencies and the 80 private banks that adhere to the Equator Principles. However, the extent to which this will materialise is not yet clear. Therefore, the arrows used are dashed.

- It is likely that Oxfam and the International Development Initiative (IDI) influenced the content of the draft WBG safeguards that integrates components of the VGGT.<sup>130</sup> However, the first draft also contains loopholes that allow national governments to use their own standards rather than those of the WBG, again increasing the risk that local communities do not benefit from grants and investments by the WBG.

- The percentage of IFC investments being administered through FIs is steadily increasing and already comprises between 40% and 60% of the total investment portfolio. The promised implementation of stronger standards for FIs and for large-scale land acquisitions has not yet materialised, as is highlighted by later CAO audits and the October 2014 monitoring report on the implementation of the FI action plan of the IFC.<sup>131</sup> However, awareness of land grab risks has increased in the meantime, possibly influencing current investment decisions taken.
- The critical audits published by the CAO and the disclosure of information related to investments that help NGOs to track the role of IFC investments in land grabbing and human rights abuses open the opportunities for NGOs to start filing complaints with the CAO. At least one NGO has started this procedure, having increased its confidence in the CAO since the Honduras Dinant audit was published.

A new development bank was recently launched by the BRICS countries, and China is pushing a 50 billion USD Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. These are unlikely to follow the WBG's safeguards and performance standards and will likely dilute the impact of the safeguards.<sup>132</sup>

Two respondents to the online survey stated that the outcomes at the level of the WBG are not relevant because Oxfam should not focus on these (reason is not clear); six others stated that they are relevant because their country depends upon WBG investments/grants and because the Bank would provide a model for good land governance to be replicated by others. For two other persons, these outcomes are very relevant, because the WBG then sets a global standard for other donors and investors and solves the land conflicts between the companies and local communities in Uganda and Honduras.

Timing: The public part of the land freeze campaign strand started in October 2012, when the WBG was already considering adopting the VGGT and just needed a further push by Oxfam to commit publicly to these guidelines.<sup>133</sup> The launch coincided with the Annual Meetings of the WBG and the IMF in Tokyo, and these Annual Meetings, the WBG Spring Meetings and the annual Land and Poverty conference have been used for direct engagement with WB staff and Executive Directors. At that time, the WBG also launched the review of its Environmental and Social Safeguards, presenting an opportunity for Oxfam to start lobbying for the integration of land governance and tenure concerns in the new safeguards. Oxfam was also aware that the CAO was conducting its audits on FIs and on the land grab case in Honduras as well as seeking to solve Oxfam's land grab case in Uganda, which then would also provide new opportunities to improve the WBG policies and practices. When the audits and the management response by the IFC were made public, these provided momentum for Oxfam and its allies to seek publicity, and since then, the timing of the public campaign (letters and press coverage) has depended more upon IFC reports being published or leaked and public statements by the WBG. Other reasons for launching the land freeze campaign in October 2012 were the fact that the recently adopted VGGTs (May 2012) needed to be brought one step further and that, according to Oxfam, no other actors at that moment were targeting the WB on large-scale land acquisitions or on FIs. Oxfam and CIEL's publication on FIs in April 2012 had prepared them to start a campaign targeting the IFC as a development bank.<sup>134</sup>

#### 4.2.3.3 Relevance of the BtB campaign

The outcomes related to the BtB land and sugar spike are relevant for the ToCs of both the land grab campaign and BtB. They are also visualised in Figure 5.2, starting with the **red rectangle and arrows**. First, coining the term 'zero tolerance of land grabbing' considerably influenced the public debate about land grabbing (agenda setting), including in the donor community.

- For the first time, the entire supply chain approach was introduced into the land grab debate and their roles and responsibilities with regard to land issues were put on the international agenda (agenda-setting).
- The implications of Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and Nestlé committing to 'zero tolerance of land grabbing' and five other FBCs and the traders adhering to the principle of FPIC, not only for indigenous people but for entire communities, are already beyond the WBG safeguards draft and the appropriate implementation of the IFC standards. The FBCs that committed to zero tolerance are already engaging with national governments to address land grab conflicts, and entire value chains are now taking into account the FPIC, which will possibly decrease the number of investors and companies being associated with land grabbing (at least the front runners).
- The fact that these FBCs disclosed their top sourcing countries and top suppliers considerably helps NGOs and CSOs to map supply chains up to the FBC, which enables these NGOs and CSOs to address the issue throughout the supply chain. One NGO is already known to follow this strategy.
- Apart from this, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo have publicly adhered to the VGGT, which will also accelerate changes in national land governance policies and practices in developing countries (policy changes).

The BtB women and cocoa spike is also relevant for the cocoa sector, because after Nestlé, Mars and Mondelez committed to mainstream gender in their respective supply chains, the WCF formulated a general action plan to secure their supplies and to implement environmental and social standards that integrate women in the supply chain (moderate change) and signed a memorandum of understanding with the government of Côte d'Ivoire. The WCF represents 90% of the global cocoa sector. The current debate in the sector on gender mainstreaming, as well as its implementation through the CocoaAction plan, help the sector to strengthen their collaboration beyond certification.

In the original ToC of the BtB campaign, we observe that both campaign spikes are already contributing to its specific objective: 'Eight of the 10 FBCs, two MSIs and two certification organisations are active in the public debate and publicly commit to improved policies and practices'. The assumptions that underpin the ToC also have proved to contribute to the outcomes achieved to this point.

The BtB campaign in itself is very relevant, because it showed a very new way of campaigning private sector organisations. Many donors, NGOs and multilateral institutions have commended the campaign approach, because it establishes the relation between investors and FBCs with issues like gender, land grabbing and climate change that, up to now, have been mainly addressed by governments.<sup>135,136,137,138</sup> The campaign addresses the roles and responsibilities of the private sector in dealing with social and environmental issues and their integration into the standard operating procedures of entire value chains.



The online questionnaire included a question regarding the relevance of the achievements of the BtB campaign at the level of the FBCs. Although the question did not distinguish between the women and cocoa spike and the land and sugar spike, most respondents referred to the land spike.

The BtB campaign is not relevant according to two respondents because their initial contribution to the campaign was not continued for different reasons and because the focus on FBCs is not relevant when one only wants to have national policies and practices for smallholders. Another respondent saw the relevance of the campaign, because, in his country, corporates are present, and BtB might contribute to finding solutions to land conflicts. The campaign is very relevant for the seven remaining respondents, because both suppliers and governments of producing countries now have to take their responsibilities to align their standards and practices on land issues, the FBCs involved in the BtB campaign set the standards for other FBCs to follow, the campaign strengthens the arguments for NGOs to urge the government to adopt strong land policies and the disclosure of top sourcing countries and suppliers by the FBCs and their influence upon the government helped NGOs in Cambodia to again urge the government to address land grab cases. In addition, the European Union engaged with the government of Cambodia, asserting that they prefer to source sugar that is land grab free.

Timing: The design phase of the BtB campaign took 1.5 years. This involved developing the scorecard methodology, the ToC, the web-platform, the social media strategy, as well as researching the companies and developing the campaign strategy and materials. This phase was needed to consult academics, other NGOs, stakeholders and companies to make sure the scorecard methodology was solid and properly aligned with global norms and corporate social responsibility standards in the food industry. The campaign was launched as soon as the scorecard was finalised and the website and all the different teams (public campaign, media, company engagement, scorecard team, allies) were in place. It was not reliant on external events such as the campaign strand related to the VGGT or that of the land freeze. However, WB staff observed that the overlap between the land freeze campaign and the BtB launch was interpreted by some to mean that the WBG was no longer targeted.<sup>139</sup>

#### **4.3 Evaluation question 2: Contribution**

Section 5.2.2 presented the outcomes to which Oxfam has contributed according to a quick contribution analysis. The analysis consisted of finding sources of information that explicitly linked Oxfam to the outcome as well as finding sources of information that explicitly linked other actors to the outcome (rival explanations), which was the case with some outcomes.

By far most of the 45 outcomes presented were achieved by the Oxfam confederation, which mobilised allies. Oxfam was one of the many contributors for five outcomes, and for six outcomes it explicitly worked in collaboration with other NGOs. For two outcomes, also other actors were identified who claim the outcome: Further in-depth analysis might provide new results with regard to contributions by Oxfam.






This section presents the findings of a more in-depth contribution analysis for two major outcomes or outcome groups. The first group of outcomes examined in depth focuses on two outcomes achieved at the level of the IFC as a result of the land freeze campaign. The second group of outcomes consists of the changes that occurred in the FBCs that were publicly targeted during the women and cocoa spike and the land and sugar spike of the BtB campaign.

The assessment of the contribution for both outcome groups consists in the first place of explaining the outcome achieved, followed by the inventory of all causal pathways that possibly might explain the outcome. These causal pathways comprise both pathways to which Oxfam contributed and

alternative pathways followed by other actors and factors. After the construction of these pathways in a ‘model’, information was sought to confirm (parts of) pathways or to reject these pathways, and this is followed by an assessment of the strength of the evidence collected.

This assessment then helps to see what the nature of the relations is between different parts in each pathway, as well as the relation between each separate pathway and the outcome achieved. Table 5.6 presents the types of relations that can possibly exist between the different parts.

This contribution assessment in the first place aims to find out *what caused the change* and in the second place then draws conclusions about *Oxfam’s role* in achieving the outcome.

Table 4.6 Nature of the relation between parts and other parts or outcomes <sup>140</sup>	
The part is the only causal explanation for the outcome. No other interventions or factors explain it. (necessary and sufficient)	
The part does not explain the outcome at all: Other subcomponents explain the outcome.	
The part explains the outcome, but other parts explain the outcome as well: There are multiple pathways (sufficient but not necessary)	
The part is a condition for the outcome but will not make it happen without other factors. (necessary but not sufficient)	
The part is a contributory cause. It is part of a ‘package’ of causal actors and factors that together are sufficient to produce the intended effect.	

Before assessing Oxfam’s contribution to the two outcome groups, the next section first attempts to describe some of the patterns observed in Oxfam’s campaign work. This will be followed by a section that assesses Oxfam’s contribution to the policy and practice changes within the IFC, and the last section will deal with the BtB outcomes.

4.3.1 General description of the way the Alliance has made contributions

Some patterns that explain how Oxfam has been working in the GROW campaign are as follows:

- Campaigns that target multilateral institutions, such as the UN CFS and the WBG, lobby in the first place the member states of these institutions at the national level where Oxfam affiliates are operational so that these governments possibly reflect Oxfam’s ideas at the international level. In the second place, Oxfam targets these multilateral institutions directly and supports and/or jointly works with NGOs and CSOs that also directly target these multilateral institutions. A concrete example of this is, for instance, the VGGT: The Oxfam office in Rome supported the CSM in its negotiations with the UN CFS and is also a member of the CSM-steering group, whereas national affiliates lobbied their own governments that ultimately have to endorse these guidelines. The same applies for the WBG land freeze campaign, where the Oxfam International Office in Washington, D.C., is directly involved in lobbying WB staff and collaborating with other NGOs whilst Oxfam affiliates lobby their own governments to take a particular position in the Board of Executive Directors of the WBG. A small difference between the work at the UN CFS and that at the WBG is that the land freeze campaign also mobilised a global audience to put pressure on the WB by means of using social media (petitioning, video campaigns with the support of Coldplay), ensuring wide media coverage and offline activities before the WB and in other places around the world.
- The BtB scorecard was inspired by ONL’s experiences with the ‘Fair Bank Guide’ and ONL’s ‘Green Santa’ Campaign. Oxfam Novib, Amnesty International Netherlands, Friends of the Earth Netherlands, Dutch Labour Union FNV, Animal Welfare and PAX are the coalition

members of the 'Eerlijke Bankwijzer', and they jointly invited Profundo to research the policies and practices of 10 Dutch banks on particular topics. Profundo has played a key role in creating the Fair Bank Guide's methodology. The scores are made public as a means to inform clients of banks and encourage these to take online action towards their bank. In 2012, ONL commissioned a study on the land policies of Dutch banks and engaged with these banks before the scores were made public on the Fair Bank Guide platform. The BtB was designed according to the same principles of engaging consumers, engaging FBCs into competition for better scores and asking them to take on bold policy commitments and make their policies transparent to the public. In addition, the BtB campaign has used traditional media as well as social media more intensely to mobilise consumers to put pressure on the FBCs.

- In both the land grab campaign and the BtB land spike, Oxfam has conducted research on land grab cases to show to a global public audience what land grabbing (and human rights violations) means for the livelihoods of local communities and that land grabbing is not a local problem, but a result of systemic issues that have global implications. These cases are linked to international value chains and investor flows, and have been linked to FBCs (Coca-Cola and PepsiCo), investors such as Dutch banks and the IFC and to MSIs such as the RSPO. The objectives were to show these relations, to seek remedy for the communities, to test grievance mechanisms (RSPO and CAO) and to obtain systemic change through financial institutions such as the IFC and international food and beverage sector.
- Most campaign strands and spikes consisted of a combination of research, evidence-based direct lobby or engagement, media coverage, working with allies and mobilising global publics to engage in the campaign through online (social media) and offline activities. Usually, the first six months comprised public campaigning, after which the campaign continued by means of direct engagement and only mobilising media and global publics to apply pressure when needed or deemed necessary.

#### 4.3.2 Land Freeze Campaign

##### 4.3.2.1 Outcomes achieved

The IFC increasingly finances development through FIs such as banks, insurance companies, microfinance institutions and private equity funds. These FIs, in turn, provide finance to sub-clients. Between 40–60 percent of all IFC financing is occurring through these FIs. A major risk attached to this is that the IFC loses oversight of the environmental and social impacts of these loans at sub-client level, which consists of local communities and their environment, creating a risk that the IFC might possibly be involved in land grabbing. Already in 2010, the Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) of the IFC concluded that there were significant gaps between the IFC's Environmental and Social requirements and their practical application by FIs, and that these gaps may potentially result in environmental and/or social harm.<sup>141</sup> Based on this, the CAO decided to proceed to an audit of IFC financing through FIs, which was published in October 2012.<sup>142</sup> It concluded that major efforts were needed to ensure that the IFC's policies and practices do no harm at community level and deliver positive outcomes, if they invest through FIs.

In the period September 2013–September 2014, the IFC introduced new regulations and practices with regard to lending through FIs:

- The IFC Environmental and Social Review Procedures (ESRPs) contain three new procedures concerning FIs in the Environmental and Social Review Procedures Manual since June/July 2014.<sup>143,144</sup>

- Some FIs are now required to disclose information concerning loans.<sup>145,146</sup>
- The thresholds for risk categorisation of loans have changed.<sup>147</sup>
- Staff in charge of environmental and social risk assessment is more involved in assessing loans and development proposals, whereas previously mostly economic experts were involved.<sup>148,149</sup>
- The IFC has intensified its advisory services to assist its clients to put in place appropriate monitoring systems to measure environmental and social risks (and impact).

In October 2014, the CAO monitored progress being made by the IFC and concluded that the changes introduced ‘have the potential to improve the quality of Environmental and Social outcomes’, but that they do not yet reflect the changes needed to correspond with the IFC’s higher level environmental and social commitments.<sup>150</sup>

A fundamental issue repeatedly being addressed by the CAO, IFC staff and NGOs is the extent to which the IFC is accountable for development impacts at sub-client level. Although the IFC states that it is mainly development oriented, it cannot guarantee outcomes at the sub-client level.<sup>151</sup>

The second outcome relates to a land grab case described by Oxfam during the campaign launch in 2011. The IFC provided a loan to Dinant Corporation in Honduras to expand its palm oil activities. Key allegations are that the company forced farmers to leave their land (land grabbing) and that violence against farmers on and around the plantation regularly occurs because of the inappropriate use of private and public security forces under Dinant’s control or influence (human rights violations). The CAO published an audit in December 2013,<sup>152</sup> but following the IFC’s weak management response to the audit in January 2014,<sup>153</sup> the IFC Board of Executive Directors demanded that the IFC formulate a revised management response, carry out an internal review and develop an action plan drawing on lessons from other CAO audits. Apart from the fact that the IFC addressed the situation in Honduras, the IFC’s analysis of this and other cases under mediation with the CAO led to changes in relation to the assessment of loan requests (assessing the context and the sector, including existing land tenure and transfer systems); the development of guidance notes on land, land-intensive investments following WB/UNCTAD/IFAD/FAO sponsored PRA<sup>154</sup> on the use of security forces by clients; stronger advisory support for clients to put in place the mandatory environmental and social risk monitoring systems; more involvement of senior management on high risk transactions and the use of the ‘High-Risk List’ to prioritise supervision and collaboration with external partners.<sup>155</sup>

#### 4.3.2.2 Contribution analysis

The first pathway follows Oxfam’s explanation of the outcome. Figure 5.3 shows this contribution story starting with the **white ovals**, the **green arrows**, the **white rectangular outcomes** of the IFC and the **blue oval** of the CAO. Important strategies in this pathway are based upon direct engagement with WB staff and Executive Directors, using the media to put the WBG under pressure and teaming up with other NGOs.

For both outcomes (FIs and Honduras), Oxfam has a similar contribution story: Oxfam and other NGOs started to prepare themselves when the CAO published the intention to start an audit on FIs in 2011. This audit was published in October 2012, when Oxfam launched its land freeze campaign. This preparation included, for example, networking with other NGOs such as CIEL and Eurodad; Oxfam and CIEL publishing a paper on FIs in April 2012, featuring several land conflict cases<sup>156</sup> and monitoring progress being made by the CAO in its auditing of the Honduras case and the Uganda case.

After the Honduras and the FI audits were made public by the CAO, followed by a weak management response from the IFC,<sup>157,158</sup> Oxfam and other NGOs publicly criticised these responses<sup>159,160</sup> and meanwhile lobbied the WB<sup>161</sup> and drew international media attention from, for example, the New York Times, the Financial Times, Reuters, Inter Press Service, Al Jazeera, the Guardian and regional media.<sup>162,163,164,165</sup>

The Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE)<sup>166</sup> in the FI case and the Board of Executive Directors for the Honduras case then asked the IFC to produce an action plan and to take stock of past experiences.<sup>167,168</sup>

After these were shared during the April 2014 Spring Meetings,<sup>169,170</sup> NGOs continued lobbying the WBG for structural changes in the working procedures of the IFC in favour of more oversight on impact at sub-client level and cultural changes needed within the IFC to ensure the compliance of their investments with Environmental and Social standards.

Evidence from within the WBG that possibly confirms the importance of the role of NGOs in explaining the outcomes within the IFC is as follows:

1. According to the internal systems in the WBG, CAO audits and the management responses are usually tabled at the level of the CODE. The Dinant case, however, was discussed by the Board of Executive Directors, and they unanimously concluded that the IFC had to revise its action plan. The main reasons advanced by respondents consist of the continuous direct engagement by Oxfam and other NGOs with WBG staff and Executive Directors, the fact that land issues were on the agenda of the WBG since the launch of the land freeze campaign and the huge impact of the media coverage of the case organised by these NGOs, which associated the WBG with human rights violations in Honduras.<sup>171</sup>
2. The Board of Executive Directors was unanimous that the IFC's management response to the Dinant audit was not appropriate and that the IFC needed to improve its performance. This is unique because, most often, the Board is divided between Europe and America, which are usually more sensitive to environmental and social impacts, and those countries that need IFC investments and therefore see strict environmental and social standards as hampering these.
3. There is not enough information available that highlights the reasons of the CODE for asking the IFC to review its very weak initial management response as a reaction to the CAO audit on FI. A second best guess is that the FI issues have been on the agenda since the last review of the IFC Performance Standards in 2009, gaining a lot of attention from NGOs working on this issue for many years and increasingly being illustrated by field cases where things went wrong. Apart from this, the weak management response from the IFC was covered by the media, which quoted Bretton Woods Project (BWP).<sup>172</sup>

From the NGO side, the following information seems to confirm their role in the moderate changes in the policies, systems and practices of the IFC.

1. CIEL, Oxfam, BWP, Eurodad and other NGOs have continuously lobbied WBG staff and Executive Directors on IFC-related issues.
  - BWP, Oxfam and CIEL have been working on the issue of FIs since 2009–2010 and may possibly have influenced the decision of the CAO to start an audit.<sup>173</sup> Oxfam joined this initiative in 2012, when it published 'Risky Business' together with CIEL,<sup>174</sup> in which it took a critical stance, as well as by means of the land freeze campaign between October 2012 and

April 2013, when it highlighted the importance of disclosure of sub-project information. It is this same network of NGOs that lobbied the WBG after the publication of the Honduras case.

- In both cases, the NGOs, together with many other NGOs, wrote a public letter to the WBG,<sup>175,176</sup> followed by other public letters and reactions from the WBG after the IFC had revised its management responses.
- Before the CAO audits were published, NGOs had good working relations with WBG staff and Executive Directors. Oxfam's good relations, in particular, were mentioned by several respondents. However, their public criticism to the first IFC management responses and possibly Oxfam's public land freeze campaign may have temporarily weakened direct engagement concerning these management responses, but this turned into more constructive dialogues to look for solutions.<sup>177</sup> These relations helped the NGOs to obtain inside information necessary for the timely mobilisation of more NGOs to sign letters or to brief Executive Directors on technical issues.<sup>178</sup> Apart from this, WBG staff and Executive Directors (EDs) are members of email lists that inform them about positions taken by NGOs, and they take part in meetings organised by these NGOs.<sup>179</sup> However, although all EDs are being informed, in particular those representing European countries and the United States are being directly lobbied in Washington, D.C. Oxfam lobbied the governments of the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Australia and Spain (not checked by evaluator), because the NGOs themselves are based in these countries.

Collaboration with allies took place (and still takes place) on an 'issue-to-issue' basis, and allies performed complementary tasks: Where one is lobbying, the other is assessing technical or legal issues. Together, the NGOs were able to directly and effectively translate technical issues such as the FIs into simpler messages for a wider audience, including WBG Executive Directors (the same applies for the Honduras case); maintain good working relationships with WBG staff and EDs; mobilise media to ensure global coverage when necessary; use evidence such as tracking information available in the WBG database to inform lobby messages and mobilise a mass of other NGOs and CSOs when necessary. The group consists of 27–45 NGOs/CSOs and was expanded with other CSOs for the Honduras case.

In addition to this, NGOs increasingly published land grab cases and cases that showed negative impacts through FI lending, highlighting that the IFC and FIs were not complying with their own standards. This gradually built pressure within the Bank to address the situation (Uganda, Honduras, India and Cambodia).<sup>180</sup> It is, however, observed that only the FI and Honduras audit, followed by pressure from NGOs, led to a revision of the initial management response by the IFC. A CAO audit of Tata Mundra, India, also showing that the IFC is breaching its own standards, did not result in a revised and stronger management response, despite the fact that more than 100 organisations had sent a letter, and it did not reach the media coverage that the Honduras and FI case received. Although the FI audit dealt with a very technical issue within the Bank, which was less attractive for the public media, news agencies like IPS covered the case by reporting that the IFC does not know if its investments 'do no harm' or improve development outcomes.<sup>181</sup> The global press coverage on Dinant directly associated the Bank with human rights violations in Honduras and therefore directly touched upon its reputation. Respondents stated that the very weak initial management response by the IFC regarding FIs and Honduras, Oxfam's capacity to obtain global media coverage for the Dinant case and, to a lesser extent, that of the FIs and the joint efforts of the core group of NGOs that constantly built pressure on the WBG Board of EDs helped to introduce the desired change within the IFC.

A *second* pathway reaches the same outcomes but without the external pressure from the NGOs. This pathway assumes that the internal accountability systems within the WBG are strong enough to decrease the risks of land grabbing and human rights violations taking place through both intermediate and direct financing. In the figure, this pathway is visualised with **blue arrows**, starting from the **blue oval** of the CAO.

We found the following information that *rejects* this pathway without external pressure from NGOs:

- Already in 2010, the CAO formulated recommendations for the IFC to ensure that investments lead to local development impact.<sup>182</sup> Both the FI and the Honduras audit were critical about the way the IFC is performing. However, despite these and other audits, the CAO on several occasions observed that the IFC did not provide appropriate management responses to audits or appropriately follow up on the action plans.<sup>183</sup>
- NGOs highlight at least two other CAO audits (India and South Africa) where the IFC's management response was below standards *before* the Dinant case, but these did not urge the CODE to ask the IFC to review its management response.<sup>184</sup> Even *after* the Board had discussed the Dinant case, the IFC showed that it had not taken stock of past experiences, because the CAO was again very critical with regard to another IFC investment in the Ficohsa Bank in Honduras.<sup>185</sup>
- On at least two occasions, the WBG stated their intention to take audits seriously<sup>186</sup> and measure the IFC's success 'by the development impact of our projects—not by the dollar volume of our investments'<sup>187</sup> and to change the institutional culture to that end. However, on both occasions, the management response by the IFC showed they did not (Dinant and Ficohsa).<sup>188</sup>
- Meeting minutes of occasions where IFC staff, EDs and CAO staff met with NGOs show, however, that EDs take responsibility<sup>189,190</sup> and that IFC staff has become aware of the issues raised. Apart from this, press releases by the WBG president and the CEO of the IFC highlight that the CAO is crucial in changing the IFC;<sup>191</sup> that the communication between the IFC management, the Board of EDs and the WBG President has intensified to prevent future mistakes in investments being made and that the IFC aspires to 'do no harm'.<sup>192</sup> This information on the intentions of the different entities within the WBG would, in the first, place support this pathway that the accountability structures within the WBG are functioning accordingly; however, NGOs and the CAO repeatedly show that those statements did not materialise.<sup>193,194</sup>


The *third* pathway follows the original ToC as signed off in August 2012. It is visualised through the **green boxes** that highlight outcomes, the **orange ovals** indicating Oxfam's approaches, and the **red arrows**, indicating relations between Oxfam's approaches and outcomes as planned. To decrease the number of land grabs taking place, 1) developing countries need to improve their regulations and land governance mechanisms, and 2) information regarding large-scale land acquisitions (LSLA) needs to be disclosed. Both outcomes require a temporary freeze upon land acquisition by the WBG, during which it will review its policies and practices. For this to happen, Oxfam wanted to create the spaces within the WBG where decision makers and staff debate the effects of LSLA on food security by means of the mobilisation of a global audience and opinion leaders to put public pressure on the WBG; by directly engaging with WBG staff and with the governments of WB member states, represented in the WB Board of EDs; by ensuring global coverage of the campaign through the media and by working with allies.

This pathway explains the first six months of the land freeze campaign, after which Oxfam continued its direct lobbying of the Bank. At the end of these six months, the WBG publicly committed to integrating the UN CFS VGGT in its standards and operational guidelines. The WBG was already informed about the campaign in July 2012. At that moment, many EDs were already concerned about land reform and property rights and these issues were increasingly being discussed within the Board, but the opinions of EDs were manifold.<sup>195</sup> The land freeze campaign touched the WBG at its very heart and it happened at the time that the Bank was considering adopting the VGGTs (respondent). The campaign raised the 'awareness on the issue of land grabs both within the WB and externally. The lobbying and policy work combined with the coverage generated by media and social media placed pressure on the WB. Consequently, it was seen as provoking internal discussions within the WB but some of their staff commented that the discussion focused too much on the veracity of the claims made by Oxfam and not enough on the issue itself. There was also some debate around the legitimacy of targeting the WB instead of other actors. NGOs focusing on land issues felt that this approach was appropriate since few international NGOs have focused on the WB and this campaign resulted in heightened attention to the issue'.<sup>196</sup>

When the public campaign ended in April 2013, the WBG had publicly committed (to Oxfam) that the VGGTs would inform the safeguards review, highlighted the importance of strengthening the capacities of national governments for improved land governance and asserted that basic information about land transfers would be made public. The campaign, however, also temporally affected the ongoing relationship with the WB, creating tensions in particular at the beginning of the campaign in October 2012.<sup>197</sup>

In this respect, the land freeze campaign's contribution to the outcomes achieved is to be interpreted as groundwork being done to start engaging with the IFC, together with the work Oxfam, CIEL, BWP and others on the issue of FIs and the monitoring of the Uganda and Honduras cases with the CAO. With regard to the intervention strategies used for this campaign, we understand that no other allies were involved in this particular campaign, but that meanwhile Oxfam worked with other NGOs on the FI and Honduras audits. At that time, it was also collaborating with the Bank Information Centre (BIC) and with the International Development Initiative (IDI). Apart from the public reactions obtained from the WBG as a consequence of the public campaign (media work and public campaign), the most effective strategy seems to have been the direct engagement with the WBG, which was already ongoing before the land freeze campaign was launched.





**Figure 4.3: Pathways that explain the IFC outcomes achieved, as well as the causal relations between (elements of) these pathways.**

#### 4.3.2.3 What explains the outcome?

What ultimately explains the outcomes achieved within the IFC? In line with the table presented in the beginning of this section that reflects the different types of causal relations that can exist between (elements of) pathways and the outcomes achieved, the following seems to be the most likely contribution to the pathway. With regard to the CODE and the Board asking the IFC to review its management response:

- The CAO audits are an important element for their decision, but they are *not sufficient*, because the IFC and the WBG repeatedly do not take these seriously enough. Without these audits, however, NGOs will not be able to improve outcomes at the level of the IFC, or at least we have not found evidence of this. The CODE and the Board most likely made these decisions when, in particular with regard to the Honduras case, they were associated with human rights violations by the global media. Apart from this, they were lobbied and received direct information from Oxfam, CIEL, BWP and other NGOs about the key issues at stake with regard to the FI and Honduras cases. The most plausible explanation is that of a causal package that combines the efforts of the CAO and the NGOs visualised by a *star*, meaning that these actors and factors together were minimally sufficient to explain the outcome. The huge outcry of civil society in reaction of the IFC's weak management response to the Honduras audit that associated the WBG with human rights atrocities was a trigger for the WB to intensify their supervision of the IFC.

- After the CODE and the Board had asked the IFC to review its management responses (*which is sufficient and necessary*), the IFC and the Board were influenced in various ways: in the first place by other CAO audits and monitoring reports on progress being made, by ongoing dialogue with NGOs and by press coverage organised by these NGOs and by WBG staffers and Executive Directors themselves. Each of these causes in themselves might explain the IFC outcomes as they are to date: Each of them might provide a *sufficient but not necessary* explanation, visualised by an → .
- Apart from this, the land freeze campaign, work on the FIs by the NGOs since 2009–2010 and ongoing publications of cases where the IFC breached its own standards might be considered *conditions* that made the WBG staff and Executive Directors aware of structural problems within the Bank, visualised as a +.
- Another condition that needs to be in place is the alignment of positions within the Board of Executive Directors: Oxfam and other NGOs lobbied in particular the traditional donor countries in the Board, but increasingly the BRICs countries and others that call themselves the G11 are using their voice in the Board meetings.

#### 4.3.2.4 What was Oxfam's role in this?

Whereas the land freeze campaign was implemented by Oxfam alone, its work on the FIs and the Honduras case was in collaboration with some 27 to 45 NGOs/CSOs, including a core group of CIEL, BWP, Oxfam, Eurodad and some other NGOs. As has been mentioned above, these NGOs worked on an 'issue-to-issue' basis, and allies performed complementary tasks. Respondents stated that Oxfam excelled in direct engagement with the WBG, mobilising media coverage when necessary and mobilising allies in a timely fashion to publish CSO statements. Respondents stated that these achievements could not have happened without Oxfam.

#### 4.3.2.5 Observations

This assessment was mainly based upon publicly available sources, and WB, IFC and CAO staff were not available for interviews, because the Honduras case, the Uganda case and the monitoring of the improvements made by the IFC with regard to FIs were still ongoing while this assessment was done.

### 4.3.3 Behind the Brands campaign

#### 4.3.3.1 Outcomes achieved

The BtB contribution analysis focuses in particular on the women and cocoa spike and on the land and sugar spike.

Evidence has been found that Nestlé, Mars and Mondelez have publicly and fully committed to Oxfam's requests with regard to mainstreaming gender in their value chains and have started to implement these commitments to a great extent. Most important achievements are that all three FBCs have conducted an independent gender impact assessment that informed a gender action plan, subscribed to the United Nations Women Empowerment Principles and are seemingly influencing other powerful public and private actors to address gender inequality in the sector. As of May 2014, the WCF published a CocoaAction plan in which gender parity is one of the focal issues.<sup>198</sup> This plan engages 12 big traders and FBCs.<sup>199</sup> Also in May 2014, an agreement was signed between these companies and the government of Côte d'Ivoire to give the cocoa sector a new momentum.<sup>200</sup> Apart from these publicly-targeted FBCs, four others subscribed to the UN Women Empowerment Principles without being targeted publicly: Coca-Cola, Kellogg, Unilever and ABF.

The land and sugar spike started in October 2013 and publicly targeted Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and ABF. In line with Oxfam's request, Coca-Cola (November 2013)<sup>201</sup> and PepsiCo (March 2014)<sup>202</sup> committed

to zero tolerance for land grabbing taking place in the way they are doing business. This entails that they disclose their top sourcing countries and suppliers for sugar, soya and palm; conduct third-party impact studies in these countries to assess on their involvement in land grabbing; adopt a company-wide policy on land rights; influence peers, traders and sourcing governments on these issues and adhere to the principle of FPIC for all communities (not only indigenous peoples) across operations and suppliers. Apart from PepsiCo and Coca-Cola, Nestlé (August 2014)<sup>203</sup> and Unilever (April 2014),<sup>204</sup> which were not publicly targeted, also committed to zero tolerance for land grabbing. All four companies adhere to the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure (UN CFS). Coca-Cola has started its assessment in Cambodia, and PepsiCo has stated it will investigate a case in Brazil, as well as conduct impact assessments in top sourcing countries (beginning with Colombia and Guatemala). Both cases (Cambodia and Brazil) were published in Oxfam's briefing note when the land and sugar spike was launched.<sup>205</sup> ABF (publicly targeted), Mondelez, Kellogg and General Mills (all three not publicly targeted) adhered to the principle of FPIC for all communities affected by land deals.

#### 4.3.3.2 Contribution analysis

*The first pathway* is that of the ToC of the BtB campaign that consists of two major elements:

In the first place, a scorecard is being updated and published periodically that ranks the 10 FBCs according to scores assigned on the seven themes, including gender and land. Company scores are assigned based on an assessment of publicly available policies of companies. The media is approached to cover the publication of the scorecard results, online public campaign 'calls for actions' are communicated with supporters and assessments of trends are publicly represented.

In the second place, to date, every six months a thematic campaign spike has highlighted particular FBCs, putting them in the spotlight for one particular theme. The women and cocoa spike targeted Nestlé, Mars and Mondelez; the land and sugar spike targeted Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and ABF and the climate mitigation spike targeted Kellogg and General Mills.

Oxfam's contribution story with regard to the first two campaign spikes is as follows: 1) publication of the general scorecard to engage the 10 FBCs into a 'race to the top', together with a package of public campaign materials including a thematic policy briefing note, a media brief and other public materials articulating (public) requests (asks) to the FBCs targeted; 2) ensuring that the thematic campaign is covered in global (social) media throughout the spike but especially at the launch of the campaign spike and again if FBCs publicly commit to Oxfam's requests to publicly recognise and celebrate the commitments that have been made; 3) throughout the campaign spike, ensuring that global publics can sign petitions, send tweets or post to Facebook pages and participate in stunts before the FBC offices when additional pressure is needed and 4) filing shareholder resolutions on key investor meetings (such as quarterly earnings and Annual General Meetings) when needed. Before, during and after the public spike, Oxfam engages in a dialogue with the FBCs and also works with allies to amplify the influence on the FBCs.

This ToC contains several assumptions: 1) that FBCs engage in a 'race to the top' to obtain better scores, 2) that public commitments for policy changes lead to changing practices, 3) that transparency and disclosure of information by FBCs' policies, suppliers and sourcing countries provide opportunities to other actors to take action, 4) that FBCs are sensitive to consumer pressure and 5) that consumers care about the products that they buy.

The following evidence was found that confirms this pathway.

Strong evidence was found that the commitments made by Nestlé, Mars, Mondelez, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo can be explained by this contribution story to a great extent:

- The regular publication of scorecards engaged these FBCs into ‘a race to the top’.<sup>206</sup>
- The campaign launch and both campaign spikes, accompanied by briefing papers on women in the cocoa sector<sup>207</sup> and land grabbing,<sup>208</sup> were widely covered by national and global press agencies like Reuters, Bloomberg, AFP and EFE.
- With regard to the gender and cocoa spike, 144,000 people signed the online petition, and around 350,000 people engaged with the campaign by sending comments on the campaign, sharing or liking posts on Facebook or re-tweeting messages (over 10,000). The website received around 323,000 visitors, and there were more than 1.1 million page views. Coverage was received in major international news outlets (New York Times, FT and BBC) and important online outlets (like the Huffington Post).
- The land and sugar spike reached 18 million followers on Twitter and Facebook pages in its two months (October–November 2013). More than 700 consumers joined a ‘thunderclap’ Twitter action targeting PepsiCo, Coca-Cola and ABF; consumers sent 27,000 emails to PepsiCo in one day and 150,000 consumers joined Oxfam’s movement to change the way FBCs impact people and planet in the period October 2013–February 2014. In addition to the land and sugar spike, three land grab cases were published in Oxfam’s briefing paper, associating these with Coca-Cola and PepsiCo and their respective traders.
- The land and sugar spike generated much more public attention (50 million people reached) than did the first spike. The women and cocoa spike may have attracted fewer people as this was the first spike that coincided with the general campaign launch. Over time, Oxfam managed to increase its constituents in terms of allies and consumer followers and was able to introduce new social media tools that helped to mobilise more consumers, including those that had already been involved in the land grab campaign.
- Oxfam and the FBCs engaged in a constructive dialogue on both the general scorecards and Oxfam’s requests regarding women and land. ONL’s previous work in the cocoa sector since 2009 and its earlier engagement with some of the FBCs and industry initiatives gave Oxfam the credibility to engage with the FBCs on the cocoa sector. Additionally, the collaboration on the poverty footprint between Oxfam America and Coca-Cola helped to engage with the FBCs.<sup>209</sup>
- The BtB Campaign started on 26 February 2013 with public stunts in front of the headquarters of the FBCs, which for some were followed by other stunts in other countries. For some FBCs, new offline and online stunts announced served as a tipping point to commit to Oxfam’s asks (Nestlé, Mars, PepsiCo).
- An analysis of social media used by consumers during the women and cocoa spike clearly shows that consumers participated in the online campaign when asked to do so or in reaction to messages in the media.<sup>210</sup> The BtB website, however, also has a facility where people can take action by means of sending tweets, sharing posts on Facebook and the like for each particular brand during interludes. To date, few consumers are using these facilities when no particular Oxfam action is taking place.
- Evidence exists that a number of these campaigns have triggered reactions by the FBCs.
- Mondelez finally committed to Oxfam’s request after the NGO had filed a shareholder resolution,<sup>211</sup> which was withdrawn before the shareholder meeting on 30 April 2013 took place.<sup>212</sup> Similarly, a shareholder resolution filed by Oxfam and 13 other shareholders of PepsiCo, followed by public actions on 26 November and 20 December 2013 and continued

dialogue with Oxfam, finally resulted into a ‘zero tolerance to land grab’ declaration by PepsiCo in March 2014.<sup>213</sup>

- Information regarding the intensity of the direct engagement with the FBCs suggests that those FBCs that Oxfam engaged with to a lesser extent did not move.
- The information available does not confirm that NGOs, apart from supporting the online campaign, have directly engaged with the FBCs to support Oxfam’s asks.

ABF’s commitment to adhere to the FPIC principle in March 2014 followed a slightly different pathway: Apart from engaging with ABF, Oxfam also engaged with its subsidiaries, Twinings and Illovo. All three have included the FPIC principle in their supplier code, in October 2013, February 2014 and May 2014, respectively.<sup>214,215,216</sup> It is assumed that pressure from subsidiaries towards the headquarters contributed to the change. Oxfam also engaged publicly with Twinings, especially in Australia. During ABF’s Annual General Meeting in December 2013, Oxfam campaigned outside and lobbied inside with shareholders to highlight inadequacies in ABF’s land policies.<sup>217</sup>

*Alternative pathways that explain the integration of gender in the cocoa sector and land issues in the sugar sector:*

With regard to the gender and the cocoa spike, two strong factors provide an additional explanation of the commitments made by Nestlé, Mars and Mondelez. In the first place, the cocoa sector faces major challenges in securing its supply, and the average age of farmers in West Africa—still responsible for 70% of global cocoa production—is 50 years, with younger farmers not seeing their future in the sector.<sup>218</sup> This has urged the sector in the past years to join forces, design appropriate strategies to increase cocoa production and make huge investments. It is in this light that members of the WCF (representing 90% of the cocoa sector) formulated the CocoaAction Plan and signed an agreement with the government of Côte d’Ivoire to make the sector more sustainable. Taking into account gender in the value chains might be considered one of the solutions.

A second explanation of the outcomes is that Oxfam Novib, together with many other organisations, has been introducing gender in the cocoa sector since 2009. In that year, KIT, Solidaridad, Hivos and Oxfam Novib focused on the creation of a *Gender Equity and Global Standards Initiative*, which also includes the creation of strategic partnerships between businesses, standard setters, producers and support organisations as an essential for a chain to work better and to produce more.<sup>219</sup> In 2012, for the first time, gender inequality was included on the list of critical issues to be assessed in the Cocoa Barometer, in which many organisations participate.<sup>220</sup> UTZ, a certification body, published its position paper on gender in the cocoa sector in March 2011.<sup>221</sup> The BtB campaign builds upon these past interventions, which were the result of efforts by many actors. These past experiences also helped in engaging with the three FBCs directly.

Apart from interventions by Oxfam’s BtB campaign and its land grab campaign, no other actors or factors were identified that explain why Coca-Cola and PepsiCo declared zero tolerance for land grabbing. Bonsucro has been working on the introduction of the FPIC principle in its standards (partially with Oxfam), but it is not in the position to lead a sector-wide change, given the fact that it only represents 2% of the sugar sector.

#### 4.3.3.3 Verifying assumptions in the BtB campaign

Apart from looking at rival pathways, a number of assumptions underpin the BtB campaign. The following presents the information obtained with regard to these assumptions.

FBCs engage in a ‘race to the top’:

Mondelez, Kellogg, General Mills, Unilever and Nestlé all improved their scores for land while not being publicly targeted, and only Mars and Danone did not follow the 'race to the top'. Unilever, Coca-Cola, Kellogg and ABF improved their scores for gender without being publicly targeted, but PepsiCo, Danone and General Mills did not. This implies that the 'race to the top' is likely to work for some and not for others. Respondents stated that engaging in such a competition would also depend upon the FBC's corporate social responsibility capacity, its capacity to understand the consequences of Oxfam's request for its operational procedures, the alignment of Oxfam's request with FBCs' current priorities and the extent to which FBCs and Oxfam engage in a constructive dialogue. Other considerations they make refer to the costs associated with the change, implying that committing to Oxfam's asks that do not incur extra costs are easily done, but that it is more difficult when investments are to be made, although these will improve their revenues and reputation in the medium term. Very costly changes would possibly lead to companies trying to engage with others to introduce sector-wide changes. Like other sectors, the food and beverage sector also has frontrunners who engage in a 'race to the top' and those lagging behind, who will follow together with the entire sector. This is already observable with the 10 FBCs targeted in this campaign, and possibly those FBCs that follow these FBCs in terms of revenue and in terms of their reputations.

Public commitments made by FBCs for policy changes lead to changing practices:

Some respondents state that, when FBCs publish their commitments, shareholders, investors and others will hold them accountable. Some FBCs, before making public commitments, have already assessed the feasibility of their implementation by seeking advice. Related to the organisational structure, some other organisations prefer to start with practical changes before adjusting their policies and therefore do not easily commit to policy changes, or do so later than foreseen. Practical changes made by such organisations would not be taken into account in the BtB scorecard, which only focuses on policy changes that have been made public.

Other respondents, however, stated that monitoring and enforcement of new FBC policies by independent outsiders is still needed.

Transparency and disclosure of information of FBC's suppliers and sourcing countries provide opportunities to other actors to take action:

To this point, evidence exists for Cambodia, where, after Oxfam related a land grab case to Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, other NGOs (again with the support of Oxfam) identified other land grab cases that were associated with the same FBCs. The EU delegation also entered into a dialogue with the government of Cambodia to find a solution for the entire sugar sector.<sup>222</sup>

FBCs are sensitive to consumer pressure:

Consumers care about sustainability when they buy a product, and they are willing to take action. Seventy percent of the public avoids products if they do not like the brand, and 87% of the big companies consider 'quality' and brand equally important in their business. They estimate that, on average, 60% of their market value is attributable to its reputation.<sup>223</sup>

On the other hand, FBCs are brand sensitive, as the Dutch Coca-Cola representative explained in a debate on land issues in February 2014.<sup>224</sup> Although it is generally agreed that not respecting land issues can damage FBCs' reputations because they are increasingly under the scrutiny of consumers,<sup>225</sup> it is possible that not all FBCs in the BtB campaign are globally known by consumers. For instance, many people may know Coca-Cola and act when the company is associated with land grabbing, but fewer people may know Associated British Foods, which is composed of far better known subsidiaries, such as Twinings and Ovaltine.

#### 4.3.3.4 What explains the outcome?

What ultimately explains the changes in the outcomes for the FBCs that were publicly targeted in the women and cocoa spike and the land and sugar spike?

- In the first place, the regular update of the scorecard and constructive ongoing dialogue between Oxfam and the FBCs helped to engage some FBCs in a ‘race to the top’ when observing that those publicly targeted FBCs had improved their scores on land and women. This explains changes in the scores of the FBCs that were not publicly targeted during both spikes. However, not all FBCs are sensitive to Oxfam’s attempts to engage with them directly and to the scorecards that are regularly updated: Mars and Danone did not move on land, and PepsiCo, Danone and General Mills did not move on gender, implying that direct engagement and the scorecard publications did not work. To some extent, the information available suggests that direct engagement with the FBCs is a key element in the intervention.
- Secondly, for those six FBCs publicly targeted for land and women, a combination of direct engagement with the FBCs and public campaigning (online and offline), together with global (social) media coverage, provided momentum for changing their policies. When this strategy did not work, Oxfam made use of shareholder resolutions where appropriate, and these were filed in advance for all FBCs. This combination of interventions did not work for ABF, which, however, improved its scores when its subsidiaries Illovo and Twinings were approached by Oxfam.
- With regard to the direct engagement with investors, NGOs and MSIs, evidence is only available that direct engagement with investors helped to file shareholder resolutions. MSIs, NGOs and certification bodies were informed about upcoming campaign spikes and reacted positively.

These interventions together cannot be disentangled, given the fact that Oxfam adjusted its strategy in line with the companies’ specific features. These are visualised in the BtB ToC in Figure 5.4 by a **star 1**. They are part of a *causal package* that is *sufficient* to explain the outcomes achieved, *given* a set of particular conditions that need to be in place.




Figure 4.4 Pathways that explain the FBC outcomes achieved, as well as the causal relations between (elements of) these pathways

These *conditions* are as follows:

- The feasibility of the implementation of Oxfam’s request in relation to the FBC’s priorities to address Oxfam’s asks and an assessment of the material and immaterial (reputation) costs and benefits of these changes.
- The extent to which FBCs and their brands are sensitive to consumer pressure, which will be more likely for the well-known brands and FBCs (Coca-Cola, for example) than for those that are not very well known (ABF, for example).
- Sector-specific context such as concerns regarding the future supply of cocoa and collaborative efforts already undertaken by the WCF that represents 90% of all actors in the cocoa sector, unlike the sugar sector, where Bonsucro represents only 2% of all actors in the sugar sector and does not face similar concerns. These provide alternative explanations of the outcomes achieved, but other explanations, such as Oxfam’s causal package, may also explain these.

These would have to be visualised in Figure 5.4 by a + in an additional element that was not present in Figure 5.1 that presents the original ToC of the BtB campaign.

#### 4.3.3.5 The role of Oxfam

The BtB campaign has been designed by Oxfam alone, and it played a very significant role in achieving the outcomes, as can be seen from the contribution analysis. As was already stated, the campaign is a very new way of campaigning private sector organisations. A number of NGOs already work with scorecards but do not follow up on these with public campaigns and direct engagement, whereas Oxfam does this.



#### **4.4 Evaluation question 4: Efficiency**

This paragraph assesses what principles and procedures are in place to ensure the efficient and effective implementation of the land grab and BtB campaigns that are part of the GROW campaign. A broader picture of how the Oxfam Confederation is working and how this relates to financial issues will increase the understanding of this section.

As already mentioned in the baseline report, Oxfam International (OI) is a confederation of 17 Oxfam affiliates in 17 countries on the European, American, South American, Asian and Oceanian continents. Oxfam is active in more than 90 countries. Country offices consist of different affiliates. They work under a Single Management Structure (SMS), with each country having one 'managing affiliate' and up to three 'implementing affiliates'. They jointly define the country strategy and are jointly responsible for the strategic direction, alignment and coordination of the programmes in one country. Apart from these, the OI secretariat has six liaison offices in Addis Ababa, Washington, D.C., New York, Geneva, Brussels and Oxford.

Oxfam International (OI) has a small secretariat that receives structural funding from all affiliates to run the day-to-day operations and functions as a central hub for the confederation. It currently hosts three international campaigns, including GROW, to which the land grab and the BtB campaigns belong. Affiliates complete annual Memorandums of Understandings with OI in line with the agreed Oxfam campaign priorities. Their contributions are based on an inventory of campaign resource needed to implement the three-year operational plans, such as the 2011–2013 and the 2013–2015 operational plans for the GROW campaign. The development of the operational plans for this campaign is led by the Economic Justice Campaign Management Team (EJ CMT). They are signed off by the OI Campaign Group, comprising campaign directors of affiliates and OI. Finally, the campaign strategy is endorsed by the Executive Directors of Oxfam. The Campaign Group is in charge of monitoring the mobilisation of resources amongst affiliates to implement the operational plans as well as monitoring progress being made with their implementation. OI staff and campaign teams are accountable to the agreed plans. Each campaign team is led by one Oxfam affiliate lead, mandated by OI and financially covered by OI through mobilised allocations from affiliates.

ONL, OGB and OA are the most important financial contributors to the land grab and BtB campaigns. These three affiliates are also the largest affiliates in the Oxfam confederation. Particular drivers for ONL to contribute to the land and BtB campaigns are that its country offices identified land as an important issue and that it obtained good results with similar scorecard campaigns already tested in the Netherlands (Green Santa and Fair Banking Guide). Apart from this, ONL uses both international campaigns to position itself as a global leader on food security through the public campaign strategy.

As mentioned above, the campaign structure is headed by the EJ CMT (13 persons), supported by an EJ Campaign Executing Committee (six persons) and an EJ Campaign Reference Group (22 persons) to ensure the representation and consultation of all affiliates. According to the 2011 campaign structure, five functional groups report to the EJ CMT: a group on advocacy, a public campaign team, a media working group, a regional and national campaign group and the private sector working group, which is meant to provide inputs to the other four groups. Each group numbered between 10 and 15 members, representing affiliates, regional offices and field offices. Moreover, cross-functional teams were created for land and for BtB: the land campaign project team in 2011 and the BtB campaign project team in 2012. Both report to EJ CMT.

This structure makes it impossible to distinguish the budget for the GROW campaign and, in particular, for the land grab and BtB campaigns. Oxfam as an affiliate financially supports (partially

with MFS II resources) the implementation of both campaigns at international level, implements activities in the Netherlands and supports regional or country offices (20) that want to take part in the GROW campaign, meaning that the campaign budget is reflected in many different budget lines and is not specifically earmarked for GROW, the land campaign or BtB. Apart from ON, the other affiliates also contribute to the international campaign, implement national parts of this campaign and support their country offices. Most financial contributions to OI are meant to cover staffing costs, which is the most critical element for the implementation of the campaigns at different levels. At affiliate level and the country offices, the most important budget component for the campaign is also staff time. The budget for the campaign is a decentralised budget and, when needed, resources are pooled to cover international campaign activities.

The following section describes the procedures in place to ensure cost-effectiveness, followed by a section on what happens in practice. The last section describes how Oxfam is drawing lessons from the way it works in order to become more effective.

#### *4.4.1 Principles and procedures in place*

##### *4.4.1.1 Participation and ownership of the campaign within the Oxfam Confederation*

Ownership of the campaign within the Oxfam Confederation is helpful in ensuring that campaign activities take place at the right moment and at the right place.

In the 2011 GROW campaign structure, this is ensured by the Economic Justice Campaign Reference Group that represents countries, regions and themes (gender, the private sector, etc.). This group was consulted when the three-year operational GROW campaign plans were drafted, and it ensures that affiliates and countries adhere to the three-year operational plan. This participation also ensures that affiliates know when and how to participate in the campaign and how to allocate their resources for campaign activities at the international level, in their own country and in country offices. It also helps to define the roles of the Oxfam International Liaison Offices, for example that of the Washington, D.C., office during the land freeze campaign and that of the Rome office during the VGGT campaign.

##### *4.4.1.2 Power analysis for enhanced effectiveness and risk mitigation strategies*

After ToCs have been developed for both the three-year operational plans and specific campaigns, such as the land grab and the BtB campaigns, they are followed by a power analysis as a joint exercise. This helps to allocate resources effectively by critically envisioning changes needed, assessing how these changes can happen and conducting stakeholder analyses to identify what influences these. This analysis results in the design of a strategy that includes the selection of tools and interventions and is followed by a feasibility check to ensure that the campaign project teams avail themselves of the tools needed, as well as to assess the costs/benefits these tools. A power analysis is mandatory for every campaign.

Apart from this, risk mitigation strategies are developed when needed, assessing risks for partners and affected communities, the importance of the risk, strategies to mitigate these risks and exit strategies if needed.

##### *4.4.1.3 Human resources and resource sharing*

Apart from the land and the BtB campaign project team leaders, who are mandated by OI and work on a fulltime basis, other project team members work part-time on several projects within the GROW campaign. Project teams are composed in line with the functions needed to be effective, and therefore the land project team was composed of persons working on the private sector, public

campaigns, media, lobby at national level and international level, policy development for countries and for briefing papers, as well as persons focusing on particular countries or regions. The BtB project team leads the development and implementation of the Behind the Brands international platform (<http://www.behindthebrands.org/>); the scorecard and its successive half-yearly updates; the development of the campaign spikes; the engagement with FBCs, investors and allies and support to national-level campaigns.

Working in different project teams also strengthens the internal cohesion between different campaign strands within the GROW campaign and ensures learning across teams.

#### 4.4.1.4 Quality control

After the sign-off of the three-year operational plan, campaign project teams (land grab and BtB campaign teams) develop their campaign strands, such as the land freeze or the women and cocoa spike, which also require a sign-off from the EJ CMT to ensure the quality of the plan, the resources available to implement the plan and its feasibility. This is then followed by the preparation of campaign products that are signed-off by the EJCMT and the campaign project team lead as a means to ensure the quality of these products before they are used in the global public and as a means to ensure that these are in line with agreements made with all Oxfams.

#### 4.4.1.5 Efficiency

Most teams are virtual teams, with staff from different affiliates located in different countries all over the world. The EJCMT and the BtB campaign team meet only once a year, with all other communications taking place through email, teleconferences and information and materials made available for all on the intranet of the Oxfam confederation.

ON has several procedures in place to ensure efficient operations. ON first relies on in-house capacities for different campaign activities before outsourcing these. Outsourcing requires tender procedures for contracts more expensive than €1000. Apart from these regulations, procedures for travelling costs, contracting consultants and fees are in place.

### 4.4.2 Practice

#### 4.4.2.1 Participation and ownership of the campaign within the Oxfam Confederation

Over the years, the *campaign architecture* has become leaner, so as to enable small field offices and Oxfam affiliates to participate fully in the implementation and management of the campaign and to ensure a stronger representation of African, Latin American and Asian country offices. The 2011 structure supported the implementation of the 2011–2013 operational GROW plan, but a new structure was created in line with the new operational plan.

Apart from adjusting its structure to the functions, staff members regularly change roles and functions within the campaign structure, but they have worked intensively together in past international campaigns. The land project group has been working in the same configuration for the last four years, and the core team of the BtB campaign has been together for the last three years. The passion, enthusiasm, ‘creative agency’ and team spirit of those directly involved are very high, helping staff to work under time pressure when needed.

The online questionnaire, however,<sup>226</sup> filled in by Oxfam staff working in different places, identified some challenges in the coordination of at least one of the two campaigns,<sup>227</sup> such as disagreements between affiliates and affiliates not committing to deliver parts of the campaign (after sign-off by the OI campaign group). In line with this, O’Neil and Goldschmid<sup>228</sup> noted that the land freeze campaign, in particular, lacked support within the Oxfam Confederation, resulting in few affiliates—although

they were informed—engaging in the public campaign. OGB and ON continued the land freeze campaign after OA withdrew in November 2012, when existing relations with WBG staff and management were challenged by the public campaign.

With regard to the involvement of country offices in the global campaigns, the online questionnaire also highlighted the need for better engagement of country offices beyond the delivery of media cases and the inability to follow up on momentum being created at country office level, because of resources/capacities. Similar messages were identified during the mid-point evaluation of the general GROW campaign.<sup>229</sup> Based on the experiences of others in the GROW campaign, all Oxfam affiliates have been asked to develop a capacity strengthening programme for their country offices to ensure that they will have the capacity and the structures in place to implement activities that reinforce global–local linkages and vice versa. This Worldwide Influencing Network (WIN) has put national-level change and digital mobilisation at its heart, and thus aims at further strengthening of local–global linkages, as well as increasing the capacity of countries and partners to deliver impact through influencing.<sup>230</sup>

#### 4.4.2.2 Power analysis for enhanced effectiveness and risk mitigation strategies

Within the Oxfam Confederation, campaign staff is being trained to conduct power analysis, and campaign project teams use the tool to jointly assess where they can make a difference. The analysis has become a standard operational practice within the confederation, and teams continuously adjust their power analysis based on new experiences and information that impacts the effectiveness of the campaign. A key question that guides all interventions (public campaigning, advocacy, conducting policy research) is ‘how to have the maximum leverage for the minimum effort’. The land freeze campaign, for example, started with lobbying many Executive Directors of the IFC Board during its launch, which involved many Oxfam affiliates, as well as convening a side event during the Annual Meeting of the WBG and IMF in Tokyo. After this event, and taking into account other experiences with the WBG, the strategy was narrowed down to key persons within the WBG and the Board rather than the Executive Directors individually, requiring less Oxfam staff capacity. Similar processes can be observed with the BtB campaign, where, after the campaign launch and over the course of the campaign period, specific strategies have been developed for each FBC.

The land team learned from the campaign launch in September 2011 that *risk mitigation plans* needed to be in place with regard to the case studies published. During the launch, five land grab cases were published as a means to mobilise a wide global audience to seek redress. This publication, however, led to serious accusations by the government of Uganda to Oxfam and its partner organisation, which, amongst other consequences, put both at risk of being deprived of their official licence to operate in the country.<sup>231</sup> When the communities involved in the Uganda case and the Indonesia case opted for a mediation process with the WBG and the RSPO, respectively, public campaigning was ceased, and extra staff capacity was made available to support these communities in the mediation process.

Given the sensitivity of land issues in some countries, on the land freeze initiative, Southern offices were also reluctant to communicate their experiences for international case studies.<sup>232</sup> Instead, in its briefing note, the land team referred to already existing cases that were being researched by the CAO and the WBG Inspection Panel.<sup>233</sup> Using existing cases also reduced the costs of the campaign.

During the land freeze campaign, Oxfam assessed on several occasions the effects its campaign had for progress being made within the WBG and the internal support for the campaign. Discussions within the confederation concerned the relevance of targeting the WBG (which has also been

discussed in the relevance section of this chapter) and potential reputational risks incurred by the public campaign.

#### 4.4.2.3 Sharing and allocation of resources

In terms of human resources:

As mentioned above, apart from the campaign project leads for BtB and land grab, all other project staff is working on these projects on a part-time basis, as they do for other GROW campaign projects, and this helps to ensure coherence across projects. Concrete examples of this are that experts on the land grab campaign helped to prepare the BtB land and sugar spike, experts on the cocoa sector were involved in the preparation of the women and cocoa spike and those involved in the ON Green Santa and Fair Banking Guide campaigns contributed in the design of the BtB campaign. At the same time, members of the EJ CMT are involved in these projects, enabling them also to keep track of progress being made and adjustments needed and to draw lessons learned that can be used in other GROW projects. Hence, cost-effectiveness and efficiency are ensured by making maximum use of the staff capacity available and by dividing tasks and responsibilities amongst the teams.

The land grab campaign team, in particular, when it shifted its campaign target from the UN CFS to the WBG, also changed in staff composition in line with these changes, using more OI resources from the Rome liaison office in the first period and then from the Washington office in the second period. Apart from this, internally, the land team has been working in a decentralised way, having a small core group coordinating all activities and smaller teams working on particular themes, such as the Uganda and Indonesia cases, the WBG, the UN CFS and the BtB land and sugar spike. Most resources from a maximum number of affiliates were mobilised during key lobby moments such as launches of different campaign strands.

Not all country offices and affiliates have the capacity to contribute to the implementation of the land grab and BtB campaigns. Some of the consequences are that affiliate staff, instead of their country office, researches particular land grab cases. Although staff was shared between Oxfam affiliates for the BtB campaign, direct engagement with the FBCs depended partially upon the availability of staff with the necessary background.

In terms of sharing information:

Project teams, in principle, are virtual teams, with staff working at different locations. Communication takes place by means of email, email lists, teleconferences and an intranet facility where all documents can be found. The fact that the project teams have worked with each other for a number of years already facilitates this way of working and this ensures a free flow of information. Apart from the core teams that are working on land, other colleagues from affiliates and country offices are kept informed through email lists, in particular with regard to the global consultations on the WBG safeguards. This helps them to attend consultations in their respective countries and to make sure that Oxfam's concerns about land are being voiced properly. The teams and their network have matured over the past years, enabling them to become more effective in lobbying more targets with similar messages around the globe. Whereas information sharing earlier on helped Oxfam staff to be informed, increasingly, email lists help them to engage in the campaign where they find the opportunity to do so.

In terms of sharing products:

Campaign teams have become more effective and efficient over time in designing products that can be used around the globe. The briefing notes and all BtB campaign materials have been translated into many languages as a strategy to accommodate affiliates with less staffing capacity. The BtB

campaign has its own Behind the Brands online platform (<http://www.behindthebrands.org/>), where global consumers can inform themselves and take action. This has been developed centrally and is maintained in 13 different language versions, allowing national campaigns to work in their respective languages and link up to their national markets. Apart from these centrally developed products, affiliates can also develop their own products. ON, for example, developed a website, ‘the bitter taste of sugar’, which was translated into English, French and Spanish.

The same applies for the land grab campaign, which also ensured that lobby messages were prepared centrally as a means to ensure uniformity across Oxfam affiliates when engaging with lobby targets.

#### 4.4.2.4 Quality control

The quality of products was a key factor for the success of both the land campaign and the BtB campaign. The briefing notes produced at the launch of public campaigns received very high media coverage. Discussion arose, however, with regard to the cases that Oxfam presented in its briefing note during the launch of the land freeze campaign.<sup>234</sup> These cases consisted of large-scale land acquisitions that were in the process of being audited or mediated by the CAO or investigated by the WBG inspection panel. At that moment, however, these cases had not yet been qualified as land grab cases, providing the WB the opportunity to deny publicly its involvement in land grabbing, as well as leading to a debate in the Dutch parliament.

#### 4.4.2.5 Efficiency

The BtB team, after having experienced that it was capable of assessing the policies of FBCs itself, decided to continue doing so throughout the campaign and no longer required external resources. However, ON, as a pilot, did use external resource persons to further co-create the public campaign concept after the women and cocoa spike, and this helped the ON public and digital campaigners to work on other preparatory activities for the land and sugar spike.

#### 4.4.3 *Changes to ensure cost efficiency and cost-effectiveness*

The previous paragraphs describe some of the most important principles that are in place to ensure cost-effectiveness and efficiency. In the first section, the ‘principles’ were presented, followed by an assessment of how these worked in practice. The most important principles identified are the following:

- Participation and ownership of the campaign within the Oxfam Confederation
- Power analysis for enhanced effectiveness and risk mitigation strategies
- Sharing and allocation of resources
- Quality control
- Efficiency

Both the land grab team and the BtB campaign team have shown that they use these principles and that these principles helped to make the campaigns cost-effective and efficient. The principles in themselves were not challenged, and no other principles were introduced during the campaigns.

### 4.5 **Case study: Mozambique**

Originally, the ON country offices in Pakistan and Mozambique were included in this assessment as a means to obtain more information on the relations and involvement of country offices in the land grab and BtB campaigns. For both countries, such involvement was initially foreseen, but this did not materialise. The case study described here reflects, instead, a different initiative through which ON

aims to stimulate South–South cooperation, involving Oxfam Brazil, Oxfam Japan and Oxfam Mozambique working together on ProSavana. This coordination is financed by ON, but this evaluation did not succeed in assessing the collaboration between the three countries due to limited resources. However, the case study illustrates how Oxfam is working with civil society networks. Oxfam Mozambique’s land grab campaign started in 2013, although work with partners on issues of land rights had been going on for at least five years at that time, and work on land grab with partners started in 2010.

#### *4.5.1 Introduction to the case and to Oxfam Mozambique*

ProSavana is a triangular programme between the governments of Mozambique, Brazil and Japan for the development of large-scale agriculture in the Nacala Development Corridor. The project was inspired by an earlier agricultural development project implemented by the Brazilian and Japanese governments in the Brazilian Cerrado, where large-scale industrial farming of mono crops (mainly soya beans) is now practiced. This Brazilian project led to the degradation of the environment and the near extinction of indigenous communities living in the affected areas.

Mozambican organisations that represent smallholders state that ProSavana was initially conceived to secure Japan’s food security needs rather than Mozambican food security, and that it only aims at promoting commercial agribusiness, providing opportunities to international agribusiness and allowing investors to acquire land.

Oxfam Mozambique’s ToC starts with the observation that private sector investments in the agricultural sector support the government of Mozambique and local communities where these investments take place. However, the unequal power balance between investors, farmers and government can lead to land grabbing taking place instead of equal development outcomes for all. Therefore, Oxfam seeks to influence these power relations so that farmers and their communities can also benefit from foreign or domestic investments. Investments then become a development opportunity for rural communities. In line with the global ToC of the land grab campaign, Oxfam Mozambique’s ToC includes strategies to prevent and resolve conflicts over land and to influence land policies in Mozambique, as well as to link national dynamics to those at the international level—such as the VGGT and the African Land Policy Initiative—and establish collaboration with Oxfam Brazil and Japan on the ProSavana programme. With regard to this programme, Oxfam intends to put pressure on the governments of all three countries to change its orientation to be in favour of agricultural development possibilities for small family farmers. For this to happen, all three Oxfam offices engaged their in-country networks to build pressure, bringing these networks together in conferences to develop strategies jointly. The added value of Oxfam was bringing the networks of these countries together through its global reach.

In Mozambique, Oxfam engaged with ‘Rede das Organizações para Soberania Alimentar’ (ROSA) in 2012, and this was formalised in the beginning of 2013. ROSA is a network organisation that addresses food sovereignty and develops a general strategy on land grabbing. ROSA, Uniao Nacional de Camponeses (UNAC) and the Rural Association for Mutual Support (ORAM) had their own campaign: ‘stop ProSavana’. Oxfam signed an MoU with UNAC, a movement of family farmers that fights for the active participation of family farmers in the development process (date unknown). When the engagement with Oxfam began, UNAC was leading ROSA, but ORAM currently leads the network. ORAM is an NGO working with farmers and other persons aiming to defend farmers’ rights and interests.

The collaboration with Oxfam Brazil and Japan was established in 2012 and secured at least until June 2014. With the support of Oxfam, UNAC and co-signatories from Mozambique and international organisations published a letter just before the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 2013, asking the leaders of the ProSavana Programme for an immediate suspension of the programme and an open and inclusive dialogue in favour of peasant agriculture, an agro-ecological approach to agriculture and a food sovereignty policy. Apart from this, Oxfam supported the network in the organisation of two Triangular Peoples Conferences in 2013 and 2014 in Maputo, as well as carrying out reconnaissance missions to the Nacala corridor.

#### 4.5.2 *Contribution of Oxfam to solving the land issues on the ProSavana case*

Oxfam Mozambique formulated a number of outcomes achieved in the ProSavana case and its contribution. The following briefly assesses Oxfam's contribution and that of other actors and factors:

1. By the end of July 2014, alliances were more effectively campaigning for changes in the ProSavana Programme than before Oxfam started to engage with them. This concerns building alliances within Mozambique and between Mozambique, Brazil and Japan.

Oxfam has strengthened the collaboration between CSOs in the three countries since 2012, by means of financing exchange visits and two Triangular Peoples Conferences in 2013 and 2014. Starting in 2011, at least in Japan, civil society was already aware of the risks of the large-scale land acquisition financed by Japan and sent an open inquiry to the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA).<sup>235</sup>

The two most important CSOs working on land grabbing in Mozambique are ORAM and UNAC and, already in January 2012, both organisations jointly organised a campaign, 'Nao ao ProSavana'. UNAC strongly advocates peasant agriculture based on agro-ecology and food sovereignty principles and does not see a constructive role for international investments in agriculture in Mozambique. ORAM, in contrast, has a more conciliatory approach in line with the government policies and is involved in awareness-raising campaigns on land policies and in promoting land demarcation. ORAM is well aligned with national elites and government officials. These different approaches and different political alignments led to an internal conflict within the ROSA Network and to the changing leadership from UNAC to ORAM. The 2012 baseline report already highlights tensions in the ROSA network, as well as a lack of trust amongst ROSA members. The conflict between these two organisations also divides INGOs and creates separate alliances that work on ProSavana, such as a new campaign started by ActionAid in October 2014.

These conflicts in the civil society arena within Mozambique, probably accentuated by the October 2014 national elections, and the change in leadership in the ROSA network do not confirm Oxfam's outcome that civil society is currently more effective in campaigning for changes in the ProSavana case.

2. By the end of 2013, the discourse and the design of the ProSavana programme have changed dramatically since the first plan was submitted in 2009.

Although the discourse and the design of the programme have changed considerably, these changes occurred at the time when UNAC and ORAM were jointly campaigning to stop ProSavana. Classen<sup>236</sup> attributes the increased attention for land grabbing to the fact that UNAC published its critical statement on ProSavana on 11 October 2012, which was inspired by the research done by GRAIN and ORAM in spring 2012. He considers the impact of their actions enormous, also given the fact that



they reached an international audience.<sup>237</sup> Planning documents from Oxfam do not include campaign activities at that moment, but do include collaboration and exchange between civil society in Brazil and Mozambique.

Since 2009, the design of the ProSavana programme also changed in the sense that it is now aligned with Mozambique's Strategic Plan for the Development of the Agricultural Sector, and not with the Japanese–Brazilian programme in the Cerrado. There is more attention for food crops and the intention to promote family agriculture next to agribusinesses. However, these changes were published in March 2013, when the Oxfam Mozambique campaign had just started to work on the case: The Concept Note that was formulated by ProSavana-PD and announced on and dated September 2013 maintains the same concept of the ProSavana-PD's report No. 2 of March 2013.<sup>238</sup>

3. Since June 2013, ProSavana is on the agenda of the three governments involved and civil society movements.

With Oxfam's support, civil society managed to influence the debate on land acquisitions during the fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in June 2013.<sup>239</sup> Both the president of Mozambique and a JICA official reacted to the open letter sent by UNAC and other organisations just before the conference.<sup>240</sup> Conferences organised by UNAC in Maputo were also attended by senior staff from the Ministry of Agriculture. Government officials have, however, also reacted to past campaigns on ProSavana,<sup>241</sup> causing confusion on the directions that the programme would take: In December 2012, the government of Mozambique stated that no farmer would lose land, JICA and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not deny the possibility that land acquisition for foreigners would be possible when they met with a delegation of Japanese civil society.

#### *4.5.3 Oxfam Mozambique, linking with Mozambican civil society and the global land grab campaign*

Although Oxfam Mozambique prepared a ToC in line with the global ToC, including support to influence national policies, resolve land conflicts and research land grab cases for international campaigns, the focus was entirely on ProSavana, which had already seen some progress being made in the previous years but reached a stalemate by the end of 2012. Both ORAM and UNAC, when negotiating with Oxfam Mozambique, stated that this narrow focus did not align with their own programme to strengthen existing national campaigns and alliances, and Oxfam's contribution is seen as a supply-driven approach. Whereas previous donors of UNAC and ORAM aligned to their programmes, they now had to align to that of Oxfam. Both were, however, attracted by Oxfam's strategy of liaising with networks and academics from Brazil and Japan. For UNAC, this meant a continuation of their collaboration with Via Campesina and Movimento Sem Terra that was established in 1992, and both UNAC and ORAM had already visited the project in Cerrado, Brazil in 2012. During the baseline assessment, the Oxfam Country Leadership Team already formulated its concern that it wanted to have a civil society-driven contribution instead of a donor-driven process. However, this apparently did not materialise.

Both the global ToC and the ToC of Oxfam Mozambique observe that private sector investments in the agricultural sector are needed, but that development should be inclusive, taking into account the interests of local communities. UNAC's statements show that they do not accept any role for foreign investment in the sector and that only the support of peasant farmers is an acceptable model for agricultural development. However, ORAM, the new lead in the ROSA network, has a more moderate opinion about these issues. This example of an interface between Oxfam and civil society networks in

developing countries clearly highlights how Oxfam offices have to deal with diversity of opinion in the countries in which they work.

Unfortunately, we were not able to assess the collaboration between the three Oxfam affiliates, two of which did not reply to our request for an interview.

#### **4.6 Evaluation question 5: Explanatory factors**

This section aims to describe the factors that explain the successes of both campaigns. It therefore briefly assesses Oxfam's organisational capacity using the five capabilities model developed by ECDPM. The second subsection briefly assesses external factors that have contributed to or hampered the successes of both campaigns. The last subsection discusses the nature of the issues addressed, in particular for land issues.

No additional information was collected to assess the issues discussed in this section. The assessments are based upon information collected to answer the previous evaluation questions.

##### *4.6.1 Internal factors*

###### **4.6.1.1 Capability to deliver on outcomes**

The outcomes presented in section 5.2.2 clearly show that Oxfam is capable of delivering on outcomes. Key factors that explain this are Oxfam's capability of developing sound ToCs and continuous reflection on the power analysis, which helps to adjust campaign strategies and interventions. Oxfam's ToCs aim for systemic change and, as a consequence, may trigger other actors to engage. Illustrations of this include the following:

- Oxfam's contribution to support the negotiation of the VGGTs, leading to progressive and global standard setting guidelines that are now being used by donor communities to support developing countries in the creation of effective land governance mechanisms.
- Its land freeze campaign targeting the IFC will most likely help to set the standards for other investors that adhere to the Equatorial Principles.
- Its assumption in both the land grab campaign and the BtB campaign that disclosure of information will lead to more actors addressing land grab cases, which materialised when Coca-Cola and PepsiCo published their top supplier countries and suppliers.
- Its assumption of the 'race to the top' indeed impacted a number of the FBCs, and hardly any other efforts were needed after some FBCs had been publicly targeted.
- Its strategy to work with investors, consumer pressure, the media and direct engagement to influence a number of publicly targeted FBCs.

Most of the outcomes identified during this assessment of the land grab campaign are at the global level, partly because of the focus of this assessment and partly because of missing information on the outcomes achieved in the countries where Oxfam has offices. Another explanation found is that global–local linkages still need to be strengthened beyond country offices providing case studies for global campaigns. A number of land grab cases have been (partially) solved because of global attention. Another positive example is found in Cambodia, where, after Coca-Cola and PepsiCo had disclosed their top three supplier countries and suppliers, civil society was able to address another land grab case. In the near future, it is expected that more outcomes will be generated at country office level in terms of policy changes and improved land governance mechanisms.

#### 4.6.1.2 Capability to act and commit

Staff capacity, being the most constraining factor in the campaigns, may explain why not all Oxfam affiliates and country offices could fully participate in the campaigns as they wished. With regard to the BtB campaign, the implications were that direct engagement with some FBCs was more intense than with others, which could be one of the explaining factors of the scores obtained on the BtB scorecard. The BtB campaign is mainly carried out by ON, OGB and OA, who, in comparison with other Oxfam affiliates, have more capacity to work on the private sector, especially with FBCs, traders and investors. Other affiliates are involved and actively run the campaign through engaging consumers of the FBCs, Oxfam supporters and the media to put pressure on the FBCs.

With regard to the land grab campaign, for most of the time, staff capacity was available and a division of tasks was in place between a number of Oxfam affiliates (OA, Australia, France, Belgium, Spain, Canada, OGB and ON). However, during the land freeze campaign, despite a sign-off from the Oxfam International Campaign Group, the commitment to participate in the campaign dropped. Tensions grew within the Oxfam Confederation when the WBG pushed back and relations with WBG staff and management were challenged by the public campaign. At that time, other Oxfam affiliates became more convinced that they were on the right track to achieve outcomes with the WBG.

After the land freeze campaign, when Oxfam targeted the IFC, it was engaging in particular with the traditional donor countries on the Board of Executive Directors, having limited capacity to influence swingers from other continents. It is not possible, however, to assess whether the contribution of other Oxfam affiliates from non-traditional donor countries (Oxfam India, Oxfam Brazil) could have led to more important outcomes than those already obtained.

The BtB campaign team, apart from coining the concept 'zero tolerance for land grabbing' and being motivated, invested energy in developing their 'creative agency', which helped to enrich the campaign tools used.

As mentioned above, the campaign teams are mature teams, because members have been working with each other for a number of years. Teams and individual members are highly motivated to make a difference and are capable of working under high pressure.

#### 4.6.1.3 Capability to adapt and self-renew

The Oxfam Confederation and the entities involved in the land grab and BtB campaigns have shown repeatedly that they are a learning organisation. Learning takes place at multiple levels through a multitude of mechanisms and systems in place. At the Oxfam Confederation level, the *organisational structure* is regularly reviewed, and the 'Oxfam 2020' vision foresees expanding the number of Southern affiliates, revising the structure of country offices, defining global programmes and campaigns, improving knowledge management and programme support and setting up shared back office functions. In this vision, a further integration of the Oxfam country offices and the regional liaison offices of OI is foreseen by ensuring that all directors of Oxfam field offices will be employed by OI rather than by Oxfam affiliates. The same will apply for regional directors as a means to minimise the duplication of costs.

At the GROW campaign level, the EJ CMT is in charge of monitoring progress and drawing lessons learned from the entire campaign and its parts, such as the land grab and BtB campaigns. The EJ CMT oversees the entire campaign, but, through its involvement in different campaign projects, is also capable of ensuring learning and adjustments across teams. At this same level, reporting takes place

every six months, as well as internal and external evaluations being commissioned for different parts of the campaign.

Again at this level, the GROW campaign architecture is adjusted to the campaign priorities over time, with different team compositions and new constellations of groups, based on expertise, geography and function.

At the level of campaign project teams, spikes (land freeze, BtB spike on land and sugar) are followed by an 'after action review' by the campaign team, which helps to draw lessons for future campaigns. This has been demonstrated with the BtB spikes. The fact that campaign staff works part-time on several GROW projects at the same time ensures that lessons are learned not only at the campaign project team level, but also at the GROW campaign level.

Learning and action in these teams is based on information sharing through email, teleconferences, the intranet and email lists that involve the wider campaign team and keeps everyone up to date and capable of taking action. Because the core teams have already known each other for quite some time, these virtual teams are capable of collaborative action throughout the world and do not need to come together physically.

At the personal level, there are ample possibilities to learn: Within the project campaign team, responsibilities are divided and provide learning opportunities for all team members, where, for instance, one affiliate leads on the UN CFS and another leads on the African Union (such as is the case with the land grab team). Individual learning also takes place through the joint analysis of past actions and through adjusting the power analysis when needed. The land grab team has, over the years, developed its 'creative agency', which is an asset for the public campaign component.

Country offices that joined the land grab and BtB campaigns received support from their affiliates (evidence available for ON) to improve their lobby and advocacy strategies.

Key lessons learned over the past years for the land grab team comprise the improvement of the risk management tools and processes between Oxfam countries and headquarters, making this more a collaborative process between both; the advantage of using the power analysis methodology and building upon past experiences (as in the case with Oxfam Australia learning from the Dutch bank campaign with the support of Profundo). Throughout the campaign, the team organically connected the dots between the different elements in its ToC. The campaign launch built a narrative and a broad change agenda, which covered national governments, FBCs, investors and land grab cases as a means to set the scene. It built on the achievements on the VGGTs in May 2012 in the remainder of the campaign and addressed cases published at the campaign launch in September 2011 in their interventions targeting the IFC, and this continued with the land and sugar spike of the BtB campaign.

The design of the BtB campaign was inspired by campaign models already tested in the Netherlands: Both the Green Santa campaign and the Dutch Fair Bank Guide proved that a combination of efforts such as a public ranking tool, public action (via social media), active engagement and research were successful in achieving policy change. During the three campaign spikes, the public campaign team managed to introduce new tools for consumer engagement, indeed leading to more engagement and more consumer pressure on FBCs.

#### 4.6.1.4 Capability to relate

For both campaigns, the key factor that explains the outcomes achieved is Oxfam staff being capable of engaging constructively with their lobby targets. With the help of public campaigning, lobby targets were put under pressure to take a stance.

The BtB campaign shows that Oxfam was capable of constructively engaging with the FBCs and positioning itself as a 'critical friend'. Collaboration with investors also proved effective. Collaboration with other NGOs was, however, limited to those NGOs supporting the campaign on social media. The BtB campaign is a typical Oxfam campaign, and no strategic collaboration was sought with other organisations.

With regard to the land grab campaign, Oxfam has shown that it is capable of working in different configurations. It supported the UN CFS CSM, realising that movements and CSOs with their constituencies had to be in the driver's seat of the negotiations. However, no other actors were involved in the land freeze campaign, whereas Oxfam showed itself again to be very effective in partnering with other NGOs to influence the IFC and the WBG safeguards review.

The Mozambique case shows the difficulties that may arise when an Oxfam office engages with civil society networks to address land grabs. Differences in visions and strategies within those networks decrease the possibilities for Oxfam to address land issues effectively. Other challenges refer to the extent to which these networks have to align with Oxfam's objectives or vice versa. Another key factor that explains the success of Oxfam and opens doors of lobby targets is the reputation it has built over the past decades as a knowledgeable organisation. Its constructive engagement in development has been noted by others.

#### 4.6.1.5 Capability to achieve coherence

Both campaigns have proven that Oxfam is capable of communicating the same messages through its many constituents around the world, not only by using centrally produced publications and press releases, but also by means of preparing internal notes that provide guidance to all affiliates on engaging directly with their lobby targets. This capability implies that Oxfam is able to voice its concerns from different locations around the globe.

Working as a global organisation also requires that different perspectives and visions are taken on board. Within the confederation, there is room for such critical reflections, and these help the organisation to fine tune its strategies and to adjust them when needed. The land freeze campaign is one example where such critical reflections took place between those that stated that public campaigning was necessary and those that stated that direct engagement would be sufficient.

#### 4.6.2 External factors

Apart from the internal factors that explain the evaluation findings, some external factors have influenced the implementation of the campaigns.

With regard to the *land grab campaign*, no public campaigning took place after the campaign launch in September 2011 and the land freeze campaign in October 2012. In the first place, Oxfam's work with regard to the VGGTs did not require public campaigning, but the following external factors prevented public campaigning from taking place:

- In the first half of 2012, a final international conference was organised on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), on which Oxfam had been campaigning for 10 years. At the same time, a severe food crisis emerged in the Sahel countries. The GROW campaign had planned two activities in that same period: the launch of the land freeze campaign strand and the positive food

choices campaign strand, to be implemented together with the Rights in Crisis Campaign. The OI Campaigns Group (all Oxfam campaign directors) decided to use the momentum to campaign for the ATT and to prioritise the food crisis in the Sahel. It also decided to continue with the GROW positive food choices campaign, which required less lobby capacity and engaged more affiliates compared with the land freeze campaign strand, which then was postponed until October 2012.

- The land campaign team changed tactics in relation to the land grab cases published during the campaign launch. Media work and public campaigning were quickly scaled back when, in both Indonesia and Uganda, possibilities opened to seek redress for the communities involved through mediation.

No other external factors have been identified that influenced the land grab campaign.

The following factors provided the opportunity to the land team to continue its activities:

- The endorsement of the VGGTs, which became the international standard as of May 2012, was a key element in the remainder of Oxfam's land grab campaign. It was used in the land freeze campaign and also during the BtB land spike, when three FBCs publicly stated that they would adhere to the VGGTs and started to participate in the negotiations on the PRAI.
- The audit of the Honduras case by the CAO and the 'standard' management response of the IFC, followed by a huge outcry of global and local civil society and NGOs directly engaging with the Executive Directors of the Board triggered change within the IFC. The Honduras case was a 'wake-up call' for the EDs, associating the WBG with human rights atrocities, and this explains why they asked the IFC to not only review its management response but also to learn lessons from other audits, including those relating to land and FIs.
- The many other cases filed with the CAO and with the Inspection Panel of the WBG, including the CAO increasingly becoming more critical on investments being made through FIs, have helped Oxfam in targeting the WBG.
- A more general observation is that after GRAIN addressed the issue in 2008, many NGOs have started working on land grab issues and keeping records (land matrix). At the same time, forces within the WBG and the donor community started working on the improvement of land governance mechanisms in developing countries.

With regard to *the BtB campaign*, the following external factors (more appropriately the interface between Oxfam and other actors) explain the evaluation findings. First, most of the FBCs engaged constructively with Oxfam, which positioned itself explicitly as a 'critical friend' of the FBCs. FBCs' engagement with Oxfam occasionally depended upon their past experiences of working with NGOs and in particular with Oxfam. Second, FBCs were given an opportunity to correct or contest Oxfam's scorecard findings by providing additional public information. The tool hence became useful as an instrument for dialogue, but the actual scores were independent of any dialogue. The cocoa and land spikes engaged a number of field offices in case study research. In the case of land, a direct relation was sought between the FBCs and allegations of land grabbing. A number of cases were rejected, but the three cases used (two cases in Brazil and one in Cambodia) helped to associate Coca-Cola and PepsiCo with land grab allegations and contributed to their commitment to zero tolerance for land grabs. These cases helped the FBCs to see the consequences of failing policies and ensured the media coverage needed for the BtB campaign. As mentioned earlier, an important factor that influenced the extent to which FBCs reacted positively to Oxfam's asks is the feasibility of the implementation of these asks in relation to the FBC's own priorities and assessment of the material and immaterial (reputation) costs and benefits of these changes. For the integration of gender in the sector-wide

approach adopted by the cocoa sector as a means to secure its cocoa supplies, previous work done with ON gender in this sector helped to integrate gender issues in the sector because of the timing, and because the opportunities were present.

#### *4.6.3 Addressing land grabbing, a delicate issue*

Land rights, land governance and tenure mechanisms and land grabbing are sensitive issues in most countries. Initiatives to secure land rights for local communities and indigenous people challenge the vested interests of local and national elites who can easily access national authorities to get backing for large-scale land acquisitions and attract local and international investments. In many countries, communities and CSOs that defend their land rights face life-threatening situations that can culminate in human rights violations. This was the case in Uganda, Honduras and Guatemala.

These cases made Oxfam realise how sensitive the issue of land grabbing is, and it was a warning for other Oxfam field offices to research land grab cases in their respective countries that then became reluctant to propose cases. Many cases were also dropped after having been researched (costs). However, when the Honduras case and the Cambodia case, both publicly used, helped to introduce change at local level, more field offices started reconsidering researching cases.

The land freeze campaign targeting the WBG and demonstrating that they are involved in land grab cases also hit straight to the heart of the organisation and is to be interpreted as a very courageous act by Oxfam: Not only in developing countries do vested interests need to be challenged, but also at the global level it is important that multilateral organisations, donor countries and FBCs become aware that they are possibly involved in land grabbing.

In countries with constrained space for civil society, Oxfam at times needs to manage operational and brand risks, choosing less aggressive public tactics and opting to keep a low profile, with partners confronting national governments and other lobby targets. These situations require robust risk assessments, not only for the Oxfam office, but also for its partners. Risk management processes were employed in Uganda, South Sudan, Honduras, Indonesia, Mozambique, Cambodia, Guatemala and Brazil, where Oxfam looked at land cases, but this remains a concern.<sup>242</sup>

### **4.7 Overview of main alliance-level findings**

This section concludes the main findings on the land grab and BtB campaigns, followed by reflections.

#### *4.7.1 Conclusions*

The conclusions formulated here follow the evaluation questions as mentioned in the terms of reference for the evaluation.

##### **4.7.1.1 Outcomes achieved to which Oxfam contributed**

Both campaigns have achieved outcomes that relate to agenda setting, changing policies and changing practices at global level, in donor countries like the Netherlands and in developing countries.

Since September 2011, the land grab campaign has been able to reach many citizens, governments, companies, investors and multilateral institutions through global media coverage. It raised the awareness of the WBG, traditional donor countries like the Netherlands (other countries unknown), FBCs and a number of investors in the Netherlands that they possibly may be involved in land grabbing themselves. A very critical outcome was the endorsement of the progressive VGGTs by the UN CFS, based on which Oxfam managed to obtain public commitments from the WBG and FBCs to integrate these guidelines in their own policies and practices. The WBG has integrated land and

tenure rights in the first draft of its Environmental and Social Safeguards, and the IFC has introduced new guidelines and practices that enable it to better understand how its investments, also through FIs, are affecting the livelihoods of local communities, in particular with regard to large-scale land acquisitions. For both the safeguards and the IFC, these are important changes, but more changes will be needed to ensure that the WBG's own ambition to 'do no harm' and to contribute to positive development outcomes for local people will materialise.

Four of the 10 FBCs targeted in the BtB campaign have committed to 'zero tolerance' for land grabbing and have consequently changed their policies and taken an active stance in addressing land grabbing in their supply chains. This outcome was unexpected, because Oxfam planned to convince one FBC to commit to zero tolerance. Apart from these, four other FBCs and a number of traders have changed their policies by adhering to the principle of FPIC.

In the Netherlands, a number of Dutch investors have also changed their policies with regard to land grabbing. The Minister of Foreign Trade and International Cooperation is playing an active role in ensuring that the Dutch private sector is taking measures to prevent land grabbing taking place in their investments and supply chains. The Minister is also addressing land grabbing in international fora, and the Dutch banks have improved their policies.

A number of land grab cases have been (partially) solved (Uganda, Indonesia, Honduras, Guatemala, South Sudan), and others were addressed but not yet solved (Brazil, Cambodia). Those cases that involved the IFC also led to the policy changes within the IFC.

These outcomes for the land grab campaign do not represent all possible outcomes of this campaign, such as could have taken place in other donor countries or in developing countries where Oxfam offices and their partners have addressed land grabbing.

The BtB campaign has been globally commended for its innovative approach, and it was the first time that land grab issues were addressed through a full value chain accountability approach in the food and beverage sector. Its media coverage was huge: Some 50 million people have been exposed to the campaign, over 700,000 people took action and over 33 investors support the campaign. The land spike again raised the attention of the Dutch government and parliament about the role of Dutch investors in land acquisitions abroad.

Seven FBCs improved their policies with regard to the integration of gender in their value chains, and three are currently changing their practices through a sector-wide approach developed by the WCF to integrate gender issues in the cocoa sector in Ghana and Ivory Coast as a consequence of Oxfam's campaign.

As was already mentioned above, FBCs have improved their policies with regard to land rights, and four companies have effectively started to address land issues in developing countries and raise the awareness of other actors on land issues by means of implementing policies in line with the VGGT.

#### 4.7.1.2 Relevance

We looked in particular at the relevance of the outcomes related to the VGGT, the WBG and changes in the policies of the FBCs.

The relevance of the endorsement of the VGGT in the wider land grab ToC is huge. The VGGT are currently *the* standard for land governance and tenure, and multilateral institutions and donor countries invest resources to implement these in developing countries: The Global Donor Working Group on Land has synthesised all of their land-related work and claim to be involved in 554 projects



in 125 countries with a total value of 4.6 billion USD, the FAO alone is running VGGT promotion in 30+ countries and the EU considerably increased its budget for the implementation of the VGGTs in 2014 and 2015. The VGGTs have also been endorsed by Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, Unilever and Nestlé, who committed to 'zero tolerance to land grabbing', and interpreted by private sector initiatives such as the UN Global Compact. Oxfam affiliates, country offices and Oxfam partners also consider the VGGT relevant for the strategies they develop to influence policies in their countries.

The relevance of the WBG outcomes achieved gives a more nuanced picture. Although progress has been made in outcomes because of Oxfam's work, it is as yet too early to assess spin-offs. Oxfam considers the WBG the standard setter for development practice and for private sector investments, as well as the advisor of developing countries with regard to land governance mechanisms. It is assumed that investors who adhere to the Equator Principles will adjust their own standards in line with those of the IFC. The recently created BRICs bank, which is larger than the IFC, might in the long run dilute the impact of the WBG standards on the practice of large-scale land acquisitions and intermediary lending. Oxfam affiliates, country offices and their partners, generally speaking, state that the outcomes of the WBG are less relevant than the endorsement of the VGGT.

The outcomes achieved through the BtB women and cocoa spike and the land and sugar spike are very relevant because they prove that the assumptions of the ToC are valid, at least for the FBCs that were targeted. Apart from this, the campaign is also relevant because it mobilised the private sector to address the role of women and that of land issues throughout their value chains, which is innovative. In particular, those FBCs that committed to 'zero tolerance for land grab' have become an Oxfam ally and have begun to influence the governments of developing countries. Oxfam affiliates, field offices and their partners generally state that the BtB outcomes for land are very relevant. For gender, the campaign was relevant as an effort to support and protect the rights of the millions of women worldwide who grow cocoa through more efforts towards gender equity in cocoa value chains and through the WCF.

#### 4.7.1.3 Contribution

Within the land grab campaign, the evaluation assessed in the first place what the most plausible explanation would be for the IFC changing its policies with regard to FIs and land grabbing. The efforts of the CAO and the collaboration of a number of NGOs including Oxfam contributed to the CODE and the IFC Board of Executive Directors asking the IFC to review its initial management plan, which are unique achievements, because no other similar cases are known to the evaluator. After this, more CAO reports, ongoing dialogue and press coverage organised by the NGOs and increased attention on those issues by WBG staffers and Executive Directors all contributed to further policy and practice changes within the IFC. Important conditions for these changes to happen were the land freeze campaign that raised the awareness of the WBG possibly being involved in land grabbing, the NGOs working on the IFC standards and practices with regard to FIs since 2009–2010 and the alignment of positions within the Board of Executive Directors, in particular when the Bank was associated with human rights violations in the Honduras case.

Oxfam played a key role in these changes, which could not have happened without the organisation. In comparison with the other NGOs, it excelled in direct engagement with the WBG, in mobilising media coverage when necessary and in mobilising allies on time to publish CSO statements.

In the most plausible explanation of the outcomes of the BtB campaign, in particular those of the women and cocoa spike and the land spike, important conditions in place were that, for *most* FBCs, Oxfam's asks were feasible and matched their own priorities, and most FBCs are sensitive to

consumer pressure. For those FBCs in the cocoa sector, sector-specific concerns such as securing cocoa supplies and ongoing collaboration of the sector in the WCF also helped to comply with Oxfam's gender asks as a sector. In addition to having these conditions in place, Oxfam's regular update of the scorecard; constructive ongoing dialogue with the FBCs; public campaigning for Nestlé, Mars, Mondelez, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo and global (social) media coverage created the momentum for these FBCs to change their policies and practices. Oxfam used shareholder resolutions to further push those that were still hesitant after the previous combination of efforts.

The BtB campaign was designed by Oxfam alone, and it played a very significant role in achieving the outcomes. As was already stated, the campaign is a very new way of campaigning private sector organisations. A number of NGOs already work with scorecards but do not follow up on these with public campaigns and direct engagement in the way that Oxfam does.

#### 4.7.1.4 Cost efficiency and effectiveness

This assessment looked at cost-effectiveness, which usually has bigger consequences for effective allocation than cost efficiency. The most important costs for both the land grab campaign and the BtB campaign are staffing costs, followed by costs related to public campaigning, for the BtB campaign in particular.

The most important changes over the years consist of the GROW campaign architecture becoming leaner in order to facilitate the participation of smaller Oxfam affiliates and country offices in the decision making of particular campaign strands. Occasionally, however, the participation of and ownership by Oxfam affiliates of parts of the GROW campaign are not fully ensured, as was the case with the land freeze campaign. Some country offices also highlighted their interest in being more included in the global campaigns, beyond providing land grab cases, and were in favour of more impact at local level.

The power analysis has been generally used to adjust strategies for addressing lobby targets and reaching outcomes. For the land freeze campaign, this resulted in a decrease of necessary staff capacity after the launch. The power analysis is part and parcel of all campaign activities. *Risk mitigation plans* became part of the land grab campaign when the land team began its research work on land grab cases in Uganda and Indonesia in 2011. These plans are meant not only to assess security risks and to change strategies when needed, but also to assess reputational risks.

The sharing of resources is a key element in both the land team and the BtB team. Apart from the team leads, all other staff is working on both campaigns on a part-time basis, and they are similarly working on other projects under the GROW campaign, which ensures that cross-team learning also takes place. The land team experts, for example, provided inputs for the BtB land spike, and the experiences of those involved in the ON Green Santa and Fair Banking Guide before the GROW campaign were used to design the BtB campaign. Within the BtB campaign, attempts were made to reinforce other Oxfams that do not have the private sector background required to engage with the FBCs. Both campaign teams are mature teams, and members have already been working with each other for a number of years. A key success factor for the campaigns is that all information is being shared, not only within the core teams, but also in the wider confederation as a means to enable other interested Oxfams to take part in the campaign at their own level. All products used for directly lobbying are also widely shared as a means to ensure coherence of messages across the globe. The BtB online platform is maintained in 13 different languages, and this helps affiliates to address their national markets.

Apart from some debate regarding cases used in the land freeze campaign, all other products published by Oxfam were very well received by the global media, consumers and citizens, and are to be considered a reference for those who want to address land grabbing or influence the food and beverage sector.

#### 4.7.1.5 Explaining factors

The most important internal factors that explain the evaluation findings are the following:

- Oxfam's capacity to design ToCs and intervention strategies that aim for systemic change and their continuous adjustment of intervention strategies based on power analyses. Some outcomes achieved in the land grab and BtB campaigns have triggered other actors to take action. However, more efforts are needed to start delivering outcomes at country level. (capability to deliver on outcomes)
- Teams are in place and are highly experienced, know how to work together and have the intrinsic motivation to do a better job. However, for some affiliates and country office staff, capacity is a constraining factor to their full participation in the campaign. The land freeze campaign put the entire confederation under pressure, and commitment to participate dropped for some affiliates, whereas others were more convinced that they were on the right track to achieve outcomes with the WBG. The BtB campaign, based on previous experiences, became very creative over the course of the campaign, and this helped to involve considerably more consumers and allies (NGOs) in the public campaign. (capability to act and commit)
- The Oxfam Confederation is a learning organisation. Learning takes place at multiple levels: Are we doing things right?; Are we doing the right things? And how do we decide that we are doing the right thing? This triple-loop learning (Argyris) is a very important capability of the organisations. (capability to adapt and self-renew)
- During both campaigns, Oxfam has demonstrated that it is capable of relating to a wide range of actors that help them to achieve outcomes. The Oxfam Mozambique case shows how difficult it sometimes is to work with a civil society that has diverse opinions of how to address land grabbing and change policies. Apart from this, Oxfam has a good reputation and knows what it is talking about, which helps to open doors with lobby targets. (capability to relate)
- Oxfam has demonstrated itself capable of speaking with one voice around the globe. Working as a global organisation requires the availability of space for critical reflection. For Oxfam, this is an asset, which keeps the organisation sharp with regard to its intervention strategies. (capability to achieve coherence)

With regard to external factors that explain the evaluation findings, the endorsement of *progressive* VGGTs helped Oxfam to include these VGGTs in its further campaign activities. The many cases filed with the CAO and the WBG Inspection Panel also helped to address land grabbing with the WBG. An external factor that triggered the changes in the IFC is its weak management response to the CAO audit of the Honduras case, which associated the WBG with human rights atrocities. This provided a window of opportunity for Oxfam and the NGOs it worked with to push further. Consequently, the IFC was asked to draw lessons from all CAO audits, including those related to land and FIs, leading to changes in its policies and practices.

Important external factors that explain the outcomes of the BtB campaign consist of the constructive dialogue in which FBCs engaged based on the scorecard and the land grab cases used in the land spike that helped Coca-Cola and PepsiCo to see how they were involved in land grabs. The feasibility

of the implementation of Oxfam's asks and the benefits of these changes for the FBCs were also external factors that explain the outcomes obtained.

With regard to the issues at hand, we observe that land rights for poor people are an important livelihood asset and that initiatives to secure these rights challenge vested interests of local and national elites, possibly leading to life-threatening situations for civil society organisations that defend these rights. Addressing these issues requires sound risk mitigation plans and practices to be in place in support of those organisations. The land grab campaign also made the WBG, donor countries and FBCs aware that they are sometimes involved in land grabbing. Oxfam's work has been ground breaking in this respect.

#### *4.7.2 Reflections*

Working on this assessment for two years has enabled me as an evaluator to learn a great deal about the Oxfam land grab and BtB campaigns, which I would like to share here.

##### *4.7.2.1 Triggering change and tipping points*

Both campaigns were based upon ToCs that looked for systemic change, and Oxfam has, through its power analysis, managed to push the right buttons in these systems to trigger change beyond single components in these systems, as has been shown in the relevance section. Some changes automatically followed from others induced by Oxfam, as has been demonstrated with the endorsement of the VGGTs, the pressure on the WBG after the IFC had published its standard response to the CAO audit on Honduras, the 'race-to-the-top' assumption in the BtB campaign that became true, as well as the disclosure of supplier countries and suppliers by FBCs that helped other actors to address land grab cases with which these FBCs are associated. Additionally, with its public campaigning, in particular during the BtB campaign, Oxfam managed to create multiplier effects that helped to reach more than 50 million people. Although it is too early to conclude that land grabbing will be appropriately addressed and that gender will be addressed in supply chains, both campaigns have shown that it is possible to induce systemic change when ToCs are well designed and the assumptions prove to be reality. The years ahead will also show whether both campaigns are enough to reach a tipping point for transformative change in the food and beverage sector, as well as in the development sector, including the WBG.

##### *4.7.2.2 Pressure from consumers and citizens and building a movement*

A cross-cutting objective in the GROW campaign is to build a movement in support of fixing the broken food system in the world that explains why many people still go to bed hungry although they are directly involved in food production. Over the years, both the land grab team and the BtB team have mobilised citizens and consumers to take part in the campaigns and have become increasingly effective because they built upon past experiences and networks. However, it is still too early to think about a movement that autonomously engages in creating a better world, as has been seen with the campaigns; consumers and citizens react when they are being mobilised.

A question that remains unanswered is to what extent citizens are ready and in a position to hold multilateral institutions such as the WBG accountable. Global consumers can hold their FBCs accountable by creating pressure, and citizens can hold their national governments accountable as an electorate, but what are the accountability relations between the WBG and a citizen?

##### *4.7.2.3 Land grabbing—multiple actors need to be held accountable*

In many of the land grab cases documented, several actors are to be held accountable. In Indonesia, for example, the company has engaged in a mediation process with the communities under the mediation of the RSPO. To date, the company claims to have resolved all issues that it had the

mandate to, but a number of demands by the communities are beyond its jurisdiction and require the involvement of local authorities. The land grab cases in Brazil have in the past been addressed by other NGOs that held the state accountable because its land governance systems in place are not operational, whereas Oxfam used these cases to hold FBCs accountable. These, and some of the other cases, highlight that land grabbing and land issues are complex in nature and that neither private sector companies nor governments alone solve these issues. More structural solutions are necessary that refer to the need to have sound land governance and tenure systems that are able to do justice to smallholders and rural people in place and enforced in developing countries.

#### 4.7.2.4 Working in developing countries with civil society: linking local to global

The Oxfam Mozambique case study shows how difficult it is to address land issues in a country where civil society is divided in terms of the land grab discourse and campaign strategies needed to improve public policies and practices. This is, however, the reality in many developing countries where civil society is still highly dependent upon funding from foreign sources. This interface between Oxfam offices and civil society networks is critical for campaigns, such as the land grab and BtB campaigns, that aim to link global changes to local changes and vice versa. Oxfam country offices and their relations with civil society, including the capacity of civil society to form coalitions, are key elements that need to be in place before campaigning national governments to improve their land policies in line with the VGGTs will become effective.

Apart from this, given the nature of the issues at stake, security concerns need to be addressed properly and checks and balances need to be in place before land grab cases become public at global level.

## 5 Fair, Green and Global Alliance

### 5.1 Introduction

#### 5.1.1 Fair, Green and Global Alliance

The Fair, Green and Global (FGG) Alliance has six member organisations: Milieudefensie (including Friends of the Earth International [FoEI] and Friends of the Earth Europe [FoEE]), ActionAid, Both ENDS, the Transnational Institute (TNI), SOMO and the Clean Clothes Campaign (the last mentioned organisation is not part of this evaluation). The overall *objective* of the FGG programme is to 'contribute to poverty reduction and to socially just and environmentally sustainable development by enhancing the capacity of civil societies in the South'. The programme focuses on enhancing civil society's capacity in relation to four strategic areas, of which area three has been selected for this evaluation: 'to reorient trade and investment policies'. The defined outcome of the Trade & Investment Programme is 'International lobby [is] strengthened resulting in (at least) four Southern governments and two European governments taking measures to improve coherence between international trade and investment policies and development policies'.

#### 5.1.2 Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis is composed of the work on two main themes: 1) trade and investment agreements and 2) biofuels. In the specific case studies, we analyse the situation in more detail in one case on biofuels in Indonesia (Jatropha growing in Central Java) and one case on international trade agreements in Asia (EU- ASEAN FTA campaign).

The work of the FGG Alliance focuses on a range of trade and investment agreements. In the baseline report in 2012, the following contextual factors were highlighted. In around 2005, there was a move within the EU from a de facto moratorium on new free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations to stimulating activities in this realm. This has been brought about by factors such as 1) the difficulties in multilateral negotiations within the WTO; 2) the need for the EU to respond to the US trade policy, which saw FTAs as a bilateral means to the end of multilateral liberalisation and rule making and 3) the burgeoning economic growth in Asia and the conclusion of a range of FTAs that has accompanied this growth.<sup>243</sup>

Through bilateral and international trade and investment agreements, corporations have acquired the power to sue governments in private international arbitration panels and dispute settlement bodies, such as the WB's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), if governments introduce legislation that may negatively affect profits. A decade ago, there was much optimism about the potential of foreign direct investment as 'an engine of development'. However, globalisation, monetarism and liberalisation have given companies greater global influence and legal rights without a parallel increase in measures that ensure accountability.

Only since the EU Lisbon treaty (2007) have investment agreements been part of the mandate of the European Commission. The existing 1,500 bilateral investment agreements between EU member states and third countries have to be replaced in the coming 10 years. This is an opportunity to make a new generation of treaties.

Major changes in the external context since 2011—the start of the MFS II funding programme—besides those described in the chapter on outcomes to which FGG contributed, are the following: 1) In November 2012, in the Netherlands, the mandate for foreign and international trade was transferred from the Ministry of Economic Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whereby development cooperation and international trade became the mandate of one minister. This means

that, at the Dutch policy level, issues related to international trade agreements can be more easily related to development policies. 2) In 2013, the EU and the US started negotiations about a free trade agreement (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP); this gave CSOs the opportunity to bring the issue of international arbitration and dispute settlement bodies to the forefront. 3) WTO negotiations seemed to revive by reaching agreement in Bali in December 2013, but later, in August 2014, the government of India announced that it refused to sign the compromise on food security issues.<sup>244</sup>

In the baseline study, the following contextual factors as to biofuels were highlighted. Some 12 years ago, biofuels were considered by some to be a solution to the emission of carbon dioxide and at the same time an opportunity for developing countries and European companies to generate income. However, already before 2008, there were concerns about biofuels production competing with food, pressure on land and land rights, as well as concerns about the environmental consequences (deforestation and negative climate impact) and the fact that no criteria were set on these issues. In 2008, food prices rose sharply, which led to reduced availability of food for the poorest people in developing countries. This was also (partially) attributed to demand for biofuels. CSO protest against the role of biofuels increased sharply during 2008. Despite these concerns, the European Commission issued the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) 2009, which came into force in 2010. It set a 10% binding minimum target for the share of biofuels in transport petrol and diesel consumption. This was to be achieved by all EU Member States by 2020. The minimum target of the share of biofuels in transport petrol and diesel consumption creates an artificial market for biofuels. Biofuels are used because it is prescribed, not because they are cheaper or better than fossil fuels. Apart from biofuels for transport, there are two other important uses of biomass: biokerosene and woody biomass production for electricity and heat. For biokerosene, the use in 2102 was very limited, but the European aviation industry has launched a plan to use two million tons of biokerosene in 2020.

Major changes in the external biofuel context since 2011—the start of the MFS II funding programme—besides those described in the chapter on outcomes to which FGG contributed, are the following: 1) In the Netherlands, a new coalition government came into power. This government is more inclined to honour issues brought in by NGOs. 2) In the Netherlands in September 2013, the Dutch government, the energy sector and NGOs signed an energy agreement. The process of negotiating the agreement gave NGOs the opportunity to raise their concerns about using biomass for energy production.

### *5.1.3 FGG Alliance: changes*

There have been no major changes in the set-up of the FGG Alliance since 2012. One person responsible for contacts on biofuels with Indonesia (and who spoke Bahasa) finished her contract in 2012 and was replaced in 2013.

### *5.1.4 Budget and financial management*

The overall budget for the FGG Alliance 2011–2015 was €24,468,560. For Outcome 3.1, which is the outcome to be evaluated, a total of €3,029,952 was available. Outcome 3.1 is completely dedicated to lobby and advocacy. The funds from Both ENDS, SOMO and TNI (in total €2,380,129) are to develop the activities around trade and investment. The funds for ActionAid (€149,823) are all intended for activities on biofuels, while Milieudéfensie's budget for biofuels is €354,216. In total, some €2.4 million of a budget of €3 million is targeted at advocacy for improved international trade and investment agreements. The spending on lobbying for changes in policies and practices around biofuels is some €500,000, which is less than 17% of the total for Outcome 3.1.<sup>245</sup> The 2013 annual report of the Alliance states that the total expenses (2011–2013) for this area of work were

marginally higher than planned. In 2013, of the total budget of €639,000, €184,000 went to Southern countries, €168,000 to own activities, €250,000 to direct attributable costs and €57,000 to management and administration.

#### *5.1.5 Types of activities developed by the FGG Alliance*

The following types of activities have been developed: 1) Production of public awareness materials such as factsheets, public presentations, publications and position papers, and distributing them to policy makers, other NGOs, academia and other interested parties. Media coverage, including opinion pieces and the provision of information to journalists, is also important; 2) Open meetings/seminars included the organisation of and/or participation in strategy meetings and seminars in Europe and in several Southern countries, also to build coalitions. This also included the organisation of workshops to inform stakeholders about consequences of FTAs; 3) Private meetings included meetings with decision makers in the EU, the Netherlands and sometimes in Southern countries. Important activities were advocacy work among Dutch and EU parliamentarians and (high-level) civil servants through expert meetings. Facilitation and organisation of visits from representatives from Southern organisations and discussions with policy makers in the Netherlands proved to be very effective. There were also dialogues with banks and companies about palm oil and other biofuel-related plantations and investments; 4) Studies/case studies played an important role. Examples are analytical studies of certain topics (e.g. the investor–state dispute settlement) and case studies (e.g. on the behaviour of certain palm oil or jatropha companies in Southern countries); 5) Actions/demonstrations were organised, for example in front of important (international) meetings like the WTO, Bali (2013) and the Action Week about the EU-RED in Brussels. In the South, FGG supported local CSOs to organise local stakeholders, for example against activities of a certain company; 6) Letters and petitions have been written, for example letters to Dutch ministers and parliamentarians, often signed by many CSOs, and letters to be signed and sent by the constituency of the FGG member; 7) Another line of activity was participation in governmentally initiated working groups to elaborate certain issues. In Ecuador, TNI was invited by the government to develop a ToR for the Auditing Commission on Bilateral Investment Treaties and is now chair of the commission. In the Netherlands, Milieudefensie participated in working groups on the Energy Agreement. 8) A last type of activity to be mentioned here was submitting official complaints, for example towards the EU (about the need to deal with social impacts of biofuel production) but also to the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO).

#### *5.1.6 Case selection and the role of the cases in the report*

In this report, there is a brief descriptions of two cases: EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreements Campaign and Jatropha growing in Central Java, Indonesia. These cases have been selected during discussions with FGG staff. Reasons for selecting the cases were the following: FGG collaborates a great deal with Southern partners to achieve their planned outcomes, so it would be interesting and important to see how that collaboration works out in practice in the South. The fact that in our evaluation team we have a member based in Sri Lanka created the opportunity to pay evaluation visits to the Philippines and Indonesia.

From the EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreements Campaign, one outcome was used in the contribution analysis.

#### *5.1.7 Data sources and analysis*

The major source was the information on outcomes, their relevance and the contribution of the Alliance, provided by the Alliance members themselves. At the request of the evaluation team, the FGG Alliance provided information on major outcomes, their relevance (according to the FGG



Alliance) and the contribution of the FGG Alliance. The Alliance supported the outcomes and their contribution with a total of 265 footnotes that referred to, for example, websites of the EU and the Dutch government where letters to parliament are published and websites showing evidence of FGG member activities—including their outputs, documents, publications, leaflets, etc. The evaluator checked all of these references.

For the cases in Indonesia (Jatropha growing) and the Philippines (EU-ASEAN FTA campaign), the Sri Lankan evaluation team member visited the cases in the two countries twice, with the first visit in 2012/2013 and the second visit in 2014. Prior to the visits, FGG staff was consulted on the emphasis of the assessment and suggestions were obtained on people to be interviewed. During the second assessment, the evaluator spent six days each in the two countries. Staff of the Southern partners were interviewed. In addition, external resource persons in the Philippines and Indonesia were interviewed to give their view and additional insights on the outcome and context. Simultaneously, inputs from FGG staff in The Netherlands were obtained via email. Some project-related documentation from Southern partners was consulted. For the jatropha growing case in Indonesia, one resource person in the Netherlands was interviewed (resource person G, see below).

Seven independent resource persons in the Netherlands, knowledgeable on biofuels and international trade agreements, were also interviewed. Resource person **A** works at a university and has expertise in governance, tropical agriculture and agro value chains (especially palm oil). Resource person **B** also works at a university and has expertise on sustainability and global food chains and has followed closely the ongoing fuel-food debate. Resource person **C** is Professor of the Law of International (Economic) Organisations and advises the EU on international trade issues. Resource person **D** is Associate Professor in international economics and European integration and has co-authored several books and publications on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Resource person **E** is a civil servant at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Resource person **F** is Professor of Financial Ethics. Resource person **G** works at a university and is an expert on social-legal studies and the coordinator of a joint Dutch–Indonesian research project on the social impacts of jatropha in Indonesia. The interviews were conducted by phone and face-to-face.

A limitation of the approaches and data used was that a relatively limited number of very independent resource persons that could be interviewed. Especially for the issue of Trade and Investment Agreements, it was difficult to find knowledgeable people. Additionally, people who were interviewed, also for ‘biofuels’, are almost always knowledgeable on only part of the fields that are covered by the FGG when they talk about ‘Trade and Investment Agreements’ or ‘biofuels’. However, this limitation was compensated by the abundance of materials and references that were provided to the evaluation team by FGG. It was almost always possible to verify whether a claimed outcome was really present. Likewise, it was almost always possible to determine what the Alliance had contributed to the outcome. It was much more difficult to determine whether that contribution was vital, important or relatively minor in achieving the outcome. To this point, it can be added that FGG never claims to achieve an outcome on its own. They almost always work in cooperation with other Southern and Northern partners.

## **5.2 Evaluation questions 1 and 3: Changes and their relevance**

The main evaluation questions for this section are the following:

- What are the changes achieved in the three priority result areas through international lobbying and advocacy on the thematic cluster ‘sustainable livelihood and economic justice’?
- What is the relevance of these changes?

For the two main topics (trade and Investment, biofuels), we first describe the original theories of change (ToCs) and the adaptations that were made during the implementation of the programme. We then describe the achieved outcomes, and, in the subsequent section, their relevance. The outcomes are classified into three priority result areas (agenda setting, policy change, changes in practice).

### 5.2.1 *Theory of change and pathway of change*

The ToCs summarised below are a reconstruction of how they were at the beginning of the programme in 2011 and were part of the ToC as formulated by the FGG. The two sections on the ToCs are followed by a section that describes what actually happened between 2011 and 2014.

#### 5.2.1.1 Theory of change: trade and investment agreements

According to FGG Alliance members, current international trade and investment treaties are incompatible with the goals of poverty reduction and equitable and sustainable development. The Alliance members aim for improved civil society involvement to enhance accountability and ensure that decision making does not conflict with the principles of justice, equity and sustainable development. This requires strong, transnationally networked coalitions of civil society organisations that are able to promote and influence policy in favour of development policy coherence. Therefore, the Alliance members aim to cooperate more strategically and build/strengthen alliances with networks in the North and the South. In the Netherlands, the FGG Alliance members were among the few organisations actively working on trade and investment agreements in 2011. However, the picture is slightly changing now, as more organisations show interest in the subject.

The Alliance focuses on several international trade and investment agreements and tries to exercise influence so that the texts and policies of each agreement are changed on the following issues:

- Food security and land issues: FGG aims for rules that govern the trade in agricultural commodities and processed agri-foods that are designed to support the right to food; the eradication of hunger and poverty; the fulfilment of basic human needs; environmental sustainability and global climate justice.
- Investor obligations: FGG focuses on diminishing excessive investment protection laid down in investment agreements and advocates the obligation of states to balance investor rights with the (inter)national obligations relating to sustainable development and the safeguarding of wider human, social, political, economic and cultural rights.
- ‘Universalised’ services: FGG focuses on the detrimental effects of liberalisation and deregulation measures (e.g. on the accessibility, democratic control, quality and affordability of [former] public services, such as water, electricity and financial services).

The importance of each issue varies from country to country. The assumption is that successes in changing texts in one agreement will help to reach success in the other. Therefore, although the agenda is extensive, it is one entity. The actual time dedicated by the FGG Alliance to a specific trade agreement depends on the developments in the negotiations and on available capacities within the FGG Alliance and partners.

FGG focuses on trade and investment agreements between the EU and India; the EU and various ASEAN countries; the EU and Colombia/Peru; and EPAs with former colonies of EU-member states, particularly the east African Community. EU decision makers including members of the European Parliament are key lobby targets. However, Dutch decision makers have (decision-making) competence as well. Lobbying and advocacy at the European level is done in conjunction with partners outside the Alliance, mostly in the context of the Seattle to Brussels (S2B) network,<sup>246</sup> of

which SOMO, Both ENDS and TNI are active members. The continuation of the work by these non-FGG partners and the S2B network on trade and investment is a critical condition for the success of the FGG Alliance (and vice versa). For influencing the above-mentioned agreements, FGG developed ToCs that are comparable for the various countries. (See also Figure 6.1.)

The FGG Alliance's aim in its work on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) is to have changes in the text or to cancel<sup>247</sup> BITs between the Netherlands and Southern countries. There are two lines of action. One line of action is through Dutch decision makers, who should become critically aware of the development dimensions of BITs. Dutch MPs should be encouraged to call for an investment policy that is more coherent with development policies. Therefore, it is necessary to create public support (in the Netherlands and the EU) for an improved investment policy. This has to be realised by influencing the general public, requiring media work on the negative impacts of Dutch investment policies. It is accompanied by advocacy and lobbying towards the decision makers. To make this possible, it is important to do baseline mapping on decision-making processes on Dutch BITs. For this, it is necessary to do research on Dutch BITs and their possible negative impact. It is also important to organise international CSO conferences and debates together with partners to show the importance of the issues at stake and increase the number of CSOs that are critically aware of the situation.




Figure 5.1 Theory of change (situation 2011): trade and investment treaties (source: elaborated by evaluation team and based on discussions with, and approved by FGG)

A second line of action is through activities in the Southern country or countries. The aim here is to make Southern decision makers critically aware of the coherence dimensions of BITs. This will be promoted by supporting CSOs in the various countries and by cooperating with them. A supporting activity is the development of a CSO-driven 'Alternative Trade Mandate', a document with concrete (positive) proposals for trade and investment agreements. These proposals will be used in the lobby and advocacy work. The development of cooperation between the Northern and Southern partners is critical to achieve success. Southern partners are supported, and cooperation is also established. This is all necessary to build effective networks. The Southern partners can influence their own government (who are at the negotiation table with the EU or the Netherlands) on the issues considered important for change. The pressure of these Southern partners is considered a key element of the intervention strategy. In the short term, it may require time and effort, but in the long term it secures sustainability and it also enhances the credibility of the whole effort. Ultimately, these Southern partners need to gain access to decision-making processes in their own countries.

#### 5.2.1.2 Theory of change: biofuels

The FGG partners Milieudefensie and ActionAid are both working on biofuels, but there are significant differences. The main focus of Milieudefensie in 2011 was the performance of individual palm oil companies, aviation (biokerosene) and governmental policies leading to large-scale oil palm plantation expansion. For ActionAid, the starting point is policy coherence for development cooperation, while for Milieudefensie it is the struggle against 'the green myth' around biofuels. The only aspect on which both organisations work is the revision of EU-RED and (ad hoc) Dutch targets for biofuel, which were planned to increase over 2012–2014

Milieudefensie focuses on three applications of biomass: biokerosene, co-firing woody biomass and biofuels for road transport. The three sub-programmes additionally must contribute to weaken the so-called 'green myth' about bio-energy.

At the top of the ToC is the objective 'no contribution of Dutch companies and Dutch government policies to environmental pollution, nature devastation and destruction of natural livelihoods resources in the South'. It should be noted that 'Dutch governmental policies' also includes the Dutch government position in the debates on EU policies. At the basis of the approach is the work on cases, developed together with partners in one or more countries in the South, which experience negative impacts from the production of biofuels. The cases serve to put pressure on a Dutch target company that is directly or indirectly linked to the case. The goal is that the company takes responsibility for the case and that the case is 'solved', which means that the situation for local people improves considerably. Another goal is that the company improves its general policies towards the South and supports Milieudefensie in improving the situation in the entire sector. Both the case and the change of behaviour of the company will make the Dutch government aware of problems in the South and how problems relate to Dutch policies. This should then lead to adapted regulations. The case work is an important element and reference for other work on lobby and advocacy regarding the biofuels issues.

Case work and lobby and advocacy are supported by informing the media about issues related to biofuels. Public support is organised through actions to have the public write letters about biofuels issues. Other supporting activities include the preparation of complaints to, for example, the RSPO and follow-up discussions. Coalition work with other NGOs in Europe and the Netherlands is vital to organise effective lobby. Collaboration is sought with scientific institutes and scientists to make a stronger plea.





Figure 5.2 Theory of change (situation 2011): biofuels Milieudéfense (source: elaborated by evaluation team and based on discussions with, and approved by FGG)





**Figure 5.3 Theory of change (situation 2011): biofuels ActionAid (source: elaborated by evaluation team and based on discussions with, and approved by FGG)**

According to ActionAid, the political and expert discussions on biofuels had, at the start of MFS II, mainly focused on environmental impacts and indirect land use change (ILUC). However, the negative impacts of biofuels on developing countries, and in particular on the food security and land rights of poor communities, should be put more prominently on the agenda. The ultimate target of

the ActionAid campaign is the elimination of harmful industrial biofuels in Europe. This is to be reached (largely) by two main outcomes/changes: the removal of the EU-RED target or the exclusion of the use of first-generation biofuels<sup>248</sup> and a comparable policy change in the Netherlands, preferably a cap on all use of land-based biofuels. A third outcome would be establishing strong social sustainability criteria for any—potentially harmful—biofuels imported through the normal market, but this way is not a key focus. The outcomes that are necessary all have to do with changes in policies and the behaviour of policy makers, parliamentarians, ministers and civil servants at relevant ministries in the Netherlands. Central is the outcome ‘the Dutch government becomes aware of concerns with biofuels; it makes public statements accordingly and takes position/actions’. This is because the Dutch government is supposed to be able to influence the EU on its RED policy and of course also has influence on national policies.

The actions are directed at both the RED policy level in the EU and Dutch policies on biofuels. Within the Dutch government, apart from the Minister for the Environment, the Minister for Development Cooperation<sup>249</sup> is considered important, as the biofuel issue has to do with coherence between development policies (taking, e.g., into consideration social aspects like women’s rights) and energy/climate (and trade) policies. Case work is an important input for the general work on lobby and advocacy regarding the biofuel issues. ActionAid uses cases and other research produced by other members of ActionAid International. It also produces and co-produces case materials itself. Case work is important, but ActionAid believes that more structural/macro evidence is also needed.

The ActionAid biofuel programme is part of a larger ToC that does not only tackle drivers such as biofuels, but also aims to strengthen local land rights and governance structures (including corporate accountability). These activities are not part of Strategic Objective 3 of the FGG Alliance,<sup>250</sup> so they are formally outside this evaluation, but results obtained there and results within Strategic Objective 3 could reinforce and complement each other. Important activities by ActionAid include coalition forming with other CSOs, dialogue with policy makers, research and case studies, supporting women and communities in understanding and claiming their rights, publishing reports and position papers, engaging Southern experts and activists in Dutch debates and organising debates, dialoguing with other key stakeholders and organising public opposition (petitions), including informing the media. Messages and influencing the general public are important tools.



## 5.2.2 Changes in ToC from T0–T2, or what happened in reality

### 5.2.2.1 Trade and investment

<b>Table 5.1 FGG Outcomes achieved in relation to the ToC Trade and investment treaties</b>	
<b>Outcomes planned</b>	<b>Outcomes achieved</b>
Overall programme outcome: 1. 4 Southern governments have taken measures to improve coherence between tax & investment and development policies 2. 2 EU governments (NL + EU) have taken measures to improve coherence between trade & investment and development policies	Achieved in South Africa, Ecuador, Myanmar, (Thailand), Philippines. Outcome Thailand eliminated after military coup  Achieved in Netherlands and EU
<b>Southern Africa</b>	
Changed text (or cancelled) in BIT NL–ZIM; and/or NL–South Africa	Achieved for BIT South Africa–Netherlands. Not achieved for Zimbabwe–Netherlands
Critical political discussion generated around BIT NL – ZIM; and/or NL–South Africa	Not achieved. Activities: discussions with South African government representatives about BIT with NL; Opinion articles in South African and Dutch press.
Dutch decision makers critically aware of dev't dimension BITs	Achieved
Dutch MPs call for a more coherent investment policy	Partially achieved: resolution in Dutch parliament which asks the government to do research on Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system
1. Public support for an improved investment policy 2. ZIM and/or South African decision makers critically aware of coherence dimension BITs 3. ZIM/South African CSOs (Seatini and TNI partner) supported & cooperated with	Not achieved, no outcomes reported
<b>India</b>	
Changed text (or cancelled) investment chapter in EU–India FTA	Not achieved
1. Indian decision makers critically aware of coherence dimension 2. BITs and financial/retail services liberalisation and deregulation	Achieved: see also WTO outcome
Indian CSOs supported & cooperated with	Achieved
<b>Europe</b>	
CSO driven alternative investment mandate developed and being used in lobby & advocacy	Partially achieved: Alternative Trade Mandate developed and published but not mentioned as an outcome and did not play a major role in lobby and advocacy in reporting period.
Changed EU trade and investment mandate	Achieved, most of all in relation to ISDS arbitration system
International CSO networks (IPS, NJGI) supported & cooperated with	Achieved

<b>Southeast Asia (ASEAN)</b>	
Thai and Phil. government increases democratic accountability in decision making around trade policy	Achieved
Unplanned	Coalition forming among campaigners from Southeast Asia (including the EU-ASEAN network) about free trade and access to medicines, rights to jobs, and livelihood, food and health. Network of NGOs organised in Myanmar that formulates strong statements about investment treaties negotiations; reactions by the EU delegation; and the government to hold a public consultation on investment treaties.
<b>Latin America</b>	
Influenced EU decision making around EU-Colombia Peru FTA	Not achieved
National members of parliament of EU member countries are aware and make use of decision-making power in FTA EU Colombia/Peru	Not achieved
CSOs in Latin America (Argentina, Uruguay, El Salvador) are supported and cooperated with in re development impact of BITs	Not achieved
Colombia CSO are supported & cooperated with	Not achieved
CSOs in Latin America (Argentina, Uruguay, El Salvador) are supported and cooperated with in re development impact of BITs	Not achieved
Not planned	Ecuadorian President publicly embraces TNI's report on ISDS and establishes an Auditing Commission that will analyse all Ecuadorian BITs and arbitration cases.
<b>International/WTO</b>	
Improved access to decision making for CSOs in trade policy and more democratic and transparent trade policies	Not achieved
WTO members are aware of negative impact financial service deregulation and landgrabbing/food security	Achieved
Not planned	An FGG report on ISDS being used by the UNCTAD. A Canadian MP reacts to the TNI report, as well as a political party in New Zealand and a German MP.
<b>EPA</b>	
Changed text (or cancelled) in ESA EPA	Partially achieved.
Decision makers are aware of GSP as an alternative for EPAs	Not achieved
Kenyan government and the East African Community negotiate a trade agreement that is responsive to the needs of producers	Not achieved
Increase awareness among Kenyan CSO on the link between human rights and trade (EPAs)	Achieved

The different steps as indicated in the ToC and Figure 6.1 have largely been adhered to. Important changes are the following:

- The countries where activities were developed differed from what was initially shown in the figure. However, it was already planned that work in countries would only be developed if opportunities were there (e.g. ongoing negotiations between EU and the country). Therefore, for example in Kenya and Colombia, not many actions were developed. However, important originally unplanned results on ISDS were booked in Ecuador. Activities in Myanmar were also not initially foreseen, but were developed at quite a large scale because of the negotiations between the EU and Myanmar on an investment treaty, announced only in March 2013, due to the country opening up.
- In India, there were important results, related to food security for poor people, also achieved within the WTO framework (India played an important role during and after the meeting in the WTO negotiations). In the original ToC, some work within the framework of the WTO was foreseen. However, in Bali (December 2013) an important meeting, the 9th Ministerial Conference, took place, and an agreement was made that included some provision on subsidies for food security.<sup>251</sup> FGG and its partners therefore became active before and around December 2013.
- At international level, there were unplanned results as to ISDS, related to the creation of much more awareness on ISDS. On EPAs, there were results, but they were not as positive as hoped for by FGG.
- In 2013, the EU and the US started negotiations about an FTA (the TTIP). This gave CSOs the opportunity to bring the issue of ISDS<sup>252</sup> to the forefront, which they did with quite some success.

### 5.2.2.2 Biofuels Milieudefensie

Table 5.2 Outcomes achieved in relation to the original ToC Biofuels Milieudefensie	
Outcomes planned	Outcomes achieved
Overall outcome: No contribution of Dutch companies and Dutch governmental policies to environmental pollution, nature devastation and destruction of natural livelihoods resources in the South	Partially achieved. See outcomes under ActionAid 2
Government adopts regulations re. corporate accountability and improves other policies	Achieved: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Dutch investors need to comply with international sustainability standards</li> <li>2. Progress in the dialogue, which the minister started with Dutch banks and investors.</li> <li>3. The Dutch and Indonesian governments announced in 2013 that they will cooperate in prohibiting the production (in Indonesia) and the import (in the Netherlands) of unsustainable palm oil</li> <li>4. One Dutch company did not receive 1 billion euro in funding for converting its coal fired electricity plant into a 100% biomass fired plant</li> </ol>
The entire economic sector (of the company at stake) improves its policy	Achieved: Awareness among the private sector about potential social and environmental problems when using biofuels. In the Dutch Energy Agreement, signed by the Dutch government, the Dutch corporate sector and Dutch environmental NGOs September 2013, the co-firing volume of biomass in electricity production in the Netherlands is limited
The company supports Milieudefensie in improving the sustainability of the entire sector, and in lobbying for governmental regulations re. corporate accountability and sustainable governmental policies	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Dutch investors ING, Rabobank, ABN Amro, PfZW/PGGM and ABP engage with palm oil companies Wilmar, Bumitama and Sime Darby to improve their sustainability performance</li> <li>2. Lufthansa and KLM are more critical when selecting their bio-kerosene</li> </ol>
The company improves its policies and operations, respecting nature and people in the South	Achieved. In reaction to the pressure, two companies state that they will improve their sustainability performance. The palm oil company Waterland has stopped its jatropa activities on Java.
Company takes responsibility in a specific case (brought up by Milieudefensie and/or its allies)	Achieved. One company accountable towards a multi-stakeholder committee in which the Kalangala Local Government in Uganda participated.
The (specific) case is solved	Achieved. One case successfully brought to RSPO Grievance Panel. In another case in Liberia, the government committed to supporting communities in protecting their land from further encroachment by a company. In Indonesia, a company stopped growing jatropa.

Here the ToC was largely adhered to. The evaluation team has made the following remarks:

- The scheme of the Milieudefensie ToC as outlined here is fairly generic and a simplification of what happened in reality. The ToC consists of many more steps. At the base of the work there are, for example, many advocacy activities (press releases, petitions, etc.) to increase public pressure.
- The ToC speaks about bringing information from specific cases directly to the attention of the company working in a developing country. However, in practice especially palm oil companies were not sensitive (enough) to the criticism, for example through complaint procedures at the RSPO. For this situation, Milieudefensie's ToC provides for choosing another primary target. In this programme, Milieudefensie took Dutch banks and investors

(e.g. pension funds) as targets. These started a dialogue with the palm oil companies in which they had invested.

- Originally in 2011 and 2012, there was much focus on biokerosene (in addition to the long-term focus on palm oil). The jatropha<sup>253</sup> case (see 6.2.6) was developed by Milieudefensie and its Indonesian partner WALHI because airline companies were going to use jatropha, or were going to use it as a legitimization for high biofuel targets. This situation has changed. Since 2013, Milieudefensie stopped its focus on jatropha and is continuing on palm oil. Milieudefensie has been busy with palm oil as biomass and biofuel since 2005 and is currently still working with its Indonesian partner on several palm oil cases.
- Both Milieudefensie and ActionAid also focus more on what was formerly called ‘conflicts on land rights’ and is presently often called ‘land grab’. This is considered a negative effect of the use of biofuels but is in itself also a theme on which to take direct action.
- In the Netherlands in September 2013, the Dutch government, the energy sector and NGOs signed an energy agreement. The process of negotiating the agreement gave NGOs the opportunity to bring in their concerns about using biomass for energy production, to set a cap and to ensure social and sustainability criteria. Milieudefensie, together with other NGOs, participated in several working groups.

### 5.2.2.3 Biofuels ActionAid

<b>Table 5.3 Outcomes achieved in relation to the original ToC Biofuels ActionAid</b>	
Outcomes planned	Outcomes achieved
EU: Eliminating harmful industrial biofuels in Europe	Partially achieved: Harmful industrial biofuels not completely eliminated, but reduced
Removing RED targets in EU policy, or excluding first generation biofuels from targets (2014, RED review)	Note: the achieved outcomes mentioned here are also outcomes to be mentioned under ToC Milieudefensie Partially achieved. The cap (maximum allowable mix) on land-based biofuels is lower than in the original EU policy
ILUC (indirect land use changes) in RED policy includes a phasing out of first generation biofuels by 2020 and obliges strong ILUC factors in CO2 accounting	Partially achieved
Strong EU Energy and/or Development Council Conclusions in response to report and corrective action is taken (social criteria, CAP first generation biofuels)	Achieved
2014: The Dutch Government takes a strong position on reporting process (demanding corrective actions) and RED review	Achieved
In NL first generation biofuels become unacceptable to public and politics and get banned from percentage	Achieved
The 2012 EC report on biofuels’ social impacts in developing countries reflects ActionAid’s concern (negative effects on land rights and food prices)	Partially achieved. Criticisms and suggestions from ActionAid on the baseline for EC reporting were partly adopted by the consultants (Ecofys).
2014: Parliamentarians and BuZa demand strong review of RED, ending target or excluding first generation biofuels	Achieved

NL: increase of biofuel target (as proposed end of 2011) is prevented	Achieved
The NL government takes a strong position on ILUC and first generation biofuels	Achieved
The NL government takes a strong position on EU reporting exercise: Need for thorough research on social impacts (in line with demands in 'fuel for thought' (end 2012/beginning 2013)	Achieved
Dutch government becomes aware of concerns with biofuels, makes public statement accordingly and takes positions/actions	Achieved
Development Minister makes public statements in Netherlands and EU expressing concerns on biofuels and highlighting need for good EU report, as well as taking measures/corrective action to prevent hunger and increase policy coherence for dev.	Achieved
Different government departments take active part in the debate (I&M, EZ and especially BZ). Development policy makers take active role in debate and are sensitized to our evidence and viewpoints	Not achieved, more emphasis on MPs, see next box
2013: Parliament demands corrective actions to the RED (stronger ILUC proposal, phasing out of first generation biofuels and stronger social criteria	Achieved
2012: Dutch politicians express concerns on biofuels and RED and acknowledge any concerns the 2012 EU report might include. This includes parliamentary questions	Achieved
Not planned	Increasing acknowledgement of negative impacts of conventional biofuels on land rights, food security, climate and biodiversity; prominent people and international organisations speaking out In 2012, a land grab (Italian-led) jatropha plantation and large-scale deforestation without any consultation) was stopped in Dakatcha woodlands in Kenya In Sierra Leone, the FMO-financed Addax sugar cane plantation company has returned some land to farmers and is in the process of changing its farmer development programme (2014)

In general, the outcomes are according to the ToC. Some planned outcomes were partially achieved. At EU level, policy changes are the outcome of a compromise, so achieving 100% of your goals is almost impossible. There were some unplanned outcomes as to land grab. Land grab has strong relations with biofuels, but it is not the same. It is difficult to separate these fields of action.

ActionAid also had a specific line of activities for this issue, but that line was not part of this evaluation.

#### 5.2.2.4 Some observations on the ToC of the FGG Alliance

There certainly were changes in the practice of implementation of the ToC. The original ToC was elaborated by the evaluation team with input and approval from FGG. In practice, while implementing the programme, several opportunities came up, and FGG reacted on these. FGG did not take the original ToC and adapt it; however, the changes they made were deliberate. In discussions within their organisations, such changes are discussed.

As mentioned in Section 6.2.1.2, Milieudéfense and ActionAid are both working on biofuels, but there are significant differences. The main focus of Milieudéfense in 2011 was the performance of individual palm oil companies, aviation (biokerosene) and governmental policies leading to large-scale oil palm plantation expansion. For ActionAid, the starting point is policy coherence for development cooperation. The only aspect on which both organisations work is the revision of EU-RED and (ad hoc) Dutch targets for biofuel. In practice, both approaches have reinforced each other. There was, as far as the evaluators could judge, no competition, but rather a cooperation when necessary. Both organisations worked on 'biofuels' but within this theme different aspects, which need different competences in the respective organisations, were emphasised. Therefore, this way of working is evaluated positively by the evaluation team.

### 5.2.3 *Changes achieved in trade and investment*

#### 5.2.3.1 Changes in agenda setting

Agenda setting on investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS):

- In December 2013, the Dutch government acknowledged the potential negative effects of investment policies and EU investment treaties for the first time. This marks an important change in the discourse on the right to regulate and reforms in the ISDS system. (target reacts)
- The Dutch government announces research: In November 2013, the Dutch government, because of a resolution of the parliament in response to FGG advocacy, announced research into possible social and environmental costs and consequences of ISDS in TTIP and in Dutch BITs. (terms of the debate influenced)
- FGG member TNI was invited to address the Ministerial Meeting of Latin American States Affected by Transnational Interests, in Guayaquil, Ecuador, on 22 April 2013, where governments of 12 Latin American countries were present. (terms of the debate influenced)
- The Foreign Affairs Minister of Ecuador tweeted a recommendation to his 39,000 followers to read the TNI report on the international arbitration system (ISDS). (terms of the debate influenced)
- The TNI report is brought to the attention of the people interested in developments in and around UNCTAD. It is referenced in UNCTAD's *Recent developments in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) No. 1, March 2013*. In June 2013, the report is referenced in UNCTAD's *Reform of investor-state dispute settlement: in search of a roadmap* as a reference to the literature that documents the deficiencies in the ISDS system. (terms of the debate influenced)
- In Canada, a member of parliament reacted to the TNI report, and raised the issue on the floor of parliament. The co-leader of the Green Party in New Zealand launched the *Profiting from injustice* report during a press conference. German MEP Ska Keller posted the report on the front page of her website. (target reacts)

- India started a review process and is working on an alternative investment agreement. It has been reported that, under this new proposal, investors will not be able to challenge the legality of an unfavourable verdict from the Supreme Court of India and that they would have to exhaust remedies under local laws before seeking international arbitration under bilateral investment protection agreements. (target reacts)
- Agenda setting on BITs between the EU and Myanmar/India/ASEAN:
- A letter signed by 78 Myanmar CSOs to the EU and member state trade ministries called for proper consultation and due time for all stakeholders in Myanmar to first begin understanding what investment treaties entail. (organisation of actors)
- The EU delegation in Myanmar responded to Myanmar CSO concerns. (target reacts)
- A strong statement by 223 Myanmar CSOs stated that this is not the moment (2014) to negotiate investment treaties. (terms of the debate influenced)
- ASEAN Leaders are aware of the position of the EU-ASEAN network as to FTAs, for example on threats to peoples' access to medicines and right to health and investment-state arbitration. (terms of the debate influenced)
- The Philippines Platform organised and led discussions with top trade negotiators of the Philippines. (opening of closed spaces)

Agenda setting on EPAs:

- On 12 September 2012, the EU Parliament rejected the 2011 proposal made by the EU Commission and demanded the postponement of the Market Access Regulation deadline from 1 Jan 2014 to 1 Jan 2016. (target reacts)
- Coalition forming within Europe: Immediately after the European Commission proposed on 30 September 2011 to withdraw market access under the Market Access Regulation (MAR) 1528/2007 by 1 January 2014, the core groups of NGOs in the EU working on EPAs picked up this issue and formed a coalition. This core group consisted of 11.11.11 (Belgium), Both ENDS (the Netherlands), Traidcraft (UK), Afrikagrupperna (Sweden) and APRODEV (EU-wide). (organisation of actors)

### 5.2.3.2 Changes in policy

Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS):

- In a November 2013 leaflet, the European Commission recognised that there are imperfections in the current system of international investment agreements and that there is a need to improve investment protection rules, '(a) Preventing investors from bringing multiple or frivolous claims; (b) Making the arbitration system more transparent: documents available to the public, access to hearings and allow interested parties (e.g. NGOs) to make submissions; (c) Dealing with conflicts of interests and consistency of arbitral awards (e.g. introduction of a binding code of conduct for arbitrators); (d) Introducing safeguards for Parties (this will allow states to maintain control over how the investment provisions are being interpreted).'<sup>254</sup> The President of the European Commission, Mr. Juncker, in his Opening Statement in the European Parliament 15 July 2014, was critical about ISDS.
- President Correa of Ecuador discussed the practices of law firms that profit from international arbitration cases, mentioning the TNI report, *Profiting from Injustice*, during the opening of the 128th Assembly of the World Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in front of 1,500 MPs and during the act of possession for a new term as President, and quoted from the report in front of 12 other presidents and five vice-presidents and delegations from 90 other countries. This clearly marks a change in policy of Ecuador (the non-willingness of Ecuador to



do business under the current international arbitration system), but it also puts the issue on the agenda in front of other presidents and high officials present at these meetings.

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs):

- In October 2013, the government of South Africa terminated the BIT with the Netherlands. South Africa's concerns regarding continuation of the BIT were related to the possibility to pursue sustainable development objectives and the government's capacity to regulate under a BIT.<sup>255</sup>

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs):

- In April 2013, after negotiation, the original proposal made by the European Commission was postponed by nine months (from 1 January to 1 October 2014). In 2011, the EU Commission made a proposal to withdraw (favourable) market access under the Market Access Regulation (MAR) 1528/2007 by 1 January 2014 for a group of 18 (developing) countries that, according to the European Commission, had not taken the necessary steps towards signing or applying (for those that signed) an EPA agreement.
- On 16 January 2014, the EU Commissioner announced the willingness of the EU to address the issue of agricultural subsidies in the text of EPAs and to stop export subsidies for agricultural products to those countries that sign an EPA.
- On 6 February 2014, the EU negotiators apparently agreed to less ambitious liberalisation requirements for the foreseen EPA with countries in West Africa (ECOWAS). Although the text of that agreement and its precise status are not known, the liberalisation requirement seems to have to been reduced to 75% or less. Several EU member state ministers suggested reconsidering the EU request that ACP countries have to liberalise at least 80% of their trade in an EPA.

Food security and the World Trade Organization (WTO):

- During the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali on 7 December 2013, the WTO members agreed to negotiate on an agreement for a permanent solution for the issue of public stockholding for food security purposes and put in place an interim mechanism to prevent related WTO disputes. In August 2014, India announced that it would not sign the proposed WTO agreement on trade facilitation, because it was unhappy with the progress of talks on food security that the ministers also committed to in Bali.

Changes in Policy (changed accountability structure):

- A TNI report inspired the creation of an Ecuadorian Auditing Commission that will analyse all Ecuadorian BITs and the arbitration cases against Ecuador. TNI was asked to develop the terms of reference of the Ecuadorian Auditing Commission on BITs and currently holds the vice-presidency of the Ecuador Commission. The Commission is currently investigating the development impacts of BITs and will report in December 2014.
- The EU initiated a public consultation on the ISDS in the context of the TTIP, and the negotiations on the ISDS chapter in the TTIP have been paused in the meantime. 150,000 individuals took part, with an overwhelming majority calling for rejection of the mechanism (European Commission analysis ongoing at the time of writing). In the context of the trade negotiations between the EU and the US, a growing number of organisations have raised concerns that the current arbitration mechanism will be used by investors against governments that promote regulations in favour of citizens and the environment.

- In early June 2014, the Myanmar government informed the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that, as a result of CSO and media attention on the issue, the Myanmar government was going to hold a public consultation on investment treaties on 23 June.

#### 5.2.3.3 Changes in practice

The Alliance did not focus on changes in practice, and no such changes have been reported. This is not surprising, as the theme is very much related to international policies and less to changed practices of governments and/or companies.

#### 5.2.3.4 Relevance of achieved changes in trade and investment agreements

For more detailed information on the relevance of each cluster of outcomes, please consult Appendix 3.

#### 5.2.3.5 Discussions on investor to state dispute settlement procedures (ISDS)

These are very relevant for maintaining the policy space of governments to regulate in the public interest. Increasingly, ISDS is adopted in the framework of wider trade agreements. The power of companies may threaten the sovereignty of states, or put whole policies at stake (e.g. environmental and social policies). Companies can sue governments, which results in enormous juridical costs for these governments to be represented in court. If companies get what they demand, high claims may result, but governments of developed countries may also face high claims. For example, in May 2012, the Swedish energy company Vattenfall filed a request for arbitration against Germany at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), housed at the WB in Washington, D.C., because of Germany's decision to phase out nuclear energy, which was ordered by the German government.<sup>256</sup>

The issue of international arbitration was important in the ToC (mentioned under 'investors obligations'), but no focus was foreseen on the EU–US free trade agreement (TTIP). The use of the TTIP negotiations between the US and the EU was an opportunity for FGG to raise the issue of the ISDS system in Europe. On arbitration issues, it is very difficult for NGOs to make a relation between the issue and the situation of the general public in Europe. It seems a very remote and abstract subject, but in the TTIP case, the NGOs and the Alliance were able to make that relation, including the impact of ISDS in TTIP for developing countries, and the issue has now also caught the attention of the Dutch and European parliaments.

Changing the current ISDS system in the US–EU TTIP is potentially very relevant for the Netherlands and the EU themselves, because it may save European states from expensive juridical procedures and high claims from companies. An important question is if the issue of international arbitration is on the agenda and/or is solved in the TTIP, will this also serve as a precedent for trade and investment treaties between the EU and Southern countries? The answer is a cautious *yes*, for the following reason: The EU seems to see TTIP as a kind of global standard, of which important elements could be copied in other trade and investment treaties. However, the discussion within the EU about whether and how to include ISDS in trade and investment treaties with Southern countries has not yet concluded.<sup>257</sup>

Especially in Ecuador and other Latin American countries, the awareness about negative consequences of ISDS has increased. For example, President Correa warned other Latin American high officials of possible negative consequences. In Ecuador itself, the accountability structure as to BITs and arbitration procedures changed. This shows that, in Ecuador, the issue is considered very relevant.

### 5.2.3.6 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)

The achieved changes were less pronounced, but relevant. Despite South Africa's termination of its BIT with the Netherlands and the achievements reached with respect to EPAs, there was little political progress with respect to the negotiations of BITs and EU trade agreements during the evaluation period, so there were not many possibilities here for the Alliance to (re)act upon. The following were important reasons for this:<sup>258</sup>

- Countries outside the EU, and especially large countries, are not eager to use the EU format for negotiation. (Other blocks of) countries want, for example, easy access to EU machinery for their markets or an agreement on 'intellectual property rights' in exchange for the easy access of their agricultural products for the EU market. The EU does not want this. In negotiations, there should be a mutual exchange, but there is a lack of agreement on what to exchange.
- The EU overplayed its position by focusing on unilateral emphasis on EPAs and liberalisation. As to the former colonies and developing countries, the EU could have focused more on combining trade with aid. Since approximately 2000, its focus has been most of all on free trade. This does not fit with the needs of, especially, African countries, which require a trade climate that provides security (mechanisms for diminishing fluctuations in prices of commodities—such systems used to exist). Moreover, the EU could have done more with its 'own' private sector in the developing countries, setting up projects for the long term. Costs of free trade are high in the short term for developing countries, and help is needed to make the necessary process of adaptation smoother. However, according to a resource person, in its aid policies, the EU focused more on trendy, short-term issues.<sup>259</sup>

Consequently, in general, if countries are well informed about the pros and cons of BITs, they will not be that eager to conclude one with the EU. Myanmar is a country that has lived more or less in isolation for the past 50 years, so many stakeholders (including CSOs and parliamentarians) were not aware of the possible pitfalls of BITs. Although this was not foreseen in the ToC, the Alliance undertook awareness raising actions that resounded in Myanmar society. The EU also had to react on this.

In its ToC, the Alliance focused on three main issues in relation to trade agreements. How do the achieved outcomes relate to these issues?

- *Food security and land issues:* The FGG Alliance was able to contribute on achieved outcomes on food security (WTO) but not so much on land issues. The agreement reached at the WTO ministerial meeting in Bali in 2013 included food security, an issue also raised by FGG in their ToC. For India, this issue is apparently so important that the December 2013 WTO compromise on this issue was not good enough. India wants to be free to maintain its system for subsidising small farmers to guarantee food security.
- *Investor obligations:* The Alliance was very well able to put this on the agenda in the Netherlands, Europe and South America, resulting in relevant policy changes. The discussion climate as to this issue has considerably changed in the direction of the position of the Alliance.
- *Universalised services.* FGG focused on the detrimental effects of liberalisation and deregulation measures, for example on the accessibility, democratic control, quality and affordability of (former) public services (such as water, electricity and financial services). The Alliance, in cooperation with other allies, brought up these issues in their Alternative Trade Mandate, but no outcomes were reported on this issue.

#### 5.2.3.7 Relevance of changes on trade agreements in general

The general objective of the Alliance was to contribute to poverty reduction and to socially just and environmentally sustainable development by enhancing the capacity of civil societies in the South. The stated outcome for Strategic Objective 3 is 'four Southern governments and two European governments taking measures to improve coherence between international trade and investment policies and development policies'. In Europe and the Netherlands, relevant policy changes took place. In Ecuador, South Africa, India, the Philippines, Myanmar and other ASEAN countries, changes took place in the way policies on FTAs and BITs are being discussed in the countries and, in some countries, the policies themselves changed. However, in the ASEAN countries, the emphasis is still on agenda setting outcomes.

#### 5.2.4 Changes achieved in biofuels

In the sections below, the outcomes of ActionAid and Milieudefensie as to biofuels are combined. This has been done so that a clearer overview on the biofuel issue and relevant outcomes can be presented for each priority result area.

##### 5.2.4.1 Changes in agenda setting

Biokerosene/biofuels:

- There was awareness in the Dutch parliament and government about potential social and environmental problems when using biofuels. On 20 February 2012, the Dutch MP, Mrs. S. Dijkers (Dutch Labour Party), asked written questions on the Dutch biofuel policy and on biokerosene policies that were based on the report produced by FGG partner Milieudefensie and its local partner on jatropha production in Java, Indonesia, for the European biokerosene market. In its reply on 12 March 2012, the Dutch government (Secretary of State for Infrastructure and Environment, Mr. Atsma) admitted that the value of the report is that it shows that the sustainability of agro-fuels must prove itself continuously and that it is good to continue checking agro-fuels on their sustainability. (target reacts)
- During 2012–2014, on many occasions the Dutch parliament called upon the Dutch government to introduce a 5% conventional biofuel cap in the Netherlands, to entirely phase out or limit conventional (first-generation) biofuels and to increase transparency on the origin of biofuels. (target reacts)
- Questions were asked in parliament on specific cases, such as the IOI palm oil company and about timber cut and land grab in Tanzania for biofuels in May 2012. (target reacts)
- A coalition formed of local communities, peasant organisations and several Indonesian and Western NGOs sent a complaint to the RSPO in March 2011 about the misconduct of the IOI group in Sarawak (Malaysia) and Ketapang (Indonesia). (organisation of actors)
- There was awareness among the private sector in the Netherlands about potential social and environmental problems when using biofuels. (terms of debate influenced)

Renewable Energy Directive in Europe and the Netherlands:

- International organisations like the IMF, FAO, UNCTAD, OECD and WB call for revising biofuel mandates. There is increasing acknowledgement of negative impacts of conventional biofuels on land rights, food security, climate and biodiversity. (terms of the debate influenced)
- In 2012 and 2013, Dutch parliamentary questions were asked and strong statements in parliamentary debates were made by GroenLinks, SP, D66, PvdA and PvdD about the social and environmental impact of biofuels. (target reacts)

- Dutch MPs spoke out strongly on the need to limit food-based biofuels and called upon the State Secretary to support the EC proposal and introduce a lower cap in the Netherlands. (target reacts)
- Criticisms and suggestions from ActionAid on the baseline for EC reporting (on social impacts of biofuels) were partly adopted by the consultants (Ecofys) in their report in 2013, which also referred to ActionAid reports. (target reacts)
- In 2012, the Dutch government (State Secretary of Development Cooperation Knapen) acknowledged the importance of adequate reporting and addressed the issue in a Foreign Affairs Council (of the European Council). (agenda setting, reaction of target)
- In 2013, the State Secretary of the Environment criticised the EC reporting and the lack of action proposed to mitigate negative social impacts, in particular on poor and vulnerable communities. (reaction of target)
- The January 2014 European Commission communication on post-2020 climate and energy ('A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030') does not include a sub-target on transport, nor any references to biofuels being a part of the future energy mix, which implies that, from 2020, the 10% blending target would be entirely dropped. This would be a great success for FGG and other CSOs that do not want a blending target. (reaction of target)

Palm oil, investments and land grab:

- Questions were asked about the palm oil company IOI in the Dutch parliament in September 2011 as a result of Milieudefensie's RSPO complaint against IOI. (target reacts)
- The political parties SP and GroenLinks raised questions in the Dutch parliament on 14 May 2013 about Friends of the Earth's Uganda case, and urged State Secretary for Finance, Mr. Weekers, to address the Wilmar case at the ING Bank, one of the investors. (target reacts)
- The Dutch and Indonesian governments announced on 22 November 2013 that they will cooperate in prohibiting the production (in Indonesia) and the import (in the Netherlands) of unsustainable palm oil. (target reacts)
- Land grab is on the agenda of the parliament and the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. There were parliamentary questions, many references to the issue in debates and policy letters and a separate hearing and debate ('Algemeen Overleg') on land grab (February and September 2013). Biofuels were specifically mentioned as a key driver for 'land grab', and the need was expressed for stronger criteria for companies investing in Southern countries, especially when public money is also involved. (target reacts)
- MPs proposed a motion (2013) and asked Dutch Minister Ploumen and State Secretary Mansveld (Environment) whether the government is financing any biofuel investments. Ploumen and Mansveld responded that they do not (directly). (target reacts)
- MPs asked the Minister questions on the FMO-financed biofuel plantation of Addax, and concerns were raised on land rights violations and negative food security impacts by Silnorf (Sierra Leone). State Secretary Mansveld extensively reported on Addax and ActionAid in a policy brief in June 2014. (target reacts)
- A large, government-led (executed by KPMG) sector risk analysis of corporate social responsibility for Dutch companies addresses land grab and, to some extent, biofuels. The final report is forthcoming (as of October 2014). (target reacts)

#### 5.2.4.2 Changes in policies

Renewable Energy Directive in Europe and the Netherlands:

Related to these issues, different relevant actors changed their political positions during a long process. All of these changes can be considered changes in the behaviour of an actor and are therefore outcomes (policy changes):

- The European Commission ILUC proposal on 17 October 2012 included indirect land use change (reporting) and a 5% cap on food-based biofuels, as well as phasing out subsidies after 2020 as food-based biofuels have little/no future (note that an earlier leaked draft was stronger).
- In Dutch government, on 18 December 2012, the adopted vote of Dutch MP Leegte of 1 December 2011 for speeding up targets for the biofuel mix for road transport from 2012 on (aiming for 10% biofuel in 2016 instead of 2020), was postponed by the new State Secretary for Infrastructure and Environment, Ms. Mansveld, and will only start in 2015. In the 18 December 2012 parliamentary session, the Minister also expressed support for the 5% limit for conventional ('first-generation') biofuels in line with the 2012 EC RED proposal, which parliamentarians requested to be implemented in the Netherlands.
- The European Parliament, on 11 September 2013, adopted—as a compromise—a position on the EC proposal including a 6% cap on land-based biofuels and stronger accounting standards for indirect land use change.
- On 12 December 2013, the Dutch government voted against the proposal of the Lithuanian president, as they feel it is 'lacking ambition': a cap that is too high, too little on ILUC and too little incentive for innovation. However, as no majority could be found for a lower cap, the Netherlands does support a slightly improved proposal in June 2014—albeit with reservations. On 13 June 2014, the European Council (EU Ministers) adopted a compromise position on the ILUC proposal that includes a 7% cap on food-based biofuels, some ILUC obligations,<sup>260</sup> an indicative non-binding sub-target of 0.5% for advanced biofuels that count double and some other sustainability references (but no reporting obligations).

Dutch energy agreement and biomass:

- Milieudefensie (together with other Dutch environmental NGOs Natuur & Milieu, Greenpeace and WWF-Netherlands) achieved that, in the 6 September 2013 SER 'Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei' (Agreement on Energy), the co-firing volume of biomass in electricity production in the Netherlands is limited to 25 PJ (a reduction of about 50% compared with the current government policy), and far-reaching sustainability criteria will be formulated for carbon debt, indirect land use change and sustainable forest management (FSC) in addition to the NTA8080 'Cramer criteria'. In the Agreement on Energy, which was signed by the Dutch government, the Dutch corporate sector and Dutch environmental NGOs, it is stipulated that the signing parties will also promote the Dutch sustainability requirements in EU discussions on European norms for biomass. Results of the Energy Agreement include a cap (maximum allowed mix) and sustainability requirements (social and environmental) to prevent 1) Dutch and EU climate policies regarding biomass from contributing to deforestation, loss of valuable ecosystems and biodiversity and land grab in developing countries (as well as in Northern countries like Russia and the US) and 2) the co-firing of biomass (e.g. via expansion of tree plantations or by logging existing forests that are replanted), which, on balance, results in an undesired climate impact (less forests, with less carbon stored in them, resulting in more carbon dioxide in the air).

Palm oil, investments and land grab:

- In June 2013, the Dutch government, and more specifically the Minister for International Trade and Development Cooperation, took steps to ensure that Dutch investors, when financing projects that involve land acquisition, comply with international sustainability standards (policy change): 1) The Minister will contribute to Dutch companies and banks leading in the promotion of better land governance and the prevention of land grab. 2) She expects investors to take the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the IFC Performance Standards as the norm in investments abroad involving land acquisitions, as well as in other investments. 3) She recommends that pension funds follow the Farmland Principles and that banks follow the Equator Principles. 4) It is crucial that investors develop binding agreements with the companies to which they provide financial services on the implementation of monitoring, improvement and complaints procedures, and on the compliance to these agreements. 5) The Dutch government will insist that the OECD puts 'due diligence in land acquisition' on the agenda of the Working Party for Responsible Business Conduct. The Minister has subsequently done so in the OECD Global Forum on Responsible Business Conduct, 26–27 June 2013.
- In reaction to pressure by Milieudefensie, two companies stated that they will improve their sustainability performance: 1) Sime Darby (Liberia) stated in February 2013 that it will apply Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) for its palm oil plantation concessions in Liberia Palm. 2) Palm oil company Wilmar International published a sustainability policy ('No Deforestation, No Peat, No Exploitation Policy') on 5 December 2013. This is despite the fact that no requirements are included in the contract with the Liberian government.

#### 5.2.4.3 Policy changes (changes in accountability structures)

Palm oil, investments and land grab:

- On 26 August 2014, the Dutch Minister for International Trade and Development Cooperation, Mrs. Ploumen, started a multi-stakeholder dialogue on land governance in which ActionAid, Milieudefensie, TNI, SOMO and Both ENDS, as well as several financial institutions, participate. The participating organisations can bring 'their' land governance cases into this dialogue.
- A multi-stakeholder committee in which the Kalangala Local Government in Uganda participated recognises the effects of illegal land acquisition for oil palm plantations by palm oil company BIDCO.
- A dialogue has also taken place between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FMO, ActionAid, Silnorf and Cordaid on the Addax oil palm plantation in Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, an ongoing dialogue has begun between the relevant stakeholders.

#### 5.2.4.4 Changing practices

Palm oil, investments and land grab:

- There has been progress in the dialogue that the minister started with investors ABN AMRO, ABP, Aegon, FMO, ING Bank, Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken, Pensioenfederatie, Pensioenfonds Zorg en Welzijn and Rabobank. Minister Ploumen reported on this dialogue in letters to the Dutch parliament in 2013. (changing practice of government)
- Dutch investors ING, Rabobank, ABN AMRO, PfZW/PGGM and ABP started discussions with palm oil companies Wilmar, Bumitama and Sime Darby to improve their sustainability performance. (changing practice of investors)
- In 2012, a land grab (Italian-led jatropa plantation and large-scale deforestation without any consultation) was stopped in Dakatcha woodlands in Kenya as a result of pressure from the

community together with ActionAid Kenya, Birdlife and local partners and with significant international support (petition) from European citizens, including the Dutch. (changing practice of a company)

- In a landmark 5 March 2014 meeting between the affected communities from District no. 4, Grand Bassa County and the President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the government committed to supporting communities in protecting their land (just over 20,000 hectares) from further encroachment by the EPO palm oil company. In May 2014, the Liberian government recognised the communities' rights to their land and resources, forcing EPO to retreat from their land (changing practice of government and, as a result, of a company).
- In Sierra Leone, the FMO-financed Addax sugar cane plantation company has returned some land to farmers and is in the process of changing its farmer development programme (2014). (changing practice of a company)

Biokerosene/biofuels:

- Lufthansa and KLM are more critical when selecting their biokerosene. On 8 February 2012, Lufthansa stated in a meeting with Milieudéfensie that it will not continue its pilot with Waterland International. On 21 March 2012, KLM promised that it will not start any purchase of biofuels from Waterland International. In its research, Milieudéfensie found that KLM is very carefully avoiding the use of any agro-fuel commodity that could have a negative impact on nature, people or climate. KLM started a weekly biokerosene flight to New York in March 2013 and uses sustainably produced biokerosene. (changing practice of two companies)
- The palm oil company Waterland International has stopped its jatropha activities in Grobogan District, the area where Milieudéfensie supported an in-depth study into the negative impacts of the extension of jatropha plantations. (changing practice of a company, see also separate case description)
- Dutch State Secretary van Mansveld (Infrastructure and Environment) stated in a letter to parliament (on 9 September 2014) that the percentage of *advanced* biofuels in 2013 was 60%, which is a substantial increase in comparison with 2011 and 2012, with 40% and 51%, respectively. More advanced biofuels, and less conventional, first-generation biofuels, are used. (changing practice of government and of society)

Biomass:

- The Dutch energy company Delta did not receive €1 billion in funding from SDE+ (a fund from the Dutch government for stimulation of sustainable energy production) for converting its Zeeland-based coal-fired electricity plant into a 100% biomass fired plant.

## 5.2.5 *Relevance of achieved changes in biofuels*

### 5.2.5.1 EU-RED policy

In the past few years, it has become increasingly clear that biofuels based on food crops or other land-intensive crops are not the sustainable alternative to fossil fuels that they were once thought to be. An increasing body of evidence shows that the promotion of biofuels by Europe and other parts of the world has resulted in rising food prices, land grabs and conflicts and biodiversity loss, often disproportionately affecting the world's poor, whilst failing to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. ActionAid, Friends of the Earth and other NGOs have long raised concerns about the impacts of these so-called conventional (or first-generation) biofuels. The EU-RED, which originally (at the start of MFS II in 2011) was a 10% target for biofuels, was therefore considered inconsistent with development and environment objectives.



The relevant EU institutions<sup>261</sup> now (fall 2014) have positions that are quite different from their positions in 2011. Therefore, these positions are considered policy changes, although no final agreement has been reached to date. Their current positions are more in line with what FGG and other CSOs propose. A remarkable difference from the situation in 2011 is also that, in the debate in the Netherlands, potential negative effects of biofuels are now often mentioned in the media.<sup>262</sup> These are important achievements, because they show 1) that at policy level the awareness is present that biofuels are not going to solve EU problems regarding carbon emissions in transport, 2) an increase of the allowed mix of biofuels is seriously limited now and 3) reporting on the way the biofuels are produced has become a serious policy issue.

#### 5.2.5.2 Dutch energy agreement and biomass

In its ToC, Milieudefensie mentioned in 2012 ‘co-firing woody biomass’ as a potential point of attention, without working out the ToC in that aspect at the time. The development of criteria for producing biomass is of course key for securing production in a sustainable and socially acceptable way. The Netherlands is currently (autumn 2014) the only EU country that has a cap and sustainability criteria for biomass, and the Dutch policy is therefore mentioned at the EU level as an example.

#### 5.2.5.3 Biokerosene

The struggle here is about unrealistically high biofuel targets set by governments and the EU, leading to poor people and the environment in the South paying the price of the unsustainable practices of palm oil companies. As a representative of WALHI (FoE Indonesia) put it already in 2008, ‘The Dutch and EU governments are acting irresponsibly by adopting biofuel targets when the feasibility of meeting them in a sustainable way is unproven and unrealistic, which leads to the conclusion that the Dutch and EU biofuel policies in fact constitute experiments at the cost of the lives of my Indonesian fellow-citizens’. WALHI called upon the Dutch government ‘to take Indonesian citizens from its learning curve’. In 2011, jatropha was still seen as a ‘miracle crop’ without sustainability problems that could legitimise high agro-fuel targets in the Netherlands, the European Union and in the policies of companies. Consequently, working on reducing biokerosene targets and showing negative aspects of growing crops for biofuels is very relevant. Most of the outcomes were achieved in the first years of MFS II, and they were important for raising awareness on the problematic character of biofuels in general (as indicated in the original ToC). (See also section 6.5.2, Case 2: Jatropha growing in Central Java.)

#### 5.2.5.4 Palm oil, investments and land grab

State agencies, banks and pension funds have started dialogues with companies in which they invest. However, implementation of actual improvements on the ground remains a challenge. Pressure by the Dutch government will help that implementation, and verification by the investors of their policies is taken more seriously by the investors, which and also leads to compliance with internationally-agreed standards such as the OECD guidelines. The relevance of the outcome may also be in the general engagement of the Minister with the issue of land grab for oil palm plantations. Banks are important players in establishing new oil palm plantations by providing investment funds. Groups in the South, such as FoE groups from Liberia and Uganda, have asked FoE Europe and its member groups to target investors about their investments in companies involved in land grabbing and to stimulate them to use their influence over these palm oil companies to solve the problems on the ground and to prevent further land grabbing. As a result, two companies have announced new policies. However, it remains to be seen whether these policies will indeed be implemented. An important outcome is that, at local level in Uganda, a multi-stakeholder committee was established

to investigate problems related to oil palm plantations. In Sierra Leone, a dialogue between relevant stakeholders has started. The changing practice of the Liberian government regarding a conflict on land rights is also a very valuable achievement. Such initiatives are worthy of being repeated in other areas.

#### 5.2.5.5 Relevance—biofuels in general

It is quite obvious that the relevance of the achieved outcomes in relation to the original ToCs is considerable. The general objective of the Alliance was to ‘contribute to poverty reduction and to socially just and environmentally sustainable development by enhancing the capacity of civil societies in the South’. It is clear that most of the outcomes within the scope of this evaluation are related to the North (the Netherlands and the EU), as described in the ToCs. The effects of most of the achieved outcomes for the South are indirect, but they are relevant. As a result of the policy changes in Europe, the possibilities to just export anything to Europe will be limited. The policy changes will also help to make the shift towards advanced biofuels. There are some outcomes related to changing practices of companies and of a government. In the joint cooperation between Northern and Southern partners, capacities for research, strategy and advocacy were strengthened.

The stated outcome for Strategic Objective 3 is ‘4 Southern governments and 2 European governments taking measures to improve coherence between international trade and investment policies and development policies’. In Europe and the Netherlands, relevant policy changes took place. In Liberia, the government, in at least one case, gave much more space to local communities to determine the fate of their land. This was an important change in the practices of the government in one case, but it remains to be seen whether it will have a follow up. In Liberia, Indonesia, Sierra Leone and Kenya, palm oil-, jatropha oil- and sugar cane-producing companies had to change their practices.

#### 5.2.6 *Were there other possible/desirable pathways of change?*

Do the changes, both for trade and investment agreements and for biofuels, really address the problem, or would other pathways of change (or the inclusion of other pathways) have been more logical or effective? There are two observations on this subject:

##### 5.2.6.1 Universalised services: are you aiming for the right policy to be changed?

The FGG Alliance, to this point, has not been very successful in achieving outcomes related to universalised services, which is part of the FTA discussions. On the two other main issues on FTAs defined by the Alliance as priority areas—food security, land issues and investor obligations (see section 6.3.2)—important achievements were reported. Why is there this difference in results? ‘Universalised services’ was a hot issue, especially in Latin America, in the early 2000s.<sup>263</sup> In Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador, privatisation was rolled back. The original idea of privatisation was that investors would pay for improved infrastructure construction, but the private investors also demanded higher rates (for, e.g., water and electricity). This caused massive conflicts. According to resource person C, this discussion is not and cannot be reflected in trade agreements: The treaties do not seem suited to incorporate this type of issue. As an evaluation team, it is very difficult to judge whether this opinion is true. The question we want to put on the table for discussion is, ‘Is it a good idea to bring “Universalised services” in as an issue under trade and investment agreements, or would it be better to define another theory of change to deal with this topic?’

##### 5.2.6.2 Biofuels versus the use of vegetable oils and ethanol feedstock for all purposes

The emphasis has been on the role of biofuels. The reason for Milieudefensie and ActionAid to focus on the use of palm oil, jatropha oils, ethanol from sugar cane, and so forth for biofuels is that the

growth (and the expected future growth) in the consumption of these products in the EU comes almost entirely from the biomass and biofuel sector, and this growth is entirely caused by obligatory government targets and government subsidies. The additional demand for palm oil is the cause of new land rights violations and deforestation, which is FGG's concern.

The limitation of the chosen approach is that biofuels are now separately distinguished in a specific EU directive that limits the method of production and puts a maximum on their use in Europe.<sup>264</sup> Negative effects of the production of vegetable oils, jatropha, sugar cane and other substances are not limited to their use as biofuels. Vegetable oils such as palm oil and soya oil are used in many products. However, the use of vegetable oils in biofuels provided the opportunity to react, because biofuels were also intended to contribute to sustainability (which often proved to be incorrect). Still, it would be logical to take into consideration all products that contain, for example, vegetable oils or sugar from sugar cane. That is what RSPO certification does for palm oil, but RSPO certification is much debated, while in a specific production area, only a small proportion of oil palm plantations are RSPO certified. Important markets in, for example, China, India and Indonesia are not interested in buying certified vegetable oil. When we focus on palm oil, there are several reasons why the oil palm surface is expanding: 1) There is a 5–7 year time lag between planting and harvesting. As a planter, you have to bridge the gap so you may start to cut trees to sell the timber (deforestation). If there were good credit facilities, then presumably there would be less deforestation. 2) More net production could also be achieved by increasing the harvest per unit of land (intensification), harvesting at the right moment and better processing. Hence, there are other strategies worth investigating, also for the future.

### **5.3 Evaluation question 3: Contribution**

The main evaluation question to be answered in this section is the following:

- Do the international lobbying and advocacy efforts of MFS II alliances and their partners contribute to the identified changes (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

#### *5.3.1 General description of the way the Alliance has made contributions*

The Alliance made many contributions to the achieved outcomes. A more detailed description of clusters of outcomes and their relevance is given in Appendix 3, where a brief and incomplete description of the contribution of the FGG Alliance for the specific cluster of outcomes can also be found. For explaining their contribution, the FGG Alliance provided the evaluators with detailed information that showed evidence of their contribution.

We begin with some perceptions from outsiders as to FGG's contributions.

- Independent resource person C mentioned the SOMO contribution as important for the ISDS discussion in the Netherlands and Europe. Independent resource person D mentioned one SOMO staff member as having good arguments in discussions on international trade agreements, although he did not always share the SOMO views.
- TNI co-published a report, *Profiting from injustice*, in English and Spanish, examining the key players in the investment arbitration industry. In his inaugural speech, President Correa of Ecuador mentioned the TNI report explicitly.
- In letters to parliament, Minister Ploumen sometimes mentioned explicitly the names of FGG members and their reports.
- Resource person E, a civil servant within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the ministry organised a conference on palm oil together with the Ecosystem Alliance and the

FGG Alliance. In such a situation, there is a dialogue and the different parties influence each other. The FGG Alliance had considerable influence on Minister Ploumen before she finished a policy paper on trade and development. FGG acted very strategically and in a timely fashion to exert influence on the Minister.

- Independent resource person B mentioned Greenpeace and FGG Alliance member Milieudefensie as important actors 'who kept the Roundtable on Sustainable palm Oil (RSPO) sharp' without being formal RSPO members.
- In a general consultation (Algemeen Overleg) of the Dutch parliament in December 2012, Dutch MP Jan Vos (Labour Party, now part of the ruling coalition) referred to persons from Kenya and Tanzania, invited by FGG member ActionAid: 'On the other hand, the NGOs also ask rightly for attention for the impact of the large-scale use of biofuels. I have spoken with representatives of soya bean farmers in Brazil, a biofuels expert from Kenya and activists from Tanzania'.

Below are two studies that describe in more detail the contributions made by the Alliance for two specific outcomes.


### *5.3.2 Philippines Platform on the EU-FTA Campaign and the EU-ASEAN FTA campaign*

The selected outcome to be discussed in more detail is from the Philippines case (presented in section 6.5), the EU-ASEAN FTA Campaign. The outcome is about establishing a platform and creating a network on the EU Free Trade Agreements Campaign, and was supported by the FGG Alliance. FGG provided capacity-building inputs to the Platform but was not a direct actor active in the Philippine arena. It was the Philippines Platform that lobbied the government to accept proposals from civil society on FTAs. The Platform's main critique was that insufficient attention is given to matters relating to intellectual property rights and access to medicine. After numerous attempts by the Philippines Platform, the government was open to having a dialogue with the Philippines Platform. This was a major breakthrough in terms of engaging with the government. The dialogue was held in September 2013. Some top trade negotiators from the Philippine Department of Trade & Industry participated, as did representatives from the Intellectual Property Office and the Department of Health. The Department of Trade & Industry invited the Philippines Platform to provide inputs to draft a ToR to have a system within the FTA mechanism/process to perform a social impact assessment. The Platform convened three caucuses on public health (to address access to medicine), fisheries (to address the issues of small fishers) and labour (to address the issues of workers' rights, which are under threat from new investments). The result was a proposal submitted to the Department of Trade & Industry within two months of the first meeting. The Philippines Platform is still discussing the issue with the Department of Trade & Industry, and funding might be an issue for the social impact studies, so a final outcome cannot yet be described. However, 1) awareness has been raised, and 2) the government has opened a space for direct dialogue on FTA-related issues.

Is it plausible that the Platform contributed to this change, or are there rival explanations? The answer is quite clear: The response of the government was made solely in answer to the request of the Philippines Platform. There were no other organisations that took the initiative and lead to make the request. However, there are many outside actors and factors that played an important role. (See Figure 6.4.)

Which actors and factors played a role? First, the Philippines Network worked hard to form a broad coalition. They mobilised organisations like the Coalition for Health and Transparency (CHAT), the Medicine Transparency Alliance (MeTA), Philippine Congress representatives, Health Justice, Action for Economic Reform, the Fair Trade Alliance and tobacco control groups. These are not the 'usual

suspects'; they are broad civil society formations whose interests go beyond FTA issues, but each had their own motivation to participate. The Philippines Platform had constant dialogues with them to inform them on FTA. In September 2011, the Philippines Platform drafted a joint statement involving these groups that strengthened the case for social impact assessment.



original elements of the ToC in black (a–e), outside factors in red and numbered i–ix

**Figure 5.4 The way FGS introduced Social Impact Assessment in FTA**

There are parties in favour of the FTA, such as large and powerful pharmaceutical companies (e.g. Pfizer) and the Pharmaceutical Association of the Philippines (PHAP). Many governmental departments lack sufficient capacity to influence the negotiations on FTA effectively.

The steps of the ToC (a–f in the above diagram) are based on FGG's ToC. In its implementation, the activities under different steps, at the level of outputs, have been duly accomplished. Therefore, such outputs could have generated a certain degree of results and outcomes. However, in practice, there have been other important factors and actors at play. They are presented in red in the above diagram (i–xi):

1. Contribution from 11.11.11 and other non-FGG partners and collaborators: 11.11.11 had been both a financial and a non-financial partner of FGS and the Platform. This collaboration predates the FGG collaboration, although TNI has collaborated with the Platform since it was established. Financially speaking, 70% of support towards the EU-ASEAN FTA Network (including the national platforms) comes from 11.11.11; the remaining funding comes from FGG through TNI.
2. Rootedness of the members of the Philippines Platform: The Platform consists of 34 organisations/networks that have been active in the Philippines for many decades and are well established, reputable and recognised entities in the context of the Philippines and beyond. Such rooted organisations bring their own capacities to the Platform.
3. Outreach and solid constituency of the Platform members: Some of the Platform members have a wider outreach and a solid constituency in terms of membership and volunteers. Such organisations bring in a diverse set of capacities to the Platform.

4. The issues at stake have been constantly flagged and pursued by various platform members. Therefore, the initiative to engage with the DTI on such issues is not purely triggered by their affiliation with the Platform; it has been a constant interest of their own networks as it related to their respective mandates.
5. The change of government, the current presidency and positive environment: Compared with the nearly 10-year Arroyo period of rule, the current regime and the overall environment is considered relatively positive. There is a more positive environment for non-state actors to interact with the state apparatus.
6. Positive attitude of bureaucrats: The particular senior bureaucrats of the DTI have been very open and positive in interacting with the Platform. The Platform identifies this as a reason for their receptivity.
7. Prior experience and previous contacts with bureaucrats: A key bureaucrat of the DTI, during a difficult situation in the past, had received in another function much support from certain NGOs in the Platform. The role of personal contacts, understanding and trust should not be underestimated.
8. Political capital and being part of the ruling government and close to the president: Some of the NGOs had very good contacts with a party in the ruling government coalition.
9. Social and political capital from broad coalition building: The Philippines Platform mobilised a broader section of civil society actors, not only the 'usual suspects'. These actors brought in their own networks. The social and political capital of people in these broad coalitions and their capacity to engage with the government agencies should not be underestimated.

What we can learn from this contribution analysis?

- An outcome of changing policies or changing accountability structures is hardly ever the result of the efforts of only one actor. The contribution of the FGG Alliance was only a small proportion of the total input of the Philippines Platform. This input cannot be traced back to concrete outputs, realised solely with the help of the FGG contribution. The input of the Platform—in total—was vital for realising the outcomes, but the outcomes were also the result of efforts of many other actors. The call for change and political pressure has to come from many sides to have an impact.
- Success is the result of long-term efforts and investments from many actors and cannot be linked to the efforts of one sole actor. Actors combine their knowledge, capabilities, networks and contacts built up over many years. For example, a very favourable factor for reaching the desired outcomes is a government inclined to listen to civil society and their arguments. However, this factor is not something that is completely beyond the influence of lobbyists. Open channels for dialogue are often based on contacts with key persons in the political and bureaucratic realms that were established much earlier, before they were in power. Different NGOs contributed with their networks to establishing contacts with these key target persons. Combining these networks is a factor explaining the achievement of the outcome. FGS, as a Southern partner of FGG, played a vital role in this.

### 5.3.3 *RED positions of the European Commission, Parliament and Council*

This chosen group of outcomes (policy changes) related to the EU Renewable Energy Policy (RED). The last outcome achieved before the end of our evaluation period (until October 2014) was the 13 June 2014 compromise position of the European Council (EU member state ministers) on the ILUC proposal that includes a 7% cap (maximum mix) on food-based biofuels, certain ILUC obligations, an indicative non-binding sub-target of 0.5% for advanced biofuels that count double and other

sustainability issues. This position was a reaction to earlier positions taken by the EU Parliament and Commission. The positions of the relevant policy makers (the EU Council, the Parliament and the Commission) show that, since 2011, the ideas about biofuels and related policies have changed considerably (although the FGG Alliance would have wished for more). So what did the FGG Alliance contribute to this important achievement? The contribution consisted of a range of activities that can be briefly summarised as follows:

- Research and case studies by ActionAid and Milieudefensie focusing on the RED policy and on cases in Southern countries.
- Public mobilisation (e.g. an ActionAid petition with 56,000 signatures from all over Europe given to the Dutch Minister Ploumen).
- Organisation of debates with the participation of Dutch members of parliament.
- Issuance of press releases around the votes in the European Parliament.
- Lobbying, particularly of Dutch members of parliament, by ActionAid and Milieudefensie.
- Organisation of a mass mobilisation week of a coalition of NGOs, including ActionAid and Friends of the Earth ahead of a European Parliament vote in 2013.
- Organisation of visits of Southern partners to Dutch MPs.
- Informing of civil servants in various relevant Dutch ministries.
- Social media actions to raise awareness with Members of the European Parliament
- Dialogue of Milieudefensie with Unilever and Rabobank may have contributed to statements of these organisations against the EU biofuel target (2011).

However, many other outcomes have contributed to a changing perception on biofuels and their supposed benefits for realising climate targets, at the level of the general public and media, but also among policy makers. These are outcomes related to the following:

- The RSPO, the palm oil company IOI and palm oil companies in general, as well as their investors: Activities undertaken by FGG created awareness among both policy makers and the general public as to problems related to oil palm plantations. Palm oil production is an issue closely related to biofuels (and the EU-RED).
- Biokerosene and jatropha: The activities undertaken, most of all by Milieudefensie, contributed to awareness that 1) biofuels are not an easy way to make air transport more sustainable and 2) jatropha is not a miracle crop for biofuels.
- Dutch biofuel policy: The activities undertaken by the FGG Alliance contributed to a changing position of the Dutch government, which, in turn, had consequences for the Dutch position in the European Council.
- Reporting on social impacts of biofuels: Especially ActionAid focused on this issue, producing reports for the European Commission and influencing the Dutch position on this issue.
- Land rights and land grabs: Work on land grab and land rights by the Alliance has significantly influenced perceptions on the risks of biofuels as well as the need for policy change.

Thus, it was a great part of the FGG programme on biofuels that contributed in some way to the changing biofuel policies at EU level. However, it must be kept in mind that other CSOs in Europe also contributed to the EU-RED-related outcomes. FGG has given detailed evidence of the activities they undertook to achieve the outcomes. There is no doubt that FGG has contributed to the EU-RED outcomes, but they were not the only actor; when possible, they work in coalitions. In communications between FGG staff and the evaluators, FGG never claimed to be the sole player. Other parties also contributed with their own activities and campaigns. In the Netherlands, for

example, Greenpeace is an important player in the biofuel discussion, Oxfam and the Ecosystem Alliance also influence palm oil discussions and at the European level there are many other pressure groups. In Brussels, other groups lobbied on behalf of pressure groups in Europe, including on behalf of FGG.

Was FGG a decisive actor to achieve these outcomes? EU policies can be influenced by organisations, companies and governments in the 27 member countries, so this situation could imply a very small contribution of FGG. However, we do know that 1) the FGG Alliance has been busy with the subject at least since the start of MFS II (see, e.g., the baseline report), so it cannot be said that they have ‘jumped on the train at the last moment’ to claim achievements to which they contributed little, and 2) the FGG Alliance has been quite visible in the Netherlands in influencing the Dutch debate in parliament and government, while there are also EU member states (e.g. in Eastern and Southern Europe) in which concerns about negative impacts of biofuels do not play a big role in the public and political arena and where the government took a much less critical position as to high biofuel targets. Therefore, the least we can conclude is that the FGG contribution has weight.

The question of the importance of the FGG contribution to the EU policy changes on RED can be compared with a group of persons who try to move a big stone. At a certain moment, the stone moves. Who did it? Who contributed most? Could we have done it with one less person? In a trial, we can try to move the stone with one less person. In lobby and advocacy, it is impossible to repeat the same socio-political process with less input, but the most important thing is that the stone has moved and FGG did contribute to moving the stone. FGG was part of a causal package that contributed to the outcome.

#### **5.4 Evaluation question 4: Efficiency**

The main question for this section is as follows: Were the efforts of the MFS II alliances efficient?

This question was further specified in the three following sub-questions:

1. What is the theory of efficiency of the ILA project?
2. How is the theory of efficiency translated and upheld in practice?
3. How is the Alliance improving and/or adapting its efficiency? (learning)

##### *5.4.1 Theory of efficiency*

###### *5.4.1.1 Starting points for efficiency*

FGG tries to achieve its objectives at the lowest cost possible: It tries to choose activities strategically that cost little but have maximum effect. However, FGG also undertakes certain activities that are costly and time-intensive, but that achieve more sustainable results—in particular activities aimed at mutual capacity development: increasing capacity of partners involved and facilitating the engagement of partner organisations with decision makers in government or the private sector and/or, through them, with local affected communities.

For FGG, the necessary priority in ranking is first effectiveness (and results) and then efficiency. Therefore, FGG is led by results and, within that direction, FGG tries to keep the costs as low as possible. Alliance members also have organisational-level environmental sustainability policies related to travel and purchasing, among other things, to ensure not only cost-effectiveness but also policy coherence (‘practise what you preach’).

###### *5.4.1.2 Operational level*

FGG member organisations and staff are cost aware and take efficiency and cost-effectiveness into consideration when making operational plans and taking decisions. In addition, FGG member



organisations and staff save on costs by sharing costs, collaborating, dividing tasks among each other and seeking synergies. Important principles already mentioned in the original MFS II proposal are as follows:

- Minimise coordination costs within the Alliance: Project teams, managed by a project leader, will carry out a well-defined part of the programme to ensure that employees from the various Alliance organisations work together and economise whenever possible on activity costs related to specific outputs and outcomes.
- Build on existing knowledge and networks: The Alliance will make use of existing research wherever possible, and strengthen existing networks where they exist and establish them where they are needed to reduce costs, build capacity and increase efficiency.
- Replication of actions: FGG knows, based on past experiences, which activities generate the best results, such as the use of petitions.
- Avoid consultants unless absolutely necessary: To minimise the costs of external (expensive) support, Alliance members will first consult the other members to seek internal solutions.
- Staff salaries are low relative to education levels and experience.
- All Alliance members have strict policies on travel expenditures (second/economy class and modest lodging costs, including room sharing). Travel is avoided whenever possible for both environmental and economic reasons by using phone, Skype or video conferencing.
- Services provided to the Alliance above €15,000 will be tendered: At least three service providers will be compared for quality and cost-effectiveness.

#### 5.4.1.3 Organisation and Coordination of the Alliance

The coordination unit of FGG is lean. FGG comprises six different NGOs. There is no secretariat, only one Programme Monitoring Officer, working on a fulltime basis. Therefore, the coordination unit starts small, and when it is necessary to do something extra together, only then is it done.

The FGG organisational scheme seems complicated, but it quickly reaches the staff member level (flat organisation). Several functions in the organisational chart are combined in one person of a member organisation. In the FGG Alliance, the expertise and capabilities of the members are maximised. The division of labour between Alliance members and partners is based on knowledge and experience, with every partner assigned to do the job that best fits his/her capabilities. Both ENDS, SOMO, TNI and Friends of the Earth Europe agree on the division of tasks regarding the work on trade and investment in Netherlands and Europe, and ActionAid and Milieudefensie regarding the work on biofuels. Sometimes there is double presence in meetings and so forth, but only if synergy can be achieved. Using each other's outreach channels allows saving on costs. A principle is that work that can be done by Southern partners will be done in the South to promote sustainability and invest in capacity.

The FGG Alliance aims at being agile, so events emerging in the work are quickly incorporated in the planning. This means that there is little chance that FGG will incur costs for activities that are no longer relevant.

### 5.4.2 *Efficiency in practice*

When the FGG Alliance was asked to give examples how efficiency works in practice, the organisations provided many examples that illustrated the issues mentioned in the previous section. Some specific observations on the practice of efficiency are as follows:

- One interviewee stated that FGG members make conscious decisions about the most effective way to achieve a goal, but also admitted that this is difficult to estimate because there is not always a counterfactual. For example, some studies take relatively little time and were very effective, others were time consuming but effective, others were effective but possibly could have been done with a significantly smaller time investment.
- Another Alliance member provided the example of preferably printing a publication at the location where it will be used most and of considering whether a publication should be printed at all in addition to having online versions. This Alliance member has targeted outputs for different constituencies, and reuses information and analyses in different ways. Another Alliance member publishes letters ('EarthAlarm') in which it asks its 11,000 subscribers to write a letter to a certain target (a company, bank or government), but only when it is deemed effective and efficient. Normally, there are five to six issues annually, but in 2013 there were only four issues. Sometimes the time between issues is very short, sometimes it is six months and sometimes no issue is produced at all.
- One FGG member explained how lessons on efficiency are shared internally. For example, they observed that YouTube clips usually do not reach a great number of people. There are exceptions with tens of thousands of viewers, but often there are several thousand, several hundred or even only tens of viewers. Producing such a clip is a time-consuming and costly activity. Such things are monitored to learn what works and what does not.

### 5.4.3 *Mechanisms for improvements and adaptations*

#### 5.4.3.1 Finance

Most FGG member organisations have procurement policies in place, requiring a comparison of costs and quality for any services acquired from external providers. At Alliance level, financial reports are compiled biannually so that budget deviations are signalled quickly. However, each FGG member monitors its financial management more frequently internally. There are agreements that budget deviations higher than 15% per outcome or 15% per cost type (or 10% for the 'Southern countries' cost type) are announced as soon as they are known, and measures are then taken.

#### 5.4.3.2 Programme monitoring

There have been as many meetings on and evaluations of progress of the programme, expenditures, spending against budget and spending on overhead, as were planned. There were a few deviations—delays, reallocations and earlier spending because of extra activities—that were discussed but not found to be problematic.

#### 5.4.3.3 Planning and evaluation

Planning and evaluation forms exist and include indicators for efficiency. One member of the Alliance reported that, in its formats for project plans, the proponents are asked to give indicators for efficiency. These indicators should describe the relation between achieved results and the means used (e.g. Euros for each signature in a campaign, number of hours necessary to get an article in a newspaper with national coverage). The same Alliance member had an evaluation form that asked about the efficiency of a project. Questions include 1) Could results have been achieved with fewer means? and 2) Could more results have been achieved with the same means? Not all FGG Alliance members have these forms.

#### 5.4.3.4 Lessons learned

Some lessons learned on efficiency include the following:

- When the Alliance was asked about their theory of efficiency, they were pleased to read back what they wrote in the MFS II proposal, as it is still very accurate for their theory of efficiency and reflects how FGG works. The rules have not changed, but of course you learn from experience to work more efficiently to execute specific activities.
- Efficiency has a downside, especially when it comes to staff members. One Alliance member noted that there are quite some persons who seem at the edge of a burn-out. Staff members of lobbying and advocacy organisations like FGG are highly motivated, and they can exhaust themselves. They take on a great deal of responsibility—sometimes too much. Here, there seems to be a starting point for a more efficient management of human resources.  
A problem in the current lean FGG organisation is that tasks that have not been assigned are difficult to delegate at a later stage. Then, suddenly, you can have six persons—one from each of the Alliance organisations—working on a certain theme or issue. That is a not good, but FGG finds it difficult to deal with this situation.
- Now that the members of the Alliance have decided to continue the cooperation after 2015, the question emerges of whether increased cooperation is desirable/necessary on issues like joint fundraising and joint external communication.

### 5.5 Case studies

#### 5.5.1 Case 1: Reorienting trade and investment policies: EU-ASEAN FTA Campaign

##### 5.5.1.1 Short description of the case

This case is about the work on the EU-ASEAN Campaign carried out by the EU-ASEAN FTA Network, coordinated by Focus on Global South (FGS), one of the partners of the FGG Alliance. The lead Alliance member in relation to the work covered in this case study is TNI. The work in the Philippines and other Asian countries is part of the overall work of the FGG Alliance, and in principle FGG worked here with the same ToC as described in previous sections. We will highlight outcomes achieved here. These are not necessarily mentioned or summarised in the sections above, because, in the sections above, only a short summary of the whole FGG programme is given. In June 2013 and April 2014, assessments of the EU-ASEAN Campaign were made during visits to the Philippines.

Again, the ToC of the FGG Alliance is applicable to this case. The ToC is based on the premise that organisational capacity building (at the level of the network, i.e. the EU-ASEAN FTA Network, and national-level platforms on FTA) will result in organisations having the ability to influence their respective governments on matters relating to FTA. The strategy had been to support the network (coordination by two offices in Thailand and the Philippines) and national platforms. Based on this, national- and regional-level activities, such as workshops, campaigns and publishing documents, were planned. The staff of national platforms and regional networks were also given the opportunity to interact in trade and investment-related events, campaigns, workshops and seminars outside Asia (i.e. in Europe, Africa and Latin America). The underlying rationale was that participation in such events would widen the exposure of members.

##### 5.5.1.2 Outcomes

Outcomes achieved include the following:

- FTA Roundtable, New Delhi Campaign (March 2011): The FTA Roundtable increased the level of coordination and awareness among campaigners from Southeast Asia and India. These links were used in follow-up workshops on access to medicines and FTA. A further outcome

of this activity is the stronger and more direct linkage with Indian medicines and FTA campaigners.

- ASEAN Peoples Forum/ASEAN Civil Society Conference (May 2011): An Open Letter to ASEAN leaders was formulated by the Forum. It was about threats to peoples' access to medicines and right to health. Such threats might become a reality in future trade agreements.
- Regional Forum on Investments (September 2011): As a result of the discussions, the issue of investments has been integrated into the campaign plan of the EU-ASEAN Network. Subsequent activities have been conducted to highlight the issue of investments. A similar discussion of investment impacts was held in 2012 under the ASEAN Grassroots Peoples Assembly in 2012 and the Regional Forum on ISDS, organised by the network with FTA Watch Thailand (September 2013).
- Global Week event in Brussels (November 2011): This event helped to create a global network on investment policies and launched the call for an Alternative Investment Model, which was issued in three languages and signed by 92 organisations and seven global/regional networks. The event also facilitated and solidified links with known progressive investment lawyers and academic activists.
- Asia-Europe People's Forum (AEPF) Sub-Regional Consultation, Jakarta (June 2012): Issues regarding investments were discussed and elaborated in more detail for use in campaigns. It opened possibilities for broadening the networks working on investments among groups in the Mekong region. This impacted the content of the regional workshop held in Laos in October 2012 (explained in a bullet point below).
- AEPF Sub-Regional Consultation, Hanoi (August 2012): This had the same results as the previous bullet point, and more links with other organisations were made.
- AEPF in Laos (Oct 2012): Demand on investment included in the final AEPF Statement, which was presented and submitted to ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) governments.
- Thailand: Public awareness was raised on the possible negative impacts of FTAs related to access to medicines, alcohol and ISDS mechanisms. This was the result of a highly successful media campaign where FGS' members of the FTA Watch coalition appeared prominently on national television, radio and newspapers. In response to the clamour for greater participation in the process of trade negotiations, the Thai government created an FTA civil society committee and provided a slot for FTA Watch to participate. However, the military coup in 2014 changed the situation.<sup>265</sup>
- The Philippines (national level, 2013): Awareness was raised by publishing a public statement. The network became engaged in a direct dialogue with high officials from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the intellectual property office (IPO) and the Department of Health (DOH). The government discussed its strategy of engagement with the EU. The network pursued the process of formulating its inputs to the social impact assessment process by convening a series of sectoral caucuses from September to October. The consolidated report was then discussed with members of the network in December and submitted to the DTI. Since September 2013, the network has been invited to meetings and consultations organised by the DTI.
- Malaysia (national level, 2013): Monitoring Sustainability of Globalization (MSN) spearheaded an intensive lobby against the ISDS mechanism in Malaysia from 7–8 November 2013. MSN's Charles Santiago, who is also a member of parliament in Malaysia, led a small group of international trade and investment experts that included FGS Executive Director Pablo Solon, researcher Cecilia Olivet of TNI and an investment law expert and academic. The group met with Malaysian negotiators and officials and members of the opposition party,

and also met and addressed parliamentarians, including the parliament caucus on trade. A public forum on involving NGOs, trade unions and media interviews was also organised.

- Regional Campaign (2013): Awareness on the impacts of FTAs was raised by writing an opinion piece in the Bangkok Post and by organising or participating in conferences and seminars, also during the Week of Action against the WTO Forum in Bali (December 2013).
- WTO, Bali and the post-Bali Development Agenda: Awareness was raised by producing a collection of short briefing papers and analysis on key issues behind the WTO Bali negotiations, the post-Bali agenda and alternatives to the WTO and free trade regime. A delegation of activists from the EU-ASEAN Network joined parallel events and actions in Bali. The Philippines Platform organised and led discussions with top trade negotiators from the Philippines.
- Myanmar: The decision by the EU's Directorate-General for Trade to start negotiations for an EU-Myanmar Investment treaty was unexpected. TNI, having 20 years of experience working in Myanmar, took the opportunity to start raising awareness on investment treaties and ISDS in Myanmar. TNI was able to bridge the CSOs in Myanmar and FGS as the coordinator of the EU-ASEAN FTA campaign. Several workshops were organised in which members of parliament and media representatives participated. One of the outcomes was that the Myanmar government organised a consultation workshop on the proposed EU-Myanmar Investment Agreement in June 2014.

(For a contribution analysis of the Philippines national-level outcome above, see the previous section on contribution analysis.)

#### 5.5.1.3 Assessment of the outcomes

The work of the network had been very successful in agenda setting at the national and regional levels. Concrete outcomes have been realised in many cases. The outcome intensities at the country level shows a promising trend. Policy influencing, especially the creation of spaces to have a dialogue with the government, is making a certain level of progress but is not as high or intense as agenda setting. However, there is less progress at the regional (ASEAN) level, except through the WTO-level event in Bali.<sup>266</sup>

The planning of the work was done in a rather flexible manner, leaving the network and its members to respond to emerging trends. Examples are the response to the WTO event in Bali and the work in Myanmar.

#### 5.5.1.4 Relevance

The outcomes are in line with the objectives of the Alliance and the defined outcome of Strategic Objective 3: 'International lobby [is] strengthened resulting in (at least) 4 Southern governments and 2 European governments taking measures to improve coherence between international trade and investment policies and development policies'.

Many of the outcomes show cooperation with stakeholders, as well as their commitment, in the respective countries. These stakeholders would not show this active attitude if the lobby and advocacy objectives were not relevant for them and their context.

The context also reflects a high degree of dynamism and surprises—for instance the re-emergence of the WTO. Such a dynamism poses another set of challenges for actors such as FGG and FGS, as well as the EU-ASEAN Network, to constantly revisit their strategies to realign and reinvent them to address new developments. Keeping abreast of these developments, studying them and making a rapid response are capacities such actors require. The progress made by FGG, FGS and the EU-ASEAN

Network clearly displays a trend of establishing an agenda and thereby gradually making advances towards policy influencing. However, the nature of the final goal—to reorient trade and investment policies—is not an easy, simple one that can be established in a short period of time.

## 5.5.2 Case 2: *Jatropha* growing in Central Java

### 5.5.2.1 Short description of the case

Milieudefensie's Overall Plan on Agro-fuel Policies identifies developing case studies for specific lobbying with particular actors as well as developing a societal discourse on bioenergy to demonstrate the 'unsustainable nature of the current policy and market development'. To lobby KLM and Lufthansa, Milieudefensie needed cases that showed that biofuel production is harmful for the environment and local people. Banking on its strength as a worldwide membership organisation, Milieudefensie opted to develop some of the case studies with its partner organisations in the South, and WALHI (Friends of the Earth Indonesia) came into the picture.

Central Java has an economy that is largely based on agriculture. Prior to *jatropha*, farmers in Central Java used to grow paddy, soya beans and corn. In 2007, Grobogan District in Central Java was identified as a 'pilot' project to promote *jatropha*. A village in Grobogan District was to be developed as Indonesia's first energy (self-)sufficient village. The political attention on this was high, to the extent that the Indonesian president made a visit to the village in February 2007 to inaugurate this initiative. Perhutani, the State Forest Company, the owner<sup>267</sup> and manager of state-owned land in Grobogan, was entrusted to arrange that farmers using Perhutani's land replace their food crops with *jatropha*, and to allocate new land for farmers who wished to grow *jatropha*. A Dutch company, Waterland Group, came forward as an investor to promote *jatropha* cultivation. Waterland came to an agreement with Perhutani on land use. Perhutani forced the farmers of 26 cooperatives to sign a *Jatropha* Cooperation Agreement with Perhutani and Waterland (Perhutani could do so because it owned the land that the farmers have been using for a long time). Waterland did the promotion work by giving seeds and advice to the farmers who were forced or wanted to cultivate *jatropha* on Perhutani-owned land. Waterland promised that they would pay 2,700 Rupiah/kg for *jatropha* seeds, but in practice offered only 400–700 Rupiah/kg. This resulted in farmers losing faith in the company as well as the crop. Gradually, many farmers wanted to shift from *jatropha* to another agricultural activity, but the farmers are trapped, because their land is owned by Perhutani or it was given to them only to grow *jatropha* as per the agreement between Waterland and Perhutani. Farmers have incurred losses, as the gains were less than promised. They are indebted because the money that they borrowed for *jatropha* cannot be repaid on time. Farmers have experienced that food production is better than *jatropha*, because they could fetch a better price for food crops, and their food security would be guaranteed. Many conflicts have surfaced within the community and between Waterland/Perhutani and the community over the issue of 'broken promises' on *jatropha*.

In mid-2011, Milieudefensie and WALHI Central Java started their collaboration on the case. A representative from Milieudefensie visited WALHI Central Java to plan the work collaboratively. From July–December 2011, WALHI Central Java and Milieudefensie carried out research in Grobogan. In December 2011, Milieudefensie visited the site with a group of journalists from the Netherlands and Germany, and, in February 2012, Milieudefensie and WALHI co-published 'Bio-kerosene: Take-off in the wrong direction: Trends and consequences of the rapid development of aviation biofuels, as shown by the impacts of *jatropha* cultivation on local people in Central Java'. Based on the research process and the above publication, WALHI Central Java released a press statement and disseminated copies to the media in Central Java, and Milieudefensie launched its extensive public campaign in the Netherlands and Europe, with wide media coverage and lobbying KLM and Lufthansa. In addition, a

petition (action card and Earth Alarm letter writing action) aimed at Lufthansa collected 7,500 signatures from the public.

The above situation and conflicts culminated in farmers gradually giving up farming jatropha. Finally, Perhutani annulled its contract/agreement with Waterland and the 26 farmers' cooperatives. The processing unit of Waterland, located in Grobogan city, was closed down. In April 2014, an evaluation team member saw an abandoned property without any equipment. A website belonging to a holding company that is in a joint venture with Waterland is still live and had not been updated—it still mentions Waterland's jatropha business in Grobogan.<sup>268</sup> In April 2014, jatropha plantations could not be seen in many areas in the Grobogan countryside. The farmers have returned to rice and corn farming on their own plots as well as on the land allocated by Perhutani for jatropha farming. Many of the farmers experienced hardship when they had to shift from jatropha to rice/corn because of their debt. At this point, many of them are said to have recovered, to a large extent, from such difficulties. The farmers are generally relieved that they are no longer trapped by jatropha.

#### 5.5.2.2 Outcomes

Outcomes of the case can be summarised as follows:

- By using the documented case in the EU–Dutch biokerosene discussions, awareness increased in the EU and the Dutch parliament and government about the potential social and environmental problems of using biofuels. The EU is still in a negotiation phase between the European Parliament and the European Council (the member states) about a lower road transport target for crop-based biofuels, but targets defined earlier have already been reduced.
- Lufthansa and KLM are more critical when selecting their biokerosene. On 8 February 2012, Lufthansa stated in a meeting with Milieudéfensie that it will not continue its pilot with Waterland International. KLM began a weekly biokerosene flight to New York in March 2013 and uses a sustainably produced biokerosene. In general, there is more awareness among the private sector in the Netherlands (and Europe) about the potential social and environmental problems of using/producing biofuels.
- The palm oil company Waterland has stopped its jatropha activities in Grobogan District, the area where Milieudéfensie and WALHI undertook an in-depth study on the negative impacts of extension of jatropha plantations. The annulment of the jatropha cooperation agreements between Perhutani, Waterland and the 26 farmers' cooperatives implies that the farmers are no longer forced to grow jatropha. Almost all farmers in the Grobogan District have abandoned jatropha and shifted back to corn cultivation, while others have resorted to community forestry.

#### 5.5.2.3 Relevance

The outcomes at the EU and Dutch levels clearly indicate that the biofuel issue had been firmly conveyed to the policy makers. The need for reduction of biofuel targets at Dutch and EU levels is recognised, and steps are underway to gradually reach a policy formulation that will do so while respecting current investments and contractual obligations.

At the EU and Dutch industry level, the responses and concrete statements from both KLM and Lufthansa suggest that they were convinced of the case against biofuel based on jatropha. The statements issued include a concrete commitment not to purchase jatropha-based biofuel. KLM and Lufthansa were the two main lobby targets of Milieudéfensie's campaign. The media attention that Milieudéfensie was able to attract is impressive. The coverage of the issue on biofuel by both print

and electronic media enabled Milieudefensie to set the agenda at the policy discourse level and to raise awareness at the general public and societal level.

In Central Java, Indonesia, Waterland's operations in Grobogan came to an end. After annulling the contract with Waterland, Perhutani abolished its institutional mechanisms to cultivate jatropha. The practice of jatropha cultivation has almost ceased, and people have returned to corn and paddy farming. As of April 2014, Perhutani had not made any formal objections to people using its land allocated for jatropha to cultivate corn and paddy. This is a clear change in practice on the part of the farmers in the area. The change did not come through formal policy processes but through their own conviction based on very bad experiences with farming jatropha. Another factor is that Perhutani and Waterland had annulled the contracts with the farmers' communities that had forced these farmers to grow jatropha instead of the food crops that they used to grow.

The case was a great success for Milieudefensie in its struggle within Europe and the Netherlands to reveal problems related to biofuels in general and jatropha-based biokerosene in particular, but was the development of this case sufficiently relevant for the Southern partner, WALHI, and for Indonesia?

- The ToC for the local level was realised: In Grobogan, jatropha growing came to an end; 'the case was solved'. The farmers were free to cultivate other crops. The project may have contributed to this outcome (partly via WALHI's local activities with the communities, and partly via Milieudefensie's advocacy work aimed at Dutch and EU policy makers and market actors in Europe, such as Lufthansa, KLM and Waterland). At the same time, autonomous market factors (e.g. no marketing channel for jatropha, lower harvests than promised, global trends) were likely important in the local change. There were elements of creation of a hype, which, at a certain moment, was deemed to have collapsed: 'Research in Indonesia shows that decision makers adopted optimistic projections derived from lab research as a basis for policy making, public budget allocations and private sector investments. Influential policy entrepreneurs and their narratives, rather than scientific evidence, informed budget allocation'.<sup>269</sup>
- The response from media towards the Indonesian version of the jatropha report was very poor. There were no other substantial dissemination efforts at either the Central Java or the national level. Therefore, the jatropha story from Grobogan reached neither the policy discourse nor the general public and societal level. However, this was not a projected outcome of the case study.
- The outcomes in Europe may contribute to the desired impact in Indonesia: lower pressure on forests and lands of people due to oil palm and/or jatropha plantation expansion driven by European government and corporate policies. This is an indirect effect.
- When Milieudefensie and WALHI started their case research in Central Java (2011), it was already becoming clear from an economic point of view that jatropha was not going to be a success. However, Indonesian policies on jatropha were lagging behind, and new pro-jatropha policies (including subsidies and projects) were about to be implemented. Moreover, the former president was at the time promoting jatropha activities in and around the Waterland project. The Waterland company was recounting in presentations that it had already planted 60,000 hectares, a rather imposing area. Only afterwards did it become clear that scientists from the YARAK research project could not find proof of this high claim. At the international level, there was a Yale study in 2009–2010 that was rather positive about jatropha. That study could be considered a new and powerful argument to promote more



jatropha growing, also in Indonesia. These were good reasons to start the case in 2011, and they indicate that it was also valuable for Indonesia.<sup>270</sup>

The new staff of the Indonesian NGO WALHI (who were not directly involved in the case at the time of the execution of the case study) believed that the joint research on the jatropha case had only been (very) useful for Milieudefensie in the European context and not for them (or Indonesia). Contrary to this opinion, the evaluators believe that the case was also useful for Indonesia (see the arguments above). However, there is still an issue about perceptions and feelings. Was it wise to use the results of the case research most of all with the objective of directly changing the policy situation in Europe? Good and continuous communication and a fine balance of stated objectives of the case research are important here.

Jatropha was important in the Grobogan area, but now (fall 2014) is no longer a top priority or a hot topic in Indonesian policy discourse. Jatropha has been overshadowed by the high priority given by policy makers (as well as WALHI and Milieudefensie) to the issue of palm oil.

## **5.6 Evaluation question 5: Explanatory factors**

The evaluation question to be answered in this section is as follows: What factors explain the findings?

We consider internal factors, external factors, their interaction and the nature of the issues involved. In this approach, we mention factors that have proven to be successful under certain circumstances. This does not mean that they will be successful under any circumstances.

### *5.6.1 Internal factors*

Internal factors related to the five FGG Alliance members are systematised according to the 5Cs model of capabilities. The section also includes observations on the capabilities of Southern partners and capacity development by the FGG Alliance.

#### 5.6.1.1 Capability to act and commit

‘Being able to mobilise the constituency and raise public awareness’:

The Alliance has used several means to raise awareness among the general public and their own constituency—for example, by way of newsletters to their constituency. Petitions have also been organised. The Alliance members have also effectively used the media (television, papers, opinions in the press) to raise awareness on the issues they consider important.

The Alliance is very well able to articulate constituency views and needs into language and images that can find hearing. One of the ways is by presenting cases (e.g. on how palm oil or jatropha plantations can have negative impacts on local farmers). There was frequent collaboration with Southern partners for research and the preparation of publications on specific Southern cases and joint advocacy, especially visits of delegations of Southern CSOs to the Netherlands and other EU countries. These were key.

#### 5.6.1.2 Capability to deliver on objectives

In its actions, the FGG Alliance is well-focused on the objectives it wants to achieve. FGG has a strong capability to deliver on objectives. It also has a clear view on the relation between efficiency and the wish to reach objectives: Objectives are always the primary goal, and, within that framework, they try to optimise efficiency. As far as the evaluators can judge, they work accordingly. Below are several examples of the way the Alliance optimises its delivery on objectives.

‘A range of different interventions and policy instruments to determine the action tool’:  
FGG members use many different tools to promote their policy objectives. The use of a specific tool depends on the situation. One FGG member uses the ‘escalation staircase’ to select the action tools to be used. The aim is to use the right action tool for the right moment. The lowest step is a meeting, followed by actions to write letters and other means, and at the end are juridical actions. The aim is to apply the adequate tool to change the way the actor behaves. In general, the heavier instruments are also more expensive.

‘Case Work used for several purposes’:  
The case work (research into the nature of specific social and environmental problems in the South and developing adequate solutions) is used by FGG members at two levels: to achieve results at the local level (solving the specific social and/or environmental problems in the case in question) and at the international level (promoting the adoption of government and corporate policies that prevent similar future cases). It is a very important way of working, and in many cases results in much success. It also leads to mutual understanding and capacity building. However, good communication is needed to explain the aim of the case study, especially when the results of the study primarily serve advocacy actions in the North. Balancing the use of the results between North and South is a point that needs continuous attention.

‘The image of the guy that bites’:  
Building the image of a watchdog that may ‘bite’ is also very effective (e.g. for Milieudéfensie). While only on occasion does Milieudéfensie really decide that it is necessary to ‘bite’, it supposes that letter writing actions, for instance, are so effective because companies (after receiving thousands of letters from its supporters with a request to improve their policies and practices) fear that Milieudéfensie may decide to ‘bite’ if they do not enter into a dialogue. Milieudéfensie closely monitors whether the dialogue is likely to result in actual improvements of the performance of the company (which serves the objectives of Milieudéfensie). Other FGG members also sometimes use the ‘bite’ method, whereas others deliberately play a different role. The ability to find synergy and collaboration between these different approaches often makes FGG successful (see also: ‘Capability to balance diversity and achieve coherence’.)

‘Selection of a target that is vulnerable to public pressure’:  
If an FGG member wants to change the practice of an unwilling palm oil company, the campaign target will not be the palm oil company itself, because these companies have no citizens as consumers and so are not vulnerable to public pressure. In such cases, pressure is exerted on the palm oil company via the financier and/or the purchaser of the palm oil (another company).

‘Create added value’:  
A positive aspect of FGG is, when deciding about whether or not to take up an issue, one of the considerations is whether other organisations are also working on it and whether the involvement of FGG will create sufficient added value.

- In the case that (a member of) FGG estimates that it can make a difference on its own, this can lead to deciding to take up a new issue that no other national Dutch organisation is working on.
- One may decide to quit (or downscale) the topics that are sufficiently covered by other NGOs sufficiently to justify the expectation that the desired outcomes will be achieved by those other NGOs.

- Alternatively, FGG (or one member) may estimate that cooperation with other NGOs is required to achieve a certain goal. In case FGG estimates that it cannot make a difference *on its own* (for instance in a Southern case where there is no reliable Southern partner), it can lead to the decision not to spend money and time.

#### 5.6.1.3 Capability to adapt and self-renew

The FGG Alliance is very capable of adapting its strategy to changing situations. A clear example of this capability is the use of the free trade agreement (TTIP) negotiations between the US and the EU as an opportunity to raise the issue of the ISDS system. This issue seemed to be only related to Southern countries and therefore far removed from the general public, but, suddenly, there was the opportunity to link it to the situation of the European states and citizens and the potential negative effects on them. Another clear example is the way TNI started to inform different stakeholders in Myanmar on the possible negative impacts of an FTA with the EU. Below are some facts that could explain this capability.

##### ‘Lobby and advocacy monitoring systems’:

One FGG member reported that all project plans have quantified targets that are evaluated during the project and after completion. For this purpose, monitoring systems are in place at organisational level, such as the ‘media monitor’ that establishes the media coverage of each project (media coverage for FGG activities is a crucial part of the intervention strategy to achieve change in almost all projects). Another example is monitoring the response percentage on petitions that are disseminated via various channels (specific magazines, at festivals, in the street) in order to select distribution channels that deliver the most signatures per euro.

##### ‘Reflection and evaluation as a continuous process’:

In each FGG project, there are continuous discussions and assessments of which interventions are expected to be efficient and effective given the target group, context and other factors. These expectations and underlying assumptions are continuously evaluated. Project teams can easily modify plans and budgets. For example, at one of the FGG member organisations (being a campaigning organisation) budgets are continuously adapted as projects are continuously adapted to changes in the external context—including context changes that result from the project in question (lobby & advocacy successes) and desired and expected changes that did *not* (yet) occur, as they appear to be more difficult to achieve than expected. Some examples are as follows:

- Adaptation of the projected result of the tool according to newly obtained information. In 2012, Milieudefensie organised a petition on the use of jatropha oil for biokerosene by KLM. They aimed at a high response target. During the research phase, it unexpectedly appeared that an unreliable jatropha oil producer had wrongly listed KLM on its website as a purchaser and that Lufthansa was the only airline company that purchased its jatropha oil. Realising that a campaign on Lufthansa would attract less media attention and be less interesting for Dutch citizens, resulting in less signatures than planned, the activities to attract more signatures in the Netherlands were downscaled to save money.
- Quick evaluation. In project teams, each activity and each context change is evaluated immediately after implementation, and the project plan is adapted accordingly. The PME Officer & Controller continuously evaluates the budget changes needed for the various projects, assesses the budget impact of the modifications of the *combined* projects and takes necessary action (internal budget shifts and, if necessary, submits a request for budget modification to the donor).

- Maintenance of an archive to documents results. The Alliance members are also very able to document the results they have obtained and to give evidence of the activities they have undertaken. Relevant articles in the press are archived, as are relevant web links. This is important for reasons of accountability to funders (and evaluators), but it also helps with learning.
- Sharing of lessons learned. What is important is that lessons are shared among team members about what strategies have worked and why, and to keep each other informed in order to enable complementarity. In the FGG view, the best way to be efficient is to be effective, so it is best to continuously focus on and learn about how to achieve results; by default, according to the FGG Alliance, that will also be the most efficient approach.

#### 5.6.1.4 Capability to relate

FGG has shown that it very able to work in networks and on issues that resonate with their constituency.

##### ‘Building and maintaining networks’:

FGG is well aware of the fact that they are not the only organisation trying to advocate for a certain issue. They try to divide the work within the Alliance and also outside. That division of tasks is relevant for outside organisations in Europe but also for Southern partners. The Alliance partners work within global networks (e.g. as ActionAid and FoE, but also more informal networks). They develop direct strong cooperation and mutual capacity building with Southern colleagues/partners in both research and advocacy, and this is key to their relevance and impact both in the North and the South.

##### ‘Cooperation/interaction with companies’:<sup>271</sup>

The FGG Alliance and other NGOs evaluated under this MFS II ILA evaluation have clear views on how to assess the company they target, how to interact with the company and how to achieve results. Various outcomes (changing practice) show this capability.

##### ‘Cooperation with governments’:

On several occasions, FGG members cooperated with a government. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised a conference on palm oil together with the FGG Alliance and other NGOs. In Ecuador, an FGG Alliance member developed the ToR for the Ecuadorian Auditing Commission on Bilateral Investment Treaties. In such a situation, there is a dialogue and the parties influence each other.

##### ‘Cooperation and discussions with and perception by (part of) the science community’:

Members of the FGG Alliance do cooperate with the science community to deepen their understanding on the issues on which they are working. All FGG organisations have intense cooperation with many members of the science community. However, when the biofuel issues are compared with issues related to FTAs, the evaluators observe a difference in the debate (in the Netherlands and Europe): The debate about biofuels is—in the assessment of the evaluators—not so polarised (anymore), while the debate on FTAs remains polarised. Part of the criticism on EU trade policies expressed by NGOs and the FGG Alliance is also shared by the resource persons interviewed for FTA-related issues. These persons do not cover all possible ideas and visions within the science community on FTAs, but they are experienced in the matter and have influence as an advisor for the EU (Resource person C) or as someone responsible for education of students on, among others, FTA issues (resource person D).

- Resource person D considered raising the issues about ISDS and free trade relevant, but his criticism focused on how the NGOs in general (which includes also FGG) translate their criticism into practice and positive proposals, relevant for people in Southern countries. His perception is that the NGOs' position is primarily anti-European and that, instead of free trade, protectionism is proposed, which he does not consider a solution for relatively small African economies. Entrepreneurs in Africa, for example, should be able to start a company, so important issues include legal security and no confiscation of profits. NGOs are not interested in these vital aspects for the development of African countries. His perception is that NGOs see developing countries too much as victims that are being exploited by the EU.
- At the start of their programme in 2011, FGG was already aware of the need to come up with positive proposals on international trade agreements and, for that reason, FGG participated in the development of the Alternative Trade Mandate (ATM), which was formulated after extensive civil society consultations throughout Europe.<sup>272</sup> At the invitation of the evaluator, Resource person C read the ATM. He recognised the need to change the current ISDS system. However, he was very critical of the ATM. For example, 1) the NGOs still consider the European Commission a non-representative and very negative institution, and 2) the NGOs are not really prepared to dig into the functioning of the various EU institutions so that they can transmit their ideals in the most effective way.

The FGG Alliance states clearly that it is not anti-European. It works at the European level in a very serious manner, and many of its publications clearly indicate that it sees solutions at that level. In April 2014, FGG organised a European election debate, making it one of the few alliances or civil society organisations paying any attention to the European elections. The debate was entirely content-filled, not anti-Europe. Likewise, FGG states that it is not pro-protectionism or anti-free trade, but FGG wants pro-fair trade agreements while at the same time allowing democratic governments (including the EU) the space to define policies that protect the health, privacy, environment and services of its own civilians as well as those in the agreement partner countries. The evaluation team does not wish to suggest that the perceptions expressed by the resource persons are shared by the evaluation team, but the perceptions are there and they probably are a hindrance for NGOs in general, and also for FGG, in obtaining more influence on FTA-related issues. Consequently, it would be advisable to intensify the dialogue with the science community in the Netherlands and Europe including (more) persons who do not agree with FGG's positions.

#### 5.6.1.5 Capability to balance diversity and achieve coherence

The part of the Alliance under evaluation is composed of five different organisations, each with its own image and its own way of acting, its own network and capacities. The division of tasks appears efficient and effective.

The FGG Alliance works within much larger networks. Some organisations are more inclined to continue discussions with the target (government, company) and will not easily enter into very hard campaigns. However, the 'biters' (the ones who sometimes 'shame and blame') also create space and pressure for the 'talkers' to have a meaningful dialogue with the targets.

Although this is not often expressed openly, everyone is aware of the different roles that have to be played. Three examples follow:

- Both ENDS wants certain policies to be changed and shows what is going wrong in existing policies. Both ENDS generally does not implement campaigns. A company with a criticised

behaviour may be an example to show politicians that a certain policy or its implementation needs revision.

- Milieudefensie is sometimes a ‘biter’. Shaming and blaming is part of the instruments used, but dialogue is certainly an option.
- Milieudefensie and ActionAid are both working on biofuels, but their ToCs were and are different. This was apparently not a cause for double work, inefficiency and the like. In practice, the work of the two organisations was complementary and led to good results.

FGG cooperates with such a diversity of organisations, whenever necessary. A complicating factor is that, in many Southern countries, the controversy between NGOs and companies is much stronger than in it is the Netherlands. Additionally, even in the era of email, Internet and Skype, communication with Southern partners is still a challenge. The realities in the North and South are very different, and it is not always easy to understand one another’s discourses, specific contexts and development of ideas.

#### 5.6.1.6 Capabilities of Southern partner CSOs

Part of the outcomes have been realised in Southern countries, together with Southern partners. The case studies of this evaluation were executed in the Philippines and Indonesia, but there was no time to perform an analysis of capabilities of the Southern partners.

However, between May and September 2013, the capacity development of the FGG Alliance’s core partners was monitored through a self-assessment survey as a follow-up to a baseline study done in 2011. The survey comprised all four programmes of the Alliance, so this is more than Strategic Objective 3, which is under evaluation. Some major findings are summarised below. The four lowest scores for current capability are as follows:<sup>273</sup>

- Ability to engage strategically with private sector actors
- Ability to secure adequate (human) resources for plans
- Ability to influence decision makers to adopt favourable positions and opinions related to the organisation’s change agenda
- Ability to integrate reflection and learning structurally throughout implementation

Quite a number of partner organisations state that the ability to engage with private sector actors is not an objective of their work or method used, or not to fit with their model of change. Unsurprisingly, this issue was scored quite low in terms of support needed despite having the lowest score for current capacity. Meanwhile, support for capacity development on the ability to secure adequate (human) resources for plans is indicated to be the major priority. The low assessment of the ability to influence decision makers coincides with a high urgency for support.

The following three indicators had the highest assessments of capacity:

- Legitimacy in the eyes of local CSOs and communities and other key stakeholders
- Ability to identify and build strategic alliances & partnerships with other relevant external actors (CSOs, think tanks, universities, etc.) to advance objectives
- Ability to engage with communities or other stakeholders the organisation aims to represent/benefit, so their voices, concerns and agency are central to plans and actions

The most positive changes since the baseline have to do with movement building, reaching out to allies, strengthening networks and exchanging experiences. In their qualitative answers, respondents

confirm that involvement with the FGG Alliance contributes to these issues, opening new spaces and making new contacts.

From the monitoring arises a clear conclusion that the priorities for capacity development, and support for this from partners such as the FGG organisations, remain the same as at the time of the baseline: ensuring financial sustainability by increasing the capacity to secure (financial) resources; improving the ability to influence decision makers (or, in other words, to implement lobby and advocacy) and planning, monitoring and evaluation.

#### 5.6.1.7 Capacity development by the FGG Alliance

Strengthening lobby and advocacy skills was always a major aim of the programme, and, according to FGG, most of the capacity development activities in the programme's first three years contributed to this aim. Within the FGG Alliance, capacity development is seen as an explicitly *mutual* process, with knowledge, contacts, skills and experiences being strengthened through the more traditional form of training sessions, workshops and resource dissemination, as well as through cross-regional exchange, learning and facilitation, and perhaps most importantly, through cooperation and joint work. This can concern research, documentation and analysis; awareness raising and empowerment; campaigns and communications and lobby and advocacy. FGG not only focused on strengthening the capacities of individual organisations, but also aims to strengthen relations that allow engagement with decision makers and building networks to have a stronger influence, opening spaces to groups and people that would otherwise be voiceless. Much training is about the execution of research and the construction of a local network.

FGG financially supports and builds the capacity of partner organisations that, in turn, build the capacities of local civil society organisations, community based organisations, communities (villages, youth, workers) and individuals to do lobby and advocacy themselves.

### 5.6.2 External factors

#### 5.6.2.1 Free Trade Agreements, general

In the baseline report in 2012, an assessment was made of favourable and unfavourable conditions for the two programmes. For free trade agreements, these factors can be summarised as follows:

- Although NGOs had gained access to policy makers, they had largely failed to shift policy outcomes in their favour. Therefore, many NGOs shifted their attention some years ago away from trade agreements and towards influencing specific companies active in value chains that start in developing countries, or towards the theme of climate change.
- The issues are very complex, and parliamentarians are not invited by their constituencies to work on the issues.
- The openness of the governments and the EC is reported to be limited. The negotiations and deliberations are not open.
- To this point, the investment rules proposed by the NGOs are perceived as being primarily in favour of developing countries, so this is more difficult to 'sell' within Europe.
- The issue is complex and difficult to be picked up by the media: Progress in negotiations is slow (the media ask 'so what is new?').
- The economic crisis plays a negative role. The EC has the slogan 'we will trade ourselves out of the crisis,' so we need free trade to fight against the crisis.

The general assessment of the evaluators in 2012 was that this was a fairly unfavourable situation to achieve results. So how did the above-mentioned factors work out?

- Most of all, the new negotiations between the EU and the US on a Free Trade Agreement (TTIP), offered the opportunity to introduce the theme of ISDS. CSOs such as SOMO successfully made the argument that the ISDS system could also have very negative consequences for European countries and citizens if introduced in the TTIP. This made people in Europe feel the potential negative consequences of ISDS; it opened their eyes to the negative aspects of the ISDS system. This counterbalanced most of the unfavourable factors mentioned above. However, the introduction of other methods of ISDS for a trade agreement between the US and the EU does not automatically mean that the same ideas will be applied for trade agreements with (Southern) countries.
- The above-mentioned unfavourable factors were not valid for Southern countries. Thus, in the South, a significant number of outcomes could be realised, also on opening spaces for discussion. However, in Asian countries, for example, politicians are not used to creating space for CSOs to have influence on policy formulation.

#### 5.6.2.2 Biofuels, general

As to biofuels, the following situational factors were mentioned in the baseline report in 2012 (summary):

- NGOs have to struggle against an opponent, the biofuel industry, which promotes itself as 'green'. This complicates an otherwise relatively simple problem.
- The biofuel market was created by EU and member countries' policies on climate, agriculture, industry and energy for geo-strategic reasons. The policy power of the EU in this dossier is much larger than in steering production and use of fossil fuels, for example, where there are more vested interests. This is a market in construction: The targets have not yet been met.
- The governments (national and at EU level) have a certain openness towards other ideas, but the relations between the governments and the biofuel industry seem to be strong. The general public is a powerful factor and not necessarily in favour of the industry. The 'food or fuel' discussion resonates in existing norms, values and religious and cultural beliefs.
- The openness of the Dutch government and the EU is not optimal: For example, there is still a lack of transparency as to figures on mixing biofuels with fossil fuels.
- The EU-RED policy is first and foremost a climate policy, so bringing in social issues about the situation in developing countries (the conditions under which biofuels are produced) is more difficult than bringing in arguments about emissions of greenhouse gases.
- The media are open to information on biofuels from NGOs and will give attention to it, as long as it is not too often. The general public and the media in the Netherlands are [in 2012] more focused on internal, national issues than in neighbouring countries like Germany, the UK and Belgium.

The general assessment in 2012, made by the evaluators, was that the picture is mixed, and although it is not easy, it still seems fairly favourable for achieving change. The question is how did it turn out? All factors proved to be valid. Several factors seem to be important: The biofuel market is a market created by the EU (factor 2, mentioned above) in combination with the fact that the targeted policies—intended to be beneficial for the environment—often prove to be detrimental for both the environment and the social situation of local communities (see also section 6.2.5.3). To this can be added that the issue has been on the lobby agenda for several years, and this also provided the time to build and extend the network of campaigning CSOs.



### 5.6.2.3 Other external factors

Apart from the above assessment, several external factors have been identified that play a role in achieving the outcomes.

‘Building up a reputation takes time but bears fruit’:

The members of the Alliance have already been in the ‘business’ of lobby and advocacy for a long time. The organisations have a certain reputation, which adds to their effectiveness. However, this reputation is always in certain fields of expertise and in certain arenas. For SOMO, it has become clear that being engaged in certain issues for a long period increases the impact and access to decision makers. Ten years ago, SOMO mostly had contact at the lower civil servant level; now SOMO is involved in parliamentary hearings and has discussions with ministers. Ten years ago, SOMO hardly appeared in the papers; now it is being approached by editors for information. To the general public, most probably Milieudedefensie, being a campaign organisation, is better known. For ActionAid a difficulty is that it changed its name late 2012 (from NiZa). TNI is internationally renowned but less known in the Netherlands. Both ENDS is probably better known for its capability to link CSOs in the South and the North and between South and North than for public campaigns.

‘Major (political) events may destroy an achieved outcome or put it in a very different perspective’:

An example is the military coup that took place in Thailand, destroying the recently created space to discuss issues related to FTAs with the government.

‘Declining media attention and therefore changing effectiveness of certain instruments’:

One FGG member experienced that, during the past seven years, public manifestations aiming at creating public pressure on campaign targets have been attracting less media coverage than before, while media coverage increases the efficiency of such actions as more people (including decision makers) are reached with the message. Such manifestations require a lot of input (time and activity budget). As a result, FGG organises less of these actions and puts less effort into their design (while not entirely dropping this intervention strategy) and has shifted to other intervention types.

### 5.6.3 *The role of the nature of the issue addressed*

For several issues, it seems possible to link the nature of the issue to success in achieving outcomes:

‘The issue has consequences for people’s own situation’:

International trade agreements and the ISDS are rather abstract subjects, and it is difficult to attract the attention of the general public with such a subject. It seems primarily an issue for ‘some remote Southern countries’. Still, CSOs depend on public support to achieve results. During the first stages of the EU negotiations with the US on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), SOMO and TNI connected the issue of the ISDS to our own situation in Europe: Such an arbitration could also have negative consequences for ourselves in Europe. Thus, the Alliance very cunningly grasped this opportunity, and now the issue is on the agenda and attracts attention from the media, EU officials in Brussels and politicians. TTIP will have to be agreed on by the European Parliament, so there will be much discussion on the issue. This discussion is also relevant for EU relations with Southern countries, although it is unknown whether an outcome in TTIP will be ‘copied’ by the EU in trade agreements with Southern countries. The TNI, part of the FGG Alliance, related the same issue also to its possible consequences in Southern countries. In these countries, the issue resounded strongly (but also in some Northern countries).

‘The targeted policies that are intended to serve environmental objectives are (sometimes) (very) harmful for the environment and often have negative social impacts’:

Both in the Netherlands and in the EU, the opposition against biofuel targets has grown considerably since 2011, and the number of NGOs expressing their opposition is large. This can be explained as follows. The problem is perceived to be caused purely by policy. Biofuels, as such, are from an economic point of view uninteresting, as they are not less expensive than conventional fuels. The need and desire to produce them is based on the prescription of a mix percentage in conventional fuels by policies in the EU and its member states. These policies were originally intended to be beneficial for the environment and for developing countries. However, the policy creates an artificial market and has all kinds of detrimental effects for developing countries and for the environment. This caused much outrage in many European countries.

## **5.7 Overview of and reflections on main Alliance-level findings**

The biofuel programmes of ActionAid and Milieudefensie work with about €0.5 million, while the budget for the trade and investment programme (Both ENDS, TNI and SOMO) is about €2.4 million for the period 2011–2015 (of which the period October 2014–December 2015 is future and not included in this report). These are relatively modest amounts of money.

### *5.7.1 Theories of Change*

The different partners of the Alliance worked with flexible strategies, although they themselves did not call that ‘theories of change’ in 2012. The ToCs presented in this report (except for the generic ToC of Milieudefensie, which, under the name of a *Change chain*, was made already before 2012) were a co-production of the evaluation team and the FGG in 2012, but described the vision of the FGG. These ToCs were largely adhered to during the whole evaluation period (2011–2014), but there were some deviations/adaptations. For trade and investment, the programme changed towards working in Myanmar (the country rapidly opened up, also for a possible EU FTA), actions were undertaken for the—unforeseen in 2011—WTO meeting in Bali (December 2013) and FGG skilfully used the opportunity of the negotiations between the US and the EU for an FTA (TTIP) to put the issue of ISDS on the European agenda. The ToC of the biofuel programme also underwent some modification. Instead of taking palm oil companies directly as the targets, more emphasis was placed on targeting their investors. In 2011 and 2012, there was a temporary focus on jatropha as a biofuel crop in addition to the long-term focus on palm oil, and now the emphasis is again mainly on palm oil. Biofuels in relation to illegal land acquisition (‘land grab’) has become more prominent. In September 2013, there was the opportunity to participate in a Dutch Energy Agreement. Here, Milieudefensie (concerned with biomass issues since 2005) and other NGOs could bring in concerns on biomass production for energy in an influential forum.

### *5.7.2 Outcomes*

The outcomes described in this report are sometimes individual outcomes and sometimes a summary of several outcomes. The outcomes also have different weights and importance, and the contribution of the FGG Alliance towards their realisation is different. With these restrictions in mind, to get a rough idea of where most outcomes have been realised, one can compare the achieved outcomes for the two programmes and the place where they have been realised (North [including EU], South or internationally).

Trade and investment:

- Agenda setting: 5 North, 8 South, 1 International. 14 in total
- Policy changes: 4 North, 2 South, 1 International. 7 in total
- Changing accountability structures: 1 North, 2 South. 3 in total
- Changing practices: 0 (but not applicable, see explanation below)

Biofuels:

- Agenda setting: 16 North, 1 South, 1 International. 18 in total
- Policy changes: 6 North, 1 South. 9 in total
- Changing accountability structure: 1 North, 2 South. 3 in total
- Changing practices: 4 North, 4 South. 8 in total

The 'Trade and Investment' programme worked in a difficult enabling environment, but was still able to contribute substantially to very relevant policy changes. The distribution of the outcomes between North and South is rather balanced. Outcomes as to agenda setting dominate. No changing practices have been reported, but this is no surprise, because the programme aims at changing trade agreements (which is of a higher 'order'). The most conspicuous outcomes were policy changes of the EU and Ecuador on ISDS. The changes in accountability structures in Ecuador, the EU and Myanmar were also important achievements: Governments gave space for CSOs to express their concerns about FTAs. A large part of the agenda setting outcomes contributed to the realisation of the policy changes and changing accountability structures mentioned earlier. As for bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), the outcomes were less pronounced. An important reason is that, at EU level, there were not many new political developments (e.g. negotiations on BITs and EPAs) for the FGG to react upon. In general, the programme focused on three themes for free trade agreements: 1) Food security and land issues, 2) investor obligations and 3) universalised services. On food security, results were achieved within the framework of the WTO. On land issues, no outcomes have been reported. As described above, the most important outcomes have been achieved on investors' obligations (ISDS). On universalised services, no outcomes have been reported.

The 'Biofuel' programme has contributed to the achievement of an impressive number of outcomes compared with its very lean budget. Most of the outcomes have been realised in the North (the Netherlands and the EU) and contribute indirectly to improving the situation in the South. The policy changes achieved are related to policy changes both in the EU and in the Netherlands as to the Renewable Energy Directive of the EU (EU-RED). The agreement on biomass within the Dutch Energy Agreement is also important. Another new development is that there is an active involvement of the Dutch government in influencing Dutch investors when financing projects that involve land acquisition. In the South, two oil palm companies changed their sustainability policies, but it remains to be seen whether this is a real change on the ground.

Also worth mentioning are the changes of accountability structures on land governance in the Netherlands and around the working area of a specific palm oil company in Uganda and Sierra Leone. In the biofuels programme, several outcomes also related to changing practice have been documented, related to Dutch investors, oil palm, jatropha and sugar cane companies in the South, governments in both the Netherlands and Liberia and two airlines in Europe.

#### 5.7.2.1 Contribution

The FGG has provided ample documentation of the contributions they made to the outcomes. These are, in many cases, also very real and traceable and include the production of materials, organisation of meetings/seminars, private meetings with targets, studies/case studies, actions/demonstrations, letters and petitions, working groups and official complaints. Most outsiders (resource persons) interviewed recognised the importance of the contributions made by the FGG Alliance. Some specific contributions of FGG Alliance members were explicitly recognised by President Correa of Ecuador (in his inaugural speech) and Dutch Minister Ploumen (in a letter to parliament). The contribution

analysis of two specific (clusters) of outcomes illustrates that FGG was not the only actor to achieve the outcomes: When possible, they work in coalitions. FGG also does not claim that they are the only important actor, but their contributions have been of weight.

### 5.7.3 Efficiency

The FGG Alliance has a coherent theory of efficiency. It takes into account starting points for efficiency, operational implications, implications for the (lean) coordination unit of the alliance and a monitoring system that takes emerging events into account in the planning. The FGG Alliance uses several mechanisms for improvement and adaptation. These include financial monitoring, monitoring of the progress of the programme and planning and evaluation forms with indicators for efficiency.

### 5.7.4 Explaining factors

What factors can explain the successful contribution to the outcomes? *Internal* factors include the following:

- Ability to mobilise the constituency and raise public awareness.
- Ability to articulate the views of the constituency, for example by organising visits of representatives of Southern CSOs to the Netherlands and the EU.
- The use of internal policy instruments to determine the specific action tool.
- The use of case studies for several purposes.
- The use of the image of the guy that ‘bites’.
- Careful selection of a target that is vulnerable to public pressure.
- Deciding whether their involvement in an issue creates added value.
- Capability to adapt the strategy (or ToC) to changing situations.
- The use of lobby and advocacy monitoring systems for planning and evaluation.
- Reflection and evaluation as a continuous process.
- The building and maintenance of networks, with an effective division of tasks.
- Collaboration with targets whenever possible, including cooperation/interaction with companies and governments.
- Collaboration with Southern partners, for example in research and joint advocacy.

FGG implemented monitoring on the capacity-building needs of Southern partners. Priorities for capacity development, and support for this from partners such as the FGG organisations, ensure financial sustainability by increasing the capacity to secure (financial) resources; improving the ability to influence decision makers (or, in other words, to implement lobby and advocacy) and planning, monitoring and evaluation. In its support, FGG focused primarily on improving lobby and advocacy capacity.

In many cases, the above-mentioned positive internal factors are sustained by specific internal FGG tools, procedures and instruments. Within the framework of this evaluation, it was impossible to conduct the necessary research to determine whether the different FGG partners are using the same instruments (and when, why and how). We recommend making a systematic and detailed inventory of these instruments and using the result for capacity building purposes in the South.

There were also external factors that played a role in contributing to achieving the outcomes. These external factors often also have to do with the nature of the issue at stake. Important factors were the following:

- In Europe and the Netherlands, an issue gets much more attention if it has very negative consequences for European countries and citizens, instead of having negative consequences only for Southern countries.
- A decisive factor in the biofuel discussion is that the EU Renewable Energy Directive is a constructed policy that creates an artificial market for biofuels with negative environmental and social impacts. Without the policy, there would be hardly any demand for biofuels. The policy results in many environmental and social problems, but it is supposed to serve sustainability goals.
- Major events, such as a military coup, may destroy an achieved outcome or put it in a very different perspective.
- The building of a reputation by members of the FGG Alliance takes time but bears fruit. It takes more time than one five-year MFS funding period.
- Certain campaigning instruments may become less effective because of the changing social environment.

#### 5.7.5 *Conclusion*

The reported outcomes of both programmes were qualitatively and quantitatively in line with the stated outcomes for the whole programme under Strategic Objective 3 of the FGG Alliance, while the unit of analysis of the evaluation is somewhat smaller than that programme. More has already been achieved than was 'promised' in the original MFS II programme document, while there is still more than a year to go until the end of MFS II. The described outcomes and contributions are very real and traceable, and they are an important achievement.

## 6 Hivos Alliance – People Unlimited 4.1

### 6.1 Introduction

#### 6.1.1 Introduction to Hivos

This chapter describes the international lobbying and advocacy (ILA) efforts of the 100% Sustainable Energy campaign of the Hivos Alliance – People Unlimited 4.1. This alliance consists of four partners, with Hivos being the lead partner and solely responsible for the programme selected for this evaluation. The Alliance is therefore hereafter referred to as Hivos.

This alliance trusts the creativity and capacity of people to increase quality of life by making their own choices. Together with local organisations and responsibly operating companies in developing countries, they aim to contribute to a free, fair and sustainable world.

The vision of this alliance is an ideal world, where citizens, women and men, have equal access to resources and opportunities for development and in which they take part in an active way in decision-making processes that determine their lives, their society and their future.

With the MFS II subsidy, the Hivos Alliance developed four coherent programmes that together set out to make effective and sustainable contributions to building and strengthening civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction.

The four programmes are called Expression & Engagement, Rights & Citizenship, Green Entrepreneurship and Action for Change. The last of these programmes aims for a change in the policy and practice of policy makers, the private sector and citizens in the North for the purpose of concrete livelihood improvements for people in developing countries. One of the campaigns of the Action for Change programme is the 100% Sustainable campaign, which aims for ‘Energy saving and global access to and a shift to sustainable energy’.

Within the 100% Sustainable campaign, four strategies or projects are being developed and implemented:

- Strategy 1: Strengthen CSOs in the South
- Strategy 2: Run an advocacy campaign for access to sustainable energy
- Strategy 3a: CSR campaign in NL 100% Green IT
- Strategy 3b: Public campaign to increase support of the Dutch audience for energy efficiency and renewable energy worldwide (not linked with advocacy)
- Strategy 4: Iconic Project (Sumba)

#### 6.1.2 Unit of analysis and boundaries of this evaluation<sup>274</sup>

Strategies 1 and 2 together constitute one campaign project that hereafter is called the *Access to Energy campaign* or *Access to Energy project*. This Access to Energy campaign aims to contribute to an increase in access to sustainable energy for the poor by, on the one hand, contributing to changes through advocacy at international level—mainly large international donors and the UN—and, on the other hand, at the level of selected Southern countries through partnerships with national/regional CSOs in which the dynamics at the international level are being used to influence changes at the national level.

Strategy 3 is a campaign in the Netherlands. It aims to contribute to CO<sub>2</sub> emission savings in one branch of the private sector. For this, data centres, part of the IT sector, were selected. This campaign (or project) was developed based on the solidarity principle that Hivos cannot only say

what should change in the South but believes that actions in its home country (the Netherlands) are also needed. In this evaluation of the ILA programme of the Hivos Alliance, the unit of analysis is the advocacy strategy, with the relevant strategies being the 100% Green IT campaign in the Netherlands (Strategy 3a) and the Access to Energy campaign (Strategies 1 and 2).

Not under evaluation are Strategy 4, the Iconic Island project,<sup>275</sup> and Strategy 3b, the increase of the support of Dutch audience for energy efficiency and renewable energy worldwide. Neither of these strategies constitutes a genuine advocacy campaign. The first is largely about national and local activities, campaigning and lobbying, and the latter is a public awareness and support programme. Both are important for Hivos and its theory of change (ToC) and they are both context factors for this ILA evaluation. Both have a link to the ILA elements of this campaign in the sense that the changes these two strategies aim to achieve could be outputs that can be used in the ILA strategy. For example, Sumba developments can be communicated to other donors, such as the World Bank, which can contribute to awareness raising or agenda setting, and increased awareness of Dutch audiences could be used to strengthen Hivos' constituency and its voice towards Dutch political actors. Therefore, the evaluation team decided that the activities within these two strategies will not be under evaluation but that, if outputs appear to have been used by the advocacy staff and have contributed to achieved changes of other social actors, this obviously will be taken into account.

### 6.1.3 *Context specific to the 100% Sustainable campaign*

The context for the access to sustainable energy topic has been well described by the UN: 'Nearly 40% of the world's population rely on wood, coal, charcoal, or animal waste to cook their food, breathing in toxic smoke that causes lung disease and kills nearly two million people a year, most of them women and children. Electricity enables children to study after dark. It enables water to be pumped for crops, and foods and medicines to be refrigerated. Modern fuels for cooking and heating relieve women from the time-consuming drudgery and danger of travelling long distances to gather wood.'<sup>276</sup>

About 1.3 billion people worldwide, mostly in developing countries, are currently without electricity, and even those who have power often face poor service quality and frequent blackouts.<sup>277</sup> According to Hivos, many more (approximately 2.6 billion) rely solely on wood and other biomass fuels for cooking and heating. Lack of access to energy services dramatically affects and undermines people's health, limits opportunities for education and development (particularly for women) and seriously reduces their economic and social potential.

After analysing various risk factors, the World Health Organization (WHO) has estimated that indoor air pollution (IAP) was linked to 4.3 million deaths in 2012 in households cooking over coal, wood and biomass stoves, almost all of which are located in low- and middle-income (LMI) countries.<sup>278</sup>

Not only the rural but also many of the urban poor rely on biomass for cooking, and access to power is very limited for the poor. Meanwhile, the urban lower middle class and above have access to electricity, traditionally through centralised, large-scale, fossil fuelled electricity production. In rural areas, decentralised electricity production is much more logical; energy production from sustainable sources is more easily achievable through new technologies such as biogas, solar power, small-scale waterpower or energy-efficient modern cook stoves. At this moment, energy access is dominated by donors and governments because of subsidies and low/negative return on investment (ROI). The World Bank and the EU are large donors that are within the sphere of influence of Hivos. It is for this reason that Hivos had sub-campaigns using opportunities to influence policy decisions of these two international institutions.

The United Nations General Assembly, which declared 2012 the International Year of Sustainable Energy for All and later extended that to a decade, is encouraging Member States and other actors to increase the awareness of the importance of addressing energy issues and to promote action at the local, national, regional and international levels.

Hivos sees the gap between what is needed and what is done by governments and by industries, and this gap is increasing. Access to sustainable energy in developing countries is the responsibility of national and local governments, though they tend to leave this to donors. In Hivos' opinion, donors should only support this for kick-starting and can never be the end solution.

In Hivos' context analysis, realising this access to energy for the poor requires a shift of the mind-set and of resources from centralised, fossil fuel-based energy to renewable energy and decentralised, off-grid services. The specific actions required for such a shift are dependent on the local or national context, which differs in every country. It is Hivos' viewpoint that at the international level, the UN Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) initiative, the World Bank and the EU are currently important actors that can be meaningfully influenced by Hivos.

The 17<sup>th</sup> Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP17), held in 2011 in Durban, South Africa, the UN SE4All initiative and the Rio+20 summit were encouraging for Southern countries, as these events provided an international enabling environment and a conducive setting in which advocacy on sustainable and renewable energy could be positively received. However, a gap exists between what was needed and what governments do in practice. Often at the national level, among energy companies and at the industry level, the trend is to go for large-scale, national coal or electricity generation projects. There is little regard for decentralised production of energy sources, which are more relevant for rural areas and the urban poor, and CSOs are left out.

The 100% Green IT campaign is a separate campaign within the same Hivos programme and has a separate context. In addition to the large data centres in the Netherlands, the Dutch government is an important actor for this Hivos campaign. According to Hivos, key aspects of the Dutch policy context are the following:<sup>279</sup>

- The goal regarding sustainable energy on the Dutch market is not very ambitious and will by far not be reached with the current policy.
- The Dutch economy has a large CO<sub>2</sub>-footprint in Southern countries and the government does not do enough or take responsibility.
- In 2013, the Dutch Energy Agreement was signed between the government and key actors from the private sector and NGOs, leading to a stronger focus on sustainable energy, although the growth will be slower than many had hoped.
- According to Hivos, Dutch companies do not take responsibility in the reduction of greenhouse gases in the Netherlands. Dutch data centres are major energy users,<sup>280</sup> and the expectation is that this energy consumption will keep growing simply because the sector is expected to grow.<sup>281</sup>
- The energy use of the Dutch data centres in 2012 was about 1.6 (1.3–1.8) TWh. This will increase to 2.1 (1.7–2.5) TWh in 2015.
- This (1.6 TWh) equals the yearly electricity use of 450,000 average Dutch families.
- The increase in the energy use of the IT sector is expected to continue. For example, 4G uses six times more energy than 3G.



- No other NGO was working to influence this sector regarding energy issues, and this has not changed.

Increasing the efficiency of its energy consumption had, to a certain extent, already attracted the attention of the sector at the start of the campaign in 2011.<sup>282</sup> That leads to many measures being taken within the sector itself. An important development was the so-called *Green Deal* that the city of Amsterdam signed with the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs in September 2011. In this deal, it was agreed that the city of Amsterdam will develop an energy efficiency standard for data centres. This was a reference to be used by other data centres country-wide.

An important context factor for the campaign was and still is the issue of availability of genuine sustainable energy. Whether that is sufficiently the case in the Netherlands is a question that is not easily answered. Hivos proposes data centres to engage in Power Purchasing Agreements through which they stimulate the investment in new renewable energy production projects. The availability of genuine sustainable energy also depends on the stability or instability of Dutch policy regarding support for sustainable energy production.

#### 6.1.4 Case selection and role of the cases in the report

Below, we shortly explain the case selection rationale and introduce both cases. Both of the cases are examples of an important strategy of the Hivos Access to Energy campaign, and they are therefore fully integrated in this report.

As mentioned above, the Access to Energy campaign works on the international level and on the national level in 11 selected Southern countries. On the international level, the UN SE4All is the central and ongoing process for Hivos, and relevant sub-campaigns or projects focused on the World Bank and the EU. The World Bank sub-campaign was chosen for the case study for the international advocacy efforts.

The overall objective of the Access to Energy campaign, increased energy access for the poor, aims at changes in the field, and Hivos believes that policy changes on national level are essential for that. The central strategy of this campaign is to use the dynamics at the international level, and mainly the SE4All process, for supporting the advocacy processes in the Southern countries. We therefore selected one of Hivos' partners in a Southern country for second case study. Hivos proposed Uganda, because Hivos assumed that its partner in this country would be able to facilitate while others would have more difficulties with this role and/or would have less results to show.

As for all case studies in Cluster I, both case studies were separately commissioned for this evaluation, and both were done in one phase that included the baseline and the endline assessment. The World Bank case study was carried out by W. Richert. Because he was also the main evaluator for Hivos, A.J. van Bodegom, Cluster I team leader, operated as commissioner and supervisor. The Uganda case was done by W. Wairimu. Both case studies resulted in separate reports.<sup>283</sup>

Case 1 focuses on an international lobbying campaign for a new World Bank Energy policy. The campaign under evaluation for this case study was led by the Washington-based NGO Bank Information Center (BIC).<sup>284</sup> The campaign focus was to influence the content of the new World Bank Energy Strategy. While BIC had the central role of facilitating or coordinating this campaign, a coalition of several Northern NGOs was involved and had support from Southern partners. Hivos was one of the initiators of this project, one of the active partners in its implementation and a co-funder of BIC.

For Hivos, this lobbying activity, which was essentially finalised in 2012, presents one of the key sub-campaigns at the international level and is therefore an integral part of this evaluation of the Hivos ILA programme.

BIC partners with civil society to influence the World Bank to promote social and economic justice and environmental sustainability. BIC is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation that advocates for the protection of rights, participation, transparency and public accountability in the governance and operations of the World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and regional development banks. BIC has about 20 fulltime staff members based at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and in regional offices in Bangkok, New Delhi, Jakarta and La Paz.

The goal of the campaign under evaluation was to influence a new World Bank Energy Strategy in such a way that promotes a low-carbon development and addresses energy access for the poor. This BIC-led campaign was initiated during 2009 and lasted until mid-2011 with limited activities until mid-2013.

Case 2 focuses on one of Hivos' newly established partnerships in a Southern country: Lobby for access to sustainable energy in Uganda in relation to the UN SE4All initiative. Hivos' Access to Energy campaign works with partners in the South. The campaign has resulted in an East African programme that includes Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania under an effort to increase the access to sustainable energy for the poor. Specifically, the intervention 'seeks to increase the share of sustainable energy access for the poor in the national energy budgets of at least 10% by 2015'. At the East African level, the Hivos campaign is implemented through a project called Sustainable Energy Access for All: East Africa Civil Society Organisations Energy Advocacy Programme. At the national level, in Uganda, the campaign is implemented by the East African Energy Technology Development Network – Uganda (hereafter called Energy Network-Uganda) as the lead partner, with four other partner organisations. This case study focused on the work of Energy Network-Uganda under the Advocacy for Energy Access Project.

Energy Network-Uganda is a registered NGO operating in Uganda. Working within the areas of capacity building, technology transfer, information sharing and networking, it seeks to improve the quality of life of poor households in Uganda by increasing their access to appropriate energy technology options and promoting income-generating activities geared towards economic empowerment of Ugandans. Under the advocacy for energy access project, Energy Network-Uganda aims to generate national debate in Uganda to focus policy decisions on prioritising pro-poor access to efficient, renewable and sustainable energy services for improved community livelihoods. The project runs between 15 September 2012 and 15 September 2015.

#### *6.1.5 Data sources and analysis*

The major data sources used for this chapter were information from Hivos staff and written documentation, such as publications, websites, internal notes and letters. During the baseline and endline, in-depth interviews were held with the two Hivos staff members responsible for the two campaigns under evaluation (on average, three face-to-face meetings per phase plus several phone calls and/or emails). During the baseline, the campaign-related ToC was reconstructed, and the context was analysed. During the endline, changes to both were identified. The source of the content of the ToCs as represented below in Figure 7.1 for the Access to Energy campaign and described without a visual representation in section 7.2.1.4 for the Green IT campaign, is Hivos itself. All of the elements were already part of Hivos' thinking—most of them explicitly—and the role of the

evaluator was only to facilitate this reconstruction. The ToCs represent Hivos' thinking in 2014. Changes are described in the text.

For both periods, outcomes were identified. This process of outcome identification started with documentation provided Hivos staff. The evaluation team then conducted separate in-depth interviews with the two campaign leaders (meaning that four initial in-depth, internal interviews were conducted) and then drafted the outcome descriptions. This was followed up by emails, Skype calls and, occasionally, a second interview, until facts were verified and it was clear what Hivos' vision was on its ToC, the outcomes, their relevance, its contribution and other actors and factors.

During the baseline, all outcomes achieved until the end of 2012, including their relevance and Hivos' contribution story, were triangulated and substantiated through six interviews with knowledgeable external respondents. During the endline, the outcomes at World Bank level and the 100% Green IT campaign were chosen to apply the contribution analysis method, which is explained in the general methodology for this evaluation (See Chapter 2).

Substantiation of the Access to Energy outcomes, including their relevance and the contribution, through external respondents, as often applied in advocacy evaluations, proved to be very difficult because of the very limited number of actors that are knowledgeable and independent. Hivos directly communicates with target actors within the public sector, but the evaluation team did not receive a response from any of these actors. The evaluation team did not try contact opponents such as heads of governments in Southern countries, the BRIC countries or companies with large infrastructures in Southern countries. We received two responses from informants regarding the World Bank outcomes (case study) and one from Hivos' partner EEPA in Brussels.

Regarding data collection for Evaluation Question 4 on efficiency, one personal interview was held with the head of the bureau of Audit and Evaluation (TEC), followed up with written input from head of the 100% Sustainable campaign (Global Coordinator Climate, Energy and Development) in response to specific questions.

In 2013, an interview with the Hivos director was held to triangulate and contextualise the baseline, mainly the reconstructed ToC.

In addition to the above, the two case studies followed the same methodology as the other parts of the evaluation, including the full contextualisation of the initial situation, the reconstruction of the ToC, the identification the most relevant outcomes, substantiation through interviews with external knowledgeable persons and an additional contribution analysis of one selected outcome.<sup>285</sup> For case study 1 on the World Bank, four in-depth interviews were conducted: one interview with the two key actors from Hivos' partner organisation BIC was, plus several preparatory and follow-up communications (mostly per email), and three separate interviews with other NGO staff who all joined this campaign.

The two case studies also faced specific challenges in data collection. The World Bank case study faced difficulties in receiving responses from external respondents. Responses from World Bank staff and from officials from the Netherlands and other European countries represented in the World Bank Board of Directors were very limited. This influenced the contribution analysis, which is described in section 7.3 below. For the Uganda case study, the initial intention was to identify 2–3 outcomes from the project documentation to kick start the discussion on outcomes with Energy Network-Uganda. However, this proved difficult, as the documents provided (at that time) were sketchy on outcomes. It also took a long time for Energy Network-Uganda to organise documents

and to comment on drafts as requested. The response to draft outcomes remained partial and incomplete.

All personal interviews were audio recorded and partially transcribed for analysis. The interview transcripts were then verified by the interviewee(s) if applicable.

Documents used as data sources for this assessment included the original and revised MFS II applications, internal strategic documents, planning documents and internal monitoring documents, information published on the websites of organisations participating in the projects/campaigns under evaluation and various external documents and websites related to the different projects under evaluation (see Appendix 1 for a summary of documents reviewed).

#### *6.1.6 Budget overview and financial management*

The total budget of the two programmes under evaluation is €1,528,489 from 2011–2015. MFS II funds account for 96% of that budget. Spending in the first year (2011) was just above €100,000, and this increased in 2012 and 2013 to an average of €300,000, with plans to further increase this amount in the final year 2014 and 2015 to just above €400,000. Access to Energy is about three times larger than the other lobby programme, 100% Green IT in the Netherlands.

Within Access to Energy, about one-third of the budget is being spent on salary costs. In line with the changes in the ToC, as described below, the salary costs for (new) staff in the regional offices was a new budget line starting in 2012 and taking almost 25% of the budget of this campaign. Other costs include costs for consultants and financing of partners. Again, in line with (changes in) the ToC, the relationship with partners changes during the evaluation period from a traditional financing of a partner to a specific project- or output-based financing.

Within the 100% Green IT campaign, about two-thirds of the total campaign budget is being spent on salary costs.

## **6.2 Evaluation questions 1 and 3: Changes and their relevance**

### *6.2.1 Theory of change from 2011 to 2014*

Hivos aims to achieve 100% sustainable energy as quickly as possible and on a worldwide scale, and the ILA projects under evaluation are expected to contribute to this aim.

#### *6.2.1.1 Access to Energy*

The main goal of this project is to increase access to energy for poor people and to shift to sustainable energy in Southern countries.

Within the ToC of this project, a number of important assumptions exist:

- If the lobbying in the North goes hand in hand with the lobbying in the South, the campaign will be more effective.
- If more CSOs/NGOs are working for a policy that supports the access to energy, they can make a difference.
- The policy in Southern countries will become more important than donor policies.

This led to the following two strategic choices:

- Strategy 1: Strengthen CSOs in the South to lobby for access to energy.
- Strategy 2: Run an advocacy campaign for energy access both internationally and nationally (also in the South).

In line with these strategies, Hivos aims to contribute to changes at the level of the following targeted actors:

- International institutions, such as the EU and World Bank, in their role as donors and as policy institutions.
- National governments and energy companies.
- Small- and medium-sized energy companies and business consumers in Southern countries.

Two expected outcomes have been formulated:

- CSOs have more awareness and knowledge of policies on access to energy and they strengthen their advocacy work.
- International donors and institutions and national governments give more priority to access to energy for the rural poor by renewable energy and by changing their policy and increasing the budget.


Hivos supports partners in Southern countries to lobby for structural changes in their countries. In addition, Hivos sees added value if staff from Southern NGOs join in international lobbying and advocacy. However, cooperation with and between NGOs can only gradually be developed in order to be able to strengthen the campaign. At the beginning of the MFS II programme, it was therefore decided to start the lobby campaign towards the EU and the World Bank without the capacities of these Southern partners.

The development of partnerships with Southern NGOs specific for this programme<sup>286</sup> started in Eastern Africa in 2011 and continued in Southern Africa and Central America. Hivos now has partnerships in 11 countries.<sup>287</sup> In 2013, Hivos concluded that working with these partners is an important and positive strategy but that more capacity building was needed to improve the national and international lobbying capabilities. Hivos continues to train its Southern partners but is more active itself than originally foreseen. Another change is that in mid-2013 Hivos hired two new staff members, one in East Africa and one in Southern Africa. Both have the task to do the lobby as Hivos and to work with the partners in the region, which symbolises the change in strategy: in addition to working with partners, also to follow its own strategy and do lobby. In Indonesia and Central America, existing programme staff received additional time for energy advocacy.

The public awareness campaign, which was Strategy 3b of the 100% Sustainable programme, and therefore related to the two campaigns under evaluation but outside the unit of analysis, was evaluated by Hivos and considered not to produce the expected behavioural change among Dutch audiences, as Hivos was not perceived by the public as a logical sender for this campaign. The decision was subsequently taken to abort this part of the programme and channel the funds to achieve other objectives within the programme, for example through the appointment of dedicated advocacy staff at the regional offices referred to above.

Lastly, an important change took place in the relationship with partners: from a traditional financing of a partner to a specific project- or output-based financing, in some ways similar to commissioning a consultant.

Figure 6.1 depicts a summary of the reconstructed ToC for the Access to Energy campaign.



**Figure 6.1 Overview of ToC/pathway of change of the Access to Energy campaign**

The two case studies offered the opportunity to gain more detailed insight into the ToC of the advocacy at the World Bank as a case for international-level advocacy, and of the work in Uganda, as a case of the partnership building and advocacy at national level.

#### 6.2.1.2 Case 1: BIC-led campaign to advocate a better World Bank Energy Strategy

BIC's mission is to influence the World Bank to promote social and economic justice and environmental sustainability. The overall objective of this campaign was to persuade the World Bank Board of directors to adopt a sustainable energy strategy by early 2011 that would more aggressively assist developing countries in adopting low-carbon energy strategies and address the energy needs of the poor.

The strategies, developed in 2009, for the first phase of the campaign included the following:<sup>288</sup>

- Coordinate global civil society efforts. BIC has initiated the convening of a diverse array of civil society stakeholders (e.g. conservation, environmental, gender, human rights groups) who are interested in seeing a more progressive World Bank Energy Strategy.
- Convene preparatory workshops all over the globe with local civil society groups before the official World Bank energy consultations from March–May 2010.
- Write 'model' Energy Strategy in collaboration with key partners and coordinate global advocacy on model Strategy.
- Media strategy (limited).
- Stop Eskom coal and Gibe dam project. BIC worked with international and local partners in Africa to prevent the World Bank from financing the ill-advised Eskom coal project in South Africa and the large Gibe hydropower dam project in south-western Ethiopia. BIC used these

projects as a symbol for the kinds of energy projects the World Bank will finance without a new and more progressive Energy Strategy.

The second phase, mid-2011 until mid-2013, focused on the final period towards a WBG decision.<sup>289</sup> That included the following key strategies:

- Conduct an analysis of the draft World Bank Energy Strategy.
- Provide travel support for Southern partners in engaging World Bank Executive Directors. As part of this strategy, Hivos funded transportation and lodging support for one Indonesian partner of BIC to travel to Washington, D.C., and lodging support for another Indonesian partner of Hivos. The advocacy particularly targeted Northern Directors, who needed support from Southern groups to maintain their progressive stance on climate, and the South Africa and Indonesia Directors, who, according to BIC's analysis, could be persuaded to the side of the NGOs.
- Coordinate global civil society efforts in advocating a progressive World Bank Energy Strategy. BIC continued to convene and strategize with a diverse array of civil society stakeholders who were interested in seeing a more progressive World Bank Energy Strategy.

See Figure 7.2 for BIC's actor analysis, target groups and pathway of change. This version of a pathway of change was not reconstructed by the evaluator together with BIC. It shows in general which actor has influence on another actor and it shows how the NGOs that were leading this campaign (here represented in the box 'Civil Society') planned to influence this actor-field.




Figure 6.2 BIC's actor analysis and possible pathway of change

Expected outcomes:

- The World Bank Board of Directors adopts a sustainable energy strategy by early 2011 that will more aggressively assist developing countries in adopting low-carbon energy strategies and address the energy needs of the poor.<sup>290</sup>
- World Bank staff drafts the Energy Strategy using the language from the NGOs/BIC campaign.
- The Board of Directors instructs the Bank management to incorporate the language from the NGOs/BIC campaign.

- The US Treasury instructs the US Board member to adopt the NGO/BIC position.
- The US House and Senate Committee engage with the issue and specifically with conditions of the additional budget (capital increase request).

#### 6.2.1.3 Case 2: Uganda's advocacy for energy access

The overall objective of this advocacy work on national level is to stimulate the national debate in Uganda focused on prioritising pro-poor access to efficient, renewable and sustainable energy services for improved community livelihoods.

Strategies:

- Establishment of a strong and vibrant energy access platform of CSOs and CBOs for voicing and management of the energy access advocacy. This was to include enhancing the capacity of CSOs, CBOs/community groups for policy awareness, implementation monitoring, budgetary assessment, behaviour change and effective lobby actions on energy issues.
- Strengthening knowledge and information building and sharing among CSOs in Uganda.
- Effective engagement with policy/decision makers on energy access and advocacy campaign at parliamentary level, informed by community-level experiences.
- Enhance the capacity of CSOs, CBOs/Community groups for policy awareness, implementation monitoring, budgetary assessment, behaviour change and effective lobby actions on energy issues.

The main target groups are civil society organisations (CSOs); government ministries, departments and agencies; parliamentarians and the private sector.

Expected outcomes. The Energy Network-Uganda expects to achieve the following:

- Greater understanding and more supportive national pro-poor energy access outlook among policy makers.
- Strengthened lobbying and advocacy capacity for pro-poor energy policy among relevant target CSOs in Uganda.
- Strengthened networking through energy information building and sharing among the national stakeholders.

The main activities of the project until early 2014 were the following:

- Setting up a national energy access advocacy working group;
- Holding partner meetings;
- Identification of capacity needs of co-implementing partners, CSOs and the private sector, and to hold trainings;
- Design, develop, disseminate and dialogue on advocacy/lobby/training tools and materials;
- Conduct desk review of national energy policies, strategies, programmes, plans and success stories promoted by energy actors in Uganda;
- Carry out outreach and advocacy campaigns; and
- In 2013, the government of Uganda had planned a national gap analysis as part of the SE4All process, and Energy Network-Uganda planned to target this process. When the national gap analysis was not done, Energy Network-Uganda largely shifted its activities towards community outreach and advocacy campaigns in four regions of Uganda as part of further outreach campaign, dialogue and dissemination of information for advocacy.



#### 6.2.1.4 100% Green IT

The main goal of this project is that Dutch data centres reduce their CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Based on the solidarity principle, Hivos is of the opinion that it should not only say what should change in the South but believes that actions in Hivos' home country are also needed.

Assumptions for this project:

- Data centres are a major energy user and their demand will continue to grow.
- New demand for sustainable energy produced in the Netherlands, such as from wind turbines, has a stronger positive impact on real CO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions than buying certificates of origin (e.g. from Scandinavian producers of water power).

Hivos made the following strategic choices within this project:

- To choose a cooperative approach.
- In line with the previous item, at the start of the campaign in 2012, Hivos did not have a strong name or image in this sector or with regard to this issue and therefore chose to convince a number of relevant actors and let them tell the story within the sector as well.
- To encourage Dutch data centres to choose in favour of 'genuine sustainable energy' by long-term contracts for sustainable energy produced in or near the Netherlands or by investing in energy production projects. This is a change in strategy compared with the start of the campaign, in 2012. In that period, Hivos asked the companies to invest in their own energy production, for example in their own windmills.
- The campaign started to focus on external data centres. These are specialised commercial players offering data centre services to other users. These users are companies that need to store large amounts of data and that prefer to outsource this activity.
- Hivos' planning was to also focus on (companies who run their own) internal data centres in the next phase, in 2013. At the end of 2013, this plan was changed, because Hivos was convinced that more can be gained by continuing to focus on external data centres.

In line with these strategies, Hivos aims to contribute to changes within the following targeted actors (all in the Netherlands):

Private sector:

- Dutch data centres;
- ICT Office;<sup>291</sup>
- Green IT;
- Surf(Net) (this was a possibility in 2012, later decided not to follow up);
- Energy suppliers; and
- Clients of data centres (since 2014)

Government:

- Netherlands Enterprise Agency;<sup>292</sup> and
- Political parties in Dutch parliament

Expected outcomes with regard to external data centres to which Hivos aims to contribute are as follows:

- Companies choose to increase the use of (real) green energy within their operations.

- Companies invest in more production of green energy.

The second expected outcome became less important for Hivos' ToC during 2013, as described above.

New regulations by the Dutch government to support the increase of green energy production are a precondition for the first and second expected outcomes to be achieved.

There are two other conditions for both outcomes. First, important actors within the sector itself must have more attention for green energy, instead only for energy efficiency. Second, energy suppliers must create special price offers for green energy.

Another expected outcome that is important but that Hivos assumes will be achieved without their intervention (expected outcome without Hivos' contribution) is that data centres see to an increase of energy efficiency within their operations.

#### 6.2.1.5 The use of the ToCs by Hivos

All of the content in the reconstructed ToCs documented in this chapter is from Hivos, and Hivos uses this content in its practice. Many of these elements are used for planning and for monitoring. No different interpretations or multiple versions of the ToC were found by the evaluator.

### 6.2.2 *Changes achieved and their relevance*

#### 6.2.2.1 Access to Energy—UN Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All)

Outcome 1: After Rio+20 in 2012, national civil society organisations in 11 countries<sup>293</sup> became aware of and have engaged in the national SE4All processes. (Agenda setting)

The goals of the UN SE4All initiative originally were (and still are) to double the share of renewable energy and energy efficiency plus universal energy access in developing countries in 2030. Joining SE4All means a commitment to deliver two key activities:

- A Gaps Analysis—highlighting key areas where attention and investment on national level need to be focused to ensure progress towards each of the three SE4All objectives.
- A National Implementation Plan—providing a rigorous assessment of the national energy situation and a year-by-year framework outlining the action and funding required for achieving the SE4All goals by 2030 at country level.

According to the UN, 83 developing countries have 'opted in' and joined the efforts of SE4All, indicating their desire to engage with the initiative to strive towards the three global goals on energy access, efficiency and renewables. Country Action plans are underway in nearly 30 of these.<sup>294</sup>

Hivos invested heavily in the SE4All process because of its relevance and the opportunities to influence the international as well as the national level. Therefore, Hivos entered into a partnership with knowledgeable CSOs in 11 countries and supported these CSOs in understanding the SE4All process and its opportunities to engage in and influence the national policy development processes.

Unfortunately for Hivos, the process was slower than expected in 2013. This happened outside the sphere of influence of Hivos but impacted the campaign strategy.

#### 6.2.2.2 Access to Energy—European Union

Outcome 2: In November 2011, EU Commissioner for Development, Andris Piebalgs, strengthened the EU policy regarding access to renewable energy by publishing a Green Paper, which, amongst other things, addressed the issue of energy access. (Policy change)

In line with this renewed policy, Commissioner Piebalgs later made sure the EU allocates €50 million to a Technical Assistance Facility to run through early 2014. In addition, the European Commission committed €500 million to support concrete energy access projects (implementation) through early 2014 and will then, likely, make significant Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) contributions from 2014 to 2020 in line with its recent prioritisation of energy.

Outcome 3: In 2013, the European Parliament strengthened the support to small farmers through renewable energy with specific amendments during the 2013 parliament meeting on the agreement on the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) for the period 2014–2020. (Policy change)

#### 6.2.2.3 Access to Energy—World Bank Energy Strategy

Outcome 4: In spring 2011, the World Bank included in its second draft energy policy improvements regarding stricter rules to finance coal power plants and more attention and budget for rural access to sustainable energy. (Agenda setting)

Although this proposed new energy policy was not accepted by the World Bank Board of Directors, this draft new energy policy was a positive change regarding two aspects. First, the World Bank included a draft new policy to stop financing coal power plants in middle-income countries while the Bank kept this option open—under strict conditions—for the least developed countries.<sup>295</sup> Second, this draft policy included increased attention for the access to sustainable energy in rural areas in developing countries, including strong arguments for prioritising the rural poor.

Intermediate outcomes:

- 4.1. On 8 April 2010, five World Bank Executive Directors abstained on the decision to fund the Eskom coal-fired power plant in South Africa. (Agenda setting)
- 4.2. In 2010, the World Bank conducted an extensive global consultation on its ‘Energy Strategy Approach Paper’ in 36 countries,<sup>296</sup> significantly larger than initially proposed. (Practice change)
- 4.3. In 2010, the World Bank created two new internal positions on climate and filled the positions with renowned international experts on clean energy. (Agenda setting)
- 4.4. In April 2011, at the World Bank/IMF Spring Meetings, the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB) adopted a resolution<sup>297</sup> that urges its members to ask their government ministers to explain their policies on the World Bank’s involvement in large-scale fossil fuel electricity generation, and invites the World Bank to review parliamentary feedback. (Agenda setting)
- 4.5. In April 2011, the US Treasury supported a World Bank Energy strategy that restricts coal lending in middle-income borrowing countries, states explicit targets for energy efficiency and requires greenhouse gas accounting for new energy projects.<sup>298</sup> (Policy change)

Outcome 5: In the summer of 2013, the World Bank actually revised its energy policy and put out a new directions paper for the World Bank Group’s Energy Sector. (Policy change)

Regarding access to energy for the poor, the new Energy Directions are in fact more positive in light of NGO objectives compared with the draft from 2011, because it says that off-grid is as valuable as grid expansion.

Outcome 6: On 24 March 2014, the United States of America and the Netherlands made a joint statement on climate change and financing the transition to low-carbon investments abroad, which

included an agreement to end support for public financing of new coal-fired power plants abroad except in rare circumstances. (Policy change)

#### 6.2.2.4 Access to Energy – Case study on Energy Network-Uganda

Outcome 7: In 2013, several governmental institutions increased their awareness for renewable energy and started to recognise Energy Network-Uganda as a relevant national stakeholder. (Agenda setting)

There has been greater understanding and attentiveness among various government actors and institutions on the importance of renewable energy and its role in achieving sustainable development in Uganda. As part of this supportive national outlook, Energy Network-Uganda is increasingly recognised as a credible stakeholder and has been invited to a number of high-profile meetings, delegations, events and organising committees relevant to the discussion and promotion of renewable energy in Uganda. (Relevant examples: see Appendix 3.)

Outcome 8: In 2013, renewable energy emerged as a key sector with increased recognition by the Ugandan government, culminating in increased budgeting for research, innovation, testing and knowledge dissemination on alternative technologies. (Practice change)

Outcome 9: In the draft 2014 budget allocations, the government of Uganda has proposed to increase the funding for the rural electrification programme to 111,736 billion Uganda Shillings<sup>299</sup> compared with 102,938 billion in the 2013/2014 budget allocations. (Policy change, Practice change)

Outcome 10: In 2013, several CSOs from Uganda mainstreamed energy issues into their strategies, activities and programmes. (Agenda setting)

Outcome 11: In 2013, several new CSOs joined new networks for advocacy on energy. (Agenda setting)

Outcome 12: In April 2014, the Civil Society Coalition Budget Advocacy Group (CSBAG) invited Energy Network-Uganda as the only energy-related network to their 2014 workshop on analysing the draft National Budget Framework Paper FY 2014–2015. (Agenda setting)

#### 6.2.2.5 Synthesis: Relevance of outcomes Access to Energy

All outcomes in this group summarise a change process and depict the most relevant changes achieved in that process. Hivos is of the opinion that its activities have contributed to these changes, and the evaluation has assessed that this is a plausible claim (for further information on contribution analysis see the next section). To assess the relevance of these changes, it is important to gain some understanding of the complexity of this change process. This complexity lies basically in the fact that all three sub-processes—the UN SE4All initiative, the EU policy making and the World Bank energy policy—are very large multi-actor and multi-stakeholder processes. Hivos is a small actor and has limited influence, with limited access to some important actors in this arena and no access to others. The same goes for the change processes in a Southern country as is described in the case study on Uganda.

Many objectives of Hivos' campaign were, as such, not new issues to the relevant decision makers: CO<sub>2</sub> emission reduction and sustainable energy versus fossil fuels, and access to energy for the poor. This is not the case for Hivos' objective and strategy in which energy access is connected to overall energy policies on both national and international level. In any case, whether it is a new or an old frame, agenda setting is required in the sense that these targeted social actors have their own interests and are subject to many other advocacy attempts, which vary in terms of how powerful

they are and in terms of how opposed they are to Hivos' objectives. It goes without saying that before, for example, the World Bank adopts a new Energy Policy, many agenda changes have taken place (priority result area: agenda setting). Not all of these are mentioned separately in the outcomes to which this campaign has contributed, partly because it would be too much detail and partly because not all of these changes had specific activities directed towards them. The exemptions are the case studies on the World Bank Energy Policy and on Uganda, which were used to get a closer look at dynamics between actors and at which targeted actors changed their agendas, policies or practices.

Outcome 1 describes and summarises changes at the level of the UN SE4All initiative, the main focus of the Hivos campaign for access to energy for the poor. The changes to which Hivos contributed are within the CSOs that became engaged. This outcome is therefore categorised as agenda setting.

The relevance of this outcome lies to a large extent in its process change. SE4All is a process that brings key social actors together in a relatively open and transparent process: international and national governments, donors, private sector and civil society. Hivos supports this process but does not have the power to influence its dynamics. The fact that the making and implementation of national action plans lags behind is not a failure of Hivos' campaign, as it lies outside its sphere of influence. Hivos' main strategy is to use the international SE4All process to influence national policy development in developing countries with regard to access to energy for the poor. It is therefore very relevant that Hivos' partner-CSOs in the 11 countries became aware of the respective national process and that they got engaged, which is also a main reason for choosing Uganda as one of the case studies. This is further discussed at the end of this section, because it is also relevant for the other international outcomes (World Bank and EU).

Outcomes 2 and 3 are both policy changes at EU level. Many interventions were needed to alert policy makers and help set their agendas to contribute to these policy changes. Both are relevant in light of Hivos' objectives, because policy focus as well as budgets are shifted towards access to sustainable energy. However, both are ongoing processes that need further attention.

Regarding the advocacy towards the World Bank Energy Policy, outcome 4 describes two changes in the draft text of the new energy policy of the World Bank that would have been direct contributions to Hivos' overall campaign objectives. Unfortunately, the draft was not accepted by the World Bank Board of Directors as a new policy position. Nevertheless, the proposed new policy makes important progress in a number of key areas, including new limitations on support for coal-fired power plants, a new prioritisation of end-use efficiency as a critical tool for meeting both strategic objectives and targets to significantly raise investment in clean energy. In light of Hivos' ToC, these developments are relevant. While in the context of the World Bank organisation, a policy is more guidance in specific financing decisions and it is not necessarily binding, the existence of such a draft, the debate that took place and the position taken by the EU and the US already influence the agenda of future concrete financing decisions. For example, there is a recent internal debate and struggle around the decision to finance a coal power plant in Kosovo.

The World Bank's new Energy Directions, outcome 5, will make it very difficult to finance coal-fired power plants. It has basically been decided that it will not support coal-fired power plants except in rare circumstances, but these are not defined by hard criteria but in conditions that need to be assessed per situation. The emphasis is on the options assessment and this should support better informed decision-making and more transparent discussions about the alternatives to coal. Altogether, it also strengthens the signal that the World Bank sends regarding no longer supporting

these types of power plants. Outcome 6 is an example of a policy statement of two leaders of the 'Western world'. Hivos assesses that there is a relationship with the previous.

In summary, regarding the World Bank Energy Policy, outcomes 4, 5 and 6 show relevant agenda changes and, to a lesser extent, some relevant policy changes. The expected outcomes of this campaign have been partly achieved. The campaign had a limited number of partners in Southern countries and therefore had limited influence on Southern countries' governments and very limited influence on real opponents, such as BRIC countries.

A central part of the Access to Energy campaign is its strategy to link its work on international and national level. This link goes both ways. The most important strategy is to use the international targets and the dynamics of SE4All for policy and practice changes on national level. This intervention strategy lies at the heart of the work on national level.

During the case study on Uganda, six outcomes were identified as an example of such a process within one of the Southern countries that Hivos selected to be active in during its Access to Energy campaign. The outcomes show some of the country-specific challenges and the need for a long-term commitment, starting with the engagement of other CSOs/NGOs.

Four of the six outcomes are categorised as agenda setting and the other two are a mix of changes in policies and/or practices on national governmental level.

The case study itself came to the conclusion that the six identified outcomes are relevant in light of Hivos' ToC. From being absent from the negotiation table to getting involved is a change that is of great magnitude. The outcomes show that the relevant target actors, especially the government of Uganda—which is in fact not one organisation but consists of several parts, with each its own agenda—started to listen to Energy Network-Uganda, to invite Energy Network-Uganda to the table and to slowly pick up the issue of renewable energy, also knowing that the entrance of CSOs into government-led processes and initiatives in Uganda is difficult. Other CSOs are also picking up the issue. However, real changes of policy and practice are yet to be achieved—outcome 9 is in fact a non-change or a negative outcome in the sense that Energy Network-Uganda's activities have not influenced a substantially increased budget for access to energy for the poor.

As mentioned above, Hivos wants to use the link between the national and international level both ways. Above, we used the example of Uganda to discuss how Hivos attempts to use dynamics at the international level, mainly the SE4All initiative, in supporting change processes on the level of a Southern country. In addition, Hivos uses national-level changes as support for the advocacy on the international level. The changes in Uganda are also relevant in that sense for advocacy activities on international level, because Hivos uses examples from the national level in its advocacy at the international level and asks its Southern partners to join conferences or meetings when possible. Hivos mentions the developments and achievements in Uganda in internal as well as external documentation. Having said this, the amount of interaction between Hivos' work in Southern countries and on international level is still limited.

To what extent has Hivos achieved the objectives of its Access to Energy campaign? To conclude the answer to Evaluation Questions 1 and 3 for this campaign, we use outcome indicators to assess the relevance of the outcomes to which Hivos contributed. We use two sets of outcome indicators: the uniform outcome indicators (UIs) and the specific outcome indicators (SIs). The latter are based on the ToC that was reconstructed for this campaign. During the baseline assessment, we took all the

*expected outcomes* from the ToC for this campaign and formulated each of them in the wording of an indicator.

These are the SIs for Hivos' Access to Energy campaign:

SI for agenda setting:

- A. CSOs partners or networks in Southern countries have an increased awareness and knowledge of policies on access to energy and have strengthened their advocacy work although not yet enough to be an equal lobbying partner (UI 1.2)

SI for influencing policy:

- B. Number and relevance of policy changes of international donors and institutions and national governments giving more priority to access to energy for the rural poor by renewable energy (UI 2.1)

SI for changing practices:

- C. Number of decisions and amount of budget increased by international donors and institutions and national governments giving more priority to access to energy for the rural poor by renewable energy (UI 3.1)

Table 6.1 presents an overview of Hivos' outcomes 1–12, categorised by UIs and SIs and the geographical spread.<sup>300</sup>

Table 6.1 All outcomes of the Access to Energy campaign					
Outcome #	Issue	Priority Result Area	Uniform outcome indicator (UI)	Specific outcome indicator (SI)	Level of change
1	UN SE4All	Agenda Setting	1.2	A	Southern countries
2	EU	Policy Change	2.1	B	EU
3	EU	Policy Change	2.1	B	EU
4	WB	Agenda Setting	1.5	-	Global/Int'l
5	WB	Policy Change	2.1	B	Global/Int'l
6	WB	Policy Change	2.1	B	NL (+ USA)
7	Case Uganda	Agenda Setting	1.2	A	Southern country
8	Case Uganda	Practice Change	3.1	C	Southern country
9	Case Uganda	Policy Change + Practice Change	2.1 + 3.1	B + C	Southern country
10	Case Uganda	Agenda Setting	1.2	A	Southern country
11	Case Uganda	Agenda Setting	1.2	A	Southern country
12	Case Uganda	Agenda Setting	1.4	A	Southern country

This overview confirms the assessments of the outcomes above. On the one hand, four outcomes at the international level are categorised as policy changes, fulfilling SI 'B'. These are the outcome changes within the EU and the World Bank. In both cases Hivos, has contributed with campaign activities that were limited in time and specifically focused on that specific decision making of that actor at that moment. The result was that these two international donors and institutions gave more priority to access to energy for the rural poor by renewable energy (SI B, UI 2.1).

On the other hand, the overview confirms that the SE4All process is slower. Hivos aims to use the dynamics of that process to influence changes on the level of Southern countries. It is therefore involved in the UN process and has invested heavily in partnership in 11 Southern countries. On both

levels, agenda setting outcomes have been achieved that are related to SI A. This intended link between SE4All and policies and practices in Southern countries is not yet visible, because the SE4All lags behind its own ambition and because the setting-up of the structure was a time-consuming task for Hivos.

#### 6.2.2.6 100% Green IT in the Netherlands

Outcome 13: Since 2012, Dutch data centres have been involved in the discussion about the realisation of several wind farms. Five large data centres in the Amsterdam region are actively involved in research to link data centres to sustainable energy producers or production, including windmills. The research is coordinated by Green IT. (Agenda setting)

Outcome 14: During the second half of 2012, Green IT, an important service provider to the data centres, introduced the use of sustainable energy as an issue within its services from the Energy Desk. (Practice change)

Outcome 15: By the end of February 2014, the majority of the 23 biggest data centres in the Netherlands were paying more attention to the subject of a sustainable energy supply than in 2012 and have either formulated plans to increase the sustainability of their energy supply or (already) taken concrete actions. (Agenda setting, Policy change, Practice change)

Outcome 16: In February/March 2014, four data centres had increased their transparency regarding their energy supply. (Practice change)

Outcome 17: Between January 2013 and December 2013, Agentschap NL, ICT Nederland, consultants and at least a majority of the 23 biggest data centres in the Netherlands accepted Hivos as a stakeholder and started to approach Hivos to engage in discussions and dialogue. (Agenda setting)

#### 6.2.2.7 Synthesis: Relevance of outcomes from the 100% Green IT campaign

All outcomes in this group summarise a change process and depict the most relevant changes achieved in that process. Hivos is of the opinion that its activities have contributed to these changes, and the evaluation has assessed that this is a plausible claim (for further information on contribution analysis see the next section). To assess the relevance of these changes, it is important to gain some understanding of the complexity of this change process. This complexity lies basically in the fact that developments in a large and growing private sector are to be seen as dynamic multi-actor and multi-stakeholder processes. Hivos is a small actor and has limited influence, with limited access to some important actors in this arena and no access to others.

Outcomes 13 and 14 were identified in 2012 during the baseline assessment. They show Hivos' first achievements with this campaign. The issue of energy saving as such is not new—not in the Netherlands, in the private sector, or in this specific sector—but data centres still prefer to focus on energy efficiency for financial reasons. Awareness regarding the use of sustainable energy is growing; a substantial change in agenda and attitude of important actors in the sector has been achieved, and some actors have already changed some of their practices.

Outcome 15 shows that Hivos continued to build on the previous changes: The agendas are more in line with Hivos' objectives, and a substantial part of the sector started to change its policy and practices regarding the sustainability of their energy supply. Outcome 16 describes a similar change regarding transparency, which is relevant to be able to continue the debate and hold companies accountable.



Outcome 17 is relevant because in 2011 Hivos was new in this sector-specific discussion, and it shows that Hivos gained a position in this debate.

To what extent has Hivos achieved the objectives of its 100% Green IT campaign? To conclude the answer to Evaluation Questions 1 and 3 for this campaign, we use outcome indicators to assess the relevance of the outcomes to which Hivos contributed. As above, we use two sets of outcome indicators: the Uniform Outcome Indicators (UIs) and the Specific Outcome Indicators (SIs). The latter are based on the ToC that was reconstructed for this campaign. During the baseline assessment, we took all the *expected outcomes* from the ToC for this campaign and formulated each of them in the wording of an indicator.

This led to two SIs for Hivos’ 100% Green IT campaign. Both focus on practice changes:

SIs for changing practices:

- D. Number and relevance of company decisions choosing to increase the use of (real) green energy within their operation (UI 3.2)
- E. Number and relevance of company decisions investing in more production of green energy (UI 3.2)

Table 6.2 presents an overview of all Hivos’ outcomes, categorised by priority result area, UIs and SIs.

Table 6.2 All outcomes of the 100% Green IT campaign					
Outcome #	Issue	Priority Result Area	Uniform outcome indicator (UI)	Specific outcome indicator (SI)	Level of change
13	100% Green IT	Agenda Setting	1.5	-	NL
14	100% Green IT	Practice Change	3.2	D	NL
15	100% Green IT	Agenda Setting + Policy Change + Practice Change	1.5 2.1 3.2	- - D	NL
16	100% Green IT	Practice Change	3.2	-	NL
17	100% Green IT	Agenda Setting	1.4	-	NL

The most important SI for the 100% Green IT campaign is indicator ‘D’. Two achieved outcomes contain first signs that the majority of the sector, Dutch data centres, choose to increase the use of (real) green energy within their operations. In addition to the achieved agenda changes, one can conclude that the changes to which this campaign contributed are relevant in light of its ToC but that there is still a long way to go before the sector is substantially changed.

6.2.3 *Overarching synthesis*

A few overarching conclusions can be drawn from the two tables above. The main conclusion, supporting the assessments made above of each of the projects under evaluation, is that Hivos has contributed to a variety of outcomes. These are spread over all three priority result areas and are not limited to changes of agendas, awareness raising, etc., but also include some relevant policy changes and practice changes. The latter is not true for the changes on the level of Southern countries.

It also goes without saying that the changes to which Hivos has contributed are somewhat limited in the sense that not all objectives have been met. For example, the policy changes within the World Bank and the EU are relevant but limited in their extent and impact, the number and relevance of policy and practice changes in Southern countries is limited, the number of Dutch data centres that have already chosen to increase real green energy use is limited and, with regard to the overall objective, the increase in access to energy for poor people is limited.<sup>301</sup>

Finally, we conclude with a methodological limitation. Four outcomes of the 100% Green IT campaign and one outcome of the Access to Energy campaign could not be categorised in the SIs. We conclude that this is due to weaknesses in the interviews during the baseline assessment, in Phase 1 in 2012, and that the evaluation team failed to ask all the right questions and identify more details of Hivos' planning, strategy and expected outcomes.

### **6.3 Evaluation question 2: Contribution**

#### *6.3.1 General description of the way the Alliance has made contributions*

For each outcome achieved, Appendix 3 summarises the main activities with which Hivos has plausibly contributed to that specific change or group of changes.

This section contains an overview of the most important activities through which Hivos contributed to changes.

Engagement in policy processes through internal and cooperative advocacy, seeking and supporting alliances:

- UN SE4All. This is a long-term, continuous engagement. It is a long-term but dynamic policy process with a very large number of national and international actors. Hivos invested heavily in the SE4All process because of its relevance and the opportunities to influence the international as well as the national level. Unfortunately for Hivos, the process was slower than expected in 2013. This happened outside the sphere of influence of Hivos but impacted the campaign strategy.
- World Bank and EU. Hivos' engagement in these policy processes is to a large extent similar but is more 'project based': If decisions come up that are of specific interest, Hivos engages. In both cases, Hivos has invested in partnerships with organisations more involved in and knowledgeable of these organisations. In both cases, Hivos also engaged with Dutch representatives in these institutions.

Southern partners. Hivos decided to focus its resources for supporting the SE4All process by investing heavily in national advocacy. It began by organising regional workshops in Africa and Central America and then chose to partner with CSOs in 11 countries.<sup>302</sup> These CSOs were not internationally operating climate NGOs but were working on local energy projects. The main activities for Hivos were a series of workshops and national strategy meetings (2011, 2012); facilitating network building between CSOs working on energy to enable participation in planning and implementation; awareness raising (Informed Dialogue Series); and direct contact with decision-makers, especially in Energy ministries. Hivos also hired dedicated advocacy officers in two Hivos regional offices. Aligned with SE4All goals, current Hivos activities are aimed at cultivating and nourishing the enabling environment for lobby and advocacy activities to be carried out. Together with its 20 partner CSOs as well as in its own (Hivos) capacity, planning and strategizing for advocacy and lobby activities at country level is well underway.

Research and collaboration with research institutes was an important in different ways. First, this was an important activity for the EU/DCI process because EEPA worked together with Wageningen University in the Netherlands and with researchers from the Dutch RIVM to prepare the amendments that were tabled as described in outcome 3. Second, it was important for the World Bank energy policy process, to develop the Alternative Energy Policy. Third, it was amongst the key activities of the 100% Green IT in NL campaign along with relationship building and maintaining with the private sector (data centres).

### 6.3.2 Selected outcomes/outcome packages

The World Bank case study and the 100% Green IT campaign were selected to apply the contribution analysis method. These two cases were chosen because both campaigns are at the heart of the Hivos ILA programme under evaluation.

We also considered applying the contribution analysis method to Hivos' partnership with a Southern country, which would have meant applying it to the Uganda case. This option was dismissed, however, because the baseline and the endline for this case study had to be done in one phase and, because the consultant received very little information about the case before the field visit, there was not enough information to take an informed decision on the outcome selection and plan the use of the contribution analysis method.

### 6.3.3 NGO campaign for a new World Bank Energy Policy

#### 6.3.3.1 Introduction

The selected case is an NGO campaign that started in 2009 and ended in 2011 and that aimed to influence the political decision making within the World Bank regarding a new World Bank Energy Strategy. This campaign and its context are introduced in section 7.1.4 and its ToC is described in section 7.2.1. In those sections, it was explained that the campaign was coordinated by the Washington-based NGO *Bank Information Center (BIC)* and that Hivos was one of the partners in the NGO-coalition that led this campaign. Hereafter we keep using the same terminology of a *BIC-coordinated campaign* or simply *the NGO campaign*.

#### 6.3.3.2 Data collection and data sources

The contribution analysis followed the stepwise approach as it is described in the general methodology Chapter 2. Two factors specific to this case caused important differences in the methodological approach.

First, the fact that this contribution analysis was applied to outcomes that were part of a case study within this ILA evaluation resulted in a few major changes in the order of these steps. The complete case study assessment was done first, including the reconstruction of the ToC and the identification of the outcomes, including BIC's view on their relevance and on the contribution of the NGO campaign and the interviews necessary for the substantiation and the contextualisation. The contribution analysis tool was then applied as an additional assessment.

Second, the availability of respondents was very limited. During the case study assessment, six knowledgeable persons were interviewed. All were staff from NGOs or research institutes and all were actively involved in the campaign. One was Hivos' programme leader, two were from BIC's management and three were from other US-based organisations. Staff members from the World Bank and from the Dutch and the US governments were approached, but no responses were received. The data collection for the (additional) contribution analysis depended to a large extent on interviews as well. We started with sending a questionnaire to three people from the US government (US Treasury) and five people from different European governments: three EDs and two civil servants. Responses were received by email from only one respondent from the US Treasury and one respondent from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Finally, a few steps in the contribution analysis approach were not done as described:

- Step 3 asks to 'gather the existing evidence on the theory of change'. The evaluation sub-team assessed during the case study that the ToC is plausible and did not have tools to

objectively assess the strengths and weaknesses of the links in the ToC. Also, previous measurement, past evaluations and relevant research were not found.

- Regarding step 4, the identification of achieved changes and the pathways of change (practice), the case study evaluator did not fully 'assess the implementation of the planned activities as set out in the ToC', because this was not considered to be useful data in this case.

#### 6.3.3.3 Selection of outcome(s) for this contribution analysis

The campaign resulted in two main outcomes, which are described and analysed as outcomes 4 and 5 in section 7.2.2 above. Both outcomes were selected for applying the contribution analysis method as one outcome package, because they are both results of the same process about the same issue and with the same actors being involved.

These are the summaries of the two outcomes to which we applied the contribution analysis method:

- Outcome 4: In spring 2011, the World Bank included in its second draft energy policy improvements regarding stricter rules to finance coal power plants and more attention and budget for rural access to sustainable energy.
- Outcome 5: In the summer 2013, the World Bank actually revised its energy policy and put out a new directions paper for the World Bank Group's Energy Sector.

#### 6.3.3.4 The contribution claim from BIC/NGOs

BIC and its NGO coalition partners, including Hivos, claim that the BIC-coordinated NGO campaign had a substantial contribution to outcome 4 in 2011 and that, through this campaign, political space was created for the NGO allies inside the Bank to continue influencing the World Bank internal conversation that led to the decision described in outcome 5.

All activities that contributed to the outcomes according to the NGOs are described in Appendix 3. They are differentiated per phase of the campaign and per outcome or intermediate outcome. Here we give a brief summary of these contributions:

- BIC coordinated global civil society efforts from 2009 until 2011 in advocating a progressive World Bank Energy Strategy. BIC convened and strategized with a diverse array of civil society stakeholders who were interested in seeing a more progressive World Bank Energy Strategy. The coalition was strongest in the USA and in the EU.
- BIC conducted an analysis of the draft World Bank Energy Strategy and developed a Model Energy Policy.
- The coalition provided travel support for Southern partners to engage World Bank Executive Directors. The advocacy particularly targeted Northern Directors, who needed support from Southern groups to maintain their progressive stance on climate, as well as the South Africa and Indonesia Directors.
- BIC itself was one of the key actors within the campaign with specific focus on advocating towards the US government and WB staff.
- Regarding the WB decision to fund the Eskom coal-fired power plant in South Africa, BIC directed advocacy around the World Bank and worked closely with its South African counterparts in raising their concerns to the World Bank Executive Directors and elevating the issue to the general public through the media. This resulted in agenda setting, and, on 8 April 2010, five World Bank Executive Directors abstained on the decision to fund Eskom.

- In 2010, the World Bank conducted an extensive global consultation on its 'Energy Strategy Approach Paper' in 36 countries, significantly larger than initially proposed. BIC advocated for a more robust consultation process with the Bank's energy team. BIC was able to organise and work with local groups in 18 countries worldwide with the objective that the World Bank receive a strong and consistent message during the consultations.
- BIC has raised the issue of limited Bank staff capacity on climate in its engagements with Bank management. This contributed in 2010 to the World Bank decision to create two new internal positions on climate, which were filled with renowned international experts on clean energy.
- In 2011, BIC encouraged the Secretariat of the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB) to initiate a resolution at the World Bank/IMF Spring Meetings that urged its members to ask their government ministers to explain their policies on the World Bank's involvement in large-scale fossil fuel electricity generation and invited the World Bank to review parliamentarian feedback.
- A separate advocacy towards the US by BIC resulted in April 2011 in the US Treasury supporting a World Bank Energy strategy that restricts coal lending in middle-income borrowing countries, states explicit targets for energy efficiency and requires greenhouse gas accounting for new energy projects.

From 2009 until 2012, Hivos

- Was one of the partners active in the development of the alternative energy policy for the World Bank;
- Undertook a direct lobby towards the Executive Director representing Netherlands and other countries at the World Bank, including several personal meetings in Washington as well as in The Hague;
- Supported several partners to lobby in Washington; and
- Contributed several times to earlier draft versions directly to the Dutch representative, Mr. Treffer, through the Dutch Ministry and with BIC to WB staff.

When the NGO campaign convened by BIC ended in 2011 after the decision of the WBG not to adopt the new energy strategy, the talks were stalled because of the controversy BRIC vs. US/EU. Hivos' assessment was that more outsider advocacy activities would only be in vain and that insiders within the World Bank would continue the silent diplomacy. For Hivos, this was a conscious strategy decision after the campaign created that political space for the NGO allies inside the World Bank.

The sustained pressure was from the Sierra Club, BIC and European NGOs/CSOs around the Kosovo coal plant. Essentially, this maintained pressure on coal at the institution by making the next coal plant in their pipeline a headache and a controversy. The Sierra Club also brought in the voice of 12 social enterprises asking for large budgets from the Bank to give to off-grid decentralised energy projects, and World Resources Institute (WRI) played a role of insider and as technical adviser to the World Bank (staff).

All this information was collected during the case study assessment through the document review and the interviews. In addition, this was the only NGO-campaign on this issue, and it is important to mention that this campaign coalition included very different NGOs, such as WWF and Greenpeace, who together spoke with one voice.

The evaluation team therefore concluded that BIC's (and Hivos') contribution claim was plausible: The BIC-coordinated NGO coalition made a substantial contribution to the first WBG decision in 2011 and an indirect contribution to the second decision in 2013.

The strength of this contribution claim is that all substantiators supported it. The weakness is that it was not possible to find substantiators other than those from partnering NGOs.

#### 6.3.3.5 Rival explanation

After the case study was completed, the evaluation sub-team sat together, critically reviewed the contribution claim from the NGOs and found one plausible rival explanation for the achieved outcomes. We summarised that rival explanation as follows:

While the NGO campaign did take place as described, it did not contribute to the decision making in governments all over the world. What BIC calls its allies within the World Bank, the US and EU governments came to their position as a result of internal dynamics and decision making.

#### 6.3.3.6 Collection of additional evidence

In seeking out additional evidence that could substantiate the rival explanation, the evaluation team found that the only relevant additional evidence is the knowledge of persons that were directly involved in the campaign and, as NGO staff who were doing the campaign had already been sufficiently interviewed, it meant that interviewing the lobby targets was essential and that we needed to interview persons within the World Bank, the US government or EU governments who either were directly involved in the decision making (e.g. an Executive Director (ED) who is a member of the Board of Directors of the World Bank) or were very close to the decision making (e.g. civil servants or assistants to the EDs). Therefore, the original informants were asked for names and contact details of these kinds of persons.

A survey was then prepared and sent to eight people within the WB, US and EU government. This was meant to be a first step that could inform follow-up steps. Unfortunately, only two responses were received: one respondent from the US Treasury and one respondent from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (As mentioned above, already at an earlier stage, World Bank staff was approached, but they did not respond positively to the requests for interviews.)

The evaluation team concluded that this response rate is too low, meaning that no strong conclusions can be drawn regarding the alternative contribution story.

Some interesting aspects can be reported from the responses from the two civil servants:

- Implicitly or explicitly, both responses verified the existence of the campaign, its activities and its visibility.
- Neither response substantiates a critical role for the BIC campaign in influencing the position of their government but point to their own, internal decision making.
- Both responses substantiate that the objectives of the NGO campaign were not achieved and that the campaign's failure to convince larger numbers of Southern countries was crucial.

#### 6.3.3.7 Conclusions

Based on the above, neither the outcomes nor the contribution claims were revisited. The responses received from government staff on BIC's contribution claims were treated as comments on the outcomes descriptions (including relevance and contribution).

In addition, the evaluation team also drew methodological conclusions. The outcome identification and substantiation during the original case study assessment allowed the evaluation team, to some extent, to assess the contribution of the Alliance to this outcome package, and subsequent attempts to attain more evidence did not prove fruitful. Nevertheless, a more solid substantiation of the outcomes was achieved, and the evaluators gained a better understanding of some aspects of this case, including the aspect of contribution. The most important reason why the contribution analysis did not work out as planned lies in the fact that additional evidence almost completely depended on personal information from lobby targets and that most people do not like to admit that they have been influenced by outsiders.

#### *6.3.4 100% Green IT campaign in the Netherlands*

The second outcome package selected for contribution analysis includes outcomes 15, 16 and 17, which are all from the endline assessment of the *100% Green IT in NL* campaign. Similarly to the selected outcome package regarding the World Bank, we chose these three outcomes because we see them as a package and as interrelated results of the same change process—Dutch data centres become more transparent and increase their use of sustainable energy.

All activities that, according to Hivos, contributed to the outcomes are described in Appendix 3. They are differentiated per phase of the campaign and per outcome.

In summary, Hivos' contribution claim is that Hivos contributed to these outcomes and that these outcomes would not have taken place without Hivos' contribution.

The evaluation sub-team considered this claim to be plausible, also because Hivos is the only NGO actively advocating this specific change process towards this specific sector. No rival explanation emerged during the outcome identification with Hivos.

As a next step, external informants were approached to gain a better understanding of the outcomes and their context. As the evaluation team attempted to use this package of outcomes for the contribution analysis, the emphasis of these interviews was on answering Evaluation Question 2: contribution. The questions were designed to test Hivos' contribution claim, identify possible rival explanations and collect data that would support these rival explanations. This was seen as a possible first step in the contribution analysis that could inform follow-up steps.

Therefore, eight informants were initially approached, most of them being representatives from the Dutch data centres themselves. Only three (3) informants responded: one from the only other knowledgeable NGO that is partly involved in the issue, one from a private company that is seen as supportive of this change and one from a public–private partnership.

After this step, we concluded that the attempt to follow the steps in the contribution analysis method failed. The main reasons were 1) the evaluation team could not identify a rival explanation that could then be assessed against Hivos' contribution story, 2) interviewing respondents helped to gain a better understanding of the issue and its dynamics but did not help to identify a rival explanation, 3) if the interviews had led to suggestions for rival explanations it would have been doubtful whether more knowledgeable people could have been found to test the two rival stories and 4) it is extremely difficult to interview the target group, especially about the question 'Who contributed to your change in position/policy/practice?' Not many people are willing to answer this question openly, especially if their activities are visible and under scrutiny by their constituency, stakeholders, shareholders and/or opponents. Therefore, even if the representatives of a target group respond, it is unclear how strategic or open their answers are.

Nevertheless, the information from the interviews led to the following insights:

- On the one hand, all respondents agreed that Hivos contributed through its research and publications. Hivos' interventions were considered to be informative and critical and to have contributed to awareness raising and debate.
- On the other hand, the respondents did not agree about the extent to which Hivos' activities have contributed to the described changes. One respondent representing a data centre (target actor) said that his company did change but that the motivation to change came from within the organisation itself. Another respondent (NGO) did not agree with the changes as such and argued that the sector is not more transparent and does not use more sustainable energy.

As a result, the contribution claim of Hivos could only be partly substantiated. Overall, the evaluation team concluded that Hivos did contribute to the outcomes in the way Hivos describes it but that it cannot be assessed to what extent Hivos contributed to these changes.

## **6.4 Evaluation question 4: Efficiency**

### *6.4.1 Theory of efficiency*

Hivos considers efficiency to be very closely related to effectiveness: 'It is difficult to fully separate 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness' considerations. They go together, or at least they are mixed.' At Hivos, efficiency is seen in two distinct but related ways: First, it is an attempt to maximise outputs with a given amount of means (for example in terms of using Hivos staff time in the most cost-efficient way), and, second, to minimise costs for a given output (for example when negotiating fees with consultants). By far the most dominant cost-type where efficiency considerations play a role is staff time (Hivos, partners, consultants). Other relevant cost-types relate to communication/publicity and travel.

If a project can be done more efficiently, it is not considered a way to reduce costs, but an opportunity to increase its outputs. According to one of the informants, being 'economical' (zuinig), keeping an eye on costs and acknowledging the origin of the money spent is very much enshrined in Hivos' organisational culture. 'Hivos procedures and mechanisms are lean and not too bureaucratic.' Another key feature of Hivos' way of working (for more on this, see the Practice section) is 'relation-oriented'. When deciding about service providers, Hivos identifies potential partners on the basis of existing relationships and track records rather than relying on formal procedures.

The interviews briefly touched on the fact that the 100% Sustainable campaign falls solely under the responsibility of Hivos, which means that no time is lost in attempts to align visions and procedures between Alliance partners.

In conclusion, Hivos has a clear understanding about the relevance of considering efficiency in decision making but considers it to be of secondary importance as far as effective lobby work is concerned, all obviously within the limits of the budget and keeping in mind the fact that in this alliance, Hivos is the only organisation working on these issues. Overall, no explicit theory of efficiency can be identified. Procedures are lean and decision-making processes light. The organisation relies on its network/relations for good services and takes pride in having an economical organisational culture.



#### 6.4.2 *Efficiency in practice*

Efficiency is discussed in the regular planning (forward) and reporting (backward) moments following the regular Annual Planning and Review cycle used at Hivos. The procedure of the Annual Review is designed and used to gather info and discuss progress with partners and regional offices. It is a written procedure with fixed timelines and an assessment. The Review replaced the previous Annual Report procedure and is considered to work better, as it combines issues of different stakeholders.

Throughout the implementation of the 100% Sustainable campaign, matters relating to efficiency are discussed when required using Skype, email or during visits. In the case of engagement with partners and consultants, efficiency considerations are primarily made during the contracting negotiations and reporting discussions.

The costs involved in ILA activities are (broadly speaking) about human resources, communication, publicity and travel costs, which are planned on an annual basis. Monitoring takes place on an ongoing basis, followed by an annual internal review. Budget deviations, such as having to make 20 instead of 10 international trips, have to be resolved within existing budgets. Whenever unforeseen campaigning opportunities arise, demanding budget increases, as was the case with the recruitment of additional staff at a regional office to influence a newly announced policy event, such budget increases may be requested. Approval of budget increases then depends to a large extent on proven success and/or plausible effectiveness.

An important element in the reflections on efficiency is the evolving role of regional offices and their connection to the Southern partners and targeted populations. While it is clear that working through Southern stakeholders is a time- and resource-intensive approach, Hivos believes this is ultimately the most efficient way of working towards achieving the desired changes. It fits with the Hivos philosophy of giving people a voice in advocating solutions and also has practical advantages. From an efficiency perspective, it is sensible to organise the work around regional offices, where staff costs are lower and there is greater proximity to the target actors. This also means that costs for traveling and communication can be kept at a minimum. Importantly, the appointment of staff at the regional offices leads to 'more intimate knowledge about and relationship with local context and conditions'. While head office staff takes a pro-active role at the level of the Netherlands/EU/international organisations lobby, the lobby at the level of Southern countries can only be meaningfully done from the regional office, for which such additional staff is required.

Procurement of materials is done through a tendering process, but services like undertaking research projects is not done through such formal procedures. The preferred way of working is to make use of existing networks and knowledge that allow for decisions to be made that 'feel good'. In the words of one of the informants 'likemindedness and commitment of consultants/partners (as opposed to being in it for the money) is considered an efficiency enhancing aspect of [our] lobby.'

A reason for the absence of such formal procedures may also be the limited size of the 100% Sustainable campaign budget in the initial years, where budgets for partners were less than €10,000 per annum and most of the activities were limited to regular planning and reporting: 'Specific analyses or audits would have been more costly than the programme itself'.

An important aspect of this approach is to document experiences afterwards. What was the quality of the work delivered by that particular consultant or agency? Is it worthwhile to work with them again? This process is increasingly taking shape, and Hivos' head office is keen to ensure this documentation takes place and keep a close eye on its outcomes.

In conclusion, Hivos pays attention to efficiency in regular planning and review processes. Few practical examples were given of efficiency-specific procedures in the ILA projects. Hivos seems to rely on 'trust' more than procedures. This approach may work for this particular situation, where Hivos does not have any 'alignment problems' with other organisations in the MFS II Alliance and has a strong internal culture/notion of cost-awareness. To be able to review their 'trust'-focused approach, Hivos does pay attention to documenting experiences with service providers afterwards.

#### *6.4.3 Mechanisms for improvements and adaptations*

During the implementation of the 100% Sustainable campaign, Hivos changed the annual planning and reporting cycle into an annual planning and review cycle. This change was organisation-wide and proved useful for the lobby work. It seems to match the 'reflection and learning' mode already embedded in the campaign, where adaptations have been made progressively as the campaign went along.

The public awareness campaign, for example, which was originally part of the Action for Change programme, was evaluated and considered not to produce the expected behavioural change among Dutch audiences. The decision was subsequently taken to abort this part of the programme and channel the funds into achieving other objectives within the programme, for example through the appointment of dedicated advocacy staff at the regional offices referred to above. While this budget reallocation could be considered as being primarily driven by effectiveness considerations, increasing efficiency through the diversion of funds towards regional offices was a significant rationale in the decision made, and this has led to partner organisations implementing their activities more efficiently.

Another important, and more fundamental, change took place over the course of the campaign in the nature of the relationship with Southern partners involved in lobby work. This relationship has gradually become more 'instrumental' in the sense that partner organisations carry out certain task following Hivos' campaign strategy. In the previous, more 'traditional', way of working, the existing partner activities were considered a starting point in considering how these could fit the campaign objectives. The efficiency gain of this change is clear in the sense of getting more relevant campaign outputs from the resources inputted into the partner organisations.

A more practical learning point is the importance of better documenting of the rationale behind strategic/operational choices made. By the nature of international lobby and advocacy work, not everything can be neatly argued in advance, but it helps to reconstruct these rationales afterwards. Hivos pays considerable attention to gathering feedback and experiences from stakeholders and incorporating these in the management of contracts with external organisations and through the annual reviews for partners and regional offices. An example of this in practice is the head office-initiated documentation of experiences with hiring external resources such as consultants.

In conclusion, Hivos made significant changes at the strategic (advocacy staff at regional offices) and practical (documenting rationale for decisions made) levels to improve the efficiency of its lobby work. As such, it can be concluded that, in the absence of specific formal procedures (apart from the annual review process), learning is embedded in Hivos' lobby work.

### **6.5 Evaluation question 5: explanatory factors**

The fifth Evaluation Question is as follows: What factors explain the findings?

The focus of this analysis is on the explanation of the identified outcomes and their relevance. This includes the explanation of contribution, as we only discuss outcomes to which the Alliance

contributed. In simple words, we assess factors explaining success and failure. To answer this question, the evaluation team considers internal and external factors, as well as the nature of the issue involved. Four sub-questions by which the evaluation question is addressed are answered one by one.

#### 6.5.1 Internal factors

The most important factor explaining the limited extent of significant changes in policies or practice within the UNSE4All process and within the 100% Green IT campaign is the fact that both initiatives are new. Knowledge had to be built, a field of actors to be assessed, partners to be found, strategies to be developed and internal structures to be designed and put in place. All this takes a lot of time considering the limited MFS II period. For these new campaigns, this evaluation comes early.

The starting point was different regarding the EU and World Bank advocacy efforts, as these were interventions into existing structures and developments in which Hivos could choose to work together with well-established NGO-partners. In addition, these sub-campaigns were relatively short.

In the further analysis, the 5Cs framework is used to categorise internal factors.

##### 6.5.1.1 The capability to act and commit

The evaluation process delivered clear evidence that Hivos can develop a strategic intent and has the organisational ability to act on this intent: to develop focus, to take decisions, plan and translate these into organisational action.

More specific to ILA, several outcomes show Hivos' ability to *mobilise* constituency, allies or media and the ability to *articulate* constituency views and needs.

##### 6.5.1.2 The capability to deliver on objectives

Key in this category is the organisation's ability to plan and perform campaigns and activities. This relates to both of the Hivos campaigns under evaluation. Both campaigns started as new activities, and Hivos assessed the arena in which it wanted to operate (in the Netherlands campaign largely through commissioning research by external experts, in the case of the Southern partners by holding NGO workshops in the region and, regarding the World Bank and EU, by partnering with a key NGO for that institution) and developed its ToC.

The outcomes and the way Hivos has contributed to them also contain clear evidence that Hivos

- Monitors development so they know what is going on in those arenas;
- Is able to estimate threats and opportunities;
- Can select strategies suitable for the situation at hand;
- Has the ability to execute strategies and to act in a timely fashion (using momentum); and
- Builds and sustains relations with the right people.

##### 6.5.1.3 The capability to adapt and self-renew

Hivos also has shown the ability to learn internally and to be able to adjust to changing contexts. For example, within the Access to Energy campaign, Hivos made use of its newly established network in 11 Southern countries to assess the progress of National gap analyses and implementation plans. This showed that progress was much slower than expected. An internal discussion and decision-making process took place, and Hivos decided to continue with the focus of the campaign but adapted their strategy and interventions to the new reality, in this case by making use of the time and continuing the capacity building of CSO partners.

The World Bank and the EU are also both examples of how Hivos assesses shifting contexts and uses opportunities. Finally, the evaluation team got the impression that Hivos as an organisation has a culture of learning and self-reflection.

#### 6.5.1.4 The capability to relate

This concerns the building and maintaining networks with constituents and allies as well as with external actors. ILA specific indicators are as follows:

- The World Bank, the EU and the 100% Green IT campaign show that Hivos can translate the viewpoints and interests of the campaign-specific target group into an agenda that resonates with them.
- The 100% Green IT campaign shows Hivos' ability to frame lobby/advocacy issues in a way that fits with inner and outer networks.
- Hivos regularly communicates with outer networks, as in the case of the 100% Green IT campaign and the workshops/meetings Hivos proactively organised at the World Bank and the EU.

#### 6.5.2 External factors

Regarding the Access to Energy campaign, the first obvious external factor that influenced outcomes is the delay in the UN SE4All process. That delay influenced the possibilities to advocate changes on national level and therefore also the possibilities to use such changes as arguments or cases on the international level. Furthermore, Hivos concluded that its newly established partnerships in the South in general were not good in lobbying. Before these groups could contribute to national or international advocacy changes, more investments in capacity building were needed.

According to Hivos, opponents on national level are large infrastructure companies and heads of states in African countries who want to acquire large coal contracts. Governments are not open or transparent, and CSOs or NGOs have to work hard before they are acknowledged and invited.

China as opponent was an important actor/factor in the World Bank case study. This country has several interests that are not in line with the changes Hivos aims for, and China is a strong, rich, well-informed and well-organised actor. The other BRIC countries and many Southern countries are opponents as well. On the other hand, powerful blocks, such as the US and the EU, had or moved towards a similar position as the NGOs. The private sector was not very active in this debate, at least not in a way visible to the involved NGOs. In the period after the World Bank Board of Directors decided not to adopt the proposed new energy policy in 2011, the World Bank changed its president. The new president picked up climate as one of the key issues for the World Bank and was more supportive of BIC's campaign issues. All informants on the World Bank outcomes agreed that the fact that there was one NGO coalition with good cooperation of very different types of NGOs working together was one of the factors explaining the success of this campaign.

In the EU arena, policy processes are large, often slow, multifaceted and involve a large number of actors. External factors explaining the achieved changes are the support from EU Member States (there was concern with Member States that the European Commission would no longer include decentralised renewable energy in the implementation of its programme) and that the idea of the amendments was supported by the Irish Presidency (who introduced it to the Development Cooperation Instrument [DCI] Member States Committee). EEPA/Hivos also received useful support from the NGO Climate Action Network, who were not very aware of the legal importance of the DCI but were very supportive once they understood the relevance. There was also support from within the Commission (informal support) of staff that were concerned about the move away from the

Commission leadership to on-the-grid RE only, and they also provided information on the timing of decisions

The private sector, which was not targeted by the EEPA/Hivos campaign, has much to gain from the on-grid large-scale solutions especially by involving banks such as the European Investment Bank, but there was no direct opposition, as far as EEPA could track. Presently, renewable energy providers such as Philips have actually come to actively support decentralised provision, so different interests are emerging.

In the case of the 100% Green IT campaign, it is the assessment of the evaluation team that two external factors were most relevant. One lies in the fact that Hivos' requests to the sector in 2012 contained new elements. Energy and energy efficiency were issues that had already been on the agenda of the sector, but the use of sustainable energy and transparency were not. In relation to the fact that data centres, the structure of the sector and the technical aspects of energy use were also new for Hivos, this explains that achieving substantial changes required time. The other factor is the role of the Dutch government. New regulations that support the production of sustainable energy are a required element in Hivos' pathway of change. The Green Deal was signed, but it is not yet certain that this will mean sufficiently more production of sustainable energy in the near future.

### *6.5.3 The role of the nature of the issue addressed*

Climate change as such is a well-known issue. It is high on the political agenda, but it is also a complicated issue for the broader public. Cause and effect are not clearly connected, either in time or in space, and the issue of the costs and whether it will be possible to maintain the current lifestyle in the North does not make the political decision-making easier.

Access to energy is a much less-known issue. The connection with national policies, especially, is relatively new to many actors.

The proposals made by Hivos are win-lose for many governments and lose-lose for some business actors, which explains the position of these actors towards Hivos' proposals.

## **6.6 Overview of and reflections on main alliance-level findings**

The Hivos Alliance – People Unlimited 4.1 consists of four partners, with Hivos being the lead partner and solely responsible for the programme selected for this evaluation.

The vision of this alliance is an ideal world in which citizens, women and men, have equal access to resources and opportunities for development and in which they take part in an active way in decision-making processes that determine their lives, their society and their future.

Hivos' 100% Sustainable Energy campaign, which was selected by NWO-WOTRO in its Request for Proposals, originally consisted of four strategies or sub-campaigns (Hivos calls them 'strategies'):

- Strategy 1: Strengthen CSOs in the South
- Strategy 2: Run an advocacy campaign for access to sustainable energy
- Strategy 3a: CSR campaign in NL 100% Green IT
- Strategy 3b: Public campaign to increase support of the Dutch audience for energy efficiency and renewable energy worldwide (not linked with advocacy)
- Strategy 4: Iconic Project (Sumba)

Strategy 3b was a public awareness campaign—which ended in 2013—and Strategy 4 is a national programme in Indonesia. Strategies 1 and 2 together are the (international) Access to Energy campaign.

The campaigns that were evaluated in this ILA evaluation are the following two related but separate campaigns:

- The international campaign for Access to (Sustainable) Energy (Strategies 1 and 2)
- The Dutch campaign for a *100% Green IT* sector (Strategy 3)

The reconstruction of the ToC of each of the two campaigns under evaluation led to a picture of a clear and consistent campaign plan. Both campaigns are built on thorough analyses of the problem, the context and the relevant stakeholders and their powers, and both have a clear and consistent set of assumptions, strategies and expected outcomes. Having said this, there is one element in the ToC of the Access to Energy campaign that is unclear. This ToC mentions the private sector as a targeted actor, but this actor/sector is not analysed, no assumptions are formulated and no strategies are defined. There are also no outcomes achieved regarding this group of actors or other activities mentioned. This does not appear as a weakness in the practice, but it is confusing why Hivos has this target group included in the (planned) ToC.

The main goal of the Access to Energy campaign is to increase access to energy for poor people and to shift to sustainable energy in Southern countries. The main goal of the 100% Green IT campaign is for Dutch data centres to reduce their CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Based on the solidarity principle, Hivos cannot only say what should change in the South but believes that actions in its home country are also needed. The total budget of the two programmes is €1,528,489 from 2011–2015, 96% of which is from MFS II funds.

The organisational structure that was put in place to plan and implement the activities is relatively small and simple and is assessed as being consistent with the campaign challenges and the available resources within the given context. The evaluation team also identified several changes that were made to the ToC since 2011 and assessed all changes to be reasonable and plausibly goal-oriented.

With both campaigns, Hivos contributed to outcomes relevant in light of its ToC. Through the Access to Energy campaign, Hivos engages on national level in Southern countries as well as on international level. Regarding the latter, the most important is the UN Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) initiative. This initiative offers opportunities to engage with international actors, such as international donors, and with national actors, such as national/regional/local CSOs, national governments and the private sector. Most importantly, it offers the opportunity to use the dynamics and the agenda of this global UN-led process to influence agendas, policies and practices in Southern countries. Through a process of research, networking and assessment, Hivos has built partnerships with CSOs in 11 Southern countries; in Central America, West-Africa, East-Africa and Indonesia. This process was time-consuming, and Hivos itself assesses these new partners to be not yet strong lobbying organisations and concludes that more capacity building is needed. Outcomes at national level did not go much further than agenda setting in the evaluation period. The case study on Uganda supports this conclusion and shows that it can already be quite an achievement if a CSO is acknowledged as knowledgeable partner by the relevant actors and institutions in its country, and it also shows how important changes in agendas of governmental institutions can be. Nevertheless, these things are not the main objective but constitute steps on the pathway of change that requires more change.

The process of the UN SE4All initiative, with national gap analyses and action plans, has not proceeded as quickly as planned, but Hivos decided to stay engaged as it still offers the best opportunities for lobbying for access to sustainable energy, nationally as well as internationally.

In the meantime, Hivos used opportunities to lobby at the World Bank and at the European Union. In both cases, Hivos partnered with other NGOs and existing networks and financially supported and worked together with an NGO very knowledgeable of the relevant institution. In both cases, the sub-campaigns contributed to changes in budgeting policies, leading to more budget for access to sustainable energy and off-grid extension and less focus on large-scale energy production and grid extension. The World Bank did not adopt a new formal energy policy as lobbied for by Hivos, but the changes in its less formal energy strategy in fact make any future financing of coal-fired power plants by the World Bank Group much more difficult than before and give (lobbying for) off-grid extensions a better chance.

Based on the solidarity principle, Hivos is of the opinion that it should not only say what should change in the South but believes that actions in Hivos' home country are also needed. After a period of assessing needs and opportunities, Hivos started the 100% Green IT campaign in the Netherlands, focusing on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reductions in Dutch data centres—a fast-growing and increasingly energy-intensive IT sub-sector. This is a newly begun campaign. Hivos was already familiar with aspects of the IT sector, but the issue of energy use and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions savings is new for Hivos. This also means that Hivos is a new actor to the sector and, while the sector was to some extent already aware or active on the issue of energy savings, most of the attention went to energy efficiency.

Hivos succeeded in becoming acknowledged as actor knowledgeable about energy issues and helped to further set the agenda of this sector and its stakeholders with the frames of Hivos' objectives. The sector is slowly becoming more transparent, and, in 2014, the majority of the 23 biggest data centres in the Netherlands are paying more attention to the subject of a sustainable energy supply than in 2012 and have either formulated plans to increase the sustainability of their energy supply or (already) taken concrete actions.

The Access to Energy campaign expected to contribute to the following two broad outcome indicators:

- CSOs have more awareness and knowledge of policies on access to energy, and they strengthen their advocacy work.
- International donors and institutions and national governments give more priority to access to energy for the rural poor by renewable energy through changing their policy and increasing the budget.

The identified changes to which Hivos contributed (outcomes) are achievements in line with these expectations. They are steps towards the main goal of this project: to increase access to energy for poor people and to shift to sustainable energy in Southern countries. That increased access and policy shifts have not yet taken place.

The 100% Green IT campaign expected to contribute to the following two broad outcome indicators with regard to external data centres in the Netherlands:

- Companies choose to increase the use of (real) green energy within their operations.
- Companies invest in more production of green energy—this expected outcome became less important for Hivos' ToC during 2013.

The identified changes to which Hivos contributed (outcomes) are mainly necessary intermediate outcomes, but only a few changes towards the first expected outcome are observable. The progress towards the main goal of this project, that Dutch data centres reduce their CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, is limited.

The evaluation team assessed factors that explain success or failure in achieving outcomes. Here, a distinction is made between internal and external factors. The internal factors are all assessed to be positive. The organisation and its structure are clear, clear choices are made in the respective ToCs and the campaign organisation is flexible and adaptive where needed. The single most important explaining factor lies in the fact that both campaigns were new activities for Hivos. Both campaigns had to start up, gain complete understanding of the new sector or policy field, identify partners or coalitions, get the cooperation started, identify the standpoint and strategy of other stakeholders and develop the campaign-specific ToC. It is therefore plausible that the campaign regarding Dutch data centres and the cooperation with Southern CSOs on access to energy were in an early stage during the evaluation period. Networks are built, capacity development is ongoing and agendas are already influenced, but meaningful changes of policies and practices have yet to take place.

The changes within the EU and World Bank to which Hivos contributed are exceptions to this rule. Regarding both institutions, Hivos partnered with an already knowledgeable, experienced and involved NGO. At the World Bank, Hivos also engaged with and supported the building of a larger NGO coalition that included all NGOs active on the issue.

The evaluation team assessed Hivos to have made a contribution to all above described changes—and to many more intermediate changes that are not described in detail. The extent to which Hivos contributed differs strongly per outcome. Regarding many of the achieved outcomes, it was difficult to assess with certainty whether the changes would still have come about without Hivos' interventions. The most plausible rival explanation would be that the targeted actors would have changed anyway, as a response to internal or (other) external pressure, and that Hivos' activities did not contribute in a decisive way. However, both contribution claims could only be verified if the targeted actors, companies or governments, would objectively explain how they have been influenced, which is by definition not possible.

Regarding efficiency, it was concluded that Hivos is 'efficiency aware' but has no explicit theory of efficiency. The dynamic and complex nature of ILA makes the development of many efficiency protocols doubtful. Issues of effectiveness overrule issues of efficiency, because it is considered incongruous by Hivos if it produces outputs in efficient ways that are not effective in contributing to objectives.





## 7 Ecosystem Alliance

### 7.1 Introduction

#### 7.1.1 Introduction to the Ecosystem Alliance

This chapter describes the international lobbying and advocacy efforts of the Ecosystem Alliance (EA).

The overall goal of the EA programme is to improve the livelihoods of the poor and create a sustainable economy, through participatory, responsible and transparent management and governance of local ecosystems. The essence of a landscape approach for the EA is that of a mosaic of different land uses and different actors; the interaction between the land use types and between the actors define the 'arena' where one can zoom in on specific issues, research questions or lobby goals. Although it may not be a conscious choice, the theory of change (ToC) as described below shows that the EA uses and applies *systems theories* and *systems approaches*.

The EA focuses on three central themes:

- Theme 1: Livelihoods and ecosystems, which 'involves a range of actions that illustrate how to better balance natural resource use with ecosystem conservation in development processes'. This theme addresses the policy failings regarding the protection of natural ecosystems of the past decades and sets out to make the livelihood-ecosystem linkage the central entry point for social and policy changes.
- Theme 2: Greening the economy, which focuses on four commodity sectors—soya, palm oil, biofuels/biomass and mining—by 'addressing [these] economic sectors and their associated policy environment, that link Northern and Southern economies and that affect both rural livelihoods and ecosystem health in the South'. For all four commodities, multi-stakeholder processes exist. Other programmes in this theme address so-called 'flaws in the economic system' mainly in the Dutch policy arena.
- Theme 3: Ecosystems, people and climate change, which 'deals with the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change and the associated international policy context, from the perspective of rural poor and ecosystems in the South'. Theme 3 is further divided into two sub-themes: (3a) ecosystem-based climate change mitigation, with particular focus on the REDD+ mechanism and (3b) ecosystem-based climate change adaptation.

These themes are designed to be interconnected, and occasionally activities of the EA address more than one of these themes. Themes 2 and 3 focus on the drivers of negative impacts on livelihoods and ecosystems, and therefore positive programme results in these areas will contribute to positive changes in Theme 1. The themes and the sub-themes have programmes in 16 countries and an international component (IC), which encompasses the EA's work at the global, Dutch and EU levels.

The EA comprises IUCN NL (lead partner), Both ENDS and Wetlands International. These three organisations have complementary working experience, expertise and interests. Both ENDS and IUCN NL have more experience working at the local level and have a more extensive partner network, and Wetlands International complements the alliance by providing strong technical input and a network of scientific partners. All three have entry points in a number of the relevant international fora. IUCN NL's network consists of—besides 38 IUCN member organisations in the Netherlands—local NGO partners in developing countries with a track record in community livelihood programmes. These partners are supported by EA grants, most of which are managed by IUCN NL. This network is complemented by Both ENDS and its partners, who have a strong track record in advocating

sustainable global commodity and trade chains and rights-based approaches. The Wetlands International network of connected local partner offices and its wider network of partner community-based organisations in each region have extensive experience in facilitating community-based restoration and sustainable use of wetland ecosystems. Wetlands International further focuses on the scientific underpinning of the relationship between wetlands and poverty reduction, as well as climate change adaptation. In addition to their own direct partners and network members, the EA also works with other organisations in the South. This involves giving support to the organisations in return for their cooperation, especially in combining lobbying and advocacy efforts.

The Alliance, especially IUCN NL, also has a strong network with Dutch companies operating around the globe. This facilitates cooperation with companies in key sectors and on important themes such as REDD+ and greening the economy.

Since 2012, there have been no major changes in how the Alliance is set up, how the EA partners work together or in team configurations.

How do the three individual NGOs cooperate within the EA? The evaluation team concludes that three elements describe the way this partnership has worked over the past years. First, all three NGOs continued to work on the same issues and with the same objectives as before. The characteristics, attitudes and approaches that each of the three EA members had developed in the past remained. In other words, the three NGOs kept their own identity, organisational culture, vision, mission and ways of working. Second, the three EA members have complementarities. These complementarities were identified and used. The EA's activities on palm oil and soya are the best examples, showing a relatively strong cooperation in which each of the three partners provides an added value. EA's activities on other issues show less—or even no—active working together, as is observed, for example, in IUCN NL's Leaders for Nature or mining. Nevertheless, coordination exists regarding all themes and issues: the three Alliance members make use of each other's knowledge, insights, experience and networks. Third, when in 2013 the three EA partners realised their cooperation and the interaction between the themes was too isolated, they selected three areas where a substantial number of aspects and activities come together: the Tana delta in Kenya, oil palm in Indonesia and the Parana delta in Argentina. This started in 2013, with the intention to develop a joint campaign in which all three Alliance partners work together in lobbying. Another attempt is to try to further integrate the landscape approach in the joint campaigning regarding these three areas.

### *7.1.2 Context specific to the Alliance*

There is a longstanding awareness of the issue of natural ecosystem degradation, which is reflected in policy debates at national and international gatherings. Over 20 years ago, actors began to address this challenge through an integrated sustainable development approach, with limited effects. Many of the threats to ecosystems and the causes of poverty are seen to have international and economic origins, and should thus be addressed at the level of national governments and international fora, as well as through changes within national and multinational companies. The EA's mission is to safeguard the natural resource base and ensure increased income and other forms of livelihood improvement for the poor. A large part of its strategy is to link actors influencing the resource base to their international context.

Because of the complexity arising from having many actors and multiple sectors in different countries involved, it has become increasingly difficult to pinpoint the exact cause of negative impacts on ecosystems and communities in the South. This is why many of the EA's activities within eco-regions

require a transboundary approach (across countries) to have a significant impact on reducing the ecological footprint.

The context of the EA's IC has not changed between 2012 (baseline report) and 2014 (endline report). However, there have been a few relevant changes. According to the EA themselves, the landscape approach got more attention in the last two years, especially in the Dutch political arena. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly mentioned the landscape approach, used the term and applied the approach in several policy documents. For the EA, this is useful, as they believe that the landscape is a good scale at which to request attention for issues such as water management and climate.

Conversely, EA staff assessed that it became more difficult to lobby successfully for issues such as ecosystems within the Dutch national policy arena. This appears contradictory and leads to the evaluator's preliminary conclusion that the changes in the agenda of the Dutch policy, being aware of the landscape approach, does not mean that there is an increased willingness to change policies and practices as well. The EA is advocating this policy change.

Certification is considered a tool to reward more sustainable practices and support transitions in the market sector. The EA's experiences of the recent past show that the chances to contribute to such changes through certification are more limited than they thought they would be a few years ago. What is needed beyond certification is more attention for broader governance issues—for instance, land use planning (in producing countries) and the development and application of sustainability import criteria by the governments of importing countries.

Nevertheless, in the palm oil sector, the EA chose to continue investing heavily in the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). In the soya sector, the EA focuses less on the Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS). Later in 2014, but outside the evaluation period, the EA organised an international multi-stakeholder meeting on agro commodities, with CSOs from producing countries and the Netherlands, the private sector and Dutch government officials.

In addition to this, there are other contextual factors specific to the EA's three themes and subthemes or issues. They are described in paragraph 2.2 as far as it is necessary to understand and appreciate the answers to evaluation questions 1 and 3.

### *7.1.3 Overview of projects under evaluation*

Initially, all programmes and activities of the IC of the EA were selected by NWO-WOTRO for this ILA evaluation. Therefore, the entire component was taken into account during the baseline assessment. That proved to be too much for the evaluators and was then limited to the following programmes:

- Theme 1. The outcomes of two projects were identified. The first is a project for which the partner NGO Forest People Programme (FPP) is commissioned, and in which Both ENDS cooperates, focusing on customary rights issues at the UN Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). The second includes the activities of Wetlands International and Both ENDS on the issue Integrated Water Resource Management or Integrated River Basin Management (IWRM/IRBM). These are not representative for Theme 1 but are illustrative.
- Theme 2. All issues are included: biomass NL, biofuels EU, mining, palm oil, soya and flaws in the economic system, including Leaders for Nature, Natural Capital Agenda and Natural Capital Accounting.
- Theme 3a. REDD+ and climate change mitigation through the UNFCCC.

The IC has three basic intervention strategies. The focus of this evaluation was on the intervention strategies of direct poverty alleviation and policy influencing (influencing government and private sector policy and practice). The third strategy, capacity building within civil society, was only taken into account if the activities had a direct link to international lobbying.

#### 7.1.4 Case selection and role of the cases in the report

Two cases were selected during the baseline assessment for further exploration, but during the evaluation process one case was dropped while the other case was broadened:

- Senegal basin: This was planned as an international case as this is a three-country river basin (Senegal, Mali and Mauritania). The EA planned interventions in Senegal and Mali with the involvement of resource persons from Mauritania. Unfortunately, this case study failed because of human resources issues. Instead, more time was used in assessing the large number of programmes that remained in the scope of the evaluation and additional time was used to broaden the scope of the other case.
- As a result of the changes in the Senegal case, the original case selection of 'Palm oil, Indonesia, RSPO' was broadened by adding overlapping EA projects to the case, namely biofuels, biomass and peatlands to become 'Palm oil, biofuels, biomass and peatlands, with a focus on the NL, the EU, the RSPO and Indonesia'. This case was selected to gain better understanding of the outcomes achieved within this group of issues, their relevance and the EA's contribution to them. These issues are all important to the EA. Palm oil and biofuels/biomass are two of the four commodity sectors on which Theme 2, greening the economy, focuses, and they are related to each other. Indonesia is an important country for palm oil and for EA's central objective, and long-lasting relationships with Indonesian partners exist. The RSPO is one of the multi-stakeholder processes on which EA focuses, and EA members have a long-lasting history with the national, European and international bioenergy developments. Furthermore, the fact that these issues are overlapping, that they influence each other and that different EA partners had the lead for different ones of these issues, makes this broad case even more relevant. Furthermore, this case study is of interest for the broader joint ILA evaluation because two other alliances (Fair, Green and Global Alliance and Oxfam) both also work on one or more issues of this case.

The decision to broaden the focus of this remaining case study did not change the focus of the field visit in the final phase, because the baseline, including a field visit, was done for the original case study focus: 'palm oil, Indonesia, RSPO'. The change was that external interviews were added.

What is the role of this case study in the EA assessment and how is this case study presented in this chapter? Basically, the case study meant that the evaluation team gained deeper understanding in some of the—interrelated—key issues of the EA. The results are an integral part of this report, not different from other issues such as soya or climate change mitigation. An exception is the part for which the field visit was done: palm oil, Indonesia and the RSPO. This is presented and discussed separately in section 4.5.1. In addition, this field visit contributed strongly to the contribution analysis, which is presented in section 4.4. Other evaluation findings of the broader case study, such as outcomes and the assessment of their relevance are presented as any other issue, but it led, in some occasions, to stronger assessments or conclusions.

### 7.1.5 *Data sources and analysis*

The first stage of data collection is described in detail in the baseline report.<sup>303</sup> Briefly, the baseline was built on in-depth interviews with four Alliance members and partners conducted in 2012 (two were interviewed twice or more) and five interviews with external resource persons. In addition, after the finalisation of the baseline report, the baseline assessment for the case study on palm oil in Indonesia was conducted in 2013 and was built on a visit to the selected Indonesian partner, where interviews were conducted with 13 Alliance partners and external informants. Finally, in 2013, a learning session was conducted with two Alliance members (the contact person for the evaluation and the head of the IC programme), and a few meetings took place to coordinate the endline assessment.

EA's Theme 1, livelihoods and ecosystems, was not evaluated in the same way as the other themes. A large number of projects is supported through this theme, and an overview could not be achieved. As a solution, a selection of two important projects was made as a way to illustrate the functioning of this theme and not to draw conclusions on all achievements. From these two projects, only the most relevant outcomes were identified and documented by project staff. The evaluator verified the observable changes described in the outcomes through documentation, but no other triangulation or substantiation was conducted.

The other two themes under evaluation, Theme 2, Greening the economy, and Theme 3a, Ecosystem-based climate change mitigation, contain 10 different issues, such as the four commodities being dealt with in Greening the economy. There were differences in the evaluation of these 10 issues. For all 10 issues, ToCs were discussed and outcomes were identified (both based on [mainly but not limited to] EA documentation and with EA staff) and verified through independent sources, if available. Six of the 10 issues (Biomass NL, Biofuels EU, palm oil [with a focus on Indonesia, RSPO], palm oil/pulp/peatlands and REDD+) were substantiated with external sources and informants. This substantiation focused on gaining a better understanding of the outcome, its relevance and EA's contribution. The field visits to Indonesia in 2012 and 2014 that were conducted as part of the case study on palm oil (with a focus on Indonesia and the RSPO) delivered a wealth of additional information for the topic of palm oil and related issues. For the key outcome, described through this case study, contribution analysis methodology was applied. The second contribution analysis was applied for a package of interrelated outcomes on the issues of palm oil, peatlands, the RSPO and biofuels/biomass in the Netherlands and the EU, with a focus on Indonesia.

A major source of data for the endline assessment was the information from EA staff. The endline assessment started with a series of interviews with two EA staff members with a coordinating role in the EA's IC. This resulted in, amongst other things, a verified version of the updated EA IC general ToC. This ToC (see Figure 4.1 below) represents the EA's own planning, thinking and choices. The role of the evaluator was to facilitate the process to put it together in this form.

The process to evaluate the separate projects under evaluation started with a request of the evaluation team to the staff person or persons responsible for the specific issues to provide information on the most relevant outcomes to which the issue has contributed, including their assessment of the relevance of this change and the contribution of the EA. Guidance for the outcome identification and format for the outcome description was included. The evaluation team then conducted 10 interviews with nine Alliance staff members, covering all 10 issues under evaluation. In each interview, outcomes were identified, verified where possible, relevance and contributions were discussed, as was elements of the ToC and changes to the ToC. In all cases, the evaluation team continued to verify or substantiate data, reviewed documentation, made interview notes and revised

the outcome descriptions, including relevance and contribution. These documents, together with notes from the interviews, were sent to the EA informants, and feedback and verification was received and integrated in the draft version of the analysis. The exception is for the two issues, 'biofuels EU' and 'palm oil (PO)/pulp/peatlands'. These were not verified by EA staff due to lack of response. As explained above, the outcomes from three interrelated programmes (outcome packages), palm oil, RSPO, peatlands and biofuels/biomass NL and EU, were treated as a case study and substantiated with external informants. The emphasis of these interviews was on answering evaluation question 2 on contribution. In total, nine informants knowledgeable of that specific issue/change responded: three were interviewed (Skype), five responded to questions via email and one combined both. Of these respondents, five were from an NGO, two were civil servants from two Dutch ministries, one was an independent consultant and one was from a Dutch branch organisation.

The field visit to Indonesia, in 2012 and 2014, for the case study on palm oil/RSPO/Indonesia, was in addition to internal and external written documents based on the following type of interviews:

- Baseline: 7 EA members or partners (from four different organisations), 3 other NGOs, 3 other external informants
- Endline: 1 EA member and 5 EA partners

In addition, two interviews with three Alliance staff members were conducted specifically to collect data for evaluation question 4. The field visit for the endline assessment for the case study on palm oil in Indonesia was conducted in 2014, and was built on five interviews with Alliance partners.

All interviews, except for those in the case study, were audio recorded and partially transcribed for analysis. These interview transcripts were then verified by the interviewees.

Documents used as data sources for this assessment included the original and revised MFS II applications, internal strategic documents, planning documents and internal monitoring documents, information published on the websites of organisations participating in the Alliance, and various external documents and websites related to the different projects under evaluation (see Appendix 2 for a summary of documents reviewed).

All of the above meant that the most important methodological choice for the evaluation of the EA's IC was to include a large number of the projects/issues in the evaluation and not to focus on only one, two or three issues. Necessary choices regarding data gathering as a result of the broad focus are described above. Considering the fact that most of the other alliances in this ILA evaluation only have one, two or three projects/issues, the broad focus also led to two important deviations from the methodology as described in Chapter 2. Firstly, it was not possible to reconstruct a complete ToC for each of the individual issues under evaluation. Elements of the issue-specific ToCs were identified through reviewing of EA's documentation and were discussed with EA staff, but this did not lead to full ToCs. The ToC elements per issue are presented below, but for the evaluation process we had to make use of the IC-wide ToC. Secondly, the capability of the evaluation team to identify explanatory factors for the findings of this EA evaluation was limited. That is mainly the result of the large number of projects in combination with the fact that different EA members lead and join different projects and the large number of identified outcomes. It was not possible to identify factors that could explain this complicated web of findings and relations, and the answer to EQ5 is limited compared to other alliance reports.

There was no variation in how triangulation was applied as it is described in the general methodology in Chapter 2.

### 7.1.6 Budget overview and financial management

The proposal budget shows the EA budget is a total allocation of €39,736,957 over the 5 years 2011–2015 inclusive. Of this total amount, around 23% is allocated for the IC. This figure is comprised of 100% of the funds granted to Southern partners for global activities and approximately one-third of the programme costs in the Netherlands. Of the same total amount, the budget is divided across the Alliance partners overall as follows: 75% for IUCN NL, 16% for Wetlands International and 9% for Both ENDS. IUCN NL as the Alliance coordinator has 3% of the total budget for overall coordination and management of both the IC and the rest of the funds, 63% of which are granted to the Southern CSO partners of the three Alliance members. The IUCN NL allocation of €16,553,581 includes €2,127,000 that is jointly managed by IUCN NL and Both ENDS.

In this budget breakdown, it is possible to see the allocation of funds across each of the themes according to which of the Alliance partners is responsible for deliverables and in which combination:

- For Theme 1, IUCN NL has an allocation of €433,611, Both ENDS €75,167 and Wetlands International €154,889. This budget is to be elaborated throughout the programme.
- In Theme 2, there is a far greater degree of precision with each commodity or area having its own allocation. IUCN NL has €150,000 each for the soya and mining areas, €75,000 for The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity and €100,000 for biofuels. Neither of the other two partners have funds for any of these four areas. Both ENDS has €100,000 for the palm oil area, and neither of the other two partners has funds for this area. Finally, there is a flexible sum of €88,667, the allocation of which is still to be decided, but to this point, it is divided between IUCN NL (€29,556) and Wetlands International (€59,111).
- In Theme 3, Wetlands International has a budget of €723,013. A significant proportion of this budget is allocated for the programme in the Netherlands. This budget covers staff time of team members working on mitigation-related issues (UNFCCC, peatlands work mainly) and also covers some direct costs for attending the related meetings and some grants to partners in the South. Both ENDS has an adaptation budget of €331,883, and IUCN NL has a mitigation budget of €331,883.

## 7.2 Evaluation questions 1 and 3: Changes and relevance

### 7.2.1 Theory of change

The EA aims to strengthen and support civil society organisations in their specific areas of interest. The EA's overall programme goal is to improve the livelihoods of the poor and create a sustainable economy through participatory, responsible and transparent management and governance of local ecosystems. Key to this approach 'is the relationship between poverty and ecosystems and how development coupled with environmental restoration and maintenance can best support sustainable livelihoods'.<sup>304</sup>

The ultimate target groups of the EA programme are the rural poor who live in, depend on, have an impact on or otherwise interact with (semi-) natural ecosystems, such as farmers, fishermen and forest dwellers.

Within the EA, the members share important assumptions:

- If the poor in rural communities secure land and access rights to natural resources, this can help them to meet their most pressing daily requirements (i.e. income and basic needs—water, food, natural and wood fibres, medicines, fuel, shelter).



- CSOs support the poor in rural communities to achieve necessary changes in policies and legislation in order to make the legal-political framework more inclusive and fair.
- Improving livelihoods may reduce current pressure on ecosystems.
- Participatory, responsible and transparent ecosystem management will help to improve the livelihoods of the poor.


The basic intervention strategies of the whole programme are the following:

- Direct poverty alleviation
- Capacity building within civil society
- Influencing government and private sector policies and practices

EA's IC is the umbrella for all programmes that fall within the scope of this evaluation. It aims to support local CSOs in their efforts to negotiate with both private sector stakeholders and with the governments present at the relevant international fora to advocate significant changes in policy and practice. However, many Southern CSOs lack the proper knowledge, capacities and network necessary to successfully raise their voices to be heard in their own countries, in global fora, at conventions, during roundtable discussions or against multinational companies based in the North but operating in the South. This is a critical hindrance to the process of lobbying for the improvement of public sector and corporate policies that will lead to favourable public and private sector practices.

The EA acknowledges that changes in Dutch, EU and international policies will impact the public sector and business sector policies and practices in the 16 countries involved in the programme, and vice versa. Therefore, a solely national approach to poverty alleviation through ecosystem management is never enough.

The main goal of the EA's IC is to enable international and bilateral preconditions (policy, governance and institutional capacity) that support the EA's overall objective regarding livelihood improvements based on sustainable ecosystem management. This goal is both long- and short-term.



**Figure 7.1 Overview of ToC/pathway of change for the EA's IC general**

Below, the EA's sub-goals, strategies and expected outcomes per theme are summarised. These summaries are rather general, and each programme within each theme works with a more detailed ToC and has its own assumptions, strategies and tactics. It is at this decentralised level that decisions to adapt strategies to changing circumstances are taken.

### 7.2.1.1 Theme 1: Livelihoods and ecosystems

Sub-goal: A strengthened role and position of local communities in ecosystem-focused land and river basin planning and other forms of natural resource management.

The IC of this theme comprises international lobbying and advocacy and capacity building interventions at supranational level.

Theme 1 and the other two themes have different set ups. Themes 2 and 3 comprise several programmes or campaigns, and each of these programmes or campaigns exists because one or more of the EA members was already working on this issue before the MFS II programme. Theme 1 also has a clear framework, but consists of scattered initiatives of EA members and of a small amount of project funding to other EA partners. Some of these projects are more connected and form subthemes such as IWRM and CBD, which are discussed below. However, there is no pathway of change or ToC for this theme besides the overall ToC of the EA programme.

The expected outcomes for this theme are the following:

- Building Civil Society: Increased civil society engagement and voice in all 16 countries on ecosystem–livelihood linkages.
- Policy Influencing: At the Dutch and the global level, policies and legislation have been adjusted to promote livelihood–ecosystem linkages.

#### 7.2.1.2 Theme 2: Greening the economy

Sub-goal: A green, inclusive economy that contributes directly to poverty reduction by benefiting and empowering the poor in economic terms and indirectly by securing the health of ecosystem services on which all human livelihoods depend.

Its IC comprises several linked strategies and interventions. The first of these is lobbying and advocacy in international fora (Rio+20, UNFCCC, CBD); commodity roundtables on sustainable palm oil (RSPO), responsible soya (RTRS) and sustainable biomass (RSB); and EU/Dutch government levels. Second is the strategy of engagement with the private sector, focusing on the Dutch and EU private sector with supply chains linked to the programme countries. The last strategy involves providing support to and engaging with Southern partners.

The strategies regarding the four commodity chains differ from each other in the context of ILA. To contribute to changes in the palm oil sector, the EA's activities focus strongly on the RSPO. The EA has less confidence in the RTRS, and its focus is more on collaboration with the Dutch NGO Soy Coalition. Regarding the biofuels and biomass sector(s), the primary focus is on Dutch and EU policy fora. There is a link with palm oil. The work on the mining sector, in contrast to biofuels/biomass, is focusing on supporting partners in producing countries. A change in the ToC of the mining issue between the baseline and the endline is that IUCN NL also started to engage, whereas previously it supported Milieudefensie (Friends of the Earth Netherlands) financially and technically. See IUCN NL's contribution to the achieved outcomes. This is the only major change in the ToC for this theme between baseline and endline.

The expected outcomes for this theme are as follows:

- Direct Poverty Alleviation: Four global trade chains, namely soya, palm oil, mining and biomass, which are important to communities, have become more sustainable. (Precondition for this outcome: Decisions need to be taken in global fora such as the RSPO, the RTRS, the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomass [RSB], the Global Bioenergy Partnership [GBP], the Aquaculture Stewardship Council [ASC], the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative [EITI], the European Union and international debates such as in the WTO and in the Netherlands through the Sustainable Trade Initiative [IDH]).
- Building Civil Society: Partner CSOs (in Southern countries) and their networks are more effective in making economic and trade policies greener and more inclusive.

- Policy influencing: Economic policies and practices of government and private sector in nine countries and at the global level have become more sustainable,<sup>305</sup> which will be achieved mainly through the Southern partners.
- Policy influencing: Trade policies and practices have been adjusted to reduce the ecological footprint of the Dutch and EU economies on the South.

The EA envisages many potential pathways of change in the sense that certain outcomes of one category can contribute to change in another category of outcomes. For example, changed international trade policies can contribute to policy change in Southern countries and vice versa. The implementation of the policy changes leading to desired changes in practice is also a step that is important to the EA and that requires a continuation of lobbying and monitoring. Good policies are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for good practices.

#### 7.2.1.3 Theme 3a: Ecosystem-based climate change mitigation

Sub-goal: A REDD+ within the UNFCCC that provides incentives to reduce deforestation and forest degradation as one of the strategies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, while at the same time delivering benefits for biodiversity and local communities.

Three strategies are defined within this subtheme. The first of these is lobbying and advocacy targeted at national-, regional- and global-level fora—for instance the UNFCCC, the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), the UN REDD Programme, national governments and their REDD+ (readiness programmes) and donor governments. This is meant to ensure the ecological and social sustainability of the REDD+ mechanism, to create appropriate incentives at the UNFCCC that reduce emissions from peatlands and to align UNFCCC processes with human rights conventions and declarations. Second, the EA intends to enhance the readiness of the private sector for REDD+. Third, the EA intends to invest in building the capacity of local NGOs and forest-dependent communities to increase their understanding of REDD+ and of their roles and opportunities.

The expected outcomes for Theme 3a are as follows:

- Building civil society: CSOs have effectively advocated safeguards for ecosystem–livelihood links in climate change initiatives in 14 countries. These outcomes depend on the willingness of national governments to open climate change-related discussions to participation by CSOs.
- Policy influencing: Global and national climate change policies and mechanisms (of governments and of the private sector) support local livelihoods, community rights and ecosystem health. (For Theme 3a: Outcomes depend on the willingness of country delegations in the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, as well as companies to change. In this, they are supported by country donors and the market.)

There have been no major changes in the ToC for REDD+ between 2012 and 2014.

#### 7.2.1.4 The use of the ToC by EA

All of the content in the reconstructed ToCs documented in this chapter is from the EA, and the EA uses this content in its practice. Many of these elements are used for planning and for monitoring. No different interpretations or multiple versions of the ToC were found in the alliance.

The introductory paragraph of this chapter on the EA already describes how the three EA members cooperate. This description includes the decision of the EA to select three areas where a large number of aspects and activities come together: the Tana delta in Kenya, palm oil in Indonesia and

the Parana delta in Argentina. The intention is to develop a joint campaign in which all three Alliance members work together in lobbying, to bring into action the landscape approach in this joint campaigning and to strengthen the coherence between local/national and international levels.

A final remark about the general ToC is that there is an ongoing discussion within the EA about the very basic approach to advocacy. At a learning event of this evaluation in spring 2014, one EA staff member said that Both ENDS basically works with a *rights-based approach*, whereas Wetlands International works with an *evidence-based approach*. In some cases, this does not work well together. EA management staff acknowledges this difference, with IUCN NL being somehow in the middle. EA management considers both approaches to be needed and not necessarily in contradiction with each other.

## 7.2.2 Changes achieved and their relevance

### 7.2.2.1 Theme 1: Livelihoods and ecosystems

#### IWRM/IRBM:

- Outcome 1 (IWRM): In 2011, the preparation of a land use plan for the Tana delta was initiated by the government of Kenya and a strategic environmental assessment was carried out. (Policy change)

The Tana delta is a vast wetland system on the Indian Ocean coast of Kenya and was designated as a Ramsar site in 2012. At the same time, the delta has been designated by the Kenyan government as a priority area for large-scale developments, such as biofuel production and the construction of hydroelectric dams. To date, there is no integrated land use plan for the Tana delta, and competing claims on natural resources are a continuous cause of conflict in the area. The Kenyan government has tried to suppress the surge of violent conflicts in the area through a series of military interventions. As a result, there is very little trust in the authorities among local communities in the delta.

The advocacy campaigns of this alliance resulted in the formation of an Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee in August 2010, tasked with developing a governance framework for all delta areas in Kenya, starting with the Tana delta.<sup>306</sup>

- Outcome 2 (IWRM): In 2011, the governments of Togo and Benin initiated the process of establishing the Mono River Basin Authority (MBA). (Practice change)

The basin of the Mono River, in the border region of Togo and Benin, is one of West Africa's many transboundary river basins. The river Mono, meaning mother of the road in one of the local languages, has since time immemorial served as a transport route and a reliable source of water for the local population. Like many transboundary rivers in Africa, however, the Mono basin has been subject to top-down, technocratic planning and poor coordination between government authorities on either side of the border. Over time, the river has become increasingly fragmented and polluted by hydroelectric dams, mining activities and large-scale agriculture. As a result, for many of those dependent on the river for their livelihoods, the mother of the road has turned into the mother of troubles.

From Cotonou to Lomè, beginning in 2012, a series of meetings between the Ministries of Water of Togo and Benin were held, leading to the validation of legal texts, creating the MBA in early 2014. CSO engagement created a space for dialogue and citizens' involvement.

- Outcome 3 (IWRM): The UNECE Water Convention and partners are currently developing a protocol to analyse the water–food–energy nexus at river basin level. (Agenda setting)

The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Water Convention) is intended to strengthen national measures for the protection and ecologically sound management of transboundary surface water and groundwater.<sup>307</sup> The protocol to analyse the water–food–energy nexus at river basin level is being rolled out in eight river basins around the world.<sup>308</sup> The aim is to ensure that analyses of the nexus include consideration of the role ecosystems play in the regulation of water supply rather than just considering them as users of water or nature.

CBD: Customary Use and Traditional Knowledge:

Outcome 4 (CBD): In the context of the UN Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), in 2013, the Working Group on Article 8(j) adopted an action plan with concrete measures to respect and support the customary sustainable use of biodiversity by indigenous and local communities.<sup>309</sup> (National: Agenda setting, International: Policy change)

This action plan has been adopted during the eighth meeting of this working group for formal approval by the 12<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in 2014.<sup>310</sup>

The adoption of the proposal marks a shift in decision-making approaches and an acknowledgement of the value and important contributions to biodiversity by local knowledge holders and practitioners. The local realities and initiatives are increasingly translated into international policy.

Synthesis: Relevance of Theme 1 outcomes:

Categorisation of Outcomes 1 and 2 according to agenda setting, policy change or practice change is not straightforward. The evaluation team categorised Outcome 1 as a policy change and Outcome 2 as a practice change. Outcome 3, also part of the IWRM issue, is considered agenda setting.

- Outcome 4 (CBD) is both a policy change at international level—assuming that the proposal will be adopted at the end of 2014—and an agenda change at national level, because national governments still have to begin a process to change their national policies.

The three IWRM outcomes are relevant contributions to the EA's objective as depicted in the figure 'Overview of ToC' above, because they all contain elements that contribute to increased civil society engagement and voice in their country on ecosystem–livelihood linkages (Building Civil Society). Additionally, all three outcomes show a contribution of these outcomes to policy influencing in the country. Furthermore, these changes in policies are relevant for the overall objective of the IC of Theme 1. A connection between these outcomes on national/regional level and the international level is not clearly visible.

The CBD outcome is a policy change that supports ecosystem–livelihood linkages at the international level. The CBD is a UN convention that is supposed to be implemented by its signatories on national level. The CBD has been criticised in the past because it is not a very strong convention, and the agreements being made are not always implemented at national level. There are no tools in place to enforce implementation.

#### 7.2.2.2 Theme 2: Greening the economy

Mining:

- Outcome 5 (Mining): On 17 December 2013, the European Parliament (EP) took a final position on the Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFR), asking the European Commission to

enhance the transparency and other corporate social responsibility (CSR) aspects of this directive. (Agenda setting)

The objective of the NFR is to increase EU companies' transparency and performance on environmental and social matters.<sup>311</sup> The directive will require large listed companies to report annually on principal risks to human rights; the environmental and social impacts linked to their operations, relationships, products and services—as well as aspects related to bribery and diversity—and their due diligence procedures for identifying, preventing and mitigating those risks. As has often been the case, the EP was more progressive than the EU member states. Tripartite meetings between the EP, European Commission and European Council are currently (April 2014) in progress.

Although NGOs advocated this, the EP did not include a reporting requirement on the resource indicators in its final position.

Relevance: Investors looking for companies with good environmental, social and governance track records will (now) find the job easier; among other things, non-financial reporting requirements will make it more difficult for investors to plead ignorance—and, therefore, avoid questions of potential divestment—when it comes to the social responsibility (or lack thereof) of the investments in their portfolios.

This legislation is the first step in embedding into EU law the corporate responsibility to respect human rights and the environment as expressed in the UN Guiding Principles and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

- Outcome 6 (Mining): In 2013/14, Dutch political parties met NGOs to discuss the issue of the EU's conflict metals policy but did not yet prioritise progressive standpoints in their EU election programmes. (Agenda setting)

In 2013, the Directorate-General for Trade in the European Commission started a public consultation on a possible EU initiative on responsible sourcing of minerals originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. The new European Parliament, which was elected on 25 May 2014, has/will have an important role in defining the EU's conflict metals policy, which will be proposed by the new European Commission.

Relevance: An EU initiative on responsible sourcing of conflict minerals would help the lobby for IMVO (International Corporate Social Responsibility) and would facilitate the levelling of the corporate playing field with regard to responsible sourcing. Setting the agenda of Dutch political parties is one way to influence the position of the new European Parliament, which has an important role to play in defining the EU's future conflict metals policy. Milieudefensie considers the correspondence as the overture to a round of lobbying among the newly-elected MEPs after the elections.

- Outcome 7 (Mining): In 2013, the Cameroon NGO SEEAC, a regional Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) association for Central Africa, provided coaching and technical back-stopping to a number of Cameroonian NGOs (including the IUCN country office) with regard to an official letter to the World Bank and to Cameroon's Minister of Mining regarding the obligation of the government of Cameroon to conduct a full strategic environmental assessment (SEA) process for the Waza Logone Floodplain in relation to a number of mega-impact projects under development. (Agenda setting)

One of these projects is the oil exploration by Chinese Yang Chang Development Company just north of Waza Logone National Park (RAMSAR/UNESCO Man and Biosphere status and part of the international Lake Chad Treaty [CBLT]).

Relevance: First, this was a capacity-strengthening exercise for the Cameroonian partner NGOs and the IUCN country office to convene a meeting amongst high-level 'non-willing actors'. The meeting proved that it was sometimes a needed and useful effort to convene meetings between oppositional groups to make progress. Second, this whole process, which is ongoing, had a positive influence on awareness of Cameroon EIA/SEA compliance and on network building between civil society groups.

Synthesis: Relevance of outcomes on mining:

All three outcomes are categorised in the priority result area 'agenda setting'. For Outcome 5, the EP took a new standpoint, but the policy regarding mining is not yet changed. Outcome 6 is agenda setting of a target group (Dutch political parties), and Outcome 7 is agenda setting in the sense of network building and awareness rising.

The overall objective of the EA's activities regarding the mining sector is 'A responsible/less destructive mining sector', which is consistent with the objective of Theme 2. The three outcomes to which IUCN NL contributed are either a contribution to the expected outcome of 'Building Civil Society' or an intermediate outcome towards the expected outcome of 'Policy influencing'. In the depicted pathway of change, these are assumed to contribute to the overall objective, which means that they are, as such, relevant in light of the EA's ToC (objectives and expected outcomes).

The EA's longer-term objectives and expected outcomes are real policy changes or outcomes showing that this global trade chain has become more sustainable. IUCN NL is of the opinion that it is not realistic to expect changes on such a scale after only two years of effective activity on this subject. Getting people around the same table was already a major effort.

In other words, this programme is relatively new, and the evaluation team concludes that it is plausible not to expect policy changes on this issue in such a short period of time. IUCN NL conducted a context analysis in 2010 and realised that 1) there is a boom in mining licenses, 2) there is a substantial increase in human rights violations related to the extractives industries and 3) globally, EIAs have increasingly become a rubberstamp procedure. These conclusions led IUCN NL to start working on this issue by strengthening CSO capacity and voice to push for legal and responsible oil and mineral governance in their respective countries, building up strong cases to push for fair, legal and best practice oil and mineral extraction in the international policy arena and working evidence-based.

The outcomes achieved so far, in addition to smaller, more intermediate outcomes that are not reported here, show that IUCN NL's activities contribute to change in line with these strategies. It could not be observed that the EA's contributions to these outcomes were substantially enforced by making a connection between activities on the national/regional level and those on the international level.

Biomass NL:

- Outcome 8 (Biomass NL): In June 2014, the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs sent a letter to parliament to implement a coalition agreement of the Dutch Rutte-Asscher administration on the optimal use of biomass through cascading.<sup>312</sup> (Policy change)

Relevance: Cascading, or rather the optimal use of biomass, is a critical element of good resource governance. There is a growing demand for biomass for food, feed, fibre, chemicals and energy, and



the amount of biomass that can be produced in a sustainable way is limited. If society wants to cater for all of these markets while protecting ecosystems, we have to make smarter use of the resources we have. Reducing the overall demand for biomass feedstock by using feedstock in a smarter way—doing more with less—is key to realising sustainable development of the bio-based economy (BBE) and to reducing the impact of the BBE on valuable ecosystems.

In principle, this so-called coalition agreement<sup>313</sup> is used as a blueprint for policy development by the current government, and the policies proposed in the ministerial letter in June 2014 are definitely a step in the right direction, but a lot remains to be done. For example, although it is important to monitor effects and to invest in innovations, this will not immediately lead to action halting suboptimal use. The sector agreement for the packaging industry is a concrete step, but only for a specific group. In addition, the strong financial support for biomass use in coal-fired power plants remains unaltered; this is not a long-term sustainable solution. Moreover, there is no level playing field between the energy, chemical and material sectors. More innovative and more sustainable uses of biomass do not get equal support compared with energy.<sup>314</sup>

- Outcome 9 (Biomass NL): In September 2013, the Dutch government, industry representatives and environmental organisations agreed on sustainability criteria for solid biomass as a prerequisite for the use of biomass in coal-fired power plants.<sup>315</sup> (Practice change)

This agreement is part of the larger agreement on energy and climate goals for 2020, the so-called SER Energy agreement. The criteria for solid biomass include the criteria set in the NTA8080 standard and additional criteria for sustainable forest management, indirect land use change and carbon debt. Moreover, parties have agreed to use these sustainability criteria as their input in the European discussions on sustainability of solid biomass.

Relevance: The inclusion of these criteria in the SER Energy agreement is an important step in extending the sustainability requirements for biofuels to all uses of biomass. These criteria are strict because they go beyond the criteria in the EU-RED and also incorporate sustainable forest management and social sustainability criteria.

Biofuels EU:

- Outcome 10 (Biofuels EU): In September 2013, the European Parliament included in its first reading position on the proposal to amend the Fuel Quality Directive and the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) the mandatory accounting of indirect land use change (ILUC) emissions through a series of feedstock-specific emission factors. (Policy change)

The EP's position included a large number of amendments including the mandatory accounting of ILUC emissions through a series of feedstock-specific emission factors.<sup>316</sup> However, the Council of Ministers failed to reach a political agreement on the subject at the Energy Council in December 2013, and the file is currently stalled until the Council reaches an agreement. The issue was already on the agenda of the debate in 2008, when the RED and FQD were adopted and has been awaiting political decision making ever since.

Relevance: The high exposure of the issue seems to have played an important role in the Commission's thinking about the climate and energy package for the period between 2020 and 2030. The Commission opposed the proposal to include ILUC and, based on informal information, it seems that ILUC will be included only in 2020.

In the Commission proposal, published in January 2014,<sup>317</sup> there are no more quantitative targets for renewable energy in the transport sector (effectively removing the perverse incentive for biofuels that currently exists due to the 10% target enshrined in the RED), and the Commission acknowledges the need for strict safeguards (not just for biofuels but also for biomass used for energy production).

Synthesis: Relevance of outcomes on biomass NL and biofuels EU:

Outcome 8 is a policy change. Outcome 9 is a change in practice (demonstrable changes in formal rules, structures, etc.) Outcome 10 is a policy change: Although votes in the parliament do not yet change formal policies, it fulfils our indicator that ‘frames from the ILA programme are taken up in policy documents’.

External respondents agreed that the Dutch sustainability criteria as agreed in the Energy agreement are a relevant, or even the most relevant, change in this policy field in the Netherlands since 2011. The underlying assumption is a strong implementation, which remains to be assessed in the future.

All respondents also agreed that cascading is a relevant precondition for a more sustainable sector. One respondent pointed to the fact that cascading is something that is being discussed a lot but, as of yet, is not brought into practice at all. The new policy paper from Minister Kamp is again not a relevant change in practice.

Three out of four respondents pointed to the changes at EU level (see Outcome 10) as the most relevant change regarding this issue since 2011. Two of these respondents explicitly qualified this as negative or disappointing changes, because it means that this policy will be ending, ILUC will not be included and sustainability criteria will not be further integrated. While the mandatory targets will most probably be lowered from 10% to 7%, this still is much higher than current practice, meaning that growth will continue without sufficient social and environmental safeguards.

All respondents, including NGO representatives, agreed that the Dutch government plays a positive role within the EU and that the achievements described in Outcome 9 constitute a relevant and positive change.

In light of the EA’s objective, one can conclude that, through influencing Dutch policy, NGOs achieved a situation where only small amounts of truly unsustainable biomass/biofuels are being used in the Netherlands—at least relative to surrounding countries—and where the Netherlands plays a positive role in Europe. Whether these relative achievements mean that the sector has become more sustainable, which is the EA’s objective, cannot be assessed by the evaluation team because it requires other data and research. EA members themselves also do not have this assessment.

The evaluation team concludes that the relevance of the changes regarding cascading in the Netherlands and regarding the EU-RED is doubtful.

It could not be observed that the EA’s contributions to these outcomes were substantially reinforced by making a connection between activities on the national/regional and international levels.

Palm oil:

- Outcome 11 (Palm oil): Between 2011 and 2014, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) endorsed and established a dispute settlement facility (DSF) to help assist both communities and plantation companies to resolve their conflicts with external mediation assistance.<sup>318</sup> (Policy and practice change)

Description and intermediate outcomes: The process of awareness raising, discussing and agreeing on the establishment of the DSF took about five years. In 2014, the DSF was established and the RSPO Board accepted a proposal to set up a DSF Trust Fund, and the buy-in from plantation companies for the DSF increased.

- Outcome 12 (Palm oil): Key actors support and improve outreach to communities. (Agenda setting)

In 2013, the RSPO Board adopted the proposal from Both ENDS for a RSPO Outreach to intermediate organisations (local NGOs, community-based organisations). A needs assessment, an action plan and a budget were prepared for adoption by the RSPO board in November 2014. It is exceptional that a commodity sector, by endorsing the RSPO Outreach proposal, assumed responsibility to proactively inform, capacitate and fund local civil society to enable them to perform their role as watchdog, intermediary and as actors of community empowerment.<sup>319</sup>

- Outcome 13 (Palm oil): RSPO adopted the revised Principles and Criteria (P&C), which include stronger social and environmental safeguards. (Policy and practice change)

In 2012, Both ENDS was chosen by social NGOs and all RSPO members as a representative on the RSPO Board. In 2013, the RSPO members (General Assembly) adopted the revised RSPO P&C.

- Outcome 14 (Palm oil): Alternative land uses and participatory land use planning are on the agenda of RSPO key actors. (Agenda setting)

Relevance of Outcomes 11–14:

- First ever agri-commodity roundtable mediation facility established
- Sector takes responsibility for resolving land disputes
- Sector takes responsibility, also financially, for information provision and capacity building of local civil society
- About five cases being handled by the DSF since it commenced.<sup>320</sup> Because progress needs to be accelerated, the RSPO decided to engage an external professional agency to offer a larger reach out and to follow up with field offices. This is now in development. The RSPO DSF makes RSPO-certified palm oil more credible because it helps to ensure that members producing, trading and buying RSPO-certified palm oil adhere also in practice to the RSPO standard, and, in case of land disputes (i.e. non-compliance), they now have a means to resolution.
- Outcome 15 (Palm oil): The Dutch government supports the RSPO, DSF mechanisms in commodity supply chains and the support to communities' capacity development. (Agenda setting)

It is relevant that the issues of dispute settlement and participatory land use planning are accepted as priority areas where the Netherlands needs to step up its involvement and support. The agreement by the Dutch Minister Ploumen and her Indonesian counterparts to develop a Centre of Social Excellence is derived from the RSPO DSF and subsequent discussions to pool resources in Indonesia in support of land conflict resolution and capacity building.

PO, Pulp and Peatlands:

- Outcome 16 (PO, Pulp and Peatlands): In April 2013, the RSPO adopted revised P&C, with key clauses and guidance regarding peatlands, GHG emissions and high conservation value (HCV) area management.<sup>321</sup> (Policy and practice change)

Key clauses are the following: 1) all peatlands under management must be mapped, 2) no extensive expansion of oil palms on peatland, 3) requirement of a drainability assessment: how long can the company continue before the land cannot be drained anymore (the adopted guidance says that two cycles before this situation occurs, re-planting should be considered), 4) measure and publish GHG emissions and 5) obligation to decrease the carbon footprint and report on it.<sup>322</sup> Wetlands International has been the principle instigator of the peatlands-related results referred to in this section and in general.

- Outcome 17 (PO, Pulp and Peatlands): Since 2013, an increasing number of major players in the industry (both palm oil and pulp wood sectors, upstream and downstream) have made public commitments to avoid further expansion on peat. ([Mainly] Policy change)

The most relevant examples are as follows:<sup>323</sup>

- Palm oil industry: Sime Darby, Wilmar (also made commitment 'no PO from peatlands' but withdrew this commitment), Unilever, Nestlé, GAR (already in 2010, as result of Greenpeace campaign; similar to 'other worlds growers') and Kellog
- Wetlands International has no data on whether these companies adhere to these statements in their practice, but they must publish this information in 2016.
- Paper industry: APP ('no further development on peat'; is largely a Greenpeace success. Wetlands International contributes by supporting the monitoring and APP's knowledge base and advocating APP's removal of plantations from peatland), APRIL (no relevant public commitments, only trials regarding marginal changes) and over 100 downstream companies such as Xerox, Disney, National Geographic and L'Oreal.
- Outcome 18 (PO, Pulp and Peatlands): A Presidential Decree in 2011 declared an Indonesian moratorium on the development of peatlands and primary forest. (Practice change)

In principle, this results in the protection of all peatlands for which no concessions were given before the moratorium. Unfortunately, many concessions were given before the moratorium and there are also large numbers of illegal activities, meaning that there are still a lot of new developments on peatlands. The moratorium was originally for two years and was extended for another two years. Next year, there will be elections and a new government. The fear is that all these developments will be off the table. According to Wetlands International, the rate of peatland conversion has decreased in Indonesia. In addition, large companies that are RSPO-certified no longer use fire in the development of new plantations. However, the government needs to create a level playing field for responsible industry, and this is not yet the case, but RSPO members are committed to avoiding peatlands in new developments. In Malaysia, the conversion of peat swamp forests continues unabated, as most entrepreneurs in the palm oil sector are not members of the RSPO and the government refuses to accept the science base on the issues.

Synthesis: Relevance of outcomes on 'Palm oil' and 'PO, Pulp and Peatlands':

Three outcomes qualify as agenda setting: Outcomes 12, 14 and 15. Outcomes 11, 13 and 16 are about changes of the rules of the RSPO; we categorise these as both policy changes and ultimately also a change in practice (demonstrable changes in formal rules, structures, etc.).

Outcome 18 is a practice change, and Outcome 17 is categorised as a policy change. This is because the outcome mentions ‘commitments’ from companies.

Assessment of the relevance of the achieved changes was difficult and did not lead to a clear picture. External respondents do not agree about to what extent the reported outcomes are relevant and contribute to achieving the EA’s objectives.

It is obvious that the changes are positive, based on the following:

- A new DSF has been developed and equipped within the RSPO.
- Important social actors, including the Dutch government, support the DSF and support further developments of the facility.
- The RSPO standard has been improved.
- There are more members, and the sector produces and consumes RSPO-certified palm oil.
- Multiple stakeholders, including governments, work together in this development.
- Responses indicate that RSPO-certified oil palm companies are improving their operations in different regards.
- Important actors are aware of the importance of peatlands and increasingly agree to protect and/or better manage peatlands.

However, the picture is not so positive:

- Forest loss in Indonesia is still increasing, and palm oil plantations are a major part of the problem.
- None of the respondents could say that RSPO-certified oil palm plantation companies are less involved in the expansion of oil palm plantations at the cost of forests than are non-RSPO-certified companies. One respondent said ‘Let’s put it this way: Not yet’.
- Criticism on weak implementation of RSPO rules remains strong.
- Level of corruption and bad governance in Indonesia seems unchanged.
- Indonesia developed an alternative certification system, called Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO). One respondent considered this to be a scheme with weaker standards and therefore a threat to the RSPO.
- The number of complaints not yet resolved is still very high, and the uptake of the new DSF is slow.
- Experience of some NGOs with the RSPO’s complaint procedures is negative.

The evaluation team can therefore not conclude whether or to what extent the outcomes contribute to achieving the EA’s objective, namely that the sector would become more sustainable. It has been 16 years since the negotiations on initiating the RSPO began. Land disputes with local communities and the conversion of forests to oil palm plantations were central in the original problem analysis.

It is notable that there is a strong focus on the RSPO, mainly within the first subset of outcomes on ‘Palm oil’. While ‘influencing (governmental) policy’ is a clear objective within the EA’s ToC, the role of government actors, such as the government of Indonesia, is hardly mentioned. Two respondents pointed to the major role of this governance context as being more relevant than the RSPO.

The conclusion differs for the Outcomes 16–18. The changes regarding peatlands to which the EA contributed are relevant and contribute to the EA’s objectives.

It could not be observed that the EA's contributions to these outcomes were substantially reinforced by making a connection between activities on the national/regional and international levels.

Soya:

- Outcome 19 (Soya): During the 2012–2013 period, the RTRS produced broad scale conservation maps and indications of High Conservation Value Areas (HCVA). (Practice change)

As a result of IUCN NL's advocacy, a HCVA criterion was included in the RTRS standard that was finalised in 2010, where it is mentioned under Criterion 4. This includes the plan to make conservation maps to come to nuanced decision making about conservation priorities in case of expansion.<sup>324</sup>

In 2012–2013, these maps were produced by a technical team supported by an advisory committee and went through extensive stakeholder consultation. Because these maps imply a reduction of expansion possibilities, they have been met with resistance from producer organisations in the RTRS, particularly regarding the implications in the Cerrado area. This led to the threat that those maps would not be accepted and used. The NGOs then advocated a pilot period to verify the accuracy of the maps and to search for payment for ecosystem services (PES) mechanisms for those farmers who suffer damage from the fact that they have to contribute to conservation (instead of conversion to farmland).

Relevance: As a cooperation mechanism between the Brazilian government and a voluntary standard setting mechanism, this is a ground-breaking governance tool. Results are expected in 2014–2015.

- Outcome 20 (Soya): The Dutch government and the Dutch soya sector, key stakeholders in the Dutch Soy Chain Transition Process (Ketentransitie), become aware that the sector has achieved insufficient progress towards the 2015 objective of 100% sourcing from the RTRS or equivalent and take additional actions. (Agenda setting)

In 2011, the Dutch soya sector, with pressure from IDH and NGOs such as in the Dutch Soy Coalition,<sup>325</sup> decided and publicly stated that they would source 100% from the RTRS for Dutch use in 2015, which would be 1.8 million tons. This was prior to the current MFS II period, and all stakeholders are now focusing on the question 'and how are we going to achieve that?'

Early in 2014, it was seen that, while considerable progress has been made,<sup>326</sup> for various reasons they are not going to make the change towards 100% sourcing from the RTRS. The government was not aware that the sector was sliding away from the objective, and civil servants thought that the sector would achieve the objective in 2015.<sup>327</sup>

Related and follow-up outcomes: government, NGOs, private sector actors, coalitions and standards systems have greater insight into the quality differences of soya (as well as biomass and palm oil) standards and act upon this insight. (For details, see Appendix 3.)

Relevance: A jointly-agreed and strict interpretation of 'equivalent to RTRS' is relevant because the risk of a 'race to the bottom' is real if the criteria or standards are not strict. It is also a political risk if a Dutch minister makes statements about how well the sector is doing while he/she does not know with certainty what the rules of the game in fact are. Over the years, the Dutch government has continuously withdrawn from taking a proactive standpoint with the result that systems threaten to slide to a weaker standard or that economic actors choose weaker systems. It is therefore important that NGOs hold the government and the sector accountable.

- Outcome 21 (Soya): In mid-2013, the Observatorio Socio-Ambiental de la Soja (OSAS) was formed as a new coalition of NGOs/CSOs in five soya-producing countries. (Agenda setting)

The objectives of this socio-environmental soya observer are 1) to monitor the expansion and impact of soya bean farming in the five countries in the Southern Cone: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, 2) to improve regional knowledge and 3) to seek concerted responses to the situation.

Relevance: The formation of the Observatorio<sup>328</sup> has already resulted in intensive information exchange on data, monitoring and mapping of land use in particular. Results of OSAS cumulative monitoring at regional level are expected in autumn 2014, to be actively promoted in Latin America and the Netherlands/EU.

Synthesis: Relevance of outcomes on soya:

Outcome 19 is a practice change. Outcome 20 is agenda setting (because targeted actors ‘become aware’ of a negative development), but the implicit change is the fact that the sector has achieved progress towards the 2015 objective of 100% sourcing from the RTRS—progress also towards the EA’s objective of a more sustainable sector—but that this progress is less than the 100% commitment made by the sector. Outcome 21 is agenda setting in the sense of (NGO/CSO) network building.

These outcomes show a diverse mix of changes within different actors, such as standard setting at the level of an international multi-stakeholder certification system, Dutch politics and market developments and building civil society in South America. This is consistent with the EA’s ToC, which focuses on all these elements and actors.

It is notable that no (positive) changes at the level of government actors in South America are included.

Similarly to the assessment above regarding the palm oil sector, data are missing to show that this commodity sector has become more sustainable.

It can be observed that the EA’s contributions to these outcomes were substantially reinforced by making a connection between activities on the national/regional and international levels.

Flaws in the economic system:

- Outcome 22 (Flaws economic system): On 22 June 2013, the Dutch government, coordinated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, presented its broad biodiversity policy, ‘Uitvoeringsagenda Natuurlijk Kapitaal’ (UNK), which includes the international biodiversity policy. (Policy change)

The Dutch government had two previous policy programmes for biodiversity: Internationaal Beleidsprogrammema Biodiversiteit (2002–2008) and Biodiversiteit Werkt (2008–2012). The Uitvoeringsagenda Natuurlijk Kapitaal (UNK) is the third biodiversity policy in succession.

According to the Dutch government, the UNK focuses on conservation and the sustainable use of biodiversity—nationally and internationally. This focus makes this policy coherent with the attempts to achieve a *circular economy* and with Dutch international policy.

The UNK takes the CBD 2020 Aichi targets as reference and focuses on four key areas or themes: 1) sustainable production and consumption: sustainable value chains, 2) sustainable fisheries and conservation of marine biodiversity, 3) sustainable agriculture and biodiversity conservation and 4) valuing natural capital.

Relevance: This outcome is highly relevant for the EA, as the UNK is the guiding government policy on biodiversity, and this relates to various working areas of the EA, particularly greening the economy and livelihoods and ecosystems (integrated landscape approach).

The former biodiversity policy 'Biodiversiteit Werkt' ended in 2012, and a new policy had to be formulated by the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs and the Environment. The evaluation of this former policy had been rather negative, and the main critique included the claim that coordination and coherence among the three Ministries had been inadequate, and that there had been an overly fragmented project approach (many different activities). The evaluation concluded that it is unlikely that this former biodiversity policy had a demonstrable effect on biodiversity.<sup>329</sup>

The UNK includes the international biodiversity policy, which is the focus of IUCN NL's intervention. The level of ambition (or at least the pretention) is lower than in the previous policies.

- Outcome 23 (Flaws economic system): During the Leaders for Nature Annual Forum in February 2014, a coalition of 14 large Dutch companies, two business platforms and one NGO signed a Green Deal with the Dutch government regarding Natural Capital Accounting. (Policy change)

In February 2014, this 'Natural Capital Green Deal' is taking steps to make the impact of the companies on natural and social capital visible, with the help of CSOs. 'The goal is the development of adequate methods and tools on (positive and negative) impacts and dependency on natural and social capital to accelerate the transition to a green economy.'<sup>330</sup> A central element in this Green Deal is thus the delivery of more information about the use and the development of natural and social capital.

The signatories are IUCN NL, CSR Netherlands, True Price, Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, AkzoNobel, ARCADIS, BAM, Deloitte, DSM, EY, FMO, Interface, Heijmans, KPMG, Philips, PwC, Thermaflex and VBDO.<sup>331</sup>

Relevance: The methods and tools that will be developed for the accounting 'will give the companies insight into the possibilities of accelerating the transition to a sustainable economy.'

- Outcome 24 (Flaws economic system): In December 2011, 12 companies sought to work jointly with IUCN NL in a long-term programme on ecosystems and biodiversity. (Policy change)

Relevance: This outcome was already reported in the baseline report in 2012. It refers to the Leaders for Nature (LfN) programme, which did not report new outcomes for the rest of the evaluation period.

Synthesis: Relevance of outcomes on 'Flaws economic system':

All three outcomes are categorised as policy changes. These outcomes can be assessed as being a positive contribution to the objective of Theme 2: a green, inclusive economy. IUCN NL identified flaws in the economic system and developed interventions to contribute to these policy changes. Having said this, while these outcomes are formally categorised as policy changes, the changes are currently mainly statements by either the government or a number of private sector actors that are not binding and that need to be seen in the context of an ongoing process.



No outcomes were reported by the LfN programme during the endline assessment of this evaluation. Outcome 24 was already achieved in 2012. Nevertheless, LfN was mentioned by other programme staff, because the LfN partnership could mobilise a number of large companies to engage in changes (Outcome 23 [Flaws economic system] and Outcome 27 [REDD+]) or because the fact that IUCN NL has this partnership with a number of large companies gives access to the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Outcome 22 [Flaws economic system]). Although these outcomes have not yet led to practice changes directly contributing to the EA's ToC, it can be concluded that it is an asset with a unique added value.

It could not be observed that the EA's contributions to these outcomes were substantially reinforced by making a connection between activities on the national/regional and international levels.

#### 7.2.2.3 Theme 3a: Ecosystem-based climate change mitigation

##### UNFCCC:

- Outcome 25 (UNFCCC): In 2012, the UNFCCC reached two important decisions. (Policy change)

These two decisions are 1) A new accounting activity called 'wetland drainage and rewetting' was adopted under the Kyoto Protocol. This opens the opportunity for countries to reduce their emissions from peatlands. 2) A decision that all REDD+ projects (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) need to monitor, report and verify 'all significant sinks and sources, and pools and gases', meaning that when peatsoils in forest areas are a significant source, these need to be included.

Relevance: Regarding 1) and 2) above, the mitigation potential of peatlands is recognised. Regarding 2), with this counting mechanism, if a country like Indonesia—with a lot of deforestation and also peat drainage—continues with its drainage of peat, it can protect forests elsewhere in the country, but that will never compensate for the losses caused by the emissions from peat. It must therefore effectively limit these emissions if it wants to engage in the REDD+ mechanism. This is possibly a reason why Indonesia included peat in the moratorium.

- In the discussions with negotiators after 2012, Wetlands International has built on these two earlier important UNFCCC decisions reached in 2012. Wetlands International's strategy is to maintain and preferably enhance these results in a new global treaty to be agreed in 2015. (See related outcomes in Appendix 3.)
- Outcome 26 (UNFCCC): In 2011, the FAO acknowledged that emissions from peatlands are significant and actively advocated incentives in the new global agreement to reduce emissions from peatlands. (Policy change)

Relevance: FAO is a UN body and one of the large and important global players, especially with regard to forests and agriculture. This is a change of the FAO position. It is also important for getting agriculture on peat on the agenda, not only for mitigation but also for adaptation.

##### REDD+:

- Outcome 27 (REDD+): In November 2013, convening parties at the 19th Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC (COP19) agreed on the 'Warsaw Framework for REDD Plus'. (Agenda setting)

Description: COP19 took place in Warsaw, Poland. Negotiations had already been taking place for seven years with no certainty about whether a final text would be agreed upon or what its content

would be. The 'Warsaw Framework for REDD Plus' includes guidance on assessing reference emission levels; monitoring, reporting and verification; national forest monitoring, drivers of deforestation and results-based financing. Together with the decisions adopted at previous COPs, this provides international policy guidance ('the Rulebook on REDD+') on how countries should deal with REDD+ in the framework of the UNFCCC. In the view of the negotiators, the international policy building for REDD+ is now ready for application.

- Outcome 28 (REDD+): In 2013 in the Philippines, diverse REDD+ partners in the region improved their collaboration, sped up the process of a REDD+ project in Mindanao and took social and environmental safeguards on board. (Agenda setting, Policy change and Practice change)

The importance of inclusive REDD+ preparations on the ground to ensure equitable interventions is illustrated by the recent comment of a staff member of Trees for All during a meeting with IUCN NL: '[This REDD+ project and the involvement of local community organisations and NGOs] forced us to take all these various issues [such as FPIC, community engagement and government agency buy-in] very thoroughly on board'.

- Outcome 29 (REDD+): Since 2012, the government of Ghana, NGOs, CSOs and private sector organisations have been developing the REDD+ Cocoa Landscape programme in Ghana. (Practice change)

The REDD+ Cocoa Landscape programme in Ghana<sup>332</sup> builds in part on the work of Nature Conservation Research Centre (NCRC), a local conservation NGO in Ghana, in providing technical capacity and facilitating learning. Currently, the Assumura Community Resource Management Area (CREMA), which NCRC develops, is being further developed as a start-up project where the certification of cocoa crops will be scaled up to groups of farmers or to landscape certification. CREMA is a governance model that clarifies and formalises rights to benefits for local communities. This model can be used to clarify and formalise community access to carbon rights and the arrangement of benefit-sharing arrangements for the proceeds. Currently, the CREMA model is used to prepare communities for group or landscape certification of cocoa production. This is developed in the context of Ghana's Cocoa Landscape REDD+ Programme.

The CREMA model and IUCN NL's contribution to its development is extensively referenced as a key component of the government of Ghana's 7 March 2014 submission for an emission reductions programme to the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF).<sup>333</sup>

Synthesis: Relevance of outcomes on 'UNFCCC' and 'REDD+' (Ecosystem-based climate change mitigation):

Outcomes 25 and 26 are both policy changes. Outcome 27 is categorised as agenda setting, because the agreed framework is not a formal policy document but rather a statement that sets the agenda. Outcome 28 is an example of a multifaceted change that is categorised as agenda setting, policy change and practice change at the same time. Outcome 29 is a practice change.

Outcomes 25–29 are positive contributions to the objectives of Theme 3. As process results, they can be appreciated as being relevant. Their contributions to the next main goal, a new climate treaty in 2015, can only be assessed in the future.

At least the last two outcomes show a strategic interaction between the EA's activities on the national and international levels. This interaction contributed to these outcomes.

### 7.2.3 *Overarching synthesis: Using outcome indicators to categorise outcomes and assess relevance*

In addition to the above, we used outcome indicators to assess the relevance of the 29 outcomes to which the EA contributed. We used two sets of outcome indicators: the uniform outcome indicators (UI), which are introduced in the general introduction to this evaluation, and the specific outcome indicators (SI), which are based on the expected outcomes from the reconstructed ToC and were developed during the baseline assessment. For the EA, the following SIs were applied.

SIs for agenda setting:

- Number of CSOs and their networks that are more effective in making economic and trade policies greener and more inclusive in a relevant way (UI 1.2)
- CSOs that have effectively advocated relevant safeguards for ecosystem–livelihood links in climate change initiatives in 14 countries (UI 1.2)

SIs for influencing policy:

- Number and relevance of adjusted policies and legislation at the global level to promote livelihood–ecosystem linkages (UI 2.1)
- Number and relevance of economic policies of government or private sector in nine countries or at the global level that have become more sustainable (achieved mainly through the Southern partners) (UI 2.1)
- Number and relevance of trade policies that have been adjusted to reduce the ecological footprint of the Dutch and EU economies on the South (UI 2.1)
- Number and relevance of global and national climate change policies and mechanisms (of governments and of the private sector) supporting local livelihoods, community rights and ecosystem health (UI 2.1)

SIs for changing practices:

- Number and relevance of changes in four global trade chains, namely soya, palm oil, mining and biomass, which are important to communities, making these trade chains more sustainable (UI 3.1 or UI 3.2)
- Number and relevance of economic practices of governments or the private sector in nine countries or at the global level that have become more sustainable (achieved mainly through the Southern partners) (UI 3.1 or UI 3.2)
- Number and relevance of trade practices that have been adjusted to reduce the ecological footprint of the Dutch and EU economies on the South (UI 3.1 or UI 3.2)

Table 7.1 presents an overview of all EA outcomes, categorised by UIs and EA-specific outcome indicators.

A few conclusions can be drawn from this table. The main conclusion supports the assessments made above of each of the issues under evaluation. The table shows that the EA's ILA programmes have contributed to a variety of outcomes, and that they are spread over all three priority result areas. They are not limited to changes of agendas, awareness raising and so forth, but rather include a more or less equal amount of policy changes and practice changes. The total number of agenda changes is 12, and there are 12 policy changes and nine practice changes—although at this point the reader should be reminded that this way of counting outcomes is only one way of assessing the relevance of outcomes, and is in fact a very limited way because it excludes the relevance of each outcome in light of the EA's ToC.

In addition, the geographical spread is also in line with the global character of the EA's ILA programmes under evaluation. The ToC has a view on global actors, as well as on Southern countries and on the role of the Netherlands and the EU.

Finally, we conclude with a methodological limitation. The majority of the agenda setting outcomes, categorised in UIs 1.1–1.5, could not be categorised in the SIs. These SIs were developed by taking all expected outcomes as they were defined in the EA's general ToC for its IC and formulating each of them in the wording of an indicator. This led to two SIs, both focusing on the increasing effectiveness of (Southern partner) CSOs. Neither of these SIs focuses on changes in agendas of the EA's targeted social actors, such as a lobby target responding to the positions taken by one of the EA's ILA programmes. Outcomes that are categorised as agenda setting and that correspond to UIs 1.3–1.5 could not be categorised under an SI. The fact that the EA has achieved such outcomes corresponding to UIs 1.3–1.5 means that the individual programmes work towards such outcomes, but that the evaluators failed to identify them during the baseline assessment in 2012.

Table 7.1 All EA outcomes categorised by UIs and Sis						
Theme	Outcome #	Issue	Priority result area	Uniform outcome indicator (UI)	Specific outcome indicator (SI)	Level of change
1	1	IWRM	Policy Change	2.1	D	Southern country
1	2	IWRM	Practice Change	3.1	H	Southern countries
1	3	IWRM	Agenda Setting	1.5	-	Global/Intl
1	4	CBD	Intl: Policy Change Ntl: Agenda Setting	2.1 1.5	C -	Global/Intl Southern countries
2	5	Mining	Agenda Setting	1.5	-	EU
2	6	Mining	Agenda Setting	1.4	-	NL/EU
2	7	Mining	Agenda Setting	1.2	A	Southern country
2	8	Biomass NL	Policy Change	2.1	E	NL
2	9	Biomass NL	Practice Change	3.1	G + I	NL
2	10	Biofuels EU	Agenda Setting	1.5	-	EU
2	11	Palm oil	Policy and Practice Change	2.1 + 3.1	D + H	Global/Intl
2	12	Palm oil	Agenda Setting	1.5	-	Global/Intl
2	13	Palm oil	Policy and Practice Change	2.1 + 3.1	D + H	Global/Intl
2	14	Palm oil	Agenda Setting	1.5	-	Southern countries
2	15	Palm oil	Agenda Setting	1.5	-	NL
2	16	PO, Pulp & Peatland	Policy and Practice Change	2.1 + 3.1	D + H	Global/Intl
2	17	PO, Pulp & Peatland	(Mainly) Policy Change	2.1	D	Southern country
2	18	PO, Pulp & Peatland	Practice Change	3.1	H	Southern country
2	19	Soya	Practice Change	3.1	G	Global/Intl
2	20	Soya	Agenda Setting	1.3	-	NL
2	21	Soya	Agenda Setting	1.2	A	Southern countries
2	22	Flaws economic system	Policy Change	2.1	E	NL
2	23	Flaws economic system	Policy Change	2.1	E	NL
2	24	Flaws economic system	Policy Change	2.1	E	NL
3a	25	UNFCCC	Policy Change	2.1	F	Global/Intl
3a	26	UNFCCC	Policy Change	2.1	F	Global/Intl
3a	27	REDD+	Agenda Setting	1.5	-	Global/Intl
3a	28	REDD+	Agenda Setting and Policy and Practice Change	1.5 + 2.1 + 3.2	- D H	Southern countries
3a	29	REDD+	Practice Change	3.2	H	Southern country

### 7.3 Evaluation question 2: Contribution

#### 7.3.1 General description of the way the Alliance has made contributions

Appendix 3 summarises, for each outcome achieved, the main activities from the EA between 2011 and 2014 that plausibly have contributed to that specific change or group of changes. This section contains an overview of the most important strategies and types of activities through which the EA contributed to the described changes.

Below, we categorise the EA's main strategies and activities. Each of the EA's ILA campaigns or projects under evaluation has its specific strategy designed to be effective in its given context towards its defined goal. The strategies are too different from each other to describe as 'the way the Alliance has made contributions'. Having said this, there are a few common elements observed in the strategies.

Insider advocacy strategy. The majority of the contributions made by the three EA members fit in the wide range of insider advocacy. The key is the direct contact with the target group, and the advocacy takes place by convincing, sharing information, relationship building, connecting people to each other and related activities. The outsider advocacy strategy, building pressure on the target group from the outside, for example through the media and mass-mobilisation, is a strategy hardly used by the EA. The following three strategies—long-term engagement (two types) and research—are all connected to this advocacy strategy.

Long-term, continuous engagement in large and dynamic policy processes with a very large number of involved actors. These actors are as follows:

- RSPO
- RTRS
- UNFCCC
- REDD+
- EU biofuels

Long-term, continuous engagement in Dutch debates and change processes, including governmental policies and private sector policies and practices (not as large and fewer actors involved).

- Biomass and biofuels NL
- Ketentransitie (soya)
- Mining
- Flaws in economic system

Research. All three EA members invest in the (scientific) evidence base of their advocacy—Wetlands International the most, Both ENDS the least. For Wetlands International, this is absolutely central to their unique ToC. It is unique because Wetlands International has made a clear choice of (limited) advocacy focus on wetlands, in combination with its evidence-based advocacy strategy. Some outcomes show plausibly that this approach made strong contributions.

Partnering with companies. The Leaders for Nature partnership between IUCN NL and a number of well-known companies is unique within the EA. For IUCN NL, this partnership is an asset in its lobby towards governments and other actors. Both ENDS and Wetlands International are not involved with companies in the same way, but their engagement with the company-led roundtables RSPO and RTRS is also a lobby strategy in which partnering with companies plays an important role.

Southern partners. The programmes under evaluation have large numbers of highly diverse partners and have various methods of engagement, partnering, support and training for and with these Southern partners. Some partnerships already existed prior to MFS II, and others were newly established. The evaluation team did not ask for a detailed picture of all of these Southern partners because there are too many, and because the type of partnership varies strongly and is dynamic. Therefore, we did not assess the added value of these large investments as that was also not feasible.

Having said this, the evaluation team also determined that not many linkages were reported between work on the national level—with or through partners in the South—and outcomes on the international level. One respondent put it this way: ‘The country programmes were more advanced than the IC/ILA. The foreseen connection between the two levels never materialised’. In conclusion, the evaluation team could not observe a strong added value of the Southern partners for the ILA achievements.

### *7.3.2 Palm oil, Indonesia and the RSPO*

Sawit Watch (SW) is an EA partner in Indonesia. SW is a social NGO that envisages social changes for smallholder farmers, labourers and indigenous peoples towards ecological justice. SW consists of individual members and networks with NGOs throughout Indonesia. It has 140 individual members and works with almost all NGOs in Indonesia. SW has been involved in the RSPO since its beginning, more than 15 years ago. SW is the lead agency implementing a project in Indonesia around RSPO (‘To enhance capacities of CSOs and influence policy for better management of ecosystem’) in collaboration with WALHI (Friends of the Earth Indonesia) and Wetlands International Indonesia Programme (WIIP).

An outcome from the case study (presented in section 4.5.1) was selected to be discussed in more detail:

In November 2013, the General Assembly of the RSPO during the Roundtable 11 (RT 11) in Medan adopted a resolution that called for the RSPO: ‘To guarantee Fairness, Transparency & Impartiality in the Complaints Mechanism, the Executive Board shall ensure that there is a strict separation of executive powers in handling complaints and grievances, in order for the Complaints System to be in line with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs, also informally known as ‘Ruggie framework’)—especially ensuring operationalisation of criterion h. (operational system); criterion a. (legitimacy); criterion c. (predictable); criterion d. (equitable); and criterion e. (transparency).’

What is the ToC underlying the intervention? With its resolution, SW intended to contribute to this EA project objective: ‘CSOs and community affected by oil palm plantation operations participate in RSPO arena with increased knowledge on sustainable palm oil’.

SW, together with LINKS, PAN-AP and SETARA, and with the support of Bora and Wild Asia, planned to table a resolution at the RSPO RT 11 and General Assembly in November 2013. The resolution made the following observations (problem analysis):

- Over 50 complaints have been filed since 2008, there has been a recent boom in the number of complaints, there is a significant backlog in addressing cases and a very low percentage of cases is resolved to the satisfaction of complainants and defendants.

- The backlog in the Complaints Panel's portfolio comes at the demonstrable expense of the interests of the environment, local communities, CSOs, the private sector, RSPO members and non-members alike and the RSPO's integrity.
- The currently publicly available Complaints System fails to fully address a fundamental institutional flaw, namely that the RSPO Executive Board can simultaneously fulfil multiple conflicting roles: 1) complainant, 2) defendant, 3) membership of the Complaints Panel, 4) Appeal Panel, 5) advisor to the Complaints Panel, 6) oversight body of the Complaints Panel and 7) final arbiter to determine ultimate sanctions.
- The RSPO does not have an independent appeal mechanism.
- The RSPO Complaints System has yet to comply with most effectiveness criteria for non-judicial grievance mechanisms the United Nations 'Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights'.
- The RSPO Complaints System is not duly formalised in the by-laws and statutes. Thus, the Complaints Panel is not bound to inform the RSPO General Assembly about the status and progress of conflict resolution and mediation.
- The RSPO Secretariat lacks the proper mandate and capacity to address complaints and grievances effectively.

SW implemented two types of interventions to lobby for this resolution. First, it engaged with the RSPO's DSF and Grievance Panel (GP). In addition to its continuous involvement in the RSPO, Sawit Watch carried out a set of activities before the RSPO RT 11 in November 2013, such as a meeting with a network of NGOs in Medan, a public discussion with the HARI Institute on 7 November 2013, the publication of a report ('Conflict or Consent') and a press conference on 7 November 2013, a labour seminar on 8–9 November 2013, the National WALHI Consolidation on 9 November 2013 and a workshop ('Conflict or Consent') on 8–10 November 2013.<sup>334</sup>

Second, SW facilitated community representatives to attend RT 11. SW brought five community representatives (two from Batu Ampar and three from Pergulaan Village) to have a side meeting with companies based on complaint letters that were previously sent to RSPO's DSF/GP.

Is it plausible that the organisation contributed to this change? Based on the above, the evaluation team agrees with SW that it is plausible that SW's activities contributed to this change. SW's contribution claim is that it took the sole responsibility and leadership in presenting the resolution. The resolution was not presented as a joint resolution but singularly by SW. There were no other organisations that took the initiative and lead to make the request.

However, the evaluation team concludes that other actors and factors have contributed to this change:

A petition distributed by SW prior to the resolution was signed by a host of organisations, including members of the EA, such as IUCN NL, Both ENDS and WIIP, as well as non-EA organisations such as 11.11.11. The petition drummed up support towards passing the resolution and created a certain momentum. Some companies were also enthusiastic about the DSF. In Puncak, when making the resolution, some of the companies were invited to contribute to drafting the resolution. An example is PT Tri Bakti Sarimas (based in Riau), which took a special interest. Golden Agri Resources was also open for dialogue with SW towards supporting the resolution.

SW did not work as a single organisation in presenting the resolution. Instead, they mobilised the support of other organisations and networks (e.g. LINKS, PAN-AP and SETARA, with the support of




Bora and Wild Asia) with whom they shared common interests. The labour organisation SERBUNDO was a major ally in this endeavour. SERBUNDO is an alliance of several labour unions in North Sumatra. They claim to have more than 20,000 members working on plantations. SERBUNDO is not a member of the RSPO but shares the vision of SW.

Prior to tabling the resolution, a mass demonstration, mobilising about 5,000 people, including victims from communities, members of labour unions and smallholder unions, was organised by SERBUNDO, an alliance comprising labour associations, local NGOs and national NGOs. There were 14 organisations, including SW, in the demonstration. The labour activity initiated by SERBUNDO along with Jambi and Riau communities took place at the same time as the opening of the 11th RSPO meeting on 12 November 2013. This was also supported by Masyarakat Korban Wilmar, Gambut Riau Network Society and Sumbar Network Society. During the activity, representatives from labour were welcomed by the RSPO's Secretary General and RSPO's Indonesia Liaison Office's Secretary General. They all had a serious discussion, which resulted in SERBUNDO's statement of claim to the RSPO. In addition to staging an activity for the RSPO, labour organisations were also carrying out another activity in front of the North Sumatera Governor's office. Labour representatives were able to engage in dialogue with the Head of the North Sumatera Provincial Manpower and Workforce Board, and they successfully made a statement of claim to the provincial government.

Figure 4.2 shows the interaction between SW activities and those of other actors in the pathway of change leading to the adoption of the resolution.

On the left side (a–c), connected with straight arrows, is the SW contribution story, which is in line with its ToC. On the right side of the figure (i–vi) are the interventions of other actors, some of which are also in cooperation with SW.



**Figure 7.2 Overview of SW's pathway of change and interventions of other actors**

In addition to the data collected during the case study, one respondent interviewed during the endline assessment in the context of substantiation of other palm oil-related outcomes (see next section), who works for an independent consultancy based in Indonesia and has been an RSPO-insider since its beginning 16 years ago, claims that he and his organisation had a leading role in initiating the resolution. This contradicts one part of SW's contribution claim. In a written comment to a draft version of this report, the EA clarified that 'the afore mentioned consultancy group played a key role in supporting Sawit Watch and co-organised the drafting workshop and co-authored the resolution.' This explains the two standpoints from SW and the consultancy group.

A second contradiction in contribution claims is that SW claims to have organised the workshop 'Conflict or Consent' on 8–10 November 2013, while the EA claims that this was organised by the EA's members and partners, Both ENDS, FPP and TuK.

As a final assessment of contribution, we conclude that it is plausible to conclude that SW played a leading role in realising the outcome achieved, the adoption of the RSPO resolution. SW was important in initiating the resolution, presenting it to the RSPO and organising support for the adoption of the resolution. However, as at least one other person also claims to have initiated the resolution, it is not likely that SW had the sole responsibility for that step. Furthermore, other actors

and factors had relevant contributions to the achieved change as they created a positive momentum for the success of the resolution.

### *7.3.3 Palm oil, peatlands, the RSPO, biofuels/biomass in the Netherlands and the EU with focus on Indonesia*

As explained in section 4.1.4, a number of additional interviews with external knowledgeable people were held to gain a better understanding of the changes achieved through four different EA programmes that are strongly linked to each other. In addition, the evaluation attempted to use this package of outcomes, or a selection from it, as a second contribution analysis. Therefore, the emphasis of these interviews was on answering evaluation question 2: contribution.

This attempt failed. The main reasons were 1) The organisation, Both ENDS, did not have a simple contribution claim (contribution was claimed, but there was no exclusiveness<sup>335</sup>), 2) Therefore, the evaluation team could not identify a rival explanation that then could be assessed against the EA's contribution story, 3) Interviewing respondents helped to gain a better understanding on the issue and its dynamics, but did not help to identify a rival explanation, 4) If the interviews had led to suggestions for rival explanations, it would have been difficult to find more knowledgeable people to test the two rival stories and 5) It is extremely difficult to interview the target group, especially about the question 'Who contributed to your change in position/policy/practice?' If the representatives of a target group respond at all, it is unclear what their answer is worth.

The evaluation team learned that another underlying cause for the difficulty in applying the chosen methodology lies in the complexity of the issue. A (very) large number of actors is involved in a (very) large number of interactions, interventions and interrelated change processes. Between these actors, there is little consensus about which intervention will lead to which result (disagreement about the cause–effect relations).

## **7.4 Evaluation question 4: Efficiency**

Two introductory remarks to this section need to be made. First, as explained above, the evaluation team started with the IC as the unit of analysis but further limited these boundaries in two steps during the evaluation process. During the interviews, it became clear that these specific boundaries are not practical for discussing the issue of efficiency, where the IC is a 'natural boundary'.

Second, the interviews resulted in more information than can be summarised here. Therefore, each section starts with a summary and analysis of the collected information. The paragraphs following this summary are illustrations of the most important answers.

### *7.4.1 Theory of efficiency*

Overall, no explicit theory of efficiency can be identified for the whole Alliance in general, or for the ILA component in particular. Individual organisations do have some ideas about working efficiently and they seem to share the idea that a common vision and clear objectives are success factors in achieving efficiency.

Most arguments given for the lack of collective consideration of efficiency relate to the start-up phase. It is logical that if organisations start a new cooperation, work processes are not efficient at the beginning. New programmes are set up or existing programmes need to be aligned.

Such start-up inefficiencies may partly be related to the MFS II requirements, forcing organisations to work in alliances. Another factor impeding the search for efficiencies at a rather fundamental level is the view, expressed in the interviews, that 'collaboration [in ILA] can be effective but never efficient'—a view challenged by the evaluator.

The start of the EA was a major challenge, strongly impacting the design of the programme. The initial proposal submission was not successful. After an appeal, the funding was awarded after all, but only two months remained to develop the full proposal. The second phase was developed going from the groundwork from the first phase, but many activities (particularly the IC and to quite some extent the country programmes) still had to be developed in this stage. This led to limited involvement of all stakeholders and very little attention for an issue like efficiency.

At the start of the EA, the broad objectives of the ILA programme were clear to the three EA members, but not all Southern partners (who would play a key role in the implementation of ILA activities) were identified at that stage. The idea was that once opportunities arose, the actual ILA programme would progressively be developed. This particular way of reacting to upcoming developments regarding the ILA activities was also reflected in developing the EA's own baseline, used to set targets for the ILA programme.

The Alliance did not set out with a distinct 'framework' on how to consider (issues related to) efficiency, nor was one developed in the course of the implementation. The respondents agreed, however, that the programme itself is an efficient approach to the changes sought, and that efficiency 'is a fundamental element in the philosophy and set up of the programme'. In the long run, enabling Southern partners to carry out activities is expected to be efficient, although costly in terms of financial and human resources in the short term. Start-up costs would be considerable, which is considered necessary: People first have to physically meet (expensive) in order to make efficiency gains in work processes later on in the programme when trust is established. This of course only applies in the case of developments of new partnerships.

However, the idea of having a joint perspective or 'theory' on how that could be done in a way that maximises the available ILA resources was not considered feasible. The individual EA members have their own perspectives on what efficiency means, as well as their own practices. IUCN NL commented that 'matters related to efficiency are in the DNA of an organisation and very difficult to change. Setting up procedures will not make a big difference.'

In this context, the point was made that 'while collaborating can be effective, it can never be efficient'. Additionally, IUCN NL mentioned that the ad hoc character of lobby and advocacy leads to situations where 'you jump on opportunities' and report afterwards. This way of working takes efficiency considerations into account (for instance by profiting from different approaches), but the main focus in such a case is on getting maximum profit from the sudden chance that presents itself.

Shared success factors that support an efficient way of working include 1) a clear vision on the end result and flexibility to adapt plans based on the dynamic context and specific needs and 2) an understanding 'to agree to disagree' in order to prevent wasting time and resources arguing among organisations.

#### *7.4.2 Efficiency in practice*

Overall, it seems that the Alliance managed to develop a workflow and decision-making process that works for the EA members.

At the operational level, several processes and procedures are in place to organise work more efficiently in this relatively broad and complex alliance. In terms of planning, budgeting and monitoring, there is a set of documents, work processes and procedures such as a tendering policy and the so-called BEMO (beoordelingsmemo), used to check and approve proposals. Efficiency is

explicitly part of this BEMO procedure, with a specific question on efficiency considerations of proposed projects.

The EA has an approach that seems to be of particular relevance, whereby decisions about all upcoming plans and projects are made in a timely and efficient manner.

Other examples of efficiency measures that have been part of the programme throughout are 1) the promotion of use of services like Skype, 2) the limitation of travel and meeting costs, 3) ensuring selection of the right partners and participants in processes and 4) ensuring timely reporting to prevent people from delaying others.

Regional REDD learning workshops took place in Asia in 2012 (cost of €20,000), in Africa in 2013 (€40,000) and in Brazil in 2014 (€80,000). This was planned already, before costs were considered. Because it is considered critical to have these workshops on three different continents, Brazil—despite being costly—is a legitimate location. Now that this choice has been made, several efficiency considerations are becoming relevant and appropriate: efficiency-conscious travel and accommodation arrangements, good preparation of necessary delegations and clear workshop deliverables and outcomes.

Another factor leading to practical inefficiencies is the MFS II framework. Legal advice, required to be able to work with the procedures of the MoFA, has cost quite some energy and money. An example is the (still unresolved) issue regarding VAT when transferring funds amongst applicants. The potential loss of 21% VAT requires possible spending on accountancy and legal advice.

#### *7.4.3 Mechanisms for improvements and adaptations*

Learning and improvements on efficiency are mixed across the IC projects and countries. Some campaigns (soya) seem to work quite coherently and efficiently, whereas for other situations (Kenya) this seems not to be the case. Fundamental differences of opinion within the EA (especially regarding REDD+) led to pragmatic choices in terms of what to collaborate on and what not. In cases of disagreement about the ToC within an ILA issue (How to be effective?), the development and practical application of a theory of efficiency is also quite a challenge.

Most relevant improvements seem to have occurred in the financial component. There is a general sense that too many regulations do not facilitate efficiency, but rather promote bureaucracy.

Programming: A few additional months in the design phase would possibly have led to a different setup—a more aligned structure. Initially, the country programmes were more advanced than the IC. Due to the limited time available, the design and implementation of the IC remained distinctly different from the setup of the country programmes. These programmes had a much clearer outline from the start, where the ILA activities needed a full year to take off. The foreseen connection between the two levels therefore never fully materialised.

The fact that sometimes different proposals were submitted on the same issue led to the suggestion by the Coordinator of the Alliance that more (palm oil-specific) coordination between the organisations was needed, culminating in several joint meetings with positive outcomes. This coordination does not come naturally. It shows that only so much can be done by regulating and putting procedures in place, and that people's mind-sets and convictions can be quite dominant. Among respondents, there is a sense that putting in place too many regulations as a response to perceived inefficiencies does not work and only creates more bureaucracy.

The basic agreement was that, when holding strategic discussions, the partners would agree to disagree. This turned out to be the reality for the REDD+ process. Where Both ENDS identifies a shared vision as a key factor in efficiency, that is exactly what is missing from the REDD+ work: Both ENDS disagrees with the underlying premises for the REDD+ system, but because the EA members accepted the principle to agree to disagree in such an instance, IUCN NL and Wetlands International were able to work on this issue without losing efficiency due to different visions.

The MFS II 'mould' is likely to be the cause for this development: On the one hand, it is recognised that a shared vision is needed to be effective. On the other hand, if there is no shared vision, organisations disengage largely from the strategic objectives to remain efficient.

Formats, procedures: Several formats and procedures have been standardised and shortened, but the financial systems of the EA members were not standardised, sometimes leading to unavoidable inefficiencies.

## **7.5 Case studies**

### *7.5.1 Case 1: Palm oil, conflicts and policy change<sup>336</sup>*

This case study focuses on the work carried out by a selected number of EA partners in Indonesia around the RSPO. The case study particularly takes the experience of SW. The SW case study is based on the EA-supported project, 'To enhance capacities of CSOs and influence policy for better management of ecosystem'. SW, as the lead organisation, implemented this project in collaboration with WALHI and WIIP.

The overall goal of this project is to improve the livelihoods of the poor and create a more inclusive economy through participatory, responsible and transparent management of ecosystems.

The following are the specific objectives:

- Increased and coherent civil society engagement and improved knowledge and skills to work on ecosystem–poverty linkages
- More effective lobby and advocacy towards greener trade chain of palm oil and sustainable livelihoods.
- Communities and government officials are engaged in climate change policy processes with emphasis on safeguarding ecosystem–livelihood links in REDD.
- Policies and legislation are adjusted in relation to livelihood–ecosystem links.

For the purpose of this case study, the second objective was taken as the focus. The ILA baseline study of the SW case documented the work carried out in 2011/2012. This account is updated to document what happened from November 2013 to August 2014. Which activities have been carried out, and what has been the outcome of this work?

SW's ToC included expected result areas and planned activities. Below, both elements are shown, followed by an assessment of the extent to which planned activities were carried out and to which outcomes these activities contributed.

7.5.1.1 Expected result area 2.1. Litigation and negotiation capacity of SW and partners is enhanced to halt unsustainable economic development (conversion into oil palm plantation)

Planned activity 2.1.1 Design of training and module on conflict resolution in the form of FGD

- SW could not carry this out because of time constraints and other emerging pressing issues.

Planned activity 2.1.2 Paralegal training

- This was not yet carried out. SW hopes to implement this in Central Kalimantan in 2014.

Planned activity 2.1.3 Negotiation training for the community in dealing with companies

- This activity is based on the above and hence was not carried out. The training will be conducted in October or November, probably in a selection of those communities that have already sent a complaint to the RSPO.

Planned activity 2.1.4 Investigation of select case(s) (selection criteria to be decided with communities)

- This activity was not carried out.

Conclusions: Outcomes achieved related to expected result area 2.1:

For various reasons, most of the planned activities relating to expected result area 2.1 were not carried out, the chief reason being that SW was putting emphasis on the RSPO work. Therefore, the level of outcomes generated is relatively low. Because the RSPO has not (yet) instituted the DSF with the changes in a formal manner, the training to develop skills in conflict resolution in the community and the paralegal workers was not conducted. However, there are two cases of conflict resolution explained in the last section (Batu Ampar Community vs. PT Kresna Duta Agroindo, GAR, Biru Maju Community vs. PT Buana Artha Sejahtera, GAR, and also Pergulaan Community vs. PT PP Lonsum, Lonsum) that took place not in a formal DSF but as a result of a side meeting at RT 11 in Medan.

7.5.1.2 Expected result area 2.2. Partners know how to deal with conflict cases

Planned activity 2.2.1 Participatory research in conflict resolution based on strategic environmental assessment (SEA) and human rights

- This activity will be implemented in Berau District of East Kalimantan Province in the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of 2014. The two provinces identified are Central Kalimantan and South Kalimantan.

Planned activity 2.2.2 Production of conflict resolution module based on community participation

- This activity is based on the above and hence was not yet carried out.

Conclusions: Outcomes achieved related to expected result area 2.2:

Most of the activities relating to expected result area 2.2 were not carried out because of various reasons, the chief reason being that SW was putting emphasis on the RSPO work. Therefore, the level of outcomes generated is relatively low. Because the RSPO has not (yet) instituted the DSF in a formal manner, the skills development of partners was not carried out.

There are two cases of conflict resolution explained below, but these took place not in a formal DSF but as a result of a side meeting at the RSPO's RT 11 in Medan. However, the amendment of RSPO's Principles and Criteria (P&C) relates to this result, because a final decision is still pending from the RSPO to agree or disagree with the last document from FORMISBI. In these documents, SW has also suggested many changes and substantive matters, especially on the recognition of the rights of peoples and also environmental management systems on the plantations. Most of the complaints that SW has submitted to the RSPO refer to these major issues. Indirectly, the P&C standard revision will have an impact.

7.5.1.3 Expected result area 2.3. CSOs and community affected by oil palm plantation operations participate in the RSPO arena with increased knowledge on sustainable palm oil

Planned activity 2.3.1 Training on the RSPO P&C:

This training was not yet conducted because of the amendment of the P&C in April 2013. First, a national interpretation of the RSPO P&C needs to be developed, and then the P&C finalised and implemented, before SW can conduct the training with the relevant stakeholders at the local level. However, SW has made significant efforts to formulate the document with maximum involvement and participation from the different layers of stakeholders and civil society at local levels. From another point of view, this is also an effort towards mainstreaming and increasing the awareness of the public about the market standard on the sustainability of palm oil production.

Planned activity 2.3.2 Engagement with the RSPO's DSF and GP:

Before the RSPO RT 11 in November 2013, SW carried out the following set of activities:

- Meeting with a network of NGOs in Medan
- Public Discussion with the HARI Institute on 7 November 2013
- Publication of a report ('Conflict or Consent') and press conference on 7 November 2013
- Labour seminar on 8–9 November 2013
- National WALHI Consolidation on 9 November 2013
- Workshop ('Conflict or Consent') on 8–10 November 2013

Planned activity 2.3.3 Facilitate community representatives to attend the RSPO Roundtables:

During RT 11, SW brought five community representatives (two from Batu Ampar and three from Pergulaan Village) to have a side meeting with companies based on complaint letters that had previously been sent to the RSPO DSF/GP. These were community representatives of Batu Ampar Village (Sarolangun District, Jambi Province) who had a conflict with Golden Agri Resources and community representative of Pergulaan Village (Serdang Bedagai District, North Sumatra Province) who had a conflict with Lonsum. The results of these side meetings are explained below.

Conclusions: Outcomes achieved related to expected result area 2.3:

The main outcome achieved to which SW contributed is the adoption of the resolution at the RT 11 that was discussed above. The resolution called on the RSPO to 'To guarantee Fairness, Transparency & Impartiality in the Complaints Mechanism, the Executive Board shall ensure that there is a strict separation of executive powers in handling complaints and grievances, in order for the Complaints System to be in line with the UNGP—especially ensuring operationalisation of criterion h. (operational system); criterion a. (legitimacy); criterion c. (predictable); criterion d. (equitable); and criterion e. (transparency).'

Furthermore, the side events held during the RT have contributed to the following concrete outcomes:

- Batu Ampar Case: The company agreed to recalculate the credit of Batu Ampar Village, because they never gained any benefit from the plasma scheme, and all parties agreed to engage with local government at district level to implement the Bupati Letters on Boundaries between Karang Mendapo Village and Batu Ampar Villages.
- Pergulaan Case: The company and community agreed to set up some of the preparation meetings to discuss in more detail the demands of the community (i.e. compensation or returning the land that has been taken by the company).
- Biru Maju Case: After the revocation of the complaint letter against the company that was submitted by SW to the RSPO DSF in 2012, the Advisory Board decided to keep the complaint status and ask the DSF staff to have a meeting directly with the communities in the field. The meeting between the DSF and the community was conducted in April 2014 in Biru Maju



Village. In the meeting, DSF explained to the community about the conflict resolution mechanism in the RSPO and how to access it. Following up on that meeting, DSF, WALHI Central Kalimantan and SW communicated several times to set up a preliminary meeting between the company (PT Buana Artha Sejahtera) and the community. The meeting was held in the second week of August 2014 in Palangkaraya, and the result was that each of the parties will try to engage with the local government and set up a meeting to hear a clarification from government perspective about the status of the land, which has overlapping transmigration and concession permits. The date for this meeting will be decided after receiving confirmation from the local government.

#### *7.5.2 Case 2: (Extended case 1) Palm oil, biofuels, biomass and peatlands, with a focus on the Netherlands, the EU, the RSPO and Indonesia*

As explained in the introduction to this chapter, the attempt to conduct a second case study in a Southern country failed. When this became clear in 2013, the evaluation team decided not to set up a new case study in a Southern country.

The additional time and interviews helped the evaluation team to cover the large amount of programmes under evaluation and harvest and assess their outcomes. In addition, the evaluation team gained a better understanding of the interrelated programmes on palm oil, biofuels, biomass and peatlands, with a focus on the Netherlands, the EU, the RSPO and Indonesia. An additional benefit is that we were able to do an additional assessment of issues that are already dealt with in the case study on palm oil and the RSPO, but now from the Dutch/EU perspective. (See sections 2.2 and 2.3.)

### **7.6 Evaluation question 5: Explanatory factors**

#### *7.6.1 Internal factors*

The total number of programmes under evaluation and their focus and extent are too large to assess and describe the relevant capabilities per organisation and per issue. Nevertheless, in general, all three Alliance members and the Alliance itself are well organised and show a high level of capability to act and commit and to adapt.

The EA's insider advocacy strategy combined with the capability for long-term commitment and engagement in the issues and in relevant discussions and institutions (such as the UNFCCC, the RSPO and the RTRS) and—especially Wetlands International's—science-based and cooperative approach helped in the EA's contributions to the achieved changes. The fact that almost all issue leaders are professionals, (extremely) knowledgeable of their issue and very experienced lobbyists, also adds to this factor.

Not only the individual staff, but all three EA members, had a strong track record on the issues that they are leading before the MFS II programme started. The cooperation between the three members is basically positive and shows a type of complementarity in which each individual organisation keeps its strong elements.

Having said this, the level and type of cooperation between the three EA members differs per issue, and no general conclusion can be drawn on whether a certain level or type of cooperation was stronger or better than another or whether more or less cooperation would have led to more success.

Not all strategies that were developed to achieve results on the level of the separate issues seem to be in full harmony with the reconstructed ToCs. Examples are the strong focus on the roundtables on soya and palm oil and the activities with the Leaders for Nature and Natural Capital Agenda/Accounting.

### 7.6.2 *External factors*

The following external factors influenced EA's achievements:

- The awareness within the policy arena of the need to take the landscape approach seriously has increased during the evaluation period—at least in the Netherlands.
- EU and Netherlands politics have an unchanged positive attitude towards the roundtables, such as the RSPO and the RTRS.
- After seeing a few years of reduced importance, it can be observed that the climate issue is being taken more seriously again. Major processes are underway towards reaching a new agreement by the end of 2015.

### 7.6.3 *The role of the nature of the issue addressed*

The four commodity sectors in Theme 2 and the climate change issues in Theme 3, which together form the largest part of the programmes under evaluation, are all truly global issues in the sense that a large number of Southern as well as Northern actors are involved. The problem is caused by an interaction between many global players, and solutions require, amongst other things, interaction between North and South. It is therefore remarkable that the EA staff members themselves, in describing and discussing the EA's outcomes, mentioned this interaction between the national and international levels only to a very limited extent. These outcomes are identified by EA staff,<sup>337</sup> but when discussing the relevance of these outcomes (at international level), EA staff members mentioned their relevance for policy influencing processes in Southern countries or for Southern partners only to a limited extent. Additionally, when discussing the EA's contribution to the outcomes, there was only very limited mention of activities on the national level or by Southern partners that contributed to these ILA outcomes. That is also remarkable because the EA's ToC explicitly shows both links: The EA assumes that 1) outcomes on the international level contribute to policy changes in Southern countries and that 2) Southern countries' CSOs, after being supported by the EA, should achieve policy changes in their countries that then contribute to policy changes at international level (ILA outcomes). The available data (evaluation findings) do not necessarily mean that these interrelations do not exist in reality, but the data show that EA staff did not mention them in this context when explaining what they deemed relevant and how the EA contributed. Therefore, we conclude that within the EA, the link between the work on the national and international levels is only visible in a few cases.

One internal informant put it differently. This person referred to the aim of the IC (the EA's ILA activities) as supporting local CSOs in their efforts to negotiate with both private sector stakeholders and with the governments present in the relevant international fora to advocate significant changes in policy and practice. This approach did not materialise in the ILA activities.

Considering the EA's own ToC, it is plausible to assume that the EA could be more successful if more attention were paid to the link between the national and international work.

## 7.7 **Overview of and reflections on main alliance-level findings**

The overall goal of the EA programme is to improve the livelihoods of the poor and to create a sustainable economy through participatory, responsible and transparent management and governance of local ecosystems. The EA's IC is the umbrella for all programmes under evaluation. The

main goal of the EA's IC is to enable international and bilateral preconditions (policy, governance and institutional capacity) that support the EA's overall objective regarding livelihood improvements based on sustainable ecosystem management. This goal is both long- and short-term.

The EA focuses on three central themes:

- Theme 1 Livelihoods and ecosystems. This theme finances a range of actions that illustrate how to better balance natural resource use with ecosystem conservation in development processes. Because of the scattered nature of the projects involved in this theme, the complete theme has not been evaluated. Rather, two projects were chosen as illustrations.
- Theme 2 Greening the economy. This theme focuses on four commodity sectors: soya, palm oil, biofuels/biomass and mining. Another programme in this theme addresses 'flaws in the economic system' mainly in the Dutch policy arena.
- Theme 3 Ecosystems, people and climate change. This theme is further divided into two sub-themes. Theme 3a, focusing on ecosystem-based climate change mitigation, with particular regard to the REDD+ mechanism, was part of the scope of this ILA evaluation.

The following are the basic intervention strategies of the whole programme:

- Direct poverty alleviation
- Capacity building within civil society
- Influencing government and private sector policies and practices

The EA has a general ToC that includes all issues of the three themes. This ToC shows a clear picture of the intended pathway of change, but it is limited because it does not reflect real campaign strategies. For example, it does not show the differences in strategies or target actors between the four commodity sectors on which the Alliance is focusing.

The intensity of the cooperation between the three Alliance members differs significantly per issue. This is probably a smart setup, because no conclusion can be drawn that one type of cooperation is more successful.

#### *7.7.1 The outcomes achieved and their relevance*

Two issues within Theme 1 illustrate that outcomes to which this theme contributed are relevant to the EA's objectives. Because they are rather isolated, no assessment was made on the extent to which the objectives of Theme 1 were achieved.

Theme 2 focuses on four commodity sectors. One of these is the mining sector. Three outcomes were identified, and all three are categorised in the priority result area of 'agenda setting'. These outcomes are first steps in a process towards policy change. They are relevant contributions to the ToC and in line with the campaign strategy. The most important factor explaining why no policy or practice changes have yet been achieved lies in the fact that this campaign only started in 2011. It is a sector with huge interests and very strong powers.

The second commodity sector is bioenergy, which includes work on woody biomass in the Netherlands and on biofuels at EU level. The assessment concludes that the agreement on Dutch sustainability criteria for woody biomass are a relevant—perhaps even the most relevant—change in this policy field in the Netherlands since 2011. The underlying assumption is a strong implementation, which remains to be assessed in the future. A second outcome refers to a policy letter from the Dutch government regarding cascading. For the EA, this is a relevant achievement. One respondent referred to the past, when the Dutch government has spoken about cascading but

done nothing substantial to implement it, and concluded that the relevance of this letter is doubtful. The third outcome is about the changes in the EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED). The relevance of this outcome is discussed in this report, and the conclusion is that it is doubtful whether this outcome is a relevant contribution to a more sustainable biofuels sector, which is the objective of the EA's Theme 2.

The third commodity sector is palm oil. Here, the EA contributed to changes in all three priority result areas. Assessment of the relevance of the achieved changes was difficult and did not lead to a clear conclusion of whether, and to what extent, the outcomes are relevant in light of the EA's objectives. Furthermore, the outcomes show a strong focus on the RSPO, whereas the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and other producer countries, who are also a target group in the ToC, were hardly mentioned by EA staff when discussing the outcomes, their relevance or the EA's underlying strategy. One respondent supported this assessment by saying that the EA's 'Indonesia portfolio is a collection of rather small-scale, very localised initiatives that are not clearly linked to "bigger picture" initiatives'. The achieved outcomes are relevant from a close range, but there is more uncertainty when looking from a larger distance. The evaluation team sees two important examples.

First, there is no insight on whether RSPO-certified companies are less responsible for deforestation than are non-certified companies. That leads to strong doubts about the progress that the RSPO has made towards a sustainable sector 16 years after the negotiations on the RSPO began. This requires some explanation. To start with, there are data clearly allowing the conclusion that deforestation is still a major problem in Indonesia and that oil palm plantation companies are still a major player in that unsustainable development. It is this involvement of oil palm plantation expansion at the cost of forests in Indonesia and the related forest fires that were the reason for setting up the RSPO after the El Niño phenomenon in 1996/97. A reasonable question about the relevance of the RSPO and the progress the RSPO is making is therefore 'Are RSPO-certified companies less involved than non-RSPO certified companies in expansion at the cost of forests in Indonesia?' While some of the respondents, EA staff members and external experts explicitly concluded that forest fires are no longer used (or at least much less frequently) for oil palm plantation expansion projects, none of the respondents had data showing that RSPO-certified companies are less involved in expansion at the cost of forests than are non-RSPO certified companies. One well-informed external respondent explicitly said 'not yet'. The evaluation team is of the opinion that the RSPO is itself accountable and that key RSPO stakeholders should be able to provide data showing that RSPO-certified companies do a better job than the rest of the sector. However, these data are not provided, but countless reports show that RSPO-certified companies continue to be involved in deforestation. This substantiates the above-mentioned conclusion that the lack of insight on whether RSPO-certified companies are less responsible for deforestation than are non-certified companies leads to strong doubts about the progress the RSPO has made 16 years after the start of this process.

Second, after years of discussion on complaints, there is a new complaint system, but the number of complaints that are actually dealt with is still very low compared with the large number of complaints made.

The changes in policies and practices regarding peatlands and palm oil are positive and relevant developments in light of the EA's ToC.

The fourth commodity sector is soya. Outcomes to which the Alliance contributed show a diverse mix of changes. Within the context of the RTRS, the outcomes show progress but, similar to palm oil, it is

remarkable that no changes in governmental policies in South America have been achieved. It is difficult to assess to what extent the sector has become more sustainable.

The outcome achieved within the issue 'flaws in the economic system' can be considered as contributing to the EA's objective of Theme 2, but the relationship with the pathway of change as depicted in the ToC is unclear.

The Leaders for Nature (LfN) only reported one outcome in 2012, which was 'a statement' by the LfN participants. The only achievement reported since then is the contribution of some LfN participating companies to two other identified outcomes (Natural Capital Accounting and REDD+) and the fact that 'IUCN NL partners with companies', giving the organisation leverage in the Dutch policy arena.

Within Theme 3, REDD+ and UNFCCC policy and practice changes are achieved. These outcomes show relevant process results although their final success can only be assessed after 2015, if and when a new climate agreement is achieved.

#### *7.7.2 Contribution*

The EA contributed to all identified changes. It contributed in many different ways. One of the strengths of this alliance is the capability to apply a large number of different tools. The EA applies different types of insider advocacy strategies and often applies long-term engagement in multi-stakeholder processes. Partnering with companies also plays a certain role in this alliance.

The EA intended to have a strong interaction between work with Southern partners and ILA activities. The strategy was twofold. First, Southern countries' CSOs, after being supported by the EA, achieve policy changes in their countries, and this contributes, in turn, to policy changes at international level (ILA outcomes). Second, outcomes achieved at the international level (mainly through the EA members) contribute to policy changes in Southern countries (mainly through Southern partners). However, EA staff members reported only to a very limited extent the Southern partners' contribution to outcomes at the international level, and they also did not report that these outcomes on the international level were a relevant contribution to policy influencing in Southern countries.

Therefore, we conclude that, within the EA, the link between the work at national level and at international level is visible in very few cases. A point for discussion could be whether the EA could be more successful if more attention were paid to the link between the national and international work.

## 8 Synthesis of Economic Justice Cluster findings

In this section, we synthesise the findings of the four alliance reports, seek overarching patterns of coherence and diversity and draw conclusions with regard to the five evaluation questions.

### 8.1 Key findings on changes achieved in the three priority result areas, in relation to plans and relevance of the changes

This section elaborates on changes achieved in the following manner: Section 8.1.1 presents all outcomes achieved per alliance according to priority result area, after which in the following section develops per alliance the analysis of achievements in relation to plans, and the relevance of the changes achieved. The last section presents general patterns observed in the outcomes achieved of the four alliances.

#### 8.1.1 *Changes achieved according to priority result areas*

This section briefly presents the changes achieved for each alliance according to three priority result areas defined in the Terms of Reference. The evaluation question to which this section answers is as follows: What are the changes achieved in the three priority result areas through international lobbying and advocacy on the thematic cluster 'sustainable livelihood and economic justice'? And what is the relevance of these changes?

In addition to these questions, this section also assesses changes achieved in relation to changes planned.

Changes have been interpreted as outcomes achieved by the alliances during the MFS II period, and these outcomes have been defined as changes in the behaviour, relationships, activities or actions of the people, groups and organisations with whom an alliance works directly.<sup>338</sup> For each of the ILA programmes under evaluation in the Economic Justice Cluster, outcomes were identified with the alliance and where possible substantiated by external resource persons or evidence provided in written sources other than those provided by the alliance. Where appropriate, outcomes have been clustered together, such as is the case when for example several lobby targets have changed their behaviour. For the four alliances together, between 160 and 180 outcomes have been identified, depending upon the extent to which the outcomes are clustered.

During the baseline assessment of this study, it was already observed that not all changes neatly fall into the three priority result areas and that priority results areas can be linked to each other in different orders, such as, for instance, a change in practice that, after having been piloted, can lead to a change into policies and vice versa. Similar situations occurred with the categorisation of some outcomes during this final assessment. The following standard indicators were used to categorise outcomes for each priority result area:

#### Agenda Setting

- Within the programme, the relevant members of an alliance determine, share and keep up to date their policy positions and strategies. UI 1.1
- Alliance and other actors become aware of the issues at stake, organise themselves and adhere to the position of the ILA programme. UI 1.2
- Extent to which lobby/advocacy targets react upon the positions taken by the ILA programme. UI 1.3

- Relevant NGOs and/or other stakeholders involved in the programme are invited to participate in meetings (or organise meetings) relevant for the issue(s) by lobby/advocacy targets on public/private sector policies or those of international institutions. UI 1.4
- The terms of public debate are influenced: New civil society perspectives and alternative approaches are introduced into the policy debate. UI 1.5

#### Policy Influencing

- Demonstrable changes (or prevention of policy changes, including adoption of new policies) take place by lobby/advocacy targets. UI 2.1
- Demonstrable shift in accountability structure for government and private sector. UI 2.2

#### Changing Practice

- Concrete changes in practices of lobby targets as to policy formulation. UI 3.1
- Concrete changes in practices of governments, institutes and/or targeted companies as to implementation of policies (changing practices) in the 'field'. UI 3.2

##### 8.1.1.1 Fair, Green and Global Alliance

Two programmes were evaluated but split into three separate ToCs: The first comprises efforts of SOMO, Both Ends and TNI and their partners to influence international trade and investment agreements. The two main intervention strategies consist of influencing Dutch decision makers and supporting partner organisations and governments in Southern countries in Asia and Latin America.

The second programme comprises efforts of Milieudefensie and ActionAid to ensure that Dutch companies, the Dutch government and the EU do not contribute to environmental pollution, nature devastation and destruction of natural livelihoods resources in the South.

#### Trade and investment theme:

This programme seeks improvements in the currently used arbitration system between companies and states, the investor to state dispute settlement procedures (ISDS) and their integration in bilateral investment treatments (BITs). Apart from these, the possible negative impacts of BITs were an issue addressed in this programme as well as those in the Economic Partnership programmes.

#### *Agenda setting:*

The ISDS has been on political and public agendas in the Netherlands and Germany, in Latin America where Ecuador played an active role, the UNCTAD and in Canada and New Zealand. In these countries, ministers and parliamentarians reacted and the Dutch government announced research on the ISDS. Countries like South Africa, India and Indonesia are currently reviewing their investment frameworks.

With regard to BITs, organised NGOs started to engage with the EU delegation (Myanmar) or with those involved in the trade negotiations (Philippines). Apart from this, ASEAN Leaders became aware of the position of the EU–ASEAN network as to Foreign Trade Agreements.

With regard to Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and developing countries, a coalition was formed of NGOs after the European Commission proposed to withdraw market access under the market access regulation by 2014 as a means to further liberalise market access. Also in consequence to this same proposal, the EU parliament rejected it and demanded its postponement to 2016. Most outcomes achieved have been classified under the standard indicator 'terms of debate have been influenced', followed by the indicator related to 'lobby target reacts to positions taken by ILA programme'.

*Policy change:*

The European Commission acknowledged in 2013 that the *ISDS* needs improvements and started to introduce these in its negotiations with other countries. Ecuador states that it is not willing to do business under the current *ISDS* and its president further influenced the World Inter-Parliamentary Union and representatives, including (vice) presidents from 90 countries. Meanwhile, the EU stopped negotiations on the *ISDS* chapter in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

The government of South Africa terminated its *BIT* with the Netherlands after concerns were raised related to the possibility of pursuing sustainable development objectives. The Ecuadorian Auditing Commission on *BITs*, with TNI holding a vice-presidency position, is currently investigating the development impacts of the *BITs* and will report in December 2014. The Myanmar government informed UNDP that, as a result of NGO and media attention on the issue, it would hold a public consultation on investment treaties on 23 June.

With regard to the *Economic Partnership Agreements*, the EC announced its willingness to address the issue of agricultural subsidies and to stop agricultural export subsidies to those countries that sign an EPA. The EC negotiators also agreed to less ambitious liberalisation requirements with countries in West Africa (ECOWAS). Several EU member states suggested reconsidering the EU request that ACP countries have to liberalise at least 80% of their trade in an EPA.

At a global level, WTO members agreed to address national policies of public stockholding for food security purposes and put in place an interim mechanism to prevent related WTO disputes. Later, in 2014, India, with the support of 33 countries, refused to ratify the trade facilitation agreement.

A number of the above-mentioned outcomes show demonstrable changes in policies by national governments, the EU and multilateral institutions. Other outcomes relate to changes in accountability structures, involving NGOs in consultation rounds in Ecuador, in the EU (TTIP) and in Myanmar.

*Changing Practice:*

No outcomes have been registered with regard to changing practice.

*Biofuels theme:*

With regard to biofuels, Milieudéfensie and ActionAid developed their own ToC: Milieudéfensie used a biofuel plantation with negative social impact to influence Dutch policy-makers who were also in charge of influencing EU policies and developed activities in Southern countries. ActionAid targeted the EU and the Dutch Government, aiming for a removal of the EU-RED target on the use of biofuels and combining biofuel issues with land issues. To a lesser extent, it aimed for the development of stronger social sustainability criteria to prevent the importation of harmful biofuels.

*Agenda setting – Milieudéfensie:*

Milieudéfensie highlighted the relations between Dutch investors, biofuel plantations and negative social and environmental impacts. Consequently, the Dutch parliament raised questions, and the Dutch government admitted that the sustainability of agrofuels needs continuous monitoring. A biofuel case by the corporation IOI led to local communities getting organized and filing a complaint with the RSPO. Apart from this, Indonesia and the Netherlands committed to prohibiting the production and import of unsustainable palm oil. The private sector has increasingly become aware of social and environmental issues to such an extent that the terms of debate have been influenced.



Most other outcomes were clustered under the standard indicator 'lobby targets react'. One outcome relates to actors becoming aware of the issues at stake (communities in the IOI case).

*Policy changes – Milieudéfensie:*

With regard to the relation between biofuel production and large-scale land acquisitions, a multi-stakeholder platform in Uganda (including the government) acknowledged illegal land acquisitions by an international company; two corporations committed to improving their performance on sustainability and the Dutch government committed to ensuring that Dutch investors involved in large-scale land acquisitions comply with international sustainability standards.

The Dutch Energy Agreement (2013), signed by the government, the private sector and NGOs foresees stricter regulations for sustainable electricity production, biomass production, carbon debts, indirect land use change and sustainable forest management.

Apart from the outcome in Uganda, which demonstrates changes in accountability structures, the others were classified under demonstrable changes by lobby targets.

*Changing practice – Milieudéfensie:*

Dutch investors engaged in a multi-stakeholder dialogue with the government and also engaged with palm oil producers to improve their sustainability performance. The government of Liberia committed to supporting communities to protect their lands from further encroachment by an international company.

Two air companies became more critical in sustainably selecting their biofuel, one company stopped a biofuel plantation in Indonesia and another company did not obtain a subsidy from Zeeland province for converting its coal-fired electricity plant into a 100% biomass-fired plant.

The RSPO concluded that one of its members was breaching RSPO standards and principles and suspended certification of new plantations of the company. These outcomes relate to changes in lobby targets as to both policy formulation and changes in practice.

*Agenda setting – ActionAid:*

ActionAid was successful in influencing the biofuel agendas, in particular with regard to negative social impacts of the Dutch parliament and government, as well as those of the EC. The Dutch government took a critical stance towards EC reporting systems in place that fail to address social impacts. Apart from this, biofuels in relation to land grabbing became an issue in the Tanzanian parliament and in the Dutch parliament and government. In the Netherlands, a separate hearing and debate took place in parliament, with experts invited to discuss land grabbing, followed by the government launching a Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on land governance. The Dutch parliament urged its government to react when research demonstrated the relation between Dutch public investments and alleged land grab cases. Indications exist both in the Dutch parliament and the EC that the role of first generation biofuels within future climate and energy policies will be reduced. The negative impacts of biofuel production on land rights, food security, climate and biodiversity also increasingly urge international organisations like IMF, FAO, UNCTAD, OECD and WB to call for a revision of biofuel mandates. Most of these outcomes were classified in terms of lobby targets reacting to ActionAid's interventions.

*Policy changes – ActionAid:*

The most recent biofuel policy change observed with the EC in 2014 is that it will adopt a seven percent cap on food-based biofuels and will report on some indirect land use change criteria. Earlier intentions formulated by the EC were more ambitious and were supported by the Dutch government.

Apart from this, the Dutch government started its Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on land governance and discussed public investments in a palm oil plantation of a company allegedly involved in land grabbing. Whereas outcomes achieved in relation to the European Union were regrouped under the standard indicator 'demonstrable changes by lobby targets', those realised in the Netherlands reflect 'demonstrable changes in accountability structure for the public and private sector'.

*Changing practices – ActionAid:*

No outcomes were classified under this priority result area.

8.1.1.2 IMPACT Alliance

Two campaigns implemented by the Oxfam Confederation were evaluated. These are the land grab campaign that aimed to stop land grabs by powerful corporations and countries and the Behind the Brands campaign.

Land grab campaign:

The land grab campaign aims to stop land and water grabs by powerful corporations and countries using a two-pronged approach: that of changing international, regional and national public sector policies, regulations and practices, and changing the policies and practices of corporations and their respective value chains and those of investors and financial institutions.

Since the campaign launch in September 2011, the issue of land grabbing has been *on the agenda* of the international media; international institutions like the UN Committee on Food Security and the World Bank Group; and traditional donor countries such as the UK, the US, Spain, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, Belgium and Italy. The issue has also reached the agendas of international corporations involved in the palm oil and forest sector, food and beverage companies and the actors in their respective supply chains, as well as investors like the International Finance Corporation, banks and pension funds. The terms of debate were influenced, Oxfam was invited by lobby targets to meetings, lobby targets reacted to positions taken by Oxfam or actors adhered to the position of Oxfam.

Major *policy changes* achieved are the adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines (VGGTs) by the UN CFS in May 2012 that helped mobilise considerable financial resources from traditional donor countries to address land governance in developing countries. Progress has also been made with the WBG, who included two standards relating to land rights and related issues in its Environmental and Social Safeguards. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs strengthened its land governance policy for international cooperation and takes a pro-active stand towards the respect of the VGGTs by Dutch corporations and investors who receive public support, for instance the Dutch Development Bank.

In the same period, the IFC changed its investment policies and regulations with regard to large-scale land acquisitions, as well as a number of Dutch banks and pension funds. Most outcomes show

demonstrable changes by these lobby targets, and the outcome related to the Dutch government demonstrates a shift in accountability structures for the public or private sector.

Five outcomes relate to *changing practices* and in particular show changes in practices of governments and corporations. These outcomes refer to interventions undertaken by Oxfam and its partners in five countries (Indonesia, Uganda, Honduras, Guatemala and Sudan) and led to remedies for communities that were victims of land grabs.

#### Behind the Brands Campaign:

The Behind the Brands campaign ultimately seeks to ensure that small-scale producers and their communities will have increased opportunities to enjoy greater food security, income, prosperity and resilience: This will happen when Food and Beverage Companies (FBCs) and others engage more actively in the public debate and publicly commit to policies in line with Oxfam's ultimate aim. Important components of the campaign consist of mobilising a global audience and media to put pressure on the FBCs, to mobilise NGOs and investors to put pressure on the FBCs and to directly engage with the FBCs. The focus of this evaluation was on two campaign spikes, one focusing on the integration of women in supply chains and land grab.

In terms of *agenda setting*, the BtB campaign was covered by many international media when it was launched in February 2013 and throughout the campaign, especially when FBCs committed to major changes. During the land grab spike, some 50 million persons were exposed to the campaign by these media, Twitter and Facebook. Some 700,000 persons have signed up to both BtB campaign spikes and have participated in online actions such as 'thunderclaps' and sharing messages online. Apart from these, some 33 investors worth 1.4 trillion USD welcomed Oxfam's initiative to work towards increased transparency and accountability in the sector in September 2013. Two land grab cases in Brazil published by Oxfam reached the attention of the Dutch government, parliament and Dutch banks and pension funds; however, these cases remained unsolved. These outcomes have mostly been classified under the standard indicator of 'Alliance and other actors become aware of the issues at stake, organise themselves and adhere to the position of the ILA programme', followed by the indicator 'Extent to which lobby/advocacy targets react upon the positions taken by the ILA programme'.

With regard to *policy changes*, five of the six FBCs that were publicly targeted by Oxfam to mainstream gender in the cocoa sector (Mars, Nestlé and Mondelez) and to declare zero tolerance for land grabbing in their supply chain (Coca-Cola and PepsiCo), committed fully to Oxfam's asks and started to implement these commitments. The third FBC targeted during the land grab spike also introduced policy changes with regard to land but did not commit to zero tolerance. Of those FBCs *not publicly targeted*, four others introduced changes in their policies with regard to gender, and two other FBCs (Unilever and Nestlé) also committed to zero tolerance for land grabbing. In the Netherlands, the Dutch government engaged directly with investors allegedly involved in land grabbing in Brazil. Outcomes were classified under both standard indicators; that of demonstrable policy changes and that of changes in accountability structures.

With regard to *changing practices*, evidence was found that Mars, Mondelez and Nestlé prepared a gender action plan for the integration of gender issues in the cocoa supply chain and that they succeeded in integrating gender into the CocoaAction Initiative by the World Cocoa Foundation that represents 90% of the world cocoa sector. Coca-Cola and PepsiCo started independent assessments in top sourcing countries to better understand land grabbing risks in their supply chains, including two land grab cases in Cambodia. Both FBCs publicly adhered to the VGGTs.

### 8.1.1.3 Ecosystem Alliance

EA's International Component (IC) goal is to create international and bilateral conditions (policy, governance and institutional capacity) that support livelihood improvements based on sustainable ecosystem management. The Alliance clustered its work, including the IC, in three different themes: livelihoods and ecosystems, greening the economy and ecosystem-based climate change mitigation and adaptation.

#### Livelihoods and ecosystems:

This theme strengthens the role and position of local communities in ecosystem-focused land and river basin planning and other forms of natural resource management. Its IC aims to increase civil society engagement and voice and to influence policies in the Netherlands and at the global level in favour of livelihood–ecosystem linkages. Given the fact that a large number of projects are being supported through this theme, only quick assessments were made of two projects as a means to *illustrate* how this theme works.

One outcome with regard to *agenda setting* is that the UNECE Water Convention and partners are currently developing a protocol to analyse the water–food–energy nexus at river basin level.

Illustrative achievements with regard to *changing practice* are that the Kenyan Government initiated the preparation of a land use plan for the Tana delta in 2011, including the implementation of a strategic environmental assessment, and that the governments of Togo and Benin initiated the process of establishing the Mono River Basin Authority.

#### A green, inclusive economy:

The full title of this working area is 'A green, inclusive economy that contributes directly to poverty reduction, by benefiting and empowering the poor in economic terms and indirectly by securing ecosystem services'. It comprises various sub-themes: mining, biomass and biofuels, palm oil and peat land, soya and flaws in the economic system. A first objective is that the four aforementioned global commodity chains become more sustainable through decisions to be taken in global fora. A second is that EA partners in Southern countries and their networks are more effective in making economic and trade policies greener and more inclusive. A third objective is that economic policies and practices of governments and the private sector in nine countries and at the global level become more sustainable. A fourth objective is that trade policies and practices be adjusted to reduce the ecological footprint of the Dutch and EU economies on the South.

Major outcomes achieved that relate to *agenda setting* are the following:

- With regard to mining, the European Parliament took a final position on the Non-Financial Reporting Directive, asking the EC to enhance the transparency and other CSR aspects in this Directive that will make annual reporting by large listed companies compulsory. NGOs in Cameroon became more aware about Strategic Environmental Assessment procedures.
- In September 2013, the European Parliament proposed amending the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD) and the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) in relation to biomass and biofuels.
- In the palm oil sector, key actors support and improve the outreach to communities. Alternative land uses and participatory land use planning are on the agenda of key actors in the RSPO.
- Between 2012 and 2013, the RTRS produced broad-scale conservation maps and indications of High Conservation Value Areas. In the Netherlands, the Government and the soya sector

became aware of the need to take additional actions if they want to achieve their 2015 objective of 100% sourcing of RTRS-certified soya. In Latin America, by mid-2013, the Observatorio Socio-Ambiental de la Soja (OSAS) was formed by a coalition of NGOs in five soya-producing countries.

Remarkable outcomes that relate to *policy changes* are the following:

- In June 2014, the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs sent a letter to the parliament to implement a coalition agreement of the Rutte–Asscher administration on the optimal use of biomass through cascading. In September 2013, the Dutch Energy Agreement contained a section on sustainability criteria for the use of biomass in coal-fired power plants.
- With regard to palm oil, pulp and peat land, since 2013, an increasing number of major players in the palm oil and pulp sector (both upstream and downstream) have made public commitments to avoid further expansion on peat. A Presidential Decree in 2011 declared an Indonesian moratorium on the development of peat lands and primary forest, which was reconfirmed in recent years. In April 2013, the RSPO adopted the revised Principles and Criteria, with key clauses and guidance regarding peat lands, greenhouse gas emissions and HCV area management.
- With regard to flaws in the economic system, 12 companies decided to work jointly with IUCN NL in a long-term programme on ecosystems and biodiversity. In June 2013, the Dutch government presented its biodiversity policy inspired by the international biodiversity policy. A coalition of 14 large Dutch companies, two business platforms and one NGO signed a Green Deal with the Dutch government regarding Natural Capital Accounting.

One other outcome can be classified both under policy and practice change. It is the creation of a Dispute Settlement Facility (DSF) under the premises of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) to assist both communities and plantation companies in resolving their conflicts with external mediators. Five cases are already under mediation.

Ecosystem-based climate change mitigation:

This theme aims for a REDD+ mechanism within the UNFCCC that provides incentives to reduce deforestation and forest degradation as one of the strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while at the same time delivering benefits for biodiversity and local communities. A three-pronged strategy was designed by the EA comprising lobbying national, regional and global to strengthen the REDD+ mechanism; enhancing the readiness of the private sector for this mechanism and building the capacities of local NGOs and forest-dependent communities to seize opportunities provided by this mechanism.

In terms of *agenda setting*, one important outcome achieved is that, in November 2013, convening parties at the 19th Conference of Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC agreed on the 'Warsaw Framework for REDD Plus'. Together with the decisions adopted at previous COPs, this provides international policy guidance ('the Rulebook on REDD+') on how countries should deal with REDD+ in the framework of the UNFCCC.

In terms of *policy changes*, the UNFCCC 1) adopted a new accounting activity under the Kyoto Protocol, opening the opportunity for countries to reduce their emissions from peat lands, and 2) decided that all REDD+ projects (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) need to monitor, report and verify 'all significant sinks and sources, and pools and gases', meaning that when peat soils in forest areas are a significant source, these need to be included (2012). In 2011, the

FAO acknowledged that emissions from peat lands are significant and actively advocated for incentives in the new global agreement to reduce emissions from peat lands.

A *changing practice* is that the government of Ghana, NGOs and the private sector have been developing the REDD+ Cocoa Landscape programme since 2012. This programme provides technical capacity and facilitates learning. A governance model is also used that clarifies and formalises rights to benefits for local communities.

An outcome that does not fit into the classification of the *three priority areas* is that diverging REDD+ partners in the Philippines improved their collaboration, accelerated the process of a REDD+ project in Mindanao and took social and environmental safeguards on board.

#### 8.1.1.4 Hivos - People Unlimited 4.1

Hivos' Access to Energy campaign aims to contribute to an increase in access to sustainable energy for the poor by, on the one hand, contributing to changes through advocacy at international level, mainly large international donors and the UN and, on the other hand in selected Southern countries through partnerships with national/regional NGOs in which the dynamics at the international level are being used to influence changes at national level. This evaluation also assessed Hivos' work in Uganda, one of the 12 countries in which Hivos developed partnerships to lobby jointly for national changes, in particular to stimulate a debate on pro-poor access to efficient, renewable and sustainable energy services. A major assumption was that opportunities would arise as a result of the global UNSE4All initiative.

Another campaign under evaluation was a campaign in the Netherlands aiming to contribute to CO<sub>2</sub> emission savings in one branch of the private sector: Dutch data centres.

##### Access to energy:

In terms of *agenda-setting* in Uganda, several NGOs mainstreamed energy issues into their strategies, activities and programmes, and new NGOs adhered to the Energy Network Uganda (which includes Hivos' partners) for advocacy purposes (2013).

*Policy changes* were registered in Uganda, the EU, the WBG, the Netherlands and the USA.

In Uganda, renewable energy emerged as a key sector in 2013, and the government increased its budget for research, innovation and dissemination on alternative technologies, followed by an 8.5% increase of the national budget for the rural electrification programme in 2014. Several public institutions acknowledged that Energy Network Uganda is a relevant national stakeholder.

After the EC published its Green Paper including access to energy as an issue, the EU allocated €50 million for a Technical Assistance Facility to run through early 2014. In addition, the European Commission committed €500 million to support energy access projects until 2014 and will possibly make new contributions for the 2014–2020 period. The European Parliament strengthened the support to small farmers for renewable energy while amending the 2014–2020 Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) in 2013.

The WB published a new directions paper for its Energy Sector policy in 2013, which aligns more with NGOs' pro-poor energy positions because it acknowledges that off-grid is as valuable as grid expansion.

On 24 March 2014, the United States of America and the Netherlands made a joint statement on climate change and financing the transition to low-carbon investments abroad, which included an

agreement to end support for public financing of new coal-fired power plants abroad except in rare circumstances in 2014.

Since the launch of the UN Energy for All (SE4All) initiative in 2011, 83 developing countries have 'opted in' and joined the efforts of SE4All. Country action plans are underway in nearly 30 of these. This outcome was classified as both '*agenda setting*' and '*changing practice*'.

#### 100% Green IT in the Netherlands:

In terms of both *agenda setting* and *changing practice*, since 2012, Dutch data centres have been involved in the discussion about the realisation of several wind farms. Five large data centres in the Amsterdam region are actively involved in research to link data centres to sustainable energy producers or production, including windmills. The research is coordinated by Green IT.

*Practice changes* were observed with Stichting Milieukeur, with the 23 biggest data centres in the Netherlands, and Green IT.

- In July 2012, Stichting Milieukeur announced a change in the certification scheme for climate management by data centres in favour of the use of green electricity, which previously was a purely optional criterion.
- The data centres either formulated plans to increase the sustainability of their energy supply or already started implementing their plans in 2014. Four data centres increased their transparency regarding their energy supply.
- Green IT introduced the use of sustainable energy as an issue within its services from the Energy Desk.

### 8.1.2 *Achievements in relation to plans and relevance of changes*

#### 8.1.2.1 Fair, Green and Global Alliance

Achievements made in relation to plans:

##### *Trade agreements:*

With regard to ISDS, important achievements were made in the EU, in particular because the TTIP negotiations with the USA offered the opportunity to do so. Important progress was also made in Ecuador (unplanned). Apart from these changes, the awareness on the ISDS has increased considerably.

With regard to BITs, important achievements were made as planned in a number of countries (South Africa and the Netherlands, the Philippines and Thailand (destroyed after military coup) and in Myanmar (unplanned). BITs became an important issue in Asia.

Expected results with regard to Free Trade Agreements between the EU and Peru and Colombia did not materialise, and progress with regard to the EPAs is lagging behind FGG's expectations. The countries where activities were developed differed from what was initially shown in the ToC figure. However, it was already planned that work in countries would only be developed if opportunities were there (e.g. ongoing negotiations between the EU and the country).

An outcome was achieved at the WTO level, with India leading a group of 33 members to allow for national (protective) measures to ensure food security rather than open markets for free trade.

Seen from another angle, FGG focussed on three main issues in relation to trade agreements: food security and land issues, investor obligations and universalised services. Progress was made on the issue of food security in the WTO, but not so much on land issues. The discourse of lobby targets with

regard to investor obligations has become more aligned with the Alliance's position and the issue and is explicitly on the agenda in the Netherlands, Europe and South America. Not so much progress was made with regard to universalised services, such as access and democratic control over quality and affordable (former) public services, but increasingly being privatised.

*Biofuels – Milieudéfensie:*

The outcomes planned were to a great extent achieved, although some of the outcomes miss quantification, such as is the case for example for Milieudéfensie's plan to let companies take responsibility in solving cases brought up by Milieudéfensie and allies, which in practice happened for one company only.

The original ToC intended to directly lobby palm oil companies to redress negative social and environmental impacts, but did not reach the intended outcomes. Instead Milieudéfensie changed its strategy and started to lobby their investors, in particular those based in the Netherlands, who in turn put pressure on the companies.

Over time, planned objectives with regard to biokerosene based upon jatropha became less relevant, and Milieudéfensie reoriented this focus towards palm oil as of 2013, which has been its core business since 2005.

No unplanned outcomes were registered with Milieudéfensie.

*Biofuels - ActionAid*

Most of the outcomes planned in the ToC were achieved. A planned outcome that the Dutch government should take positions and actions regarding biofuel concerns was partially achieved through another angle—that of large-scale land acquisitions of international palm oil companies financed by, amongst others, Dutch investors. Unplanned outcomes registered are that international organisations like IMF, FAO, UNCTAD, OECD and WB call for revising biofuel mandates in light of the negative impacts these have for land rights, food security, climate and biodiversity. Also unplanned were two land grab cases that were (partially) solved.

Relevance:

*Trade agreements:*

Discussions on the ISDS are very relevant for maintaining the policy space of governments to regulate in the public interest. Increasingly, ISDS is adopted in the framework of wider trade agreements. The power of companies may threaten the sovereignty of states, or put whole policies at stake (e.g. environmental and social policies). This is a threat for both Southern and Northern countries. In Europe and the Netherlands, relevant policy changes took place on this issue. The European Commission intends to use the TTIP (and so the ISDS paragraph) as a model for future trade agreements. In Ecuador, South Africa, Philippines, Myanmar and other ASEAN countries, changes took place in the way policies on trade and investment agreements and their possible impacts (or actual negative impacts) are being discussed in the countries, and, in some countries, policies themselves have changed.

*Relevance – biofuels – Milieudéfensie and ActionAid:*

All changes achieved are relevant in light of the ToCs of Milieudéfensie and ActionAid. The promotion of biofuels by Europe and other parts of the world has had negative impacts, often disproportionately affecting the world's poor while failing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The



EU now (fall 2014) has taken positions that are quite different from those in 2011 and relevant in the light of the ToCs.

Similar relevant contributions towards decreasing the negative impact of biofuels for food security, land access, biodiversity and food prices were made in the Dutch energy agreement and with regard to the use of biokerosene and investments in palm oil related to illegal large scale land acquisitions in the South.

#### 8.1.2.2 IMPACT Alliance

Achievements in relation to plans:

Generally speaking, many outcomes in the original ToC have been achieved. However, an overview on changing policies and practices in developing countries is missing for those to which Oxfam contributed. At the same time, many actors are currently addressing land governance in these countries. With regard to the BtB land spike, unintended outcomes were achieved: Whereas Oxfam planned that only one FBC would commit to zero tolerance for land grabbing, four FBCs made this commitment. Other intended but ambitious changes achieved consist of FBCs, previously targeted by Oxfam, turning into allies and taking responsibility for chain-wide changes. The same applies for other actors in the BtB campaign, in particular media, global audiences and investors who became allies in this campaign.

With respect to the overarching objective, which was to stop land and water grabs, this water-related part of the objective was not explicitly dealt with in the campaign.

With regard to the BtB women and cocoa spike, outcomes have been achieved as foreseen and the FBCs publicly targeted also turned into Oxfam allies.

Relevance:

With regard to the land grab campaign, the endorsement of the VGGTs for the wider land grab ToC is highly relevant, not only according to Oxfam, but also to four Oxfam partners in Asia and Africa. The VGGTs are currently *the* global standard for land governance and tenure. The Global Donor Working Group on Land is currently integrating the VGGTs in 554 projects in 125 countries. The relevance of the WBG outcomes achieved gives a more nuanced picture, in terms of their current contributions made in the ToC and as seen from different perspectives by Oxfam affiliates and four partners in Africa and Asia. In terms of impact upon people's livelihoods, the land grab cases that were solved in Uganda helped thousands of people to get a land title.

*The BtB campaign* is relevant because, in the first place, it presented a new and innovative campaign approach by addressing women and land issues in a value chain perspective. In the second place, a number of previous lobby targets, such as FBCs, have become allies who have started to influence governments of developing countries to stop land grabbing or to address gender issues such as is the case in the cocoa sector. In the third place, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, Nestlé and Unilever, who committed to zero tolerance for land grabbing, had to disclose their top sourcing countries and suppliers, which considerably helps other NGOs to map supply chains up to the FBCs and to address land grabbing in their supply chains.

#### 8.1.2.3 Ecosystem Alliance

Achievements in relation to plans:

It is not possible to assess the extent to which outcomes achieved under the *livelihood-ecosystem component* have been realised in line with plans. This component is operational in at least 16 countries where EA works with its partners, and only two projects were assessed.

With regard to the *greening the economy component*, four objectives were formulated:

The first objective was that global fora make decisions to make the mining, palm oil, soy and biomass/biofuel sector more sustainable: Changes happened in the palm oil sector, where the RSPO, amongst others, revised its Principles and Criteria, with key clauses and guidance regarding peatlands, greenhouse gas emissions and HCV area management. Nevertheless, the evaluation team has strong doubts about the progress the RSPO has made in the 16 years after the start of the process or in the period of this evaluation. In the other three sectors, sustainability issues were further set on the agenda as a part of a process as well, but this did not result in policy decisions in the period under evaluation.

The other three objectives aimed for more inclusive economic and trade policies. One of these, emphasising EA partners becoming mobilised, resulted in outcomes in Cameroon in the mining sector, in Indonesia where many EA partners are actively involved with the RSPO and in by partners in five Latin American countries working on soya. Outcomes in other countries have not been documented or reported, given the magnitude of the programme.

The third objective aimed for decisions to be made by governments and the private sector in nine countries and at the global level. Outcomes achieved only show progress being made by the government of Indonesia and the Netherlands. Changes in the private sector are supposed to trickle down as a result of changes in the standards used by the RSPO and the RTRS. In the case of the RSPO (palm oil), it remained doubtful to what extent this really happens. Apart from this, the EA's leadership for the nature programme managed to sign a green deal with 14 Dutch companies and two business platforms that does not reflect concrete policy or practice changes in the private sector.

With regard to the fourth objective, policies and practices for reduced the ecological footprint of the Dutch and EU economies on the South, and progress has been made with regard to flaws being addressed in the Dutch economy system, but not in the EU.

The objective of the *ecosystem-based climate change component* was to improve REDD+ within the UNFCCC for the reduction of deforestation and degradation as a means to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The outcomes achieved mostly relate to the role of peatlands in greenhouse gas emissions and represent policy changes by both the UNFCCC and the FAO. They contribute towards reducing emissions, but not by measures to tackle deforestation and degradation, which is somewhat to be considered as an unplanned outcome. Apart from this, progress towards decreasing emissions was realised in Ghana and in the Philippines.

#### Relevance:

The 'expected' relevance of outcomes achieved under the *first EA component* is that they increase civil society engagement and the voices of their partners in developing countries on ecosystem–livelihood linkages. As already mentioned, an overview of outcomes achieved in the 16 countries involved in the programme has not been collected.

With regard to the *greening the economy component*, the changes achieved in the mining sector to date do not include policy changes occurred within the EU and the EITI or the changes obtained in relation to the EU-RED.

The Dutch sustainability criteria in the energy agreement (relating to biomass) represent the most relevant policy change in this field since 2011, in addition to the creation of the Dispute Settlement Facility under the RSPO (palm oil), which is the first ever agri-commodity roundtable facility of its kind.

The outcomes achieved in the soya sector are consistent with the EA's ToC, which focuses on a chain-wide change involving actors in the Netherlands and South America, as well as the outcomes achieved with regard to flaws in the economic system.

Relevant outcomes in the *ecosystem-based climate change mitigation* component are the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ that forces tree planting projects under REDD+ to take up issues such as Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) by affected communities, community engagement, government agency buy-in—which is in line with the EA's efforts to link ecosystems to livelihoods—as well as to strengthen the capacities of local communities and NGOs. The contribution of this outcome to a new climate treaty in 2015, can only be assessed in the future.

The new counting system put in place by the UNFCCC with regard to peatlands and their mitigation potential acknowledges the important role played by peatlands and will help to effectively limit emissions from peat. The policy change of the FAO with regard to peatlands is relevant, because it helped to put agricultural production on peat on the international agenda, not only for mitigation but also for adaptation.

#### 8.1.2.4 Hivos

Achievements in relation to plans:

With regard to the campaign *Access to Energy for poor people*, no considerable achievements have been made towards increasing access in practice. Both the EU and the WBG have changed their policies, and the EU has increased budgets for the implementation of projects in the South to ensure pro-poor access to energy. Additionally, 30 of 83 developing countries that adhered to the UN Energy for All (SE4All) initiatives have formulated their own country action plans. The Uganda case illustrates that important steps have been made to stimulate the national debate on access to energy for the poor, and the government has taken concrete actions. The planned outcome in Uganda has hence been achieved; achievements to effectively increase access to poor people have not been measured, but new policies and practices show a positive turn.

The main goal of the *100% Green IT in the Netherlands* project is that Dutch data centres reduce their CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. There are indications that a majority of the data centres have begun to choose to increase the use of (real) green energy within their operations. However, there is still a long way to go before the sector is substantially changed.

Relevance:

The relevance of the Access to Energy programme is that national and international decision makers in developing countries, the EU, the WB and the UN have become aware of the economic and social impact of energy for poor people, in particular rural poor people, in the South. More funds are currently being mobilised to implement energy projects for the poor. Additionally, the new WB Energy Directions will make it more difficult for the WB to invest in coal-fired power plants, while at the same time acknowledging the potential of off-grid electricity generation, which could be made possible by using alternative energy sources such as wind and sun.

Apart from this, the Uganda case shows that the NGO Energy Network Uganda has become a reliable partner for the government to discuss policies and practices, while other NGOs are also picking up the issue. Progress being made in Uganda also informs policy influencing by Hivos and its partners in other countries and at international level.

The *100% Green IT in the Netherlands* initiative by Hivos was inspired by its solidarity principle, meaning that interventions on sustainable and accessible energy in the South should be

accompanied by the promotion of sustainable energy in the North and, more specifically, in the Netherlands. The fact that the Netherlands hosts many data centres in comparison with other EU countries makes the achievements made to this point more relevant.

### 8.1.3 Discussion of outcomes achieved

As noted above, the programmes of the four alliances are very different. This makes comparison and synthesis of the outcomes difficult. In this section, we try to highlight some patterns that we observe with regard to outcomes achieved, as well as highlight diversity across the alliances.

#### 8.1.3.1 Outcomes achieved

In the lobby and advocacy programmes under evaluation, environmental and social aspects are dealt with in relation to each other. This is reflected both in the individual outcomes and in the whole group of outcomes together. Within the NGO community, there is hardly any disagreement that both aspects are important. Ten years ago, there were still different schools, but now cooperation between the different schools happens more often.

#### 8.1.3.2 Themes addressed in the programmes

The following table gives an overview of themes addressed per alliance and shows the breadth of the themes dealt with, as well as thematic overlaps between alliances.

Table 8.1 Theme	EA	FGG	Hivos	Impact
REDD+	X			
Sustainable use of energy by data centres			X	
Biofuels	X	X		
Supply chain-wide change (BtB land and BtB women)				X
Biodiversity – UN CBD	X			
Climate Change mitigation		X		
Access to energy			X	
Flaws in the economic system	X			
Free trade, investment arbitration, bilateral trade agreements and economic partnership agreements		X		
Integrated water resource management	X			
Large-scale land acquisitions		X		X
Mining	X			
Sustainable palm oil, pulp wood, soya	X			
Gender mainstreaming in land issues and in the supply chains of food and beverage companies				X

Whereas Hivos and the IMPACT alliance focus only on a limited number of themes, the numbers addressed by the EA, in particular, are very large. Part of the diversity in the themes under evaluation lies in the selection of campaigns to be evaluated according to NWO-WOTRO; another factor explaining this diversity relates to the identity of the alliances and their strategic orientations with regard to economic justice. Within some alliances, the identity and track record of individual members also explains the diversity of themes addressed, such as is the case with FGG and EA.

The alliances also collaborated in many cases with others to achieve outcomes. In some cases, outcomes have been reported as outcomes under two alliances. This is the case, for instance, with FGG and Oxfam both having contributed to the initiative taken by the Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation to ensure that Dutch investors comply with international sustainability standards and are not involved in land grabbing. This outcome was the result of collaborative efforts by ActionAid, Both ENDS, ICCO, Milieudefensie, NCIV and Oxfam, and not only by FGG and the IMPACT Alliance. The same is valid for the Minister starting to meet with Dutch

investors to discuss allegations by several Dutch NGOs (Oxfam, ActionAid, SOMO, TNI and Milieudefensie) of involvement in land grabbing. Those examples are both within the focus of the evaluation, and, for FGG, they were achieved under its biofuel campaign; for Oxfam, it was part of the land grab campaign.

However, other outcomes achieved are also claimed by other alliances but were outside the unit of analysis for this evaluation. Examples of these are, for instance, Oxfam claiming to have contributed to changes within the RSPO in relation to palm oil where the EA and FGG claim outcomes. However, Oxfam's work targeting the RSPO is part of Oxfam's Private Sector Programme, not within the unit of analysis for this evaluation, and one outcome with regard to land was part of the land grab campaign. The same is valid for Oxfam claiming to have contributed to the amendment of the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD), the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) and to the Dutch Energy Agreement (EA, FGG, Hivos). However, these topics are not part of the unit of analysis of the Oxfam assessment. Similar decisions were made not to take into account land work done by ActionAid, a member of the FGG Alliance, which certainly has contributed to achievements in the land grab campaign of Oxfam.

#### 8.1.3.3 Lobby targets reached

Of all outcomes achieved, most consisted of changes taking place within companies (Dutch companies, FBCs, companies working in the palm oil sector), in particular as a result of efforts by the IMPACT Alliance and to a lesser extent FGG. It is specifically within this cluster that alliances are found that focus on companies. Changes within the Dutch government come in the second place, in particular because of contributions made by FGG. Next, many changes were observed with the EU and the World Bank Group with considerably more contributions made by FGG (EU) and Oxfam WBG). Apart from these outcomes, changes occurred in governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America; in UN institutions like the FAO, UNFCCC, UNCTAD, CBD; in multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the RSPO and RTRS; in Dutch investors and in Southern NGOs. One particular outcome which was observed several times with FGG is that of changes occurring in the bilateral trade relations between countries such as between the Netherlands and South Africa, and the EU–USA.

#### 8.1.3.4 Priority result areas

As mentioned above, between 160 and 180 different outcomes were identified, depending upon the extent to which outcomes were clustered. Those outcomes under the priority result area 'agenda setting' by far exceed those classified as a 'policy change', followed by 'changing practices'. We abstain here from further presenting numbers and frequencies but rather highlight trends.

Outcomes most often relate to the following standard indicators in order of importance:

- Demonstrable changes (or prevention of policy changes, including adoption of new policies) take place by lobby/advocacy targets. UI 2.1
- Extent to which lobby/advocacy targets react upon the positions taken by the ILA programme. UI 1.3
- Alliance and other actors become aware of the issues at stake, organise themselves and adhere to the position of the ILA programme. UI 1.2
- Concrete changes in practices of governments, institutes and/or targeted companies as to implementation of policies (changing practices) in the 'field'. UI 3.2

It is very encouraging that demonstrable policy changes is the standard indicator most often used for the classification of outcomes achieved. This means that lobby and advocacy programmes did indeed lead to a substantial number of changes in policy, at least in the Economic Justice Cluster. The

outcomes did not stop at the agenda setting level. However, it does not mean that the alliances get 100% of what they want and that the policy changes exactly reflect their objectives. Here, the responsible policy makers made trade-offs.

We observe here that, for some alliances, it was not possible to identify all outcomes achieved, in particular those relating to changes achieved in Southern countries. This is the case in particular with the 40 Oxfam countries involved in the land grab campaign, and the 16 countries where the EA is intervening. Therefore, we observe a bias in this assessment towards including outcomes achieved at international level or in the EU and the Netherlands.

Some of the standard indicators were not used at all or were only mentioned very few times:

- Within the programme, the relevant members of an alliance determine, share and keep up to date their policy positions and strategies. UI 1.1. No outcomes are mentioned under this category. Our assessment is that, for the alliances, apparently this indicator was too obvious to report on.
- Relevant NGOs and/or other stakeholders involved in the programme are invited to participate in meetings (or organise meetings) relevant for the issue(s) by lobby/advocacy targets on public/private sector policies or those of international institutions. UI 1.4. This indicator can also be confused with indicator UI 2.2 which is about demonstrable shifts in accountability structure.

#### 8.1.3.5 Outcomes achieved vs. planned

The following table presents the extent to which the alliances realised outcomes in relation to plans made. We observe, however, that for a number of the alliances, planned outcomes or objectives were not quantified, such as for example in how many developing countries changes need to be observed, or how many companies were expected to change their policies and practices, or what targets the alliance set for reducing the biofuel cap in Dutch and EU policies. For the Ecosystem Alliance, only one ToC was made for the entire lobby and advocacy programme, whereas in reality a large number of themes addressed each required a specific ToC, which would have made the assessment of outcomes achieved vs. outcomes planned more accurate.

<b>Table 8.2 Alliance – theme</b>	<b>Achievements made according to plan</b>	<b>Not (entirely) achieved</b>	<b>Unexpected positive outcomes</b>
Trade and Investment – FGG	In general yes for ISDS and BIT	EPAs partially achieved; As to BITs, in some countries no results (but it was clear from the start that activities would only be developed in countries where there were opportunities). No progress made with regard to universal services	WTO negotiations for the acceptance of protective measures to ensure food security (some results planned, but results were more than expected).
Biofuels – Milieudefensie – FGG	In general yes, but targets set are not specific.	No	No
Biofuels – ActionAid - FGG	In general yes	No	International organisations call for revising biofuel mandates Two land grab cases that were (partially) solved.
Land grab campaign, including BtB land - Oxfam	In general yes, but overview missing at country level	Water grab was less explicitly dealt with in the campaign, although part of the overall objective	Instead of one food and beverage company declaring zero tolerance for land grabbing, four committed to this principle and its implementation
BtB campaign women and cocoa	In general yes	No	No
Livelihood-ecosystem - EA	Not assessed		
Greening the Economy - EA	Partially achieved	N/A	N/A
Climate change mitigation - EA	In general yes	Limited progress in commodity sectors. Unclear progress in Leaders for Nature. Number of objectives not measurable	No
Access to energy – Hivos	Partially achieved, WB and EU changes are positive	Not yet increased access to energy for the poor in Southern countries, (new issue, capacity building and agenda setting take time)	No
100% Green IT Netherlands – Hivos	Partially achieved	Changes in sector started but new issue, agenda setting took time	No

#### 8.1.3.6 Relevance

Generally speaking, all outcomes achieved by the alliances were relevant in the light of their ToCs. A general observation with regard to the assessment of relevance is to assess the gap between outcomes planned vs. outcomes achieved. In cases where outcomes were formulated in terms of changing policies and practices, outcomes achieved in terms of agenda setting were considered less relevant because this gap was too wide. One example relates to achievements made in the mining sector (EA), which, however, did reflect modest policy changes in the EU.

Apart from this, some outcomes achieved are considered to be more relevant than others, such as is the case with FGG, where the President of Ecuador became an ally of FGG in disseminating a report on the ISDS, or with Oxfam, where the endorsement of the VGGTs is now mobilising millions of euros

to implement it in developing countries, etc. More of these examples have been found, where outputs or outcomes to which the alliances contributed generated further positive changes beyond expectations.

An element that was not addressed with all alliances is to assess for whom changes are relevant and why? A decent attempt to do so with Oxfam highlighted the importance of people and organisations at different locations having very diverse opinions about the relevance of some outcomes achieved, as was the case with the WBG.

## **8.2 Key findings on contribution**

The main evaluation question to be answered in this section is: Do the international lobbying and advocacy efforts of MFS II alliances and their partners contribute to the identified changes (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

In our report, we have made a distinction between external changes in context and changes to which the alliance programme contributed in some way. All outcomes mentioned in the previous sections have been realised with contributions of the alliances under evaluation. The nature of the contributions made vary to a great extent, with some contributions being quite easy to establish—such as solving specific cases on the ground, where contributions are considerable and direct. In other cases, such as policy changes in international fora or the EU, contributions are more difficult to assess because many other actors are involved and not all processes are visible. For each alliance, we selected two specific outcomes for which we made a more detailed analysis (see the alliance reports). For all of these selected outcomes, it became clear that the alliances had contributed to the outcomes. Almost always, the alliance was not the only one to contribute.

Several alliances have contributed to the achievement of one outcome, as has been highlighted in the previous section. Are they doing double work? The evaluation team does not believe so. On these issues, important results have been reported and, in all cases, broad coalitions of NGOs are bringing the issues forward. This is a common pattern. The wide involvement of NGOs (whether they are part of one of the alliances evaluated here or not) is a factor explaining the achieved changes. In general, each NGO tries to bring in its own expertise and specialisation, avoiding competition. Having said this, there is still space for discussion.

We refer to the respective sections in the reports of the alliances and Appendix 3, where the outcomes, their relevance and contributions are dealt with together for the different sub-themes.

Is there a pattern in contribution with respect to the three priority result areas? After having categorised all outcomes according to the priority result areas, we concluded that this leads to an artificial distinction that seems not to do justice to the reality of the change processes that took place in reality. It goes without saying that none of the alliances worked with separate ToCs to address each priority result area (agenda setting, policy change, change in practice) individually. Some (or most) campaigns were designed in such a way that the same interventions led to agenda setting, changing practice and/or changing policies. We regroup here a number of types of interventions and strategies that contributed to the identified outcomes (common practices) that we identified for each of the alliances under evaluation. When we mention alliances here, the list is not exhaustive, but an illustration.

In the following section, we present contributions made by each alliance separately, followed by an analysis of contribution patterns that aims to identify commonalities and divergences in lobby and advocacy strategies by the alliances.



### 8.2.1 Contributions made by the alliances and validated

For each of the alliances, two outcomes or outcome groups were selected to do an in-depth contribution analysis. However, attempts were also made to validate contributions made by the alliances to other outcomes achieved by triangulating information obtained from the alliance, with that coming from external resource persons or written sources. Important information that was considered 'evidence' consisted for example of lobby targets or external resource persons explicitly mentioning contributions made by the alliance or justifying changes made in relation to the alliance position, or changes in policy documents by lobby targets matching position papers of alliances.

For each alliance, in the next session, we attempt to assess plausible relations between interventions by the alliance and outcomes for all outcomes presented in Appendix 3. We further present the results of the extended contribution analysis for two selected outcomes or outcome groups.

#### 8.2.1.1 Fair, Green and Global Alliance

Approximately 70 outcomes have been listed for FGG in Appendix 3 and presented in the previous section. Apart from all interventions made by the alliance, contribution claims by FGG have been substantiated externally in the following ways:

- One of our independent resource persons mentioned the SOMO contribution as important for the ISDS discussion. This relates to six outcomes presented in the annex.
- A TNI co-published a report, *Profiting from Injustice*, in English and Spanish, examining the key players in the investment arbitration industry, was explicitly referred to by politicians in three countries, the UNCTAD, in Ecuador (the president) and in Latin America. This report explains contributions made to another six outcomes.
- One independent source mentions Greenpeace and FGG Alliance member Milieudefensie as important actors 'who kept the RSPO sharp' without being formal members of the RSPO, strengthening Milieudefensie's contribution claim for three outcomes related to the RSPO.
- In letters to parliament, Minister Ploumen sometimes mentioned explicitly the names of FGG members and their reports. Resource person E, a civil servant within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the Ministry organised a conference on palm oil together with the Ecosystem Alliance and the FGG Alliance. In such a situation, there is a dialogue, and the different parties influence each other. The FGG Alliance had considerable influence on Minister Ploumen before she finished a policy paper on trade and development. FGG acted very strategically and in a timely fashion to exert influence on the Minister. This strengthens FGG's contribution claim for some four outcomes.
- Independent resource person B mentioned Greenpeace and FGG Alliance member Milieudefensie as important actors 'who kept the Roundtable on Sustainable palm Oil (RSPO) sharp' without being formal RSPO members. This strengthens Milieudefensie's contribution on some 11 outcomes referring to palm oil.
- In a general consultation (Algemeen Overleg) of the Dutch parliament in December 2012, Dutch MP Jan Vos (Labour Party, now part of the ruling coalition) referred to persons from Kenya and Tanzania, invited by FGG member ActionAid: 'On the other hand, the NGOs also ask rightly for attention for the impact of the large-scale use of biofuels. I have spoken with representatives of soya bean farmers in Brazil, a biofuels expert from Kenya and activists from Tanzania'. This strengthens ActionAid's contribution to at least two outcomes.

Most contributions made by FGG were made together with other actors.

Two more elaborate contribution analysis were done, one focussing on trade and investment and the other on the EU Renewable Energy Directive.

Contribution analysis: EU–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement campaign:

One of the outcomes to which FGG claims to have contributed, consists of the Philippines government engaging in a dialogue with the Philippines Platform. The Platform's main critique in the negotiations of the FTA is that insufficient attention is being given to matters relating to intellectual property rights and access to medicine. The dialogue was held in 2013 and some top trade negotiators from the Department of Trade & Industry participated, as did representatives from the Intellectual Property Office and the Department of Health.

The Philippines Platform is the only actor that requested a dialogue with the government, in reaction to which the government responded by explicitly inviting the platform.

The following pathways were identified that possibly explain the creation of the Philippines Platform and the invitation for a dialogue by the government. In the first place, FGG designed a ToC that would start with capacity building and financial support provided by FGG, leading to improved capacities of the Platform and the Platform in consequence taking the initiative to engage with the EU–Philippines FTA. In consequence, this should lead to a positive response from the government (the actual outcome achieved) followed by the implementation of the FTA. Apart from this, the following other actors and factors were identified that probably explain the outcome:

- The Belgium NGO 11.11.11 covers 70% of the Platform's institutional costs and other NGOs also support the Platform in building its capacities.
- The Platform members, 34 organisations/networks, have been active in the Philippines for many decades and are well established, reputable and recognised entities. They can reach out to a wider audience and to their constituencies, helping to diversify the capacities needed for lobby and advocacy. The issues at stake have been on the agenda of the platform for a long time.
- The change of government in 2010 created a more positive environment for non-state actors to interact with the state apparatus: Bureaucrats became more receptive of the Platform's position and personal contacts between bureaucrats and Platform members, and mutual understanding and trust improved. Apart from this, some of the NGO members had very good contacts with a party in the ruling government coalition and mobilised their networks to establish contacts with key lobby targets in the political and bureaucratic realms.

The outcome is to be explained as a combination of all actors and factors mentioned above. FGG's contribution was only a small proportion of efforts made by the Philippines Platform and those of others. However, it played a vital role in building the capacities of the Platform and in relating networks to each other. The outcome probably could not have been achieved without FGG's contribution.

Contribution analysis: EU Renewable Energy Directive:

Several intermediate outcomes culminated in the EC compromising a position on indirect land use changes that includes a 7% cap on food-based biofuels, certain ILUC obligations, an indicative non-binding sub-target of 0.5% for advanced biofuels that count double and other sustainability issues in June 2014. The EU Council, its Parliament and the Commission have considerably changed their positions about biofuels and related policies since 2011.

Several pathways possibly explain the outcome achieved, some of which implied contributions by FGG. FGG's most direct lobby and advocacy pathway consisted of case-specific research in Southern countries to support lobby asks, petitioning in EU member states, issuing press releases and organising a mass mobilisation week to influence the EU elections with a coalition of NGOs, using social media to raise the awareness of European MPs, influencing Dutch MPs and inviting Southern partners to meet with them, and engaging with Dutch civil servants in various ministries. A dialogue of Milieudefensie with Unilever and Rabobank may have contributed to these organisations taking a position against the EU biofuel target in 2011.

Other pathways taken by FGG may have indirectly contributed to a changing perception on biofuels within the EU and the Netherlands. These relate to changing policies and practices of the RSPO; increased awareness that jatropha is not a miracle crop for biofuels; changes in the Dutch biofuel policy, which, in turn, helped to influence EU-RED; reporting on social impacts of biofuels and increased attention for land rights and large-scale land acquisitions.

Other NGOs in Europe also contributed to the EU-RED policy change, and FGG worked in coalitions when possible. In Brussels, other groups lobbied on behalf of pressure groups in Europe, including on behalf of FGG. In the Netherlands, Greenpeace is an important player in the biofuel discussion, whereas Oxfam and the EA also influence palm oil discussions with the RSPO.

The outcome is to be explained as a combination of all these actors and factors, as well as different pathways targeting the EU, the Netherlands and the palm oil and jatropha sectors. Those together can be compared with a group of persons who try to move a big stone. At a certain moment, the stone moves. FGG did contribute to moving the stone and hence was part of a causal package that contributed to the outcome. FGG has been busy with biofuels since the start of MFS II and has been quite visible in influencing the Dutch debate in parliament and government, while there are also EU member states (e.g. in Eastern and Southern Europe) in which concerns about negative impacts of biofuels do not play a big role in the public and political arena and where the government took a much less critical position as to high biofuel targets. Therefore, the least we can conclude is that the FGG contribution has weight.

#### 8.2.1.2 IMPACT Alliance

Approximately 45 outcomes have been listed for the IMPACT Alliance in Appendix 3 and presented in the previous section. A quick scan for contribution was done for all of these outcomes. The analysis consisted of finding sources of information that explicitly linked Oxfam to the outcome as well as finding sources of information that explicitly linked other actors to the outcome (rival explanations), which was the case with some outcomes. By far, most of the outcomes were achieved by the Oxfam confederation, which mobilised allies. Oxfam was one of the many contributors for five outcomes, and for six outcomes it explicitly worked in collaboration with other NGOs. For two outcomes, other actors were also identified who claim the outcome: Further in-depth analysis might provide new results with regard to contributions made by Oxfam.

Both for the land grab campaign and the BtB campaign, a more elaborate contribution analysis was done.

Contribution analysis: The International Finance Corporation changes policies and practices: Two changes in policies and practices have been registered with the International Finance Corporation.

The IFC has introduced new regulations and practices with regard to lending through financial intermediaries (FIs). These regulations and practices possibly increase IFC's oversight of the environmental and social impacts of these loans at sub-client level (local communities and their environment), decreasing risks that the IFC might be involved in land grabbing through its FIs and closing the gap between IFC's standards and their practical implementation.

IFC's policies with regard to large-scale land acquisitions funded directly changed based upon an analysis it made of alleged land grab cases under mediation with the WBG Ombudsman, the CAO. One of the cases analysed (Uganda) was brought up by Oxfam, and another one on which they campaigned allegedly associated the IFC with human rights violations in Honduras.

Three pathways were identified that possibly explain the two outcomes:

*According to the first pathways*, Oxfam and other NGOs started to prepare themselves in line with audits announced or published by the CAO. Preparations included research and publication, collaboration with a core group of NGOs (EURODAD, Bretton Woods Project, CIEL, etc.), and direct engagement with the IFC and the CAO to monitor progress being made on the Uganda and Honduras cases. When the audits of Honduras and the FIs were made public by the CAO, followed by a weak management response from the IFC, the core group of NGOs and a huge network of NGOs around the world publicly criticised these responses and mobilised international media coverage, while the core group continued its direct engagement with WB staff and decision makers.

In both cases, the Board had to react and asked the IFC to take stock of past experiences and draw lessons learned. These were shared with NGOs including Oxfam in April 2014, after which the core group continued lobbying for more structural changes by both insider and outsider strategies.

*According to the second pathway*, the outcomes were reached without the external pressure from NGOs, assuming that internal accountability systems within the WBG, in particular the CAO, are strong enough to improve policies and practices with regard to FIs and the prevention of land grabbing.

*According to the third pathway*, the outcomes were reached by following Oxfam's original ToC for the land freeze campaign, which asked the WBG for a temporary freeze on land acquisitions during which policies and practices would be reviewed.

The most plausible explanation for the outcomes is as follows: The pathway that internal accountability systems within the WBG explain the outcomes was rejected: The CAO and its audits are an important (*necessary*) element for the change to happen but they are *not sufficient*, because the IFC and the WBG repeatedly do not take these seriously enough. Without the CAO, however, NGOs possibly were not able to contribute to change: The Board most likely took action when, in particular with regard to the Honduras case, they were associated with human rights violations by the global media. Apart from this, they were lobbied and received direct information from the core group and others about key issues at stake. A causal package that combines the efforts of the CAO and the core group of NGOs explains the outcome, *meaning that these actors and factors together were minimally sufficient to explain the outcome*. The huge outcry of civil society in reaction to the IFC's weak management response to the Honduras audit that associated the WBG with human rights atrocities was a trigger for the WB to intensify their supervision of the IFC.

Oxfam played a key role in these changes, which could not have happened without the organisation. In comparison with the other NGOs, it excelled in direct engagement with the WBG, mobilised media coverage when necessary and mobilised allies on time to publish CSO statements. An important

condition (*necessary but not sufficient*) for Oxfam to play its role are preparations made during the land freeze campaign and earlier direct engagement with the WBG.

Contribution analysis: Behind the Brands campaign:

The contribution analysis of the BtB campaign comprises the explanation of all outcomes achieved with food and beverage companies, as well as an assessment of the assumptions in the broader ToC.

Evidence has been found that Nestlé, Mars and Mondelez have publicly and fully committed to Oxfam's requests with regard to mainstreaming gender in their value chains. Apart from these publicly-targeted FBCs, four others subscribed to the UN Women Empowerment Principles: Coca-Cola, Kellogg, Unilever and ABF.

The land and sugar spike publicly targeted Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and ABF. In line with Oxfam's request, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo committed to zero tolerance for land grabbing taking place in the way they are doing business. Nestlé and Unilever, which were not publicly targeted, also committed to zero tolerance for land grabbing and started taking action in line with their commitments.

*The first pathway* that possibly explains these outcomes are the interventions of Oxfam in line with their ToC. At the heart of the campaign are a regular update of a scorecard that ranks the top ten FBCs on seven themes, including gender and land, and a six-month public thematic campaign spike, that publicly targets some FBCs to commit to Oxfam's asks. Oxfam's interventions for each campaign spike consists of 1) publication of the general scorecard to engage the 10 FBCs into a 'race to the top', together with other campaign materials articulating (public) requests (asks) to the FBCs targeted; 2) ensuring global (social) media coverage at the beginning of the spike and when FBCs publicly commit to Oxfam's requests; 3) throughout the campaign spike, ensuring that global publics can take action through social media or participate in stunts before the FBC offices when additional pressure is needed and 4) filing shareholder resolutions on key investor meetings when needed. Before, during and after the public spike, Oxfam engages in a dialogue with the FBCs and also works with allies to amplify the influence on the FBCs. Below, the ToC as set of assumptions has been formulated.

For the outcomes related to the gender and cocoa spike, *alternative explanations* were identified. The sector faces challenges to secure its supply, which urged the World Cocoa Federation (representing 90% of the cocoa sector) to take collaborative action, including on gender issues. Additionally, Oxfam Novib, together with many organisations (KIT, Solidaridad, Hivos, etc.) has been introducing gender in the cocoa sector; gender is a critical issue assessed in the Cocoa Barometer since 2012, and UTZ, a certification body, has been working on gender since 2011.

For the outcomes related to the land and sugar spike, *no other actors and factors* were identified that explain why Coca-Cola and PepsiCo declared zero tolerance for land grabbing. Bonsucro has been working on the introduction of the FPIC principle in its standards (partially with Oxfam), but it is not in the position to lead a sector-wide change, given the fact that it only represents 2% of the sugar sector.

The outcomes can be explained by the following:

The assessment of the assumptions highlights that FBCs will most likely commit to Oxfam's requests when they are in line with the FBC's priorities and do generate (material and reputational) benefits, to the extent to which FBCs and their brands are sensitive to consumer pressure and depending on sector-specific features. These are to be considered conditions (*necessary but not sufficient*) that

explain the outcome. In addition to having these conditions in place, Oxfam's interventions (outsider and insider) created the momentum for FBCs to change their policies and practices.

The BtB campaign was designed by Oxfam alone, and it played a very significant role in achieving the outcomes. As was stated above, the campaign is a very new way of campaigning private sector organisations. A number of NGOs already work with scorecards but do not follow up on these with public campaigns and direct engagement in the way that Oxfam does.

#### 8.2.1.3 Ecosystem Alliance

With the Ecosystem Alliance, evidence was found of some 35 changes in agenda setting, policies or practices of lobby targets. For the first component under evaluation, only some outcomes were identified as an illustration of the component that works with partners in 16 countries.

By far, most outcomes to which the Alliance claims to have contributed have been achieved together with other civil society actors, in particular outcomes related to the UN Convention on Biodiversity, biomass issues in the Netherlands, biofuels issues with the EU, palm oil issues with the RSPO, soya issues with the RTRS and climate change issues with the UNFCCC. Exceptions are made for two outcomes related to palm oil, pulp and peatlands, for which Wetlands International is most likely the only contributor, and IUCN-NL's outcomes related to the Dutch Green Deal. Those outcomes possibly would not have materialised without those two actors.

One contribution analysis was conducted on the creation of the Dispute Settlement Facility of the RSPO. Interviews with external resource persons confirmed the EA's contribution to outcomes achieved in relation to biomass in the Netherlands (2 outcomes); biofuels in the EU (1 outcome); palm oil—RSPO and Indonesia (4 outcomes); palm oil, pulp and peatlands (3 outcomes) and REDD+ (3 outcomes).

Contribution analysis: RSPO guarantees Fairness, Transparency and Impartiality in the Complaint Mechanism:

In 2013, the General Assembly of the RSPO adopted a resolution to create a Dispute Settlement Facility in line with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

*A first pathway* that possibly explains this outcome refers to Sawit Watch, an EA partner in Indonesia, which is a member-based organisation of 140 persons or individuals, involved in the RSPO since its creation in 2004. Sawit Watch convened a workshop to draft the resolution, which was shared, validated and amended during other meetings and seminars. Sawit Watch also engaged with the RSPO's DSF and Grievance Panel (GP) as an additional involvement with the RSPO and published a report on conflict resolution within the RSPO. In the second place, it enabled community representatives to attend RSPO meetings and helped them to engage with companies to discuss complaints filed with the DSF and GP. These interventions orchestrated by Sawit Watch alone explain the resolution adopted. However, external resource persons very explicitly state that their organisation took the initiative to draft the resolution and that both organisations co-authored it. Other resource persons also added that a number of workshops were co-organised or even organised by other EA partners.

*A second pathway* consists of Sawit Watch, in collaboration with other actors explaining the outcome. Sawit Watch distributed a petition, which was signed by EA members and non-EA members; some companies supported the initiative to create a DSF, and some contributed to drafting the resolution and mobilised the support of other organisations with whom they shared common interests, including an alliance of several labour unions that claims to represent more than

20,000 members working on plantations. This alliance initiated a mass demonstration prior to the tabling of the resolution, including the participation of Sawit Watch. During that demonstration, representatives from labourers had discussions with the RSPO's Secretary General and its Indonesian Liaison Office, while others engaged in a dialogue with the Head of the North Sumatera Provincial Manpower and Workforce Board, and they successfully made a statement to the provincial government.

The most plausible explanation of the outcome is that of a combination of actors and factors made relevant contributions because they created a positive momentum for the success of the resolution (*a causal package*). Sawit Watch played a leading role, but it is unlikely that they were the only initiators of the resolution.

Contribution analysis: Palm oil, peatlands, RSPO, biofuels, biomass:

As mentioned above, an attempt was made to conduct a contribution analysis of four different EA programmes that are strongly linked to each other (palm oil, peatlands, RSPO, biofuels, biomass).

Although external resource persons confirmed the contributions made by EA towards the 13 outcomes achieved, it was not possible to deepen the analysis. The main reasons are that it was impossible to identify rival pathways to those of EA, nearly impossible to identify other resource persons who could confirm or reject pathways and interviewing lobby targets themselves would lead to risks of bias in answering questions.

#### 8.2.1.4 Hivos, People Unlimited 4.1 Alliance

Some 20 outcomes were identified for Hivos' Access to Energy campaign and its 100% Green IT in the Netherlands campaign. For its first programme, Hivos worked with other NGOs to lobby the EU (EEPA) and the WB (BIC), and in both cases Hivos and its partners cooperated in a larger NGO coalition. In addition, Hivos and/or its partners worked with civil society networks in Southern countries. Hivos was the only NGO working on the sector of data centres in the Netherlands (100% Green IT campaign).

Apart from the World Bank case that is discussed below, substantiation of the access to energy outcomes, including their relevance and Hivos' contribution, proved to be difficult by interviewing external resource persons, because only a limited number of actors are knowledgeable about the issues at stake and independent. Although Hivos engages in a cooperative way with lobby targets in the public sector, their support given to the evaluation team did not result in responses. No efforts were made to contact lobby targets in developing countries or the BRIC countries. External resource persons confirmed Hivos' contribution to 10 outcomes, and no external information was available to confirm its contribution to the other 10 outcomes.

Two contribution analyses were made for Hivos, the first exploring its contribution towards outcomes achieved with the World Bank, together with the Bank Information Centre (BIC), and the other concentrating on the 100% Green IT campaign. For the World Bank assessment, six knowledgeable persons were interviewed.

Contribution analysis: Access to Energy and the World Bank:

Contribution has been assessed for two changes observed within the WBG, which are the result of the same Hivos – BIC process and involve the same actors.

The first outcome consists of a decision in 2011 by the Board of Directors of the World Bank to not revise its energy policy or adopt stricter rules to finance coal power plants. This was followed by a

decision in 2013, resulting in a new Energy Directive, which includes similar rules but with a different, weaker role.

The *first pathway* that possibly explains these outcomes consists of two phases:

In the 2009–2011 BIC coordinated global civil society efforts for a more progressive Energy Strategy. Hivos was one of the partners in that effort and additionally lobbied the Dutch Executive Director at the WB and those representing other countries, supported its partners to lobby in Washington and contributed to earlier drafts via the ED, the Dutch Ministry and with BIC. The coalition was strongest in the EU and in the USA and in influencing key decision makers from these countries, while mobilising support from their partners in the South and the EDs representing these countries. BIC also developed a Model Energy Policy and further successfully lobbied the US Treasury and the Secretariat of the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank. Apart from this, BIC campaigned with South African partners to stop a loan to a coal-fired power plant in South Africa. When the WB conducted a global consultation on its Energy Strategy Approach Paper in 36 countries, BIC worked with local groups in 18 countries to send a stronger and consistent message to the second draft of the energy policy.

The WBG decided in 2011 to not adopt the new energy strategy because of controversies between BRICS representatives in the WBG and those of the EU/USA. Consequently, BIC's campaign was ended and Hivos decided to continue with silent diplomacy with the WBG, based upon the political space that had been created.

However, the Sierra Club, BIC and European NGOs sustained pressure upon the WBG around investments in a Kosovo coal plant; The Sierra Club, together with 12 social enterprises campaigned for more funding of off-grid energy projects, and the World Resources Institute (WRI) played a role of insider and as technical adviser to the World Bank.

A *second pathway* that possibly explains this outcome is that BIC's allies within the WB, the governments of USA and within the EU drafted their new 2013 Energy Directive as a result of internal dynamics and decision making.

Unfortunately, only two of eight resource persons within the WB, US or EU government responded to a request for further information to confirm or reject these pathways.

The evaluation team concluded that the coalition coordinated by BIC made a substantial contribution to the 2011 WBG outcome and had an indirect contribution to the second outcome in 2013. Reasons for this conclusion are that all external resource persons interviewed agreed with contributions being made by BIC and its coalition, including Hivos. However, external resource persons also stated that the campaign did not succeed in mobilising the WBG Executive Directors representing Southern countries to align with the position taken by those of the EU and the USA. This might explain the time it took the WBG to produce its new Energy Directive.

Contribution analysis: 100% Green IT campaign in the Netherlands:

A contribution analysis was made that seeks explanations for Dutch data centres having become more transparent and increasing their use of sustainable energy. This relates to two other outcomes, which consist of data centres engaging with actors in the wind energy sector and a service provider introducing the use of sustainable energy as an issue within its services from the Energy Desk.



A first pathway that explains this outcome is that Hivos contributed to these outcomes, and that these outcomes would not have taken place without Hivos' contribution. A list of interventions can be found in Appendix 3 of the report.

At first glance, no alternative pathways could be identified as an alternative explanation. However, three of eight invited external resource persons agreed that Hivos has contributed to the outcome through its research and publications; that its interventions were considered to be informative and critical, and that they helped to create awareness (three persons); one felt that the extent to which Hivos has contributed is not agreed upon, because one of the data centres claims that the motivation to change came from within the organisation (1 resource person), and one resource person did not confirm the outcomes achieved: the sector has not become more transparent and does not use more sustainable energy.

The evaluation team concludes that Hivos' contribution claim could only be partially substantiated and that the extent to which Hivos contributed remains uncertain.

### *8.2.2 Contribution patterns*

Based upon an analysis of all contributions made by alliances towards achieving outcomes, the evaluation team has attempted to identify patterns to influence lobby targets. These are being presented in this section.

#### *8.2.2.1 Research on and documenting of cases*

FGG, Oxfam and the EA have all researched and documented cases for different purposes. Hivos and the EA used positive examples of respectively sustainable energy and land use planning to convince their lobby targets: a wider audience in the Netherlands (Hivos) and the RSPO. The other cases mostly deal with breaches in RSPO standards regarding land acquisitions and land grabbing. These cases were published at the global level and served to change government policies and practices in the countries where land grabbing takes place, to test international complaint mechanisms such as the RSPO, OECD and the Ombudsman of the WBG, and to associate these cases with investors or corporates at the end of the value chain. Doing research and documenting cases is a very important basis for reaching outcomes. One example given is a land grab case in Honduras with financial support from the IFC. This case associated the WBG with human rights atrocities, and was used as a trigger by NGOs to ask for structural changes within the IFC. With the facts presented in the case documentation, the alliances presented the evidence to policy makers, other stakeholders and the general public that changes are needed. Often, lobby and advocacy strategies consist of outsider advocacy interventions, such as ensuring wide media coverage, using social media to increase consumer power, organising petitions to mobilise the electorate and sending letters co-signed by NGOs and social movements. Apart from these, direct lobbying has been taken place, directed at the Dutch government, members of Dutch parliament, RSPO and WBG staff as well as decision makers.

#### *8.2.2.2 Building partnerships in the South*

All four alliances have invested in the establishment or enlargement of NGO and civil society networks in the Southern countries (while Southern NGOs [had] made also their own investments). These Southern national NGOs or networks have shown to be effective in lobbying their respective governments to improve national policies. Important examples of such improved policies are the sustainable energy policies in Uganda (Hivos), land governance (Oxfam, FGG), improved management of natural resources (EA), ability of all partners to engage in a multi-stakeholder dialogue (Kenya, Benin-Togo, and Ghana-EA) and stronger positioning of civil society vis-à-vis the government in terms of voice and demanding accountability (Philippines REDS, EA Observatorio Soja).

In addition, Southern partners also have contributed to some of the lobby of international organisations, such as the RSPO (FGG and EA) and to lobby the EU and the Netherlands governments.

Support from the alliances has contributed to the strengthening of the Southern NGOs or networks. This support most often consisted of providing assistance to partners and their networks on content issues (Hivos, FGG, EA, Oxfam) and support in terms of designing lobby and advocacy strategies (Hivos, Oxfam, FGG). Occasionally, support only consists of providing funding (EA) or also providing funding for capacity building (FGG).

Quite typical, because of the bilateral nature of the issues at stake, is the lobby and advocacy process around the bilateral agreements and other trade and investment agreements that also most often consists of informing partner organisations and their networks, as well as Southern government officials about the consequences of these bilateral agreements, or currently used arbitration systems. FGG takes an expert position in this by means of conducting research and documentation, convening meetings with academics and policy makers. It is capable of influencing the EU, the Netherlands and the governments of the Southern countries through the networks it has in these countries. There is also an extensive influence in the South–North direction: FGG learns from the information and insights the Southern partners share with them.

#### 8.2.2.3 Influencing the EU and/or multilateral institutions through one's own government

All four alliances have strategies in place to influence the Dutch government so as to influence policies in the European Union or the World Bank Group. Apart from influencing these supranational institutions through member states, the alliances also directly engage with staff and decision makers of these institutions. Oxfam, FGG and Hivos had (or still have) a strategy in place that also foresees lobbying several national governments that are represented in the EU or World Bank by building coalitions with NGOs in other countries who each lobby their respective governments. Through their allies or affiliates, they attempt to ensure that member states of, for instance, the UN Committee on Food Security, or the Executive Directors of the World Bank Group, take the same position.

A very concrete example is the FGG Alliance with regard to the EU Renewable Energy Directive; they first built a coalition with other NGOs and CSOs in their home countries to jointly lobby their respective governments by means of a public campaign (mobilising the media, social media and public petitioning) and a direct engagement with Dutch policy makers, in which their Southern partners participate. This is continued in Brussels with public actions. Another example is Oxfam informing the Dutch Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation by means of a publication, ensuring broad media coverage and direct engagement about potential land grab cases. The Minister followed up on this, raising the issue with the World Bank Group.

#### 8.2.2.4 Targeting the Dutch government

The alliances use multiple ways to influence Dutch members of parliament and, through them, the government. Most commonly (for all four alliances), policy influencing in the Netherlands takes place through questions being raised by members of parliament that need to be answered by the government. Tabling questions with members of parliament is possible by means of convening meetings and workshops—in which Southern partners may participate to give testimony on the negative social and ecological impact of the behaviour of Dutch companies, investors or policies. These meetings are attended by members of parliament, and by preparing staff within the different ministries. Attracting the attention of members of parliament also often requires a public campaign, ensuring prime time media coverage, petitioning and using social media.

Another strategy used consists of some alliances being formal members of a number of working groups or multi-stakeholder platforms, or actively participating in such fora without being members. Concrete examples of these are the Land Academy, which regroups Dutch NGOs, research institutes and DGIs, or the EA support of parts of the working group on the UN Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). In some cases, the alliances provided direct input to the relevant ministries. The alliances engage the ministry actively through regular meetings with ministry representatives.

#### 8.2.2.5 Targeting the EU and multilateral institutions

The strategies to influence the EU and/or multilateral institutions differ considerably for each of the four alliances.

Hivos, in particular, explicitly partnered with an NGO that knew its way in Brussels or in Washington and, apart from working with these groups, engages with a wide range of other actors at these levels. This network directly engages with decision makers and sends letters to brief them on sustainable energy issues.

Oxfam also directly engaged with the World Bank, briefing Executive Directors, working directly with or lobbying WB staff and the ombudsman in Washington, D.C., and during annual World Bank group meetings. Apart from this, they also publicly targeted the WBG in their land freeze campaign. The public campaign also successfully used celebrities to build pressure on the WBG to change its land policies and practices.

Apart from the WB, Oxfam supported the Civil Society Mechanism in the negotiation process towards the adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines by the UN Committee on Food Security.

Both Hivos and Oxfam also take part in stakeholder consultation rounds organised at global level as a means to provide inputs to World Bank policies. This is based upon an invitation from the WBG, whereas the previous strategies start with the NGOs themselves.

The Ecosystem Alliance (WI) has an expert role in some of the UN bodies and informs other actors that are well aligned with these bodies to influence them. Its approach is based upon scientific research and publications, raising the awareness of NGOs, the private sector and governments. It has a strategic partnership with, for example, the FAO, as an indication of the extent to which it can play an insider advocacy role.

FGG, in targeting these institutions, uses both insider and outsider approaches. It mobilises many NGOs and issues press releases—for example just before the European elections in 2013—as a means to influence the European electorate. It also has Brussels-based NGOs as allies, who do the lobby work there. In the cases of ActionAid and Milieudefensie (Friends of the Earth), these allies belong to the same international federation. This approach to coordination and division of labour between FGG members was well illustrated during the WTO ministerial meeting in Bali in 2013: While Both ENDS, as a member of the Dutch government delegation, was well positioned with regard to lobbying the EU delegation in the conference building and to co-strategizing with other accredited CSOs from other countries, other alliance partners organised public stunts in front of the WTO meeting rooms.

#### 8.2.2.6 Targeting commodity roundtables

This assessment has seen outcomes in both the RSPO (palm oil) as the RTRS (soya): In both cases, one of the alliance partners (EA-Both ENDS respective EA-IUCN NL) is not only a member of the roundtable (Both ENDS is also a board member of the RSPO), but also a member of a working group or advisory committee that addresses particular issues or an expert on the issue (EA–Wetlands

International).<sup>339</sup> This insider approach was combined by co-strategizing with outsiders, who can push for change. Outsider strategies consist of organising coalitions of organisations and supporting them to formulate a resolution or a recommendation. For all organisations mentioned, the cooperation with those Southern partners who are also members of that roundtable is an important element of the strategy and practice.

#### 8.2.2.7 Private sector organisations as an ally

On a number of occasions, private sector organisations and alliances together have been able to introduce change. The private sector hence became an ally of the alliance instead of a lobby target.

This was for instance the case with IUCN-NL and Platform Both ENDSE who launched the REDD+ Business Initiative during COP 19 in Warsaw of the UNFCCC in the presence of three of the four companies that participate in the initiative. Other examples from IUCN-NL are its efforts to sign a Green Deal with the Dutch Government together with companies. Hivos 100% Green IT in the Netherlands campaign also shows an approach of working with the private sector as an ally rather than a lobby target. Also Oxfam's BtB campaign led to companies turning into allies and taking action, after they had committed to Oxfam's requests.

#### 8.2.2.8 Targeting the private sector

Both FGG and Oxfam have lobbied the private sector. For example, FGG started an OECD complaint against Rabobank, and Oxfam targeted the IFC and the RSPO. There is also a more indirect way. FGG and Oxfam have managed to influence the Dutch government to start a dialogue with the private sector and banks about their investment safeguards. This required case documentation, ensuring media coverage and direct engagement with both parliament and the minister.

Hivos' 100% Green IT campaign on Dutch data centres is one example of explicitly targeting the private sector, as is Oxfam's Behind the Brands campaign, which targeted the 10 biggest food and beverage companies in the world and aimed for changes in the value chains in which they are involved.

### 8.2.3 Discussion of findings

In this section, we discuss the findings with regard to contribution for the Economic Justice Cluster, as well as reflect upon lobby and advocacy strategies and make some methodological reflections with regard to the evaluation methodology and practice.

#### 8.2.3.1 Contribution findings

For all four alliances, attempts were made to assess contribution claims for more outcomes than those for which an in-depth contribution analysis was made. Major sources that helped to do so consisted of evidence found on the Internet or other written materials (FGG and IMPACT Alliances), or by consulting external respondents (all four alliances). A rough estimate is that this was done for 50 to 80% of all outcomes identified.

Most contributions made by FGG were made together with other actors, part of these being FGG partners and other allies, and similar findings were obtained for the EA with exceptions made for particular outcomes achieved by EA Wetlands International and IUCN-NL. Most of Hivos' contributions also involved both partner organisations and allies, except for its involvement in the Green IT campaign, where it was the only civil society actor lobbying for this issue towards the sector. The Oxfam Confederation also contributed to outcomes most often including the mobilisation of allies and, particularly for the BtB campaign, it was in the driver's seat.

A more in-depth contribution analysis for eight outcomes (groups) of which some of the many features are being presented in the following table:

Table 8.3 Outcome topic	Alternative explanations identified	Explanation of the outcome	Role of the alliance	Insider / outsider strategies used
EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement - FGG	Yes, commingled	The Philippines platform. Good relations with new government (condition to change)	Capacity building and financial support of the platform	Insider
EU-Renewable Energy Directive - FGG	Yes, commingled	NGOs including FGG and some EU member states (causal package)	Long-term engagement with the sector and quite visible in the NL	Insider/outsider
International Finance Corporation on land issues - Oxfam	Yes; one rival explanation rejected	IFC Ombudsman and Oxfam as a member of a core group (causal package). A condition (necessary but not sufficient) was Oxfam's land freeze campaign.	Direct engagement with the WBG, mobilised media coverage when necessary and mobilised allies for public action and statements	Insider/outsider
Food and Beverage Companies on land issues and gender - Oxfam	Yes, commingled	Oxfam and systemic pressure orchestrated by Oxfam. Conditions (necessary but not sufficient) need to be in place with FBCs	Driver of change, critical friend	Insider/outsider
Dispute Settlement Facility with the RSPO - EA	Yes, commingled	Sawit Watch and other actors from civil society and private sector (causal package)	Sawit Watch plaid a leading role, partner of EA	Insider/outsider
A general analysis palm oil, peatlands, RSPO, biofuels, biomass - EA	No	Not explained	Various	
WB New Energy Directive – Hivos	Yes, one rival explanation but not enough information to reject/confirm	BIC and a coalition of NGOs including Hivos	BIC being the driver of change	Insider/outsider
100% Green IT campaign in the Netherlands -Hivos	No, but claims by Hivos nuanced, commingled explanation	Hivos and sector, but also doubts by resource persons if the outcomes were achieved (causal package)	Facilitator of change, critical friend	Insider

For all eight outcomes attempted, alternative explanations of the outcome were found, but this proved to be difficult for three outcomes. However, in two of these cases, information provided by external sources helped to nuance the contribution claim by the alliance. Rather than finding *rival* explanations that refer to a complete other set of actors and interventions, in most cases other explanations, alongside that of the alliance, were identified that also contributed towards explaining the outcome (commingled explanations).<sup>340</sup>

In most cases, the outcome can be explained as a collaborative effort of the alliance partner or the alliance itself, in collaboration with others. In these cases, the alliance or its partner was part of *a causal package that together explains the outcome*.

The role of the alliance itself in explaining the outcome varies to a great extent, from supporting partner organisations in the South with their interventions (EU-ASEAN FTA and RSPO), to being in the

driver's seat of change (FBC campaign, Green IT campaign). In other cases, the alliance itself participated in a network coordinated by another NGO partner (WBG New Energy Directive) or by being one of the actors in a core group of NGOs that take action (EU RED and IFC land issues).

Two campaigns explicitly relied upon insider strategies (EU-ASEAN FTA and Green IT), whereas the others all combined insider strategies with outsider strategies.

#### 8.2.3.2 Methodological reflections

Using contribution analysis to assess contribution has been a challenge to put into practice, apart from being a time-consuming methodology. In all cases in Cluster I, we started with an outcome or a group of outcomes achieved, although in one case even the achievement of the outcome was questioned (Green IT).

As already mentioned, at times it was difficult to find alternative explanations completely separated from the interventions of the alliances. In most cases, other pathways consisted of contributions made by other actors that helped to explain the outcome. Given our quick assessment, this is a plausible finding because our quick contribution analysis for all outcomes already showed that most often alliances collaborate with partner organisations they support, or with other allies. Therefore, these alliances in most cases are part of a causal package of actors that together explains the outcome. In at least two of the above contribution analyses (IFC land issues, WB Energy Directive), a rival explanation was identified but rejected that consisted of the lobby target itself being capable of introducing the change without external interventions.

Attempts to get a glimpse of internal processes within lobby targets (IFC land issues, WB Energy Directive) failed, or the information provided is possibly biased towards the lobby target itself being responsible for the change. On the other side, the contribution analysis for the FBC campaign heavily relied upon internal documents made available by Oxfam and like for the WB Energy Directive and the Green IT campaign, and it proved difficult to find enough resource persons knowledgeable about internal processes within the lobby targets and contributions made by the Alliance. Contribution analysis of insider strategies is extremely difficult and would probably require internal documents from both the alliance and its lobby targets to obtain more reliable findings.

### 8.3 Key findings on efficiency

The main question for this section is: Were the efforts of the MFS II alliances efficient?

This question was further specified in the three following sub-questions:

- What is the theory of efficiency of the ILA project?
- How is the theory of efficiency translated and upheld in practice?
- How is the alliance improving and/or adapting its efficiency? (learning)

#### 8.3.1 *Theories, practices and adaptations of efficiency of the ILA programmes in FGG*

A starting point regarding efficiency for the FGG is the distinction between efficiency and effectiveness. FGG tries to achieve its objectives at the lowest cost possible: It tries to strategically choose activities that cost little but have maximum effect. However, FGG also undertakes certain activities that are costly and time-intensive, but that achieve more sustainable results—in particular, activities aimed at mutual capacity development: increasing the capacity of partners involved and facilitating engagement of partner organisations with decision makers in government or the private sector and/or through them, with local affected communities. For FGG, the necessary priority in ranking is first effectiveness (and results) and then efficiency. So FGG steers on results and, within

that focus, FGG tries to keep the costs as low as possible. Alliance members also have organisation-level environmental sustainability policies related to travel and purchasing, among other things, to ensure not only cost-effectiveness but also policy coherence ('practise what you preach').

When the Alliance was asked about their theory of efficiency, they were pleased to read back what they wrote in the MFS II proposal, as it is still very accurate for their theory of efficiency and reflects how FGG works. The rules have not changed, but of course lessons have been learned from experiences in order to work more efficiently for executing specific activities.

Many examples of how efficiency works in practice show that the FGG Alliance has a culture of cost-awareness and is used to working economically. Some of the relevant examples are that the FGG programme has procurement policies in place, as well as budget monitoring so that budget deviations are signalled quickly. Some members report using planning and evaluation forms that include indicators for efficiency. There is a general culture of cost-awareness, avoiding consultants unless absolutely necessary and taking efficiency and cost-effectiveness into consideration when making operational plans and decisions. Furthermore, staff salaries are low relative to education levels and experience, and all alliance members have strict policies on travel expenditures (second/economy class and modest lodging costs, including room sharing). In addition, FGG saves costs by sharing costs, collaborating, dividing tasks among the members and seeking synergies within the Alliance structure.

Important principles, already mentioned in the original MFS II proposal were:

- Minimise coordination costs within the Alliance: Project teams, managed by a project leader, will carry out a well-defined part of the programme to ensure that employees from the various alliance organisations work together and economise whenever possible on activity costs related to specific outputs and outcomes.
- Build on existing knowledge and networks: The Alliance will make use of existing research wherever possible, and strengthen existing networks where they exist and establish them where they are needed.
- Replication of actions: FGG has repeatedly implemented certain tools, for example petitions. FGG learns about how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of these tools; it becomes more efficient every time.

### *8.3.2 Theories, practices and adaptations of efficiency of the ILA programmes in EA*

Overall, no explicit theory of efficiency can be identified for the whole alliance in general, or for the ILA component in particular. Individual organisations have ideas about working efficiently, and they principally share the idea that a shared vision and clear objectives are success factors in achieving efficiency.

Most arguments given for the lack of collective consideration of efficiency relate to the start-up phase. It is logical that, if organisations start a new cooperation, work processes are not efficient at the beginning. New programmes are set up or existing programmes need to be aligned.

Such start-up inefficiencies may partly be related to the MFS II requirements, which forced organisations to work in alliances. Another factor impeding the search for efficiencies at a rather fundamental level is the view, expressed in the interviews, that 'collaboration [in ILA] can be effective but never efficient'.

In practice, it seems that the Alliance managed to develop a workflow and decision-making process that works for the EA members. For example, the EA has an approach that is of particular relevance in this context whereby decisions about all upcoming plans and projects are timely and efficiently made, and efficiency is explicitly part of the internal procedure that is used to check and approve proposals. Other examples of efficiency measures that have been part of the programme throughout are 1) use of services like Skype is promoted, 2) limitation in travel and meeting costs, 3) ensuring selection of the right partners and participants in processes and 4) ensuring timely reporting to prevent people from delaying others.

Learning and improvements on efficiency are mixed across the IC projects and countries. Some advocacy programmes (soya) seem to work quite coherently and efficiently, while, for other situations (Kenya), this seems not to be the case. Fundamental differences of opinion within EA (especially regarding REDD+) led to pragmatic choices in terms of what to collaborate on and what not. In cases of disagreement about the theory of change within an ILA issue (How to be effective?), the development and practical application of a theory of efficiency is also quite a challenge.

Most relevant improvements seem to have occurred in the financial component. There is a general sense that too many regulations do not facilitate efficiency, but rather promote bureaucracy.

### *8.3.3 Theories, practices and adaptations of efficiency of the ILA programmes in Hivos*

Hivos considers efficiency to be very closely related to effectiveness: 'It is difficult to fully separate 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness' considerations. They go together, or at least they are mixed.' At Hivos, efficiency is seen in two distinct but related ways: Firstly, it is an attempt to maximise outputs with a given amount of means (for example in terms of using Hivos staff time in the most cost-efficient way), and second, to minimise costs for a given output (for example when negotiating fees with consultants). By far the most dominant cost-type where efficiency considerations play a role is staff time (Hivos, partners, consultants). Other relevant cost-types relate to communication/publicity and travel. Overall, no explicit theory of efficiency could be identified. Procedures are lean and decision making processes light. The organisation relies on its network/relations for good services and takes pride in having an economical organisational culture.

In practice, cost-awareness is promoted, and Hivos pays attention to efficiency in regular planning and review processes. Few practical examples were given of specific efficiency procedures in the ILA projects. Hivos seems to rely on 'trust' more than procedures. This approach may work for this particular situation, where Hivos does not have any 'alignment problems' with other organisations in the MFS II alliance and has a strong internal culture/notion of cost-awareness. To be able to review their 'trust'-focused approach, Hivos does pay attention to documenting experiences with service providers afterwards.

Regarding learning and adaptations, Hivos made significant changes at the strategic (advocacy staff at regional offices) and practical (documenting rationale for decisions made) levels to improve the efficiency of its lobby work. As such, it can be concluded that, in the absence of specific formal procedures (apart from the annual review process), learning is embedded in Hivos' lobby work.

### *8.3.4 Theories, practices and adaptations of efficiency of the ILA programmes in the Oxfam Confederation*

This assessment looked at cost-effectiveness in the first place, which usually has more significant consequences for the effective allocation of resources than does cost efficiency. The most important costs for both the land grab and the BtB campaign are staffing costs, followed for costs related to public campaigning for the BtB campaign in particular. Both the land grab and the BtB campaign are



part of the GROW campaign, which is implemented by the Oxfam Confederation, which has 17 affiliate members (including Oxfam Novib) operating in some 90 countries.

The most important principles (theories) in place to ensure cost-effectiveness and efficiency are ensuring participation and ownership of the campaign amongst Oxfam members and countries; conducting continuous power analyses to adjust campaign strategies where appropriate and have in place risk mitigation plans to ensure security, brand reputation and strategy change if needed; sharing human and other resources within the confederation to implement campaigns; ensuring the quality of products that go public and ensuring that efficiency procedures are followed.

The most important changes over the course of the years consist of the GROW campaign architecture, becoming leaner in order to facilitate the *participation* of smaller Oxfam affiliates and country offices in the decision making for particular campaign strands. Occasionally however, *participation of and ownership* by Oxfam affiliates of parts of the GROW campaign are not fully ensured, as was the case with the land freeze campaign. Some country offices also highlighted their interest to be more included in global campaigns, beyond the provision of land grab cases and in favour of more impact at local level.

The power analysis has generally been used to adjust strategies to address lobby targets and reach outcomes. For the land freeze campaign, this resulted in a decrease of staff capacity necessary after the launch. The power analysis is part and parcel of all campaign activities. *Risk mitigation plans* became part and parcel of the land grab campaign when the land team started its research work on land grab cases in Uganda and Indonesia in 2011. These plans were meant not only to assess security risks and to change strategies when needed, but also to assess reputational risks.

*Sharing of resources* is a key element in both the land and the BtB team. Apart from the team leads, all other staff is working on both campaigns on a part-time basis and they are working similarly on other projects under the GROW campaign, which ensures that cross-team learning also takes place. The land team experts provided inputs, for example, in the BtB land spike, and the experiences of those involved in the ON Green Santa and Fair Banking Guide before the GROW campaign were used to design the BtB campaign. Within the BtB campaign, attempts were made to reinforce other Oxfams that do not have the private sector background required to engage with the FBCs. Both campaign teams are mature teams, and members have been working with each other for some years already. A key success factor for the campaigns is that all information is being shared, not only within the core teams, but also in the wider confederation as a means to enable other interested Oxfams to take part in the campaign at their own level. Additionally, all products used for direct lobbying are widely shared as a means to ensure coherence of messages across the globe. The BtB online platform is maintained in 13 different languages and helps affiliates to address their national markets.

Apart from some debate regarding cases used in the land freeze campaign, all other products published by Oxfam were very well received by the global media, consumers and citizens, and are to be considered a reference for those who want to address land grabbing or influence the food and beverage sector.

#### *8.3.5 Patterns in theories, practices and adaptation of efficiency in the four alliances in Cluster I*

Rather than having 'theories of efficiency' in place, all four alliances have principles in place that help them to ensure cost-effective and efficient operations.

For all four alliances, the most important inputs used for lobby and advocacy are human resources. Key questions that guide the alliances in the allocation of those resources are, in the first place, 'are

we doing the right things to achieve outcomes’, which refers to cost-effectiveness being the most important issue being looked at, before considering cost efficiency. Lobby and advocacy trajectories are seldom repeated, because contexts, issues and lobby targets continuously change. Therefore, particular ways of working that continuously keep track of opportunities provided in the context, or identify better strategies to reach the outcome at lower staff costs are all part of the game. Learning and adaptation of strategies are explicitly mentioned by Hivos, FGG and Oxfam (power analysis) as important strategies to remain cost-effective. Other strategies to work in a cost-effective and efficient way mentioned consist of working with decentralised mandates as a means to decrease coordination costs (FGG, EA, Oxfam), building upon past experiences with campaigns and building upon existing networks that have proved to be effective (FGG, Oxfam). All four alliances have highly motivated staff in place and that are cost-aware of the interventions they make.

Apart from thinking about cost-effectiveness, all four alliances have efficiency procedures in place that are common to most NGOs, regarding, for example, out-sourcing of activities, traveling procedures, keeping track of budget expenditures according to plan and implementation and promoting the use of digital tools for communication rather than convening meetings.

Another factor leading to practical inefficiencies, specifically mentioned by the EA, is the MFS II framework itself. Legal advice, required to be able to work with the MoFA procedures, has cost quite some energy and money. An example is the (still unresolved) issue regarding VAT when transferring funds amongst applicants. The potential loss of 21% VAT requires spending on accountancy and legal advice.

#### **8.4 Key findings on explanatory factors**

The evaluation question to be answered in this section is: What factors explain the findings?

We consider internal factors, external factors, their interaction and the nature of the issues involved. In this approach, we mention factors that have proved to be successful under certain circumstances. That does not mean that they would be successful under any circumstances. Examples of alliances mentioned in the text are meant to be illustrative only.

##### *8.4.1 Internal factors*

Internal factors are systematised according to the 5Cs model of capabilities.

###### **8.4.1.1 Capability to act and commit**

Key factors for success that explain the evaluation findings include, in the first place, that all staff involved in the campaigns of the four alliances are intrinsically motivated to do their jobs, have a proven track record on the issues that they are addressing and have the necessary experience to realise lobby, public campaigning or mobilising the media. A key factor of success for the Oxfam Federation is that the teams that are working globally are mature teams and that tasks are being divided, as is also the case with FGG. All alliances are working together with their partners overseas, each on their particular topic of interest.

Ample evidence is available that the alliances are capable to mobilise their constituency (although Hivos, Oxfam, FGG are not member based organisations). Hivos, Oxfam and FGG worked closely together with their partners overseas to achieve outcomes at both local and international level. Examples are for instance FGG’s work on the bilateral trade agreements and the state dispute settlement facility, Hivos’ work on the formulation and implementation of the UN SE4All and Oxfam’s work with its partners in countries where land grab cases were documented.

Apart from this direct collaboration, some alliances have also made their concerns known through (social) media coverage to raise the awareness of global and national audiences (FGG – Milieudedefensie, Oxfam), used online petitioning as a means of mobilising their constituencies to take action (FGG-ActionAid, Oxfam) as well as using other tools to build consumer pressure on private sector organisations and the World Bank Group (Oxfam). The EA did not use public campaigning as a strategy to influence their lobby targets. Publishing case studies and inviting Southern partners to attend meetings in the Netherlands, Brussels and elsewhere have been used to articulate the views of people living in Southern countries and to show how their livelihoods were affected by global actors.

#### 8.4.1.2 Capability to deliver on objectives

The alliances have proven to be able to reach outcomes. For this to happen, they use a wide range of tools and methodologies that considerably contribute to effective interventions. Naturally, they all conduct context analyses, which helps to identify lobby targets or systems that need to change. Both Hivos and Oxfam use the ToC method, which helps to design the system that needs to change. A key factor of success for the Oxfam campaigns is that these ToCs help to identify ‘the right buttons’ to push within these systems to obtain system change without too many further interventions required. This is followed by a more operational campaign design or plan of action that is then transformed into an organisational action plan. An important element in the design phase is power analysis (FGG, Oxfam), which is then continuously adjusted over the course of the campaign based on context analysis, assessing threats and opportunities for action, selecting appropriate strategies and using momentum for action where appropriate, as is being done by Oxfam, FGG and Hivos. Apart from the power analysis, FGG–Milieudedefensie also uses an ‘escalation staircase’, which starts with less costly activities to obtain outcomes, followed by more costly interventions if the outcomes do not materialise. For both Oxfam and FGG cases are published not only to seek remedy for the people affected, but also to search for policy changes and changing practices with multilateral institutions, the Dutch government and Dutch investors and Development Banks (IFC), food and beverage companies or palm oil producers and roundtables such as the RSPO.

Another key factor for success identified is that some alliances have developed long-term relations with their lobby targets, as can be observed in the EA, which has long-lasting relations with institutions such as the UNFCCC, the RSPO, the RTRS, the Leaders for Nature network and relevant Dutch ministries, whereas others designed their interventions based on past experiences, such as is the case with the Oxfam BtB campaign.

As was already mentioned, bringing in the Southern perspective by means of case studies that show how people’s livelihoods are being affected by foreign investors, companies, traditional donor countries and multilateral institutions are effective elements in the campaigns of FGG and Oxfam. Both organisations seek, in the first place, compensations and remedy for the affected people, as well as changes in policies and practices of their lobby targets. Apart from these case studies, most alliances also establish other relations between local and global networks. The EA has different types of relationships with its large number of Southern partners. The extent to which these partners contribute to ILA outcomes remained unclear in this evaluation.

#### 8.4.1.3 Capability to adapt and self-renew

The capability to adapt and self-renew is a key factor for successful campaigning and direct engagement with lobby targets. For lobby and advocacy, key elements of this capability consist of learning from new networks, learning from changing contexts, learning from similar experiences in

other contexts and having effective monitoring evaluation and learning systems in place. Some of these learning opportunities are the following:

- Hivos had to invest in building the lobby and advocacy capacities of its new networks in Southern countries to lobby their respective governments and to support lobby at the international level. This helped to strengthen the sustainable energy policies within a number of those Southern countries involved, but, as of yet, with limited interaction between the national and the international campaigns on access to sustainable energy (learning to adjust). The same applies for the Oxfam country offices, which had to align with local dynamics of civil society networks, as can be seen in the Mozambique case study (learning from new networks).
- The FGG managed to introduce the issue of investor-state dispute settlement systems, which is an important issue in the relation between Southern countries on the one side and European countries and the US on the other side, into the free trade agreement (TTIP, between the USA and the EU). Another FGG example is that it informs different stakeholders in Myanmar on the potential negative impacts of a free trade agreement with the EU, based on examples with other countries (learning from other contexts).
- Oxfam, Hivos and FGG-Milieudefensie have systems in place that continuously monitor contexts, threats and opportunities to take action. For Oxfam, this is done by means of the power analysis and risk mitigation plans, for Milieudefensie this is the escalation staircase and for Hivos this consists of ongoing monitoring of the context. These systems in place help to seize the momentum for lobby and advocacy when needed (learning from changing contexts and identifying the momentum for action).
- All alliances have monitoring and evaluation systems in place that help generate lessons for ongoing and future actions. Within the FGG alliance, Milieudefensie conducts 'after action reviews', as is also the case with Oxfam. Both organisations have systems in place that help to describe the outcomes achieved, including number of consumers, citizens reached through public campaigning and number of petitioners that sign, or number of persons that take part in the Oxfam land grab and BtB campaign through the use of other social media actions, such as sending tweets and posting messages on Facebook. Apart from these, Oxfam produces monitoring reports twice a year for the confederation. Oxfam and FGG review their ToCs and power analysis continuously to make change happen.

The evaluators conclude that all four alliances are to be classified as 'learning organisations'. The evaluation team believes that it would create added value if the alliances with long-lasting experience in lobby and advocacy would document their internal lobby & advocacy monitoring systems and decision tools, so that these could be used by Southern partners.

#### 8.4.1.4 Capability to relate

The four alliances all show that they are capable to relate to their lobby targets in different constellations as a means to achieve outcomes, as well as to collaborate with other NGOs, CSOs and academics to influence these lobby targets.

All four alliances engage successfully, although very differently, with private sector organisations and are capable to identify within these organisations their own allies, swingers and blockers of change, as is the case with other lobby targets. On their side, companies also assess the NGO staff with whom they are engaging. The most prevailing strategy is that of directly engaging with the company and developing a common language. Drivers for companies to engage with the NGO consist of preventing reputational damage taking place, securing the sustainable supply of raw materials and assessing the

costs and benefits for changes asked by the alliances. Most alliances assume that having an ally within the sector will lead to sector-wide changes or to changes in the supply chains. Examples exist with the EA that illustrate that collaboration with companies led to policy changes in multilateral agreements and IUCN's Leaders for Nature Network; with Oxfam, where gender is now being integrated in the cocoa sector, and entire supply chains are expected to become free of land grabbing and with Hivos, which built up relationships within the sector of Dutch large data centres. Within the FGG alliance, Milieudefensie may take a different stance with regard to direct engagement when practice shows that, in a specific case, direct engagement leads to wasting time and 'greenwashing'. In such cases, Milieudefensie may choose to position itself as 'the guy that bites', or as a watchdog organisation. Hivos, Oxfam and FGG also use public campaigns to induce change within companies and investors. Apart from directly targeting private companies and investors, FGG and the EA both have long-term relations with roundtables such as the RSPO and the RTRS.<sup>341</sup>

All four alliances have good working relations with the Dutch parliament and staff within the respective ministries that they lobby. Members of FGG and of EA are members of formal working groups or official delegations to multilateral conferences.

Direct engagement with lobby targets is also the prevailing strategy to change the agendas, policies and practices of multilateral institutions such as the UN, the WBG and the EU.

With regard to collaboration with other NGOs, CSOs and networks, we observe that all four alliances have good working relations with the partners they work with in developing countries. At the national (Netherlands) and international levels, all four alliances make strategic choices for collaboration, depending upon the added value that such collaboration might generate towards achieving outcomes. This implies that affiliates need to have the capability to support existing networks or configurations, when necessary without being in the driver's seat, as well as the capability to collaborate with other NGOs on equal footing and upon the basis of complementarity, taking the lead when the organisation itself is capable of introducing change within lobby targets. A concrete example of collaboration in a 'mature' network is EA working with the European network on Renewable Energy Directive (RED) to lobby the EU. In the Netherlands, similar mature networks can be found, articulated around soya in the Dutch Soy Coalition and around also palm oil and biomass (FGG-Both Ends, EA-Both Ends, IUCN NL). Within these networks, different organisations play different roles.

All four alliances partly seek advice from the science community and partly see these as lobby targets. EA-Wetlands International is the most explicit in this relationship. The science community is in some cases very influential on the topics or themes at stake. Scientists are advisors to governments, the EU or multilateral organisations. For achieving results, it is important to maintain good contacts with the science community. This is also true for that part of the science community that may have another opinion than the ones promoted by NGOs. They may be influential towards policy makers or the media.

#### 8.4.1.5 Capability to achieve coherence

Three of the four alliances consist of different organisations that work together for achieving outcomes. Hivos is the only organisation in its alliance in charge of the ILA projects under evaluation, and Oxfam Novib, although being the only member of the IMPACT Alliance, is working with other Oxfam affiliates around the globe. The three members in the Ecosystem Alliance have, over the past years, searched for coherence by identifying three geographically bounded areas for collaboration,

but efforts to jointly lobby for outcomes have been limited. Cooperation between the three members is based upon complementarity, in which each individual organisation keeps its strong capacities. Collaboration and coherence within the FGG is based on an effective division of tasks amongst the five partners and complementarity of lobby and advocacy strategies: While some partners are more inclined to engage on a continuous basis with their lobby targets, other partners use an outsider approach or name and shame their targets during public campaigns. FGG effectively uses these insider and outsider approaches and roles occasionally and with purpose. The FGG Alliance works within much bigger networks, seeking diversity. Within these broader networks, healthy tensions may exist: An example is that, in Southern countries, NGOs and companies have more antagonistic perceptions and interests than is the case in the Netherlands. Also, in the era of email, Internet and Skype, communication with Southern partners is still a challenge. The realities in the North and South are very different and it is not easy understand each other's discourses, specific contexts and development of ideas.<sup>342</sup> The Oxfam Confederation is capable of communicating the same message through its many constituents around the world. Working as a global organisation also entails that different perspectives and visions need to be catered for. Ensuring that local-global linkages produce outcomes both at international and at national level in developing countries remains a topic on the agenda of the confederation. Different perspectives and critical reflections also enable the confederation to fine tune its lobby and advocacy strategies and adjust them where needed.

#### 8.4.2 External factors

This section presents a compilation of external factors that either positively or negatively affected the campaigns.

##### 8.4.2.1 Factors that positively affected campaigns

Some alliances were able to grasp new opportunities to achieve outcomes *when new leaders took over positions in target organisations*.

Examples were found with the new World Bank president nominated in March 2012, who picked up climate as one of the key issues for the World Bank and was more supportive of Hivos' Access to Energy campaign. The new president also shared Oxfam's concern regarding the consequences of large-scale land acquisitions for the poor in developing countries.

Another example is the nomination of the Minister for International Trade and Development in November 2012, who has demonstrated the willingness to incorporate social and environmental issues in trade, in particular in relation to social and environmental impacts caused by Dutch investments in the South (e.g. consequences of large-scale land acquisitions including those for palm oil or investments in coal-fired plants).

Despite new momentum and new opportunities presented by the nomination of new leaders and the adoption of new policies, relations established with persons in the ruling governmental coalition that had been forged when these persons did not have much political power also proved to be helpful in the Philippines, when a new government was elected in 2010. Therefore, there is a time to sow and a time to harvest, and these do not necessarily occur within a short period of time.

In addition to the nomination of a new Minister for International Trade and Development in the Netherlands who takes a proactive stance, *new policies formulated* (in particular those related to water and food security) also opened spaces for lobbying and advocacy in the field of economic justice. Apart from these things, landscape approaches seem to gain increased attention from the

Dutch government, as well as an unchanged positive attitude towards private sector initiatives such as the round tables.

The EU also continued to positively approach the private sector roundtables (RSPO, RTRS) and increased attention has been observed with regard to ISDS in trade negotiations, in particular in relation to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations with the USA.

At the international level, increased attention for climate change and sustained attention for land grabbing, as well as many alleged land grab cases filed with the WBG, helped the alliances to open spaces and to seize the momentum created for change.

#### 8.4.2.2 Factors that negatively affected campaigns

Some factors were identified that negatively affected campaigns or their outcomes.

A first factor that has possibly affected outcomes to be achieved *within multilateral institutions* such as the World Bank and UN organisations, relates to the position taken by Southern member states or in particular the BRICS. Concrete examples were found with Hivos' Access to Sustainable Energy for the Poor campaign targeting the WBG. The draft of the New Energy Directive was delayed when African Heads of States and BRICS countries opposed limitations made with regard to investments in large coal-fired plants in the New Directive, in favour of smaller and greener technologies including off-grid energy supplies. Similar processes were observed with Oxfam's land grab campaign targeting the WBG showing diverging interests between European and North American member states on the one hand, and those of Southern states and the BRICS countries on the other. More (long-term) efforts are needed to support civil society in Southern countries to push issues like climate change and land (and water) policies and practices higher on the agenda of national governments and multilateral institutions.

Of course *resistance to change* towards positions taken by the alliances is also observed at national level in those countries that produce palm oil, soya and minerals and mainly export these to consumer countries who do not adhere to social and environmental standards set by multilateral institutions and private sector standards (e.g. EA about China, Indonesia and Latin America). Another case of resistance relates to the position taken by the EU, which uses the persisting economic crisis as an argument to take a hard position in negotiations on Trade and Investment as to the interests of Southern countries (EPA-FGG).

More practical external factors also impacted the implementation of the campaigns:

- The military coup in Thailand that destroyed the recently-created space to discuss issues related to tree trade agreements with the government (FGG). Apart from Thailand, FGG experienced more difficulties opening spaces for collaboration between governments and civil society in Asian countries.
- The delay in the UN SE4All process that influenced Hivos' possibilities to advocate changes on national level and subsequently use these changes to inform changes at international level.

#### 8.4.3 Interfaces

Here, we highlight some of the factors at the interface of the alliance and the external context. Some of these have already been addressed in the section on internal factors, in particular those that refer to the 'capability of the alliance to relate'.

Apart from interventions implemented by alliances, particular *features they have* also help to achieve outcomes. One of these is the reputation an organisation has. Two examples are mentioned here. The members of the FGG Alliance—under their own names—have already been in the ‘business’ of lobby and advocacy for a long time. They gained a certain reputation, which adds to their effectiveness. However, this reputation is always in certain fields of expertise and in certain arenas. For ActionAid (part of FGG), a difficulty is that it changed its name late 2012 (from NiZa). TNI is internationally renowned but less known in the Netherlands. Both ENDS is probably more well-known for its capability to link NGOs in the South and North and between South and North than for public campaigns. SOMO has a strong profile in research, which is stronger than it was 10 years ago.

Oxfam Novib is part of a wider confederation of Oxfams that have a track record on implementing programmes in countries, as well as advocacy and lobby experience at a national and global level. Oxfam’s brand name and authority as a voice on development and poverty issues is well established and this helped to achieve outcomes.

It took Hivos several years to establish a new issue, as was the case with its 100% Green IT campaign: Its requests to the Dutch IT sector to use sustainable energy and to be transparent about it were very new elements. Energy and energy efficiency were existing issues, but the use of sustainable energy and transparency were not. The structure of the sector and the technical aspects of energy use were also new for Hivos. Achieving substantial changes in a sector and on a new issue requires time.

Milieudefensie observed a *decline in media attention* that affects the effectiveness of certain instruments: During the past seven years, public manifestations aiming at creating public pressure on campaign targets have been attracting less media coverage than before, while media coverage increases the efficiency of such actions as more people (including decision makers) are reached with Milieudefensie’s message. Such manifestations require a lot of input (time and activity budget). As a result, Milieudefensie organises less of such actions and puts less effort into their design (while not entirely dropping this intervention strategy) and has shifted to other intervention types.

#### 8.4.4 *The nature of the issue addressed*

All four alliances work in sectors with *vested interests* and address sensitive issues related to land and natural resource rights, rural livelihoods and environmental concerns. Initiatives to secure land rights for local communities and indigenous people challenge the vested interests of local and national elites, who can easily access national authorities to legalise large-scale land acquisitions and attract local and international investments. In many countries, communities and civil society organisations that defend their land rights face life-threatening situations that possibly culminate in human rights violations. These situations can be found when dealing with global commodities (EA), land issues (Oxfam), the installation of coal-fired plants instead of off-grid energy supplies (Hivos) and biofuels (FGG). In these cases, it is important that the alliance consciously drafts risk mitigation plans, as is the case for Oxfam and its civil society networks. Risk sharing mechanisms are important to secure partners in countries with constrained civil society spaces.

These vested interests, however, also influence policy formulation processes of multilateral institutions, such as has been observed with Hivos’ Access to Energy campaign with the WBG and the land grab campaign also targeting the WB.

With regard to the *association of issues at stake with the situation where audiences live*, we observed that the attention attracted from policy makers and the general public was considerably higher if the issue could be framed as having consequences for the targets’ own situation. International trade agreements and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) are rather abstract subjects, and it is



difficult to attract the attention of the general public and policy makers such as parliamentarians with such a subject. It seems primarily an issue for ‘some remote Southern countries’. But, still, to achieve results, NGOs like the FGG Alliance depend on public support. During the first stages of the EU negotiations with the US on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), SOMO, Friends of the Earth Europe, Both ENDS and TNI—part of the FGG Alliance—connected the issue of ISDS to our own situation in Europe: Such an arbitration could also have negative consequences for those in Europe. Consequently, the Alliance seized this opportunity, and now the issue is on the agenda, attracting attention from the media, EU officials in Brussels and politicians. The Transnational Institute (TNI), part of the FGG Alliance, related the same issue also to its possible consequences in Southern countries. In these countries, the issue resounded strongly.

The changes envisioned by (some of) the alliances may *be beneficial for the global community while possibly being negative for the Western consumer*. It takes more time to achieve success if implementing the ideas of the NGOs—beneficial for us all as global community—have negative consequences for us as (Western) consumers. Climate is a well-known issue. It is high on the political agenda but it is also a complicated issue for the broader public. Causes and effects are not clearly connected, either in time or in space, and the issue of costs and whether it will be possible to maintain our lifestyle does not make it easier for political decision making. The proposals made by Hivos are win-lose for many governments and lose-lose for some business actors.

## 8.5 Conclusions

In this section, we present our conclusions for the Economic Justice Cluster, following the evaluation questions in the ToR of this evaluation. These are as follows:

- Do the international lobbying and advocacy efforts of the MFS II alliances and their partners contribute to the identified changes (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- Were the efforts of the MFS II alliances efficient?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

We elaborate on each of these evaluation questions in the following sections.

### 8.5.1 Measuring effectiveness

We have extensively described our findings with regard to outcomes achieved according the priority result areas defined in the ToR. Key issues that we look at in order to draw conclusions regarding the effectiveness are as follows:

- General trends observed in the classification of outcomes according to standard indicators
- An assessment of outcomes achieved versus outcomes planned
- Findings of a quick contribution analysis for 50 to 80% of all outcomes identified
- The in-depth contribution analysis of eight cases

While looking at all outcomes achieved, we observed that by far most outcomes were classified under the standard indicator of demonstrable policy changes of the lobby target. This shows that concrete changes have taken place beyond agenda setting, although this does not mean that these policy changes completely respond to the alliances’ ambitions. We also observed that no outcomes were reported in terms of alliance members determining, sharing and keeping up to date their policy positions and strategies and conclude that this agenda-setting indicator was apparently too obvious to report on, because most outcomes planned by the alliances reflect changes in policies and practices.

Generally speaking, all alliances contributed to positive changes or change processes in line with their plans. For some sub-themes in these components or campaigns, achievements lagged behind planned ambitions, as is the case with 1) the Economic Partnership Agreements under the Trade and Investment theme of FGG, or no progress being made with universal services; 2) water grabs being less explicitly dealt with in Oxfam's land grab campaign; 3) parts of the EA's Greening the Economy component and 4) both Hivos campaigns. Unexpected positive outcomes also occurred, as has been observed with 1) FGG's outcomes regarding WTO negotiations being more than expected under the Trade and Investment theme; 2) international organisations increasingly calling for a revision of biofuel mandates, and land grab cases related to biofuels solved (FGG—biofuel campaign by ActionAid) 3) four instead of the one food and beverage company planned by Oxfam committing to zero tolerance for land grabbing and taking action to implement their commitments.

The four alliances together registered between 160 and 180 outcomes, depending upon the extent to which outcomes are clustered. Apart from selecting two outcomes or outcome groups for a more extensive contribution analysis per alliance, the evaluators attempted to assess contributions towards the other outcomes in a more concise way, by means of consulting written materials by persons outside the alliance or by interviewing external resource persons. The evaluation team succeeded in doing so for 50 to 80% of all outcomes identified. In all these cases, evidence was found that the alliances contributed towards the outcomes. For most outcomes, alliances contributed to these achievements together with their partners or with allies; however, we observe considerable variations in the number of allies and partner organisations involved. For example, Oxfam (BtB campaign) and Hivos (Green IT campaign) are to be considered the main civil society contributors to the changes achieved. Other examples can be found within the EA, in particular for a range of outcomes to which IUCN-NL or Wetlands International contributed. For other outcomes, a selected list of partners or allies worked together with the alliance to contribute to the outcomes: Examples of this are Hivos' Access to energy campaign in Uganda, FGG's support to the Philippines Platform on Free Trade Agreements or outcomes achieved with the IFC in Oxfam's land grab campaign. For a last group of outcomes, it is nearly impossible to obtain a clear view of the many partners and allies involved, as has been the case for country consultations organised by the WBG to formulate drafts for the Energy Directive (Hivos) and the Environmental and Social Safeguards (Oxfam).

The evaluation team had a closer look at two outcomes or two outcome groups for each alliance, aiming to explain the outcomes achieved including the confirmation or rejection of alternative pathways. For all eight outcomes, alternative explanations of the outcomes were found, but this proved to be difficult for three outcomes. However, in two of these cases, information provided by external sources helped to nuance the contribution claim by the alliance. Rather than finding rival explanations that refer to a complete other set of actors and interventions, in most cases other explanations, alongside that of the alliance, were identified that also contributed towards explaining the outcome (commingled explanations).<sup>343</sup>

In most cases, the outcome can be explained as a collaborative effort of the alliance partner or the alliance itself, in collaboration with others. In these cases, the alliance or its partner was part of a causal package that together explains the outcome.

The role of the alliance itself in explaining the outcome varies to a great extent, from supporting partner organisations in the South with their interventions (EU-ASEAN FTA and RSPO), to being in the driver's seat of change (FBC campaign, Green IT campaign). In other cases, the alliance itself participated in a network coordinated by another NGO partner (WBG New Energy Directive) or by being one of the actors in a core group of NGOs that take action (EU RED and IFC land issues).

Two campaigns explicitly relied upon insider strategies (EU-ASEAN FTA and Green IT), whereas the others all combined insider strategies with outsider strategies.

A few campaigns explicitly relied upon insider strategies: the Philippines Platform (which is part of the EU-ASEAN FTA), most of Hivos' Access to Energy projects and most of the EA's ILA work. The others combined insider strategies with outsider strategies.

Hence, we conclude the following:

- Most outcomes documented relate to policy changes that most often are in line with the alliances' planned outcomes.
- Generally speaking, most outcomes planned were either entirely or partially achieved.
- The evaluation team found external confirmation of contributions made for 50–80% of all outcomes documented.
- Seven of the eight case studies show that the alliance is at least part of a causal package explaining the outcome and that the outcome could probably not have been achieved without the alliance.

The international lobby and advocacy efforts by the alliances have been effective.

#### *8.5.2 Relevance of changes*

Generally speaking, all outcomes achieved by the alliances were relevant in the light of their ToCs. A general observation with regard to the assessment of relevance is to assess the gap between outcomes planned vs. outcomes achieved.

Apart from this, some outcomes achieved are considered to be more relevant than others, as is the case, for example, with FGG, where the President of Ecuador became an ally of FGG in disseminating a report on the ISDS, or with Oxfam, where the endorsement of the VGGTs is now mobilising millions of euros to strengthen land governance in developing countries. More of these examples have been found where outputs or outcomes to which alliances contributed generated further positive changes beyond expectations.

An element that was not addressed with all alliances is to assess *for whom* changes are relevant and why? A decent attempt to do so with Oxfam highlighted the importance of people and organisations at different locations having very diverse opinions about the relevance of some outcomes achieved, as was the case with the WBG.

Generally speaking, the outcomes achieved by the alliances are relevant in relation to their ambitions for change.

#### *8.5.3 Efficiency of the efforts made by the alliance*

The three questions used to draw conclusions about the efficiency of the efforts made consisted of comparing the alliances' principles (theories) about efficiency to their practices and assessing their learning capacity to improve practices or to review theories. The evaluation findings are descriptive rather than conclusive.

Generally speaking, all alliances started with a 'theory of efficiency', except for the Ecosystem Alliance, who had a difficult start in the MFS II programme. All alliances not only consider cost efficiency but, in the first place, relate to the cost effectiveness of their campaigns. Major principles observed for cost effectiveness are lean coordination mechanisms within the alliance to ensure timely and appropriate action when needed, using past experiences to inform cost-effective

strategies periodically and adjusting interventions on a regular basis based upon recurrent power or context analysis. Cost-efficiency is ensured by decreasing operational costs where possible.

All alliances use reflection and learning moments to decrease potential gaps between theory and practice to improve cost effectiveness and efficiency.

However, the alliances also highlighted tensions between cost effectiveness and efficiency in relation to strengthening the capacities of their Southern partners (FGG, EA, Hivos), which they consider a time- and resource-intensive approach (cost efficiency), but which they think is ultimately the most effective way to induce change. Further assessments are needed to confirm or reject this assumption in their ToCs on effectiveness and efficiency.

The information obtained with regard to efficiency tells us that all alliances have built in strategies, procedures, ways of working and learning events that help them to maintain cost effectiveness and efficiency.

#### *8.5.4 Factors explaining the findings*

We assessed internal factors according to the 5Cs framework of organisational capacity and identified external factors that helped to achieve change or hampered this. Apart from this, some factors that explain the findings are directly related to the interface between the alliances and their context, as well as factors related to the nature of the issues addressed.

With regard to the *organisational capacity* of the alliances, the most important factors that contributed to the evaluation findings consist of highly motivated staff and mature campaign teams, capable of mobilising their constituents when appropriate (capability to commit). We further observed that all alliances know the context in which they are operating; know what to change and how; start with less costly interventions, followed by more costly interventions when needed and included a Southern perspective in their campaigns. Occasionally, alliance partners agreed to disagree (EA) about visions of change, which, however, meant that they had less capability to deliver on outcomes. All alliances build in procedures, tools or moments for reflection and learning about the context in which they operate, to reassess their power analysis and interventions, and to assess safety issues and reputational risks (capability to adapt and self-renew). Most alliances demonstrated the capacity to engage with lobby targets directly, to align with other NGO networks and to mobilise their own constituents where appropriate, and, when appropriate, they used outsider strategies to increase pressure upon lobby targets. Some campaigns, however, explicitly only used insider strategies, as was the case with the EA's Leaders for Nature or FGG's work on the EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement with the Philippines Platform (capability to relate). While the capability to achieve coherence increased over time with the EA, the other alliances were also demonstrated to benefit from this capability.

*External factors* that were successfully seized by the alliances to obtain results clearly relate to external opportunities that present themselves, new leaders being nominated among lobby targets, new policies that reflect the alliances' agendas to some extent, as well as changing priorities on international agendas.

*Negative factors* that explained delays in achieving outcomes were, for instance, related to the internal political dynamics within multilateral institutions, where diverse interests (those between the EU and the USA on the one side, BRICS and Southern countries) affect decision-making processes as well as the outcomes of these decisions.

Of course, resistance was found amongst lobby targets, in particular in those cases where vested interests were challenged.

Factors at the *interface of the alliance* and the context in which it operates have partially already been addressed under the capability to relate. Other factors that explain findings relate to specific features of the organisation, such as its trustworthiness or reputation, as well as to the acknowledgement that starting to engage in a new sector on a new theme also takes time before you are respected as a reliable actor.

*The nature of the issues at stake* within the Economic Justice Cluster often challenge vested interests in favour of more equal and environmentally sustainable outcomes. Defending the rights and livelihoods of marginalised groups can provoke life-threatening situations and requires sound risk mitigation systems to be in place with the alliance and its partners. These vested interests also influence policy formulation processes of multilateral institutions, as has been already mentioned.

Campaign themes that at first sight do not immediately affect audiences or policy makers face difficulties in attracting the attention needed to induce change: Framing the issues at stake in terms of potential impacts upon these lobby targets helps to obtain sufficient attention, as was the case with FGG's trade and investment campaigns.

Some of the changes envisioned by alliances may be beneficial for the global community while they are possibly negative for the Western consumer, hence also causing resistance to change. Climate change is a well-known issue that increasingly becomes a global issue requiring changes in both Northern and Southern countries.

#### 8.5.5 *Reflections, lessons learned and looking forward*

In this section, we briefly reflect upon the evaluation methodology followed by some observations concerning the organisation of the evaluation. First, we observe that we, as evaluators, have also learned a lot about lobby and advocacy practices by the alliances under evaluation, as well as about methodological issues.

##### 8.5.5.1 Evaluation question 1: What are the changes achieved?

We started our evaluation by determining what types of changes we would be looking for, defining these changes as outcomes that consist of changes in the behaviour, relationships, activities or actions of the people, groups and organisations with whom an alliance works directly.<sup>344</sup> In the Economic Justice Cluster, we use a narrower definition, identifying changes in lobby targets. However, FGG's work on bilateral trade and investment relations, as well as Oxfam's Behind the Brands campaign open space for reflection about changes in terms of relations *between* lobby targets or *systemic change*.

As mentioned already, in this cluster, between 160 and 180 changes were identified, depending upon how detailed they were written down or clustered together. However, some of these changes represent incremental steps of a process beyond MFS II, having started before MFS II and ending after MFS II. Examples of such processes are the negotiations on the EU Renewable Energy Directive or the WBG Energy Directive, which at some moments come to a standstill, whereas progress is being made at other moments. Other changes, however, immediately seem to trigger additional changes, as is the case with FGG's work on ISDS in Ecuador, which, without other interventions (or with relatively few interventions) by FGG led to the issue gaining importance on many national agendas outside the EU and the USA in the first place, very recently also becoming a big issue in the EU–USA TTIP negotiations. Another example consists of the changes achieved with the FBCs in Oxfam's

Behind the Brands campaign, which also led to other non-targeted FBCs changing their policies and occasionally practices. Hence, we observe differences in changes occurring; some are based upon a far more incremental process, whereas others represent ‘quick wins’ or having reached a certain ‘tipping point’ where a bigger system starts to change. In registering outcomes, this dimension might shed some additional light on the meaningfulness of changes made, as well as the context in which these changes take place.

The Terms of Reference stipulated that changes were to be categorised into three priority result areas that were regrouped into a set of uniform indicators. In practice, we observe that not all outcomes neatly fall into one priority setting area and that some changes reflect simultaneous changes in more priority result areas. Additional reflection seems to be necessary to further define uniform indicators, if relevant for future evaluations.

#### 8.5.5.2 Evaluation question 2: What contributions were made by the alliance?

In this evaluation, answering the contribution question has been the most challenging.

In the first place, some of the programmes not only covered many Southern countries but also many different themes or campaign strands to be addressed. Therefore, in the evaluation methodology we selected two outcome(s) (groups) amongst the many outcomes documented, justifying our choice.

A second challenge relates to the identification of alternative pathways and finding evidence to reject or confirm (parts of) these pathways. In most cases, alternative pathways identified consisted of contributions made by others, which reflects day-to-day practice in international lobby and advocacy. However, further contribution analysis could possibly help to gather stronger ‘evidence’ for contribution and further determine the specific role or features of all contributions made. In terms of evidence, we could think of looking for patterns that link the intervention—cause to the outcome achieved, as well as the lobby target explicitly referring to the one who caused the intervention. In thinking of contributions made by different actors, one could think about actors triggering change or sustaining change or role division amongst actors.

A third challenge consists of the accessibility of insider information, in particular when the alliance uses an insider strategy. In these cases, external resource persons were not be able to answer specific contribution questions or were not available for interviews. In a very hypothetical situation, both lobby targets and the alliance itself would have to make available their information for the evaluation.

We also observed that contribution analysis would be nearly impossible for certain outcomes, whereas others are more ‘contribution analysis friendly’. An example is the first draft of the WBG Environmental and Social Safeguards, which contains two articles related to land grab in line with Oxfam’s lobby objective. However, the WB organised a global consultation, mobilising 2,000 persons from 40 countries and during which 81 position papers were submitted with 1,257 signatory organisations. While a first observation indicates that Oxfam has contributed to this change because two of the 10 articles relate to land issues, it is rather impossible to assess how the contribution was made. Other similar examples are a global consultation organised by the World Bank in 2010 to draft its Energy Strategy Approach, involving 36 countries, and the public consultation started by DG Trade from the European Commission in 2013 on responsible sourcing of minerals originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, with contributions from 280 respondents and 18 more respondents after the deadline.

Whereas, for some alliances constructing ToCs, thinking about how to induce change and conducting power analysis is part of their organisational DNA, for others the ToCs were constructed during the evaluation with the evaluators. Apart from this, other differences have been observed.

In particular, when assessing change processes through lobby and advocacy we acknowledge the complexity of change processes. Future evaluations could possibly make more use of ToCs and contributions by highlighting tipping points in outcomes, emerging patterns and assumptions made in change processes, which are part complexity thinking and social innovation processes.

The evaluation methodology would, then, apart from addressing changes, also address the design of change processes and the extent to which these materialised during implementation.

#### 8.5.5.3 Evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of the changes?

For most of the alliances evaluated, we looked at the relevance of changes in the light of the ToC by answering the following questions: Did the outcomes achieved contribute towards the ultimate outcomes planned? Did a deviation in the strategy occur (FGG Milieudefensie reorienting its biofuel campaign on Dutch investors instead of directly targeting palm oil companies)?, etc.

However, in particular when evaluating *international* lobby and advocacy programmes, obtaining the perceptions of actors in different countries (partners of the alliance) or different alliance locations (offices in Southern countries, Northern countries, different continents), helps to capture different views and enriches the evaluation findings.

Future Terms of Reference could highlight different ways of looking at relevance, as mentioned above, as well as becoming more specific (but not exhaustive) about including other perspectives, such as comparing changes with the general alliance objectives, the original MFS II proposal and Dutch policies for international cooperation.

#### 8.5.5.4 Evaluation question 4: How efficient were the alliances?

For the efficiency question, we looked at the theory of efficiency, its practical application and mechanisms in place to adjust practice to theory. We observe that all alliances have principles and practices in place that help to ensure cost effectiveness and cost efficiency, with the last consisting of standard operational procedures.

Most of the information gathered comes from the alliances themselves in the Netherlands, with only a few other sources being consulted. With the information obtained, we could draw conclusions about the extent to which the alliances consider themselves to be operating in an efficient way. However, a more triangulated opinion could be obtained by also consulting partners who closely work with the alliances or alliance offices in other countries.

#### 8.5.5.5 Evaluation question 5: Explaining factors

No additional reflections.

#### 8.5.5.6 Organisation of the evaluation

The organisation of the evaluation itself has been experienced as a bureaucratic and time-consuming process.

As the evaluation was conceived as an external process, no exchanges were possible with the NWO-WOTRO advisory team, which possibly could have enriched the evaluation methodology based upon their experiences, rather than receiving comments after methodology has been developed and reports have been drafted.

A second point of concern consists of the lengthy and time-consuming review process, consisting of at least two rounds in which alliances provided feedback upon their own report, including alliances sending in comments and changes worth 10 days of work, followed by one feedback round on the cluster report, and finally the advisory committee who again added an annex on comments by the alliances.

It was unfortunate that there were no possibilities to meet with the advisory committee as a means to get a further clarification on comments made. The rather cryptic texts led to various interpretations of suggestions for improvement to be made.





**THEMATIC CLUSTER 2: SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RIGHTS CLUSTER**



## 9 Overview of the Cluster Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights

Sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) for all continues to be an elusive goal. Globally, a great deal of controversy remains regarding SRHR issues, especially those judged to be sensitive or ‘taboo’ (e.g. safe abortion, SRHR for young people, discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, SOGI), resulting in devastating on-the-ground implications in terms of individuals’ ability to claim their SRHR. The full evaluation period (2011–2014) represented a critical moment for international lobbying and advocacy (ILA) on SRHR, both internationally and in the Netherlands, in light of the opportunities and risks accompanying broad policy change.

Globally, advancements in SRHR have continued to lag behind other development cooperation goals, and regional inequalities in SRHR are severe. Each day, preventable childbirth and pregnancy complications lead to the deaths of approximately 800 women, with 99% of these deaths occurring in developing countries.<sup>345</sup> Worldwide, approximately 222 million sexually active women who wish to postpone childbearing have an unmet need for modern contraception. The unmet need for contraception varies greatly by region, and, since 2008, unmet need for contraception has increased in some areas, including the 69 poorest countries.<sup>346</sup> Further, 21.6 million unsafe abortions each year (including 18.5 million in developing countries) result in the deaths of 47,000 women yearly.<sup>347</sup>

Women often bear the heaviest burden of SRHR challenges, and certain groups of individuals face much higher risks of compromised SRHR. These individuals include those with lower socioeconomic status, young people, oppressed or marginalised populations and rural residents.<sup>348</sup> Estimated at 1.8 billion, there are currently more young people (aged 15–24) worldwide than ever before, but their concerns are often overlooked, and they are often not meaningfully involved in developing frameworks and policies that affect them.<sup>349</sup>

### 9.1 International advocacy context

SRHR advocates have identified the last several years as a critical moment for SRHR in the international policy arena and have consequently ramped up their efforts to impact agenda setting in this sphere to refocus international attention on relevant SRHR issues. At the same time, opponents of SRHR, though by no means newly active, also became more vocal and better organised in their efforts to prevent progressive SRHR developments—and in some cases to attempt to weaken existing international agreements on SRHR issues.<sup>350</sup> Internationally, supporters of SRHR include strong coalitions of civil society organisations (CSOs) worldwide, certain European countries often take the lead and a number of additional actors, such as certain Latin American countries, have recently begun to speak out in favour of SRHR issues. Groups opposed to SRHR at international level include the Holy See, conservative Christian CSOs from the United States, certain Arab and African nations and other countries such as the Russian Federation.

Two international processes running concurrently that are of particular importance are the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) process and the post-2015 process. Although the two processes are distinct, SRHR advocates worked for the ICPD process to have a significant influence on the post-2015 development agenda in addition to having a strong continuation of the Programme of Action after 2014. The timing overlaps in the ICPD process and the post-2015 process have been viewed by some as a potential advantage, giving SRHR a platform to be discussed in the public eye and increasing the possibilities for SRHR issues to be taken fully on board in the post-2015 agenda.<sup>351</sup>

### 9.1.1 *The ICPD Process*

The 1994 ICPD Programme of Action identified sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as a key precondition for development and made strides in broadening the discussion of SRHR issues in terms of individual human rights. However, as outlined above, many deficiencies have persisted globally in the implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action. Recognising the amount of work remaining, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) extended the original 20-year ICPD Programme of Action, mandated a global review of progress towards ICPD goals and convened a special session to assess this progress (United Nations General Assembly Special Session, UNGASS).

The review of the ICPD Programme of Action concluded in 2014. The review process included data gathered from 176 member countries, academic research and a series of regional and thematic conferences, culminating in the very progressive Global Review Report.<sup>352</sup> The progressive outcomes regarding SRHR at the regional and thematic conferences and in the Global Review Report sparked a great deal of hope among SRHR advocates for the 47<sup>th</sup> Session of the Commission on Population and Development (CPD), which was the final CPD meeting before the end of the ICPD review. CPD 47 resulted in several positive outcomes, and although 'SRHR' was not included in the outcome document, the broader Index Report summarising the meeting was significantly more progressive. The UNGASS took place in September 2014.

### 9.1.2 *The post-2015 process*

Following the baseline report, the post-2015 development agenda, which will replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) after 2015, also progressed. The MDGs were adopted in 2000 and have shaped development priorities and practices globally over the past years. The United Nations (UN) is currently elaborating the development agenda for the next period, drawing on a variety of inputs, including the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (2012–2013), special high-level events and thematic dialogues organised by the UNGA President (2014) and, crucially,<sup>353</sup> the report of the Open Working Group (2013–2014). Civil society participation in this process has been channelled primarily through the Major Groups. In September 2015, the post-2015 development agenda will be launched by the UN.

As originally put forward in 2000, the MDGs contained no commitment related to any aspect of SRHR apart from maternal mortality reduction. In 2007, an SRHR component was incorporated in MDG5-B as the result of intense lobbying and advocacy.<sup>354</sup> A broad feeling among advocates is that the late and incomplete incorporation of SRHR in the MDGs contributed to SRHR lagging behind other development targets in the past decade. There is a strong determination to avoid a repeat of this scenario for SRHR in the post-2015 development agenda, so significant effort has been directed towards linking the ICPD experience to the post-2015 process. Despite strong support for SRHR from some countries, with so many issues on the table as the new development framework is set, advocacy efforts are necessary to ensure that SRHR will not be sacrificed as part of extensive negotiations at international level.

## 9.2 **Advocacy context in the Netherlands**

The Netherlands has a long history as one of the leading countries providing support for SRHR, worldwide. The Dutch reputation is built particularly on support for 'taboo' topics that others find too sensitive to address. Along with the other 'likeminded' countries, the Netherlands takes a leading role in providing financial support for the improvement of SRHR—particularly on topics such as safe abortion and providing services to unmarried young people.<sup>355</sup>

Over the evaluation period, there has been significant political change in the Netherlands. In 2010, the right wing government (Rutte I, 2010–2012) cut the annual Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget by €1 billion and planned to further reduce this budget from 0.8% of the gross national product in 2010 to 0.7% in 2012.<sup>356</sup> At the same time, massive reforms to development cooperation were introduced, reducing the number of partner countries from 33 to 15 and focusing on four policy priority areas (compared with the former 11).<sup>357</sup> In April 2012, the government collapsed over budget discussions. Before the election of the new government, the 'Kunduz agreement' established that the Netherlands would adhere to promises to spend 0.7% on ODA,<sup>358</sup> and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) released the official SRHR policy.<sup>359</sup> In October 2012, the new government (Rutte II) published a coalition agreement, stressing continued commitment to the four development priority areas but also establishing intensified yearly cuts to the ODA budget.<sup>360</sup> These cuts resulted in the Netherlands falling below the internationally-agreed 0.7% for development cooperation for the first time since 1975.<sup>361</sup> Additionally, the new ministerial position of Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation was created, and Lilianne Ploumen was installed in this role. In 2013, Minister Ploumen formalised her new development cooperation policy, including the intention to increase the role of trade in development, and laid out extensive cuts to the development cooperation budget beginning in 2014.<sup>362</sup> This new policy, which relies on investments from businesses, has potential implications for SRHR, as pathways to investment are unclear, especially for sensitive, taboo and rights-based topics.<sup>363</sup> Transparency in ODA budget allocation is also a major topic at national level. Specifically for SRHR, this debate has been fuelled by a recent Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) evaluation, which found that allocating a large percentage of ODA funding for SRHR to multilateral organisations may not be consistent with Dutch policy priorities for SRHR issues.<sup>364</sup>

Through these governmental, policy and economic shifts, SRHR has remained a policy priority of the Netherlands and has garnered broad support in the Dutch parliament.<sup>365</sup> Adding the weight of reality to these policy decisions, the yearly budget level for SRHR as a percentage of total ODA has been maintained or increased, despite widespread cuts in development funding. Even before the official prioritisation of SRHR, the Netherlands had built a reputation as a worldwide leader on SRHR advocacy and support, particularly for unreached populations and on issues often considered by others as 'taboo' or too sensitive. A 2012 assessment found strong evidence of the added value of the Netherlands' contribution to SRHR development cooperation.<sup>366</sup> However, in an economically difficult time, with public support for ODA waning in general, SRHR, like the other policy priorities, can be considered continually vulnerable, especially in light of the shift from aid to trade.



## 10 Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance

### 10.1 Introduction

#### 10.1.1 Overview of the Alliance

The SRHR Alliance consists of five participating Dutch organisations: Amref Flying Doctors, CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, dance4life foundation, Rutgers WPF and Simavi (with Rutgers WPF as the lead agency). The overall programme of the SRHR Alliance, entitled 'Unite for Body Rights' (UFBR), works towards equal access to sexual and reproductive health information and services, as well as all people having the freedom to make informed choices about their own sexuality. The UFBR programme aims to contribute to the realisation of the ICPD Programme of Action and the fulfilment of the MDGs, especially MDG 3 (gender equality), MDG 5 (maternal health) and MDG 6 (HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases). Through collaboration between the different participating organisations, the UFBR programme was envisaged to take on the full range of SRHR issues, with the main focus of strengthening Southern civil society partners to work towards improvements in SRHR in a sustainable way. The SRHR Alliance currently supports CSOs in nine African and Asian countries.

The five SRHR Alliance member organisations are diverse in terms of size, funding and experience, as well as thematic, strategic and geographical focus. Each organisation was originally chosen because of their specific areas of expertise and geographical range. AMREF is an African health organisation that focuses on lasting health change. CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality is a youth-led organisation that focuses on capacity building to enable young people worldwide to stand up for their SRHR. dance4life also focuses on youth, seeking to empower young people through providing information about HIV/AIDS and SRHR. Rutgers WPF serves as a centre of expertise on SRHR issues, building capacity among partner organisations and advocating improvements in human rights and quality of life, especially in developing countries. Simavi works towards widespread health improvements in developing countries and has a particular expertise in maternal health and maternal mortality.

During the MFS II proposal writing process, advocacy officers from the member organisations came together to work on strategy and an ILA context analysis. The group was later formalised as a working group on lobbying and advocacy consisting of six members (one staff member with an advocacy focus from AMREF, dance4life, CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and Simavi, and two staff members from Rutgers WPF). Between the baseline and the endline data collection, there were significant changes in staffing: New advocates replaced the original staff members from AMREF and CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality. dance4life brought in an additional staff member, and an additional advocacy officer took the place (in the international group of the ILA working group) of a Rutgers WPF staff member who was seconded to the MoFA.

ILA within the SRHR Alliance was originally conceived as a well-integrated component of the larger Alliance work. The programme was called International Advocacy and Campaigning Activities (IACA). When faced with funding cuts, the SRHR Alliance Steering Committee decided to cut this programme, among other aspects of the total Alliance programme.<sup>367</sup> The total MFS II budget available for the entire ILA programme 2011–2015 was €2,505,923.<sup>368</sup> The approximate total funds available for ILA became clear only in mid-January 2011: AMREF allocated no MFS II budget for ILA but agreed to draw upon other resources to allocate staff hours (0.2 FTE) and some seed funding for activities (€10,000); CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality had €38,500 in 2011, with no personnel paid through MFS II.<sup>369</sup> dance4life had €155,000 in MFS II funds and €225,000 in additional funds available for the five years (and a total of 2.9 FTE, .1 of which is paid through MFS II funds). Rutgers WPF had approximately €100,000 for 2011, in addition to personnel costs (2.2 FTE, approximately 1.07 of



which is paid through MFS II funds). Simavi had €150,000 in MFS II funds, including the salary costs of an SRHR advocacy officer. Generally, there were relatively small changes in these yearly budgets at the time of the endline data collection, but there were changes over time for several member organisations. AMREF, Rutgers WPF and Simavi figures remained consistent through 2014 (with plans for Simavi to increase to 1.5 FTE in 2015 with the same total budget). For CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, the 2013 budget increased to €40,974 (0.25 FTE including advocates and board), and the 2014 budget increased to €43,517 (0.45 FTE including advocates and board). For dance4life, MFS II budget paid for 0.6 FTE in 2013 or 2014, with no other MFS II budget allocated. dance4life had an additional €20,000 in 2013, and €17,000 in 2014 budgeted through other resources. Also funded through other resources was 1.0 FTE for dance4life in both 2013 and 2014.

In spring 2011, the ILA working group requested clarification regarding expectations for them, given that there was no justification for maintaining a formal working group because of the lack of funding allocated to ILA. In autumn 2011, the Steering Committee decided to maintain the advocacy working group, instituting, amongst other things, a rotation in working group leadership to distribute tasks more fairly across the organisational members (Rutgers WPF chaired in 2011–2012, dance4life in 2013, Simavi in 2014 and AMREF in 2015). As of 2012, the group aimed to meet once every six weeks. Beginning in 2013, the working group decided to divide their meetings into separate subgroup meetings for the national, international and in-country advocacy teams (with flexible planning), and additional synergy meetings were held with the entire group (every two months). The intended purpose of the synergy meetings was to discuss crosscutting issues that affect both subgroups,<sup>370</sup> identifying synergies. At the beginning of each year, the ILA working group also holds a day-long ‘heidag’ to review their efforts over the last year and to plan for the year ahead.

Another change in 2013 was the beginning of the Access, Services and Knowledge (ASK) programme, which focuses on sexual and reproductive health services for young people.<sup>371</sup> This programme operates in five UFBR countries as well as in two additional countries and is implemented by all of the Dutch members of the SRHR Alliance, with the addition of STOP AIDS NOW! and the International Planned Parenthood Federation. ASK organisations join the SRHR Alliance ILA working group in the synergy meetings and ‘heidag’ events, where both programmes are discussed.

The development of another new project (G77, led by Rutgers WPF) drew on the experience of the lack of funding for linking national and international advocacy within the UFBR programme and on an increasingly visible opposition to progressive SRHR internationally. This project focuses specifically on linking national organisations to international processes and trying to neutralise and/or positively influence the positions of some countries in Africa and Asia. Some of these countries overlap with the UFBR countries. Capacity building of partners is also part of this project.

A further important new programme, ‘Unite against Child Marriage’, was developed by the SRHR Alliance in collaboration with Edukans (lead Simavi). This programme received one year of funding (€1.3 million) from the MoFA to fight child, early and forced marriage<sup>372</sup> as part of the €8 million to be allocated to non-governmental organisations (NGO) programmes on these topics as a result of an amendment in 2013 (to the 2014 budget).

#### *10.1.2 Overview of projects under evaluation*

The unit of analysis for the evaluation of the ILA programme of the SRHR Alliance is the individual lobbying and advocacy projects, as defined in the Call for Proposals. The two ‘projects’ analysed are 1) the national-level project, directed towards the budget of the Netherlands for SRHR as a percentage of ODA going up or staying the same and towards Dutch spending on SRHR being

effective and 2) the international-level project, directed towards the SRHR agenda at UN level being renewed after 2014 (focusing on the ICPD and post-2015 processes). Based on experience and capacity, as well as feasibility following intensive budget cuts to the ILA programme, in 2012, three member organisations in the ILA programme mainly focused their work on either the national or international level. CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, dance4life and Rutgers WPF were involved in lobbying at the international level, while AMREF, dance4life, Rutgers WPF and Simavi were involved at the national (Netherlands) level. By the endline data collection, Simavi had joined Rutgers WPF and dance4life as the organisations working at both levels.

In line with the staffing and organisational focus shifts described above, the organisational dynamics have changed in that four organisations (compared with three organisations at the time of the baseline report) are currently involved in the international-level project (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, dance4life, Rutgers WPF and Simavi). Four organisations continue to work at national level, as at the baseline (AMREF, dance4life, Rutgers WPF and Simavi).

For the national-level project, we assessed the SRHR Alliance's lobbying and advocacy efforts in the Netherlands. For the international-level project, we assessed the work done by Dutch SRHR Alliance members internationally and additionally selected two international cases (Indonesia and Malawi) to explore a selection of the international-level advocacy work done by the SRHR Alliance through Southern partner organisations.

#### *10.1.3 Case selection and role of the cases in the report*

Malawi and Indonesia were selected as international cases to assess the efforts of the SRHR Alliance in linking Southern partners to international processes. The cases were selected as two contrasting contexts for lobbying and advocacy. The selection of these two cases was partly geared towards finding out how having a physical presence in a country through an office of one of the Dutch partners might influence the ILA efforts of the Alliance.

Given the small number of SRHR Alliance member organisations involved in work in Indonesia (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, dance4life and Rutgers WPF) and the fact that most local partners already had a relationship with the Rutgers WPF Indonesia office, the Rutgers WPF Indonesia country representative was appointed as National Programme Coordinator (NPC) for Indonesia. To ensure accountability and transparency, dance4life (based in the Netherlands) was appointed as country lead. The country office facilitated the linking between the national level and the international level. Having a country office in Indonesia also made it easier to unite the Indonesian partners behind the advocacy agenda. Around the MFS II framework, an Indonesian Alliance with a separate identity—Aliansi Satu Visi (ASV)—was developed. This alliance works together very closely at national level and has continued to grow over the years beyond those organisations involved in the UFBR programme.

The Indonesian Alliance faces a number of challenges, including geographical distance between members, substantive diversity and widely differing capacities between organisations. Indonesia's status as the country with the largest Muslim population is described by local advocates as both an opportunity and a challenge for promoting SRHR. Three of the Indonesian organisational partners involved through the SRHR Alliance are (or have been) active in SRHR advocacy at international level.

At the time of the case selection, in contrast to the case in Indonesia, SRHR Alliance partners in Malawi were operating with no NPC. Both the SRHR Alliance members and the Malawian partners described the Malawian partners as struggling with severe resource constraints and other challenges. In contrast to Indonesia, the partner organisations in Malawi have not come together very cohesively into a national-level alliance. Two of the five current partner organisations in Malawi are active in

international advocacy. After the baseline data collection period, an NPC for Malawi was recruited. This NPC resigned in February 2014 but was replaced by someone with experience working with one of the Alliance organisations in Malawi by April 2014. As of April 2014, the NPC in Indonesia also resigned, and a new NPC had recently been hired at the time of the endline data collection.

In both countries, the organisations involved have differing levels of capacity for and interest in ILA. However, in contrast to the SRHR Alliance partners in Malawi, where there were few established links to international advocacy before the SRHR Alliance was formed, the Rutgers WPF Indonesia office was already active in national- and international-level advocacy before the SRHR Alliance began to operate.

Regarding the role of the international case studies in this evaluation, three things are important to note:

- No specific SRHR Alliance budget was assigned for working together as an Alliance to link Southern partners to international advocacy. In discussion with the SRHR Alliance, the evaluation team decided in 2012 to include this aspect of Alliance work because at the beginning of the evaluation, one Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) was involving SRHR Alliance Southern partners (beyond its own organisational partners), attempting to inform them about the ongoing international processes and building their capacity for advocacy at the international as well as the national level. In the meantime, however, this situation has changed, possibly because of staffing changes at Rutgers WPF and also because all of the Dutch SRHR Alliance organisations involved in the international-level project have increased their capacity for international-level advocacy and increasingly work on bringing their own organisational Southern partners into the international processes.<sup>373</sup>
- Efforts to bring Southern partners into international advocacy represent only a small and voluntary part of the SRHR Alliance's overall international-level project. The findings from the international case studies are informative, but they should not be given more weight than is reasonable in the evaluation of the SRHR Alliance international-level project. Given this, the findings from the two case studies are fully integrated with the rest of the results in this chapter instead of being presented separately, as stand-alone projects.
- Although these two country cases were purposely selected (as described above), it must be stressed that the findings of this evaluation cannot be generalised to all international partner organisations of the Alliance; the study of these efforts is limited to the two selected cases. An additional limitation is that, in 2012, a scheduling conflict within the evaluation team meant that no site visit to the Indonesian Alliance partner was possible, and the baseline investigation for Indonesia was incomplete—based on a single in-depth interview conducted in the Netherlands with the NPC at the time.

#### *10.1.4 Data sources and analysis*

This report draws on data collected for the baseline (T0–T1, 2010–2012) and a second main phase of data collection (T3, 2014), as well as an interim data collection effort (T2, 2013). In general, the end date for outcomes that would be considered for this evaluation was 31 August 2014. However, given the importance of the UNGASS (22 September 2014),<sup>374</sup> an exception was made whereby outcomes from the event would be included.<sup>375</sup> As is elaborated below, to achieve triangulation, sources internal and external to the SRHR Alliance were used, and we incorporated both interviews and pre-existing documents in our analysis.

The first stage of data collection is described in detail in the baseline report.<sup>376</sup> Briefly, the baseline was built on 15 in-depth interviews with Alliance members and partners conducted in 2012, including all six members of the working group on lobbying and advocacy in the Netherlands (most interviewed twice), seven individual members of partner organisations in Malawi and one member of a partner organisation in Indonesia. In 2013, an interim interview was conducted with two Alliance members (the 2013 and 2014 chairs of the ILA working group), and regular contact was maintained through emailed updates from the Alliance. The endline data collection added interviews with 21 individuals internal to the Alliance.<sup>377</sup> In the Netherlands, interviews were conducted with seven members of the ILA working group,<sup>378</sup> one advocacy manager, the SRHR Alliance staff member who was seconded to the MoFA in 2014 and one additional staff member active in international advocacy. In Indonesia, five interviews were conducted with 11 members of Alliance partner organisations,<sup>379</sup> and three interviews were conducted with individual Alliance partners in Malawi as part of the case studies. All but one of these interviews were conducted face-to-face, and the other interview was conducted by phone. The semi-structured internal interviews closely followed an interview guide designed to collect information on the Alliance's theory of change, outcomes realised since T1, facilitators and obstacles, as well as changes between T1, T2 and T3. All interviews lasted approximately 1 to 2 hours.

For the baseline report, external expert interviews were conducted in 2012 with three (former) MoFA staff members, one United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Malawi staff member, one external CSO staff member and one former parliamentarian. In 2014, the selection of expert informants was expanded, and a total of 16 external interviews were conducted. At the national Dutch level, three external experts were interviewed face-to-face. Interviewees included an advocacy manager working for a nation-wide association for Dutch NGOs and two individuals working in parliament. All three experts had closely cooperated with SRHR Alliance members. At international level, three experts were interviewed by telephone, as the interviewees lived abroad. All three experts were advocates working for external CSOs focusing on gender or SRHR and were knowledgeable about the Alliance's role in the international network of SRHR advocates.<sup>380</sup> The remaining 10 experts were interviewed face-to-face in Indonesia and Malawi as part of the case studies and included representatives of UNFPA and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as external CSO and governmental agency staff.

All of the expert interviews followed an interview guide designed to elicit information on the relevance of certain changes, the contribution of the Alliance to these changes and, for selected outcomes, other actors and factors involved. These guides varied by expert interview respondent, as experts were chosen for their knowledge of and experience with specific outcomes or categories of outcomes—subsets of the full list of outcomes to which the Alliance claims a contribution. Within categories defined by the evaluation team, Alliance members and partners were invited to suggest experts who were aware of the SRHR context internationally or nationally. The evaluation team then selected interviewees based on demonstrable knowledge of the SRHR situation. The team also contacted additional experts individually in Indonesia, Malawi and internationally (see Appendix 1 for a list of all interviews conducted).

All interviews were audio recorded and partially transcribed for analysis.<sup>381</sup> Documents and interviews were coded based on a combination of pre-defined and in-vivo coding, and a thematic analysis was conducted using NVivo 10.<sup>382</sup>

Documents used as data sources for this assessment included multiple documents that originated from the Alliance (the original and revised MFS II applications, meeting minutes and Skype call

summaries internal to the working group, information published on the websites of organisations participating in the Alliance, factsheets prepared by the Alliance for parliamentarians, internal monitoring documents and informational emails sent to international Alliance partners and collaborators), as well as external sources (publicly available documents of the Dutch parliament and MoFA [e.g. parliamentary questions and answers, parliamentary letters, policy statements, amendments filed], and other CSOs working for SRHR internationally (see Appendix 2 for a summary of documents reviewed).

## **10.2 Evaluation questions 1 and 3: Changes and their relevance**

In this section, we address evaluation questions 1 and 3. To place these evaluation question answers in the appropriate context, we first lay out the relevant theories of change for the SRHR Alliance ILA programme across the evaluation period.

Evaluation question 1: What are the changes achieved in the three priority result areas through international lobbying and advocacy on the thematic cluster ‘sexual and reproductive health and rights’ during the 2012–2014 period?

Evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes?

### *10.2.1 Theory of change from T0 to T3*

The SRHR Alliance does not work with a formalised theory of change specific to their ILA programme at the national or international level. For the baseline report (T0–T1), separate theories of change were reconstructed at the national and international levels based on interviews with all Dutch members of the SRHR Alliance ILA working group and the analysis of Alliance documents. For logistical reasons, it was not possible at that time to conduct a feedback workshop to validate the reconstructed theories of change.

For this report, the two theories of change reconstructed at T1 and earlier input from individual Alliance members were taken as a starting point for discussing adaptations. The process of individual interviews with all Alliance members was repeated, and the results of these interviews on theories of change were then shared with the larger Alliance team. Both the national and the international group discussed these results and provided further joint input. The finalised joint theories of change presented graphically in this section capture the joint views of the members of the international and national working groups.

#### **10.2.1.1 Summary of the theory of change at baseline: national level**

At the time of the baseline report, the overall national-level objective was defined as maintaining an enabling environment for SRHR in the Dutch government, and it was measured by examining whether the percentage of Dutch development cooperation budget allocated to SRHR is maintained/increased each year.<sup>383</sup> To reach this overall objective, a key outcome to be achieved was the inclusion of SRHR as a main issue in new development cooperation policies at national level. This outcome was to be achieved through building support for SRHR both in the MoFA and in parliament by raising awareness through lobby and advocacy on the importance and benefits of investing in SRHR. This support was to be ensured by working towards building expertise, convincing and encouraging positive action for SRHR among members of parliament and the MoFA.

In terms of activities, a significant amount of the work planned by the Alliance aimed at building and maintaining relationships with parliamentarians and individuals within the MoFA. These activities involved hosting one-on-one meetings, making regular telephone and email contact, participating in roundtables and organising events. Some organisations in the Alliance were active in bringing their

Southern partners to act as spokespeople in the Netherlands, also with the goal of influencing parliamentarians and the MoFA. Public campaigns (e.g. Moedernacht and the Estafette voor Wereldmoeders) as well as press releases and media attention were aimed primarily at generating support from parliamentarians and also from the general public. To provide information on the content of key SRHR issues, the Alliance sent factsheets and suggested parliamentary questions to parliamentarians, provided input documents to the MoFA and wrote letters to the embassies. To strengthen their message, the Alliance worked to strengthen cooperation with civil society in a number of different spheres, but especially in HIV/AIDS and health. The Alliance also put significant effort into the continuous monitoring and analysis of changes in the development cooperation policy and budget in order to be able to provide relevant information to parliamentarians, MoFA representatives and other stakeholders at the right time.

#### 10.2.1.2 Changes in **planned outcomes** and **pathways**: national level

Figure 10.1 presents a visual overview of the presently operating ILA theory of change at national level (T3). The major development since the baseline report (T1) in the national-level theory of change involves an adaptation related to the overall goal of the project. The goal of maintaining or increasing the budget for SRHR as a percentage of ODA remains important, but the Alliance has moved somewhat beyond this goal to focus also on the quality of the budget. Instead of focusing exclusively on the percentage of ODA budgeted for SRHR, the SRHR Alliance became more active in monitoring and responding to how the SRHR budget is being spent. This development came about partly because the percentage of ODA allocated to SRHR increased each year following the baseline report, indicating that it was possible to expand the focus to include the quality of spending on SRHR. However, the fact that the SRHR budget has fared well relative to the other policy priorities has drawn significant attention, and additional resources have been sought for the other policy priorities. In this climate, it remains very important to monitor and defend the budget for SRHR, especially on taboo and rights-based issues, where Dutch input is particularly needed. The development to consider the quality of SRHR spending is also related to Minister Ploumen's shift in policy, including the move towards trade, phasing out aid in certain transition countries. SRHR interventions are generally very much dependent on aid, and this policy has the potential to put rights-based and sensitive SRHR issues, which are not easily combined with trade, at risk. This raises questions about the quality of future SRHR spending and its reach for achieving Dutch policy priorities.

This development is not entirely new and cannot be seen as a departure from the theory of change at baseline. It can also be argued that, technically, this development does not represent a change in the overall goal, but rather a refinement of the definition of what kind of funding the Alliance considers to be funding for SRHR. Additionally, over the long term, Alliance members believe that, in addition to being desirable in itself, demonstrable effectiveness of SRHR spending is necessary to maintain and build support for SRHR among parliamentarians and the general public. However, the broadening of the overall goal has resulted in additional preconditions within the overall theory of change.

Two quality-focused outcomes were added to the theory of change: 'Parliamentary debates take place on the quality of SRHR ODA spending' and 'SRHR ODA spending division is transparent and effective for reflecting SRHR aims'. Both outcomes fit into the existing theory of change as part of the pathways through which parliamentarians are informed about SRHR and convinced of its importance.

In the baseline report, parliamentarians and the MoFA were identified as the most crucial actors in the theory of change, and this remains true. Most of the advocacy strategy continues to work through the MoFA and Dutch parliament, whose support and positive actions are seen as crucial for

achieving the national-level goal. For that reason, attaining the trust and the ability to convince these two groups is very important.

Since the baseline, the relative importance of working through the MoFA has increased, to become the main focus of national-level advocacy efforts. The Alliance is currently working very closely with the MoFA. However, it remains important to maintain good contacts and trust with parliamentarians to keep support for SRHR high. In 2012, the Alliance was working mostly with the Social Development Department (DSO) within the MoFA. Responding to the move from aid to trade and the corresponding shifts of influence within the MoFA, although DSO remains the most directly related to Alliance work, the Alliance has expanded their focus to include other divisions within the MoFA (e.g. the Multilateral Organisations and Human Rights Department—DMM and the Directorate-General for Foreign Economic Relations—DGBEB).





At T1, 'good cooperation and collaboration between organisations advocating for SRHR and HIV/AIDS' was identified as an outcome in the theory of change. This desired outcome draws upon networked advocacy, whereby Alliance members seek to align their messages with those being conveyed (to the MoFA or to parliament) by related CSOs. The aim in doing this is to unify the message being sent, where possible, in order to give the message additional strength. As at T1, the Alliance continues to cooperate with HIV/AIDS, gender and broader CSOs. Since the baseline report, CSOs focusing on gender have gained influence, particularly with the founding of the Gender Multiparty Initiative (MPI) in the Netherlands parliament.<sup>384</sup>

#### 10.2.1.3 Changes in **strategy** and **activities**: national level

Most of the main Alliance activities have not changed since the baseline report. In line with the theory of change, the Alliance continues to dedicate a great deal of work towards building and maintaining relationships with parliamentarians and individuals in the MoFA (through engaging in direct lobby, planning individual and group meetings, maintaining continual telephone and email contact and organising events). One result of the development of the overall goal has been an increase in the strategy of working closely with the MoFA. Additionally, this development has increased the importance of building expertise within parliament so that the debates on quality would be possible. Sharing information with parliament and the MoFA through meetings and written communication remain key strategies used by the Alliance.

Compared with the baseline, less work is directed towards increasing public awareness and support of SRHR. For example, the Moedernacht stopped after 2011 and the Estafette voor Wereldmoeders campaign did not continue after 2012. These events were coordinated by individual Alliance organisations, and largely financial internal organisational decisions resulted in their stopping. Communicating with the media through public statements, press releases and occasional smaller-scale Alliance-run events within parliament (e.g. the Blije Doos for new parliamentarians and the photo exhibition on child marriage) have continued as strategies to increase the interest and cooperation of parliamentarians (especially) and the MoFA on certain topics within SRHR. Presently, as parliament has agreed with the policy laid out by Minister Ploumen, current Alliance work has turned towards monitoring and influencing implementation—work that can be done especially through the MoFA. Responding to this perceived shift in the importance of the MoFA vis-à-vis parliament, the Alliance focused less on this pathway at endline than at the time of the baseline report. However, parliament remained important, especially for monitoring (of implementation, effectiveness, budget allocation and if necessary re-allocation, spending, etc.), and other pathways of influence operating through parliament continued to be key for the SRHR Alliance.

The broadening of the overall goal to include SRHR budget quality issues has in no way reduced the necessity of careful monitoring and analysis of developments in the budget and policy on development cooperation. The difference is that this monitoring activity increasingly focuses additionally on the implications of the quality of the SRHR budget for effectiveness.

#### 10.2.1.4 Summary of the theory of change at baseline: international level

At international level, the overall goal was defined at T1 as ensuring that there is a renewed progressive agenda on SRHR at UN level after 2014. This 'progressive agenda' is a wide topic, including issues such as recognition of sexual and reproductive rights, comprehensive sexuality education, support for safe abortion, non-discrimination based on SOGI and SRHR for young and unmarried people. The theory of change describing how this goal was to be reached focused on two important international development frameworks: ICPD and the post-2015 development process. As

the desired change involves multiple, large-scale, international processes, the Alliance's theory of change around this project was multilayered.

At the highest level, the language on SRHR in the new UN framework outcome documents should advance or maintain language agreed in the ICPD Programme of Action. For this to happen, SRHR must be considered a key part of development topics by national governments and consequently the UN. Good contacts between Alliance members and UN agencies including UNFPA were also thought to facilitate the progressive representation of SRHR in outcome documents. A second pathway of change operated through informing country delegations to relevant UN meetings about SRHR and convincing them of the need for progressive SRHR. This change was to be achieved through the involvement of CSOs from the global South in advocacy at the international level (primarily through their own governments) and through progressive SRHR civil society jointly communicating one clear message. The SRHR Alliance aimed to facilitate those changes through maintaining a high level of trust with diverse civil society partners, achieving good integration within larger networks of CSOs and building capacity of CSO partners, especially towards international advocacy. A third pathway to achieving change through UN processes was identified as working through influencing national governments (including the Netherlands) and regional bodies (including the EU) directly to prioritise SRHR. Important for enabling this change was the outcome of the SRHR Alliance and other progressive CSOs being approached as dialogue partners, being asked to provide input for relevant decisions and events and receiving invitations to be part of official national delegations to UN processes. To reach these outcomes, the SRHR Alliance aimed to establish good working relationships and trust with both the MoFA and mission staff, as well as to support CSO partners in the global South to do the same with their governments and mission staff.

At T1, all Alliance member organisations working on international advocacy were active participants in multiple international-level meetings, with a focus on UN-level meetings. Alliance members often worked in conjunction with international networks of likeminded CSOs active on SRHR issues in the lead-up to and at these meetings. Alliance members worked to build and maintain good contacts with the MoFA. Around the CPD meetings specifically, Alliance collaboration with the MoFA included participation on official Dutch delegations, and two Alliance organisations participated in the formalised Youth and ICPD Partnership. In several cases, the SRHR Alliance sponsored their partner organisations' participation in key meetings at international level. This was done to develop the partners' international advocacy capacity, to contribute directly to the inclusion of diverse civil society and youth organisations in international processes and to increase the opportunities for partners to work with and influence their own governments to achieve positive SRHR outcomes. Alliance members also sent briefing papers and updates on key international processes to their partner organisations.

#### 10.2.1.5 Changes in **planned outcomes** and **pathways**: international level

Figure 10.2 presents the international-level theory of change constructed at T3. One significant development in the SRHR Alliance's theory of change at international level represents less of a change in the way of thinking about how change happens than a refinement of the understanding of the process, as the components of the ICPD process and, particularly, the post-2015 development agenda were clarified over the evaluation period.

Networking is mentioned most explicitly in the theory of change in the pathway beginning with the desired outcome of trust and good contact among diverse likeminded CSOs including youth organisations. This outcome is thought to lead to Alliance partners joining larger international advocacy networks, which, in turn, leads to CSOs, including youth organisations, participating in

international decision making and expressing one clear message. However, the importance of networking pervades almost all other parts of the international-level theory of change and is seen as a useful facilitator for achieving many of the desired outcomes. At the time of the baseline data collection, Alliance members already stressed the importance of joint advocacy and transnational advocacy networks. As the end of the international development agenda frameworks of interest drew closer, networking became increasingly important. Especially in the initial uncertainty surrounding the events making up the post-2015 development process, networks were essential for exchanging information. Alliance members are united in the view that, when dealing with complex and uncertain international processes of this type, working with a trusted network of likeminded individuals and organisations is necessary to make sense of the situation and to be effective. It is important to have good networks at the national (including the SRHR Alliance itself), regional and international levels.

Increasingly, the goal of work to shape the Dutch government's position on SRHR issues in international processes goes beyond influencing only the position of the Netherlands or the EU, extending also to include a wider group of governments through the diplomatic influence of the Netherlands. This influence often works through the Dutch embassies and extends well beyond the eight partner countries working on SRHR.

#### 10.2.1.6 Changes in **strategy** and **activities**: international level

Although the importance of a good, trusting relationship with the MoFA was part of the theory of change constructed in the baseline report, the type of contact between the SRHR Alliance and the Ministry has deepened, and the nature of the work has changed. Overall, the relationship has become closer and more like a partnership for strategizing. Correspondingly, activities have generally moved from sending often unrequested input to accepting invitations to closed strategy sessions and working together as partners over the longer term. As one Alliance member noted, 'Here in the Netherlands we have the space to really work closely with the MoFA and work with them in a very equal way and contribute to each other's roles within the international fora. I think that really builds up to having an impact on the international level'. Although certain members of the Alliance previously engaged in partnerships with the MoFA, the Alliance increasingly engages in these types of activities as a whole. Within the MoFA, DSO remains very relevant. DMM (responsible for multilateral and human rights processes) has also become more important in relation to the international negotiations on ICPD and post-2015, and Alliance members have increased their collaboration with this department.



It is important for the SRHR Alliance to maintain close contacts with broader civil society, to keep each other informed about international developments and SRHR issues of relevance for these groups and to advocate through different networks. These close contacts facilitate the Alliance's integration into international civil society networks working towards progressive SRHR. The SRHR Alliance can use the information acquired through the larger networks in their own lobbying and advocacy efforts with decision makers.

The strategies of informing Southern partners about international advocacy and, where possible, facilitating their integration into international advocacy networks, were already present at T1. However, the SRHR Alliance members have also generally broadened their scope for collaboration with their (organisational) international partners towards international advocacy. Several members of the international group noted that, since the T1, there has been a progression towards focusing more on bringing the partner countries into international advocacy. One reason cited for this development is the progression of the two international development processes of focus (ICPD and post-2015), and especially the realisation of the importance of the regional meetings in the ICPD review. Another reason for this progression reflects the acknowledgement that many partners want to influence these processes and are affected by the outcomes, and a commitment to making their voices heard in this international arena. This can also be seen as part of an active strategy to encourage Southern countries with progressive views on SRHR to speak up to combat the oppositional stance put forward by some groups that SRHR is an exclusively 'Western issue', while encouraging those Southern countries with conservative views on SRHR to be less vocal. For some Alliance partner organisations, their growing awareness of international processes and capacity for international advocacy allowed them to be more directly involved and also to hold their governments accountable to what they have agreed upon at international level.

Although there is variation in the scope for these activities, three SRHR Alliance organisations have been active over the last few years in building the capacity of their own international partners to do international advocacy. Additionally, in 2013, there was an example of part of an international advocacy training open to SRHR Alliance partners in Africa and Asia (hosted by one Alliance member organisation). The reason for this Alliance-wide training on international advocacy was not a change in the theory of change or in the basic strategy, but rather that budget was freed up for use elsewhere in the ILA programme. Although such joint training activities are easily incorporated in the theory of change, there is usually insufficient budget to carry out these activities, which are not generally part of the SRHR Alliance ILA programme. However, Rutgers WPF did always include a part on international advocacy in their capacity building workshops on advocacy, which were for all UFBR partners.

In the face of a more visible opposition to progressive SRHR internationally, some Alliance members mentioned a strategy shift towards working more with the governments of countries who are not supportive of SRHR issues (including some countries where the Alliance has partners), with the intention of building trustful relationships and eventually reversing or neutralising some of the opposition. This strategy is applied alongside the strategy of working to make governments of countries who are supportive of SRHR issues more vocal. These efforts are made through preparing briefings and supporting and maintaining individual contacts with diverse civil society worldwide, as well as one-on-one contacts with delegation members at key international meetings.

#### 10.2.1.7 Changes in the link between national- and international-level theories of change

From the beginning of the working group on lobbying and advocacy within the Alliance, there has been a link between the two theories of change. At T1, the primary link between the national and international theories of change operated through EU and international commitments on SRHR and ODA generally influencing the extent to which SRHR is mentioned in new policy in the Netherlands. By T3, a more solid, but somewhat different, link had been established. At T3, the SRHR Alliance members saw the two projects linked mostly in the role of both projects in addressing the Dutch position in international meetings. With the MDGs coming to an end and the post-2015 development framework approaching, the MoFA increasingly had to explain and discuss their input to these processes in parliament. This created an opportunity to draw upon the expertise and contacts of both SRHR Alliance ILA projects (national and international) to influence the Dutch position. The national and international advocacy groups increasingly found opportunities to work together to strengthen the Dutch role and voice in the international processes on SRHR in relation to the post-2015 agenda. For example, beginning in 2013, the national group indicated that they saw an opportune time to brief parliamentarians about developments in the international processes. The international group then prepared a draft update briefing, and the national group then fine-tuned the briefing based on their experiences and communication with the members of parliament before sharing it with them. This has also worked in the opposite direction, where the international group becomes aware of an unexpected message expressed by the Dutch government in an international forum and then informs the members of the national group, who follow up through parliament as necessary. This kind of collaboration has been fostered by the regular synergy meetings held with the national and international advocacy groups to inform each other about what is going on in both spheres and by active efforts of the Alliance to find ways to collaborate more closely across levels.

#### 10.2.2 Use of the ToCs in practice

As was mentioned at the start of this section on ToCs, the SRHR Alliance did not work with a formalised ToC specific to their ILA programme during the period under evaluation. The ToCs described here were reconstructed by the evaluators based on information provided by the SRHR Alliance in interviews and in internal documents, but they are also inevitably influenced to some degree by the evaluators' subjective interpretation of these data, and they have been formatted visually to follow the model used by the larger evaluation team. Although drafts of these theories of change were presented to the SRHR Alliance and revisions were made based on feedback received, it should be noted that Alliance members stressed on several occasions that, if they were to write up their own theory of change as a group, it would look quite different. For example, SRHR Alliance members would prefer a model that more clearly showed the hierarchy between outcomes, flowing from top to bottom or bottom to top, with outcomes at the same 'level' appearing on the same horizontal line.

This evaluation did not identify any significant differences of opinion between Alliance members working in the different organisations regarding how change happens, but, within the overall theory of change, there are some differences in focus between Alliance member organisations. These differences can have significant benefits, allowing the member organisations within the Alliance to focus on their own organisational strengths and work complementarily. Particularly at international level, the different Alliance members focus to differing extents on parts of the overall theory of change, in line with their own organisational capacity and focus. In terms of capacity, the most significant difference between the Alliance organisations is the difference in staff hours available. In terms of focus, there are multiple differences, but the most notable is the concentration of two Alliance organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and dance4life) on the pathways of change

relating directly to young people's involvement in shaping SRHR in international development agendas. As described above, these differences in focus were part of the reason for the selection of the Dutch member organisations in the SRHR Alliance, because they create a complementarity and breadth in focus within the Alliance that would not otherwise be possible.

### *10.2.3 Changes achieved and their relevance*

This section provides only a brief summary of the changes that have been achieved at national and international level from 2011 to 2014 and their relevance. Only outcomes to which the SRHR Alliance claims to have made a contribution are included. Further information about each of these outcomes, including a more detailed description, specifics on the claimed contribution of the SRHR Alliance and more detail on the relevance of each outcome, is found in Appendix 3.

In this evaluation, relevance is understood in light of the Alliance's ToCs. We were concerned with several aspects of relevance (as is detailed in Chapter 2): relevance in terms of addressing the needs identified in the Alliance's ToC; relevance in terms of achieving the Alliance's overall aims and relevance over time. Across outcomes, consistent with the methodological approach for the overall evaluation, relevance was assessed through interviews on the changes achieved with external informants and by evaluating the importance of these changes in the context of the reconstructed ToCs presented above through in-depth interviews with Alliance members and partners. Where possible, internal and external documents (e.g. internal meeting minutes, monitoring documents, public statements made by the Alliance and the broader network of pro-SRHR advocates, parliamentary transcripts) were used to strengthen this assessment.

### 10.2.3.1 National-level changes

#### Netherlands Government and Parliamentary Position and Commitments on SRHR

Table 10.1 Outcomes achieved: Netherlands government and parliamentary policy position and public commitments on SRHR	
Agenda setting	
1.	State Secretary Knapen committed to improving SRHR for women and girls globally and to giving at least half of the €400 million for SRHR-Health-HIV/AIDS to SRHR by 2014 (Moedernacht, May 2011). (UI 1.5) <sup>385</sup>
2.	Parliamentary questions were posed on funding for SRHR (UI 1.5), and State Secretary Knapen repeated the amount from Outcome 1 (UI 1.5) (parliamentary debate on Knapen's 19 April 2011 letter, 18 May 2011).
3.	State Secretary Knapen committed to spending €370 million on SRHR including HIV and health in 2012 and expressed the intention to increase this amount to €413 million in 2015 (London Summit on Family planning, 11 July 2012). (UI 1.5)
4.	SRHR was mentioned in the programmes of most political parties before the September 2012 election. In several cases, SRHR was added or adapted in amendments during Spring–Summer 2012. (UI 1.3)
5.	The Multiparty Initiative on SRHR and HIV/AIDS was continued by the new parliament in 2012 (announced 31 October 2012). (UI 1.3)
6.	A parliamentarian requested that the MoFA ensure expertise on SRHR in the embassies of transitional countries moving from aid to the trade sector (parliamentary debate on the revised multiannual strategic plans of the embassies, March 2014). (UI 1.5)
7.	Parliamentarians requested a separate debate about the IOB evaluation after the Christmas recess in 2014. (UI 1.5)
8.	Parliament voiced strong support for SRHR in debates on the Dutch position in the post-2015 development agenda, taking up points of the SRHR Alliance to focus on rights in SRHR and maintaining the forerunner role of the NL in this process (18 September 2013 and 11 September 2014 parliamentary debates). (UI 1.5)
Policy influencing	
9.	SRHR was included in Dutch State Secretary for Development Cooperation Knapen's four spearhead development priorities. This was approved with support from all members of parliament. (Focus letter, 18 March 2011). (UI 2.1)
10.	State Secretary Knapen's policy on SRHR reaffirmed the position of the Netherlands as a strong supporter of SRHR, supported SRHR Alliance goals and laid out increases to the SRHR budget scheduled up to €427 million in 2015 (7 May 2012 letter to parliament). (UI 2.1)
11.	Eight Dutch government development cooperation partner countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Yemen, Benin and Burundi) chose SRHR as a policy priority in 2012 in their multi-annual strategic plans (Knapen's letter to parliament, 13 April 2012). (UI 2.1)
12.	Following the government collapse in April 2012 before the SRHR policy was in place, parliament did not declare SRHR a controversial topic. (UI 2.1)
13.	SRHR was selected as a priority area by the VVD/PvdA coalition government (Government Agreement VVD-PvdA, 29 Oct 2012). (UI 2.1)
14.	SRHR remained one of the development cooperation focal points of Minister Ploumen's new policy, and despite cuts to many areas of civil society, Minister Ploumen's letter promised no cuts to SRHR (April 2013) (UI 2.1)
15.	The 2013 Human Rights Policy (debated September 2013) and Human Rights Report 2013 (submitted 24 April 2014) have significant coverage of SRHR. (UI 2.1)
16.	In response to Outcome 6, Minister Ploumen committed to informing the embassies of the need to gain expertise and find a balance between taboo topics and topics related to the private sector (parliamentary debate on the revised multiannual strategic plans of the embassies, March 2014). (UI 2.1)
17.	A parliamentary motion (filed February 2014) on transparency in allocating SRHR funding to multilateral organisations was made and passed with broad political support. (UI 2.2)
Changing practice	
18.	In a letter to parliament, Minister Ploumen stated that the next focal areas update will state clearly what amounts of funding are going to different organisations, how this is linked to different policy priority areas of the NL and what the impact has been (April 2014). (UI 3.1)

#### Relevance:

As was summarised in the previous section, the SRHR Alliance's theory of change at the national level works primarily through the Netherlands MoFA and parliament. As such, Dutch government support for SRHR is critical for the Alliance to reach the overall goal of maintaining or increasing Dutch



funding for SRHR as a percentage of total ODA and ensuring the effectiveness of SRHR spending. Changes in policy and practice have direct relevance for the funding allocated to SRHR, while changes achieved in agenda setting serve as building blocks to achieve further policy and practice changes.

The Netherlands has a strong reputation worldwide for supporting SRHR. The role of the Netherlands in SRHR internationally is conceived as taking a progressive voice on what are often considered controversial issues. SRHR has remained one of The Dutch government's four policy priorities through the change of governments, massive budget cuts and two rounds of severe changes to Dutch development policies. The practical significance of this was reflected in State Secretary Knapen's focal letter<sup>386</sup>, which mentions the aim of doubling the percentage of funding to the focal points from 2011 to 2014, and in Minister Ploumen's policy letter<sup>387</sup>, which promised no cuts to SRHR. The status of SRHR as a policy priority area has also encouraged parliamentarians from all parties to show active support for SRHR.

A strong policy is of high importance. The MoFA implements this policy through showing political support, building the expertise of embassies and sending out calls for proposals. A positive policy environment amplifies the work of the SRHR Alliance. The positive policy changes described in this section served to reconfirm the efforts of the Dutch government related to SRHR and provide a basis for continuing the Dutch position as a global leader on SRHR, both politically and programmatically.

Parliamentary support is important in the SRHR Alliance's national-level theory of change, both because of the influence this can put on the MoFA and because it will lead to parliamentary debates on the quality of SRHR ODA spending. In the two previous outcome clusters, it is clear that parliamentary support has been consistently important to achieve outcomes in Dutch policy on SRHR and in funding allocated to SRHR. Additionally, there have been several relevant outcomes in parliament not directly linked to the acceptance or amendment of a particular policy document. Most of these outcomes were in the area of agenda setting, laying a foundation for building additional support (continuation of the MPI) and for later changes to policy and practice (parties' election programmes and debates on post-2015).

At the level of policy influencing, parliament did not declare SRHR controversial after the collapse of the government in April 2012, when the SRHR policy was not yet in place. The SRHR policy was finally approved by parliament in June 2012 before the summer recess. If parliament had declared SRHR controversial, there could have been no SRHR policy, and no forward movement on SRHR would have occurred until after the new parliament was elected. Additionally, the upwards direction of the budget allocation and the focus within SRHR might have been altered. Because the Alliance was happy with the chosen priorities, these sorts of shifts would not have been desirable in their view.

The relevance of the outcomes relating to expertise on SRHR in the embassies of transition countries and the transparency of SRHR funding being allocated to multilaterals relates specifically to the part of the Alliance's overall goal aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of the quality of spending on SRHR. Globally, the Netherlands' reputation as a defender of SRHR is built on working on rights-based and taboo issues. Although good SRHR is the basis of sustainable social and economic development, it is difficult to maintain SRHR in a trade agenda—especially rights-based and taboo issues—meaning that SRHR issues could fall off the agenda as countries move from aid to trade. The policy shift to ensure that the embassies in countries transitioning from aid to trade retain or acquire the expertise necessary to continue their work on SRHR, support local civil society working on SRHR, act as a broker and advocate for SRHR was therefore crucial.

The policy change towards increased transparency in reporting on SRHR funding to multilateral organisations is also relevant for the Netherlands maintaining its position as a champion of SRHR globally. The 2013 IOB evaluation of SRHR<sup>388</sup> indicated that multilateral organisations are not as effective as NGOs at taking on taboo topics or at reaching marginalised or difficult-to-reach populations and pointed to an inconsistency between Dutch policy goals and the practice of using multilateral organisations heavily to distribute Dutch ODA funding for SRHR (more than half). In the longer term, the increased transparency in reporting on SRHR funding to multilateral organisations may reveal information that will convince currently opposing political parties of the need for balance in funding channels for SRHR.

The motion calling for transparency in reporting of ODA spending is also relevant to the broader goal in larger civil society of basing budget allocation on effectiveness. One external expert speaking about the motion remarked, ‘The motion builds at the thematic level on what has been advocated at the general level. Excellent’. On an even more general, societal level, this change can be seen as important for contributing to a more positive public opinion of ODA through increased transparency. Referring to this change, another external expert remarked on this point, ‘People think that development cooperation does not help, so you need good information to counteract this’.

Netherlands Government SRHR ODA Funding:

Table 10.2 Outcomes achieved: Netherlands government SRHR ODA funding	
Agenda setting	
1.	Parliamentary questions were raised to clarify and justify the extent of cuts to the SRHR ODA budget for 2012 (October and November 2011). (UI 1.5)
2.	Beginning with a joint response to the threatened SRHR budget cuts for 2012, CSOs working on SRHR, HIV/AIDS and health worked collectively to issue joint input on SRHR issues (UI 1.1)
Policy influencing	
3.	Following State Secretary Knapen’s response to the questions posed in Outcome 1, two amendments were filed proposing to reverse the proposed cuts and to increase the SRHR ODA budget for 2012 (budget debates in parliament, 2011). (UI 2.1)
4.	A motion on funding for projects on safe abortion was filed during the parliamentary debate on the IOB evaluation and the progress of the policy focal points (11 March 2014). (UI 2.1)
Changing practice	
5.	State Secretary Knapen reversed the cut of €35 million to the SRHR ODA budget for 2012 and took up the amendment (Outcome 3) that proposed an additional €8 million of funding for SRHR. (UI 3.2)
6.	After adjustments, the final SRHR ODA budget for 2014 was somewhat higher than the 2013 budget, and the percentage of Dutch ODA to be spent on SRHR increased (to approximately <sup>389</sup> 5.2% in 2014, compared with 4% in 2013). (UI 3.2)
7.	The motion in Outcome 4 resulted in €5 million that will be specifically earmarked for abortion projects in the SRHR Fund beginning in 2016. (UI 3.2)

Relevance:

The amount of ODA funding allocated to SRHR represents a significant part of the SRHR Alliance’s overall goal at national level, so the relevance of this outcome cluster in view of the theory of change is certain. Clearly, it is important that, in addition to being listed as a formal policy priority, concrete resources are reserved for development cooperation on SRHR by the Dutch government. Given the world-leading role of the Netherlands as a defender of SRHR described above, the amount of ODA allocated to SRHR is very important.

Despite making SRHR one of the four priority areas, the planned 2012 budget represented a large cut to SRHR, while increasing the budget for the other priority areas of water and food security and leaving the budget for rule of law untouched. This cut was highly surprising, given the promises made

regarding SRHR spending earlier in the year. Because of the new merging of budgets for SRHR, HIV/AIDS and general health, changes as compared with previous years were difficult to detect and could easily have gone unnoticed. The final 2012 budget (with the cuts to SRHR reversed) provided a solid starting point for budgets in years to follow.

The increase in planned funding for safe abortion (from the existing SRHR budget) beginning in 2016 doubled the previous spending on abortion, bringing the funding practice more in line with Dutch policy on taking on taboo topics in SRHR. This is significant especially because safe abortion is a critical topic, but one that other countries often consider controversial and avoid funding.

10.2.3.2 International-level changes

ICPD Process:

Table 10.3 Outcomes achieved: ICPD process	
Agenda setting	
1.	Mobilisation of progressive SRHR CSOs including youth organisations around CPD 44, 45 and 47 increased each year (April 2011, 2012 and 2014). (UI 1.2)
2.	Two SRHR Alliance organisations were invited to be part of the Dutch delegation, including one youth delegate, to CPD 45 (April 2012) and CPD 46 (April 2013). (UI 1.4, also Changing Practice, UI 3.1)
3.	Two member organisations of the SRHR Alliance were invited to the UNFPA ICPD Beyond 2014 Civil Society Stakeholder Meeting (global consultation meeting on ICPD Beyond 2014 process, 9–10 Dec 2011). (UI 1.4)
4.	SRHR Alliance partners in Indonesia and Uganda were invited by their governments to be involved in the consultation process that was part of the review of the ICPD Programme of Action. (August 2012) (UI 1.4, also Changing Practice, UI 3.1)
5.	The ICPD Global Review Report (February 2014) and the UN Secretary-General’s Summary Report (January 2014) contained progressive language on SRHR. (UI 1.5)
6.	The CPD 47 chair (Uruguay) decided for a negotiated substantive outcome (March 2014). (UI 1.5)
7.	An unprecedented (at CPD) number of country statements expressed support for SRHR at CPD 47 (April 2014). (UI 1.5)
8.	Ten Southern partners of SRHR Alliance organisations (including partners in the SRHR Alliance) were invited to join their official national government delegations to CPD 47 (April 2014). (UI 1.4)
9.	One Alliance member was invited to serve as a youth delegate on the Dutch delegation to CPD 47, and another Alliance member seconded to the MoFA was a member of the Dutch delegation (April 2014, see also Table 10.6, Outcome 4). (UI 1.4)
10.	The SRHR Alliance was invited for extensive preparation and strategizing with the MoFA ahead of CPD 47, as well as a debriefing session following CPD 47 (2014). (UI 1.4)
11.	The Secretary-General’s Index Report on the implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action drew on statements delivered by countries, regional country groups and civil society representatives at CPD 47 and contained strong references to SRHR, SOGI, comprehensive sexuality education and a link to post-2015 (August 2014). (UI 1.5)
Policy influencing	
12.	The CPD 44 outcome document reflected a renewed commitment to SRHR, but no new progressive language was included (April 2011). (UI 2.1)
13.	The CPD 45 outcome document included progressive statements on young people’s rights and was the first resolution at UN level recognising adolescents’ and young people’s sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights (April 2012). (UI 2.1)
14.	The CPD 46 outcome document contained language on human rights for migrants, including their sexual and reproductive health, reproductive rights and access to basic social services (April 2013). (UI 2.1)
15.	At all five regional conferences in the ICPD process (UNESCWA-LAS, UNECE, UNECLAC, UNECA/AU and UNESCAP), progressive language on SRHR was adopted (2013). (UI 2.1)
16.	At two thematic meetings in the ICPD process, progressive language on SRHR was adopted (ICPD Beyond 2014 Global Youth Forum, Bali, 4–6 December 2012; ICPD International Human Rights Conference, The Hague, July 2013). (UI 2.1)
17.	The CPD 47 outcome document reflected the link between ICPD and post-2015, referred to evidence-based comprehensive education on human sexuality and maintained previously-agreed language on sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights. It did not include full SRHR, as sexual rights were not included (April 2014). (UI 2.1)

#### Relevance:

The overall goal of the SRHR Alliance ILA working group at international level is for the SRHR agenda to be renewed at UN level after 2014 and for SRHR to be included in the post-2015 agenda. Within this goal, the Alliance focuses on two processes: ICPD and post-2015. Also crucial is that a link to ICPD is established as part of the post-2015 framework.

The CPD has met yearly since 1994 to monitor developments in population and development, review the Programme of Action of the ICPD and provide related recommendations to the Economic and Social Council. Some Alliance members perceived the CPD meetings to have become increasingly political in recent years, with both governments and civil society recognising the CPD as an important platform to discuss issues around SRHR. There is increasing concern with the language used in the outcome documents of the CPD meetings among those working towards progressive SRHR. Opposition countries are trying to break down the existing language on SRHR, and they are perceived as an increasing threat as the end of the ICPD +20 review process and the elaboration of the post-2015 development agenda approach.

In 2012, the Operational Review of the Implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action began at national levels. This review process involved national surveys, regional consultations, national meetings with civil society and governments, regional political meetings with regional Economic and Social Commissions and thematic consultations. All efforts at UN level to promote the SRHR agenda have implications for the ICPD Beyond 2014 process. Although CPD resolutions are not as significant as resolutions passed through the General Assembly, and although they are not binding, they can provide advocacy tools for further work. The CPD outcome documents have always been very important, and these outcomes were of great relevance in the Operational Review of the Implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action, which concluded in 2014. The outcome document of the 2014 CPD, the last CPD before the end of the ICPD review process, had a special weight, both for this process and, potentially, for the beyond-2015 development agenda. Having negotiations at CPD 47 (2014) opened possibilities for language advancement, especially considering the strong outcomes in the thematic and regional consultations leading up to this CPD, and was important to give political weight to the integration of the outcomes of the ICPD review into the post-2015 negotiations. However, at the meeting itself, organisational issues and lack of transparency resulted in a severely limited space for civil society involvement.

Especially leading up to the CPD meetings in 2011 (on the theme of Fertility, Reproductive Health and Development), 2012 (on Adolescents and Youth) and 2014 (on assessing the status of the implementation of the Programme of Action of the ICPD), SRHR advocates felt that they needed to be present at the meetings to advocate strong language and to keep their governments accountable, as well as to share experiences from their countries and to work with their country delegations. The increasingly large and coordinated presence and strong statements of progressive SRHR advocates at the 2011, 2012 and 2014 CPD meetings sent a clear message to delegations worldwide, as well as offering opportunities for CSOs to develop their capacity for international advocacy and to build trust among their global network. The topic of the CPD 46 (2013, on New Trends in Migration: Demographic Aspects) was less directly relevant for SRHR, but advocates were present and active in successfully maintaining previously agreed language and achieving advancements on human rights language for migrants, including sexual and reproductive health, reproductive rights and access to emergency contraception and basic social services.☐

Having SRHR Alliance representatives on the official Dutch delegation and having Southern partners on the official delegations of their countries at the CPD meetings represent important outcomes. Being part of the delegation allows for a more direct impact on the negotiated outcome document of the meeting. Based on interviews conducted with Southern partners in Indonesia and Malawi, this in-depth, international-level interaction with government officials is additionally relevant because it allows advocates to develop better relationships with these officials. They are then able to use these relationships in further national- and international-level advocacy.

The agreed documents from the regional meetings and the agreements made in the thematic meetings contributed to positive, higher order outcomes through the ICPD Global Review Report and the Zero Draft for CPD 47, as well as broad support for SRHR expressed by many countries during CPD 47 and finally in a strong Index Report. The outcomes of the regional conferences on the ICPD process are important, because they laid out the regional priorities for the ICPD beyond 2014 process. The agreed documents from the regional conferences, along with the Review Report, were also used in advocacy with countries who were signatories to these documents, and the documents can also continue to be used to put pressure on government leaders to support strong SRHR language in the future.

Post-2015 Process:

Table 10.4 Outcomes achieved: Post-2015 process	
Agenda setting	
1.	Despite certain limitations in the language, SRHR is well positioned in the Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (published 20 May 2013). (UI 1.5)
2.	Two roundtables suggested by the Alliance were later organised at the MoFA on providing input for the vision letter on post-2015 and on providing input on targets and indicators for the Open Working Group (2013 and 2014). (UI 1.5)
3.	The SRHR Alliance was invited to participate in strategic consultation with a small group from the MoFA on the post-2015 development framework (June 2014). (UI 1.4)
4.	The outcome document of the Open Working Group includes 1) a target for sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights; 2) references to the ICPD Programme of Action and the Beijing Platform to Action, as well as both of their reviews and related conferences in the Chapeau and 3) a target to ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health care services by 2030 (final session in July 2014). (UI 1.5)

Relevance:

In the SRHR Alliance theory of change, SRHR is conceptualised as being at the heart of development issues and therefore should be included in the post-2015 development framework. The explicit link between the ICPD Operational Review and the beyond-2015 development agenda is also important to avoid repeating the situation that happened with the MDG framework: When the MDGs were originally developed, SRHR was left out entirely. After five years, universal access to reproductive health was added to the framework, but being five years late in determining indicators led to this being one of the most off track targets in the framework. Establishing the link between the ICPD and post-2015 processes as early as possible in the evolution of the post-2015 development framework is crucial.

While the High Level Panel Report does not have the status of UN-agreed language, it is an important input in the post-2015 development agenda. The High Level Panel Report is part of the advising process for the elaboration of the global development framework beyond 2015. The High Level Panel Report was one of the inputs to the Secretary-General’s report to the Special Event towards Achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The High Level Panel report also directly informed the Special Event towards Achieving the Millennium Development Goals on 25 September 2013.

However, the draft of the Secretary-General’s report was much less positive than the High Level Panel report and finally only included reference to sexual and reproductive health. As for the work of the Open Working Group, the list of Sustainable Development Goals proposed by the Open Working Group were considered and acted upon by the General Assembly at its 68<sup>th</sup> session in September 2014. As such, this outcome document has a very crucial place in the post-2015 development process. The Secretary-General has recognised the outcome of the Open Working Group (something that the SRHR Alliance also worked towards) in the continuing process towards the post-2015 summit in September 2015.

Other UN-level Processes:

Table 10.5 Outcomes achieved: Other UN-level processes	
Agenda setting	
1.	The SRHR Alliance as a whole was invited to join the official Dutch delegation to the UN General Assembly High Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS (June 2011). One Alliance member joined the delegation as a representative of the Alliance. Two youth representatives from the Alliance were also part of the delegation. (UI 1.4)
Policy influencing	
2.	The Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) 55 outcome document contained more progressive language regarding SRHR (22 February–4 March 2011). (UI 2.1)
3.	The outcome document from CSW 58 included explicit links to the post-2015 development agenda, called for a standalone goal on gender equality and provided the first agreed language related to sexuality education at UN level leading up to the post-2015 process (March 2014). (UI 2.1)

Relevance:

Although SRHR Alliance members focus primarily on the ICPD and post-2015 processes, certain outcomes extend beyond these processes, and some Alliance organisations also claim contributions to other UN-level meetings and processes (listed above).

The 2011 High Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS was the first time that one member of the SRHR Alliance (the director of one of the member organisations) acted as a representative of the Alliance in international advocacy. This represented an opportunity to influence the outcome of the High Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS 2011 in favour of SRHR. Through the meaningful involvement of two SRHR Alliance organisations in the High Level Meeting on HIV and AIDS, the close link between SRHR and HIV/AIDS was emphasised. The positive outcome statements have been used to further lobbying and advocacy activities in favour of progressive SRHR worldwide.

Positive conclusions on SRHR by the influential UN Commission on the Status of Women provides an agreed precedent for in-country advocacy to advance the position of women and girls and for shaping the global debates about gender equality and the advancement and empowerment of women and girls. This precedent can then be used in further lobbying and advocacy efforts internationally to reach the SRHR Alliance goal of renewed commitment to SRHR in international frameworks after 2014. Because of the timing and theme of CSW 58, it was expected to feed directly into the post-2015 development framework. The language on education for human sexuality is important, because it could then be used in other UN-level conferences, such as the CPD, and possibly the post-2015 process. CSW 58 also contributed to setting the atmosphere for CPD 47.

Strengthening of international partnerships and networks between civil society and youth, government and UN bodies:

Table 10.6 Outcomes achieved: Strengthening partnerships

Agenda setting	
1.	The Dutch MoFA committed to appointing a Youth Ambassador for SRHR and HIV/AIDS in 2012 (Two-way Mentorship with the Dutch SRHR and HIV Ambassador). (UI 1.5)
2.	The Civil Society Platform to Promote SRHR Beyond 2015 was established in May 2012 with an SRHR Alliance organisation as one of three co-chairs, representing more than 2000 organisations. (UI 1.2)
3.	SRHR Alliance Southern partner organisations were increasingly linked to international SRHR advocacy networks (2011–2014). (UI 1.1, 1.2)
4.	An Alliance staff member was seconded to the MoFA for ICPD and the post-2015 process from 1 January 2014. In this role, the Alliance member was included on the CPD 47 delegation (2014). (UI 1.4, also Changing Practice UI 3.1)
5.	The Youth and ICPD Partnership was established by the Dutch MoFA in cooperation with two SRHR Alliance organisations. This is a partnership of young people, NGOs, UN organisations and national-level governments (announced in April 2012). (UI 1.4, also Changing Practice UI 3.1)
6.	One Alliance organisation was invited by UNFPA to join the Youth Leadership Working Group (2013). (UI 1.4)
7.	One Alliance organisation was invited by UNAIDS to join PACT, a collaboration of 25 youth organisations working on HIV and AIDS and SRHR in the post-2015 process (2013). (UI 1.4)
8.	Relationships between the SRHR Alliance and the MoFA were strengthened and maintained (2013–2014). (UI 1.4)

#### Relevance:

Some of these outcomes (outcomes 1, 4, 5 and 8), as well as certain outcomes classified elsewhere in this evaluation, work directly through strengthening or maintaining relationships between the SRHR Alliance and the MoFA. These relationships are relevant for achieving the overall alliance goal at international level through the pathway of influence operating directly through the Netherlands' participation in UN processes and through the diplomatic influence the Netherlands has over other countries. Especially given the prominent role of the Netherlands in speaking up for SRHR internationally, a good relationship with the MoFA is very important for influencing international agendas on SRHR. Having good contacts with the Ministry allows the Alliance to work to influence their standpoint on SRHR issues, work together with them to coordinate a stronger joint message and gain access to information about closed spaces (particularly UN spaces). The SRHR Alliance is also important for the MoFA because of the Alliance's access to a large civil society network and, consequently, to many countries. All of these things allow the SRHR Alliance to be more effective in their efforts to influence the international development agenda.

In light of the complexity of the processes and the large number of actors involved, worldwide, in the post-2015 development agenda and ICPD processes, there is a great need for progressive SRHR organisations to unite around shared goals and to strategize, rather than working against each other or duplicating each other's tasks haphazardly. The strength of this global network, when the constituent CSOs are able to speak with one voice, is much stronger internationally than the voice of any individual organisation ever could be. This allows for a broader outreach and a more significant impact. Knowledge sharing and capacity building are other benefits of working in a broad and varied network.

SRHR Alliance partners in both Indonesia and Malawi recognised that it is essential to work with larger networks to accomplish international-level change. However, interviews with partners in Indonesia revealed a potential downside to operating through international networks. Many Indonesian advocates stressed the importance of being very careful in the positions they take publicly, because expressing views that would be seen too much in contradiction with their

government's international-level viewpoints could result in damage to relationships with some key people in their government, hindering subsequent advocacy efforts.

Because of the perception held by many Indonesian partners that they should be cautious in expressing positions, and also because of a perception that the government seeks to avoid outside (international) influences, a few Indonesian partners felt that publicising a close association with an international NGO or an international network might be undesirable. For strategic reasons, these partners preferred to be visible as individual organisations or in national or regional networks, also in their international work.

### **10.3 Evaluation question 2: Contribution**

The previous section (see also Appendix 3: SRHR Alliance Outcomes) summarises outcomes at national and international level to which the SRHR Alliance claims to have contributed. In this section, we look more deeply into the contribution of the SRHR Alliance to two selected outcomes/outcome clusters, responding to evaluation question 2: Do the international lobbying and advocacy efforts of MFS II consortia and their partners contribute to the identified changes (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

#### *10.3.1 General description of Alliance contributions*

In line with the Alliance's national-level theory of change, all of the national-level outcomes to which the Alliance claims to have contributed involve parliament and/or the MoFA. Contributions at the national level are claimed to be achieved through the continual sharing of information (requested and unrequested) and expertise with members of parliament and with the MoFA, as well as building and sustaining contacts with both groups and organising meetings and events. Based on expert interviews and a review of documents (especially parliamentary transcripts), we conclude that these activities contributed to outcomes related to policy, funding and the continued strong support for SRHR on the Dutch development agenda voiced by both parliament and the MoFA. External informants consulted who had expert knowledge on the relevant outcomes universally praised the SRHR Alliance for their information-sharing efforts and close ties within the relevant spheres (parliament, the MoFA and broader society).

At international level, the outcomes centre on the ICPD and post-2015 development agenda processes, in which many actors with differing interests are involved over multiple years in determining the outcomes. In these complex, international processes, the SRHR Alliance usually works in close cooperation with international networks of SRHR advocates to bring about change. Therefore, the link between the SRHR Alliance and international outcomes can rarely be direct, and the contribution claims towards these outcomes are necessarily modest. To contribute to these outcomes, Alliance members took a leading role in strengthening partnerships and growing networks of likeminded CSOs, built and strengthened (formal and informal) relationships and partnerships with the MoFA, developed Southern partners' international advocacy capacity and network integration and participated in formal meetings around the ICPD and post-2015 processes.

#### *10.3.2 Selected outcomes/outcome packages*

##### *10.3.2.1 National level*

At the national level, the selected outcome for contribution analysis is the motion filed by Jasper van Dijk (SP parliamentarian and Chair of the MPI for SRHR and HIV/AIDS) in February 2014 requesting more transparency in reporting on the effectiveness of multilateral organisations receiving Dutch SRHR funding.<sup>390</sup> Specifically, the motion requests information in the yearly focal area reports justifying the selection of certain multilateral partners to receive Dutch SRHR funding, detailing their



impact and explaining how this supports Dutch SRHR policy goals. The motion was discussed in the 12 February 2014 General Meeting (Algemeen Overleg, AO).<sup>391</sup> After a small adaptation,<sup>392</sup> the motion was passed with high support during the 11 March 2014 Extended General Meeting (Vervolg Algemeen Overleg, VAO). It was signed by seven parliamentarians representing different parties.<sup>393</sup> In a letter to parliament on another motion, Minister Ploumen wrote that in general in the next budget, it will be stated clearly what amounts are going to different organisations, how this is linked to the policy priority areas of the Netherlands and what the impact has been.<sup>394</sup>

#### 10.3.2.2 International level

Overall, the resolution of the 47<sup>th</sup> session of CPD (CPD 47, 7–11 April 2014) was seen as positive, if somewhat less than the outcome desired by key actors.<sup>395,396</sup> The CPD 47 resolution<sup>397</sup> included language on human rights and sexuality, made a link between the implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action and the development of the post-2015 development agenda and maintained previously agreed language on SRHR. No new language on sexual rights was included in the final text, although the document does refer to the regional consultation documents (in which sexual rights are included) as a source of ‘region-specific guidance on population and development beyond 2014’. The resolution refers to human rights, ‘especially the human rights of women and girls, including sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights’ and to ‘comprehensive education on human sexuality’. The post-2015 development agenda is mentioned twice in the resolution.

CPD 47 set a new record for civil society participation at a CPD meeting, with more than 800 NGO representatives registering to attend.<sup>398</sup> Youth participation was also extraordinarily high, with over 100 young people participating.<sup>399</sup> More than 50 countries made progressive statements about SRHR issues at CPD 47, including countries that had not made progressive statements on SRHR before.<sup>400</sup>

Outcomes related to the ICPD process occur at multiple levels, are deeply overlapping and feed into each other in multiple, often complex, ways. For these reasons, we have selected a ‘package’ of outcomes to explore with regard to contribution analysis in this evaluation. Three linked positive outcomes that are part of the 47<sup>th</sup> CPD have been chosen<sup>401</sup>:

- Decision for a negotiated substantive outcome at the 47th CPD
- Mobilisation of progressive SRHR civil society, including youth, around the 47th CPD
- Unprecedented support for SRHR expressed by many countries, including the Netherlands, during the 47th CPD

Decision for a negotiated substantive outcome:

In the lead-up to the 47<sup>th</sup> session of the CPD, there was significant resistance to negotiations taking place. According to Alliance members and experts, a variety of perspectives led to the positions countries took on negotiations at CPD 47. Some countries wanted to avoid negotiations to prevent more progressive language from entering the resolution. Other countries worried that negotiations might lead to losses of progressive language already in the ICPD Programme of Action and resolutions adopted during previous CPDs.

After a drawn-out process to decide the CPD 47 modality, the Commission countries failed to reach consensus about a negotiated substantive outcome vs. a procedural resolution. Only in late March 2014, the CPD 47 Chair announced that there would be negotiations.<sup>402</sup> After the CPD began, a group of African countries led by Nigeria, Egypt and Cameroon continued to call to reverse the Chair’s decision and to produce a procedural document without substantive content, but the decision was not overturned. However, throughout the 47th CPD, the negotiation process was difficult and

hampered by failures in organisation, lack of a transparent chair and ongoing resistance by a group of African countries.<sup>403</sup> The meeting rooms were insufficient to accommodate the large numbers of CSO participants, and there were difficulties with CSO UN entry passes. More than 110 CSOs signed a letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General on the contribution of CSOs, including having five CSO speakers per plenary. Following this effort at the beginning of the week, changes increased the possibilities for CSO participation to some extent later in the CPD 47 week. Although CPD negotiations are always closed to CSOs in general (except for those on official delegations), the circumstances of CPD 47 led to a process that was less transparent and accessible to CSOs than previous CPDs.<sup>404</sup> On the first day, the negotiation room was too small for all of the delegates, and no negotiations took place. On the second day, conservative countries first attempted to block the negotiation process by refusing additions by the EU and later added large amounts of new text to slow the process down. The chair avoided 'clashes' by continuing country/region contributions but avoiding discussion on paragraphs. On Friday evening, the chair presented a final draft to be negotiated. These negotiations involved a very limited number of delegates and lasted until Saturday morning.

#### Mobilisation of pro-SRHR civil society, including youth:

Considering civil society of all types (including those opposed to SRHR), more than 800 NGO participants were registered for CPD 47, over 60 CSO representatives were included in 47 country delegations and 29 NGOs made plenary statements<sup>405</sup>. This was an unprecedented level of participation from civil society in the official CPD proceedings. Youth participation at CPD 47 was also extraordinarily high, with over 100 young people participating.<sup>406</sup> Of the 27 English-language statements made by CSOs at CPD, 18 were explicitly pro-SRHR.<sup>407</sup> Alliance members indicated, and key external informants confirmed, that civil society participation at CPD is important to put pressure on some governments and to assist others in the negotiation process.

#### Support for SRHR by many countries, including the Netherlands:

Many countries (more than 50, according to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development<sup>408</sup> and 59 governments on SOGI alone according to the International Planned Parenthood Association, IPPF<sup>409</sup>) from around the globe, including a number who had not spoken out before, made progressive statements about SRHR issues (including language on 'SRHR', comprehensive education on human sexuality, abortion and non-discrimination on the basis of SOGI) at CPD 47. These countries included Australia, Argentina, Brazil, the Cook Islands, Lebanon, Mongolia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, South Africa, Suriname, the United States, Vietnam, several European countries and many Latin America countries.<sup>410</sup> This level of support for SRHR was unprecedented, compared with CPD sessions of previous years. The Netherlands made four official plenary statements,<sup>411</sup> which included calls to end discrimination on the basis of SOGI, to guarantee legal safe abortion and to respect and protect young people's sexual and reproductive rights.

### 10.3.3 National level: Parliamentary motion on transparency in allocating SRHR funding

#### 10.3.3.1 Contribution narrative and evidence

The SRHR Alliance's claimed contribution to the selected national-level outcome follows their national-level theory of change (See Figure 10.1). This outcome falls under 'Parliamentary debates take place on quality of SRHR ODA spending'. The relevant pathways of change leading to this outcome work through parliamentarians being knowledgeable about SRHR and convinced of its importance. The most direct pathway works through the SRHR Alliance's good contacts with parliamentarians. These contacts, in turn, lead to parliamentarians trusting the SRHR Alliance. Also important is the pathway going through good cooperation between CSOs advocating for SRHR-

related issues. A step further removed is the contribution of the Alliance's longer-term lobby for SRHR to be well positioned in Dutch development aid to parliamentarians' knowledge of and support for SRHR.

The SRHR Alliance has long highlighted the importance of civil society funding in relation to other channels. Leading up to this specific motion, the Alliance saw the results of the IOB evaluation on SRHR<sup>412,413</sup> as crucial for strengthening and continuing their argument. The IOB evaluation indicated that multilateral organisations are not as effective at taking on taboo topics (such as abortion and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights) or at reaching marginalised or difficult-to-reach populations. Further, little is known about the beneficiary-level effectiveness of multilateral organisations, and results on three Dutch funding priorities (unsafe abortion, equal access to services and key populations) lag behind. The IOB evaluation pointed to an inconsistency between the explicit Dutch SRHR policy goals and the practice of allocating a large percentage of the total SRHR funding to multilateral organisations.<sup>414</sup>

Having seen the results of the IOB evaluation informally, the SRHR Alliance called parliamentarians' attention to the need for scheduling a separate debate on the evaluation after the Christmas recess at the MPI meeting where Lambert Grijns was introduced as the new Ambassador for SRHR and HIV/AIDS (20 November 2013) and in subsequent contacts. The separate debate on the IOB evaluation and the progress of the four focus themes was set during a procedural meeting.<sup>415</sup>

The SRHR alliance analysed the results of the IOB evaluation in detail,<sup>416</sup> raising several key questions. This analysis acknowledged that multilateral organisations have an added value to the overall SRHR policy, but asked whether more than half of the total SRHR budget should be spent via this funding channel and how and through which channel the Ministry decides to allocate additional budget to SRHR when it becomes available.

The Alliance knew that focusing on the IOB evaluation results about the need to make decisions regarding funding channels based on policy priorities and the related impact of (international) organisations in a motion would improve its chance of being adopted. In line with the position of their Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (Ploumen), coalition parties VVD and PvdA opposed the idea of fixing funding percentages for each channel but were willing to talk about effectiveness.

Following their analyses, the SRHR Alliance shared the idea for a motion through the MPI and contributed to its formulation. The Alliance had extensive contact with the MPI secretariat and with SP representatives, mainly by phone and email and in direct meetings. The SRHR Alliance provided input for the motion and discussed the matter with other parliamentarians. Prior to the 12 February 2014 debate (AO)<sup>417</sup> where the motion was discussed, the SRHR Alliance sent a factsheet<sup>418</sup> to parliamentarians with the conclusions of their analysis of the IOB evaluation on SRHR.

Evidence used to assess the contribution claim of the Alliance included transcripts of the AO and the VAO discussed above, copies of the Alliance's inputs to parliament and interviews with three external resource persons (two people who were involved in the process of filing this motion and one lobbyist active on broader related issues). These external experts were all well acquainted with the Alliance and their work.

External experts commented on the usefulness of the SRHR Alliance's analysis of the IOB evaluation. One resource person noted, 'I think an added value of the SRHR Alliance is that they really pulled out this point [being guided by effectiveness rather than channels] from the IOB evaluation', and was

convinced that the motion would not have been realised if the SRHR Alliance had not provided their analysis. Another external expert noted that the information provided by the Alliance was important specifically in motivating the request for a separate debate on the IOB evaluation.

External experts interviewed also confirmed the involvement of the SRHR Alliance in shaping the text of the final motion. They valued the contribution of the Alliance in this process, especially in providing advice on what other parties would likely support. One external person interviewed noted, 'They function like a spider in a web, between all other parties, and try to unite common interests in a motion like this one. And they managed very well'.

One external expert involved in developing the motion also confirmed the role of the SRHR Alliance in helping to build support for the motion in parliament: 'The SRHR Alliance might have had a kind of pivotal role in that they inform what a party thinks about the motion and that they pass this information to another party. They oversee how a motion will be valued. [...] They work towards getting people on one line, but that is very hard to make explicit. A lot happens informally. This was a clear example of how you can unite different parties on one line, and I do think that the role of [SRHR Alliance member] in this was important, that you help to think about a motion that is supported broadly by parliament, and maybe also communicate between members of parliament'.

#### 10.3.3.2 Alternative pathway and other factors and actors

We explored potential alternative pathways to reach this outcome in the context of the broader context around effectiveness in development cooperation. An ongoing, broader, non-SRHR-specific lobby on transparency and effectiveness in funding is led by Partos and expressed in their vision<sup>419</sup> and press releases.<sup>420</sup> There is also a longer-term debate on the role of civil society, stimulated by, in part, the policy document 'Wat de Wereld Verdient'.<sup>421</sup> Partos' non-specific lobby contributed to another motion to continue bilateral and multilateral support to civil society and monitoring this<sup>422</sup> and to Ploumen's promise to inform parliament about ODA budget per channel and the choices made based on results within the policy priority areas.<sup>423</sup> However, according to one of the key external experts consulted, there is no chance that the specific motion on SRHR funding proposed by van Dijk would have been realised without the input of the SRHR Alliance. Based on discussions with the three external experts and analysis of the Alliance's written inputs, the probability of this alternative pathway leading to a specific motion on transparency on funding for SRHR is not very high. It is also unlikely that, without intervention, the IOB evaluation would have resulted in a parliamentary request for a separate debate on transparency or restructuring of SRHR funding. The request for the separate debate was pivotal for the motion to be developed.<sup>424</sup>

However, it is also clear that the motion discussed here was not created in a vacuum. There are several factors that helped to achieve this outcome, including broader trends such as the call for transparency and effectiveness in funding for development cooperation and support—supported by many different actors both inside and outside parliament—and the fact that SRHR is high on the political agenda and is valued by many stakeholders.

Funding for development cooperation is moving away from channel choices to choices based on effectiveness. The motion can be seen as part of this broader, longer-term on-going discussion. One expert noted, 'It sends a much broader message to the government: I think this has been a good signal, to provide insight into the effectiveness of budget allocation'. There is broad support for being guided by effectiveness or 'what really works'. For example, analysis of written records of the AO, written ministerial responses and the VAO showed that parliamentarians and Ploumen seemed to be in favour of being guided by effectiveness rather than channels.<sup>425</sup> One of the experts explained,

‘When you look, for example, at the private sector, the IOB has also a report on this. It is in fact disturbing: We do not know what the impact is, whereas a lot of money goes to it, because it is the core business of Ploumen’s policy’.

The Netherlands has a long history of working on SRHR, and its expertise is valued worldwide. According to one of the experts, ‘The Netherlands distinguishes itself from other countries on SRHR and has an important niche function, especially on taboo topics’. Many stakeholders are convinced that SRHR development cooperation does work: ‘It is very clear that development cooperation has had effects in the last decades. [...] Efforts in health, of which SRHR is part, and education have surely had an effect.’ The fact that SRHR is high on the political agenda enabled the promotion of, in the words of one of the experts, ‘a well-functioning MPI’, which is represented and supported by almost all political parties. In addition, there is a special Ambassador on SRHR and HIV/AIDS who is ‘very engaged in SRHR’, according to one of the experts interviewed.

#### 10.3.3.3 Final assessment

The evidence available to support the SRHR Alliance’s contribution story on this outcome is very strong. There is also evidence of the Alliance’s work taking place in an enabling context created by a broader group of CSOs. While it would be impossible to determine with certainty whether an outcome similar to the one realised would have been enacted without the Alliance’s efforts, for this specific policy shift, the contribution of other actors (e.g. the alternative pathway described above) is more distant—it likely contributed to the conditions for realising this change but would not have been sufficient, by itself, to achieve this specific outcome. For this outcome, a very strong link can be made with SRHR Alliance activities. There is no doubt that the SRHR Alliance played a strong role in suggesting and shaping the motion for transparency in the distribution of SRHR funding. In short, as one external expert put it, ‘There’s no other way than the SRHR Alliance being behind this motion’.

#### 10.3.4 International level: CPD 47 Outcome cluster

##### 10.3.4.1 Contribution narrative and evidence

The claimed contribution for the selected outcomes around CPD 47 fits within the Alliance’s international-level theory of change (See Figure 10.2). CPD 47, which had the theme of the assessment of the status of the implementation of the Programme of Action of the ICPD, was identified as a key step in reaching the SRHR Alliance’s overall goal of the renewal of the SRHR agenda at UN level after 2014, in both the ICPD process and the post-2015 process. Having a negotiated substantive outcome was not mentioned explicitly in the theory of change as a desired outcome, as it was assumed that there would be normal negotiations (as had happened each year previously at CPD). However, several theorised pathways of change are dependent on having a negotiated outcome, so it became necessary to make this an advocacy focus when having a substantive negotiated outcome was suddenly called into question. The second selected outcome, the mobilisation of likeminded civil society, was mentioned explicitly in the SRHR Alliance’s theory of change at several points, including the involvement and coordination of CSOs and young people in decision making and advocacy efforts at international level and the participation of SRHR Alliance members and partners on national delegations. The third outcome chosen, involving the large number of pro-SRHR country statements made at CPD 47, relates to high-level desired outcomes specified in the Alliance’s theory of change: SRHR issues being considered key in different development topics by national governments and the government of the Netherlands prioritising SRHR in UN processes. The second and third chosen outcomes are clearly linked to each other: Through the mobilisation of likeminded civil society around the ICPD process, it is expected that

governments will become more aware and convinced of the need for progressive SRHR and prioritise SRHR in this process.

The SRHR Alliance contributed to these outcomes through a set of complementary strategies, acting through and with broader networks to lobby for negotiations, mobilise CSO to attend CPD 47 and advocate for SRHR at national level directly through the Netherlands MoFA and indirectly through the governments of their partners in the global South. The details of the contribution narrative and evidence are presented separately by each chosen outcome. Evidence used to assess the contribution of the SRHR Alliance to these international-level outcomes consists of publicly available documents, including CPD 47 statements and interviews with three international experts. Because much of this work was carried out in conjunction with international networks of SRHR advocates, we begin by introducing their general function and the overall role of the SRHR Alliance within the networks.

International networks of progressive SRHR advocates are important for each of the chosen international-level outcomes. These networks act as information-sharing and strategizing groups, often communicating via electronic listservs to exchange information leading up to and at the CPD meetings. There are multiple international networks active in this sphere. One network identified as important by Alliance members and external experts is the International Sexual and Reproductive Rights Coalition (ISRRC).<sup>426</sup> At CPD 47, representatives from this network met daily ‘to exchange information [...], develop lobby strategy [and to] determine who to approach [with] what message’.<sup>427</sup> CSO representatives on CPD 47 country delegations (including the Netherlands) shared information about the proceedings through these international networks, allowing subsequent actions to be taken.

The contribution of the SRHR Alliance in these networks was traced through 1) documents published online regarding preparation meetings (e.g. Civil Society Platform to Promote SRHR Beyond 2015<sup>428</sup>) and documents released at CPD 47 and 2) interviews with three external informants knowledgeable about the Alliance’s role in the network, especially in terms of network organisation and influencing the Dutch national position. In general, the SRHR Alliance organisations actively participated in exchanging information through the international networks and in some cases had a leading role in their organisation around CPD 47. External experts confirmed that the Alliance organisations are well known in the international networks (though generally as individual organisations) and that there is a strong perception of organisational differences in the focus of their contribution to the networks (e.g. youth, European level, international level and national Dutch level).

#### 1. Decision for a substantive negotiated outcome

The SRHR Alliance and likeminded civil society worldwide took action to ensure a negotiated substantive outcome from CPD 47, as they wanted, in the words of one of the internal informants ‘to talk about substance’, and, according to one of the experts, ‘a negotiated outcome will have more weight than a non-negotiated outcome’. The SRHR Alliance members lobbied for negotiations before and during the 47<sup>th</sup> CPD meeting using three overlapping approaches: a) through the international network; b) through EuroNGOs<sup>429</sup> and c) through the MoFA and the Western European and Others Group (WEOG).<sup>430</sup>

a) ISRRC member organisations, including the SRHR Alliance, took a strong stance in favour of negotiations at CPD 47. The ISRRC began pressing for negotiations in autumn 2013 and continued until the last day of CPD 47. A primary way of working was through encouraging Southern partner organisations to reach out to their governments on the issue of a negotiated outcome. There were

contacts with multiple countries and with Uruguay (the CPD Chair) to push through direct lobby for negotiations. SRHR Alliance members also actively encouraged their organisational Southern partners, particularly in Africa, to advocate their own governments to support a negotiated outcome at CPD 47. According to an external expert, the ISRRRC network helped to engage civil society from the South, bringing more national voices to the CPD: 'We had national advocates who can try and grab their government official in the corridor on a toilet break and... it's just better for [...] like a Kenyan to talk to a Kenyan, as opposed to say me speaking to a Kenyan'. The network also supported CSOs to lobby for a place on their official government delegations.

b) The SRHR Alliance, especially one member organisation, collaborated closely with several EuroNGOs members,<sup>431</sup> notably partners from the Countdown 2015 Europe consortium,<sup>432</sup> around negotiations leading up to CPD 47. Alliance member organisations were well represented at the EuroNGOs International Conference.<sup>433</sup> With Countdown 2015 Europe partners, a meeting for civil servants from the Nordic countries plus the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France was organised to discuss and prepare for the CSW, CPD and post-2015 processes. These partners are also part of the international network, and together worked on joint messages for the progressive European countries.<sup>434</sup> Alliance members believe that when civil servants from multiple countries receive the same messages from CSOs, 'that does influence positions and discussions' and has a 'multiplier effect'. This idea was also expressed by one of the external experts interviewed: 'You're stronger together, and I think having one cohesive message is just really important, because it makes that message so much stronger [...] The idea is if you say the same message to governments from different parts of the world, hopefully that will build up a momentum towards achieving our overall objective [...]'.<sup>434</sup>

c) The SRHR Alliance used direct lobby to push for negotiations through the Netherlands MoFA and the WEOG, of which the Netherlands is a member. The position of the Netherlands gradually shifted from being quite hesitant to being unopposed to negotiations. One Alliance member noted that 'they weren't still really enthusiastic', whereas others characterised the final Dutch position taken as more positive regarding negotiations. The SRHR Alliance lobbied actively for a substantive negotiated outcome through letters to and meetings with civil servants of the MoFA. Alliance members were confident that the lobby to the MoFA was successful, but it is not possible to establish the direct effect of this strategy through external evidence.

The Netherlands, along with some other WEOG countries, raised the question of what kind of outcome would help the ICPD review process. There were mixed opinions within the WEOG countries, with a minority of countries opposing negotiations. Internal interviews indicate that there were bilateral discussions between the Netherlands and WEOG countries that were opposed to negotiations, but again it is difficult to establish the importance of these contacts through external evidence. The final WEOG standpoint was to support the Chair of the Bureau of CPD in his decision to have negotiations.

## 2. Mobilisation of pro-SRHR CSOs including youth

All of the SRHR Alliance organisations involved in international-level advocacy were present at CPD 47. Individual SRHR Alliance organisations have contributed to a) strengthening and broadening international and European networks, b) training and supporting partner organisations to attend CPD 47 and c) organising side events and providing input to statements at CPD 47.

a) Over the long term, SRHR Alliance organisations contributed to the strengthening and broadening of networks of SRHR advocates, including setting up and taking a leading role in the Civil Society

Platform to Promote SRHR Beyond 2015<sup>435</sup> and its listserv. Other important international networks for (continued) collaboration around CPD include the CSW\_CPD listserv and the ISRRC and its listserv. According to one of the experts interviewed, one member organisation of the SRHR Alliance serves as one of the few core moderators of the CSW\_CPD listserv worldwide. Additionally, the same external expert affirmed that advocates of this Alliance member organisation have generally played a key organisational role in the ISRRC: 'They were one of the groups that proposed the working groups idea [...] and that played a monitoring role [...] making sure that the plans that were discussed in the network were being carried out and that information was being connected on everything'. This expert also indicated that the organisational role of the SRHR Alliance member organisation had declined somewhat in 2014, both because of an internal personnel change<sup>436</sup> and because there were more advocates involved to share the work. Another external expert confirmed that this Alliance member organisation 'took a really active role in leading a lot of the advocacy toolkits' related to the ISRRC listserv, which resulted in bringing more global Southern partners to the CPD and linking those Southern partners to the international networks. Both partners interviewed in Malawi confirmed the important role of the SRHR Alliance in supporting them to attend CPD 47 and in linking them to the international network. For one of these partners, CPD 47 was his first exposure to a meeting at that level. Furthermore, the SRHR Platform coordinating committee advocated towards the CPD Bureau for increased civil society participation. An Alliance organisation was a co-chair in the Platform on behalf of EuroNGOs.<sup>437</sup>

b) Several Alliance organisations contributed to training partner organisations and supporting them to attend CPD 47. One Alliance organisation (Simavi) organised a two-day international advocacy training session focused on CPD 47 in Nairobi that was open to other Alliance partners as well.<sup>438</sup> UFBR partners from Kenya (CSA), Malawi (YONECO) and India (CINI) attended, as well as Uganda and Ghana, both part of ASK. Rutgers WPF conducted two training sessions on international advocacy leading up to the CPD 47 for their organisational Southern partners: one in Istanbul for five Muslim countries including UFBR partners from Indonesia (who confirmed the usefulness of this training session during interviews in Indonesia) and the UFBR partner from Bangladesh and a second training in Kenya for CSOs from Kenya (including UFBR partners CSA and NAYA), Ghana (including ASK partner Curious Minds, Planned Parenthood Association of Ghana) and Senegal (including ASK partner Association Sénégalaise pour le Bien-Etre Familial). The participation of all Simavi partners (from Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, Malawi and India) was funded through UFBR; Rutgers WPF used other funding sources for attendance of their partners (from five Muslim countries, Kenya, Ghana and Senegal). In an interview with the Malawian partner attending, he confirmed the practical usefulness of this meeting in preparing him for the realities of CPD 47, noting that it was especially important to learn in advance to seriously engage with his national delegation on critical issues.

The training and support sometimes contributed to Southern partners joining their country delegations at CPD. Four SRHR Alliance organisations (dance4life, CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, Rutgers WPF and Simavi) had Southern partners (or, in one case, a field office) on their government delegations to CPD 47. This included partners from Ghana (2 partners), Indonesia, Malawi (plus one invitation to join the delegation that was declined), Pakistan, Peru, Senegal and Uganda.

SRHR Alliance organisations also supported some of their Southern partners to increase international advocacy capacity by sending targeted informative email communications and by working one-on-one with individual organisational partners on specific strategies. Both partner organisations visited in Malawi and two of those visited in Indonesia<sup>439</sup> confirmed receiving information about the ICPD process, including CPD 47, from the Alliance by email. According to the Southern partners, the



content of these messages included possible advocacy avenues, information about upcoming international meetings, overviews of the main issues at stake and general updates on ongoing international-level processes. The Malawian partners said that this information was practical and useful, and one partner was able to give examples of actions taken as a direct result of the information provided.

The former NPC for the SRHR Alliance in Indonesia (until April 2014) was very active in sharing information received from the SRHR Alliance with the full Indonesian Alliance, translating many documents into Bahasa for those who were not comfortable with English. The research took place during a time of transition (the new NPC was hired in June 2014, and the data collection took place in July), when there had been a short-term halt in this information sharing. The partners in Indonesia were mixed in their views of the usefulness of the information that had been sent; one did find the information useful, whereas another partner felt that, in the absence of any specific organising effort or significant dedicated international advocacy budget, simply being aware of international-level processes did not facilitate any productive action. (It must be again noted, however, that active support for involvement in international advocacy of the type referenced by the latter partner was not a part of the ILA programme during the implementation phase, although Alliance members continued to do as much as possible despite the cut of the IACA programme.)

c) At CPD 47 (as in previous years), CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality contributed to hosting and organising the Youth Caucus<sup>440</sup> before the conference in order for young people to learn about advocacy and to strategize together.<sup>441</sup> In 2014 for the first time, the Youth Caucus was organised through the Youth Leadership Working Group, a collaboration of youth organisations and UNFPA founded after the Bali Global Youth Forum (2012). Through the reach and financial support of this new working group, participation in the Youth Caucus was made more geographically diverse compared with previous CPDs. Over 100 young people representing CSOs attended the Youth Caucus. One expert testified that 'CHOICE took quite a leading role in facilitating the Youth Caucus and in helping with the organisation of it'.

Additionally, the Youth and ICPD Partnership continued. Through this partnership, CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, dance4life and the Dutch MoFA organised a side event on meaningful youth participation at CPD that was attended by more than 100 people.<sup>442</sup>

Alliance organisations contributed to several CSO statements made at CPD 47. Rutgers WPF and partners made an NGO statement on behalf of a cross-regional group of civil society advocates,<sup>443</sup> and CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality endorsed two other statements.<sup>444</sup> According to one Alliance member, 'The CSO statements at the CPD 47 were [...] very strong and received quite some support in the room'. Furthermore, Alliance organisations contributed via their active membership of broader networks to several of the pro-SRHR CSO statements.<sup>445</sup> The SRHR Alliance also came together around a small network-strengthening activity at CPD 47, distributing an 'SRHR for All' pin and flyer.

### 3. Support for SRHR by many countries, including the Netherlands

The SRHR Alliance contributed to this outcome a) through international networks and NGOs in countries expressing their unprecedented support for SRHR, b) to the position of the EU and c) to the position of the Dutch delegation during the 47th CPD.

a) Alliance organisations contributed indirectly via their active membership in broader networks to the pro-SRHR position of countries worldwide. According to one of the external experts interviewed, 'Some of [the ISRRC's] civil society partners were invited to help draft the country statements, and

also I think that's why some of them were quite pro-SRHR'. There was a continuous push at country and regional level around the regional and thematic meetings as well as the national consultations leading up to CPD 47. Alliance efforts to this end included supporting Southern partners to attend their regional meetings. Looking at the two cases chosen for this evaluation, the NPC in Indonesia was part of the official delegation to the Sixth Asian and Pacific Population Conference (UNESCAP, 2013, Bangkok). A second Indonesian partner reported extensive advisory contact with her government's delegation at this meeting, as did a Malawian partner with his government's delegation at the UNECA/AU conference in Addis Ababa.

One individual Alliance member expressed the view that the strong outcomes from the regional meetings may have in some cases fuelled the opposition group's resistance. The ISRRC and its individual organisational members directed advocacy efforts towards influencing governments, and it is clearly the case that the SRHR Alliance member organisations work actively in this network. However, because of the complex nature of this outcome, and as is readily acknowledged by the Alliance members themselves, it was difficult to identify evidence establishing a concrete link between the efforts of the Alliance organisations and the specific statements made by countries at CPD 47.

b) Through their work in an EU-level network (as well as with the Dutch government directly), the SRHR Alliance worked to influence the voice of the EU bloc at CPD 47. There was no clear consensus within the EU on two paragraphs of the resolution related to SRHR issues. The Netherlands and Germany took the lead in coordinating a position among the European member states wanting to speak out in favour of SRHR. According to an Alliance member, this resulted in about 22 of the 28 member states and some other countries supporting SRHR language. The SRHR Alliance advocated a break in the EU bloc on SRHR—meaning that there would not be consensus on this issue within the EU bloc—so that it would be possible to advocate strong pro-SRHR language. Although it is likely that the Netherlands would have been part of the EU group making a strong pro-SRHR statement even without the contributions of the Alliance, it is less likely that the Netherlands would have taken a main leading role in developing this statement if an SRHR Alliance member had not been seconded to the MoFA as the key person on the ICPD process. These contribution claims of the Alliance are plausible and were repeatedly indirectly confirmed by internal documents and interviews. One interview with an external expert also confirmed the general usefulness of having a CSO representative available with the expertise to contribute to the EU joint statement.

c) Related to the previous point, the Dutch position at CPD 47 was strongly in favour of SRHR. In this, the SRHR Alliance's long-term work with the MoFA throughout the ICPD review process was critical. This long-term work had resulted in having an SRHR Alliance staff member on secondment at the MoFA throughout 2014 working to prepare for ICPD and the post-2015 process. This staff member had a significant effect in processes leading up to CPD 47 and led negotiations at the meeting for the Netherlands. For example, as was mentioned in the above paragraph, having this staff member at the MoFA allowed the Netherlands to take a leading role in the rapid drafting of a joint statement on SRHR for many EU countries while at the CPD. In an interview, an external expert commented that the MoFA is 'continually asked to react ad hoc-', and that they 'lack capacity' for 'more in-depth analysis that require more time'. This expert went on to state explicitly that the presence of the SRHR staff member at the MoFA gave them the time and expertise to deliver useful input in such situations. Ahead of CPD 47, a preparation and strategizing meeting for the full Netherlands-based CPD 47 delegation and CSO representatives was organised at the request and in collaboration with Share-net. At this meeting, which was attended by SRHR Alliance members and one other CSO

representative, SRHR Alliance members presented a joint analysis of the Global Review Report and chair's summary and joint language recommendations based on the CPD 47 Zero Draft. Three of the Dutch government's CPD 47 statements were written by the MoFA, and the youth delegate (a member of an SRHR Alliance organisation, CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality) wrote his own statement, which was reviewed by the MoFA.<sup>446</sup> The statement of this youth delegate and also the statement of Lambert Grijns, Ambassador for SRHR and HIV/AIDS gave valuable insights into sexuality in the Netherlands and youth, and external accounts indicate that both statements were valued.<sup>447</sup>

#### 10.3.4.2 Alternative pathway and other factors and actors

The contribution of the SRHR Alliance at the international level is hard to verify with external, objective evidence. This is because the Alliance organises their international-level efforts with and through larger networks, and the processes they seek to influence are very large—with a multitude of actors and factors contributing to the changes realised. Given the modest nature of the SRHR Alliance's contribution claim, alternative pathways are also difficult if not impossible to describe. When asked to consider alternatives to the different parts of the contribution narrative described above, external experts often fell silent or struggled to answer. One expert believed that some outcomes would likely have been accomplished without the leading role of the Dutch government; for example, another country probably would have taken the lead together with Germany in coordinating a strong EU position. No evidence provided an alternative to the international network of SRHR advocates having at least some impact on the outcome examined in this section.

The consensus among the experts interviewed was that working through transnational advocacy networks is the most effective strategy to influence processes and actors at UN-level meetings such as CPD 47. One expert contemplated the added value of international networks: 'What the international network brings is intelligence, because [...] national partners [...] often do not have access to some of the information'. This expert added that the networks were useful in supplementing national partners' capacity, noting that, for national partners, sometimes 'it's hard to conceptualise and understand', because 'the way that politics plays out at national level vs. at the global level can be very different'.

At the international level, a number of key organisations in the field of SRHR, like the International Women's Health Coalition (IWHC),<sup>448</sup> the Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID),<sup>449</sup> and IPPF<sup>450</sup> play a key role within the ISRRRC. According to one expert, the ISRRRC facilitated CSOs in coordinating input to the negotiations and gaining support to attend CPD 47: 'Before this, international activism was much more divided.'

One external expert expressed reservations regarding the current geographical inclusivity of the ISRRRC, noting that the voices of Western European and North American organisations as well as larger organisations are much more powerful within the coalition: 'The ISRRRC itself is not a regionally representative group. Whenever we have had phone calls, it is very Western European and North American heavy, with maybe a few representatives from Asia or Africa or sometimes the Latin group... There's rarely anybody from the Arab group'. The same expert reflected later in the interview, when asked about working with diverse CSO groups through the ISRRRC, 'I do sometimes think there are a few voices that are probably stronger and louder than the others, and often if you disagree with them, then you will get shouted down. And it's really difficult because there is an imbalance of power dynamics within the group, for a whole host of reasons'. In terms of supporting partners from the global South, this expert's final reflection was that the ISRRRC is self-reflexive regarding the necessity of providing more support and training where needed, and she praised one

SRHR Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) for being the one who pointed to that need within the coalition.

Many NGOs in developing countries, including those where politics are not in favour of SRHR, appreciate the leading role of the Netherlands on SRHR topics, Dutch development cooperation and especially support provided by Dutch civil society. One expert explained: 'Although the Netherlands is a small country, they fund many SRHR projects, which is highly valued internationally. NGOs in developing countries appreciate the funding by the Netherlands and also the support by the SRHR Alliance in putting comprehensive sexuality education and safe abortion on the agenda. They dare to do that.' Having an Ambassador on SRHR and HIV/AIDS also positively influences the Dutch position on SRHR at international level.<sup>451</sup>

There were also a number of factors that hampered negotiations at CPD 47. One of the main factors, according to one of the experts, was the poor organisation of the meeting: 'This amazes me endlessly. You would think the UN is doing this for more than 60 years and has a lot of experience to organise conferences. You expect there is a format and they follow that.' Alliance members and experts remarked that the CPD was significantly more 'closed' than previous CPD sessions, limiting opportunities for CSO involvement. Negotiations were also hindered by the lack of facilitation by the Chair. According to one Alliance member, 'The lack of transparency from the chair and the CPD Bureau has definitely limited our space of influence as well'.

#### 10.3.4.3 Final assessment

Because the complexity of the processes in question and the large numbers of actors involved, the SRHR Alliance chose to work in conjunction with large international networks of advocates, in which many organisations are represented.<sup>452</sup> Each external expert interviewed confirmed the usefulness of this strategy. However, these factors cause the links between the SRHR Alliance and the international-level outcomes achieved at CPD 47 to be necessarily distant. Correspondingly, the SRHR Alliance's contribution narrative is in most cases modest and always acknowledges the contribution of multiple additional actors, worldwide. Our general approach involved assessing a) the overall contribution of international networks where the SRHR Alliance is active and b) the direct contribution of the SRHR Alliance to the functioning of these networks. Treating the latter of these first, we find ample evidence demonstrating that Alliance members played a strong role in the international network.

Main contributions of Alliance member organisations to the international networks involve being active as a member; taking organisation and leadership roles in international (e.g. ISRRRC, Civil Society Platform to Promote SRHR Beyond 2015) and European (e.g. EuroNGOs, Countdown 2015 Europe Consortium) networks; facilitating the integration of Southern partners in these networks; conducting training sessions and providing individual support and financing for Southern partners; organising side events at CPD; and strategizing with the Netherlands MoFA through preparation meetings and providing input in country statements. Outcomes at Dutch level seem to have benefited significantly from having a youth representative from the SRHR Alliance on the delegation at CPD 47 and having another Alliance organisation staff member on secondment at the MoFA. One of the main contributions of the SRHR Alliance is, in the words of an internal informant, 'that members in the SRHR Alliance [...] bring [...] institutional memory of SRHR discussions that the Ministry doesn't always have'. The strategizing together by the SRHR Alliance and the MoFA seemed to be more than observed at T1 in 2012. One external expert remarked: 'It's really a nice model of partnership and working with their government ...I see really good work coming out of that'.

However, it is difficult to make a concrete link between the different actions of the network and the more distant international-level outcomes. One expert clearly stated that it will never be known if these actions truly tipped the scale in UN-level decisions: ‘We never know what happened in the Bureau, and whether it was the UN agencies, whether civil society, whether certain governments, whether all of the above—we never know.’

#### **10.4 Evaluation question 4: Efficiency**

This section concerns efficiency, responding to evaluation question 4: Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?

##### *10.4.1 Theory of efficiency*

With a relatively limited budget drastically reduced from the originally planned ILA programme, members of the SRHR Alliance ILA working group have sought ways to do the most possible with the fewest resources for the duration of the programme. The most wide-reaching decision was to focus on low-resource activities such as one-to-one lobby and information sharing and network building through electronic communication. The Alliance generally chose not to focus on large public campaigns or events. At T1, the Alliance already focused on lower-resource activities, but this tendency had strengthened by T2 because of the cancellation of two large organisational events (Simavi’s Estafette and Moedernacht, which was organised by Rutgers WPF). However, Alliance members do not completely rule out the effectiveness of a public campaign organised with a specific purpose; it is simply not financially possible with the budget allocated to this project by most of the organisations involved.

At national level, the main lobbying and advocacy activities undertaken by Alliance members have few associated costs. Several Alliance members indicated that main cost associated with the SRHR Alliance ILA work at national level is the salaries of the advocates. At international level, significant costs include travel to regional and international meetings for the Dutch Alliance members and for Southern partners. Three organisations also conducted training sessions for Southern partners specifically on international advocacy. SRHR Alliance members work with the general principle of making efforts to minimise the costs of this travel. For both the national and the international groups, there is also money spent on occasional activities (e.g. the Happy Box for new parliamentarians, the ‘SRHR for All’ pin and information sheet at CPD 47).

Because a significant portion of the ILA budget is spent on person-hours, especially when looking only at the national-level project, it is also important to consider time efficiency. Alliance members actively planned from early stages for an efficient division of labour within the ILA group. The ILA working group has a rotating chair and vice-chair to ensure that the workload associated with chairing the group is distributed evenly across the five organisations over the years of the programme. Additionally, the Alliance has planned to have a lead person for each advocacy topic so it is clear who is responsible for the main work and the division of tasks within the group.

##### *10.4.2 Efficiency in practice*

In terms of both time and money, Alliance members make efforts to work efficiently by getting multiple benefits out of a single action. For example, when organisational partners visit the Netherlands, the visits are coordinated among Alliance members to ensure multiple meetings take place if necessary (for example, with the individual organisation and with the Alliance office, as well as a visit to parliament and the MoFA). Additionally, when Alliance organisations do host (non-Alliance) public events, they invite their SRHR Alliance advocacy colleagues, who are sometimes able to use the opportunity to strengthen contacts with the decision makers present.

The SRHR Alliance ILA group conducted a strengths and weaknesses analysis of all members to assess possibilities for a natural division of recurring tasks (e.g. budget tracking and analysis). At national level, Alliance members also roughly divided parliamentarians, so that, in general, a particular parliamentarian is always approached by the same Alliance member. This facilitated the Alliance members to build stronger relationships with certain parliamentarians in the limited time available.

Particularly in the national group, several Alliance members remarked on the potential (time) inefficiency of processes requiring formal approval from organisations (i.e. if an official letter is to be sent to the MoFA). The group is in discussion with the Alliance office and the directors to smooth this process.

When booking travel for themselves or for partners, Alliance members travel in economy class<sup>453</sup> and select tickets based on a combination of cost and convenience. The Alliance tries to save money where possible on accommodations. For example, the accommodations selected by one Alliance member for herself and her Southern partners attending CPD 47 led to some partners complaining that it was 'not what they had expected'. However, decisions of this type are managed at the organisational, not the Alliance, level. In the two selected cases for contribution analysis, Southern partners confirmed controls, checks (e.g. the necessity of submitting receipts, audits) and limitations on spending by their individual organisational partners.

#### *10.4.3 Mechanisms for improvements and adaptations*

Regular meetings and a yearly 'heidag' provide opportunities to discuss issues of efficiency, workload and division of labour. Increasing efficiency was a major reason for changing the structure of the ILA working group meetings (described in section 10.1.1). Beginning in 2013, the working group divided their meetings into separate subgroup meetings for the national and international teams (with flexible planning) and synergy meetings held with the entire group (every two months). The synergy meetings are meant to discuss only planning on crosscutting issues that affect both subgroups. On reviewing this meeting structure, the Alliance members realised that the synergy meetings continued to be inefficient, not moving beyond updating each other on ongoing work happening in the subgroups. The Alliance members then committed to send updates in writing on the subgroups before the synergy meetings so that the synergy meetings themselves could be used for strategic discussions.

### **10.5 Evaluation question 5: Explanatory factors**

This section proposes factors that may explain the findings on the first four evaluation questions, responding to evaluation question 5: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The explanatory factors are divided into internal factors, external factors, the interplay between these two and the role of the issue being addressed.

#### *10.5.1 Internal factors*

At national and international level, the SRHR Alliance contributed to achieving many changes relevant in light of their theories of change (as reconstructed for this evaluation). In describing internal factors important for explaining the findings in this evaluation, we draw upon the concept of organisational capacity, operationalised through the 5Cs framework.<sup>454</sup> A full mapping of the organisational capacity of the SRHR Alliance and its member organisations was considered beyond the scope of this evaluation and was not conducted, but we used relevant aspects of the 5Cs framework in the analysis for this evaluation question.

Changes achieved at national level (regarding the positions and commitments of the Netherlands government and parliamentarians on SRHR and the ODA funding allocated to SRHR by the Netherlands) operate through pathways involving the MoFA and/or parliament. Consequently, the achievement of these outcomes was universally facilitated by good relationships between the SRHR Alliance and the MoFA as well as parliamentarians. The SRHR Alliance's capability to act and commit is a relevant explanatory factor: They showed themselves capable of developing a focus and then acting jointly to achieve shared goals. This included working to mobilise SRHR 'champions' within parliament, constructing convincing cases for issues of importance and conveying their messages and goals effectively to parliamentarians and the MoFA. The Alliance also constantly monitored developments in parliament and the MoFA and, over the long term, maintained and built trusting relationships with key members of both groups that allowed them to take action by appealing to a relevant contact at the right moment (capability to deliver on objectives).

At international level, the changes achieved centre mostly on the ICPD and post-2015 processes. Changes were achieved through influencing UN-level agencies, the Netherlands government and the governments of partner countries. Considering the large-scale processes involved at international level, working in international networks to achieve change is crucial. Alliance members and partners, as well as external experts, universally stressed the importance of pro-SRHR CSO networks speaking with a single voice. The deep integration of individual SRHR Alliance organisations within international networks of SRHR advocates (capability to relate) therefore serves as an explanatory factor for their ability to contribute to outcomes occurring at international level. However, this way of working also explains why it is difficult to trace and distinguish the full and specific contribution of the Alliance under evaluation within these processes.

Many of the outcomes achieved by the SRHR Alliance at both international and national level reflect the Alliance's capability to adapt and self-renew. The changes in the theories of change at both national and international level reflect the presence of this capability in the Alliance. At national level, had they been unable to expand their overall goal to focus more on the quality of SRHR spending when external circumstances made that more possible and necessary, for example, it is unlikely that they would have contributed to the achievements linked to increased transparency in funding for SRHR. At international level, the details of the post-2015 process, in particular, were so vague at the time of our baseline data collection that, if the Alliance had been unable to adapt their approach as more information became available, it is difficult to imagine that they would have made any relevant contributions in this arena. Additionally, their reflexive approach to the overall structure of their working group and meeting setup (See sections 10.1.1 and 10.4) likely contributed to increasing time efficiency under challenging circumstances.

At both levels, the ability to act in a timely fashion was important for explaining many of the changes achieved. This involves following and responding quickly to expected and unexpected developments (e.g. policy cycles in the Netherlands and at UN level, statements made by Dutch MoFA representatives in national or international public fora). To enable this kind of response, it is necessary to define the relevant arenas and to carefully and continually monitor developments in those arenas. In terms of the 5Cs framework, this relates closely to the capability to deliver on objectives. Through their careful following of developments, maintaining of strong strategic relationships and regular information-sharing and strategic communication (internally and through larger networks) the SRHR Alliance was consistently strong in this kind of response.

However, some Alliance members also noted the potential usefulness of acting proactively to shift the agenda in a positive and new way. One Alliance member suggested that the reason for difficulties

with this kind of longer-term strategy may have to do with organisational differences: 'I think the difficulty, also with longer-term planning, especially with agenda setting, is that we are still quite different. We're all SRHR, but for example only a few of us work on maternal mortality. [...] So I think that's one of the difficulties that we haven't been working more proactively and doing agenda setting, because, apart from SRHR, what is our joint agenda?'

The SRHR Alliance's capability to relate is also a key explanatory factor. At both national and international level, building and maintaining networks is important. For both levels, the starting point for networking is the association between the five organisational members of the SRHR Alliance. Alliance members noted that, while some organisations had loosely worked together in the past, the MFS II framework brought a new level of intense and sustained collaboration that allowed them to build trust between the Alliance member organisations and between individual Alliance members across the organisations. Alliance members described the Alliance as their 'inner circle' and 'closest colleagues'.

At national level, being able to cooperate productively with CSOs from other sectors (especially HIV/AIDS and gender) was important in achieving outcomes, especially those operating through parliament. This collaboration was managed despite some tensions—most clearly a conflict of interest that arose with STOP AIDS NOW! around the motion for increased transparency on SRHR funding through multilateral organisations in relation to the advocacy of STOP AIDS NOW! for funding for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (capability to relate, capability to balance diversity and achieve coherence).

Across levels, the Alliance has faced the challenge of adapting the scope of the issue to be something that all (networked) organisations involved can support (capability to relate, capability to balance diversity and achieve coherence). This has been a challenge within the SRHR Alliance, as the five organisational members of the Alliance vary significantly (although all involved organisations are united around the lobby and advocacy for SRHR). At international level, the challenge is intensified as the relevant network includes more partners and more geographical diversity. Common themes adopted in international networks will necessarily be broader than what is possible at national level.

Another factor explaining the findings of this evaluation involves the cumulative effects of good inputs provided and good relationships built with key individuals with parliament, the MoFA, UN agencies and CSOs at the national, regional (EU) and international levels by the Alliance since 2011, and by the individual organisations previously.

Finally, the findings regarding the SRHR Alliance throughout the evaluation period have been impacted by the original funding shift and uncertainty around the creation of the ILA working group (see section 10.1, as well as the baseline report). These shifts left the ILA working group in an uncertain position at the beginning stages of the ILA programme, and the eventual budget allocated for ILA was less than half of the original IACA budget,<sup>455</sup> with clear implications for both programming possibilities and staffing. These challenges at times may have contributed to difficulties with proactive joint organisation and planning, which Alliance members noted requires more time and preparation than reactive work, especially in the early years of the SRHR Alliance. At the time of this report, Alliance members were optimistic about increasingly acting in proactive ways, based on the experience of working together acquired over the years. Further, the cancellation of the IACA programme meant that the ILA working group began their work without a full and integrated plan. The reductions in the budget for ILA impacted the work of the international-level group most



directly; although significant outcomes were achieved regarding Southern partners' involvement in international-level advocacy, these were clearly limited by the sudden shift in the funding available.

As a result of the cancellation of the IACA programme, the SRHR Alliance ILA group was placed in a position where they needed to determine (quickly) what was possible and how they could still work together. At international level, this likely contributed to the individual organisational members continuing to work mostly independently within the international network (especially in the first years of the SRHR Alliance). As one member noted, 'The international advocacy group, up to now, has mainly been about informing each other'. The cancellation of the IACA programme also led to communication channels with Southern partners being largely limited to contacts between individual Dutch organisations and their own Southern partners. Responding to a question about international advocacy work with partners of other Alliance member organisations, an Alliance member remarked, 'I don't have the responsibility to work with their partners on international advocacy. [...] And that's because we don't have [the] ILA [programme]. If we would have had [the] ILA [programme], this would have happened. Then we would have been one, and would have pooled our partners and would have trained them all together and then taken them to international conferences. But that is not part of the programme'. Accordingly, in the Indonesian case, members of two of the three Alliance partner organisations engaging in international-level advocacy expressed feeling disconnected from the overall Alliance's international advocacy programme and a desire to receive more in-depth information ('We don't have a strong relation between the Alliance here and the Alliance in the Netherlands'; 'Since the Dutch Alliance is more focused on international advocacy and they attend so many international advocacy meetings... And, for us, we only attend occasionally on several meetings, and I think it is important to get the picture of what's going on at the international level—we need to know all the details, but we only get those updates... or we only search it in Google.'), and some cited a lack of internal long-term strategy and planning at international level ('We did not really organise: We just said, oh, there's this meeting, okay we will come. There's no specific advocacy agenda or timeline or planning that we've been working with').

This sentiment is likely at least in part a consequence of the choice made at the beginning of the MFS II funding period not to budget for these kinds of connections between the (national-level) advocacy of the partners and the advocacy at international level. It also does not fully reflect the complete picture of Alliance work with Southern partners, including those in Indonesia. The international ILA group within the SRHR Alliance did, voluntarily, 1) make significant efforts to increase capacity for international advocacy among the broader group of Southern partners and 2) work to integrate multiple Southern partners in the international network of SRHR advocates. Rutgers WPF worked to involve partners, including the Indonesian partners, as much as possible through Skype and email updates as well as preparations for international meetings. According to SRHR Alliance members and confirmed by interviews with partners in Indonesia, the Indonesian partners consistently communicated differently and much more positively on the connection and cooperation between the Dutch Alliance members and the Indonesian partners during the implementation phase, when it was regularly communicated that Indonesia was doing fine in terms of advocacy. In fact, this message was also confirmed by the many advocacy results achieved by the Indonesian partners, including being part of the Indonesian government delegation to the CPD meetings in 2012 and 2013, the extensive presence of ASV members and the very progressive language achieved at the Global Youth Forum in Bali in 2012 and the progressive language put forward by the Indonesian government at the Asian and Pacific Population Conference (2013).

The above remarks of the Indonesian partners should also be interpreted in light of the recent changes in the Rutgers WPF Indonesian office—specifically, the resignation of the NPC and director of Rutgers WPF Indonesia shortly before the data collection for this report. She was key in the international advocacy of the Alliance in Indonesia and was, by all accounts, active in informing other Indonesian partners about international advocacy and, when possible, taking them along to international-level meetings to help them build capacity. Although the interview extracts above were not explicitly in reference to these changes, it is possible that the interviewees' remarks were, to some extent, in reaction to perceived uncertainty during a period of change.

In sum, the cancellation of the IACA programme and the consequent loss of funding for ILA efforts undoubtedly influenced the ILA working group's way of working, but the amount achieved—including through working with international partners—is remarkable.

Differences in capacity between the Alliance organisations also presented a challenge for the SRHR Alliance throughout the evaluation period. The decision about how much funding to cut from the ILA programme was made at individual organisational level, resulting in strong differences between the organisational members in terms of personnel and funds available for ILA. This sometimes led to frustrations within the SRHR Alliance: on the part of staff of organisations with fewer hours available, when they had difficulties combining SRHR Alliance work with their other duties; among staff working for organisations with more hours available, when they perceived unfairness or a lack of clarity at organisational (not personal) level in terms of who would do what. As one Alliance member remarked, 'In the end, it is a voluntary alliance. The ILA programme doesn't exist. It's a voluntary collaboration on advocacy, so it all depends on all of our input and the time we dedicate to communicating with each other and sharing [...] so that's of course a difficult dynamic'. One Alliance member noted that the increased collaboration between the international and national groups (discussed in section 10.2.1.7) was facilitated by the increasing capacity in the team, as the team grew and as the member organisations developed experience and knowledge on international advocacy.

#### *10.5.2 External factors*

The experience of the SRHR Alliance throughout the evaluation period highlights the fact that the types of goals aspired to in their lobbying and advocacy work were highly dependent on external frameworks and policy timescales. Through the years of the evaluation, we have observed ebbs and flows in what was accomplished at national and international level. It almost goes without saying that much of this variation in accomplishments is a result of external challenges and opportunities offered by, for example, a new Dutch government developing their policy on SRHR in 2010, and again in 2012, or the UN delving into a worldwide review of the 1994 ICPD Programme of Action and a reformulation of the international development agenda for the coming decades. These years have been critical for SRHR, opening tremendous opportunities, but also tremendous risks, for the SRHR Alliance and other SRHR advocates. This context has meant that a great deal was at stake, raising the de facto relevance of outcomes achieved. Notably, one Alliance strategy at international level involved seeking to increase the stakes (i.e. pushing for a negotiated outcome at CPD 47). Combining national and international levels, with the MDGs coming to an end and the post-2015 development framework approaching, the MoFA increasingly had to explain and discuss their input to these processes in parliament. This created an opportunity to draw upon the expertise and contacts of both SRHR Alliance ILA projects (national and international) to influence the Dutch position.

As was introduced above, good relationships with parliamentarians and the MoFA are crucial for success, but these relationships can be fragile, personal and sensitive to external changes in the

political structure. The situation depends on the parties and parliamentarians currently in office. Important external aspects in this regard are individual officials' interest in SRHR issues and availability to dedicate time to these issues and, more generally, political parties' views on SRHR and on development cooperation overall. Because both parliament and, to a lesser extent, the MoFA, change regularly, the effort to maintain relationships with both are ongoing.

An important shift observed between T1 and T3 was that the founders of the MPI for SRHR and HIV/AIDS, those who were most committed to working through the initiative, had left parliament. At the same time, the Gender MPI began in 2012, and its founders currently remain in parliament. This resulted in a dynamic in parliament where general support for gender increased, attention for SRHR issues lagged somewhat and there was a danger of involved parties equating the two sets of issues. The Alliance's capability to relate then remained important, as collaboration with other members of WO=MEN and the network's secretariat was used to keep support high for SRHR.

At national level, the 2013 IOB evaluation of SRHR<sup>456</sup> was an external factor that the Alliance used as an opportunity to spread their ongoing message on the effectiveness of multilaterals vs. NGOs for achieving key Dutch SRHR policy priorities. The Alliance was able to use the results of this evaluation to build support for the parliamentary motion requesting transparency in the allocation of SRHR funding. In terms of challenges, the shift from aid to trade was identified as a potential risk to SRHR—again, particularly for more sensitive and taboo topics, which are very difficult to combine with a trade agenda. The Alliance responded to this risk in a timely way, pushing for commitment to support SRHR expertise in the embassies, especially as countries moved from aid to trade.

Changes achieved at international level were likely held back by an increasingly vocal resistance to SRHR from opposition groups and conservative countries at key meetings. Progress at CPD 47 (2014) was likely hampered by organisational and leadership issues, as well as a lack of transparency (described in section 10.3.4), all of which severely limited the possibilities for CSO involvement. Having negotiations at CPD 2014 opened possibilities for language advancement, especially considering the strong outcomes in the thematic and regional consultations leading up to this CPD, and was important to give political weight to the integration of the outcomes of the ICPD review into the post-2015 negotiations. However, at the meeting itself, organisational issues and a lack of transparency resulted in a severely limited space for civil society involvement.

### *10.5.3 Interplay between internal and external factors*

At international level, partly in response to an unpredictable and rapidly changing context, and partly out of necessity because of an initially uncertain, drastically cut internal budget, the SRHR Alliance ILA working group described their own approach at times as very much reactive, rather than proactive. The rapidly changing and unpredictable context described above, however, would in any case have required swift reactions and a high level of flexibility in response. These aspects of organisational capacity became more important because of the changing context.

At international level, the initial lack of information about key international processes (especially post-2015) occurring over the last few years created a situation in which broad networking was especially critical. In the initial uncertainty surrounding the events making up the post-2015 development process, networks were essential for exchanging information. Because information was scarce and the processes involved were so uncertain, the Alliance depended on their networks to share any discovered information. The Alliance also contributed heavily to information sharing in these networks.

#### *10.5.4 The role of the nature of the issue addressed*

In this section, we discuss how the nature of the issue (SRHR) serves as an independent factor that can contribute to explaining the findings of this evaluation, apart from the actions taken by the SRHR Alliance members. At both national and international level, when the SRHR Alliance worked through the Netherlands government, their work was undoubtedly facilitated by the longstanding position of the Netherlands as a worldwide champion of SRHR, particularly in terms of sensitive and taboo topics. Understandably, this reputation of the Netherlands, built over many years and based on concrete and valuable inputs made to SRHR issues, serves as a point of pride for the Netherlands government and parliament. This contributes to SRHR generally having broad support in parliament and to the MoFA being committed to advancing SRHR issues.

Especially at T3 (endline), the ongoing lobbying and advocacy efforts of the SRHR Alliance at national level were, to some extent, challenged by the Alliance's own success. In a time of economic downturn, SRHR issues had faced relatively few cuts (and, in fact, had even been allocated an increased level of funding, after funds were redirected from the Dutch Good Growth Fund). Given that SRHR was positioned relatively well, compared with the other policy focal points, it became difficult to make a case for further increases to the funding for SRHR.

At international level, the nature of the issue at stake is extremely complex, involving a multitude of stakeholders from around the world. The complexity of the issue at this level and the need for consensus of so many diverse actors means that any change achieved will usually be relatively slow. It also means that working towards a change must be done within larger networks of likeminded organisations and governments, representing perspectives from a geographically diverse membership base. SRHR issues are also often considered highly sensitive, and advocates sometimes face difficulties with raising certain issues at international level because they are considered to be local in nature—tied up with context-specific traditions, values and customs. This dimension, as well, increases the importance of working with broad networks to achieve legitimacy and 'palatability' of messages put forward.



# 11 Key Findings Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance

## 11.1 Introduction

This section parallels the third section followed by each of the clusters in this evaluation. However, the SRHR Cluster is unique in this evaluation in that it consists of only one Alliance. As such, the concept of a 'cluster synthesis' does not apply in this chapter, and this section is used instead to provide a brief summary of the key findings for the SRHR Alliance on each of the evaluation questions, with particular attention to the priority result areas and drawing upon the outcome indicators.

## 11.2 Key findings on changes achieved in the three priority result areas

The changes achieved at national level over the evaluation period were presented in two outcome clusters: 1) The Netherlands government's and parliamentarians' position and commitments on SRHR and 2) The ODA funding allocated to SRHR by the Netherlands government (see section 10.2.2 and Appendix 3). These changes span the policy priority areas of agenda setting, policy influencing and changing practice. At international level, changes achieved were mainly around the ICPD and post-2015 processes, with some changes related to other UN-level processes and an overarching set of outcomes linked to strengthening international partnerships and networks between civil society including youth, government and UN bodies. These changes were heavily geared towards the priority result area of agenda setting, with some outcomes for policy influencing and changing practice.

### 11.2.1 Agenda setting

The largest number of changes achieved at both national and international levels were classified in the priority result area of agenda setting. This finding is not surprising, as agenda setting changes were generally put forward in the theories of change as preconditions for reaching higher level outcomes, which might often require a longer time-scale to realise.

At national level, key agenda setting changes included public statements and commitments made by the Dutch government regarding funding for SRHR as well as directed parliamentary questions posed and requests made. The main agenda setting changes at international level included the mobilisation of broad civil society in favour of SRHR around the CPD meetings; invitations extended to SRHR Alliance members and partners to join official government delegations to UN processes, as well as invitations to participate in closed meetings and associations with UN agencies around the ICPD review process; invitations extended to the SRHR Alliance to participate as a collaborative partner with the MoFA around international processes; the increased integration of Southern partner organisations in international SRHR advocacy networks; and having key points taken up in international-level debates and documents. Partly because the ICPD process had progressed further than the post-2015 process over the evaluation period, somewhat more agenda-setting outcomes were observed in relation to ICPD.

As was the case at the time of the baseline report, all of the broad indicators for agenda setting identified in the uniform outcome indicators for this evaluation (see Chapter 2 for an explanation of the uniform outcome indicators) are relevant for the SRHR Alliance. Specific outcome indicators used (and their corresponding broad uniform outcome indicators–UI) are as follows:

- Extent of participation and/or leadership of Alliance members and partners in national, regional and international networks (including cross-sector networks) (UI 1.1)

- Extent of awareness of partner organisations and other Southern civil society regarding international framework processes (ICPD and post-2015), as well as the extent of their participation in these processes (UI 1.2)
- Number and nature of public commitments of decision makers to defend SRHR in Dutch policy (UI 1.3)
- Number of invitations received to 'closed' national and international meetings of relevance to SRHR issues (including number of invitations extended to SRHR Alliance member organisations, partners and other networked CSOs working on SRHR to serve on official national delegations to international decision-making meetings or to participate formally in and/or shape consultations surrounding setting new international frameworks) (UI 1.4, See also UI 3.1)
- Number and kind of questions submitted to and posed by parliamentarians, and points taken up in debate at national or international level (UI 1.5)

At national level, the majority of the outcomes observed fell under UI 1.5, relating to parliamentary questions asked, amendments filed or points taken up in debate. At international level, UI 1.4, relating to achieving access to 'closed' meetings relevant to SRHR issues, was the most common category. This category (UI 1.4) was not observed at all among changes achieved at the national Dutch level. The reason for this may be that 'closed' spaces around Dutch SRHR policy development are rare, and the Alliance has not engaged in strategies to gain invitations to additional fora in this arena. Changes involving influencing the terms of public debate through the introduction of civil society perspectives (UI 1.5) were the second most frequently observed category at international level. The cluster-specific indicator associated with UI 1.2 was international-specific, whereas the indicator associated with UI 1.3 was Netherlands-specific. Consequently, each of these categories was observed only at the relevant level. UI 1.1 was relevant for network integration and collaboration; one broad outcome indicator was included at both national and international levels.

### *11.2.2 Policy Influencing*

Changes in policy influencing were the second most frequent type of outcome observed at national and international level. Although the same is true, to some extent, for agenda setting changes, policy influencing is very much linked to opportunities created by policy structures and timetables.

At national level, crucial policy influencing changes included steps to ensure the appearance and maintenance of SRHR as one of the spearhead development priorities (through changing governments); official commitments to SRHR funding levels; the selection of SRHR as a policy priority by eight governmental partner countries, and later the assurance that the importance of SRHR expertise would be stressed in the embassies of those countries that were to move from aid to trade; and the new policy to increase the transparency in reporting on SRHR funding allocation and results. At international level, largely because of the opportunities available for policy change and the time-scale of the international processes of interest, important policy influencing changes mostly centred on CPD meetings and the ICPD review process. These changes included the defence of previously accepted language and some progress in language made at UN-level meetings (especially CPD meetings), progressive outcomes from all five regional conferences and thematic meetings in the ICPD process and the link between ICPD and post-2015 in the CPD 47 (2014) outcome document and in the outcome document from CSW 58 (2014).

Two broad uniform outcome indicators were defined to capture policy influencing: UI 2.1: Demonstrable changes take place by lobby/advocacy targets and 2.2: Demonstrable shift in

accountability structure for government. The specific outcome indicators for the SRHR Cluster defined for the endline report corresponded to the broad uniform indicator 2.1:

- Extent to which SRHR is stated as a priority in Dutch development policy overall (UI 2.1)
- Extent to which SRHR is chosen by specific embassies in Multi-Annual Strategic Plans (2012-2015) (UI 2.1)
- Number and kind of changes (or prevention of proposed changes) to language on SRHR at UN-level meetings (especially in ICPD beyond 2014 and interim meetings—CPD, thematic consultation meetings and regional consultation meetings) (UI 2.1)
- Extent and nature of inclusion of SRHR in the beyond 2015 framework (replacing the MDGs) (UI 2.1)

Because no change was anticipated regarding governmental accountability structures, no specific outcome indicator was defined ahead of time for UI 2.2. However, at national level, an important change corresponding to UI 2.2 was achieved: The parliamentary motion filed in February 2014 on transparency in allocating SRHR funding to multilateral organisations did result in a policy shift that will alter the long-term openness regarding the implementation of policies and results. The remaining policy influencing changes at national level, and all of the changes in this priority result area at international level, map onto the broad indicator of demonstrable policy changes (or preventing policy changes, UI 2.1).

### *11.2.3 Changing practice*

Outcomes reflecting changing practice were the least commonly observed in this evaluation and often represented longer-term outcomes following a series of necessary lower-level outcomes along the way. At national level, the outcomes achieved in changing practice involved the amount of ODA budget actually spent on SRHR; the shift towards stating clearly what amounts of funding for SRHR are going to different organisations, how this is linked to different priority areas of the Netherlands and what the impact of funding decisions has been; and the new initiative to earmark €5 million from the SRHR Fund specifically for abortion projects beginning in 2016. At international level, the changes achieved that are relevant for the changing practice priority result area involve the opening of CPD delegations for the first time to CSO participation, both in the Netherlands and in Alliance partner countries; the creation of (and placement of an SRHR Alliance staff member in) a position within the Netherlands MoFA focusing on SRHR in the post-2015 and ICPD processes; and other changes that formalise the participation of Dutch CSOs in the development of the Netherlands' international policy positions.

Both of the broad uniform indicators for changing practice developed for this evaluation are relevant for the SRHR Alliance's realised changes during the evaluation period. Specific outcome indicators used in the SRHR Cluster are as follows.

- Number of governments that newly extend invitations to SRHR Alliance member organisations, partners and other networked CSOs working on SRHR to serve on official national delegations to international decision-making meetings (UI 3.1)
- Number and nature of formal pathways (e.g. positions created, long-term partnerships) established to bridge civil society and government around SRHR issues (UI 3.1)
- Number and funding amount of Netherlands-funded initiatives for SRHR issues (UI 3.2)
- Number and nature of new strategies or work plans developed by governments or other targeted organisations to ensure implementation of policy related to SRHR (UI 3.2)



- Funding allocated for SRHR as a percentage of the Dutch ODA budget for SRHR each year and overall funding level for SRHR (UI 3.2)

The changing practice outcomes achieved fall under both UI 3.1 (concrete changes in practices of lobby targets as to policy formulation) and UI 3.2 (concrete changes in practices of governments as to implementation of policies). Those changes under UI 3.1 include governmental shifts to include CSO representatives on official delegations to UN-level meetings, the Dutch government's policy change to make decision making regarding the allocation of SRHR funding more transparent and the inclusion of a focus person for the ICPD and post-2015 processes within the Dutch MoFA. For UI 3.2, these observed changes involve strategies initiated by the government to ensure the implementation of Dutch SRHR policy (including outcomes related to actual levels of SRHR funding and specifications of the allocation of SRHR funding to topics that are particularly highly prioritised by the Netherlands).

### **11.3 Key findings on contribution to identified changes**

The SRHR Alliance makes contribution claims for a range of outcomes spanning all of the priority result areas. In this section, we recap our findings on the SRHR Alliance's contribution to the outcome and outcome cluster selected for contribution analysis, before presenting an overview of the activities and strategies thought to contribute to the total outcomes by priority result area.

For the contribution analysis at national level, we selected the proposing and passing of the 2014 parliamentary motion increasing transparency in Dutch SRHR funding to multilateral organisations. The final assessment of the evidence available for this evaluation was that the SRHR Alliance's contribution story for this national-level outcome was very strongly supported; a plausible case has been made for a direct and extensive SRHR Alliance contribution to this outcome, and this is supported by several types of evidence. However, there was also evidence that several other factors created an enabling environment that contributed to the realisation of this outcome.

At international level, for contribution analysis, we selected three outcomes as part of a cluster of changes occurring around CPD 47 in 2014: having a negotiated, substantive outcome for CPD 47; pro-SRHR civil society mobilisation around CPD 47; and unprecedented support by countries for SRHR at CPD 47. The contribution of the SRHR Alliance to most aspects of this outcome cluster are more distant, compared with the outcome selected for contribution analysis at national level. The evaluation team's assessment of the evidence concludes that it is plausible and highly likely that SRHR Alliance organisations and individual members played important roles as organisers and members of several international and European networks active around CPD 47. However, it was not possible to locate evidence tracing the exact contribution of the international networks to the eventual UN-level outcomes. A more direct, plausible link can be made between SRHR Alliance activities and actions taken by the Dutch national delegation to CPD 47.

#### *11.3.1 Agenda setting*

Much of the SRHR Alliance's agenda setting work at national level is directed towards changing the policy agenda—ensuring that SRHR remains high on the agenda and influencing the way it is framed. One important strategy used to achieve change in this priority result area is to build good, trusting relationships between SRHR Alliance members and both the MoFA and parliament through continuous lobby, through which the four SRHR Alliance member organisations active at national level engage in direct contact with MoFA staff and parliamentarians (through written input, phone calls, emails, in-person visits, roundtables, etc.). Especially in the first years of the SRHR Alliance, the Alliance also contributed through its member organisations hosting public events targeted (partially) at parliamentarians and the MoFA, but this strategy has decreased in the last two years. Also to

influence this priority result area, the SRHR Alliance has used the strategy of collaborating with CSOs from other sectors (especially HIV/AIDS and gender).

At international level, SRHR Alliance members have been active in network building, including taking a leading role in strategizing efforts through the ISRRRC for preparation in CPD meetings (since 2011) and close engagement with EuroNGOs (regarding both the ICPD and the post-2015 process). Building good relationships (through providing inputs and making direct contact) with UN organisations and the Netherlands MoFA has contributed to several invitations to 'closed' spaces, such as consultation meetings related to the ICPD process and strategizing sessions on both ICPD and post-2015 with the MoFA. Although this was not officially part of the ILA working group's task, the group also worked, where possible, to build the capacity of their Southern partners so that they could lobby their own governments regarding the positions on SRHR they would put forward at UN-level meetings.

### *11.3.2 Policy influencing*

As was the case for agenda setting, the Alliance's contributions to policy influencing often worked through the good relationships Alliance members built and maintained with parliament, the MoFA, UN agencies and national and international networks of CSOs. A range of experts interviewed for the baseline and endline reports confirmed that the SRHR Alliance has a strong, trusting relationship with each of these groups and that each invites input from the Alliance and counts on their expertise, information and analysis. This input, often provided in written form, is important across priority result areas but is especially useful for achieving policy influencing outcomes.

At national level, main activities were directed towards lobbying for SRHR to become and remain one of the spearhead development priorities, for partner countries to select SRHR as a policy priority, for SRHR to be listed in party plans during the election, for SRHR funding generally (and for funding on taboo topics in particular) to be prioritised, for expertise on SRHR to be emphasised in partner countries transitioning from aid to trade and for more transparency in how SRHR funding is allocated through multilateral organisations. The many contacts with decision makers in parliament and the MoFA were again key for achieving change in this priority result area. Crucially, the SRHR Alliance provided input to the MoFA each time a new SRHR policy was being developed and worked with parliamentarians to ask questions and make formal requests for each of their lobby goals.

To influence policy at international level, some SRHR Alliance organisations worked through close collaboration and joint strategizing with the Netherlands government; direct lobby to the Netherlands, the EU and other countries; and increasing their Southern partners' capacity for international advocacy (through information-sharing, training sessions, network integration and material support to attend international conferences) so that they could approach their own governments. SRHR Alliance organisations also worked with European and international networks of pro-SRHR CSOs to share information and provide a variety of inputs, including direct inputs on international language at several stages. An important part of the contribution of the SRHR Alliance to policy influencing at international level was the secondment of an SRHR Alliance staff member to the MoFA to act as the focal person for the ICPD and post-2015 processes.

### *11.3.3 Changing practice*

The trust and good contacts developed and maintained between the SRHR Alliance and parliament, the MoFA and UN agencies, described above, were absolutely crucial for changing practice. Each year, the national ILA group in the Alliance conducted a careful analysis of the ODA budget. In this budget for 2012, this analysis resulted in the identification of a budget cut to SRHR that was significant but difficult to discover. Alliance members were able to use their good relationships with

parliamentarians to get several parliamentary questions on this asked and amendments filed. These actions resulted in the MoFA acknowledging and reversing the cut to SRHR. Additionally, one of the amendments filed, requesting a further increase to SRHR, was adopted. Also towards the priority result area of changing practice, the Alliance worked with parliament to suggest and give extensive input for a motion that will result in €5 million being specifically earmarked for abortion projects beginning in 2016 and for the motion that resulted in Minister Ploumen's statement that, in the next budget, it will be clearly stated what amounts of SRHR funding are going to different organisations, how this is linked to the policy priority areas of the Netherlands and what the impact of this funding has been. (Both motions were passed in 2014).

The SRHR Alliance's contribution to the international outcomes categorised as changing practice in this evaluation period (long-term changes in the Netherlands' and other governments' policies regarding bringing CSO representatives to CPD meetings as part of the official delegations) builds on the long-term advocacy work of the organisational members of the SRHR Alliance, who have done extensive work to build an excellent reputation and, again, very good working relationships with the Dutch government, especially within the MoFA. Although SRHR Alliance members were not part of the Dutch CPD delegation at the time, they did work closely with the Dutch delegation in 2011, demonstrating the value of their formal inclusion. The SRHR Alliance also supported Southern partners in lobbying their governments for the inclusion of CSOs in the official CPD delegations and other aspects of the ICPD review (through providing relevant written information on the ongoing processes, building capacity for international advocacy and, in one case, putting forward the names of Southern partners to receive an invitation to an important consultation meeting). Lastly, SRHR Alliance member organisations focusing on young people's SRHR worked together to contribute to the establishment, formalisation and continuation of ongoing links between CSOs working on young people's SRHR and the MoFA.

## **11.4 Key findings on the relevance of the changes achieved**

### *11.4.1 Agenda setting*

At both national and international levels, changes in agenda setting are important in terms of the SRHR Alliance's theory of change largely as preconditions that enable movement forward to achieve later changes in policy and practice. At national level, it is important that the Netherlands keeps SRHR high on the agenda and remains committed to maintaining its strong international reputation for development work on SRHR issues. Public commitments made regarding the prioritisation of SRHR in Dutch policy or funding intentions are useful to SRHR advocates, because they give a strong indication of the current stance of the government and can also serve as tools in future advocacy efforts. The change in government in 2012 made it especially important to ensure continued political support for SRHR issues. Political support is also important for the Netherlands to take a progressive stance in the post-2015 development agenda. Agenda setting moves through parliament to raise questions regarding the SRHR budget (for 2012), transparency in the allocation of funding for SRHR and about how expertise would be maintained in the embassies of transition partner countries were also seen as important first steps in achieving change in policy and practice.

The involvement of SRHR advocates in setting the agenda in the ICPD and post-2015 processes is a key part of the SRHR Alliance's theory of change. A continued international CSO presence is necessary to advocate strong language, to hold governments accountable, to share experiences from different countries and to work with individual country delegations. Having the SRHR Alliance and Southern partners participate as members of the official delegations of the Netherlands and other countries and the growth of close, collaborative relationships between CSOs and governments

around SRHR issues generally allows for a more direct impact on the negotiation process and makes it possible for CSOs to gather (and share) useful information about the process. Outcomes reflecting the growth of a broad international movement of diverse CSOs working together are also critical, as international pro-SRHR CSO networks, including youth organisations, are much stronger internationally than a single organisation could ever be. They are also able to share information and contacts with each other and work more efficiently towards a shared goal. Together they have a broader reach and can achieve a more significant impact.

#### *11.4.2 Policy influencing*

Beyond placing SRHR high on the agenda, the SRHR Alliance theories of change at national and international level include outcomes for policy change. At national level, a strong Dutch SRHR policy is important because it has implications for the MoFA's support of SRHR issues and commitment to building SRHR expertise in the embassies, and the policy will be used to guide practice. SRHR remaining a policy priority in the Netherlands has concrete implications for funding, especially in the face of drastic budget cuts across the board. The relevance of the outcomes relating to expertise on SRHR in the embassies of transition countries and the transparency in reporting on SRHR funding being allocated to multilaterals relates specifically to the part of the Alliance's overall goal aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of the quality of spending on SRHR, and to the idea of the Netherlands maintaining its global reputation as a champion of SRHR, especially for taboo and sensitive issues.

All internationally-agreed (and, to a lesser extent, regionally agreed) documents at UN level over the years of the evaluation period have implications for the international policy to be adopted in the ICPD beyond 2014 process and the post-2015 process, and some assert that the relevance of these agreed documents has increased over the years in the lead-up to the renewal of these development frameworks. Although CPD and CSW resolutions are not binding and not as significant as UNGA resolutions, they can provide tools for advocates around the world working for progressive SRHR. For this reason, the international networks of advocates work very hard to progress or maintain SRHR language in UN documents. The link between the ICPD Global Review and the post-2015 process is important, as SRHR is conceptualised as being at the heart of development issues.

#### *11.4.3 Changing practice*

At the highest level, policy shifts in favour of SRHR should lead to actual, demonstrable changes in practice. At national level, it is of clear importance that, in addition to being named a formal policy priority, concrete resources are reserved for development cooperation on SRHR by the Dutch government. It is for this reason that efforts to defend and increase the SRHR ODA budget are made. Additionally, in light of the developments in the Alliance's national-level theory of change, changes that result in funding streams and checks on funding that ensure the implementation of Dutch policy goals on SRHR are also highly relevant.

At international level, observed changes in the priority result area of changing practice operated through long-term changes in how governments include CSOs in the development and presentation of their official positions on international development processes. Increased formal inclusion (e.g. on CPD delegations, in the ICPD consultation process, in formal MoFA positions, through formalised partnerships) is important because it provides significant opportunities for civil society to have a direct influence on international-level processes through their own country. The additional relevance of these changing practice outcomes is that the inclusion of civil society becomes more sustainable through formalisation and concrete, long-term changes in practice, allowing CSOs to build individual and collective experience, capacity and relationships that will allow them to increase the depth of their participation in these processes over time.

### **11.5 Key findings on efficiency**

This evaluation responded to the evaluation question on efficiency by developing a methodology for assessing efficiency suitable for the context of ILA. As a first step, multiple members of the ILA working group were asked about their understanding, in theory, of how they attempt to work efficiently (Theory of Efficiency). The next step was to attempt, where possible, to assess to what extent the Alliance held up the ideas in the theory of efficiency in practice. For this assessment, we turned again to the SRHR Alliance members, as well as their Southern partners.

The ILA working group does not have many explicit, established procedures or mechanisms for assuring efficiency. However, the principle of minimising costs wherever feasible (i.e. wherever this could be done without harming the effectiveness of the advocacy effort or causing undue inconvenience to the advocates or others) guides all Alliance members in their financial decision making. To maximise their impact while minimising costs, the Alliance tends to focus on low-resource activities such as one-to-one lobby and information sharing and network building through electronic communication, rather than large-scale, expensive public campaigns or events. Another strategy involves getting multiple benefits from a single action/activity wherever possible.

Other than personnel costs, expenses incurred are largely limited to international travel expenses for Alliance members and partners and, sometimes, costs associated with conducting ILA training sessions for partners. These costs are generally within the international working group. Procedures for booking air travel and hotels for Alliance members and Southern partners are generally set by individual SRHR Alliance member organisations, and these procedures vary to some extent from organisation to organisation.

Time efficiency is also important for the SRHR Alliance, as a significant portion of the ILA budget is spent on salaries (especially at national level). The working group as a whole has made continual efforts to monitor and improve the time efficiency of their way of working. From early stages, Alliance members also took steps towards efficiency in division of labour and a fair distribution of the workload. However, perceptions of inequality across organisations in the time officially available for SRHR Alliance ILA work remains an occasional source of tension, and there is a continued perception shared by most Alliance members that individuals in the working group tend to voluntarily contribute more than their allotted hours for SRHR Alliance work. Time inefficiency for certain actions may also be caused by larger Alliance processes requiring formal approval from the organisations.

The Alliance remains reflexive and looks to improve on each of these points. Issues of efficiency, workload and division of labour are continually discussed at the ILA group's yearly 'heidag'. These reflective discussions resulted in a change in the meeting structure of the ILA group beginning in 2013, and the current meeting structure will be re-reviewed.

### **11.6 Key findings on explanatory factors**

This section summarises the key findings regarding explanatory factors for the findings on changes achieved, the SRHR Alliance's contribution to those changes, their relevance and efficiency. Important explanatory factors are divided into internal factors, external factors, interplay between these two and the nature of the issue being addressed.

#### *11.6.1 Internal factors*

At national level, changes were largely achieved through working with the Netherlands MoFA and/or parliament. Across these changes, the capability to act and commit and the capability to deliver on objectives were crucial. Together, these capabilities within the SRHR Alliance are explanatory factors

for the strong, trustful and productive relationships that they were able to build and maintain with key actors at the Dutch level.

At international level, most changes were linked to the ICPD and post-2015 processes, where change takes place in complex arenas and on very large scales. Working in international networks is essential. For these changes, the capability to relate was especially important as an explanatory factor for the SRHR Alliance's integration and strong role within international networks of SRHR advocates.

Across the outcomes achieved, the capability to adapt and self-renew allowed the SRHR Alliance to be flexible enough to respond appropriately in rapidly changing or unpredictable circumstances. In practice, this capability was manifested in adaptations and refinements to the theories of change at both national and international levels as well as in the reflexivity to continually revisit and reconsider the overall structure and meeting setup within their working group with an eye towards improved effectiveness and efficiency.

Similarly, the capability to deliver on objectives is an explanatory factor, which, together with the strong strategic relationships they maintained with key actors and the regular information-sharing and strategic communication within the Alliance and through external networks, enabled the Alliance to continually monitor developments in the relevant arenas to be able to act in a timely fashion to achieve a result. Although the SRHR Alliance demonstrated the ability to respond quickly and appropriately, they sometimes exhibited an internally identified weakness in terms of longer-term, joint planning that would allow for more proactive action. This is itself an explanatory factor for the types of outcomes achieved, and it may be explained by the differences between Alliance member organisations or by the lack of a concrete plan for international advocacy at the inception of the ILA working group (see below). At the time of the data collection for this report, the Alliance was continuing to direct more focus towards improving their longer-term, joint planning.

Another key explanatory factor is the Alliance's capability to relate, as building and maintaining networks was shown to be important for achieving results at both national and international level. At national level, it was additionally important to cooperate productively with CSOs from other sectors. A related challenge faced by the Alliance involves adapting the scope of the issue such that all networked organisations can support the cause (capability to relate, capability to balance diversity and achieve coherence).

Relationships with key actors were very important. Understanding the Alliance's extremely good, trustful relationships with key individuals in parliament, the MoFA, UN agencies and CSOs at national, regional (EU) and international levels requires addressing the cumulative effects of good inputs provided and good relationships built over time—both by the Alliance since its inception and by individual Alliance organisations previously.

A final, complex internal factor that may provide explanatory information for the findings presented in this report involves the large, late-stage cut to the ILA programme and the initial uncertainty this created about the ILA efforts to be made jointly by the SRHR Alliance. Throughout the evaluation period, the ILA working group faced the challenge of strong differences in capacity, including person-hours, between SRHR Alliance organisations.

#### *11.6.2 External factors*

This evaluation clearly points to the fact that outcomes achieved (especially changes relating to policy influencing or changing practice) are highly dependent on external frameworks, policy

structures and policy timescales. Many changes are only possible because a new policy is being developed or decided upon.

Another external explanatory factor is the change of the political party (or parties) in power, as well as individual personnel turnover within the MoFA and parliament. Relationships with these individuals are critical for many outcomes achieved, but the relationships are fragile and dependent on larger questions regarding the political parties' views on SRHR and development cooperation in general, individual officials' and policymakers' interest in SRHR issues (vs. other issues competing for their attention) and the availability of time to dedicate towards these issues.

At international level, progressive SRHR CSOs worldwide have noted the growing visibility of oppositional groups and conservative countries opposing SRHR at key meetings. These oppositional voices were likely also responding to the increased pressure to influence the ICPD and post-2015 processes before the new development frameworks were set. Opposition at CPD 47 (2014) was particularly strong from the African group, and, along with organisational and leadership challenges and a complex range of other factors, this opposition may have had an impact on the unfolding of the meeting process and on the ultimate outcome of that meeting.

#### *11.6.3 Interplay between internal and external factors*

Especially during the first years of this evaluation, and especially around the post-2015 process, lack of information about key international processes and the unpredictable nature of this situation increased the importance of maintaining a high level of flexibility and of maintaining close information-sharing ties with broad, international networks.

#### *11.6.4 The role of the nature of the issue addressed*

The strong worldwide reputation of the Netherlands as a defender of SRHR (especially on sensitive and taboo topics) and the pride taken in this reputation by the Netherlands government and parliament contributes to SRHR having broad support in parliament and to the MoFA's commitment to advancing SRHR issues.

At national level, and particularly at T3 (endline), the fact that SRHR was relatively well positioned compared with the other policy focal points made it more difficult to lobby for additional advances for SRHR in the current climate of economic downturn.

At international level, achieving change on key SRHR issues involves many diverse actors and highly complex processes. The complexity of this situation limits possibilities for the SRHR Alliance to have a direct impact, working alone. It is because of this complexity that CSOs seeking to contribute to international-level change on SRHR issues almost invariably act within larger, international networks that allow them to reach more people and to bring in perspectives from a geographically diverse membership base.

### **11.7 Reflections, lessons learned and looking forward**

This evaluation has traced the ILA work of the SRHR Alliance from 2011 through late 2014—crucial years for SRHR, both nationally and internationally. Despite a great deal of initial uncertainty, the ILA working group has contributed to a significant number of changes across the three priority result areas elaborated in the NWO-WOTRO Call for Proposals. Among Dutch and international experts familiar with the Alliance, impressions of their influence and effectiveness were universally highly positive. Other stakeholders noted that they appreciated the Alliance's information sharing and expertise: 'In general, we are being very well informed on SRHR projects [...] [The SRHR Alliance] provide[s] us with a lot of country-specific information, which is very helpful to us [...] We appreciate

the specific expertise very much and they are very well rooted in society'; 'They keep a finger on the pulse. They are really active lobbyists, and they are very good in providing support and the right information, also for the MPI'.

One of the issues mentioned in the baseline report to monitor into the future was the Alliance's T1 conviction that the link between the international and national working groups would grow stronger in 2013 and 2014. This progression was indeed observed, although some Alliance members continued to hope to find more synergies between the two groups in the future. At the end of the evaluation period, the Alliance members continued to be reflective as a group about their work process, seeking ways to continue to strengthen their collaboration in the remaining MFS II funding period.

The Alliance largely worked in accordance with the original theories of change put forward at national and international level (as reconstructed at T1). Adaptations were well justified in terms of the original goals. The strategies and activities undertaken were consistent with the (revised at T3) theories of change at national and international level. Although Alliance members expressed ambitions for more proactive, joint planning, a great deal is shared in terms of the basic understanding of how change happens (the pathway of change) and what the relevant changes (and arenas) are.

Methodologically, in line with the overall evaluation reflections, we found contribution analysis challenging to carry out for the selected international-level outcome package. It is our assessment that the Alliance contributed to the selected outcomes as part of the broader network, but, as is reflected in the previous chapter, it is difficult—if not impossible—to isolate and define the ultimate contribution of SRHR Alliance efforts, outside of the larger pro-SRHR civil society networks. With the time and resources available, it was generally not possible to conclude with confidence just how the selected international-level outcomes might have differed without the work of the SRHR Alliance, in particular. We were, however, able to find evidence of a less direct link between the Alliance and the selected outcomes, adopting the strategy of examining 1) the Alliance's specific contributions to the network and 2) the role of the overall network in achieving the selected changes. For the outcome selected for contribution analysis at national level, the link between Alliance activities and the outcome is much more direct.

#### *11.7.1 Reflections beyond the scope of the evaluation*

In terms of bringing Southern partners on-board to participate in international-level advocacy, the case studies in Indonesia and Malawi revealed several lessons that are potentially useful, generally, for future efforts. First, it must be noted that the primary conclusion to be drawn involves the remarkability of the achievements obtained despite challenges. Again, it should be made absolutely clear that all efforts on the behalf of SRHR Alliance members to build the capacity of the Alliance's Southern partners for international advocacy (beyond their direct organisational partners) was on a voluntary basis and was not officially a part of the ILA working group's programme.

In both Malawi and Indonesia, partners expressed the unmet desire for a strong link from local to national to international advocacy. Partners spoke about how important this kind of link was, in theory, but said they were unable to put it into practice without assistance. In Indonesia, the national-level alliance (ASV) was described as very strong, and all partners interviewed expressed the belief that it would continue to operate on the national level long after the end of the MFS II funding period. The ASV is organised by a board with representatives from several member organisations. Partially because of language barriers, the Dutch SRHR Alliance organisational members



communicated almost exclusively with their direct organisational partners. As the director of Rutgers WPF Indonesia was also the NPC for Indonesia, she was responsible for distributing information sent by Rutgers WPF to the rest of the alliance in Indonesia. Based on the interviews conducted with Indonesian partners for this evaluation, this distribution was, indeed, regularly carried out. However, both those with and those without direct organisational partners in the Netherlands described it as a missed opportunity that the ASV board was not more active in taking up a joint advocacy agenda, particularly with regard to international advocacy.

Most individual members of the three organisations active in international advocacy in the Indonesian Alliance viewed one individual (the former NPC) as by far the most experienced, knowledgeable and active in international processes. As the NPC for Indonesia, this individual was very active in informing other Indonesian partners about international advocacy and, when possible, taking them along to international-level meetings to help them build capacity. After this person resigned her position in April 2014, some of the Indonesian partners felt that they had lost a crucial link to international advocacy: 'We lost the link, for example, with ICPD, because just [SRHR Alliance Indonesian organisation staff member] was in charge, and [she] was always sending us [information] about the progress of the international advocacy... When she resigned, we cannot... we cannot get into it. And we don't know how to get involved, to continue the advocacy internationally'. Those with more experience in international advocacy were more concerned about the loss of the former NPC's strong governmental and international contacts, many of which were forged before she joined Rutgers WPF. It was beyond the scope of this evaluation to fully investigate the extent and causes of the Indonesian Alliance's dependence on a single individual, but one possibility was suggested by a former colleague of this former NPC, who noted that this person chose, from the beginning, to take on many roles because of her advocacy experience—something the Indonesian Alliance appreciated at the time. Another partner remarked that 'she was very powerful in the Alliance, and that's also not really good'. Several Alliance partners were uncertain at the time of the data collection how, or if, they would go forward with international advocacy. This situation could not be investigated fully, and it is far too early to draw a firm conclusion (the new NPC for Indonesia started in June 2014, and the data were collected in July), but it may provide a cautionary lesson regarding the robustness of sustainability of international advocacy initiatives among partners.

However, this also has to be seen in light of the decision, described above, to omit the link between national and international advocacy in the UFBR programme because of budget cuts. Everything that was done in this area by SRHR Alliance members was based on individual and organisational capacity and individual willingness to forge ahead towards these goals because of the passion and commitment of the advocates involved. As Rutgers WPF was already involved in international advocacy prior to the formation of the Alliance, the director of Rutgers WPF Indonesia was a logical choice to take the lead and continue her previous work in close collaboration with her advocacy colleagues at Rutgers WPF in the Netherlands.

A key point emerging throughout this chapter involves the importance of networking at a range of geographical levels. For national-level lobbying and advocacy efforts, the close-knit network made up of the different member organisations of the SRHR Alliance and a small number of additional advocates was key in many of the outcomes achieved. At international level, it was important to work through broader, international networks—especially in times of uncertainty—to make sense of the situation and be effective.

### *11.7.2 Looking forward*

In the coming years, it will be important to follow up the ramifications for SRHR of the policy shift from aid to trade. At several points in this chapter, the relevance of this policy shift for SRHR was suggested. Good SRHR is crucial for economic development, so it is critical that the sustainability of work on SRHR is ensured as development cooperation in the Netherlands moves from aid to trade. However, SRHR—especially rights-based issues and taboo topics—can be very difficult to incorporate into a trade agenda. Interventions in these areas have historically been very dependent on traditional aid. Sensitive and taboo topics are exactly the issues on which the Netherlands' strong international reputation as a defender of SRHR is built, but work on these topics may be put at risk by the move to trade. To this point, the SRHR Alliance's work to advocate continued support for SRHR in light of this policy shift has been directed towards achieving a commitment to pay attention to expertise on SRHR in the embassies of partner countries that will make the transition from aid to trade. It is necessary for pro-SRHR civil society in the Netherlands to monitor developments closely over the coming years, especially in these countries, and to be proactive in finding and advocating continued support for SRHR in this political context.

At the end of the evaluation period, the post-2015 development process is very much ongoing. The team endeavoured to include outcomes from the September 2014 UNGASS and UNGA to extend findings on the ICPD and post-2015 processes. However, for the SRHR Alliance, these meetings raised significant issues for follow-up, but these actions are beyond the temporal scope of this evaluation. Although a number of governments stressed the importance of integrating the experience of the ICPD into the post-2015 development agenda, many others did not. Crucially, Minister Ploumen, in the Netherlands' statement at the UNGASS, did not 1) mention the ICPD Global Review Report or the Index Report submitted to the UN General Assembly ahead of the meeting, 2) make a clear connection between the recommendations and outcomes from the ICPD Global Review and the post-2015 development agenda or 3) mention the continued commitment of the Netherlands to addressing taboo topics in SRHR, internationally. These omissions were followed up with written parliamentary questions, and Ploumen's answers confirm the continued commitment of the Netherlands to these issues.<sup>457</sup> However, this and other follow-ups to the UNGASS/UNGA in September are outside the evaluation period and could not be examined in full. Developments in this sphere will require continued monitoring as the post-2015 development agenda is further elaborated.



**THEMATIC CLUSTER 3: PROTECTION, HUMAN SECURITY AND  
CONFLICT PREVENTION CLUSTER**



## 12 Overview of Protection, Human Security and Conflict Prevention Cluster

Insecurity and conflict constitute crucial development challenges, as human security is strongly affected by fragile contexts, continuing cycles of conflict, organised crime and economic insecurity. Apart from the physical insecurity resulting from open violence, people's life chances are affected in many ways. The distribution of food insecurity in the world largely coincides with conflict settings (FAO 2010), and 1.5 billion people live in deep poverty in conflict-affected areas, often deprived of basic health and education services. People suffer from the double jeopardy that conflict severely exacerbates their vulnerability, while the institutional environment fails to provide safety nets. Another major concern is that conflicts affect regional stability and the global economy, further endangering the institutional enabling of human security.<sup>458</sup> In many cases, human insecurity goes hand in hand with a lack of good governance, impeding human rights and delaying economic development.

Protection, human security and conflict prevention are thus interlinked with peace, development and human rights and related to (inter-) national policy developments. As the MDGs are nearing their deadline in 2015 with the majority of the targets not having been reached, discussions continue on the next phase, and advocacy efforts are apparent to incorporate reference to the drivers of conflict.

Human security as a backbone concept for development policy is gaining in importance. The UN Security Council Resolution 66/290 adopted in October 2012, for example, states that 'Human security calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities'.<sup>459</sup> The World Bank World Development Report 2011, 'Conflict, Security and Development', advocates trust building and inclusive political processes focusing on human security, governance and economic development in conflict-affected areas. This was taken up further in the discussions on the drafting of the 'New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States' in Busan in 2011, where peace- and state building are given central attention, with a focus on governance, legitimate inclusive political processes, security and economic development. In line with these international developments around the thematic areas for this cluster, the Netherlands has adopted 'security and good governance' (veiligheid en rechtsorde) as one of its four priority areas for development. This includes an emphasis on human security, good governance, inclusive political processes, legitimate and capable government and peace dividend, and seeks to implement an integrated approach (Diplomacy, Defence and Development).<sup>460</sup>

Conflict prevention policies emphasise the value of local ownership. In practice, this is hampered by donor structures that undermine the collaboration with local actors while violence recurs and new and more effective collaborations are sought.<sup>461</sup> Because of the governance complications in conflict-affected and fragile states, the important role of civil society actors has been recognised and enhanced since the 1990s, internationally and in the Netherlands. While this mainly concerned the implementation of programmes by international NGOs, we now see the focus shifting on the one hand to multi-actor alliances bringing together international and national governments and civil society, and on the other to lobby and advocacy as an important prerequisite to create sustainable development operatives. Cooperation, connectivity and context have increasingly become recognised as key issues.

Cluster III consists of three alliances that were pre-selected by the commissioner of this evaluation.<sup>462</sup> These were the Together 4 Change (T4C) Alliance, the Communities of Change Alliance (CoC) and the Freedom from Fear Alliance (FFF). For each of these alliances, we evaluated a part of their international lobbying and advocacy work funded by MFS II. In each case, one organisation was in the lead of a programme on which the evaluation focused. These programmes and organisations were the ILA programme of the African Child Policy Forum (ACPF) of the Together 4 Change Alliance; the Women Leadership in Peace and Security Processes (WLPS) lobby and advocacy, led by Cordaid, of the Communities of Change Alliance, and Programme IV of the Freedom from Fear Alliance, led by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). Here, we present brief introductions of the three organisations that have led the evaluated programmes, as well as the theories of change behind the programmes. The theory of change (ToC) is a key aspect of the terms of reference of the ILA evaluation. A ToC refers to the understanding that an organisation, project, network or group of stakeholders has about how political, social, economic and/or cultural change happens, and how it can contribute to such a change process. A ToC is a tool for planning, implementation and evaluation that defines all of the building blocks required to bring about a given long-term goal.<sup>463</sup>

### **12.1 African Child Policy Forum**

The unit of analysis for this evaluation, the Ethiopian-based ACPF is one of the Southern partners in the T4C Alliance that received MFS II funding for 2011–2015. The Dutch organisation Investing in Children and their Societies (ICS) is the lead co-financing agency (CFA) in the Alliance, which was set up to alleviate poverty through strengthening North–South and South–South relationships, focusing on the improvement of the wellbeing and protection of children and young people. Dutch partners in the T4C Alliance, in addition to ICS, are Wilde Ganzen/IKON, Wereldkinderen and SOS Kinderdorpen. This alliance has an extended programme on children and wellbeing in a wide geographical area covering 14 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

ACPF is an international not-for-profit, pan-African institution of policy research and dialogue that aims to contribute to child wellbeing in Africa by putting children and specific issues regarding their rights and wellbeing on the public and political agendas. ACPF is the only institution of its kind on the African continent, and is located in Addis Ababa, in the vicinity of the African Union (AU). It has a secretariat of approximately 30 staff members (including support staff) and an independent Board of Trustees comprising an Administrative Council and Board members, most members being international experts on child rights (many with a UN background). The current Chair of ACPF is H.E. Dr. Graça Machel, recently appointed for a four-year period.

ACPF executes the international lobby and advocacy (ILA) component of the T4C programme in Africa as a Southern partner organisation and non-Alliance member.<sup>464</sup> The relationship between the T4C Alliance and ACPF is to be understood as predominantly financial (donor–recipient relationship).

#### **ACPF'S theory of change:**

ACPF focuses on child wellbeing and envisions an Africa that embraces a culture and regime of child rights both in law and practice by putting children on the public and political agendas. ACPF assumes that improved knowledge, a platform for dialogue, strengthened capacity of civil society organisations (CSOs) and strengthened capacity of governments will result in the envisioned changes. The strategies include building knowledge through research, speaking out, contributing to legal and policy reforms and their effective implementation, building alliances and working with the AU and other international partners. The main assumption underlying ACPF advocacy is that child wellbeing

can be improved by promoting the realisation of child rights and including children in public and political agendas through knowledge building and sharing.

### **12.2 Cordaid's Women Leadership in Peace and Security (WLPS)**

The unit of analysis for this evaluation is the Cordaid WLPS lobby and advocacy.<sup>465</sup> This is a subpart of a larger programme with the same name: WLPS. WLPS was transformed into a business unit in accordance with Cordaid's internal reorganisation in January 2013. WLPS lobby and advocacy is part of the MFS II Alliance CoC, of which Cordaid is the lead CFA and receives funding from 2011–2015. Other partners are PAX, Impunity Watch, Mensen met een Missie, Netherlands Red Cross, Wemos and Both ENDS. The Alliance has an extended programme focusing on disaster risk reduction, conflict transformation, health and wellbeing, entrepreneurship, living in slums and humanitarian aid. This programme works in different countries around the world; the geographical area is thus not limited to one region.

WLPS lobby and advocacy focuses on international lobby and advocacy to increase women's inclusion, participation and gender equality in peace and security processes, policies and practices. The programme is rather isolated from the rest of the Alliance work, within Cordaid as well as in cooperation with its direct Alliance partners. We could not find any reference or cooperation between the WLPS lobby and the extended Alliance. Hence, in accordance with our terms of reference, the focus of the evaluation is the WLPS lobby funded by MFS II.

The work of WLPS lobby and advocacy takes place in a context within which—despite numerous national and international policies, practices and agreements aimed at securing women's rights and increasing the role of women in peace and security processes—women remain largely absent from peace negotiations and excluded from the making of security policies.

WLPS' theory of change:

WLPS envisions sustainable and inclusive peace and security. An important condition for this is to include women and incorporate a gender perspective in peace and security processes. WLPS seeks to achieve this by focusing on the effective implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, increasing capacities of local women and integrating women's perspectives and participation in national and international policies and practices. The strategies used include knowledge producing and sharing, network building, individual and collective capacity strengthening of partners and networks, stimulating cooperation between CSOs and governments and lobbying in national and international policy arenas. The underlying assumptions are that the inclusion of women in peace and security processes and an effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 will contribute to more sustainable peace and security.

### **12.3 The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)**

GPPAC is a civil society-led network that focuses on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The network officially aims to establish a new international consensus, moving away from reaction and towards the prevention of violent conflict, building on local ownership and multi-stakeholder processes. GPPAC works to strengthen civil society networks for peace and security and to link local, national, regional and global levels of action. GPPAC seeks to enhance CSO collaboration in designing and implementing conflict prevention strategies and catalysing partnerships with relevant stakeholders. GPPAC seeks to contribute to the desired changes through the development of, and acting through, a global network consisting of 15 regional networks comprising national and regional peacebuilding and conflict prevention organisations, supported by a set of network structures that facilitate and coordinate network development, communications and actions. The development of



global and regional network structures is to enable members to effectively steer the strategies and actions of the network through building capacity and linkages and the consolidation of the network's governance and operational structures. A bottom-up, member-steered process, in which overlapping regional priorities are to determine the agenda of the global network, is meant to bring about collaboration between CSOs in designing and implementing joint conflict prevention efforts at global and regional level, fostering synergies and cohesion between programmes and regional and global levels of implementation. The networked nature of GPPAC gives space for peacebuilding and conflict organisations worldwide to come together, and for partners and targets to act together, in complex contexts where such acting together is highly warranted. GPPAC is highly geared towards the achievement of inclusiveness, through linking and convening, and the shaping of collaborative practices by which space for civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding is enhanced.

GPPAC's theory of change:

GPPAC aims to change the paradigm from reaction to prevention of conflicts through the inclusion of civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes. To achieve this, it is considered necessary to mobilise the United Nations, regional international government organisations (RIGOs) and state actors to take action for more systematic conflict prevention in cooperation with civil society. To become a reliable partner for these actors and influence various political processes, CSOs active in conflict prevention and peacebuilding will have to combine forces in strong regional and global networks. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen civil society networks to generate knowledge and improve the practice of CSOs at multiple levels. The strategies used are policy and advocacy, action learning, public outreach, network strengthening and the mainstreaming of gender equality. The main assumption underlying GPPAC's work is the belief that when CSOs active in conflict prevention and peacebuilding join forces through strong regional and global networks, this will increase CSO leverage to contribute to conflict prevention.

## 13 Together 4 Change Alliance: African Child Policy Forum

### 13.1 Introduction

#### 13.1.1 Context and overview of the T4C Alliance

The Ethiopia-based African Child Policy Forum (ACPF) is one of the Southern partners in the Together 4 Change (T4C) Alliance that received MFS II funding for 2011–2015. The Dutch organisation Investing in Children and their Societies (ICS) is the lead co-financing agency (CFA) in the Alliance, which is set up to alleviate poverty through strengthening North–South and South–South relationships, focusing on the improvement of the wellbeing and protection of children and young people. Dutch partners in the T4C Alliance are, in addition to ICS, Wilde Ganzen/IKON, Wereldkinderen and SOS Kinderdorpen. This alliance has an extended programme on children and wellbeing in a wide geographical area covering 14 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

ACPF is an international not-for-profit, pan-African institution of policy research and dialogue that aims to contribute to child wellbeing in Africa by putting children and specific issues regarding their rights and wellbeing on the public and political agendas. ACPF is the only institution of its kind on the African continent, and is located in Addis Ababa, in the vicinity of the African Union (AU). It has a secretariat of approximately 30 staff members (including support staff) and an independent Board of Trustees comprising an Administrative Council and Board members. Most Board members are international experts on child rights (many with a UN background). The current Chair of ACPF is H.E. Dr. Graça Machel, recently appointed for a four-year period.

ACPF executes the international lobby and advocacy (ILA) component of the T4C programme in Africa as a Southern partner organisation and non-Alliance member. According to MFS II requirements,<sup>466</sup> Southern partners could not be admitted as full-fledged Alliance members. ACPF is the only Southern-based unit of analysis and, as such, holds a unique position in this evaluation. It is at a larger distance from the main donor (MoFA/DGIS) than Alliance members and does not fully take part in Alliance dynamics (if at all). However, this unique position offered us the possibility to look into the relationship between ACPF and the T4C Alliance from a Southern perspective. Section 13.6.3 focuses specifically on some findings and conclusions in this respect.

The relationship between the T4C Alliance and ACPF is to be understood as predominantly financial (donor–recipient relationship). We conclude that the ILA programme operated by ACPF is virtually independent from the T4C Alliance, except for the MFS II funds provided as institutional support. ACPF has other institutional donors in addition to T4C, namely OAK foundation-UK and Wellspring advisors, and so parts of ACPF’s lobby and advocacy work are not funded by MFS II. In conformity with our terms of reference (ToR), the focus of this evaluation is the pan-African lobby and advocacy of ACPF for as far as this is funded under MFS II.

ACPF was set up in 2003 against the background of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) as a means to reinforce the 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). In 2000, the ‘Africa Fit for Children’ (AFFC) framework was endorsed, following the first pan-African Forum on Child Wellbeing, which was organised by the AU. This policy commitment posed enormous challenges for African governments, putting children on the agenda, and it seemed a natural step towards the development of a pan-African organisation like ACPF with an advocacy voice uniquely focused on the African child. As the monitoring of the implementation and progress of the Charter is carried out by the AU and its subcommittee—African Committee of Experts on Rights and Welfare of

the Child (ACERWC)—the pan-African nature of ACPF provides for a well-placed organisational link to support the AU and the Committee in this task, both technically and in terms of content.<sup>467</sup>

### *13.1.2 Changes with regard to the ILA programme*

Halfway through the MFS II period, ACPF underwent some rather drastic and unexpected structural organisational changes, in terms of changes in staff establishment and management, as well as in restructuring organisational and operational procedures. The process was referred to by some interviewees as a much needed transformation process aiming to strengthen not only the capacity of ACPF but also its 2010–2015 programme of work,<sup>468</sup> including the MFS II ILA programme (the unit of analysis). During the evaluation team's second visit in April 2013, serious concerns were raised by various stakeholders—in interviews with staff, interim management, old and new management, Board members and the T4C donor (ICS)—stemming from different views on the future orientation of ACPF but also from the way the process was communicated. However, it needs to be stressed that, despite this highly insecure period of change and reform, ACPF staff continued its work on child rights and wellbeing, not only through the regular programme activities but also using opportunities as they arose. By the last (fourth) visit in September 2014, the organisation had established its pace, continuity and stability, with staff pursuing its work with ambition, commitment and renewed energy.

At the beginning of the MFS II period, there were changes in budget. The overall MFS II budget for ACPF that was initially approved by the Netherlands government amounted to €8,788,875.<sup>469</sup> Eventually, due to the economic crisis in the Netherlands, this was cut in half to €3,524,058 in May 2011.<sup>470</sup> This had implications for the ILA programme (including its theory of change [ToC]), as new priorities needed to be set for how to continue the programmes.

### *13.1.3 On data sources and analysis*

This evaluation offered us the opportunity to collect data over an extended period of time (2012–2014) from the lead agent (ICS) and one other Dutch-based partner in the Alliance (Wereldkinderen), and take a deep dive into our unit of analysis (ACPF). Data came from interviews and documentation within ACPF (managerial, research and operational staff), from immediate (nearby) partners like the AU, ACERWC and members of the Africa-wide Movement for Children (AMC), but also from other stakeholders such as civil society organisations (CSOs) and national government representatives in Ethiopia and further afield in Uganda, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa and Namibia. Field visits were paid over April–June 2014. Most of the contacts for in-country interviews were provided by the ACPF office in Addis Ababa, drawing upon their own network. Others were referred by interviewees. For various reasons, it was in no way feasible to make a representative selection of respondents or recipients of the advocacy message. First, there was no clear picture available of specific users of ACPF's advocacy work at country levels, which to a certain degree is inherent to the nature of ILA work. Second, as ACPF aspires to reach out via the African Union to the 54 AU member states,<sup>471</sup> the size of the continent made it practically impossible to make a representative selection of recipients, but quite a number of recipients are unknown in any case. We learned that, over the past years, ACPF actually concentrated its advocacy work on selected countries only,<sup>472</sup> which makes sense given its available institutional resources, and, although this was never clearly confirmed, we concluded that these would likely include Kenya and Uganda. That is why these countries were purposefully made part of the field work. Third, time and financial constraints on our part prevented us from expanding the evaluation to West Africa, Central Africa and the Maghreb region, while the country visits to Mozambique, South Africa and Namibia were combined with other assignments and were thus, to some extent, an opportunistic selection.

We are fully aware of the limited scope of our field research, which includes only six of the 54 African countries, was conducted mostly in Anglophone countries (and one Lusophone country) and comprises interviews with only a limited number of people per country. To make the best possible use of expected and unexpected users of ACPF's advocacy work given the limitations of our research, we included respondents who were recommended by ACPF. We also included respondents specialised in (aspects of) child rights and wellbeing issues in Africa but who—prior to the interviews—expressed being unfamiliar with ACPF. It is worth noting how openly and frankly our respondents reacted to our questions; they were prepared to share their experiences and views on African advocacy on child rights, even if they were not aware of ACPF and its work.

Our main sources of information consisted of general literature on lobby and advocacy and child rights in Africa, numerous documents made available by ICS and ACPF, but also from outside ACPF (see bibliography) and narratives from over 80 interviews. These narratives were collected and mostly recorded<sup>473</sup> with the help of semi-structured interview guidelines that were adapted according to the situation in which we found ourselves. For example, ACPF was not known to some organisations and respondents, so questions on joint working experiences were no longer relevant.

We were fully cognisant that narratives reflect the narrator's interpretation of facts and personal opinions and views, especially when facing difficult periods or situations (as explained above for ACPF in 2013 but also as highlighted below for AMC and CSO Forum). Hence, we judiciously assessed, validated and revalidated our information, revisiting some respondents and written resources, thus seeking to better understand ACPF, its programme, way of working, organisational changes and outreach as a policy research and advocacy agency on child rights in Africa, using this rich palette of perspectives.

For the evaluation question on relevance, we examined the changes achieved in relation to the needs identified in the ToC, the use of advocacy output by targets and other stakeholders, the uptake of the advocacy message by other stakeholders and to the extent possible we took into account the broader context of child rights. The data used to assess the programme's relevance was based on interviews with staff and external stakeholders, targets, partners and other CSOs working in the same thematic area. Additionally, as much as possible, we also used documentation and paper trails to establish the link between ACPF and the outcome in order to assess the plausibility of the relevance claim.

In the final stage of the evaluation process (September 2014), we assessed our data by taking a helicopter view, asking ourselves what patterns had surfaced over time, what outreach, outcomes/changes were reported, what grey areas emerged, but also what new opportunities arose. We were in the fortunate circumstances to share these views as well as the pre-final draft of this report with ACPF in a full staff meeting in Addis Ababa,<sup>474</sup> which enriched this report to a great extent. This report presents the findings and conclusions that underpin the recommendations (see section 13.6.2), which we hope will serve as food for further thought for ACPF, for ICS as the lead agent in the Alliance and for mutual learning, including for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

#### *13.1.4 Case selection and the role of the cases in the report*

In close consultation with ACPF, we selected two case studies to provide deeper insights into the advocacy processes and to conduct contribution analyses. We selected the African Report on Child Wellbeing (ARCW) and the Africa-wide Movement for Children (AMC) as high potential case studies to further elaborate and learn about the working and outreach of ACPF. Both cases are MFS II-

funded, traceable and part of ACPF's ToC (at time periods T0 and T1), while the evidence-based research and the network are considered important vehicles for their advocacy and lobby. For the contribution analysis, we followed the research report and network and examined the processes through which they had reached out over time to establish the contribution rather than the other way around.

We did this in a number of countries, through time and space. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in five countries. The main sources of information for the case studies consisted of these semi-structured interviews with ACPF and ICS staff, partners in the countries visited and other CSOs working on child rights, and, where possible, also policy officers in the targeted institutions. Other data sources used are reports, policy briefs and the paper trail of formal and informal, public and non-public documents and communications. The assessment was thus made based on internal and external sources of information, where possible substantiated with written documentation. This report could not have been written without the cooperation of so many, especially the full support of the ACPF management and staff, for which we are extremely grateful, bearing in mind the workload already ascribed to everyone.

## **13.2 Evaluation Questions 1 and 3: Changes and Relevance**

### *13.2.1 Theory of change as it developed in practice from T0 to T3*

The ToC, as illustrated in Figure 13.1 below, is based on the strategic framework provided by ACPF as input into the MFS II framework for the T4C Alliance, Towards an Era of Accountability for Children in Africa (2010–2015). As this ToC (at T0/T1) was to a great extent discussed in the baseline report (February 2013),<sup>475</sup> we only address its main features here. We noted that ACPF did not really use its ToC as a tool, and consequently had not updated or adjusted its theory ever since. At an early stage, of our review, ACPF had hinted at the ToC being an alien instrument to their way of working and conceived as a donor requirement rather than a working tool. Despite the 2012 workshop covering the use of ToC, facilitated by external consultants,<sup>476</sup> ACPF did not internalise this way of working. We therefore choose to focus on ACPF's practice of change over T2/T3 (time periods 2013 and 2014), explaining our findings and observations in this respect.

### *13.2.2 Theory of change (T0/T1)*

The overall aim of the ACPF advocacy is to contribute to child wellbeing, to support a culture in Africa in which child rights are embraced and to put children and specific issues regarding child rights and wellbeing on the public and political agendas. ACPF focuses on the African child, as they are a pan-African-focused organisation with an African profile. Working towards these overarching aims, ACPF, as indicated in the ToC in 2010, seeks to 1) improve knowledge on children's rights through building knowledge, providing evidence and research and speaking out on the issues to address; 2) provide a platform for dialogue and 3) strengthen CSOs and government capacity to effectively change and implement pro-child programmes and policies.

These objectives are linked to strategies and thematic areas, supported by a rich variety of activities. The strategies are 1) building knowledge, 2) speaking out, 3) contributing to legal and policy reforms through research, 4) building alliances and 5) working together with the AU and other international partners to achieve the main aims.

The thematic priority areas underlying these strategies focus on 1) monitoring government performance on child wellbeing, 2) promoting legal protection and access to justice, 3) strengthening family and social protection mechanisms, 4) voicing children's needs and 5) building partnerships for change at pan-African and international level.

These themes/priority areas rely on the content-based work that substantiates ACPF's advocacy work, such as the extensive research reports, the conferences organised, the monitoring frameworks and the index used to assess governments' child friendliness.





Figure 13.1 ACPF Theory of Change at T0/T1 as reconstructed

In this light, it is considered relevant to reiterate how ACPF maintained its own character, way and scope of working as a research centre advocating evidence-based messages on child rights during the MFS funding period. Rather than engaging in public campaigning, ACPF pursued an informative mode of working, focusing on mediation and consensus building and still targeting<sup>477</sup> African governments, CSOs and international bodies, with a strong focus on the AU. The model ACPF pursues is best visualised as follows:



### 13.2.3 Practice of the ToC (T2/T3)

The ToC of ACPF at T2/T3 could not be identified, because ACPF simply did not actively work with the ToC over the last years, as was confirmed by ACPF management. In practice, when new initiatives are undertaken, possible processes of change are reflected upon among staff, but reportedly in ad hoc sessions. Under the new proposal submitted in September 2014 to the Netherlands government for funding 2016–2020,<sup>478</sup> ACPF included a new ToC but now as lead organisation. Informed by ACPF management, this inspired ACPF to further develop their overall ToC as an independent autonomous organisation, also in the future. It therefore goes without saying that for this evaluation we had focused on the practice of change rather than theorising, trying to reconstruct a ToC at T2/T3 that ACPF never used. Hereunder, we highlight how, in our observation, major aspects of the original ToC developed in practice and where/how it deviated at instances.

#### 13.2.3.1 Strategies

Practice shows that ACPF works on different institutional levels, more than expressed in their strategic planning 2010–2015 and referred to in the baseline report (namely the AU, civil society and governmental levels). We distilled from their working practice the following five different levels:

- Global level,
- Inter-agency partnerships,
- Regional (pan-African) level,
- National (African) government level and
- National CSO level.

The scope of work and stakeholders identified in the baseline survey is thus broader and more comprehensive.

The global level refers to supra-national bodies, like the UN, but also to actors beyond pan-Africa. The ambition to reach out to this level was not articulated or pursued under T0/T1. We understand the inter-agency partnerships (e.g. inter-agency but also international working or writing groups) as important connectors between the pan-African and global levels. We had not identified such working partnerships elsewhere in ACPF's institutional landscape. They are conceived having a bridging function between the research conducted by ACPF and the various actors not only at global level, but



also at national and the regional levels, where potential users of the advocacy message are active. At the time of the baseline survey, ACPF participated in inter-agency working groups but reportedly mostly in the regional pan-African context, within the AU setting. ACPF's outreach to African governments was part of the ToC mainly through countries' Child Friendly Index (CFI), a naming and shaming instrument and one of the tools to monitor governments on child friendliness. The pathway (of change) to influence African governments works out differently in practice, as explained under outcomes. Lastly, also the road towards national CSOs took another path in daily life, operating not so much through an established network as was envisaged but by way of ACPF's content-based advocacy message.

In the original ToC (T0–T1), we identified a gap regarding the articulation of the 'narrative of strategies', being the general reasoning behind ACPF's priority areas, and strategies including the various policy considerations. In practice, we noted that narratives were there, although these were tacit and not always shared internally. This lack of narrative is also observed in how ACPF builds networks, convenes processes and brings together stakeholders for dialogues; the narratives of these processes are not articulated, while we learned that these are key functions of ACPF's work and part of daily working practices. For example, for the legal protection and access to justice for children to be realised by way of Child Legal Protection Centres (CLPCs), it should be noted that these centres are Ethiopia-based and not pan-African, though it was the idea to serve as an example for other countries. This perspective is not articulated in the ToC. Another non-articulated strategy refers to the priority theme 'monitoring of government performance on child wellbeing' (ToC T0/T1), to be achieved especially through 'building national advocacy and monitoring capacity'. This is not taken up directly at national level, but in practice indirectly through the AU channels. This pathway remained tacit.

ACPF's insider advocacy strategies seem to rest partly on silent diplomacy and personal relations, where it concerns partnerships and cooperation, seeking building consensus. ACPF considers consensus essential to advance the advocacy message and to create space to provide technical and content support to various processes. Consensus building is a rather strong characteristic of ACPF's work that is not expressed in the ToC. As a consequence, personal/professional relations are at the heart of ACPF's work, especially in their relationships at pan-African level. This quality should not be overlooked, although it is not included in the theory.

#### 13.2.3.2 Assumptions, constraints and strengths

The ToC includes the assumption that ACPF's advocacy message in itself enables capacities of CSOs and governments, but what capacities it referred to was not well articulated or defined and thus we could not verify whether this was the case. However, we understood that the Africa-wide Movement for Children (AMC) was to play a role in developing such capacities, but this did not work out the way it was envisaged as further explained in section 13.3.3. On the other hand, our country visit revealed that the advocacy message did its work in that it encouraged agencies and individuals to take action. There were other constraints affecting the initial ToC, such as for instance, when ACPF intended to give a voice to children and youngsters through a number of direct activities (art and music, competitions, festivals) and via AMC; these activities were not pursued partly because of budget constraints but also the non-uptake by AMC.

Lastly, but definitely not the least important development in this respect is how the quality of ACPF's research remained very rich and widely appreciated by everyone who uses ACPF research. This quality aspect of ACPF's work has not been articulated in the ToC, but proves to be the backbone of

its success in advocacy, although its outreach is not (yet) as broad throughout the pan-African continent as was planned.

#### *13.2.4 Changes achieved and their relevance: a general picture*

This section gives an overview of the main findings (a summary of the changes achieved) as further elaborated in section 13.2.4 and addresses the evaluation question: 'What are the changes achieved in the three priority result areas through international lobby and advocacy in the thematic clusters during the period 2012–2014?'

Reflecting on the ACPF outcomes identified (see Figure 13.2 below), we noted that most changes are shown at pan-African level, specifically at the AU (Department of Social Affairs/Division of Social Welfare<sup>479</sup>) and its African Committee of Experts on Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC). ACPF provides overall backstopping to the Department within the frame of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990). Outcomes pertain mainly to setting the AU agenda, influencing AU policy on child rights, resulting in changing practices not only at AU Commission's level but also through AU ministerial conference at member state level. The AU/Social Department and its ACERWC give full recognition to ACPF and highly appreciate its continuing and high quality contribution to their work on child rights in Africa. This is considered a major and crucial outcome of ACPF's programme.

There are various active inter-agency working groups (IAWGs) in different compositions, on different subject matters, in different locations related to child rights (post-2015 agenda, governance and child protection) where ACPF is being invited to give input on content and/or to participate in drafting guidelines, policy or declarations for decision-making bodies. Examples are the working groups for the AU and its committees but also for the various regional economic communities (ECOWAS, EAC and SADC) and the international governmental institutions. We consider these ongoing requests for input and ACPF's actual participation in such IAWGs an important outcome of its advocacy work as it brings about changes in agendas, policy and practices. Most recently, ACPF's advocacy outreach expanded to the global level (UNICEF Geneva and New York, but also UNCRC and UNHRC) and to the Netherlands and even Australia.

A good number of outcomes was noted at civil society level but mainly as spin-offs (indirect outcomes) of various general ACPF activities/outputs such as the African Report, the IPCs, the support to ACERWC and the AU. It shows that ACPF's content message in child rights dating back to 2011 and 2012 still resounds and stimulates actions in civil society and at governmental levels in 2014. The message is continually taken forward by other actors. Advocacy appears a long-term task and requires long-term commitment and perseverance.

Besides these outcomes or changes achieved by ACPF, we also noted that some outcomes/changes that were hoped for did not materialise, despite efforts being made by ACPF to make it happen. These outcomes 'hoped for' were expected to be realised through, amongst other things, the Africa-wide Movement on Child Rights (AMC) and its CSO Forum, the offspring of AMC especially established to give input to the ACERWC. Overall, the AMC appears not very visible in the countries visited outside the inner-circle of AMC members or affiliated organisations, whereas numerous questions were raised in all six countries as to its relation to the CSO Forum. Serious tensions of competence were reported between the two bodies, including confusion as to their specific functions, but also about the value added by AMC at national levels. Many child rights networks are operational on the continent, each claiming its own specific linguistic, geographical or content focus.

This confronts the AU and ACERWC with a major problem where it comes to coordination and credibility of civil society progress reports on the implementation of the African Charter on Child Rights. The AMC as an African network and planned outlet for ACPF's content message to the various countries will be further elaborated in one of the cases in section 13.3.3, which primarily focuses on AMC, but embraces to certain extent also the CSO Forum and ACERWC.

#### *13.2.5 Understanding outcomes and changes in relation to the priority result areas and indicators*

The outcomes/changes reported below refer to time period T3, meaning that these were collected at the latest per 1 September 2014. As discussed in the baseline report and methodology chapter, there are many kinds of outcomes relevant for ACPF to consider, such as planned/expected outcomes (included in ToC) and outcomes (outside the ToC) and in that sense unexpected. It also involves tangible and intangible outcomes, as well as evolving outcomes having potential for a follow-up and 'end' outcomes. The latter two are mostly verifiable from narrative sources. Moreover, some outcomes have roots in previous (MFS I) or other sources of funding but eventually emerged with the help of MFS II funding at T2/T3. A last category of outcomes we felt should be acknowledged, concerns the 'hoped for outcomes' (or non-outcomes) that were not achieved, despite ACPF's efforts and investments. This will be further illustrated in the case study on the AMC.

ACPF outcomes were very difficult to obtain. We roughly identified the following interrelated reasons for this. In its various progress reports (Highlight Reports), ACPF claims a set of achievements under MFS II that, after close scrutiny, we considered more as ACPF activities and outputs as was confirmed by ACPF staff,<sup>480</sup> rather than outcomes that brought or are bringing about changes. Moreover, where changes are being claimed we felt solid substantiation in some areas tends to be missing. This flaw may be a result of the unfamiliarity with the concept of outcome within ACPF, which came out only in September 2014 (see section 13.6), and may to some extent explain why outcomes were not observed by ACPF or ICS. Another reason why data/information and awareness of what ACPF had achieved in practice was lacking may be due to discrepancy between MFS II theory and ACPF's working reality.<sup>481</sup> Official MFS II progress reporting (following an M&E protocol), if at all available, did not tell much about ACPF's changes and outcomes. Lastly, the ToC (T0/T1) has not been used or applied to report on planned outcomes.

This situation encouraged us to look at outcomes and changes from a wider perspective, going beyond that what ACPF and ICS had claimed or may have been expecting or what was written in the ToC at T0/T1. The overview of outcomes that we present here is primarily grounded in the daily reality of our African respondents working on child rights but also gives due regard to the theoretic frameworks that inform the methodology of the evaluation. We dealt with the changes/outcomes as follows: 1st step collecting outcomes, 2nd critically viewing/clustering these in light of ACPF's working practice and aspired outreach, before 3rd relating outcomes to priority result areas. In our opinion, this best reflects ACPF's position and achievements. To surface 'hard' (verifiable) data on outcomes and changes, we frequently stepped out of the box stimulating our respondents both to also think off the beaten path and to take a wider look at outcomes/changes than the programme frame was focusing on. We felt such an approach does justice to the pan-African nature of work by ACPF and to the notion that not everything that is achieved could have been predicted given the complex world surrounding ACPF's work, nor could everything that has been planned have been achieved.

#### *13.2.6 Priority result areas and how to understand their indicators*

Outcomes are grouped into the three priority result areas as given in our ToR. To identify and relate the outcomes to the given priority result areas, we used the broad indicators as an instrument to

measure and visualise how outcomes are understood and related to the priority result areas. However, given the specific position of our unit of analysis, as an Addis Ababa-based organisation reaching out at different institutional levels all over Africa and the autonomous nature of its ILA programme with a loose relation to the T4C Alliance, there was need to refine most broad indicators to explain how these can be best understood in the ACPF context, as shown in Table 13.1 below. The outcome overview (Figure 13.2) includes references to the applicable broad outcome indicators.

### *13.2.7 Outcomes and changes per priority result area*

The changes reported are achieved during the period 2011–2014, funded (mainly) by MFS II. The list is not exhaustive, which is not only because of the complexities of the issues evaluated and the geographical scope of the evaluation, as explained above (section 13.1.3), but also because possible changes might not be visible or cannot be claimed due to sensitivities of the nature of work, while further and maybe more importantly, we realise the voice of ACPF may be reaching out on a much wider scale than any monitoring and evaluation methodology could ever capture.

The five different institutional levels that ACPF addresses in its working practice (global arena, inter-agency working groups, regional pan-African/AU level including ACERWC, national governmental [country level] and civil society [country level Africa]) are taken as point of departure for clustering outcomes, thus doing justice to ACPF's working reality. These levels are crosscutting in the three priority result areas, as shown in Figure 13.2.

Overarching across all priority result areas is ACPF's achievement of contributing to favourable conditions for their advocacy work that provides space, especially at the pan-Africa arena and via the AU channels, to set agendas, influence policy and change practice on multiple levels. ACPF had gained a robust reputation in those places where it is known as child rights advocate. This achievement is not only demonstrated in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between ACPF and the African Union Commission in 2012<sup>482</sup> and the observer status granted to ACPF by ACERWC in 2010,<sup>483</sup> but also in the rising appearance of ACPF in global and supranational fora. This composite outcome is further discussed in section 13.2.6.

#### 13.2.7.1 Agenda setting

##### Global level:

The changes in agenda setting at this level relate to invitations to ACPF by policy institutions, CSOs and research institutes to provide input in policy (and agenda) discussions as well as technical discussions. These can all be understood as awareness raised on the issues advocated, targets reacting on the issues advocated and opening (closed) spaces (broad indicators 2, 3, 4). Four changes were reported:

- The African Report (ARCW) 2011 and its Child Friendly Index (CFI) appear main sources of inspiration creating space for ACPF to be invited. In June 2014, the Netherlands NGO Kids Rights and the Netherlands Institute of Social Studies (ISS) sought technical input from ACPF, based on the CFI work in the African Report, which is published every two years. ACPF was invited to attend and present at their conference its methodology and experience with the CFI, provided input on Kids Rights Index and presented recommendations.
- The UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) in Geneva invited ACPF to provide expert input in a panel discussion with regard to the issue: 'towards a better spending to realise children's rights,'<sup>484</sup> acknowledging ACPF being part of a global initiative on investing in children as the African voice. This outcome is directly related to the ARCW 2011 titled Budgeting for Children. In this forum, ACPF shared findings and issues identified in their research.

- In relation to global partnerships or inter-agency working groups (IAWGs) and ACPF's visibility in the global arena, UNICEF (Geneva) sought input from ACPF for their strategic planning 2014–2017, inviting ACPF for the strategic planning discussion in September 2014. This outcome is owing to ACPF's message and research (ARCW 2011), their African voice and experience and the close cooperation with UNICEF in a number of IAWGs.
- UNICEF's Executive Board (New York) invited ACPF for a special session at the UN in June 2014 for input in the post-2015 development agenda after ACPF had provided a statement and policy brief to that effect (thus raising awareness about its work, which gave access to the forum). In that session, ACPF presented a situational picture on Africa's common position to post-2015<sup>485</sup> on the theme: 'sustainability and development in Africa: a child centred perspective'. Prior to this session, a two-day workshop was organised by UNICEF in London on child rights and social accountability, where ACPF was also invited to give input on the post-2015 agenda. These outcomes will be evolving over the coming period and for now we cannot yet assess any further changes that may follow in pursuit of these connections and cooperations.

Inter-agency working groups:

Applicable indicators that helped to identify two outcomes refer to coherent positions among partners and opening (closed) spaces or creating space (broad indicators 1, 4).




Figure 13.2 Overview of selected MFS II outcomes ACPF

- ACPF was invited to give input in diverse inter-agency working groups (IAWGs), cooperating with PLAN International, Save International, UNICEF, World Vision, REDLAMYC (a Caribbean and Latin American network for child rights) and others, working at both international and regional levels.
- These IAWGs are ad hoc strategic partnerships between different national NGOs (NNGOs) and international NGOs (INGOs), at times including UN actors, leading to a shared and common agenda and coherent working environment on thematic and policy arenas. The IAWGs contributed to the above-mentioned global level agenda setting outcomes with various UN institutions and a policy influencing outcome with the UN Child Rights Committee in Geneva. These working groups are providing space for ACPF to pursue discussions at different levels, combining strengths and creating coherent agendas for multilevel cooperation
- A non-MFS outcome at this level that is worth mentioning is ACPF's input in the SIDA-funded African Charter Child Project (ACCP). This IAWG (2014) made up of five partners supports the implementation of the African Charter and was lauded by ACERWC for the exemplary role of consortium partners' 486 seamlessly working complementarily. This participation is also seen as an outcome of ACPF's advocacy work, though not MFS funded.

#### Regional pan-African: AU and African Committee on the Rights of the Child:

All outcomes here can be understood under the broad outcome indicators (2, 3, 4, 5) of awareness raising on the issues advocated and the role of ACPF as such, targets reacting to ACPF and taking action on the issues advocated, the opening of (closed) space or creating space and influencing terms of public debate on the pan-African level by bringing in issues, supporting the AU and the use of ACPF reports.

- ACPF was invited to give input on child rights in the 2063-agenda of the African Union at its 50th year anniversary (2013). This can be seen as an outcome that will be evolving while for now it is an end outcome.
- Based on their close cooperation with the AU and ACERWC, as well as ACPF's profile, reputation and content-based experience and work, ACPF was asked to support the AU/ACERWC Campaign for the ratification of the African Charter, which was launched in January 2014.
- Also, input was provided by ACPF for CSOs and governments on periodical reporting guidelines to monitor the African Charter, which in turn is informed by the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework Africa Fit For Children (AFFC) that ACPF developed in 2007. This frame also serves as inspiration for new M&E protocols for themes like people with disabilities and aging.

#### National government (African):

A mix of indicators (2, 5, 3, 4) apply to these outcomes mainly generated through the African Report and the inter-country adoption IPC that made governments aware of issues at stake and encouraged using the reports in their work, in discussions and in policy debates.

- The usability of the African Report (mostly referring to 2011) is related to its robust research content and its advocacy potential as was confirmed in most of the six countries where field studies were conducted. Governments use the ARCW to compare their positions with

previous years or with other countries, especially for what is called the 'naming and shaming' of a country's child rights government agenda.

- An outcome beyond ACPF's scope of control, but inspired by the International Policy Conference (IPC) 2012 on inter-country adoption is the spinoff on national level in Uganda (among other countries), which led to research cooperation between UNICEF and the Ugandan government on the issue.
- On (national) individual level, opinion leaders/politicians are reported to be especially inspired by the ARCW 2011 (Budgeting for Children), calling upon their national government to pursue budgeting and investing in children, thus pushing it onto the agenda.
- Another outcome related the ARCW evidence-based messages is that political leaders and governmental staff are reported to invisibly and confidentially consult ACPF on issues researched, gaps identified and recommendations for policy change.

Civil society (African) outcomes:

The six outcomes identified at this level mostly fall under the broad outcome indicators (2, 5) of awareness raising, influencing public debate and opening space for dialogue and cooperation between CSOs and between CSOs and the government.

- The usability of the Africa report for CSOs as an evidence-based advocacy tool and for identification of gaps is confirmed in three out of the six investigated countries. There is, however, as at government level, diversity in perspectives on the usability as well as in criticism towards the report: Among a number of respondents, the report was not known at all, or the digital version was not easily accessible due to poor Internet connection, or the language was too academic or not accessible.
- The IPC 2012 on inter-country adoption was said to have strengthened networking between CSOs and government thanks to the open dialogue space it had offered to various parties. This resulted in more agenda coherence in Uganda between CSOs and government on the issue. Additionally, inter-country adoption is pursued now by a number of Ugandan CSOs.
- Based on the ARCW 2011, some CSOs in Uganda now push for the issue 'investing on children' within their own working programmes as well as with government.
- A typical intangible outcome is that CSOs in especially two out of the six countries (Namibia and Mozambique) felt recognised by the ACERWC, which gives them space to speak out via CSO reporting on the country status. By virtue of ACPF technical support to the ACERWC, we see this also as a contribution of ACPF's advocacy role.
- Ugandan CSOs used the ARCW 2011 as an inspiration for their alternative reporting and included a chapter on budgeting in the shadow reports.
- Also in Mozambique, the ARCW 2011 strengthened networking between CSOs and government, leading to more agenda coherence.

#### 13.2.7.2 Policy influencing/policy influenced

There is only one broad indicator (1) that marks the outcomes in this priority result area pertaining to policy influenced and solicited policy advice (read influence) acting on adopted agendas.

In that sense, no demonstrable changes in adopted policy were observed, but we identified demonstrable policy changing processes set into motion with ACPF delivering substantial input.



#### Global outcomes:

- The UNCRC in Geneva invited ACPF to be part of the writing and drafting committee to develop a general comment on public spending to realise children's rights, providing an authoritative interpretation of UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 423. This outcome is directly linked to the findings and evidence based on the ARCW 2011.
- The International Policy Conference 2012 put inter-country adoption on the agenda of a number of governments in Africa as well as in other parts of the world. The issue was well received, as adoption is a worldwide phenomenon involving national governments and the broader public alike. The IPC brought together a broad range of stakeholders and received worldwide media attention through the BBC, CNN and other national media stations. Ethiopia, the Netherlands and Australia are but a few examples where policy was changed according to ACPF's research findings and where further research was conducted following the Conference. All these changes relate to policy influencing (also to change of practice), as was confirmed in documentation received; a number of African countries, as well as Western countries such as Australia and the Netherlands, had ratified the Inter-country Adoption Guidelines.

#### Inter-agency working groups:

- In 2012, ACPF became a member of the Inter-Agency Group on Strengthening Child Protection Systems<sup>487</sup> in sub-Saharan Africa formulating a joint inter-agency policy statement (2013) on how to develop and strengthen child protection systems in sub-Saharan Africa. The call for policy making was addressed to governments, the AU, regional economic communities, multilateral agencies, donors, the private sector, academia, CSOs, communities and organised children's and youth groups.
- Space was created, awareness raised and policy influenced when ACPF was invited to cooperate in an IAWG with regard to developing child policies in the Eastern African Community (EAC),<sup>488</sup> with the aim of working towards strengthening child protection systems. Though primarily supporting the development of the EAC Child Policy, the IAWG also supports other child rights within the EAC, including the biennial child rights conference of the EAC, which enables dialogue with children on issues of priority in the EAC.

Table 13.1 Broad Indicators and Their interpretation for ACPF Outcomes			
	Agenda Setting/ Agenda set (Ag)	Policy Influencing/ ed (PI)	Changing/ed Practices (CP)
Broad indicator 1	1. Within the 'programme' relevant partners maintain coherent positions and strategies	1. Demonstrable changes and adoption of new policies by lobby and advocacy targets	1. Concrete changes in practice of targets as result of policy formulation
Comment	Instead of Alliance partner we refer to Unit of Analysis	We looked at both policy influenced and solicited policy advice, (read influence) acting on adopted agendas	It was not possible to surface if changes were result of policy formulation
Comment	ACPF operates virtually independently from T4C; no other significant relation to the Alliance was found except for funding and M&E reporting	We included drafted and not yet adopted policy as well as adopted policies	Changes are long term processes some changes may have come from MFS I, some for other reasons.
Comment	We rather included likeminded and occasional alliances such as special inter-agency working groups (IAWGs).	Different institutional levels where policies are made are distinguished in line with outreach focus ACPF	
Comment	Being aware of differences (besides the coherent position) is also included in this broad indicator.	Not only ILA targets also non-targeted actors further afield are considered here	
Broad indicator 2	2. External partners are aware of issues at stake and adhere to issue	2. Demonstrable shift in accountability structure for governments.	2. Changes in practice of indirect targets and stakeholders
	We consider agenda setting a multi-layered process, where agendas figure at different institutional levels.	We did not verify at government level	This indicator understood as practices changed but out of sphere of influence or control of ACPF
Broad indicator 3	3. Extent to which ILA targets React to positions advocated		
	Not only targets reacted or take position. We came across many others (not-specifically targeted) who were influenced (positions taken) by ACPF work		
Broad Indicator 4	4. Relevant stakeholders invited in/or organise meetings on relevant policies (opening closed space)		
	Also non-involved stakeholders are included here as we noted them to have participated/taken action on the basis of ACPF's work.		
Broad indicator 5	5. Terms of public debate show influence of advocated message		
	The major public debate could not be followed in the pan-Africa context; The AU, UN and within civil society organised debates have been leading for the assessment.		



Regional pan-African outcomes:

- In April 2014, the AU sought ACPF's support for policy input on child marriages, which resulted in writing and adoption of the Declaration on Child Marriages by the ACERWC. The invitation to ACPF was based upon their close cooperation with the AU and the ACERWC as well as their evidence-based research on child marriages.
- The EAC-IAWG in which ACPF took part drafted the Bujumbura declaration that served as input for a child policy within the EAC. In February 2014, the zero draft was completed and submitted.
- ACPF provided input to the AU Department on Social Affairs in the experts' consultations for the guidelines on social protection, which were drafted in April 2014 and adopted during the AU Meeting of Ministers for Social Development in May 2014.

National governmental level outcomes:

- No specific outcomes identified yet under MFS II, although law reforms were reported to have happened prior to the MFS II period such as in Swaziland, which, according to ACPF documentation (see the Yichalal Consortium proposal for new MFS funding), could just as well be classified as change of practice. Moreover, there may have been more law reforms that we are not aware of such as in the area of inter-country adoption.

Civil society (African) outcomes:

- In pursuance of the launch of the ARCW 2011 in Mozambique, one of the CSOs that sat into the accompanying workshop approached ACPF in 2012 to help in drafting the health policy for children.

### 13.2.7.3 Change of practice

Under this priority result area, we observed changes in practice among targets and non-targets, whether or not related to policy formulation but recognised as a contribution of ACPF (broad indicators 1 and 2). On the global level, we could not yet identify changes of practices, but it might be too early, as ACPF's profile at this level seems to be slowly rising since last year.

Inter-agency working groups:

- The frequent invitations extended to ACPF to be a policy resource to IAWGs is seen as change of practice in itself. We did not identify such solicited contribution of ACPF in the previous period. It is self-explanatory that IAWGs in general are a source for interactions between the likeminded, leading to reciprocal influence in agendas, policy and practices.

Regional pan-African:

A major outcome/change that cuts across all three priority result areas eventually seen as change of practice is ACPF's broad 'backstopping' role for the African Union, to be precise for its Department of Social Affairs, especially for the Division of Social Welfare and the African Committee of Experts (ACERWC) in the process of implementing the African Charter. This outcome is not only achieved under MFS II, as it started already under MFS I and is observed and acknowledged in the AU's ongoing working practices and frameworks on child rights and wellbeing.

- In cooperation with other CSOs, ACPF developed a training and framework for the ACERWC on child protection systems, which was adopted and is now in use by the ACERWC in their communication with governments.
- As mentioned above, the IPC 2012 also resulted in a change of practices such as the ACERWC endorsing the Guidelines for Action on Inter-country Adoption for children in Africa to be

implemented as a guiding tool for stakeholders and governments, used during consideration of state party responses in the implementation of the Charter.<sup>489</sup>

- Another change of practice is the reported increase in CSO and governmental progress reporting on the Charter as a result of the earlier mentioned campaign on the Charter.

National (African) governmental outcomes:

- Another typical and well documented case of changed practices (non-MFS II) is the earlier mentioned example of Swaziland that reportedly improved policy and practice as a result of its (low) ranking in the CFI as part of the ARCW 2008 (subtitled 'how child friendly are African governments?'). The Swaziland example is frequently shared in ACPF progress reporting (e.g. in the 2014 YICHALAL consortium proposal). The low CFI ranking was taken up by both UNICEF and the government.
- Another change in practice (initially non-MFS) pertains to the Children Legal Protection Centres (CLPCs) in Ethiopia rooted in an earlier ACPF project (2005), which was halted in 2010. In 2012, the CPLCs were restarted with the MFS II support of ACPF but now are entirely under Ethiopian government management. The case is documented by ACPF but was not further verified through other sources.

Civil society (African) outcomes:

- In Mozambique, it was reported that one CSO adjusted its programme focus towards child and governance and budgeting for children, accountability and anti-corruption, which may likely have been inspired by ARCW 2011.
- In Kenya, the 2011 African report created space for a project to develop and provide training to CSOs and local government in government budget tracing with regard to children.

### *13.2.8 Non-outcomes and missed opportunities*

Besides the outcomes/changes explained above, the evaluation also uncovered some 'non-outcomes' of activities that had been initially scheduled as part of the ToC at T0–T1. These non-outcomes constitute in fact missed opportunities, impacting in particular the outreach of ACPF at national government and civil society level, but also the presence of a collective civil society voice.

ACPF's outreach at national level was envisaged to be achieved through the Africa-wide Movement, initiated by ACPF and made up of national NGOs as a genuine African CSO voice feeding into the pan-African policy arena. However, the country studies show not only a lack of visibility and outreach by AMC, but also overall confusion on the role and added value of AMC and its offspring the CSO Forum. This 'non-outcome' of ACPF's support to the AMC also resonates at AU/ACERWC levels, lacking focal points for CSO reporting.

The AMC network is one of the cases presented in section 13.3.3 and will be further elucidated including the analysis how it did not contribute to its initial and expected goal.

### *13.2.9 Additional outcomes that create and sustain the international reputation as advocate*

In the process of identifying ACPF's outcomes, we came across outcomes we consider important but that did not really match the broad indicators and thus could not be specifically categorised in one of the priority result areas. These outcomes are related to those mentioned above but conceived to serve as a gateway towards the priority result areas. We consider them crucial for successful advocacy work, as noted in the case of ACPF and therefore mention them separately: credibility, visibility, tested advocacy strategies for outreach, and supportive strategic partners. By no means are these outcomes considered output of ACPF's organisational development. They can be seen as the

effects of ACPF's output on the outer world, not under the control of ACPF, but the result of dynamic interactions with others<sup>490</sup> thus establishing ACPF's reputation as a pan-African child rights advocate. These outcomes are propelling the changes and are dynamic in nature so as to remain a powerful incentive for change.

Over the past 10 years of its existence, ACPF has gained credibility, especially pertaining to its robust message on child rights and wellbeing in Africa. ACPF's evidence-based research is found on numerous desks of international and national agencies over which ACPF claims no ownership. The content is freely accessible, widely read and taken up and promoted by many forwarding the advocacy message. Sustaining credibility requires hard work. It helps also in raising and maintaining the visibility of the organisation, in terms of being an independent pan-African voice and an open and user-friendly source of knowledge and expertise for all actors at all levels of the institutional landscape, thus ensuring the message remains usable so that it can be passed on and implemented. For ACPF, this implies balancing between visibility as an organisation at the highest institutional levels (AU and UN) but equally being visible and accessible for those who operate at grassroots level to promote child wellbeing, while the visibility is not related to ownership over the message. Tested advocacy strategies are needed to reach out and get the message across, tailor-made for the users/platforms, thus creating open space for dialogue. These strategies have to remain flexible so as to remain responsive to needs. Supportive strategic sparring partners (helping hands) are important to remain alert to new developments and well connected to overall daily realities at all levels, enabling the advocacy message to be kept alive and well embedded in its context. This is especially important given the complex surroundings of advocacy work.

Hence, these four outcomes are intertwined and can be seen as overarching ACPF's advocacy work, or rather a special result area, which we tend to summarise as creating and sustaining an international reputation as an advocate. This provides space for ACPF to fulfil its role as an advocate and to support child friendly agenda setting, influence policy and eventually influence people and organisations to change their practices. In this domain of creating and sustaining its reputation, ACPF's work showed especially at global and pan-African (AU) level some impressive outcomes in terms of credibility, visibility and tested advocacy strategies. We identified supportive sparring partners in, for example, the International Board of Trustees (IBOT), even at the AU/ ACERWC, again especially where it concerns the higher echelons of the institutional landscape. However, as to the governmental and civil society levels that we noted that the overall reputation of ACPF is not as established and consistent as at pan-African level. Some respondents who knew ACPF before as a recognised advocate mentioned having lost contact, especially in recent years, and even said ACPF had gone off the radar. But we have also spoken to child rights organisations that had only a very vague or no idea at all of ACPF's existence but had expressed keen interest to link up.

Our overall finding is that the reputation of ACPF at higher level is well established, whereas especially at national governmental and civil society, level its voice is not (sufficiently) heard. There is still a world to win.

### *13.2.10 Relevance*

This section seeks to answer the evaluation question: What is the relevance of these changes?

#### *13.2.10.1 Relevance in African and global context*

The above (positive) outcomes and changes especially show the relevance of their work in the broader context of child rights and wellbeing in Africa, both at pan-African level and at global level, sharing the African perspective in an international context. To a certain extent, the outcomes and the

continuing interest in ACPF's work and products from different angles (UN-family, ISS Netherlands and AU/ACERWC) speak for themselves. The frequent invitations extended to ACPF to give input in inter-agency working groups (IAWG) or directly to the AU, for example, to address meetings or convene trainings are testimony to the relevance of their work and the changes it can bring to agendas, policy and practices. This is to a certain extent relevant in the context of the comprehensive and complex reality of working towards sustainable poverty alleviation.

#### 13.2.10.2 Relevance within the aim of ACPF

ACPF's overall aim is to put children on the public and political agenda for the sake of child wellbeing, embracing the African culture. Viewing ACPF's work and the changes it achieved, it can be concluded that, also within ACPF's original ToC, their work can be seen as relevant. This was confirmed by many interviewees, obviously mainly those who were familiar with or closely involved in the work of ACPF. ACPF's input is particularly appreciated for the high quality and extensive evidence-based research that addresses issues on child rights. ACPF voices African concerns and provides African-based evidence and recommendations on issues that are not yet on the African agenda, and, as such, seems to awaken numerous policy makers, public institutions and CSOs on the continent.

#### 13.2.10.3 Relevance within the ToC

The changes achieved fall in line with the ambitions expressed in the ToC (T0/T1) to provide more knowledge and create platforms to produce awareness on issues regarding children's rights and wellbeing such as government's accountability. Relevance of its research and advocacy message is ensured through validation workshops and roundtable expert meetings.

ACPF's work includes, though on a limited scale, strengthening the capabilities of those who are to hold governments accountable and who address the needs at national levels, as well as those who address issues at regional and international levels. As to the changes achieved in civil society, there is still ample scope to gain in relevance, especially where it concerns the mobilisation and mainstreaming of grassroots work with national CSOs.

#### 13.2.10.4 Relevance within the T4C Alliance

There are different perspectives noted in this respect. Informed by interviews, the lead agent ICS Amersfoort considers ACPF's input and involvement in the joint programme relevant for their overall work. However, the relevance of the changes that ACPF brought about in Africa for ICS (and the T4C Alliance) could not be verified in terms of being applied in the Alliance work. Verbally, it was confirmed, but, from the limited documentation provided by the lead agent to our team on their relationship and exchanges with ACPF, we were not able to distil whether and if so to what extent there was any complementary or relevant benefit of ACPF's work in the ongoing T4C programmes. ICS has an office in Nairobi with its own network partners; the relevance of ACPF's work for the Nairobi-based work is reportedly mainly embedded in the evidence-based research, more than in support to locally operating organisations and civil society outreach of ACPF.

#### 13.2.10.5 Relevance over time

Relevance is not only related to evidence-based content but also to raising issues that remain topical and up to date over a longer period of time. The interlinks between current discussions and research and gaps identified by ACPF in their extensive publications (ARCW 2008, 2011) or at conferences (IPC 2012) show this relevance of the outcomes generated by ACPF's work. We can speak of relevance for a variety of multiple stakeholders alike, be it policy makers within the regional platforms or international arenas, child rights experts, CSOs on national and international level, or

intergovernmental organisations such as the UN. Relevance is only to a certain extent under ACPF's sphere of control or influence.

Overall, the relevance of ACPF's advocacy resonates on the pan-African level as well as at country level, and in the last year (2013–2014), increasingly in the international and global policy and public arenas; ACPF's work is acknowledged as voicing the African position on child rights and wellbeing. ACPF could, however, gain in relevance if there were a stronger outreach of their message to CSOs that are Africa-rooted as well as to different language and geographical zones. This consideration is not a plea for regional offices but rather a direction to intensify mobilising representative antennas on the continent and spreading the advocacy message in accessible language and readymade suggestions to those who work at the grassroots level.

### **13.3 Evaluation Question 2: Case studies and contribution analysis**

#### *13.3.1 General description of the way the Alliance has made contributions*

This section is about the question: Do the international lobby and advocacy efforts of the MFS II-funded ILA programmes contribute to the identified changes? The previous chapter listed the outcomes/changes achieved and explained in short the contributions made by ACPF; we surfaced most of these changes through our selected case studies. In this chapter, we describe the two cases, using them also to carry out a contribution analysis, seeking to illustrate and provide deeper understanding on the process behind the contributions made by ACPF. One case presents a planned outcome, the second case a non-outcome (or postponed dream) and we added one additional example that we considered to offer a highly interesting picture as to how the contribution came about pertaining to an unexpected outcome.

The two cases initially proposed to ACPF were re-confirmed by the new ACPF management team in November 2013: the African Report on Child Wellbeing (ARCW) and the Africa-wide Movement on Child rights (AMC). Both are components of ACPF's main programme funded by MFS II financing over 2011–2015 and play a central role in ACPF's ToC, as instrument and network to inform the advocacy process, respectively.

The African Report (see section 13.3.2) is prepared and published by ACPF every two years and as such is part of a continuing process feeding the evidence-based advocacy.

As the starting point of the report,<sup>491</sup> we took the ARCW 2011 'Budgeting for Children' and the ARCW 2013 'Towards greater accountability of Africa's children'. We followed the two reports through time and space, collecting information over a period of two years at AU/ACERWC, country (including government and civil society) and ACPF's home-base level. We chose to focus on them as of the moment of publication, rather than on the development of the reports as such (the research work), because we look at outcomes of what has been achieved through the reports (the output of ACPF's work). Moreover, the preparatory research for the 2011 report can only partly be attributed to MFS II, as it started much earlier. Many of the outcomes found (see Figure 13.2 above) could be traced back to the ARCW 2011; none were yet reported in the 2013 report. The outcomes we found are on global, pan-African and national levels and create awareness and space for uptake of the issue of financing for children in policy and public arenas and direct policy influencing through UNCRC, UNHRC, ACERWC and CSOs.

As to the AMC (see section 13.3.3.), this case was proposed because it fully complied with our criteria,<sup>492</sup> while we had understood that this movement was set up by ACPF in 2008 as an important channel for the ACPF advocacy message. Despite some hesitation on the side of ACPF to take up this particular case, it was finally concluded to offer a rich learning opportunity. AMC's website speaks of



a network 'to serve as African voice advocating and lobbying for the promotion and protection of the best interests of the African child at national and pan-African levels'.<sup>493</sup>

To understand the initial justification for this network and its developments, we used information furnished by various sources, such as AMC's previous and current chairpersons and custodians, ACPF staff and websites. In 2009, 'the Civil Society Organizations Forum (CSO Forum) on the African Charter was formed, reported to be a direct offspring of AMC to ensure a united voice on behalf of Africa's children and to strengthen the work of the ACERWC in carrying out its mandate'.<sup>494</sup> AMC as activity/output of ACPF did not generate outcomes in the context of our advocacy-oriented analysis, but MFS II funding and a lot of efforts have been invested in AMC.

The post-2015 outcome (see section 13.3.4) is about opening previously closed spaces influencing discussions to include children on the post-2015 agenda at regional (AU) and unexpectedly also at global level (UNICEF). The post-2015 agenda was not included in the ToC T0/T1, but taken on board by ACPF in 2013 (T2), when discussions gained momentum. As this could have been foreseen, ACPF was ready to promptly adjust its planning to support the AU. The outcomes at AU level are thus partly planned for, but the further spin-off to global level has been unexpected. Suddenly, opportunities arose enabling ACPF to voice their message in UN circles and follow through. Because this evaluation is focused on international lobbying and advocacy with its inherently complex nature, we consider this outcome interesting to analyse as ACPF's contribution. Post-2015 resonates throughout the pan-African lobby on child rights.

All three cases relate to the overarching and composite problem regarding pan-African child rights that are not yet (sufficiently) safeguarded in political and public agendas on the continent.

### *13.3.2 The case of the African Report on Child Wellbeing and its contribution to change*

#### *13.3.2.1 Background and ToC (T0/T1) of the ARCW*

The African Report on Child Wellbeing is ACPF's 'flagship publication', referred to as a 'message driven advocacy report' and focusing on different thematic areas relating to government accountability on child wellbeing. The research is conducted by ACPF staff with the help of external consultants while the themes are defined through consultations with CSOs and governments, which also provide information about the specific issues to pursue and government performance.<sup>495</sup> The report provides evidence on the state of affairs of themes per country and presents its child friendly index (CFI) as well as policy recommendations related to child wellbeing.

The ARCW is part of the ToC under the objective 'building knowledge', making governments aware of the current status of their performance on child wellbeing and their responsibility towards children and providing CSOs with a tool and evidence to hold their governments accountable. The report is always published in French and English, given the pan-African focus, sometimes with additions in Portuguese. As is also shown in Table 2.2.2, the report underlies much of ACPF's changes achieved.

The ARCW 2011 report was launched in the course of 2011 in both Dakar (Senegal) and Maputo (Mozambique), with a mixed crowd of participants from government officials to local, national and international CSOs. The launches were accompanied by a number of side activities, such as workshops and trainings on the issues discussed in the report, the use of the report as an advocacy tool and the methodology. These activities were part of the outreach programme. Only in Mozambique we could confirm and verify the launch and activities.

The ARCW 2013 was launched in November 2013, at ACPF's 10 year anniversary in the Sheraton Hotel in Addis Ababa in the presence of the President of Ethiopia and a number of high level

government representatives, decision makers and international CSOs, but also of the International Board of Trustees (IBoT) and ACERWC members. The Ethiopian President opened the session expressing his concern about child rights and wellbeing in Africa but also his gratitude for the work by ACPF. The discussions were led by a high level panel. The event was not as well attended as expected due to last minute changes in the date of the event. According to the ACPF workplan for 2014, follow up actions are in planning to start working through partners with the lowest performing countries. In collaboration with PLAN International, work is taken up in Guinea Bissau to start to mobilise stakeholders.

#### 13.3.2.2 The process, distribution and outreach of the reports 2011–2014

The outreach of the report (and its advocacy message), which starts with its distribution, is an important issue for ACPF. Interviews revealed that there are mixed findings as to what extent the reports are indeed widely spread. Overall, it seems that distribution of the 2011 report was more effective, reaching out further afield than the 2013 one. At country level, the ARCW 2011 is relatively well known and used, maybe owing to the follow up workshops and trainings, whereas the ARCW 2013 has not (yet) had much acknowledged visibility. In some of the countries we visited, people received the report through partner CSOs. The picture on the role of CSO partners and networks in the distribution of the report is not very clear. Some CSOs only reported having sent it to their partners; others did not mention this. It was also reported that policy makers and even opinion leaders such as parliamentarians referred to the report, which may point to a wider distribution. In some places, including at one UNICEF office, the report was not known at all.

We understood that, amongst others, AMC members are supposed to distribute the report amongst members, but we have not been able to find evidence and verify whether this has happened. Our time permitted only a cursory search amongst ACPF partner organisations and websites, showing that online visibility of the reports is quite meagre. ACPF shows the reports on its website and Infohub, but obvious partners and associated networks such as AMC and the CSO Forum do not refer to the report on their websites. Another issue mentioned by some respondents in relation to its distribution is the lack of reliable access to Internet to download soft copies. Overall, we found the ARCW 2011 to be much more visible and well known amongst the respondents than the ARCW 2013.

#### 13.3.2.3 The advocacy message and its contribution to change

In Kenya, Uganda and to lesser extent in Mozambique, the message in the 2011 report in particular reached out to multiple institutions and policy makers, which was partly planned and mostly unexpected. After-effects of the 2011 report are still noted in 2014. The report contributed to agenda setting, policy changes and even change of practices, as was explained above. It had resulted in invitations extended to ACPF to give input into dialogues, platforms and working sessions. Individuals and organisations also took the message forward, leading to follow-up research on national levels, while programmes were adjusted in reaction to the advocacy message. All these changes were beyond ACPF's sphere of control but were inspired and influenced by the ARCW 2011.

#### 13.3.2.4 The analysis of the contribution

Analysing its contribution shows that visibility of the report, supportive actions (workshops), language and accessibility of the message, and also the evidence base of the message, working with strategic partners, picking up the flow, commitment, personal contacts and many more aspects are important to generate change/contribution, as is endurance.

#### Visibility and supportive actions:

Interviewees confirmed reports sitting on desks in national and regional governmental offices and other organisations have helped in its extensive use as resource product, reference and even an advocacy tool. Supportive actions, as in 2011 in Mozambique, may also have contributed to its wider use and accessibility. This is underlined by some respondents stating that they used the 2011 report as inspiration to adjust their programmatic framework, to include budgeting and government accountability and to push for further government investments on children by using the CFI ranking list. In Uganda, it was mentioned that the 2011 report was the inspiration for including budgeting as a key issue in the alternative reporting on the progress of the Charter to ACERWC.

There is also criticism of the ARCW (and thus implicitly to ACPF), as the report is seen as too AU focused and lacking visibility on the country level, which refers especially to the 2013 report. Overall, the report is being used more extensively in those places where ACPF's visibility is greater, through personal contacts including focused follow-up.

#### Language and accessibility of the message:

As the report is usually written and translated into English and French, this has implications for the outreach in Africa, where many countries are Lusophone and Arabic speaking.

It affects the accessibility of the message and also outreach of the report to the entire continent.

However, one interesting example was shared relating to the language and uptake of the report by a CSO acknowledging how the translation of the summary of the report had helped in understanding the message and enhanced its outreach activities on country level.

Regarding the content, many external respondents see the report as an evidence resource to use in their relations with governments, with other organisations and also at individual level. However, it is also noted that the message is not always easy to access, and a popular version of the report would help in understanding. One respondent stated what was felt overall: 'the report is not set in stone and elicits discussions on all levels, whenever it reaches these levels'.

#### 13.3.2.5 The advocacy process step by step

The issue on government accountability to invest in children (ARCW 2011) contributed to a number of changes on the international level. It is interesting to follow how the pathway evolved, which we show by looking at the various steps in the process.

In pursuance of the 2011 report, Save International contacted ACPF in 2011 to talk about budgeting, accountability and governance for children and child wellbeing. This resulted in 2013 in an international partnership on global child rights governance in which investing and budgeting for children is a topic. ACPF established the contact with the international group and made a presentation on their work on these issues, which resulted in an invitation to ACPF to join the group. The other partners are Plan International, Save International, UNICEF, REDLAMYC, Child Rights Coalition Asia, Child Rights Connect, Eurochild and World Vision. In collaboration, they work towards a global advocacy trajectory on public spending to realise child rights.

#### The changes achieved and the contributions:

- This international partnership had a spin-off in the global policy arena as they wrote a joint proposal on the inclusion of public spending to realise children's rights to supplement the general comments of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) in Geneva. The UNCRC is seen as an entry level, able to influence governments and hold them accountable.

The submission of the joint proposal resulted in an invitation to ACPF to give a presentation to the UNCRC. Through joint forces within the global initiative and with ACPF board members present and willing to present ACPF in Geneva, talking points were developed and presented. This meant visibility and recognition of ACPF as well as of the other partners in the Geneva discussions.

- The change achieved through this work of the international partners is the acceptance of the proposal by UNCRC, which also led to the establishment of an internal working group. ACPF and its partners were asked to provide technical support in preparing a working plan for UNCRC.
- ACPF, being in the lead of the international partners, drafted the first version of a scoping document to define the content, strategy and impact of the actual workplan, which is a document heavily informed by the ARCW 2011. This was further elaborated by the international partners in a 'zero draft' document, which is currently being reviewed and further developed by the UNCRC working group. ACPF is now one of the members of the drafting and writing team working closely with the UNCRC working group on the issue. In September 2014, ACPF joined the discussions within UNCRC (in Geneva) to provide direct input. There are monthly telephone conferences between the UNCRC working group and the international partners.
- As part of their work with the UNCRC and the global initiative, ACPF has also been invited to attend and provide input during the UNICEF Geneva meeting on the strategic planning for 2014–2017. This invitation was on ACPF's title and based on their experience, profile and work on pan-African and international affairs. The strategic meeting was conveniently planned and thus could be combined with the UNCRC expert meeting.
- Another result of the above steps was the invitation to ACPF as African representative to present its case on investing in children for the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) (also September 2014) in Geneva and to speak about the African situation in general.
- Budgeting is an issue that is now on the global agenda. Policy is influenced through technical and expert support in drafting and writing teams to the UNCRC and UNHRC. These processes are aimed at changing practices at multiple levels, as the UNCRC and UNHRC are institutes to hold governments accountable. It is a multi-track process in which the credibility, visibility, evidence-based advocacy and profile of ACPF play a role, as do their strategic partnerships and the manner in which they coherently cooperate.

This unexpected result at international level shows that ACPF's contribution is a result of their commitment, pushing for agenda issues and pursuing the opportunity when it arises. Personal relations to follow up on issues, building and sustaining relations as well as using feedback loops between the partners and the other stakeholders are in this case crucial to coordinate, share and maintain a strategically coherent and common agenda in which niches are being filled by the different profiles of the organisations.

Another outcome related to the ARCW 2011 was the invitation to provide input on the Kids Rights Conference on Child Index 2014 in the Netherlands. Kids Rights Netherlands was developing an index, which tended to duplicate the work ACPF had done on the Child Friendliness Index. Only in the last stretch of launching their index, Kids Rights invited ACPF, which can be seen as an outcome of the report (rather the research). Although the report was not previously known to Kids Rights, it had come to their attention through ACPF's partnership with the Dutch Alliance.

ACPF has been working with the CFI for over six years and developed a rigorous methodology. The CFI as well as the ARCW has been an inspiration also to some organisations working in Asia developing their own report and index, together with technical support from ACPF; a South Asia index is now in use since 2013.<sup>496</sup> This outcome derives directly from ACPF's inspirational work, the visibility of the report, their commitment to extend support for further developments, follow up and also their reputation.

#### 13.3.2.6 Final assessment/reflections

Overall, the relevance of the report is felt, at field levels with NNGOs, INGOs and governments, as well as among regional and global institutions. First of all, the report is seen and used as a resource document. Second, it is seen and used as a tool for further advocacy. However, the findings also show the critical notes of language sometimes being too abstract and academic but also the issue advocated, which does not always resonate at national level. In relation to the overall aim of ACPF to put children on the public and political agenda, the report is a very concrete way to put forward a well-documented message; it is an incentive for other advocacy work and for undertaking programmes on child rights and wellbeing. For academia, the report is equally interesting and used as a resource as we were told but could not verify. ACPF has reached various public and policy arenas and even unexpectedly triggered discussions on global level. The message is being taken up and brought forward at multiple levels. ACPF's influence in these discussions thus may evolve further into awareness raised at national levels and change of practice. Eventually, the assumption is that this will affect the day-to-day lives of children. In general, in the institutional, policy and individual spheres, the report is seen as an inspiration, on the one hand to trigger discussions and to use as a resource, on the other hand to further pressure and pursue issues on public and policy agendas.

#### 13.3.2.7 Optimising the report, some lessons from the findings

Distribution of the message of the report through networks and partners, such as the AMC and other partners, is not very strong, affecting its scope and content. To take the message further, it needs more strategic propelling. The critical notes on the report evoke the question, for whom is the report written and what is the purpose of the report? Recommendations are being made by various stakeholders and policy makers working with the report as to including summaries, highlights or shorter statements alongside the report.

Responses are also mixed on the African report and the CFI. In some countries, governments take the ranking as an inspiration to improve, whereas others set it aside do not follow up or even disregard it as a whole. In the case of CSOs using it towards the governments, the CFI is either used as an evidence base to pressure the government or as a comparison with other similar countries. Additionally, some CSOs mention that they are using the ARCW as a reference document on where the national gaps are and on what and how to improve.

The uptake of the report demonstrates that advocacy is not a quick fix but long term process: The spin-off of the report in 2011 is still evolving on regional, international and also national levels. The message needs time to land and mature. This has something to do also with the issue resonance. Overall, the budgeting issue was taken up, but it was also mentioned in many countries visited that the topics in the ARCW do not always resonate with the reality of the issues on country level, where many other issues require attention of CSOs and governments alike, and they do not have the time, resources or capacity to act if they have an opportunity to even look at the report.

Some reflective questions pertain to the use of media for the outreach of the report or any outreach to the private sector. We did not look at these aspects but consider it a challenge for ACPF to investigate whether the report is also distributed to and of use to the private sector.

### *13.3.3 The Africa-wide Movement and its (non) contribution made*

The AMC was part of ACPF planning (T0/T1) as African network to advocate and lobby for child rights at national and pan-African levels. Under MFS II, important investments were made in efforts and money to make AMC work, but it did not materialise (yet). Serious concerns about AMC were expressed by many external interviewees. Considering that planned but not achieved outcomes are worthwhile to understand, we sought clarifications as to why the AMC activities did not work out. What contributed to this non-outcome and how can ACPF be supported in possible remedial actions?

#### *13.3.3.1 ToC and background of the movement*

The ToC (T0/T1) of ACPF (section 13.2.1) refers to building alliances with African child rights organisations to achieve lasting improvements in the lives of children. The ACPF report presented to us in 2012<sup>497</sup> describes how the Africa-wide Movement for Children envisaged fulfilling its contributing role:

- ‘African organisations must form a united front to collectively advocate for policy change and implementation, so as to help the child rights agenda to move forward. The AMC seeks to improve the quality of ACPF work and serves as unifying factor in child rights advocacy also ensuring ACPF’s work to be representative and based upon a mandate from other child rights organisations’.

This train of thoughts fits well into the ACPF objectives as given in its ToC, namely providing a platform for dialogue among AMC members, who represent national NGOs (NNGOs) on child rights. Through this united platform, capacities will be strengthened that also help to develop and implement effective child rights programmes. Collectively advocating policy changes entails interactions with policy makers and implementers of policy change. It takes little to imagine that during platform and AMC meetings, knowledge from civil society and national situations will be ploughed back into the advocacy message of ACPF, which refers to ACPF’s ambition to generate knowledge (ToC).

It is to be noted that the above ToC is a reconstruction based on various documents and discussions but has not been articulated as presented above. Whether the ToC has been discussed or maybe contested beforehand by AMC partners is questionable. AMC members seem to have gone with the flow.

The AMC was born in 2008 of the need to have a pan-African voice that can speak on children’s and human rights, set minimum standards for child protection and defend and protect African values.<sup>498</sup> The main objectives of AMC were to put children on the African political and public agenda and campaign for the protection and realisation from an African perspective of the rights and wellbeing of children. Other objectives included to serve as a platform for child rights organisations developing home-grown solutions to problems children are facing, to raise a political and moral voice for children in Africa, to provide mutual support and to reduce duplication of efforts by joining hands.

The initiative to establish a movement was taken after ACPF’s second IPC (2006: Violence against Girls in Africa<sup>499</sup>), when an all Africa consultative meeting on child rights, youth and human rights was convened by ACPF and the African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect (ANPPCAN), the Coalition of NGOs working for Children in Africa (CONAFE) and the

Uganda Child Rights NGO Network (UCRNN). The meeting discussed options for an Africa mechanism to follow up not only on IPC resolutions but also on many other problems facing children in Africa, and decided to form a taskforce of seven members, including ACPF, convened by ANPPCAN to do the groundwork for such a mechanism. In 2008, following the third IPC (Child Poverty), the governance structure of the Africa-wide Movement on Children was discussed, and AMC was established with a board of six Custodians and a Regional Programme Director of ANPPCAN as its President.

In the first years of its existence (2008–2012), funds were mobilised by ACPF (via ICS), and so AMC was considered a project of ACPF, which, according to some respondents, offered a possibility for ACPF to raise extra funds from which members could benefit. In the course of time, AMC developed a strategic plan and constitution and was established as legal entity, registered in Uganda.

Its governance structure consists of a General Assembly as the highest body, made up of AMC members, that elects the Custodians: the President, Vice president and 5 additional Custodians, each representing one of the regions that the AU and ACERWC distinguish for its reporting work on the progress of the Charter, namely East, South, West, North and Central Africa. As one of the respondents explained, the Custodians are meant to be the main entity around which other national or regional coalitions are united. ACPF facilitated the secretariat, making available an AMC coordinator, based in Uganda until the network established its own coordination office. As reported, the coordinator is now working independently. The exact number of AMC members is not known and is not mentioned on the AMC website, although a list of AMC members' countries circulates with 162 names, which we consider a list of interested persons.

#### The CSO Forum:

As part of AMC's working strategies, four working groups were set up, and one of these was tasked to engage in particular with the ACERWC for which the Civil Society Organisations Forum (2009) was created, not as network but as regular meeting place, a platform to interact with the African Committee twice a year. Six AMC members (including ACPF and AMC itself) coordinated the Forum, preparing its meetings. Financial support was reportedly mainly provided by Save International and Plan International in the form of secretarial support, but on the condition the secretariat was to be a rotating responsibility among INGOs.

Five years later, the CSO Forum performs entirely independently from AMC, formulating its mission as to ensure a united voice on behalf of Africa's children and to strengthen the work of the ACERWC in carrying out its mandate. International development partners joined the Forum and, as was shared by one of the CSO coordinating organisations, also sought to influence the agenda setting and priorities of CSOs in Africa, changing the initial character of the CSO Forum. The Forum eventually became a legally established entity with a similar structure as AMC, namely regional representatives for each of the five AU regions. Its website states that it brings together CSOs from across Africa, child rights experts and representatives from the AU, and organises meetings where participants discuss issues relating to child rights (in panels and working sessions) and prepare resolutions and recommendations for the ACERWC session that follows.<sup>500</sup> It currently counts over 400 affiliates, including numerous Save the Children and Plan International organisations across Africa, UN organisations and CSOs in Europe, as well as international donors. Membership is open to any organisation that in one way or another addresses the rights and welfare of children in Africa. ACPF and AMC also currently figure on the list of CSO Forum affiliates/members. It is noteworthy how the CSO Forum has taken a different direction away from its original mandate, in part duplicating AMC but not presenting the united voice to AU/ACERWC.

### 13.3.3.2 The problem of non-outreach of AMC 2011–2014

The outcomes AMC was supposed to achieve when founded in 2008 are widely confirmed not to be achieved. AMC did not reach out to regional and national actors the way it was envisaged at its early beginning as an advocate of the pan-African ACPF message, or at least this picture is not confirmed through our interviews. Interviewees are quite unanimous in their assessment of the effectiveness of AMC as a network, despite the narratives from the documents, which tends to give a different and more glorious picture. In general, AMC or its members are not visible as such and, where they are recognised as AMC members, are not seen as instrumental in creating collective civil society voices, in strengthening capacities to implement child rights, as resource of knowledge and expertise for ACPF or as a focal point representing civil society for AU/ACERWC.

### 13.3.3.3 Contested added value of AMC and its claims

The value added by the movement in the context of ACPF's work and its original aim is contested (as explained below), notwithstanding AMC's own reports on certain successes. In November 2012, AMC presented at the AU its progress report on the implementation of Africa Fit for Children (AFFC) as a collective civil society voice. Furthermore, it was mentioned to have contributed to bringing about shadow reports for ACERWC while it also claims to have given input in 2013/14 to the post-2015 development agenda. The latter two contributions could not be surfaced or confirmed. AMC stated having been involved in defending child rights issues in the Mali conflict, while in Kenya involvement was mentioned in setting up an accountability observatory. At ACPF/pan-African level, AMC contributed to the inter-country adoption IPC (2012) and performs in public launches (in the person of its Chair), which was witnessed in 2014 at the AU launch of the latest ACPF research on violence against children (September 2014).

We did not further verify these specific claims, as this was beyond our scope and mandate.

We followed AMC's work from its networking role, its potential outreach as an advocate to country and civil society level, helping to bring out a collective voice on child wellbeing from civil society and be of help to the AU. However, in this respect quite a few respondents especially in Uganda and Kenya said that AMC developed little added value over the last years; this was even confirmed by those who stood very close to its genesis and its infant years, expressing also disappointment about AMC's overall functioning. Custodians are said to not take up the tasks they are supposed to do, which, according to some, is unrelated to AMC having members or not. Membership is reportedly not considered crucial for the movement to do its work, but ACPF's recognition of AMC is conceived essentially as acknowledging it as independent body, with an independent secretariat, as was mentioned by some. In this respect, tensions between AMC and the CSO Forum were also often mentioned. There is considerable discrepancy noted in how AMC achievements are experienced by various parties. Overall, we conclude that claims made by AMC as to its achievements over the last years stand in sharp contrast to the expectations.

#### Missing coordinated CSO voice at pan-African level:

Neither AMC nor the CSO Forum are currently offering AU/ACERWC the coordinated CSO voice needed for progress monitoring and reporting on the Charter. AU/ACERWC is very explicit in its statement that such a voice is missing, as is, consequently, a well-coordinated CSO input, which hampers the work of the African Committee. In its criticisms, both AMC and the CSO Forum, and especially the cumbersome relation between the two bodies, are implicated.



#### CSO confusion:

Presumably partly because of its wide membership policy, the CSO Forum seems to have outgrown its mother organisation, AMC. This is the case not only in size, but, because members pay an annual fee, funding also strengthened the CSO Forum, which thus is becoming increasingly powerful and reportedly even working against AMC. Many respondents familiar with AMC and its offspring expressed concerns, mentioning the severe tensions between the CSO Forum and AMC that even played out in public meetings. Competition, distrust and duplicating work were among the issues reported, while others said they had left the CSO Forum for another network where they could be more effective. Some conclude that there is serious duplication, while in no way the AMC is seen as playing a complementary role to ACPF, as one of the respondents expressed. The tensions affect not only the work of AMC as network but also indirectly ACPF, as some consider ACPF to be party to the 'confusion' or rather to the absence of a common CSO voice.

#### 13.3.3.4 Lack of AMC visibility

Furthermore, in all six countries visited, there were many who had never heard of AMC. Where Kenya and Uganda (geographical but also in working scope) are relatively near to ACPF, both also having AMC custodians, representing the east African region and obviously also the countries. We noted in these two countries a far higher AMC (and ACPF) profile than in the other three countries, including Ethiopia. In Mozambique, participants who attended the launch of the African report (ARCW) 2011 had a vague idea of AMC's existence; others were entirely ignorant about such a network. The language may have contributed to this, as some interviewees suggested, but also the existence of similar Mozambican child rights networks were reported as a reason. All over the region, many civil society networks on child rights are active, whether or not they are connected to Western/European networks.

Informants often mentioned the CSO Forum when referring to AMC as representatives of civil society with an African identity involved in child rights but indicated this to be an initiative of INGOs, rather than NNGOs. Most interestingly, frequently the ACERWC was seen as the African civil society network on child rights. This perspective may have been inspired by recent visits of ACERWC members (especially the chair was mentioned) to a number of Southern countries. The message the ACERWC had sent out concerned in particular the importance of alternative or shadow reporting by CSOs as a critical complement to the governmental reporting on the progress of the African Charter to the AU. The CSO representatives interviewed especially in Namibia and Mozambique highly appreciated this acknowledgement from the committee.

#### 13.3.3.5 Contribution analysis on a non-outcome: postponed dream still to come true?

Without prejudice against the work of Custodians, individual members, ACPF staff and all others involved in the work of AMC, we conclude that in the case of AMC we can speak of a non-outcome. As relative outsiders, we had to leave many stones unturned, but we did reflect on the situation and came to some pertinent considerations.

The non-outcome is a broken dream in terms of expectations at various sides but cannot be attributed to a sole player, and so it cannot be said that AMC or ACPF failed in its efforts. On the one hand, there may be overlooked organisational aspects that played a role. On the other hand, it is an unfortunate combination of factors and circumstances that led to the non-achieved results. ACPF management suggested this non-outcome or broken dream is better defined as a postponed but also a joint dream.<sup>501</sup> We identified three phenomena that contributed to the non-outcome, namely disconnections in communications with CSOs, untapped local resources (input) and a weak answerability relationship between AMC and ACPF.

#### Disconnections:

Where both at national but especially at pan-African level, the need for a civil society network with African roots (NNGOs) is well articulated, we noted that ACPF's advocacy message is not easily reaching the many CSOs on child rights. The connecting lines and interfaces between, on the one hand, ACPF and its advocacy message and the AU/ACERWC, and, on the other hand, CSOs, are assumedly not strong and open enough to let information freely flow and to assist one another in reaching out. This can be a result of dialogue for a that are not well established, unfamiliarity with ACPF and its message or inaccessibility of the message, as highlighted in the case of the African Report.

Additionally, as expressed by some, too many CSOs from around the globe (including donors) claim to know the voice of Africa on child rights, whereas national CSOs and even Community Based Organisations (CBOs) do not have space to share their concern. Some community based respondents conveyed that once they develop successful programmes, other bigger and well-funded organisations stand up to claim their success, which was considered rather discouraging. There are serious disconnects noted in the functioning of AMC between these community based and national dynamics but also pan-African and global dynamics. That contributes to the absence of a collective and grounded civil society voice.

#### Resources remain untapped:

And thus a potentially rich AMC resource remains untapped, which for ACPF means a missed opportunity in terms of a rich community based input for its research and outreach network for the advocacy message. AMC and its affiliated members could potentially offer much to ACPF, the AU and also to their national governments.

On the other hand, among those who had not been aware of AMC and ACPF, a keen interest was noted in the advocacy messages of ACPF to benefit their work on the ground. Many national child rights organisations do not work in isolation but are connected to networks. The ACERWC invitation to submit CSO reporting to the AU was highly welcomed and brought CSOs and governments together who otherwise would not have shared the meeting table. This demonstrates how resources of expertise and practice could be made mutually beneficial and mainstreamed in the overall advocacy work on child rights in pan-Africa.

#### Mutual answerability:

A third and most essential consideration focuses on the interface between AMC and ACPF, especially because the Africa-wide Movement for Children was embedded—as CSO network—in the ToC and meant to contribute towards the overall goal of pan-African advocacy.

In our analysis of the ToC and reflections on the practice, we conclude that the success of AMC was contingent on mutual consensus and commitment between ACPF and AMC as to the contribution it was to pay. Such mutuality brings along answerability or accountability on either side of the work undertaken. This even applies if no major financial flows are involved, though we were made aware that some AMC members had expected donor funding from their affiliation. Willingness to be part of the network and ability and commitment to perform are part of the cooperation. Answerability should have been anchored in the mutual commitment, pertaining to sharing what has been done, how and what was achieved in terms of advocacy work, interacting with policy makers at pan-African and national levels, what was learned and how to adjust to remain mutually supportive and effective. If members are not able to live up to the promise or expectations of contributing to ACPF's advocacy work, there must be scope to withdraw from the network and replace members.

Although we could not investigate in-depth to what extent mutual answerability had been part of working arrangements between ACPF and AMC, analyses of the information obtained from interviewees point to serious weaknesses in accountability mechanisms. This flaw might be one of the main reasons why the AMC did not function as was envisaged and why we speak of non-outcomes or 'broken dreams' or 'potential dreams' yet to come true.

#### 13.3.3.6 Relevance

Notwithstanding the above, many of our interviewees, particularly in Kenya and Uganda (where AMC was better known than elsewhere), do acknowledge the relevance and potential value of an Africa-wide movement, except for a single voice notably closely related to the Alliance partners.

Among the areas for AMC to address, the following are mentioned: supporting implementing structures within countries, distribution of the African report (ARCW), bringing out children's voices, informing the ACPF research agenda, galvanising priority areas in advocating children and also helping to translate recommendations in doable actions at country level, AMC as an 'advocacy engine'.

In this context, also some institutional arrangements were mentioned, such as the need for an independent AMC, ACPF allowing AMC to become independent but also giving full recognition to its role as a movement and AMC recharging itself, showing resilience and reflecting upon its role as a civil society network with an African identity—in other words, working towards a relationship with mutual accountability, where two autonomous bodies with African roots collaborate, each guided by their own strategic advocacy approach but driven by a common goal on child rights. Roles, responsibilities and concomitant authorities of all partners (network partners and ACPF alike) should be transparent, so as to promote outcomes that are mutually strengthening. Thus new forms of collaboration may emerge whereby skills, competence and know-how could be unleashed and used complementarily, instead of ending up in tensions, unrealistic expectations, invisibility and duplication of work power struggles. The relationship between the CSO Forum and AMC also requires attention, but that is outside the scope of ACPF's ambition as an advocate of child rights and wellbeing in Africa.

#### 13.3.4 *An (unexpected) outcome regarding post-2015 agenda*

The UN-led discussions on the global post-2015 agenda following the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), was not yet on the ACPF radar in 2010 when ACPF's strategic agenda and ToC were drafted for MFS II. However, post-2015 was quickly taken up by ACPF on their internal agenda when the discussions especially within the AU received greater attention. There was no planning whatsoever to join the global policy arena on post-2015. The outcomes achieved at AU level are thus to a certain extent planned for but the further spin-off to the global level has been unexpected. Suddenly, opportunities arose, enabling ACPF to voice their message in UN circles and follow through.

##### 13.3.4.1 Background and ToC to the post-2015 agenda

During our last evaluation visit (September 2014), ACPF's contribution relating to the post-2015 discussions on pan-African and global level were reported, referring to a number of meetings and high level invitations to ACPF by UNICEF New York and the World Bank in Washington. ACPF provided input on agendas, expressing the pan-African child rights perspective speaking with an African voice.

##### 13.3.4.2 Contribution to change

Although ACPF started preparing for the post-2015 agenda in 2012, it was not until mid-2013 that it presented a background and position paper as input in the discussions raising some significant challenges Africa is facing on children's wellbeing. This was a first step that eventually opened the

way for ACPF to influence the post-2015 discussions from an Africa perspective. The evidence-based background report and position paper were used by different stakeholders in the discussions, ensuring the message was brought forward while their pro-active direct input in relevant discussions was taken further with the AU in the discussion on the Common Africa Position (CAP). Further spin-off effects of this outcome are noted in ACPF's direct input in the global post-2015 discussions through UNICEF and their participation in a number of high level discussions.

13.3.4.3 The push for child rights into the post-2015 agenda from regional to global outcome  
ACPF explained its contribution by mentioning the subsequent steps it had taken:

- When ACPF identified the absence of the African voice on child wellbeing in the post-2015 discussions, it drafted the paper entitled 'Africa's children and the post-2015 development agenda', which was discussed in a high level senior technical consultative meeting (March/April 2013) that included the AU, ACERWC, ECA, UNICEF, Save International and many others so as to achieve collective consensus on the background and position paper. The launch of this paper then took place early May 2013 and resulted in another position paper: 'Towards an African position on children and the post-2015 development agenda'. This was used as entry point into official AU post-2015 discussions, where ACPF was invited to be present and provide input, as the only pan-African child rights organisation. Well after the development of these ACPF papers, a meeting took place in Kigali (December 2013), attended by CSOs, where ACPF took the opportunity to share its work on post-2015.
- At the same time numerous regional consultations were held in the pan-Africa region, including the 'Africa-wide consultation on post-2015' in Hammamet, Tunisia (March 2013), for which ACPF, in cooperation with UNICEF, prepared and presented their strategic and coherent common agenda for this meeting. UNICEF's Head of Liaison Office to the AU was present at the meeting also on behalf of ACPF.
- The contribution of ACPF to the AU discussions, the backdoor influence in the regional consultations and their position paper resulted in an invitation by the ACERWC to provide technical support and become a member of the drafting committee on post-2015 and child rights, which resulted in January 2014 in the Common African Position on Post-2015 (CAP).

13.3.4.4 More spin-off effects

- In 2014 (February), another high-level meeting took place in Denmark, aimed at mapping the landscape around post-2015, in which the child rights agenda was important. Although ACPF was not invited, it decided to send a representative to Denmark also to distribute its statement. The meeting offered ample possibilities for networking and relations building.
- In March 2014, this was followed by an invitation to a London meeting on the post-2015 agenda at the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The meeting was organised by UNICEF, and ACPF was invited to make a presentation on the African Voice and Africa Position on the inclusion of children in the post-2015 agenda. During the meeting, there were important networking opportunities, and World Vision and the World Bank Global Partnership on Social Accountability were identified as important entry points to further advocate the message on the Africa position.
- As ACPF did not have access to the New York arena, they contacted members of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development by sending them an information package including the ARCW, the position paper on post-2015 and a letter explaining their position. This resulted in a personal letter of invitation by its co-chair who is also his country's Permanent Representative to the UN and the current chair of the UNICEF Board. ACPF was

invited to come to New York for UNICEF's Executive Board's Special Focus Session on Africa's Children and for a side event on the theme of 'The Promise of Global Partnership for Africa Children@CRC2039', where government representatives were invited to discuss the post-2015 position. ACPF presented and provided input at both meetings. This outcome at global level is a direct result of the earlier outcome at the pan-Africa level, and influenced pan-Africa and global policy. This is a major achievement in itself for ACPF, as they had previously not been invited to these high level meetings.

#### 13.3.4.5 Final assessment and reflections

The relevance of ACPF in this process of outcome(s) lies in their independent status as a child rights organisation raising an African voice for children's wellbeing in pan-African and international (post-2015) fora. Although ACPF's current influence is seen mostly in agenda setting for new policy, it is assumed that this is an evolving outcome that will touch people's lives once policy frameworks are drafted and implemented, and once CSOs (and also donors) start working on the post-2015 agenda taking better account of child rights and wellbeing.

The post-2015 agenda was seen by ACPF as an opportunity to influence the regional and global discussions and agendas. The way ACPF has taken this opportunity shows its flexibility and resilience, ambition and commitment to bringing forward the message of child rights. The fact that ACPF was one of the few African voices in this post-2015 process underlines its overall reputation as an African advocate on children's wellbeing.

As underlying factors relating to the changes achieved under agenda setting, we identified the following:

- personal commitment and flexibility to grasp and acting upon an opportunity
- connecting through personal relations;
- building, sustaining and using the favourable conditions;
- mapping the stakeholders and following through on this;
- having a message and believing in the message.

Personal connections and partnerships are important to pursue such an undertaking. Connecting to people on a personal and organisational level is as important as connecting on the content. This eventually led to high level consultations with UNICEF in New York, directly contributing to the global discussions on post-2015 and bringing in the regional pan-African voice.

#### 13.3.4.6 Optimising: bridging the gap between local needs and global policy arenas

Despite the above, a critical note is appropriate as to the relevance of these worldwide and mostly high level discussions on the post-2015 agenda for those at community and village levels engaged in child rights and wellbeing, challenged by a daily reality that seems far from the good intentions expressed in the international fora. In some of our field interviews, respondents clearly articulated that daily practices are leading in their work rather than any post-2015 agenda. This apparently demonstrates a serious disconnect between high level discussions and national but mainly local challenges. The question arises of who bridges this gap for the good cause of child wellbeing and whether this should also be part of ACPF's advocacy mandate, seeking ground level translations that could limit the gap and stimulate local CSOs and community-based organisations to join hands with ACPF.

### **13.4 Evaluation Question 4: Efficiency**

This section deals with the evaluation question on whether the MFS II ILA programmes were efficient. Efficiency is about finding the balance between the different operational, financial and human resources playing a role in any strategic and operational planning in an organisation and the effectiveness of the organisation to perform. ACPF considers efficiency important as part of an efficient way of working, reducing costs as well as maximising outputs, thus balancing effectiveness and efficiency. ACPF has its efficiency tools in place and incorporated in decision-making and answerability structures of the organisation, ensuring the theoretical basis for daily practice. We discussed this approach on efficiency with ACPF management who acknowledged this line of thinking.

#### *13.4.1 Theory of Efficiency (ToE)*

Efficiency for ACPF is about the effective use of its resources; decisions on cost-effectiveness are inherent to its day-to-day work. ACPF considers efficiency part of its accountability towards donors and back-donors. Efficiency is embedded in the internal decision making as well as in the operational structure of ACPF, referring to staff costs and time, consultancy fees, production and running costs. Conscious decisions are made with regard to outsourcing work and the use of shortlists to ensure quality outsourcing, while relations management is also considered part of the efficiency.

At the operational level, rules and regulations are reported to be in place; there are statutes and Board arrangements with an Administrative Council; there are regular team meetings between support staff, programme staff and management; and staff do have work plans and discuss their progress. There is a clear office management taking care of daily logistics. ACPF has recently made an organisational capacity assessment, as part of the new proposal. The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework and guidelines are still being prepared and internally discussed (2014).

In the field of managing human resources, ACPF has around 18–20 core staff (management, programme, research) and 10–12 support staff (drivers, cleaner, cook). The core staff is well gender-balanced and has an international character in that especially at the senior level expatriate staff members are identified, coming from different parts of Africa. Some European staff members also work in ACPF. We were informed that staff protocols, such as job descriptions, procedures for travel and other costs, procedures for hiring consultants and outsourcing work are in place.

Financially, ACPF has protocols and guidelines for financial management and guidelines for finance, resource mobilisation and purchasing. Audits are done annually. Donor funding and accountability structures are included in financial reports, and finances are divided at programmatic and institutional levels. There are monthly and quarterly financial meetings and internal reporting on the financial state of affairs. Overall, we found that efficiency tools are in place.

#### *13.4.2 Practice of Efficiency*

The efficiency theory as above is brought into practice as we observed and improvements are made where needed so as to remain efficient. In mid-2013, ACPF experienced a difficult organisational period of management shifts and staff turnover, but in 2014 it had visibly regained its pace moving forward. This shows the resilience of the organisation also in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. Below, a few practical examples of efficiency are given, directly related to some improvements. These are not exhaustive, but illustrative of the way the organisation deals with efficiency.

High level meetings and conferences are often held in upmarket locations such as the ARCW 2013 launch in the Sheraton Hotel in Addis and events in 2012 and 2014 held at the AU. One of the considerations for such choice is that it attracts those representatives that are assumed of

importance by ACPF for what they aim to achieve. Even though it might be cost intensive in the short term, in the longer run the choice for an upmarket location and high level audience benefits effectiveness.

ACPF shows to be operationally stable and modest; the location of the office and the office itself are approachable, and some respondents mentioned the office being 'humble' for the stature of ACPF. It has the latest publications and posters laid out in the office. The office seems to be run efficiently and well-coordinated between finances, operations, programmes and management.

As to its human resources, we noted staff to be very committed to their work. Last year, a new programme director was recruited who put in place programme and staff work plans. These work plans are used in practice, but, as some staff shared, not yet to their full potential (in terms of reflections on progress). However, the work plans stimulate efficiency and effectiveness of work.

#### 13.4.2.1 Finances in practice

ACPF is fully dependent on donor resources, which come as longer-term institutional funding as well as project-based and time bound funding. Table 13.2 shows the total sum of money from all sources that ACPF had available to spend every year. Over the period 2011–2015, ACPF received institutional funds through the T4C Alliance (MFS II) for the amount of €3,524,058, which was in a way a continuation of MFS I. This amount (75% of the total ILA programme<sup>502</sup>) is matched with two other sources of institutional funding, namely from OAK foundation-UK, Wellspring advisors. PLAN Netherlands also contributes MFS II funds, but these are project-based through projects such as Girl Power Africa and Girl Power Ethiopia. The institutional funding together with project-based funding (totalling €8,635,383) currently constitute the main financial basis for ACPF, whereby the T4C share in the ILA programme is 41% of the total, making the T4C Alliance ACPF's most important donor.

Table 13.2 also presents a summarised overview of how ACPF's overall budget is being spent. It is beyond the mandate of this evaluation to assess the efficient use of available financial means. Nonetheless, there are a few critical notes in this respect.

- The financial figures for staff salaries between 2011 and 2014 did not only increase from 24% to 47% over total annual expenditures, but also show a growth in absolute spending of 70% in 2014 as compared with 2011. The new governance structure as implemented in 2013 (resulting in 38% growth of core staff), and the additional costs that come along with staff turnovers (severance payments and settling-in allowances) do not fully explain these increases. We also learned about seriously divergent salary rates within the organisation and noted that too much difference in pay structure brings risks such as provoking envy among staff and/or tensions within the organisation.

Table 13.2 Some financial figures regarding ACPF and the T4C ILA programme in million €						
T4C (ACPF)	2011	2012	2013	2014 (data on expenses not yet complete)	2015 <sup>503</sup> forecast	2011–15
Total ACPF budget: income/spending						
Total (annual) income	1,359,495	2,304,705	1,579,837	1,766,779	1,658,689	€8,635,383
% MFS II (incl. PLAN Neth.) of total income	1,008,515 (74%)	1,245,372 (54%)	967,788 (61%)	956,642 (54%)	832,785 (50%)	€5,011,102 (58%)
% T4C of total	845,272 (61%)	932,064 (40%)	633,772 (40%)	582,252 (33%)	530,698 (32%)	€3,524,058 (41%)
Total (annual) expenditure	1,712,878	2,136,155	1,572,285	1,500,186	1,658,689	€8,580,193
% MFS II of total expenditure	971,635 (57%)	1,354,657 (63%)	970,842 (62%)	827,432 (55%)	832,785 (50%)	€4,957,351 (58%)
% T4C of total expenditure	780,728 (46%)	978,969 (46%)	655,602 (42%)	534,706 (36%)	530,698 (32%)	€3,480,703 (41%)
Overall spending per category						
African Report (incl. staff time)	371,573	174,461	233,666	173,472	258,092	€1,211,264
Africa-wide Movement (incl. staff time)	82,164	105,137	41,722	29,048	34,122	€292,193
Other Production /Advocacy cost <sup>504</sup>	1,078,154	1,540,255	1,020,634	1,029,038	1,124,895	€5,792,976
Running costs Office	85,564	159,637	167,386	178,352	144,205	€735,144
Miscellaneous <sup>505</sup>	95,423	156,665	108,877	90,276	97,375	€548,616
Total	1,712,878	2,136,155	1,572,285	1,500,186	1,658,689	€8,580,193
Breakdown staff costs per annum of total expenditures	413,880 (24%)	479,351 (22%)	630,514 (40%)	704,329 (47%)	765,749 (46%)	€2,993,823 (35%)
Core Staff numbers Operations, programme & management staff	13	15	18	18	21	



- The remuneration system and prospects for professional growth for both nationally and internationally recruited staff require due attention in terms of promoting an internally well-balanced structure giving regard to the international standard of ACPF, expertise required, responsibilities assigned in relation to the realisation of the aspired scope and quality of advocacy work. ACPF staff works hard and spends a lot of overtime in the office. They are committed to their work, but that should be balanced both in remunerations as well in time spending.
- Moreover, for the last two years there has been a relatively high turnover of staff, where good staff is increasingly taken up by other organisations providing better benefits or working conditions. This affects work efficiency but at the same time continuity, as valuable knowledge and relations leave with the staff. It also causes a heavier workload for the remaining staff.
- Evidence-based advocacy involves staff-intensive work, so understandably human expertise represents a major cost factor. But from audit reports, we also noted a certain imbalance between overall staff expenditures versus overall programme costs.
- Where institutional funding is preferred over project-based funding for obvious reasons (continuity in budget for running costs), ACPF receives project related funding from, amongst others, Save International, Plan Netherlands and UNICEF. The precise amount (%) is not known. This form of funding bears not only the risk of discontinuity and donors driving their own agendas; it also demands project-oriented management structures to strictly monitor budget allocations, project accountability reporting and ensuring timelines on work as agreed in funding agreements. In terms of efficiency, this is time consuming and may adversely affect the continuity and effectiveness of ACPF's overall programmes, especially of an advocacy programme where no quick fixes can be made in terms of research and bringing about changes.
- The overall dependency on (Western) donor funding makes ACPF vulnerable, as donors tend to regularly change policy and programme priorities under influence of their national political and public debates on foreign aid. Donor dependency at large also challenges autonomous ways of working and priority setting and thus influences effectiveness and efficiency of recipients like ACPF.
- The institutional funding that ACPF has received over the past five years had given them a certain assurance of continuity and autonomy, although donors also call for co-decisions if structural changes are made to a sponsored programme, as happened in 2013 (see section 13.1.2). The weaknesses in communication and reporting during that period placed a heavy burden on ACPF's efficiency and effectiveness. More transparency (on both sides) could have avoided this.

#### *13.4.3 Mechanisms for improvements (maintaining) efficiency*

Within ACPF, deliberate strategic decisions are made to maintain efficiency, such as working in partnerships and participating in meetings only if it is strategically important to bring forward their advocacy message. Additionally, ACPF organises or ensures consultations are being held in back-to-back meetings when it is not possible to organise and provide for a meeting by themselves. Discussions are ongoing on staff needs, such as for an advocacy officer, a communications officer, an M&E person and/or an economist. ACPF has a relatively small staff establishment and outsources a lot of work to consultants, for which it has developed guidelines that are being applied. Keeping

quality standards for their staff but also for outsourced work is a strategic decision and contributes to its overall efficiency.

Against the background of a changing international development context and economic crisis leading to global budget cuts in donor funding, ACPF proved to be a highly resilient organisation able to work effectively under budget constraints. Some respondents commend ACPF for undertaking a lot of work and upholding its quality with such a relatively small budget, especially compared with the INGOS and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs).

As to strengthening its financial basis, ACPF (and the Board) is taking up the discussion on how to become less (Western) donor and back donor dependent. In the new MFS proposal, ACPF is the lead organisation in an alliance with Dutch NGOs, which underscores its desire for more autonomy. This may have a positive influence on their efficiency as well. Moreover, ACPF acknowledges that the very African nature of ACPF may open doors to cater for funding coming from Africa itself, such as from the private sector or philanthropists.

#### *13.4.4 Reflections on efficiency: the balance between efficiency and effectiveness*

Regarding efficiency, we see that ACPF is cost-conscious. Budget constraints may affect effectiveness, but they can also work as a stimulus to enhance efficiency by better prioritising and improving internal alignment of work. This is already happening but requires clear communication lines and transparency within the organisation. We understand that there is room for improvement in this respect.

The question arises of how to be effective and efficient in terms of man hours spent, funding and quality of work at the same time. One option might be improved administering of man hours (logging time), thus getting an overview of everyone's time spending and also allocating time/costs to activities/projects undertaken. This is not being done in practice, although this might be a way to monitor expenses and time on project budgets and check and countercheck effectiveness in relation to efficiency.

ACPF's effectiveness in work is high given the rich array of outcomes reported by a relatively small number of staff. Its modest appearance is effective for its advocacy work, as it makes ACPF approachable, but is also efficient in terms of costs. ACPF does not claim their work and often shares ownership of their work with other partners and stakeholders free of charge, which feeds into the efficiency/effectiveness loop, although it implies that no income is generated from the research products. However, the message of child rights might have lesser outreach and effects when the reports are being sold. Nonetheless, we see the challenge of enhanced balancing between its high profile focusing effectively on high level policy arenas while there is also need to look at national and grassroots needs, which demands extra resources and possibly more efficient use of resources at the higher level.

It is evident and was reconfirmed in interviews and documents but also shown in changes achieved that efficiency in relation to effectiveness cannot be upheld without a sound financial foundation that maintains ACPF's institutional set-up and advocacy approach. As mentioned previously, ACPF is entirely dependent on external funding and, by virtue of its advocacy work, has few income earning opportunities. As mentioned above, the discussion on resource mobilisation has already been taken up. A reflection in this respect pertains to the composition of the International Board of Trustees (IBoT), namely to consider pursuing a more diverse board membership,<sup>506</sup> representing mixed backgrounds not only in child development work but in private sector and business as well. Social corporate responsibility currently figures high on companies' agendas, so it must be feasible to

identify and lobby for child friendly chief executives to join the Board, adding expertise on resource mobilisation from non-traditional donors.

### **13.5 Evaluation Question 5: Explanatory factors**

In this section, we seek to answer what factors explain the findings. We look at factors from both an internal organisational perspective and an external contextual perspective and at the interplay between these internal and external factors.

An overarching explanatory factor is that advocacy work is non-linear and a long-term process that can only be planned for to some degree.<sup>507</sup> ACPF's advocacy aspires to reach out all over Africa while ACPF's most direct partner is the AU including the ACERWC, selected CSOs and international fora. Not explicitly targeted 'users' of the advocacy message remain out of ACPF's view; they may be spread all over Africa and even beyond. This may be the major explanatory factor for why the outreach of the advocacy message was not observed by ACPF and outcomes remained obscure.

#### *13.5.1 Internal factors*

Following our methodology, we applied the 5Cs frame as internal factors to explain findings. They refer to the following organisational capabilities i) to act and commit; ii) to deliver on objectives; iii) to adapt and renew; iv) to relate; and v) to balance diversity and achieve coherence. However, we identified within ACPF a number of organisational competencies (and functions) that do not immediately suit the 5C frame but reveal a lot about its overall advocacy potential—perhaps even more than the 5Cs that seem to be mostly inward-looking in the organisation, taking a rather development-oriented focus,<sup>508</sup> more than an advocacy focus. These competencies/functions are further highlighted in section 13.6.3.

##### **13.5.1.1 Capability to act**

The capability to act and commit is well established within ACPF, contributing to the outcomes achieved. ACPF has a strong focus on putting children on public and political agendas in Africa and staff is qualified, knowledgeable and committed, which is especially appreciated by the AU and its ACERWC. ACPF's ability to act strategically and to articulate the evidence-based message of child rights and wellbeing in such terms that it resonates within the AU and other international arenas explains why doors and minds open and the advocated messages are taken up. ACPF has been less successful in navigating and maintaining interactions with the AMC, which partly explains that the concept of a networked common African voice as envisaged did not materialise in the way that was hoped. Nonetheless, ACPF established credibility also in circles of CSOs and to some extent also at governmental levels, although limitations were observed in adapting its message to civil society needs. This may be a result of staff shortage, as well as the absence of a monitoring system that would have helped ACPF to better understand its outcomes achieved.

##### **13.5.1.2 Capability to deliver on objectives**

ACPF has planning strategies and tools available to deliver on objectives (though the ToC is not used), but these strategies and tools mostly remained tacit. The capability to deliver was under severe strain during the difficult period ACPF encountered early 2013 (see section 13.1.2), which resulted in delays in deliverables (ARCW 2013) and possibly also affected relationships with stakeholders such as AMC, though we could not identify a significant correlation in this respect. However, generally speaking, ACPF has shown to be fully able to plan, select specific (international) arenas and to address creating access to these arenas at the right moment, which explains in part its recent successes at the global level. ACPF's ability to customise its content-based message to suit the international audience proves highly essential for a successful advocacy strategy towards

international organisations. Where it concerns reaching out by way of thought-through civil society advocacy strategies, ACPF's ability seems to suffer from time, staff and budget constraints, although the message resonates in civil society arenas, indicating that it is a meaningful message. The capability to mobilise financial means is definitely there, given the substantial institutional and other donor funding ACPF acquired, but access to more donor funding to fully deliver has limitations and so certain tasks (advocacy and/or monitoring) could not be taken up.

#### 13.5.1.3 Capability to adapt and renew

To adapt and renew as an advocating organisation requires reflective space for internal and external learning, while both ways of learning are subject to transparency, openness to feedback preparedness to account for what was achieved and also understanding shifting contexts and trends. ACPF has the capability, but this is vested more in individuals than organisation-wide, although the pursuance of the post-2015 discussions showed ACPF's strong adaptive capacity.

Before 2013, there was indeed joint reflective learning space, though little, and, as was shared, the need for such and more space is there. Currently, learning is more on planning than on achievements and more on a bilateral basis than collectively. We noted a tendency to cling to planning models with the risk of overlooking unexpected opportunities, which may have deprived the organisation of attaining a more realistic overview of its achievements (and non-achievements). Staff and programme implementation may well benefit from enhanced learning, such as for instance on the network concept and understanding how to adapt and renew it.

#### 13.5.1.4 Capability to relate

ACPF's ability to relate is expressed in its relationship with the AU and ACERWC and the UN, in participation in inter-agency working groups, but also in its relationship with government (officials) and networked CSOs, and the Africa-wide movement. It is about relating with supporters and opponents, with individuals and groups, high level politicians and officials, but also with child rights advocates working in communities. ACPF's ability to relate is demonstrated most significantly at the higher institutional levels where targets are easier to identify but less at the country level where ACPF was only partly known or not known at all. This can be explained as a result of the wide geographical scope ACPF aspires to cover, or that this particular function of relating is not yet well enough established within ACPF. Dealing with tensions and power imbalances in relationships is part of this capability, which also refers to how answerability/accountability is mutually understood, articulated and managed, as is shown in the case of the Africa-wide movement. ACPF reacted to the competing AMC and CSO networks by withdrawing and leaving it to parties to resolve their own problem, probably not fully realising that, to a certain extent, the conflict bounced back on ACPF as the spiritual mother of AMC.

#### 13.5.1.5 Capability to balance diversity and achieve coherence

This balancing capability is well established within ACPF. There is a strong organisational focus, and staff members are fully aware of how to continuously ensure this focus. This contributes to rich research, prioritising issues relating to the overall aim of ACPF and thus constituting the basis for the advocacy message. The non-claiming of the message or the strategy creates space for diversity, as users of the message have the freedom to translate these in their terms, suiting their specific context. It entails that messages in essence should be clear and consistent to partners both at global level as well at community and societal level (upward and downward coherence). The appreciation of ACPF's message among current partners and high level fora highlights the strong side of this capability. However, ACPF shows less strength and alertness to how their message resonates at civil society and community-based levels (downward coherence), despite being aware of the diversity in

these voices. The AMC was to play a key role in translating them in a common voice, but that did not work out. ACPF is now challenged to support establishing such a networked African voice, as well as being required by the AU and ACERWC.

### *13.5.2 External factors that explain outcomes*

External factors create opportunities and threats for the advocacy message and, as such, affect the outreach, uptake and changes achieved. We identified a number of external factors on national, pan-African and international levels that may have affected ACPF's work. For obvious reasons, the factors identified cannot be exhaustive. Not only is it impossible to have an overview of external factors while grasping their complexities, also the geographical dimensions of ACPF's work interferes.

#### Political space for child rights:

A shrinking socio-political and legal space for CSOs is noted on national levels, especially for CSOs that receive funding from abroad. While governments are apparently not convinced about child rights or have priorities elsewhere, CSOs' space to influence is becoming limited. These CSO restrictions also have consequences for ACPF letting their message trickle down to the various levels of outreach and pushing the message on child rights further than agendas alone. This becomes particularly apparent, as was reported, at the governmental level, where there is an assumed need for law reform but the support from CSOs to governments seems lacking.

#### Competing CSOs and networks:

The CSOs and their networks—nationally, regionally, internationally—do not have a collective voice, and many are working on the same issues, duplicating work, not cooperating towards complementarity and competing for donor funding. The networks fight for a sound financial base to ensure their existence, thus contributing to these (power) struggles, eventually resulting a fragmented CSO voice and representation. This fragmented voice, but also its underlying reasons, require due consideration, as they (have in the past and) still are adversely affecting the advocacy outreach of ACPF, hampering the process of landscaping and blurring the outlook of who best to work with. Whether ACPF needs to engage in addressing these underlying factors (power struggles, duplication of work, donor funding) is a big question, as the main interest of ACPF (and the AU/ACERWC) is linking to a common African voice (or regional voices) on child rights. Moreover, ACPF in our view does not have sufficient manpower and in-house capacity to adequately support networks overcoming their disputes.

#### Donor policy and funding:

- Over the last years, the donor landscape at international level has been changing dramatically, resulting in new stakeholders (with new development agendas) entering the field and others donors withdrawing. This has also resulted in changed donor policies and subsequent shifts in donor funding from governance/human rights to private sector development. Result-based management has also made its entry into development, requiring accounts on mainly pre-planned results. These changes affect programme continuity and stability but also the autonomy of organisations.
- Conflicts, disasters and economics. All kinds of other developments shape the pan-African landscape and political agendas and priorities and, as such, the space for the advocacy message. Recent examples are the Mali conflict and the Ebola disease, which is currently a priority for West African countries as well as bordering regions but also for the AU. These developments take away space and attention from child rights agendas.

### *13.5.3 The nature of the issue and its resonance*

The manner in which ACPF presents the issue of child rights and wellbeing invites many to embrace the message and take it further. Children are seen ‘as identifiable victims’ if their rights are violated and not respected. All over Africa, children are officially acknowledged as the future of the continent, though at the same time exploitation of children and violation of their rights is widely spread.

The issue of child rights and its translations into sub-issues, such as inter-country adoption as discussed in the IPC 2012 and budgeting and investing in children as illustrated in the ARCW 2011 or more recently in the report on violations of children (2014), resonate very well and carry a broad support among those who are familiar with the ACPF messages. Where it does not resonate, we found various reasons for this such as (as mentioned above) other national priorities and lack of political space. Moreover—as was reported by some—the rather academic formulation of the advocacy message made the uptake difficult. A much heard complaint is also the difference between the global arena policies and national, local level realities, referring to the need to frame and reframe messages, or the confrontational ‘naming and shaming’ that in certain cases discouraged extending the message. Additionally, the complex nature of the messages and action advocated prevents quick results in terms concrete outcomes. It takes time before an advocacy message is fully internalised and digested leading to change of practice and even influencing policy, as shown in the Child Protection Centres in Ethiopia, which took many years to come about.

Keeping up issue resonance is not only in the hands of the advocating agency, but is also part of the discretionary power of partners and targets in the process and deserves full recognition. Non-resonance of ACPF’s advocacy message may have limited the outcomes at national levels.

## **13.6 Main findings & conclusions, recommendations and afterthoughts on the ICS–ACPF relationship**

### *13.6.1 Summary of main findings, additional reflections and conclusions*

Without repeating what has been said already, some findings are highlighted here that generated additional reflections and provide for some conclusions.

#### *13.6.1.1 Findings on outcomes: advocacy a long-term process*

The review of ACPF’s advocacy programme under MFS II (2012–2014) revealed that quite some changes had come about through their advocacy work, which indeed had helped in setting more child friendly agendas, influenced policies and in some cases changed practices regarding child rights and wellbeing in pan-Africa. The interconnectedness of the various ACPF programmes, projects and organisational activities made it difficult to trace the Dutch funding precisely, considering that the MFS II funding has not been project bound, but was meant as institutional support to ACPF as an organisation. Nonetheless, the outcomes described in this report definitely have a Dutch funding connection except for a few where this is mentioned.

While most of ACPF’s outcomes were seen at pan-African level represented by the African Union and the African Committee of Experts (ACERWC), where strong working relations with ACPF have been established over the past years prior also to the MFS II period, we saw an increasing interest in the ACPF advocacy message at the global level. UNICEF, UNCRC and UNHRC, but also a child rights organisation like Kids Rights in the Netherlands expressed keen interest in ACPF’s research work and its view on child rights in Africa. These agencies and bodies (including the inter-agency working groups) belong to key stakeholders in ACPF’s advocacy work; this refers especially to the AU and its committee.

At governmental and civil society levels, fewer outcomes were reported, which may be partly because of the geographical limitations of our field work that forced us to make a very practical selection of organisations for interviews. A broader approach in the field work would have revealed more outcomes possibly referring to a wider range of broad indicators. There is a tension between the geographical scope of the work aspired to by ACPF and the feasibility to demonstrate outcomes/changes achieved in such a huge geographical area. It would require more time, different research methods and budget lines to cover the changes Africa-wide. Thus, the relatively few outcomes we identified may be considered a result of the limitations in number of interviews, as well as of course the invisibility and also limited functioning of the AMC.

Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that most outcomes at national level, of which ACPF was not really aware, appeared to be spin-offs of earlier ACPF activities and outputs, going back as far as 2011 or maybe even before that time. It tells us that advocacy work is not only sometimes difficult to target; it also has a long-term horizon. The message takes time to land, to be absorbed and to be digested. This requires commitment, perseverance and continuity of the advocates (ACPF together with key stakeholders AU and the ACERWC).

#### 13.6.1.2 Output and outcome and the quality of ACPF's advocacy message

The changes identified as outcomes of ACPF's advocacy work had not been mentioned earlier as such either by Alliance respondents or in ACPF's regular progress reporting (respective Programme Highlights). It appeared that confusion exists about the distinction between output and outcome.

Outputs are seen as the 'products' of ACPF's work, which are in ACPF's sphere of control and influence. An outcome is the effect that the 'product' brings about or what others do with the output, as was explained by staff in the debriefing session at the end of our evaluation (September 2014). In this full staff meeting and upon our request, definitions of outcomes were collected that demonstrated the various perceptions largely differentiated in more conceptual terms (action on output, long-term results, not in control), but also in content terms (changes achieved in policy and practices, in attitudes, and strengthened systems/capacity in protecting child rights and wellbeing).

We agreed that outcomes identified in the evaluation complied with the definition of 'achieved effects of an output', over which there has not been direct (organisational) control and in certain cases only influence, such as for example in the inter-agency working groups. However, most outcomes reported upon have been even beyond the sphere of influence of ACPF staff; it was the quality of the advocacy message that exerted the influence. The advocacy message had done its work.

#### 13.6.1.3 Priority result areas: no end station

Most outcomes were identified in the result areas of agenda setting and policy influence. This may be because the persons we interviewed are not those tasked with formulating policies or whose (organisational) practices need to be changed towards more child-friendly approaches and programmes.


The highest decision-making body at the AU is the AU Assembly, a semi-annual meeting of Heads of member States and government. As regards child issues, ministerial conferences are convened to adopt AU policy on child rights. It is the AU commission, the secretariat of the AU, that prepares the conferences. In that sense, the changes achieved by ACPF at AU and ACERWC levels are intermediate steps in a longer process of adoption by ministerial conferences and national implementation. The AU and ACERWC pursue governmental compliance of adopted guidelines and policies through monitoring progress on the implementation of the Charter. Where we reported changes in practice,

difference is made in changes at AU/ACERWC level proper and as noted by AU/ ACERWC in civil society reporting.

However, in no way can the priority result areas be considered end stations for ACPF's advocacy work, as the ultimate changes in child rights and wellbeing have to take place at national governmental levels and be practiced by national CSOs, which in turn can stimulate their governments to comply with the AU regulations and rules.

#### 13.6.1.4 AU/ACERWC as key strategic partner to further maximise the advocacy message

The AU and its ACERWC can be seen as a core strategic partner for ACPF to influence national African governments to embrace child rights. From the onset, this has been the approach and, as we understood, the main reason why ACPF opened its doors in Addis Ababa, near to the African Union. Additionally, ACPF aspired to influence national governments and CSOs, for which it had established the AMC. The overall strategic approach was depicted in a triangle as follows:



Under MFS II, as we have noted, ACPF did not directly reach out to governments, but governments were influenced indirectly and for as far we understood mostly through the AU and its ministerial conferences. The influence of ACPF on civil society level had its limitation, as explained largely by the absence of a successful coordinated CSO approach, but also because of disputes between AMC and its offspring the CSO Forum.

Given the nature of ACPF as a non-governmental international agency independent from political agendas, its relatively modest staff establishment, its quality and content-based research work and its well-established working relations with the AU/ACERWC, we consider the latter to be the strategic core partner to effectively maximise the ACPF advocacy message by reaching out to national governments. In our view, there should not be pressure for ACPF to work directly with national governments, running the risk of being compromised, which may eventually adversely affect its independent character and good reputation and the favourable conditions ACPF succeeded in creating over the last 10 years of its existence.



#### 13.6.1.5 Creating favourable conditions and good reputation requires continuous attention

As explained above (section 13.2.6), in the course of the evaluation process outcomes had emerged that did not fall in line with the three given priority results areas. These include outcomes that are related to the image of ACPF as a credible and visible advocate recognised as knowledgeable on how to reach out to international and pan-African platforms. ACPF knows how to be 'deliberately opportunistic', as a staff member described the nature of ACPF's strategic approaches. In its advocacy work, ACPF succeeds in mobilising many 'helping hands', strategic sparring partners who believe in ACPF's work for child rights and assist ACPF in its advocacy work.

This is an overarching achievement of ACPF that has to be treasured, enabling ACPF to make the difference that it aspires to make all over Africa. It means keeping up the high standard of content work, not taking up too many new subjects at a time, following the changes that are happening and encouraging and giving incentives for changes. A good reputation also requires organisational maintenance (*noblesse oblige*) in that ACPF needs to keep investing in its institutional strength, its staff, its network and its overall performance as Africa's advocate for child rights and wellbeing at both the level of the African Union/ACERWC as well as the level of CSOs.

#### 13.6.1.6 AMC dream to pursue

There is still a dream to come true and that is to strengthen the ties with CSOs and to help raise a coordinated pan-African voice that can speak on children's and human rights, which is in the interest of many. This includes the AU and ACERWC, who expressed the need of such a voice from civil society for their monitoring function on the progress of the Charter, but also in the interest of ACPF's advocacy work and outreach. The Africa-wide movement was meant to be instrumental in surfacing this pan-African voice, but so far it did not work or maybe is not yet working.

It is our opinion that ACPF has a role to play in revitalising the AMC, regardless of the tensions between the CSO Forum and AMC. It is undoable for ACPF to reach out to national CSOs in 54 countries without having national or regional coordinators who are acceptable representatives for their country/region. Likewise, it would be very helpful for those civil society respondents who are not familiar with the work of ACPF but keen to linking with ACPF's work to have an easy nearby contact.

### 13.6.2 Recommendations

From the findings and conclusions, three major recommendations emerge for ACPF as were also discussed in the staff debriefing in September 2014:

#### 1<sup>st</sup> Recommendation:

The first is of a strategic nature and pertains to the way ACPF could best approach its three major targets, namely the AU/ACERWC, national civil society and governments.

Outcomes and overall findings demonstrate that the triangle as depicted above (section 2.6.1.) is not working in that governments have not been reached directly by ACPF, but indirectly through the AU/ACERWC and to some extent also through CSOs, as reported in Uganda, Mozambique and Kenya.

As in the picture below, we see ACPF continuing as a strong sparring partner for the AU/ACERWC while strengthening its outreach to CSOs, especially to NNGOs so as to mutually benefit from African expertise, knowledge and networks. Through enhanced civil society ties as well as continued partnership with the AU/ACERWC, national governments will be influenced along two mutually reinforcing lines. Should ACPF be approached by government representatives for technical support or advice on child rights issues, ACPF could draw from the expertise and resources of CSOs (both

INGOs and NNGOs) and help in linking demand to supply. It even may generate some income for NGOs performing as consultants/advisors.


As such, ACPF will perform not as an advocate or capacity builder but as a broker or facilitator, maintaining its independent character and its good relations with governments.

#### 2<sup>nd</sup> Recommendation:

The second recommendation pertains to strengthening the links with civil society or revitalising the Africa-wide Movement for Children (AMC). The call for a well-coordinated African voice on child rights has been regularly heard, especially from the side of the AU/ACERWC, but also from CSOs, some of whom had even expressed embarrassment about the tensions between AMC and the CSO Forum. Some respondents shared their view on the CSO Forum as not representing the African voice given the many international agencies (even foreign donors) that are member of this forum. An African civil society voice needs to be well-embedded in its local context and needs to have an African identity so as to be a legitimate voice.

ACPF seems well placed to be instrumental in bringing new life to the AMC, without competing with the many existing regional and national networks on child rights, rather seeking complementarity. Lessons to be learned from past experiences include paying due attention to establishing mutual answerability in relationships, harmonising reciprocal expectations and remaining aware that potential AMC affiliates bring a lot of expertise and experience, which, in turn, could be deployed when government requests arise for technical support or advice, avoiding mutual dependency and respecting each other's autonomy and working space.

A coordinated civil society voice, or rather coordinated regional or national civil society voices, would be helpful for the AU/ACERWC in, amongst other things, monitoring the progress of the Charter. It would also be beneficial to the quality of ACPF's advocacy message and contribute to its good reputation and it would help in mobilising expertise if the need arises.



#### 3<sup>rd</sup> Recommendation:

Lastly, this recommendation is of a very practical nature. To keep track of ACPF's advocacy work, it seems logical that a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) position is created. The evaluation has shown that most of the outcomes were not observed by either ACPF or by its funding partners. Admittedly, also for us as evaluators, it would have been quite difficult to surface outcomes without extensive

interviews and a sound evaluation methodology. Moreover, the monitoring and evaluation protocols that came along with MFS II did not really encourage searching for all kinds of outcomes.

In our view, a position of M&E expert could very well be combined with an advocacy function (also mentioned as relevant and urgent), considering that monitoring and evaluating outcomes/results of advocacy will reveal where the advocacy message is not reaching out, why not and how to remedy the situation. Though these functions are acknowledged to be different, they are complementary as well, and we see such combined function as watchdog for ACPF to remain on track and relevant, enhancing the outreach to its two main partners, the African Union and NNGOs.

### *13.6.3 Afterthoughts on the relationship between ICS and ACPF*

Evaluating an ILA programme under MFS II that is independently executed by a non-Dutch actor invites looking into the relationship between the latter and the Dutch MFS II partner.

ACPF is the only unit of analysis under this evaluation that cannot claim a position as an alliance member. It participates as a Southern partner of T4C, or rather of ICS; MFS II admission criteria<sup>509</sup> did not allow them to directly apply for MFS II subsidy. However, the importance of involving Southern actors in MFS II programmes (not in isolation but as an integral part) was underlined in terms of the need to demonstrate how they were for instance to participate in decision making and steering of policy, how to influence MFS II programming and accounting for progress. Moreover, the applicant/alliance was asked to explain how to enhance Southern partners' ownership over the programme and equality of status in the relationship and explain its policy for capacity development. These issues set out the frame for cooperation between Northern and Southern partners, which ICS and ACPF elaborated and confirmed in an official agreement.<sup>510</sup>

In the process of evaluating, a number of issues emerged in respect of this relationship that we address separately so as to do justice to the efforts invested in it but also to reflect upon learning purposes, co-creation potential and complementarity of programmes. Issues pertained to the following:

- Balancing between the formal and informal cooperation
- Tier-one and tier-two relationship
- Scope for co-creation and complementarity

#### *13.6.3.1 Balancing between formal and functional cooperation:*

The 2011 agreement between ICS and ACPF provides broad outlines for the rights and obligations in the cooperation such as the need for annual narratives covering previous years, quality monitoring and evaluation reports. It defines what is called 'shareware' information, which is free for use by 3rd parties, and it devotes an article to ICS not bearing responsibility for the internal ACPF organisation and doings. Certain dissimilarity is noted in contractual obligations for ACPF as compared with those for ICS.

According to interviewees, the process of cooperation between the two worked very well during the conception of MFS II. ICS and ACPF had worked together under MFS I already and so ACPF was a natural choice to continue with as a strategic Southern partner. In formulating the final proposal, ACPF was fully facilitated to actively take part in the discussions, submitting also their own programme of work 2010–2015.<sup>511</sup> The cooperation mode the MFS II criteria had requested proved to be very functional in the initial phase.

In the period thereafter when ILA work was progressing we have noted less ICS attention. The intense cooperation at the beginning of MFS II seems to have transformed into a more distanced relationship, formal information sharing mainly focusing on the flow of funds and ACPF's progress reporting, such as annual narratives as per contract. Not much other 'shareware' exchange was brought to our attention. Whether and to what extent ICS responded content-wise to ACPF reports, and whether T4C work benefited of the achievements of ACPF, either in a complementary or in any other way, we could not identify, at least not from documentation available. Jointly reflecting on issues at stake for learning purposes did not transpire as an institutionalised form of cooperation. However, in interviews it emerged that exchange between individual staff members is indeed taking place, but apparently this is more person-related and ad hoc in nature rather than firmly embedded in organisational practices. This may explain the limited the scope for mutual accountability, for cross-pollination and for learning between the programmes of ICS and ACPF that after all are designed to be complementary under MFS II.<sup>512</sup>

The relationship as formalised per contract gives ACPF full responsibility for its own organisation and allows using its discretionary space<sup>513</sup> in programme implementation to do what it considers necessary within their overall ILA mandate. However, responsibility comes with accountability (answerability), keeping the formal relation functional, open to mutual exchange, reflection and learning. When the governance structure of ACPF was re-organised (2013), the space for constructive exchange between ICS and ACPF became very slim and it demanded serious balancing efforts of all parties to keep lines open. We conceive that accountability arrangements between ICS and ACPF have room for improvement.

It is to be noted that, besides the MFS II/ILA programme, the cooperation between ICS and ACPF covers other projects and initiatives as well, which remained beyond the scope of this evaluation, but that according to ICS information enjoys a rather broad base.<sup>514</sup>

#### 13.6.3.2 Tier-one and tier-two relationship

ACPF is a direct contract partner of ICS, a so-called tier-one relationship, but is in fact under sub-contract with the NL MoFA, a relation that can be seen as a tier-two relationship. How ACPF relates to T4C is difficult to determine, as ICS is the lead of T4C and as such represents the Alliance.

ACPF has a second-tier relationship with NL MoFA, ICS being the partner in between. We have observed a tendency in ICS to protect the relationships with ACPF from the NL MoFA, which we did not further investigate. It gives room for assumptions that, in our view, can better be tested seeking to open a learning loop for the donor and also opening doors to promote ACPF's work and the relevance of its outcomes within the donor agency and its network (embassies).

A second-tier relationship is also a distanced one. In the baseline report (p. 155), we mentioned already that a rather generic picture of the ACPF programme of work appeared in the MFS II proposal due to little space left under the protocol to exemplify the wide-ranging ILA work of the Southern organisation. Thus, information is being filtered. Such a distanced relation to the main donor also entails less influence of donor-induced planning and analytic tools. We noted that the ToC, the use of the M&E protocols and the concept of outcome are not mainstreamed in ACPF's regular work in spite of workshops and training conducted by ICS and PLAN Netherlands. Their organisational ILA world is part of and adjusted to the AU and the African context and not necessarily aligned to the Western donor world (and its paradigms and vocabulary), despite its funding sources.

The 5Cs concept was also unfamiliar to ACPF until PLAN Netherlands did the analysis in the context of its Girl Power programme (2013). ACPF had never focused on these specific capabilities that—as

mentioned before—are more development-oriented than ILA oriented. In our ACPF consultations with interviewees, six key competencies for successful advocacy emerged that differ but are complementary and partly overlapping to the 5Cs. They are worth mentioning as they arose from a Southern perspective:

**Keeping up the focus of the organisation:**

The focus of the organisation is considered important to prioritise and make autonomous choices with regard to the content of the advocacy message. Without a focus, you may run the risk of spreading yourself too thinly. Keeping focus contributes to rich research, prioritising on issues relating to the overall aim of advocacy.

**Delivering evidence-based content:**

The evidence-based content is the backbone of the advocacy message and serves as connector between the various levels an ILA agent seeks to target, which may vary from grassroots organisations to civil society, the national/governmental to regional (e.g. pan-Africa) and international level.

**Knowing-the-landscape and doing landscaping:**

Knowing-your-landscape and doing-the-landscaping means being aware of the working context and knowing who figures in the institutional landscape in what capacity. Landscaping means sorting out to whom, what, when, why and how to spread the advocacy message. This includes making stakeholder and context analyses to know exactly whom you need to influence to achieve what kind of result. This is part of the strategizing behind the advocacy.

**Knowing your network and doing the networking:**

Also knowing-your-network and doing-the-networking is seen as a highly relevant function for proper framing of the advocacy messages. For example, political actors demand a different wording and framing of the same advocacy message from national level NGOs and IGOs. Networking is about liaising and understanding how to make the message suitable for a diverse group of stakeholders to ensure effective outreach. This includes the capacity to be aware and sensitive to feedback loops and dynamics that are inherent to cooperating in partnerships and networks.

**Maintaining a capable external environment:**

Maintaining a capable (external) environment is about seeing prospective partners and being seen as a capable partner (visibility and credibility), but also mobilising and cooperating in partnerships and seeking complementarity for cross-fertilisation with strategic partners.

**The enabling organisation:**

The last competency pertains to being an enabling organisation for ILA work and refers to a high extent to the internal organisational capability as under the 5Cs.

### 13.6.3.3 Scope for co-creation and complementarity between ICS and ACPF

The relation between ICS and ACPF is not conceived as a traditional donor–recipient relation in that ICS gives institutional funding and indeed provides full space to ACPF to fulfil their mission and implement the ILA programme independently. As such, it offers ample space for rich interfacing between autonomous entities.

The interface is the domain where partners interact; different experiences and perceptions on issues, on gaps in policy and understanding, on context, feedback loops and unexpected developments may appear on the table to be discussed. As explained above (section 1), activities generating outcomes are shaped at the interface between one internal actor and capabilities (e.g. ICS) and another

external actor and capabilities (e.g. ACPF) in response to contextual complexities, opportunities and restrictions. It is the space par excellence for mediation and co-creation as Wierdsma has it.<sup>515</sup>

We identified ample scope for strengthening this kind of dynamic inter-organisational interactions between ICS and ACPF, two organisations acknowledged to stand on equal footing (peers), sharing a common agenda of child rights, pursuing the agenda each from their own viewpoint. However, we noted ambivalence in this respect especially on the side of ICS, not only the contract is a case in point where obligations are mainly ACPF-focused and ICS' role is expressed in non-interference only. In practice, mutual answerability could have been better addressed, and also the shielding of ACPF from the relationship with NL MoFA could have been lifted, while ACPF as independent implementer of the ILA programme should have been facilitated to attend the learning event organised under this evaluation for ILA implementing organisations (April 2014).

We realise that interfacing enhancing co-creation and complementarity among peers is time consuming but it has many advantages, not only as a platform for learning and innovation on child rights, but it also supports transparency without limiting each other's independence.



## 14 Communities of Change Alliance

### 14.1 Introduction

#### 14.1.1 *Specific context and overview of the alliance*

The unit of analysis for this evaluation is the Cordaid Women Leadership in Peace and Security (WLPS) lobby and advocacy.<sup>516</sup> This is a subpart of a bigger programme with the same name: WLPS. WLPS was transformed into a business unit in accordance with Cordaid's internal reorganisation in January 2013. WLPS lobby and advocacy is part of the MFS II Alliance 'Communities of Change' (CoC) of which Cordaid is the lead co-financing agency (CFA) and receives funding from 2011–2015. Other partners are PAX, Impunity Watch, Mensen met een Missie, Netherlands Red Cross, Wemos and Both ENDS. The Alliance has an extended programme focusing on disaster risk reduction, conflict transformation, health and wellbeing, entrepreneurship, living in slums and humanitarian aid. This programme works in different countries around the world; the geographical area is thus not limited to one region.

WLPS lobby and advocacy focuses on international lobby and advocacy to increase women's inclusion, participation and gender equality in peace and security processes, policies and practices. The programme is rather isolated from the rest of the Alliance work, within Cordaid as well as in cooperation with its direct Alliance partners. We could not find any reference or cooperation between the WLPS lobby and the extended Alliance. Hence, in accordance with our terms of reference (ToR), the focus of the evaluation is the WLPS lobby funded by MFS II.

The work of WLPS lobby and advocacy takes place in a context within which—despite numerous national and international policies, practices and agreements aimed at securing women's rights and increasing the role of women in peace and security processes—women remain largely absent from peace negotiations and excluded from the making of security policies. Notwithstanding their vulnerable position, women's voices are not only excluded at national or local levels but also in regional and global policy arenas. It remains challenging to build peace and implement conflict prevention mechanisms and policies and include women leadership in such processes.

The exclusion of women takes place at different levels. First, on the national level, women are often excluded from participation because of existing unequal gender relations and a lack of political will to include women in policy making and peace negotiations. Second, on the international level, there are increasing policies and mechanisms such as the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) on women, peace and security and, especially, the UNSCR 1325 (2000), which is implemented through the National and Regional Action Plans (NAP/RAP) mechanism for 1325. However, the implementation of these policies remains a difficult process on the national level because of, among other things, a lack of funding. This is voiced by the women's movement as well as international-, regional- and national-level women's collectives and networks.

#### 14.1.2 *ILA Programme—WLPS lobby and advocacy overview*

The unit of analysis for this evaluation is WLPS lobby and advocacy, part of the Women's Leadership programme (WLPS), which operates under a business unit (BU) of the same name. The WLPS lobby and advocacy is headed by one person who works 0.8 fte exclusively on WLPS lobby and advocacy in coordination with the other WLPS officers, as well as with other business units across Cordaid. The WLPS policy officer realises the advocacy work with partner organisations, namely network/movement building, research and capacity building at the local/national and international levels. For research, work can be outsourced, a common strategy in research for lobby and advocacy. The total MFS II budget for the WLPS programme according to the information received from Cordaid



is €25.9 million, of which the bulk of the costs are staff and production (consultancies, reports, launches, etc.), but also included are costs to support local partners and local lobby and advocacy processes.<sup>517</sup> How much of these costs are allocated to the ILA programme under evaluation specifically could not be surfaced from the data provided.

The reorganisation of Cordaid into business units is the major organisational change that we encountered after the baseline. The business units have been functioning since January 2013, after a period of an organisation-wide reorganisation. As we briefly described in the baseline, Cordaid reorganised working units from thematic and country-focused programmes to thematic-focused business units. These business units are thematically specialised and horizontally organised across geographical locations. During the year of transformation, this situation produced staff insecurities due to layoff of personnel and the changes in ways of working with regard to content and country focus. A year after implementing the new structure, much of the insecurity seems to have transformed into a new, energetic way of working together within and between the business units. We will reflect further on this in the section on explanatory factors. The budget cuts from subsidiary systems and changes in the global financial arena for development aid are the major instigations. Internal procedures and processes, such as transparency standards, have changed in accordance. We will reflect on this further in the section on Theory of Efficiency.

#### *14.1.3 Application of the methodology, triangulation and analysis*

This evaluation has offered a chance to have a deeper look into and understanding of the lobby and advocacy processes as performed by WLPS lobby and to progressively collect our data over a period of two years (2012–2014). The data we collected centres on the WLPS lobby and its main partners, as well as some external experts and policy makers. During the two years of evaluation, we have conducted four field visits, two to New York and two to Colombia. Most of the contacts for interviews were provided in cooperation with WLPS lobby and advocacy and the WLPS BU, while others were referrals by interviewees or by experts in the specific field of women, peace and security. Some interviews were conducted via Skype.

The main sources of information are the recordings of regular meetings and (Skype) calls with the WLPS policy officer and others within the WLPS BU, data collected and triangulated through observation of meetings and WLPS documents (internal documents such as emails and strategic planning documents and external documents such as public documentation), web research and research reports linked to and/or part of WLPS lobby and advocacy. Other sources of information used to understand and triangulate interview data were general literature on lobby and advocacy and specific literature on women's movements, networks and women in peace and security processes. Narratives were collected from over 50 interviews, which we conducted with the help of semi-structured interview guidelines that were adapted to the specific informant. We find it important to emphasise that the narratives reflect the narrator's interpretation of facts and to point out the sensitivity of the issues and relations that play a role in the advocacy processes on women's rights. We have substantiated and validated our information to be able to reconstruct processes and facts. In some cases, we have revisited informants to better understand the WLPS lobby and advocacy. Several factors made it difficult at times to disclose the exact changes and outcomes perceived and achieved. First, the unit of analysis for this evaluation is part of a larger programme within Cordaid. At times, this has made it difficult to determine the outcomes achieved specifically by the WLPS lobby and advocacy. Most of the outcomes came to the fore through interviews and documents. Second, we have not received (internal) outcome reports from the WLPS programme and received the MFS II reporting to the NL MoFA by the CoC Alliance only in October 2014. Third,

part of the research work is outsourced and/or conducted in close partnerships and through close cooperation with other BUs within Cordaid or partners external to Cordaid (such as WO=MEN, GNWP in New York, etc.). The coordination is handled by the policy officer in cooperation with partners. Outsourcing work is not exceptional in the sector.

For the relevance assessment, we examined the link between changes achieved and needs identified in the ToC, the use and, as much as possible, also in the broader context of women's rights. We observed advocacy processes and meetings, and we examined the uptake of the advocacy message and output by other stakeholders, as well as the number of meetings and invitations to speak. The assessment is based on interviews with staff and partners, but is also substantiated with external resource persons, targets and other stakeholders. In addition, we studied documentation and followed the paper trail of communication in some cases.

#### *14.1.4 Case selection and the role of the cases in the report*

In close cooperation with WLPS advocacy programme and policy officer, the WLPS programme coordinator/manager and other policy/programmes officers and the Corporate Strategic Unit (CSU) within Cordaid, we selected two cases for deeper investigation. The case studies provide insights into the advocacy processes on different levels. We selected two levels for the case studies because these are key to the WLPS advocacy programme. As part of these case studies, we conducted a contribution analysis on one outcome per case.

The first case study focuses on the UNSCR 1325 process on international level (UN). The integrated contribution analysis aims at understanding WLPS' contribution to the Multi-Stakeholder Financing Mechanism (MFM). The second case study focuses on UNSCR 1325 at regional level in Colombia. The integrated contribution analysis analyses WLPS' contribution to the implementation and localisation of UNSCR 1325 in Colombia. These processes were seen as key processes in the WLPS lobby and were stressed as possible internal learning opportunities for WLPS to further strengthen the lobby and advocacy. The international processes constitute a big part of the advocacy work by the WLPS lobby. By looking at both national and international levels, an analysis of this case could constitute a valuable learning opportunity for strategically linking the various levels. Both cases are MFS II funded and traceable, part of the main working body of WLPS lobby and part of the ToC. As part of the case studies, we conducted a contribution analysis on one of the outcomes achieved per case study. By combining the case studies with the contribution analysis, we took the opportunity to dive deeper into WLPS' lobby and advocacy work.

Data for the case studies were collected by way of semi-structured interviews with WLPS staff working on the international and regional levels, as well as with partners on regional and international levels. Findings were triangulated and substantiated through documentation and semi-structured interviews with external resource persons and policy officers who were part of targeted institutions, where possible. Moreover, observation was used as a verification and substantiation method for processes in New York and in Colombia.

This evaluation could not have been conducted without the cooperation of Cordaid, especially the WLPS lobby and policy officer, the WLPS programme staff and Cordaid more broadly, the Monitoring and Evaluation officer and the direct partners to the WLPS programme, for which we are grateful, bearing well in mind that the workload of all persons involved.

## **14.2 Evaluation questions 1 and 3: Changes and relevance**

### *14.2.1 Theory of change from T0 to T2*

In this section, we describe the theory of change (ToC) that the work of the WLPS lobby and advocacy is based on, as well as the eventual practice of change that we have observed.<sup>518</sup> The ToC for the WLPS ILA programme is part of a broader ToC of the WLPS programme, and at the same time exists next to other ToCs within Cordaid. The WLPS lobby and advocacy ToC that we describe here covers the MFS II-funded period 2011–2015. The theory behind (planned) change consists of broadly formulated aims, objectives, strategies and activities, which we used to translate into a ToC. We have not found a competing ToC.

#### *14.2.1.1 Theory of change*

The focus of the WLPS programme is ‘women as agents of change’. In accordance with the former Women & Violence programme, Cordaid identified the added value for lobby and advocacy on UNSCR 1325 of the programme as its ability to link local knowledge and needs to various levels of policy making in the Netherlands, the EU, the international level and in partner countries. By linking these levels, Cordaid aims to open political space and enable its partners to implement UNSCR 1325, also in fragile conflict-affected areas. The WLPS lobby aims at ensuring effective implementation of the UNSCR 1325, strengthening capacity of partners and engaging partners in the broader lobby for women leadership to enable bottom-up and as well as top-down political engagement and secure political will. This is linked to the broader objective of the conflict transformation programme under the CoC Alliance, which aims to improve the position and life standards for poor and marginalised groups in society, including women, and to strengthen civil society as an autonomous movement to pursue this through the principle of communities of change. The overarching focus or objective is conflict transformation, supported by the assumption that sustainable peace without women is not possible.<sup>519</sup>

The overall aim of the WLPS programme is to contribute to sustainable peace and security by supporting women’s involvement and participation and gender equality in collective peace processes. The WLPS lobby and advocacy seeks this contribution through effective implementation of the UNSCR 1325, increased capacity of local women, women’s organisations and women’s collectives and the integration of women’s perspectives in international policies and practices. The objectives of the WLPS Lobby and Advocacy have been formulated as follows: 1) The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, the NL and the UN; 2) Increased capacity of women’s collectives and 3) Integration of women’s perspectives and participation in processes of international policies and practices. The linked strategies of the WLPS lobby and advocacy are the following: i) producing and sharing knowledge; ii) Network building; iii) Individual and collective capacity strengthening of partners; iv) stimulating cooperation between governments and CSOs; (v) Lobbying in national and international policy arenas. These strategies rely on both the content-based knowledge produced by the WLPS lobby and their strategic partnerships. For a more complete overview of the ToC and the underlying activities, see Figure 14.1.

The WLPS lobby and advocacy ToC is based on three basic assumptions on how change happens. First, the inclusion of women in policy and practice concerning peace and security processes will ensure more sustainable peace and feelings of security. Transition to peace is not possible without the participation of women. As such, it is considered important to develop policies and mechanisms that aim at supporting women's positions in peace processes and ensure women's rights. The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 will then result in successful integration of women in (peace and security) policy processes and practices. Second, sustainable development needs transformative change that addresses the unequal power relations between men and women. Third, women's specific capacities, experiences, knowledge and talents can and should be utilised to make a critical contribution to a stable, secure society. By training, preparing and supporting women to play the political game, women's participation and empowerment, according to the ToC, will increase. To reach this, it is crucial to increase the capacity of women's collectives, to integrate women's perspectives and participation in processes of international policies and practices on security, and to strengthen the networks of women.




Figure 14.1 CoC Theory of Change. Source: own elaboration based on WLPS documents

#### 14.2.1.2 Practice of change

Below, we describe and discuss how the ToC is put into practice. The practice, as well as ToC, shows that the WLPS lobby and advocacy works on different levels to influence public and political agendas. It does so by focusing on, and seeking linkages between, the national and international levels as well as developing and (whether or not ad hoc) partnerships and networks. WLPS lobby and advocacy seeks to connect and bridge between local needs and policy arenas. The practice of change adds two important elements to the ToC when it comes to how change is envisioned.

First, a focused message and content-based documents have a prominent role in the process of change. WLPS lobby and advocacy work is based on a focused message around women, peace and security and specifically the UNSCR 1325, the NAP 1325 implementation and the role of women in peace and security processes. Advocacy is conducted through partnerships and networks, working closely with multiple stakeholders in the processes and based on research that produces content-based documents. This production of knowledge, which is shared and used to strengthen the advocacy message in combination with various strategic partnerships, is a crucial element in WLPS' practice of change, as will become clear in the sections that follow.

Second, local voices are important in the way change is envisioned in practice. The idea that change is achieved from below is more prominent in practice than comes to the fore in the ToC. The integration of the voices of women in the formulation of the lobby message to facilitate and broker communication processes between global, national and local levels is a crucial element in WLPS' practice of change. The local voices of women's organisations, collectives, networks and women are constantly solicited and included in the lobby message. To be able to realise this, Cordaid also allocates resources to facilitate network/coalition building among local women's organisations and assist in their interaction with their constituencies. Additionally, Cordaid seeks to be complementary to other stakeholders and partners by working in this way.

#### 14.2.1.3 Theory of Change – Practice of Change

The ToC for WLPS lobby and advocacy is part of a broader ToC of the WLPS programme, and at the same time exists next to other ToCs within Cordaid. The theory behind (planned) change consists of closely related aims and objectives that are translated into strategies and activities. We have not found a competing ToC. The overarching focus or objective is conflict transformation, supported by the assumption that sustainable peace without women is not possible—this is the core of the idea behind the ToC and the key assumption about how change happens. This assumption is translated into activities that are derived from the ToC by putting women as well as their active participation and their capacities at the centre. In the practice of change, we found two elements that could be added to the ToC: one, the prominent role of a focused message and content-based documents in the process of change, and two, the importance of local voices in the way change is envisioned in practice. The idea that change is achieved from below is more prominent in practice than in the ToC.

### *14.2.2 Changes achieved and their relevance*

In this section, we discuss findings on the following evaluation questions: What are the changes achieved in the three priority result areas through international lobbying and advocacy? What is the relevance of these changes? To be able to define the outcomes and changes achieved we often had to think outside of the ToC in terms of anticipated achievements, because practice often developed in other directions than the starting points formulated by MFS II. Not everything planned for could be achieved and not everything achieved could have been predicted at the onset of the planning in 2010. This has everything to do with the way 'doing' lobby and advocacy works: Not everything can be planned, as much of the lobby and advocacy takes place in relation to occurring events and opportunities. We have chosen to discuss the relevance of the described outcomes in a separate subsection instead of directly after the regarded outcome, because we think that in the case of WLPS this gives a better overview of and insight into the multiple layers of relevance (see also the methodology chapter). Additionally, this way of presenting the relevance reduces repetition, as the described outcomes and their relevance, are interlinked. The relevance is assessed by looking at the overall achieved changes across priority result areas and across outcome clusters.

#### *14.2.2.1 Summary of the changes achieved*

The WLPS lobby and advocacy programme mainly contributed to changes relating to agenda setting. A number of changes in policy and practice in the field of women, peace and security (WPS) were also so achieved. Policy changes are long-term processes and, sometimes, the little progress made is set-back when the policy institutions targeted (re)close opened spaces. Therefore, the changes described in this domain are not necessarily already a change of policy or practice yet. WLPS lobby work and the changes achieved are often small but important steps in a process towards a bigger outcome. During the evaluation we have seen movements relating to setting agendas and influencing policy, which we will further elaborate below. We also reflect on some changes of practice that we have observed on the national levels relating to WLPS advocacy work. WLPS lobby changes have been achieved at different levels: international, national and on the level of partnership.

WLPS lobby and advocacy partnerships and networks are particularly important to understand how and why changes have been achieved. WLPS lobby collaborates with a variety of partners in different ways, strategically as well as ad hoc and depending on occurring events. These partnerships bundle strengths and knowledge and take messages further to constituencies, partners, external stakeholders and targets. Over the past years, there has been an increase in invitations for the WLPS lobby/policy officer to provide input during internal meetings, public events and in cooperation on various projects with and within the EU, NATO, UN Women, and others. This can be considered a change that has facilitated changes at the international and national levels of WLPS lobby and advocacy work.

On the internal level within Cordaid, the reorganisation over the course of 2012 and the implementation of business units since 2013 have resulted in a number of changes we consider significant for coherence across business units, which affects the strategic way of working and strengthens capacity and knowledge building and use within Cordaid on women, peace and security and gender issues, as well as externally towards partners and other stakeholders.

On the national level, changes have been achieved in different domains: in the Netherlands and in partner countries. In this evaluation, we have focused on the advocacy directly conducted by the WLPS lobby in Colombia. We will, however, also address outcomes considering the Transition

Monitoring in Afghanistan. In the Netherlands, WLPS lobby work is mostly conducted through the NAP 1325 Working Group, facilitated by the Dutch Gender Platform WO=MEN<sup>520</sup> in which CSOs cooperate with the NL MoFA to work towards effective implementation of the NAP 1325. This is an ongoing process since 2008, and various achievements have been made, such as budgeting for UNSCR 1325 in the Netherlands and putting UNSCR 1325 implementation and cooperation between CSOs and government on the discussion table within the NL MoFA as well as the NL parliament. Another achieved outcome is the maintaining of structural budgets for UNSCR 1325 and WPS. In Colombia, WLPS lobby and advocacy has been involved in supporting the implementation and localisation of the UNSCR 1325. Information and awareness processes have focused on women's groups and local politicians and have become part of the women's movement agenda and, in some cases, also of municipal policy. WLPS has opened political space for Colombian's women's organisations to push their government to embrace UNSCR 1325. WLPS has done this by strategically linking the women's group with the UN Secretary-General Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, who then approached the Colombian government on UNSCR 1325 using the entry point of 'Sexual Violence' rather than 'Peace and Security', which is more politically sensitive, as the government did not want to recognise Colombia as a 'conflict' country.

At the global level, WLPS lobby and advocacy has achieved a number of outcomes the past years. These outcomes are mostly related to the strategic partnerships WLPS lobby has built and sustained while at the same time providing substantial input in discussions on international level regarding the UNSCR 1325 process providing critical lessons and perspectives with regard to the implementation of National and Regional Action Plans (NAP/RAP); the role of women as participants and leaders in peace and security processes; the inclusion of gender in the New Deal;<sup>521</sup> and raising the critical issues of implementing policies regarding women's rights. On international level, WLPS advocacy focused on UN organisations, NATO, EU, various representatives/missions of national governments to the UN and the international CSOs working on women, peace and security and gender. WLPS advocacy thereby seeks to ensure the links with their national partners as well as with local needs.

The work on international and national levels has been the result (at least partly) of strategic partnerships with global networks and local organisations, and it has culminated in more sustainable partnerships and (policy) engagements. WLPS lobby and advocacy is, for example, working closely together in partnership with UN Women and has ongoing policy engagements with NATO. There is now close cooperation on multiple levels with these bodies and an increase of invitations to provide input in internal as well as public discussions. This has led to changes relating to the Multi-Stakeholder Financing Mechanism, which is now being taken up by UN Women in partnership with Cordaid and GNWP. Together with other stakeholders, namely the Peace Building Support Office at the UN (PBSO), UN member states from donor and conflict-affected countries, as well CSO representatives (including WLPS national partners), WLPS is now leading the international Financing Discussion Group on Women, Peace and Security. This initiative is praised in the UN Secretary-General Report on Women, Peace and Security submitted to the UN Security Council during the 14<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of UNSCR 1325.<sup>522</sup> Another example is the input on the post-2015 agenda with regard to women, peace and security putting the implementation issues around UNSCR 1325 continuously on the discussion tables of UN Women, NATO, the EU and national level political and public arenas.

#### 14.2.2.2 Outcomes and Changes per Priority Result Area

Below, we discuss the outcomes in the priority result areas 2012–2014 according to the broad outcome indicators identified for this evaluation. The data gathered over a period of two years



provide a substantial understanding of the changes achieved and at T3 (2014). The outcomes were collected until September 2014.

The broad outcome indicators are grouped into the three priority result areas: agenda setting, policy influence and change of practice. We used the broad outcome indicators as an instrument to identify, measure and visualise how outcomes can be understood and in which way they are related to the priority result areas. Before we go on to discuss the outcomes in relation to the priority result areas, we would like to make some comments on how we understand the broad outcome indicators: 1) It is important to note that we did not identify relevant partners within the MFS II Alliance specific for the WLPS advocacy. We only refer to occasional partnerships such as strategic, long-term and ad hoc partners (agenda setting, indicator 1); 2) The major public debate could not be fully explored in the global context; the UN, national (NL, Colombia), NATO and EU-organised debates have been leading (agenda setting, indicator 5); 3) We consider 'policy influence' as a process and therefore included the process of policy drafting and other steps in the process of policy influence here.

Most changes of the WLPS lobby and advocacy have been achieved in the priority result area of 'agenda setting', while some of the changes are policy influencing and change of practice. As these processes are long-term and messages need time to land and sustain influence, the changes with regard to policy and practice are often not clear yet. This does not mean the processes instigated by Cordaid and its partners will not lead to such changes in the (near) future. The changes that have come to the fore have often been achieved on multiple levels that are frequently linked: internal to Cordaid, in the international arena of lobby and advocacy, on the national level of partner countries and on the national level of the Netherlands. These observed changes are not exhaustive due to the limitations of our evaluation research in terms of time and budget.

#### Agenda setting:

Partnerships and networks are at the heart of Cordaid's WLPS advocacy because they provide a supporting, facilitating and brokering role to women's organisations and women in conflict-affected countries enhancing capacity and brokering their voices to (inter-)national policy arenas. Partnerships are an underlying condition to create a sustaining and enabling environment for lobby and advocacy. In the evaluation, it was noted that these partnerships facilitate other outcomes related to the priority result areas and contribute to the visibility and credibility of the WLPS advocacy. Hence, this is considered an important aspect to include. Partnerships are an important lobby and advocacy strategy of WLPS, and at the same time the deepening and maintaining of partnerships constitute an important change achieved.

WLPS lobby and advocacy has strategic partners in order to be able to advocate on various strategic levels and arenas. Partnerships are often a strategically effective, as well as efficient, choice (see also the section on efficiency). Partnerships work both ways: linking to the global level and to the local/national level of partner countries. Cordaid often functions as a broker between these levels. According the WLPS ToC, this is the way change could occur. The changes achieved in this domain are the following:

- The most prominent partnership on international level is GNWP.<sup>523</sup> GNWP is a network of women's organisations and women working on women, peace and security issues on local, national and international levels. Their geographical location in New York provides for a good entry point at UN level, integrating local voices in the global policy arena. Together GNWP and Cordaid support the advocacy on international level as well as on local level in conflict-affected countries. On international level, the support is about strategic linking and learning

in partnership with those working close to the UN system. Changes have been achieved where the networks and partnerships are used to strengthen capacity and share knowledge in order to link between the local needs and the international policy arenas and opportunities through providing input at meetings as a collective voice, bringing Southern partners to the meeting tables on international levels and also linking the international levels with national partners. On regional level, Cordaid also ensures numerous engagements through partnerships. An example is its membership of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO). For European-level advocacy, WLPS lobby works closely in partnership with EPLO's Working Group on Gender.

- On the national level in the Netherlands, the important partnership is with the Dutch Gender Platform, WO=MEN. Through this NL-based network, WLPS provides input to advocate issues in Dutch internal and Dutch international and defence policies. Through its participation in the NAP 1325 Working Group, Cordaid contributes to the lobby focused on the implementation of NAP 1325 in the Netherlands, among others. Cordaid's role is more or less behind the scenes as a broker, bringing together the important voices on specific issues and gathering information and sharing knowledge from within their own networks and partnerships. Cordaid also played a role as co-coordinator of a lobby group as part of the working group during the first implementation of the Dutch NAP 1325. In the second Dutch NAP, they are now members of the working group on 1325. In addition, WLPS serves as the lead agency between Dutch NGOs in the working group and the Dutch government to implement the Dutch NAP 1325 project in pilot countries: Middle East North Africa region; Democratic Republic of Congo and Colombia; as well as being co-implementer in Afghanistan. Through Cordaid, its partners' voices and needs from various different backgrounds are voiced and provided as input in the discussions in the working group in the Netherlands, within the WO=MEN network and with the government/parliament.
- On the level of partner countries, Cordaid has established diverse partnerships. The specific characteristics of the partnerships vary but are mostly women CSOs in conflict-affected countries. The local voice, which is key to WLPS advocacy, is integrated through Cordaid's in-country partners as well as through partnerships with GNWP and other international NGOs with their specific constituencies and partners in conflict-affected areas. Important examples here are AWN (Afghanistan), working on Transition Monitoring and bringing their reports up to the national arenas, and the 1325 Coalition and National Network of Women (Colombia), where Cordaid functions as a broker in the process of implementing and localising 1325.

On the internal level of coherence within Cordaid (broad indicator 1: within the programme relevant partners maintain coherent positions and strategies) under agenda setting, we identified an important change:<sup>524</sup> the communication and coherence within the WLPS programme and internally across business units in Cordaid with the gender advocacy, the post-2015<sup>525</sup> specific work and the New Deal advocacy. The WLPS lobby and advocacy has developed a more coherent way of working across the business units' policy platforms, which are directly linked to the women, peace and security agenda, such as the gender, post-2015 and New Deal discussions. This is illustrated not only in the way Cordaid employees reflect on the issue in interviews, but also in the strengthened cooperation in terms of research and writing policy and position papers, linking the different policy units within Cordaid. This internal bundling of strengths is the cooperation and interaction amongst these different policy units with regard to conferences and meetings in which input is shared, bundled and used. For example, when one colleague is invited to provide input in the EU meeting on gender, it is coordinated internally that also the WPS perspective is included. Hence, different

programmes within Cordaid share and keep up to date their agendas and positions regarding women, gender and the global policy agendas, evidence-based advocacy, research and publications.

The main outcomes in the WLPS lobby and advocacy programme on the global and regional levels for agenda setting are about being recognised as a thought leader by CSOs, partners and stakeholders. The main outcomes within the WLPS lobby and advocacy are in the domain of agenda setting at the global level: UN, UN Women, Initiative for Dialogue in Peacebuilding and State building (IDPS)<sup>526</sup> and NATO:

- Increases in invitations for meetings, presentations, conferences and discussions, informal and formal discussions from CSOs, Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs), Regional Intergovernmental Organisations (RIGOs) and regional or national policy institutions. There has been an increase of invitations to meetings where the travel costs are expensed. Examples are invitations to NATO meetings on specific issues and occasions (Afghanistan Transition Monitoring; NAP 1325; Women in peace and security processes), UN meetings (UN Women Global Technical Review 2013; formal and informal closed meetings), the IDPS process on the New Deal. Many meetings are co-hosted with other partners and governments, who are keen and willing to cooperate with Cordaid and their partners such as Switzerland, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands but also UN Women and CSO stakeholders. Cordaid was also invited to provide input during the Africa Regional Meeting hosted by UN Women in Kenya. Cordaid WLPS is thus recognised as a credible voice and partner, leading to agenda setting beyond the stakeholders targeted.
- The creation of space for partners' voices by bringing in partners (appointed by Cordaid and in cooperation with partners) in meetings at global (UN Women Global Technical Review; side meetings during the CSW 58 and 1325 Weeks in New York in 2013 and 2014 co-hosted by various missions such as Finland, Denmark, Swiss) and on regional levels (Kenya CSO Meeting 2013 hosted by UN Women; Afghanistan Transition Monitoring). The increase of invitations is reflected from the past two years but builds on the strong relations and credible voice WLPS lobby has built for itself over the past years previous to the MFS II period. The relations built, the content developed and spread is a long term process leading step by step to progress. The stakeholders, partners and targeted policy makers react by providing space for the WLPS lobby and advocacy officer as a resource person, and as such opportunities are created to influence the public debate.
- An important outcome in the realm of international lobby and advocacy is opening spaces of the NATO. Various governmental and civil society voices have confirmed this closed institution is changing, although slowly in interviews. According to an external resource person, the WLPS lobby and advocacy has been the most active in actually getting around the table with NATO. Cordaid was invited to provide input for a series of workshops to develop an independent Scorecard to monitor how NATO implements UNSCR 1325.
- Within the process at NATO, linking of national level (in this case transition monitoring<sup>527</sup> in Afghanistan through networks and partners on the ground in Afghanistan) and international arenas (NATO) proves to be crucial and central to Cordaid's work. Thanks to their content-based policy and research reports, their reputation and their contacts, Cordaid and its partners (especially Afghan Women Network, AWN, partner from Afghanistan, involved in Transition Monitoring) have been asked to participate in a number of high level meetings in Brussels, Berlin, New York and Belgrade (2013 and 2014) to speak about women, peace and security, implementation issues UNSCR 1325, and the transition monitoring and the role of women in Afghanistan. In an email conversation between NATO and Cordaid, it comes to the

fore that part of the input were the critical lessons learned on these thematic issues by Cordaid and partners as well as critical reflection on the NATO policies and practices in this light. Changes have been identified in awareness raised on the issues around the financing and implementation of NAP's 1325 and space created to further the discussions on the issues raised. The research reports by Cordaid and its partners, i.e. the research report on 'Financing for implementation of National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325' is used for internal agenda setting and policy making by policy makers such as UN Women,<sup>528</sup> UK NAP 1325, Swiss NAP 1325 process<sup>529</sup> and is the reason for many of the invitations for presentations by multiple stakeholders such as EU, NATO, UN Women and CSO organisations. Other CSOs working on NAP's for 1325, such as UK Women's Network, have taken up Cordaid's research and recommendations on financing.

- Part of the process in Afghanistan resulted in WLPS facilitating the former Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security of NATO, Mari Skare, at the National Consultation meeting in Kabul, organised by AWN. This was done to close the circle of accountability, bringing in an international policy maker to meet directly with WLPS partners and their constituencies.
- In addition to the above outcome, the Ministry of Gender in South Sudan invited Cordaid to support them in costing their NAP 1325. This is an evolving process.
- Cordaid was invited to provide input as one of the facilitators and resource persons during the UN Women Global Technical Review on WPS resolutions in November 2013. This meeting brought together government officials (NL, Finland, Nepal, Burundi, Philippines among others); UN Women, independent experts and consultants on the issues discussed, evaluation experts and CSO representatives from all over the world. WLPS presented on financing and implementation of UNSCR 1325 and facilitated group discussions. The outcome related to this meeting was the integration and uptake of the financing issue within UN Women internally, to join Cordaid in leading a Financing Discussion Group and promote the establishment of a Global Acceleration Fund on WPS.
- As a spin-off of the above outcome, the UN Secretary-General included the Financing Discussion Group initiative and Cordaid's name in the report to the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security (September 2014), which is an outcome under indicators: awareness raised, targets react upon the issue advocated and space is created for further discussions.
- Cordaid joined GNWP in facilitating a meeting between South Sudanese women representatives with the troika supporting South Sudan Peace Process (Norway, UK and US). Together with UN Women, Cordaid also co-hosted a high level Panel Discussion during CSW 58th Session<sup>530</sup> in March 2014. Such meetings create opportunities and space for influencing and agenda setting and the meeting put women, peace and security on the agenda of the representatives involved resulting in further invitations to input and a closed door meeting with a number of delegations during the CSW 58 week.
- During a meeting with UN Women Deputy Executive Director and a number of country representatives from the Netherlands, Sierra Leone, Nepal, UK and in absentia supported by Finland and Switzerland specifically focusing on financing NAP 1325 implementation, Cordaid and partners co-organised the meeting and presented their case and recommendations that were taken up by UN Women in a strategic partnership. The issue is set on the agenda and is being taken further in close cooperation with Cordaid WLPS the coming period. This outcome will be further discussed in the section on contribution.

- WLPS raised awareness on integrating gender into the New Deal during a meeting in Juba. WLPS was invited to Juba in 2012 for a meeting with the steering committee of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State building (IDPS) on the New Deal and has been working on the integration of gender in the New Deal since, working closely with the IDPS and the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS). Cordaid WLPS advocates the importance of integrating gender perspectives within the New Deal processes, such as the 'Fragility Assessment' conducted by the government, which will then result in the 'compacts', the country's national plan, which will be supported by their partner/donor governments. This was discussed during meetings in New York during the CSW 57 week in 2013 in a side event at the Netherlands Mission to the UN and also during the CSW 58 week in 2014 in cooperation with the Danish government.
- Another outcome in the general field WPS and in partnership with UN Women, is that WLPS lobby and advocacy has been asked to be part of the 'Planning Committee' to prepare the Global Technical Review in November 2013 on women peace and security, which lead to WLPS' further involvement in the 'Global Study on WPS' as part of the High Level Review to be presented during the 15th Anniversary of UNSCR 1325 in October 2015.
- Cordaid WLPS is further involved in an international collaboration led by ICAN, UN Women and others in the development of a toolkit that will be used by relevant parties, to ensure a 'Better Peace'. This came out of the ICAN Virginia for international peace symposium, organised by ICAN and where WLPS, together with various UN agencies, government representatives and women's groups, including those from South Sudan and Afghanistan were invited. WLPS facilitated two sessions, combining lobby and capacity building.

Another set of changes have been achieved in the realm of post-2015 agenda setting. The post-2015 process is a predominantly global policy process on which many CSOs are working to have issues included. This encompasses including women, peace and security and is about the inclusion of women in the new global agenda post-2015. The work of the post-2015 agenda is integrated in the work conducted on the New Deal, the NATO and the UNSCR 1325. The post-2015 discussions are integrated into the presentations, meetings and discussions at global level during the Gender week in 2013 and 2014 and during the UNSCR 1325 week in 2013. Cordaid seeks to influence the post-2015 agenda through their cooperation with MoFA of different countries. According to the representative: 'WLPS's efforts to influence the post-2015 development agenda has been geared towards ensuring that gender equality and fragility issues are sufficiently addressed. This is done through linking the post-2015 framework with UNSCR 1325 and the New Deal for Engagement in fragile States. High level Side Events were organised during CSW Session and UNSCR 1325 Anniversary in New York and the World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington D.C. Coordination is also done with other Dutch organisations and the Netherlands government, through contributing to the Dutch CSO Position Paper on 'Challenges and achievements in the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals for women and girls'. For example, WLPS lobby and advocacy has contributed to agenda setting regarding the post-2015 agenda through the following:

- WLPS was invited to contribute to the Africa Regional Meeting hosted by UN Women on gender in post-2015 in 2013 and also to the Swiss Peace meeting on gender in post-2015 in Zurich in 2013.
- WLPS lobby and advocacy works together with Swiss and Danish MoFAs in terms of developing content on the post-2015 agenda presentations and regular meetings with targets such as UN Women and national governments.

- In March 2014 during the Gender week Cordaid co-organised (with WLPS and UN women) side-events at the CSW 58, which produced recommendations of Netherlands civil society '*Challenges and achievements in the implementation of the MDGs for women and girls. Setting the agenda for post 2015*'. However, influence on this process is hard to contribute as many organisations are involved, including the larger extent of the women's movement.
- WLPS played an important role in the facilitation of women's organisations to do advocacy and to become aware of the effects of conflict on society and their lives specifically. An example of this is the facilitation of the Asian advocacy through the Asia Meeting, a regional advocacy strategy meeting about advancing women's leadership for peace and security in Asia's conflict-affected communities. The meeting was held in February 2014 Bangkok, Thailand. This is considered an important step because in Asia overall conflict is hardly recognised and as such the effects of the conflicts on women are not recognised, this is the first step. Similar change happened in Colombia, where after a sustained work by Cordaid's partners at national and global level, the Colombian government is now open to discuss how they can implement UNSCR 1325.

#### Policy Influence:

- The Multi Stakeholder Financing Mechanism (MFM) is becoming part of the policy discussions and the policies at international and national levels. During fieldwork in New York, among others, it became clear that the MFM research is presented numerous times in side-events in cooperation with missions such as Netherlands, Finland and Switzerland at the global level around NAP 1325 week, CSW processes as well as in the Global Review of UN Women in 2013. Other CSOs take the issue at heart, such as UK, GAP and Womankind adhere to the issue on financing in their NAP and changed it accordingly.<sup>531</sup> Besides the missions and CSOs also UN Women takes up the issue during the global review and includes it as a priority result area in their report and actions following the Global Technical Review in November 2013 (see case study and contribution analysis).
- Cordaid WLPS was engaged with UN Women and GNWP in the development of the Secretary-General Report to the Security Council in September 2014.<sup>532</sup> The report specifically mentions implementation and financing of UNSCR 1325 as an issue while also mentioning the Cordaid co-lead initiative of the formation of a global discussion group on financing.<sup>533</sup>
- In Colombia, where WLPS lobby and advocacy supports the implementation of UNSCR 1325, Women's networks in Bucaramanga have reached agreements with municipal authorities and the police about the implementation of the UNSCR 1325, especially on how to make women feel more safe in their daily environment (see case study and contribution analysis).
- WLPS lobby and advocacy influenced NATO policy to include UNSCR 1325 integrated in its policy, in close cooperation with other partners and stakeholders. Since 2013 WLPS lobby and advocacy has been active in the process of integrating the UNSCR 1325 resolution in the work of the NATO. Although this has mainly focused on Afghanistan, it should be considered as a broader process of integrating women's perspectives in security issues. This outcome is closely related to the outcomes in the result area of Transition Monitoring in Afghanistan. In 2013 (May) the Report Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the conduct of NATO led operations and missions was published. In the foregoing process, WLPS participated in roundtables and made recommendations. One year later, WLPS participated in a workshop UNSCR 1325 and NATO Project – Gender Mainstreaming: Indicators for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325. In email conversations it comes to the fore that the

contribution of Cordaid to this workshop has been explicitly acknowledged by NATO and consisted of identifying challenges, lessons learned and best practices. As a follow up, WLPS lobby and advocacy representative has been invited to participate in a workshop in Washington with high-level functionaries, will be developing scorecard further. WLPS lobby and advocacy contribution to this process has resulted in being invited to and being resource person in a follow up meeting on the NATO 1325 Score Card project in Washington. The Score Card is to be developed to monitor how NATO implemented UNSCR 1325 and is coordinated by Women In International Security (WIIS) and Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.

Changing practice:

- On the national level of partner countries, the opening of closed spaces has been an important change. Opening space for women's participation in peace and security processes in South Sudan, Colombia and Asia where women are increasingly included in peace processes is an outcome we were not able to assess in depth in all countries. In both Colombia and South Sudan WLPS lobby and advocacy has supported the participation of women's collectives in peace processes. The participation of women and inclusion of women's voices is difficult in these national contexts because there is no culture of providing space for women's rights or CSOs. For that reason, other entry points have been used such as focusing on sexual violence in Colombia and the development linked to post-2015 in South Sudan (as well as the facilitating of women's organisations in Asia—which is noted under agenda setting). As a result women from South Sudan and Colombia (see case study) are now more involved in processes related to the Peace Process. In South Sudan WLPS lobby and advocacy has been involved in the process of organising South Sudanese women. They have now had several meetings with high level officials from the African Union to advocate their case for involving women in the upcoming peace negotiations. In Colombia, WLPS lobby and advocacy brokers and facilitates the process of implementation of UNSCR in Colombia, a process that is very much related with the peace process.
- In the Netherlands, WLPS also advocated for available funds for UNSCR 1325 in the focus countries in cooperation with WO=MEN: Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Middle East North Africa Region to which a fund allocation was made of €4 million per year. WLPS pinpointed this as an important outcome on policy change, but could also be under change of practice as the budget was allocated.
- NAP 1325 resulted in uptake broader than the NL Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the so-called 'NAP-buzz' reached out to the NL Ministry of Defence, The NL National Policy and the NL Security and Justice Ministry where there is more attention for 1325 and women's rights are included and increasingly embedded in protocols, policies and practices.
- Cordaid's WLPS serves as the lead agency in the partnership between the Dutch NGO and government to implement the Dutch NAP 1325 project in MENA Region, DRC and Colombia; and as co-implementer for the partnership in Afghanistan. Additionally, Cordaid Netherlands manages the Small Pilot Fund NAP1325 from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 'Small Seeds for Big Baobabs'.
- At the international level it can be considered a change of practice that UN Women is now taking the co-leadership position in facilitating the Financing Discussion Group WPS (Global Acceleration Instrument WPS).

### 14.2.2.3 Relevance

Relevance in relation to the global level of women, peace and security:

The above changes achieved show the relevance of WLPS work in the broader context of the women, peace and security field in which women's rights, leadership and participation remain relevant issues to pursue. This is also underlined by several external resource persons and targets, stressing the supportive and brokering role of Cordaid WLPS bringing issues and (local) voices to the policy tables. WLPS lobby and advocacy links the numerous global policy instruments to practice on the ground and vice versa, while constantly brokering between the broader field and the specific local contexts. At national and international levels WLPS works through its partners to ensure linking the local needs to the global policy arenas to bring in the voice of women, the voice of the needs and to make a continuing case for women involvement. Through their work on WPS they have become a credible voice for multiple stakeholders to follow, to partner with and to cooperate with towards shared goals and beliefs. The increased number of invitations and the strong strategic partnerships with multiple stakeholders show the relevance of WLPS work in terms of being recognised as a valuable and important voice. In addition, relevance is shown by the uptake of their work by targets, partners and external stakeholders alike.

Relevance within the aim of WLPS:

The aim of WLPS lobby and advocacy is to contribute to a 'sustainable peace and security'. It is difficult to say whether or not this has been achieved in which terms and with what relevance. The sub-aims relating to women inclusion and participation in peace and security processes and the aim of gender equality are more focused towards the actual work of WLPS on which they have theoretically planned to work through: knowledge building, network building, cooperation between CSO and governments and linking local to global. WLPS has, through its research and advocacy voiced many needs of women in different situations around the world and has given women a floor to present in various political arenas regionally and globally. The research and advocacy messages have been validated by the partners in the broader national and global fields and ensure the relevance of its work. This has contributed to continuously grasping and voicing the relevance of the issues at stake in several policy arenas.

Relevance within the ToC:

The ToC shows the need to include women's voices in peacebuilding policy and practice processes, which is enhanced by Cordaid through a validated advocacy message, linking and sharing knowledge to ensure a locally and globally embedded advocacy message and capacity building, strengthening networks on the WPS agenda. The changes achieved by the WLPS advocacy are in line with the expectations and ToC. However, it becomes clear that progress is a slow and long term process and not everything is tangible or can be planned for. The ToC has an ambitious goal, its objectives and aims are set up in a broad manner so it easily includes the strategies and eventual changes in the WLPS programme.

Relevance over time:

As already mentioned above, the relevance of the outcomes should be considered in a longer time span than the period evaluated. Many of the changes achieved can be considered stepping stones for other changes in the future or are changes that need to be seen through processes already started in the past. The changes achieved cannot be understood without taking into account the stepping stones build up towards this before the evaluated period. Gaps as identified by Cordaid, for example on the financing for NAPs 1325, have been identified much earlier than the MFS II period but have shown (see next chapter) they need time to be able to mature as an advocacy message. Also, the



credibility and visibility of Cordaid WLPS have grown over time and are not MFS II bound even though we might have seen some examples of these leading to change in the period 2012–2014. In this sense, the relevance of the topics chosen, the visibility and credibility of the advocacy message and the messenger are not always within the sphere of control or influence of the advocate.

Relevance in relation to Priority Result Areas:

Most outcomes have been observed in relation to agenda setting. It is important to acknowledge that many outcomes are linked and also 'prepare' for other outcomes to follow; such as engaging in effective partnership, internal coherence and coordination as well as internal agenda setting, which pave the way for outcomes outside of the sphere of control of the WLPS advocacy. These are not 'end outcomes' as this inspiration is taken up and further by the stakeholders involved. In the priority result areas policy influencing and changing practice we only observed a few outcomes, being well aware of the long term nature of advocacy processes and the difficult paths to influence national and international policy institutions on such sensitive issues such as women's rights, accountability and financing for women. The outcomes we found are relevant in terms of WLPS being recognised as a credible voice on the issues at stake. The outcomes part of the process towards policy influenced. This also goes for the priority result area 'changing practice'. However, the opening of closed spaces in terms of peace processes is an important change of practice as this has until now been considered a male domain in many countries.

### **14.3 Evaluation question 2: Case studies and contribution analysis**

In this section, we discuss the findings on evaluation question: Do the international lobbying and advocacy efforts of MFS II alliances and their partners contribute to the identified changes (i.e. measuring effectiveness)? This section describes the two case studies we have chosen to take a deeper look at lobby and advocacy processes. The two case studies include the contribution analysis to achieve a more in-depth understanding of the outcomes achieved and the contribution of WLPS advocacy to these outcomes. Both cases present a partially planned and non-planned outcome, as the processes unfolded progressively with time not being able to predict and plan for the outcomes achieved.

The two case studies were selected in cooperation with Cordaid WLPS and CSU and reflect a key advocacy topic, the way WLPS conducts multi-layered advocacy work, as well as a learning possibility for WLPS to better understand the advocacy processes on global and national levels and the linkages between them. Both cases are components of the WLPS lobby and advocacy and financed by MFS II. Additionally, the case studies include the contribution analysis of one outcome per case study, reflecting WLPS advocacy on global and national levels and the link they seek to broker between the different arenas. The two case studies and outcomes are the following:

- The Multi-Stakeholder Financing Mechanism (MFM) on global level is a process relating to the UNSCR 1325 and its National Action Plans for the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 on national levels. This is an advocacy topic within the WLPS agenda and is followed through in close cooperation with its partners in global and national arenas. The outcome embedded is the uptake of the MFM as an issue on the global-level agenda on agenda and policies of various stakeholders. We have followed this process over the course of two years, 2012–2014 in which we have followed it through time and space, observing meetings, presentations and conducting interviews with stakeholders involved as well as with WLPS internally. We have seen the topic develop and become increasingly prominent and more pronounced on the WLPS as well as the stakeholder agendas.

- Lobby and advocacy capacity building in Colombia aims at establishing women's networks capable of composing their own lobby and advocacy agenda and of lobbying and advocacy in the context of peacebuilding—women as peacebuilders and as leaders. The work in Colombia is complemented by and complements the WLPS international lobby towards the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and UN Women. Additionally, WLPS lobby and advocacy has lobbied several UN Permanent Missions on the peace process in Colombia. In this case study, we will look into Cordaid's contribution to the process of UNSCR awareness-rising, and localisation by the women's movement on national level. This is a process in which many different actors are involved: GNWP, Cordaid, a network organisation on the national level of Colombia (Red de Mujeres), a Colombian NGO (CIASE), as well as local representatives of networks in Bucaramanga, working together with national and global actors in the UNSCR 1325 process. As such, it does not focus on lobbying itself, but on capacitating women to lobby and advocate, also for the implementation of 1325. This case gives specific insights in the role of networks, the linkages between the different levels and in the capacitation of the involved women.

The two cases are funded by MFS II and relate to the ToC, as they illustrate a combination of pathways identified: knowledge building and sharing, networking, seeking cooperation between governments and CSOs, lobbying and strengthening capacities. Underlying the cases is the constant brokering and linking between local needs, local voices and global and national policy arenas, which is central to the WLPS advocacy work.

#### *14.3.1 General description of the way the alliance has made contributions*

The ways in which WLPS lobby and advocacy has made contributions to the changes described in the previous section can be categorised into three domains: the participation in meetings and the organisation of side-events, the publication of documents and the constitution and support of networks. These ways of contributing to change are closely related to the objectives and strategies described in the section on changes and their relevance. Additionally, they also confirm the importance of content-based research and local voices that we observed and described in the section on the practice of change. It is important to note that these domains of contribution are closely connected to and continuously inform each other.

The participation in meetings, one-on-one engagements and the (co-)organisation in side-events has been important to set the focused and content-based message on the agenda of targets such as the UN. By the WLPS representative this is called 'direct lobby'. To be able to do so, the publication of documents and position papers, based on research, has proved to be crucial. Furthermore, the focused message coming from such publications has resulted in invitations of WLPS lobby and advocacy to participate in meetings that otherwise would have remained inaccessible. In other words, this has opened closed spaces for WLPS lobby and advocacy and as such for the WPS issue. The constitution and support of local, regional and national networks (often through training and awareness-rising workshops) has been important for bringing local voices into that same focused message and linking the global to the local level.

### *14.3.2 The case of the Multi-Stakeholder Financing Mechanism for NAP 1325 implementation*

#### 14.3.2.1 Background and ToC to the MFM

Cordaid published its 'Costing and Financing 1325' in 2011, 11 years after the UNSCR 1325 was adopted and there was a need for a critical review on the implementation of the resolution. WLPS noted the discussion on financing as a 'missing link in the discourse on women, peace and security' (Cordaid 2011), and this report was meant to provide analysis on national and international level and recommendations as to how to move forward. One of the recommendations coming from the analysis is the need for a financing mechanism, which WLPS has framed: 'Multi-Stakeholder Financing Mechanism (MFM) for the implementation of the NAPs 1325'. Now, three years after publication, a process evolving regarding the financing discussion and some smaller and bigger steps towards change have been achieved.

For this case study, we take the process after publication in 2011 as the entry point, looking into the MFS II-funded advocacy following the report. At the same time, we take note that the process started earlier than 2011, as the gap identified—UNSCR 1325 implementation and financing—is part of a longer process in time. The contribution analysis is conducted on one outcome: the uptake of the MFM for the implementation of the NAPs 1325 by a number of stakeholders: civil society, UN Women and UN member states.

The MFM is embedded in the ToC, as WLPS seeks to bridge the local needs with the policy arenas through UNSCR 1325. The aim is to bridge the policy around UNSCR 1325 and its implementation with the practice and the reality on the ground. The needs identified are based on voices from local partners. These needs are further researched, discussed and reported with multiple stakeholders and partners and through a policy document included into policy discussions on regional and global levels. Cordaid WLPS seeks to build and share knowledge on the financing issues standing in the way of NAP 1325 implementation and thereby raise the advocacy issues on the need for women's participation, leadership and the role of women in peace and security processes. Through the various research and presentations, they have brought this message forward, and the events (co-) organised have brought together CSOs and governments to talk about the problems raised. Ultimately, this is flexibly a part of the ToC.

As part of this broader case study on the processes around the financing and implementation of UNSCR 1325, we discuss a specific outcome. Below, we further analyse the contribution of WLPS to this outcome: The discussions on financing have led to the uptake of the issue by multiple stakeholders, numerous governments have stated public commitment and UN Women specifically has taken the position of coordinator in the next step to the process to organise a global discussion group on the establishment of a global fund. The outcome to the MFM process is not singular and hosts many smaller and bigger outcome steps.

#### 14.3.2.2 The process 2011–2014, outreach of the message

The research report on costing and financing 1325 was published in 2011 in cooperation between Cordaid WLPS and GNWP. The report was published online and distributed in hard copy to partners and during the launch at the Netherlands Mission in New York in 2011 to which a number of key partners, strategic national missions to the UN and UN agency representatives were invited. The launch was well attended and the discussions flowing. However, this did not result in a continued strong pace forward, as the subject matter remained politically sensitive and the main challenge of lacking political will to take up the message stood in the way. At the same time, WLPS and GNWP were presenting their research at numerous events, including it into their presentations on other subjects and also continuing to strategize on how to best move forward on the issue of financing the

implementation of NAP 1325. While the report came from a bottom-up need to look more closely into the financing of NAPs 1325, it still took some time for the message to mature and land in the discussions around NAPs and UNSCR 1325.

During 2012 and 2013, Cordaid WLPS and GNWP proceeded in advocating on the issues and strategized to take the research one step further, looking into specific case studies to distract lessons learned from countries in the global South and North implementing or having NAPs. This resulted in a number of (co-)organised public meetings and invitations to (in-)formal meetings during the UNSCR 1325 week in New York in September 2013 to discuss the issue of financing. This was followed by a presentation during the Global Technical Review Meeting organised and hosted by UN Women. This resulted in a spin-off of further meetings and events, leading to a strategic partnership with UN Women to follow up on the recommendations regarding the MFM.

To explain this process further, it is good to go through the process in a step-by-step manner:

- In 2011, the publication and launch of the report came about in a partnership by Cordaid in cooperation with a global network situated in New York (GNWP), meaning the outreach of the report did not stop at the launch or at the organisations involved but was taken further to the national-level partners in addition to being taken up in the Netherlands and New York. The launch, however, did not result in a wider outreach because it did not yet quite resonate as much as having to do with political sensitivity of the topic, other agenda issue priorities and lack of political will.
- The report and the reactions from within their own networks inspired Cordaid and GNWP to continue their research and follow up on the publication's findings and recommendations to develop a more concrete message. In the meantime, the message and the report were mentioned during meetings, presentations and discussions at all levels, linking it to other subjects such as gender equality, the New Deal and the post-2015 agenda discussions. Also in discussions with national government representatives, the issues were brought forward by both WLPS and GNWP to create leverage while at the same time continuous framing and letting the message nurture and mature. This relates to another important aspect of timing and relations. On timing, it becomes clear that an advocacy message needs time as well as space (opportunity, space created to provide input, space in public debate) to be taken up. On relations, the message needs leverage, visibility and credibility to be taken up. Relations can be helpful for this but also relations with stakeholders and policy makers can be useful to make progress. While WLPS advocated for financing of NAP 1325 for some time, the message was eventually taken further in 2013/2014 as the opportunity and space were created and relations were established, sustained and willing to take up the issue.
- The above steps resulted in a continued research process, doing case studies specifically on the NAP 1325 in various Northern and Southern countries, which led to continued discussions in these countries and with these country representatives.
- In the second half of 2013, this resulted in an invitation to present the financing case and the case studies at the Global Technical Review by UN Women, to which a great number of CSO representatives, government representatives, UN Agencies and other intergovernmental organisations and experts were invited to discuss the progress of UNSCR 1325, the NAP implementation and the accountability with regard to the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions regarding women's rights and CEDAW (Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination Against Women). The meeting was really meant as an open, formal/informal gathering to discuss transparently what the most prominent issues are and

what can or is being done about them. Open discussions, learning, critical reflections and presentations were the key format for the meeting. The presentation by WLPS led to a discussions beyond the small working groups and was taken up in the final report of the Review Meeting as being a prominent and important issue to follow up on (UN Women 2013).

- As a spin-off of this meeting, WLPS continued discussing the issues with various stakeholders, and during the CSW 58 weeks<sup>534</sup> in 2014, the issue was taken further as discussions continued with UN Women on how to go about it further. Eventually, this resulted in a high level meeting with the Deputy Executive Director of UN Women, who fully supported the case for developing and establishing an MFM in the sense of a global fund. From this point onwards, UN Women agreed to continue as the coordinator of this process to organise a Global Discussion Group to take the issue of financing further on the international agenda, in cooperation with Cordaid and GNWP. This process is being taken further by all partners in close cooperation: Cordaid in The Hague and with its in-country partners, GNWP in New York and within its global network, and UN Women.
- In the meantime, during the CSW 58 weeks in 2014 as well as the UNSCR 1325 week in 2013, numerous events and meetings were organised, publicly and formally behind closed doors in which WLPS was co-organiser, convenor and invited to provide input, brokering and bringing together various local partners with policy makers. The mix between formal closed-door meetings, discussion groups and public events is important in the sense of visibility, credibility and getting your message across, as well as providing space for the local voices to be heard. The closed-door meetings were used to discuss sensitive issues as well as take action to continue the issue on agendas.
- Another spin-off outcome of the process described above is the changes occurring on national levels. The GAP network through WOMANKIND in the UK has included reference to and recommendations from the financing report in the NAP 1325 CSO reporting after asking WLPS for advice on this.<sup>535</sup> Other countries such as Switzerland, Finland, the Netherlands, Sierra Leone and Nepal have publicly expressed commitment to the financing issue as presented and reported by WLPS and GNWP and have taken this up in the implementation of their NAP 1325.<sup>536</sup> Additionally, it was mentioned by some of the interviewees that an increasing number of countries take up costing and financing in their NAP and make calculations as to the estimated costs. Unfortunately, we could not verify and substantiate this claim.

#### 14.3.2.3 Analysis of the contribution

Analysing the contribution of the WLPS advocacy to the outcome on having the issue of financing and implementation of UNSCR 1325 on the discussion tables is difficult in the sense that many stakeholders are involved in the women's movement and specifically focus on UNSCR 1325. Hence, the actions and contributions by WLPS are not a stand-alone and always have to be understood in light of what has been achieved in the broader women's movement on women's rights and women's roles in peace and security processes, gender equality discussions, etc. What we have observed is the specific position by WLPS in close cooperation with its partners in conflict-affected areas as well as various global and regional arenas in which they have contributed to identifying certain gaps in the UNSCR 1325 implementation processes linked to financing. They have taken up this issue in depth and made it one of their main advocacy messages on UNSCR 1325 in order to create a direct practical link between the reality on the ground and the policy and its implementation. Taking into account that we have not been able to fully comprehend and surface all of the issues and discussions with

regard to UNSCR 1325, we did note the financing report by WLPS and GNWP is the only one of its kind now widely used by CSOs, governments and IGOs alike.

From this in-depth case study, we have learned that WLPS' content-based message and focus, their outreach and supportive actions through presentations and meetings and voicing the needs of partners, as well as bringing in partners to meetings were crucial elements to enhance their visibility and credibility and also create leverage with partners as well as other stakeholders. Their choice for strategic relations and partnerships and the ability to act and react to opportunities (partly also due to the strategic partners in different arenas and locations) are shown to strengthen their message and outreach as well. Further, the continuous pushing to have the issues on the discussion tables and discuss it at meetings together, this endurance and resilience of the persons involved to act and react to opportunities and threats all matter in the creation of space that WLPS and its partners contributed to.

The credibility and visibility are amongst the important aspects we observed from our data. Most of the interviewees stress the importance of Cordaid's contribution as being credible, because of the message being embedded in the specific contexts (different case studies are used), it is based on local voices and needs, WLPS brings in partners voices by inviting them to meetings. Ensuring the 'authentic voice of the partners' being heard was mentioned as an important aspect, according to interviewees. Another issue WLPS and Cordaid was praised for by interviewees is the issue of non-claiming as Cordaid WLPS always provides space and seeks to create space for partners voices rather than its own voice. Also, interviewees stress WLPS and GNWP ability to quick act and react due to the geographical location to political and public arenas and due to their close cooperation with partners.

The changes we identified are specifically related to WLPS advocacy based on the content-based and focused advocacy message and advocacy through continuous pushing for the issue at meetings, in presentations, through partners etc. The contribution story as described above is based on the findings and research by WLPS and GNWP and their partners. Although many other stakeholders in the women's movement are also advocating and pressing for issues around UNSCR 1325 and many voices can be heard around these issues, we have identified changes that WLPS has contributed to through our observations of meetings, documentation (public and non-public) and interviews.

The changes with regard to agenda setting WLPS advocacy contributed to are the awareness on the issue of financing NAP 1325 as one of the issues around the implementation is raised and taken up by several stakeholders; the continuous pushing through insider strategies, relations built, meetings and presentations has put the issue on the global (UN Women) and some national agendas (NL, Finland, Switzerland, Nepal, Burundi etc.); space is created to voice needs from conflict-affected areas through WLPS and GNWP partners in different settings (CSW; UNSCR 1325 week in New York; UN Women Global Technical Review 2013; NATO) Besides these changes we identified as is described above in more detail changes in policy influenced as the issue and the recommendations made by WLPS and GNWP is being taken further by CSOs (GAP, Womankind UK among others) and UN Women as well as specific national governments (Nepal, Finland, Switzerland, NL, among others) to develop a reference group and put a financing mechanism in place to ensure UNSCR 1325 implementation.

#### 14.3.2.4 Issues surfaced from the contribution analysis

The advocacy around the MFM is a focused message based on research conducted in various case study countries and globally, expressing an assessment and analysis of findings and recommendations. This research is still continuing as it is an evolving process and builds on the

existing knowledge and experience while in the meantime the advocacy is continuing through outreach, sharing the knowledge, linking the findings to other aspects of the women's rights context and building and maintaining relations and networks. Reflecting on this, we gathered the advocacy message to be focused while at the same time flexible in terms of strategies. Insider strategies are being followed, cooperation and co-creation are key to these, while at the same time opportunities are being taken. One of the main examples of the capacity to act and react to opportunities is the uptake of the process after the UN Women Global Review to step into a strategic partnership with UN Women and continue the process through the establishment of a Global Discussion Group on MFM. This creates opportunities to further influence discussion at both UN and National levels and continue the discussions on a policy level while using the practical information from the research. Some of the issues we have understood to play a role are described below.

#### Timing, language, accessibility and attention of the message:

The timing is an aspect that plays a role in the resonance of the issue amongst the stakeholders sought to influence. As seen in 2011 after the report on financing was first published, other issues are taking up more time and space in the policy arena and the time seems not yet ripe for further discussions. Whereas the issue is being taken up in 2013/2014, when the issue of implementation is getting more attention in policy arenas. Also, strategically making sure the right persons receive the message plays a role and is challenging. Regarding the MFM, many governments are non-responsive but strategically WLPS and GNWP decided to rather focus on those few that can take forward the message to their constituents, partners and meetings. The follow-up by WLPS and GNWP through more extensive research and continuous mentioning or pushing on the issue together with strategic choices on seeking out allies and partners. Timing and attention or accessibility to the issue play a role in the changes that can be achieved and as such in the contribution story.

The issue of language has everything to do with framing and wording of the advocacy message. For example, the needs on local level as worded by partners might not resonate as well in the global arenas where different wording and framing is used (and vice versa). Knowing how to go about this and acting and reacting on such issues is an important aspect of Cordaid WLPS work when they are bridging between the multiple layers of policy arenas and the needs as identified on the ground. To ensure the message comes across WLPS makes sure to understand the problem identified and frames this into the appropriate wording for the various discussions it will be used in. For example, using the UNSCR 1325 language on gender, equality and women does not always resonate on the national levels whereas the national issues are sometimes best represented in a language everyone else understands. This includes for example the insertion of recommendations in reports, using policy briefs or using talking points is part of this, as well as knowing how to move and go about the various arenas you come across. The Washington policy arena is for example very different from the New York arena, which is different in speed and way of working from national arenas. In short, knowing your way around the different stakeholders and speaking the different languages, as WLPS and GNWP have illustrated, is a key aspect of the work that contributes to the uptake of the message.

#### Partnerships, relations and personal commitment:

To advocate for global issues the WLPS case has proven that partnerships are important to build, maintain and nurture. Partnerships go beyond those likeminded organisations that you partner with and extend to those you seek to influence such as policy makers. Sometimes, geographical location and constituencies or networks can be an asset as in the case of WLPS and GNWP. To first discuss partnerships with the likeminded, WLPS and GNWP have a strong strategic partnership combining

strategic efforts, knowledge and strengths with the advantage of the locations (New York, The Hague) and their input from global network (GNWP) and partners (Cordaid). The position in New York by GNWP supports Cordaid's ability to advocate and lobby on a structural level through this partnership. GNWP knows the arena very well and together with Cordaid they can combine strengths in terms of efforts, meetings and organising meetings, building and sharing contacts and relations maintaining. Also, it can prove fruitful to spend more time with those likeminded policy makers to gain more access and outreach such as in the case of the MFM. A key strategy used by WLPS and GNWP is an insider advocacy strategy meaning the focus on cooperation rather than reactive/activism. This strategy has resulted in continuous dialogue on MFM; a close cooperation in the MFM Global Reference Group with a number of national governments (NL, Finland, Swiss, Denmark, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Burundi); as well as currently cooperation and co-creation together with UN Women on the financing issue.

From the above described contribution story the nature of partnerships and relations becomes clear. Many relations are professionally personal in nature and often these can either make or break the advocacy. WLPS and GNWP have a strategic division of tasks whereby GNWP maintains all relations in New York (besides their other work of course) while WLPS contributes to these through GNWP, through regular interfaces over Skype or in meetings as well as by always visiting and keeping in contact with the different relations built in IGOs, INGOs and with partners. The changes come about in light of and due to the relations built as these are the points of entry, the allies and are key to creating space. The continuity of the relations thus has to be maintained and carefully handled as part of the advocacy, not to mention the sensitive political and personal frictions advocates walk into within organisations they work with. Often the relations reflected were 'professionally personal' in nature due to shared backgrounds, personal commitment to an issue or due to working together for a long time. Closely related to this is the personal commitment to take up the advocated message. This is often reflected in the relations built as a strong commitment to a certain topic also seeks out allies. There were a few examples whereby issues were taken up because of personal commitment by policy makers or CSO representatives, which we cannot further disclose here for reasons of sensitivity.

#### Challenges and resilience:

One of the challenges already mentioned, which is also key to the problem identified in the implementation or non-implementation of NAP 1325 is the lack of political will on national level, which is also affecting the global level policy arena. In the UN system, the member states are the ones deciding to take on issues and resolutions and it is mostly up to national level systems to check the implementation of these processes. Another challenge is the sensitivity of the issue of financing and women's rights. This has everything to do with the message of holding governments accountable for the implementation and thus the secure and transparent financing. Besides, women's rights are a delicate matter in many countries.

These challenges are related to the sensitivity and uptake of the advocated issue at stake, whereas there are also challenges directly related to the process. One of the challenges encountered in the MFM process has to do with the pilot countries that were selected to pursue the findings and recommendations of the study. These processes did not work out as planned, relating to the above challenges on the one hand, a changing political environment in one of the countries and the external changing donor budgets on the other hand. On the other hand, reflecting from the interviews we understood there were problems in terms of personal commitment and changes in government representation resulting in the process not being taken up and progressed.



Regardless of these challenges WLPS and GNWP pursued the issues and chose different strategies to pursue their advocacy taking further steps on international levels while keeping up to date on national situations and letting the message further mature on the national levels.

#### 14.3.2.5 Final assessment and reflections

The report on costing and financing is not a vehicle on its own but needs strategic advocacy to get the message through to other stakeholders in order to achieve the desired change. The advocacy has many interlinked aspects as described above, characterising its pathways to change in the complex reality of everyday life. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Cordaid WLPS made the conscious decision to focus on the few rather than the many stakeholders meaning they focus on the few that after careful assessment have been decided to matter most in bringing forward the message. This is why, scope was never the purpose of this case, at least not in the beginning to set things up properly and strategically while the scope can grow in time. These kind of decisions define the advocacy strategy, its outreach and its process while ultimately much of the advocacy is beyond the sphere of control or even influence of the advocate.

The way WLPS navigates and brokers between the various arenas seems key to the above described changes achieved. From our interviews, observations and document study we can conclude the role of Cordaid WLPS and GNWP in bringing forward the issue of financing is relevant to the progress of implementing UNSCR 1325 and ensuring NAP in practice. It is an issue that is prominent in the field for quite some time, but was not taken up to this high level and extent (global discussion group) before. The public expression of commitment by donor countries such as Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland is being seen as an important change by WLPS and GNWP alike. However, the discussions during the CSW 58 weeks in 2014 and the UNSCR 1325 week 2013 do not reflect the issue to be carried broadly by other stakeholders as only the Cordaid/GNWP event was taking the issue on board.

This outcome is an evolving outcome with the potential to change policy and practice especially when the partners keep linking and learning between national and global levels.

#### 14.3.3 *Implementing, monitoring and localising UNSCR 1325 in Colombia*

WLPS lobby and advocacy capacity building in Colombia aims at establishing women's networks capable of composing their own lobby and advocacy agenda in the context of peacebuilding—women as peacebuilders and as leaders. In this case study, we analyse WLPS' contribution to the process of UNSCR 1325 awareness-rising on the national level, resulting in 1) the 1325 Coalition 2) external agenda-setting on the agenda of the Colombian government 3) opening of the closed spaces of the peace negotiations (spin-off). Additionally the contribution analysis assesses the WLPS contribution to implementation and localisation by the women's movement in Colombia in partnership with GNWP (global level) as well as with the National Network of Women (national Colombian) level, which resulted in: 1) visibility on the agenda of the women's movement, and in some cases also on the agenda of local officials and politicians and 3) spin-off outcomes in the area of municipal public policy in terms of giving the resolution content in daily live. This case gives specific insight on the role of women's networks in the work of WLPS lobby and advocacy and how the local-national-global 'loop' that is so important for its work, as well as within the overall theory and practice of change works. As such, studying the Colombian case provides insights into the process of translation of local needs and national and global policy arenas and vice versa. This is also one of the learning points formulated by Cordaid self for the evaluation. The information presented in this case study is based on document analysis and interviews held in Bogotá, as well as in Bucaramanga (department of Santander), where we looked more into how the localisation process of the 1325 takes place. Before we go on to describe the national and local processes of awareness-rising and

implementation, we briefly set out how the work of WLPS in this domain relates to the theory of change.

#### 14.3.3.1 Theory of change

The WLPS lobby and advocacy in partnership with GNWP on the UNSCR 1325 process in Colombia focuses on an important element of the earlier described Theory of Change, combining objective 1 (effective implementation of UNSCR 1325) and objective 2 (strengthening women's networks capacities): capacitating women to be able to lobby themselves and to participate in politics and intervene in policies on all levels. The process works two ways. First there is a process lobbying for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on the national level and of monitoring the situation in Colombia according to the UNSCR 1325 indicators, giving the lobby towards the national government on UNSCR more body. Second, there is the process of localisation of the UNSCR 1325. They do this by way of capacity building for women, as well as local authorities, on UNSCR 1325. Generally they work through existing networks (often constituted by other Cordaid programmes in the past, such as Women and Violence under MFS I). The two processes inform and feed each other and eventually the implementation and localisation of UNSCR 1325 will enhance local women's lobby and advocacy strategies and as such effecting change by way of constructing participation and claiming space in peace and security issues from below.

#### 14.3.3.2 Brief History

In Colombia the National Network of Women (*Red Nacional de Mujeres*) is WLPS' most important partner. The National Network of Women is also a member of GNWP. This relationship between Cordaid and the National Network of Women existed before MFS II and a lot of work had been done when the programme was still called Women and Violence. Today the programme reaps the fruits of this partnership.

The National Network of Women was constituted in 1991 and consists of more than 80 organisations in 13 regions of the country. The National Network of Women had already been involved in working on the UNSCR 1325 before they started to engage in the global arena with GNWP. In 2010 they were able to participate in the anniversary of the 1325 in New York through the mediation of Cordaid. This was the start of their global engagement, in which they started to work with GNWP (GNWP and Cordaid are both mentioned as important actors here). When the representatives of the National Network returned from the event, they invited other Colombian women's organisations to share their experiences. On the basis of this meeting it was agreed that there was a need to start a more structural platform to work on the 1325 in Colombia. Facilitated by GNWP and Cordaid the first steps were set towards the formation of the 1325 Coalition. This is where the work started that also became funded with MFS II money.

#### 14.3.3.3 The national lobby on UNSCR 1325

After the networks' involvement in the international meeting in New York, Cordaid's involvement in the UNSCR 1325 lobby in Colombia has followed two different tracks that come together at several points in time: one, supporting the National Network of Women in the process of monitoring the implementation of the 1325 in Colombia (although Colombia does not have a NAP); and two, linking women's groups to UN Secretary-General Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict as an entry point to create more openness towards UNSCR 1325.

The process of monitoring the implementation of 1325, although there was no national action plan for Colombia, started after the participation of the Network in the New York meeting. The Network convened a meeting with other women's organisation to share experiences of the meeting and they

decided on organising their own trajectory. They convened more or less ten women's organisation and the 1325 Coalition was founded. They worked together on the first report, which came out at the end of 2010. At the time of writing, the fourth report has come out.

The first monitoring report was distributed widely nationally and internationally. Women of the National Network of Women look back at this process as a very enriching experience as it was not only a collective experience of self-reflection of the organisations participating, it also gave them a more evidenced basis on which they could base their lobby and advocacy activities regarding the 1325. It was now made possible to lobby more effectively with the Ministry of Defense and they also lobbied successfully for developing protocols for denouncing cases of sexual violence. The entry point of sexual violence would prove to be fruitful for bringing into attention the necessity of making and implementing a UNSCR 1325 national action plan for Colombia. In the course of this process the National Network of Women became more credible in two ways: content-wise (because of the case studies) and in terms of internal organisation; the movement became empowered and gained strength through the process of writing the monitoring report. Besides this, the involvement of regional networks (members of the national network) in this process has been important for the building of credibility of the message. We will come back to that later. The process of evaluation and monitoring is supported by WLPS MFS II funding and takes place in close collaboration between the Colombia programme officer and WLPS lobbyist.

Next to supporting the process of the 1325 Coalition in the monitoring of the implementation of 1325, WLPS has opened up political space for Colombian's women organisations to push their government to embrace UNSCR 1325 and include women in the peace negotiations by way of strategically linking the women's group with the UN Secretary-General Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict (Margot Wallström). WLPS has facilitated the visit of Margot Wallström to Colombia in 2013. In preparation of this visit, women's groups prepared a document of the situation of sexual violence in the Colombian conflict.

This does not stand on its own. In the same year ABColombia and Sisma Mujer, also member of the 1325 Coalition publish a study about the phenomenon of sexual violence in the armed conflict: *Colombia: mujeres, violencia sexual en el conflicto y el proceso de paz*. In this document civil groups demand that there will be taken action towards the perpetrators of sexual violence (Military, guerrillas and para military alike). They demand that the government complies with the 1325 and the 1820 resolution. Important here is that both resolutions stipulate that sexual violence should be on the agenda during peace negotiations.

These developments put sexual violence in Colombia, and its relation with resolution 1325 on the map for Margot Wallström, who for these reasons has insisted that the Colombian government should do more to take care of impunity and sexual violence, recognising that this is very much related to UNSCR 1325. She approached the Colombian government on UNSCR 1325 using the entry point of 'Sexual Violence' rather than 'Peace and Security'.

As a spin-off of these processes, and part of a broader process, women have been included in the peace negotiations with the FARC. In 2012, the peace negotiations started out without any women in the team of negotiators. Women were, however, visible in the public consultations on regional and national level. In October 2013, various organisations, among which Coalition 1325 presented a shadow report on the rights of women and insisted again that it was important to formulate a 1325 National Action Plan, and for the same reason, include women in the negotiation team. In November

2014, the Colombian government announced the participation of two women in the plenipotentiary team to negotiate on the side of the government.

#### 14.3.3.4 The need for localisation of UNSCR 1325

It is within this context that the process of localisation of the UNSCR 1325 begins in 2013, directed by GNWP and Cordaid. Before this, there had been a series of workshops with the financial help of Cordaid in the months September–November in several departments, directed towards de municipal and departmental administrators. To give this process continuation CIASE and the National Network of Women, supported by GNWP-WLPS started out the process of localisation of UNSCR 1325 in 2013. Localisation takes place in several departments; in what follows we will look deeper into one of these departments, Santander (capital: Bucaramanga) to be able to show the different dynamics and how they are embedded in the local context of the women's movement as well as in Cordaid's/WLPS' earlier work.

Women that are involved in the process of localisation, all think of process of localisation as important because it means 'giving body' to what still is a 'paper' resolution. According to them, the UNSCR 1325 can become 'real' and incorporated in the daily lives of people on the local level and a way of constructing citizenship from below. At the same time, it is seen as a powerful instrument because of its international character, accepted by various countries. On the level of Colombia, the resolution is furthermore considered important in relation to the peace process. Working with UNSCR 1325 means constructing peace, and provides a way of turning 'peace' into something more than the conclusion of peace agreements on paper and making them part of everyday life.

The main strategy is a process of awareness and capacity building in the municipalities among civil society as well as local authorities. In this process there is made use of the existing networks established by Cordaid. There are various actors involved in the process: GNWP, Cordaid, the National Network of Women, the Colombian CIASE, as well as local representatives of networks in Bucaramanga (Hypatia and Metropolitan Network of Women). The GNWP, together with Cordaid, brought the project of localisation of the UNSCR to Colombia, to be implemented through their partner National Network of Women. Whereas the National Network of Women would focus more on the lobby on the global and national level, CIASE became the NGO that worked specifically on the localisation of the UNSCR 1325 in cooperation with the National Network of Women. The localisation of the 1325 takes place through networks that have already been constituted in the past, often with the support of Cordaid in the programme Women and Violence. These are the same networks that engage in processes of Evaluation and Monitoring described before.

#### 14.3.3.5 History and context of women's participation in Bucaramanga

The work on localisation of UNSCR 1325 is embedded in the work that Cordaid already had realised with constituting the networks in the regions. These networks are part of the national network described above and have been part of Cordaid's work on Monitoring and Evaluation. The process of localisation in Bucaramanga should be considered within this local context of women's participation and networks, in which Cordaid has also played a major role. The strength of the existing networks is (partly) a result of Cordaid's earlier work in the region, and lay the ground for the recent work on the localisation of 1325. The two main actors that have been involved in the process of localisation in Bucaramanga are both represented in the National Network of Women (that has been working together with Cordaid as described above): Hypatia and the Metropolitan Network of Women.

The Metropolitan Network of Women was constituted in 2005, and other networks of women of the department of Santander followed.<sup>537</sup> The constitution of the metropolitan network was initiated

from another women's organisation based in Bucaramanga that was involved in organising events on special days such as Women's Day on March 8. This organisation was called 'Mujer y Cultura' (Woman and Culture). The objectives of the women's networks in general were to provide for a space in which women could reflect on their processes of empowerment and to be able to bundle the activities that were developed to defend women's rights and to take care of women's interests being integrated in development plans in local policies. The networks were also directed towards supporting women participating in politics. Cordaid, through its programme Women and Violence, supported these women's networks in Bucaramanga with capacity building in lobby and advocacy with regard to public policies. In Bucaramanga, Cordaid mainly supported the strengthening of the networks, whereas in other departments Cordaid had a bigger role in in terms of organising and convening, in the actual constitution of the networks.

The first years went well for the networks in Bucaramanga; there was a high spirit of working together on important things, according to the interviewees. The networks consisted of different members with a variety of backgrounds; from victims of the internal conflict, to community mothers and University students. As a result, the network disposed of different qualities, which enabled the development of some rather successful activities, which partly took place with the support of Cordaid's Women and Violence programme. Among these achievements were a development plan with a gender perspective, which was taken into account on the level of departmental politics and the installation of a women advisory council on the level of departmental politics. This is a body that should be consulted about gender-related issues.

This all happened in 2007. Hereafter it became more difficult to mobilise the women, according to interviewees in Bucaramanga. The government changed in 2009, meaning that the officers that had collaborated before, were changed for others. Besides that, there was no structural funding of the networks, which meant they could not organise workshops and general meetings on a regular basis for the networks. Many women lost their attention, and most of the work was realised by the coordinators of the network and thus depending a lot on.

The networks were linked to, first, the Cordaid programme Women and Violence, which transformed into WLPS in 2011. In the context of the Women and Violence programme the networks described above also engaged in the process of Evaluation and Monitoring that was steered by the National Network of Women. This process has been as important on the local level as on the national level: interviewees look back at this process as a process of self-reflection that helped to get an overview of the situation women were in. As a result, women not only learned to formulate their lobby goals, it was also a process of internal growth and empowerment. They learned from each other, from other women's groups and reflected on their experiences.

#### 14.3.3.6 The 1325 localisation process in Bucaramanga

The processes described above, set the stage for the actual process of localisation of UNSCR 1325 that localisation started in January 2013 with the direct support of GNWP and as such of Cordaid WLPS. The embedding in already existing networks as well as in former Cordaid programmes and the non-lobby part of WLPS are crucial in this process.

The first step to take was process of awareness raising and capacity building on the contents of the resolution, because 'nobody, nobody, knew anything about it!' Although one representative of the Bucaramanga women's movement shared with us that she had learned about the contents of the 1325 resolution in the context of a research she had conducted among victims of the civil war around 2005, the general image that comes to the fore in the interviews, is that not many people had heard

about the resolution before the localisation process started. A key member in the women's movement and an active player in the networks, told that she thought she would never had heard of the resolution if it had not been for the localisation process. Not just the women's movement and the rest of civil society, but also local politicians and officials, had no idea about what the contents, let go the possibilities of the 1325 were.

So, the first activity that was organised by CIASE in Bucaramanga in collaboration with Hypatia, was a workshop that sought to provide information on the contents of the resolution. GNWP-Mavic Cabrera was also present at the workshop, representing thus the link between the global and the local. In the workshop actors from civil society, as well as officials and authorities participated. The workshops included the four municipalities that are included in the metropolitan area. Issues that were touched upon were: what does it mean, what are the strengths, where does it come from, how does it relate to other UN resolutions? It also included some lived experiences of implementation of the resolution. It was also discussed how 1325, as now on paper, could be transformed into practice. After that there was a workshop that went into the planning of making the resolution more 'real', and finally there was a workshop on how this could be implemented.

However, when the above process had concluded, the landscape of women's participation changed. The networks of Bucaramanga re-organised themselves into an Alliance on the national level (with the support of Cordaid), as this was more in line with the activities they realised. So the *Mesa Interredes Santander*, part of the National Network of Women, does not exist anymore and under its new identity of Alliance is not part of the National Network of Women. The Alliance works on a number of issues, among which the 1325 resolution. The alliances per department, however, are allowed to choose whether or not to work on the 1325. In Santander they chose not to. The work on localising 1325 is now realised by Hypatia, which continues to be part of the National Network of Women.

As a consequence, in the process of 2014, only Hypatia, as member of the National Network of Women participated in the process of localisation. As a spin-off of this process, Hypatia has engaged in meetings and negotiations on the level of municipal politics and municipal officials. The most important achievement however, has been negotiations with the police department, which has resulted in an agreement on the formation and training of police officers on gender and the 1325 resolution. Although this process of intervention resulted from a process financed by another, smaller agency, it should be seen as a result of the localisation policies as it is the product of the implementation meeting organised by CIASE and Metropolitan Network of Women in Bucaramanga.

#### 14.3.3.7 Changes

On the national level, the changes achieved by WLPS lobby and advocacy:

- On the level of the 1325 Coalition, it is considered an outcome that it has been possible to actually organise the Coalition. The Colombian context is still very polarised, conflictive and tense. There are many differences within the women's movement and it is not easy to get organisations together and work on one issue. This is a relevant outcome, as it can be considered as a strengthening of the women's movement on the national level of Colombia (internal agenda setting);
- Margot Wallström has recommended that the Colombian government takes the UNSCR 1325 resolution seriously (external agenda setting);
- Spin-off: opening of the closed spaces of the peace negotiations. Women have now become part of the main negotiations with the FARC.

Although the project of localisation has only started in the beginning of 2013 and participants still wait for many changes to come, some changes are already visible.

- The most important change has been that the UNSCR 1325 is now visible on the agenda of the women's movement agenda, and in some cases also on the agenda of local officials and politicians, mostly in the provinces Cauca, Chocó and Caribe, but also in Santander (Bucaramanga), where the issue of the internal conflict is less evident. This is a big step in internal agenda setting, and a smaller step in external agenda setting. As such many women, and officials have already been part of a processor capacity building, which will enhance the process of adequate lobby, advocacy and possibly political participation.
- At a local level there are also some spin-off outcomes in the area of municipal public policy (thus policy influencing) in terms of giving the resolution content in daily live: agreements on how to go about the needs of women that are now often victims of violence in their own neighbourhood, and the agreement reached with the police department on capacity building of police officials.

#### 14.3.3.8 WLPS lobby and advocacy contribution to these changes

The WLPS lobby and advocacy has directly contributed through facilitating (as a broker through GNWP) the process of trainings and workshops on UNSCR 1325 in its partnership with GNWP. These workshops have been organised in Bogotá (the capital) and at the level of departments and municipalities as described in the Bucaramanga process. Besides this, WLPS lobbyist continues participating directly with the national processes of implementation of the 1325 in Colombia, for example by way of participating in a meeting on International Lobby and Advocacy WPS Colombia in September 2014.

The basis for this to happen, however, was laid down by earlier Cordaid activities of other programmes: Violence and Women including Evaluation and Monitoring process, and as part of this the constitution of the networks. These were programmes led by programme officers on Colombia, but always in close coordination with the WLPS lobby and advocacy. The process of Evaluation and Monitoring on the basis of the UNSCR 1325 indicators has created an infrastructure, which could be, and is used in the process of localisation. It has, however, also contributed to a culture of 'doing' lobby on the local and regional level. Before the process of Monitoring and Evaluation started out, local women's group had not been involved in such processes.

This interrelatedness between programmes and WLPS lobby and advocacy is important to understand the outcomes of such processes, as it shows how different projects can reinforce each other and how important it is that they dialogue. In the process of national lobby the programme officer and the WLPS lobby and advocacy staff member have coordinated activities and participated in the same events. Representatives of the National Network of Women for example, refer to both the programme officer and WLPS lobbyist as important actors in the support of national lobby activities. The localisation process would have needed a longer start-up phase, if the networks that had been supported by Cordaid through the Women and Violence programme would not have existed. On the local level, actors that participated in the Women and Violence programme, are partly the same as those who participate in the process of localisation. In the local reality the distinction between the different flows of money are not completely visible; key actors combine the different sources in the practice of change.

The outcomes on the municipal level in Bucaramanga show the importance of the WLPS/GNWP in their role as broker and 'translator' between local and global levels. The initiative of the localisation



lays with the WLPS/GNWP and the National Network of Women. Together with the local networks, first the Metropolitan network and Hypocaria, and later in the process only Hypocaria, they have worked on a process of awareness-rising. The next step was setting the agenda for planning and implementation, also supported by WLPS/GNWP. This is where the abstract, 'paper', character of the resolution becomes translated into local needs and action plans. Although the name Cordaid/WLPS has completely disappeared in the narrative here, they have contributed to the process of capacity building, planning and implementation that made it possible to turn ideas into practice, through the above described process. The agenda for implementation has been set with the support of the workshops facilitated by GNWP/Cordaid, and Hypocaria has independently given it follow up.

#### 14.3.3.9 Strengths and challenges

The two most evident strengths of the case study are, first, the achievement of finding the right entry point to bring the UNSCR resolution on the national agenda, and second the use of existing networks, which makes it easier to achieve changes and actively contribute to these changes at the local and the national level. For the same reason it becomes less evident who or which programme within Cordaid is responsible for which contribution. At the local level, actors move around in networks and between programmes easily, combining the knowledge, strengths and networks. At times they do not know which organisation is behind which activity, but they do succeed in bringing it forward. This is not a weakness, but demonstrates that it is difficult to speak of demarcated contributions to an outcome or change; and that such changes are part of a longer organisational process, embedded in the social, cultural and political context of the country.

The main challenges of the implementation and localisation of 1325 are located in the external sphere. The context of conflict, (sexual) violence, a polarised society, a society of fear and a society full of gender inequalities (machismo) come to the fore in all the interviews as important contextual factors that hamper an effective implementation of the UNSCR 1325 on the local and the national level. Such a tense context also produces tense relations at times within the women's movement. Whereas the implementation and localisation of the 1325 is embedded in the broader process of peace negotiations, which is conceived as positive, there is still the fear for people that have 'other interests and are not interested in peace'; notwithstanding the peace talks, it is still a complex and explosive landscape they are moving on. Besides that, due to conflictive situations, other topics are often put on the agenda first that are seemingly more related to the conflict and victims of sexual violence.

Two other external factors mentioned by interviewees, both closely connected to political will is machismo and gender inequality, and the complete exchange of officials at key positions in municipal and departmental politics due to elections. Machismo influences political will to 'do something with gender'. New officials on key positions often means that organisations have to start all over again to reach agreements.

Finally, until now, there has not been realised a dialogue between the process of localisation of the 1325 and the Barometer. One informant mentioned that these two processes would have great possibilities of strengthening each other.

#### 14.3.3.10 Final assessment

This case study shows the continuation of Women and Violence into the contemporary WLPS programme. The changes that WLPS lobby and advocacy contributed to in Colombia cannot be understood without taking into account its roots in the Women and Violence programme. This becomes particularly clear on the local level where actors that are engaged in WLPS programme

were often also engaged in the Women and Violence programme and as such combine knowledge and networks. However, all in all, exactly because of these overlaps in networks and dialogues between programmes, the abstract paper message of the UNSCR resolution is being translated into local needs and lobbied for at the national level. As such, the changes as well of the strategies described in this case study are aligned with the theory and practice of change discussed earlier: emphasis is put on women as actors of change and strategies are focused on the participation of women and make use of local voices and content-based research.

The linkages between the local-national global levels are multiple and contribute to the process of implementation and localisation of the UNSCR 1325 resolution, which is in line with the Theory of Change. Global level informs the local awareness-rising, planning and implementation process (hence the objective to train women's networks to do lobby and advocacy) through CIASE/National Network of Women workshops, as well and the national process through participation in the global arena and support from GNWP. At the same time, the local level informs the national level through its participation in the process of Evaluation and Monitoring.

#### **14.4 Evaluation question 4: Efficiency**

This section discusses the findings with regard to evaluation question: Were the efforts of the MFS II alliances efficient? It does so by a discussion of the Theory of Efficiency as well as the Practice of Efficiency of the WLPS lobby and advocacy programme as part of the WLPS business unit, accommodated within the organisational structure of Cordaid. As a first note on theory and practice of efficiency: there is no formal theory of efficiency, because as it is part of the whole operation 'it is ingrained in the way of working'. The ToE that we present here is thus a reconstruction based on our interviews with staff members and our observations and reflections regarding the practice of efficiency.

##### *14.4.1 Theory of Efficiency*

WLPS/Cordaid believes efficiency is key to their work as considerations are always regarding effectiveness and efficiency whereby it is mentioned that you cannot be efficient without being effective. Efficiency is not only about budgets and costs but very much about the capacity, time and networking and learning: 'You can be effective without being efficient, but you cannot be efficient without being effective,' interviewee said during an interview on the topic. Efficiency and effectiveness with regard to advocacy has everything to do with being strategic and tactical. Reflecting on the WLPS advocacy the following issues surfaced as important elements of the Practice of Efficiency: the importance of partnerships and learning dealing with issues of efficiency beyond costs and efficiency through effectiveness. It is also mentioned that the embedding of their work in local needs and reality is understood as being part of the efficiency.

A core element of the ToE of WLPS lobby and advocacy is 'time' – and related to this, the use of capacity and knowledge through partnerships. To be time-efficient, knowledge on what the most strategic ways to work are and being able to define a niche are important as well as finding strategic partners to strengthen this. For the same reasons efficiency is integrated in all levels of work, whether or not specifically discussed or translated in the monitoring protocols, it always plays a role in decision making structures: 'It is integrated in our way of working.' Decisions are being made based on time, effectiveness, strategic choices, division of labour and combining strengths but also a number of systems are put in place to ensure efficiency such as monitoring and a number of protocols.

#### 14.4.1.1 Practice and mechanisms for improvement

A number of systems and practices are in place to ensure efficiency in five domains: operational; organisational; financial; human resources; and in the domain of transparency.

On an operational level, the functioning procedures to control and monitor time and money within Cordaid are in place as part of the organisational structure overall and as part of the business unit structures. On the organisational and programme level, Cordaid monitors its efficiency through different monitoring programmes and internal control mechanisms as well as regular business unit meetings, cross business unit meetings and financial controller meetings cross-organisation. Monitoring databases such as PRIMA, Daisy are used, as well as internal reporting formats. Yearly audits are incorporated in the organisational structure and provide management and programme level recommendations. These are considered during the business unit staff meetings and may for example relate to partner relations continuation, donor relations and results relating to efficiency.

On the financial level, Cordaid uses audit reports and the consideration of its recommendations are internally necessary for the approved continuation of activities. Every BU has a financial controller working in tandem with the programme managers and programme and policy officers. The financial controllers ensure checks and balances through internal monitoring systems and regular checks. They are responsible for learning, discussions and development across business units as they have regular (every 2 months) meetings amongst financial controllers. They are also in close contact with the corporate controllers.

When it comes to human resources, Cordaid uses Time Tell to account for the checks and balances between efficiency and effectiveness in time spending as part of the processes and an organisational scan that contains several questions on effectiveness and efficiency and how to ensure both. Besides, staff descriptions, procedures regarding travel and expenses and hiring consultants are in place and there are regular evaluation meetings internally.

To increase *transparency*, IATI is used since 2013.<sup>538</sup> IATI is a voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiative that seeks to improve the transparency of aid, development and humanitarian resources to increase their effectiveness. In the database the projects are described (see aidtransparency 2014). The idea behind IATI is that developing countries need information to plan and manage resources effectively. At the same time, citizens in developing countries and in donor countries lack the information they need to hold their governments to account for the use of those resources. IATI aims to address these challenges by making information about aid spending easier to access, use and understand (aidtransparency 2014) According to the officers we talked to on the issue, open data in terms of 'putting everything on the Internet', helps to be efficient. Sharing data on budgets, activities and results to the world pushes you towards efficiency and effectiveness.

In addition to the systems, partnerships and learning come to the fore as important points of reference in the process of taking decisions about efficiency.

In practice, partnerships and networking are strategic choices. Engaging in strategic partnerships and networks provides chances to combine capacities, share knowledge and multiply the efforts while at the same time ensuring visibility and having eyes and ears in different locations of meaning to the issues at stake. Such as in the case of cooperating with GNWP, a global network situated in New York, or AWN, an Afghan network working locally and nationally. Internally cross-Cordaid strong partnerships add to efficiency as well when only one person leaves for a certain meeting but includes the discussions points from the others working on related topics.

Learning is another important aspect to ensure quality of the work. An example relating to cost efficiency balancing effectiveness is the outsourcing of work to consultants whereby Cordaid learned a valuable lessons to put quality over budget. Balancing effectiveness with efficiency for example by ensuring the credibility of your voice through the quality of the work, which increases opportunities in terms of efficiency when invitations to meetings increase on expense. Cordaid has an increasing number of invitations to meetings providing some more space for efficiency choices in terms of outsourcing work, inviting partners to join meetings, which possibly leads to an increase of its credibility and visibility.

The improvement we noticed with regard to efficiency is the need to shift from 'internal' efficiency measures to 'external efficiency' measures as due to changing funding landscapes. Interviewees voiced that it is increasingly important to be efficient in another way (cost efficient and impact efficient) and find a better balance between effectiveness and efficiency. Not only are internal efficiency systems deemed more important and as such are now embedded in the organisational system, it is as important to be visible, transparent and coherent. According to the interviewees, the changes in organisational systems do not always contribute to more efficiency as they tend to cost much time but in the end they think the transparency will increase the efficiency as there will be more monitoring and as such visibility with regard to spending of time and budget. This is an adaptation to the changing context in which Cordaid as a whole is functioning. In this process it has become clear that it is very important to ensure quality, to link the communication department with the different programmes, to work cross-programmes and to combine strengths in internal and external partnerships.

#### *14.4.2 Reflections on efficiency*

During the evaluation we noticed the increased efficiency choices and decisions made internally while constantly balancing between effectiveness and efficiency on questions of content, quality work and outsourcing, but also partnerships and networks, internal coherence and communication and the nature of the relationship between partners and Cordaid. These are continuous underlying reflections shaping the decisions made to pursue activities and issues in light of added value, effectiveness and balanced with efficiency. An issue illustrated by the case studies is the cooperation in partnerships and other engagements to ensure strengths, outreach and being at discussion tables, but also balanced with effectiveness and work quality. Hence, we consider WLPS advocacy cost conscious. One of the issues we reflected on with the staff internally and that also came up in some of the external interviews is the issue of staff capacity. From the start the WLPS advocacy was considered only 0,8fte although the advocacy is with the reorganisation of Cordaid increasingly embedded in the broader business unit of WLPS and cross-organisation. However, the 0.8 FTE was the focus for the evaluation as submitted by Cordaid. It was brought forward multiple times in interviews with staff as being an issue bringing in limitations as to what can be pursued and achieved. Until now the WLPS advocacy has proven very flexible in time and capacities but this cannot be taken for granted. As this is an issue that was raised several times, we think it important to include this in our reflections, considering the amount of changes achieved and processes and activities being pursued, effectiveness being upheld while with regard to the staff capacity the efficiency in staff time might be stretched to its limits.

### **14.5 Evaluation question 5: Explanatory factors**

In this section, we examine the internal and external factors that explain changes, contribution, relevance and efficiency of the WLPS programme, answering the evaluation question: What factors

explain the findings drawn from the questions above? The information presented is based on internal and external document analysis and interviews with internal and external resource persons.

#### *14.5.1 Internal factors*

In this section, we examine the internal factors that explain changes, contribution, relevance and efficiency, including responses to internal challenges and opportunities, of the WLPS programme. To do this, we use the 5Cs approach. Capabilities comprise the collective capacity of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system.

##### *14.5.1.1 The capability to act and to commit*

The capability to act and to commit is about the strategic intent and the organisational ability to act on this intent, also as a dimension of relations within an alliance and wider network. It is about developing focus to take decisions, plan, and translate these into organisational action. This depends on, among other things, organisational structure, action-oriented leadership and effective monitoring.

The capability to act and to commit is one of the WLPS lobby and advocacy's core capabilities. This has, according to interviewees, been facilitated by the reorganisation of Cordaid into business units (BUs). In the BUs, there is more coherence and focus than there was in the former organisation structure. This explains the WLPS coordination with the specialists that have worked extensively in the involved countries before. Strength is bundled thematically, which makes it possible to work more effectively and efficiently on issues related to gender, women, peace and security, especially in relation to the lobby and advocacy on the post-2015 agenda and the New Deal. The CSU has played an active role in coordinating and bringing different business units together (Cordaid 2014). This focus of the programme on both thematic and geographical levels is an important building block for WLPS lobby and advocacy work.

There is a strong ability to mobilise partners within (i.e. programme officers) and outside Cordaid. Outside Cordaid, the WLPS lobby maintains a strong partnership with WO=MEN. WO=MEN is an umbrella organisation that links all organisations that have an interest in gender together, and, as such, have more influence on the parliament and more weight in the NAP 1325 Working groups. Another strategic choice in partnerships that increases the capability to act and to commit in the international lobby on UNSCR 1325 is the partnership with GNWP. Cordaid is, as far as we can see, the only Dutch organisation that is so active in New York. This has been confirmed by external resource persons. This explains how it has been possible for WLPS to organise a strong lobby on the international level of the UNSCR level, especially about the financing mechanism.

The capability to act and commit translates into the strategic drive to work through partnerships and networks to ensure the message is being taken up and forwarded on multiple levels. The partnerships the WLPS lobby and advocacy maintains with CSOs in partner countries make it possible for them to build strong cases that can be brought to the fore in higher lobby arenas, such as NATO. This explains how the partnership with AWN and the way they have worked on the Transition Monitoring could bring forward a really strong case on bringing the local voices of Afghan women and integrating UNSCR 1325 in the work of the NATO. Not only the fact that Afghan women are invited to meetings, but that the WLPS lobby and advocacy can present the case of the Afghan women is very much appreciated by the NATO, as expressed in email conversations. The likeminded partnerships with WO=MEN and GNWP increase the ability to act and commit on national NL level and on global level on the UNSCR 1325 agenda, while the partnerships with local organisations in conflict-affected countries also inspire and strengthen the capacity to act and commit on local levels.

The successful transmission of the WLPS message through photos, videos, presentations, reports and policy briefs as well as talking points facilitate the WLPS lobby and advocacy to be seen as an important resource on the issue of UNSCR 1325 and integrating gender in security policies. The WLPS lobbyist is very active in claiming, as well as being invited, to fill timeslots to present and to facilitate workshops, like at the Peace Symposium (ICAN June 2014), side events at CSW 58 and the UNSCR 1325 anniversary. Being seen as a resource person makes it possible to be invited in the closer circles, for example more intimate meetings organised by NATO on UNSCR 1325 (like meeting in Washington or Roundtable hosted by the Dutch embassy), where it is actually possible to influence policies. The screening of 'Women Unveiled' also put Cordaid more on the map and made Cordaid visible for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an important actor on the Afghanistan issue.

The organisational monitoring of lobby and advocacy activities and outcomes is not always evident. As we described in the section on efficiency above, there are a number of protocols in place since the organisation into business units. It is difficult to plan lobby activities, and, as such, it is difficult to plan meetings with partners far ahead, as activities are often informed by the current events and as such is shaped by more external factors. This is confirmed by the WLPS lobbyist as well as external resource persons. There are, however, a few recurring events that always accumulate meetings and networking prior to the events, as well as during the events. These events are CSW 58, the celebration of Dutch NAP on 1325 and the celebration on UNSCR 1325 in New York. Preparation for events like the Global Review meetings are organised on a more ad hoc basis.

#### 14.5.1.2 The capability to deliver on objectives

The capability to deliver on objectives concerns the organisation's capability to achieve access to financial resources, knowledge and information sources, human resources and facilities. It also involves standards on measures of performance, embedded in a results-orientation and logic. In ILA, it also concerns the ability to relate to decision-making actors, arenas and processes.

The relations the WLPS lobby and advocacy officer maintains with decision-making actors and other lobby targets are stable. Building on long relations, such as with GNWP, they have built mutual understanding, which helps to enter the arenas of decision making. Through existing contacts, counterparts and engagements with the NL MoFA, WO=MEN, GNWP and EPLO, as well as with counterparts in partner countries, WLPS lobby and advocacy is constantly in interaction with and monitoring what is going on. This is also facilitated by the organisation into BUs, which enables communication with country-specialists. This capability to relate to decision-making actors, especially the NL MoFA, explains mainly the outcomes related to the implementation of the Dutch NAP and coordination with Dutch MoFA when it comes to the NATO Review.

The planning of activities around recurring events makes it possible to strive for results in designated result areas, and at the same time leaves enough space open for jumping into more short-term activities. The WLPS lobby and advocacy programme formulates result areas every year and attaches activities to these. This makes it possible to deliver on objectives on different levels, embedded in a results-orientation and logic. The programme has, as is described in the section on changes and their relevance, selected arenas to advocate in that are central to discussions on development, security and gender: effective implementation of UNSCR 1325, inclusion of the voice of women's collectives in processes of peace and security and the integration of WPS agenda in relevant development and security policies. Within these areas, WLPS has no structured way of monitoring developments. Most contacts go through emails. Considering the fact that there is quite some flexibility in jumping into ongoing realities, this monitoring works effectively. The openness, to a certain point, of the lobby

agenda, permits WLPS Lobby and Advocacy to make use of momentum, such as the opening that occurred with NATO and the developments of the Asian lobby.

Reflecting on our findings, one of the aspects we consider an important building block to deliver on objectives and act/commit for WLPS advocacy is the *focus* of the programme on both thematic and geographical levels. The focus ensures the strategic priorities, as well as dedicated capacity building and partnerships, which underlies the pathways to change and directly affects the outcomes. Without a focus, the organisation seems to risk being spread too thinly. Linked to this is the *evidence-based content* as an important factor shaping the framing and wording of the advocacy message. Reflecting on WLPS, we surfaced a link between the credibility and visibility of the organisation regarding directing external stakeholders to their focused and content-based evidence on the thematic areas they emphasise.

#### 14.5.1.3 The capability to act and self-renew

This is about the ability to learn internally and to adjust to changing contexts. This can be influenced by internal openness to learning, ability to analyse important external factors, flexibility and openness to change. Thus, it is about reacting swiftly to occurring events. In the above analysis of the capability to act and commit and to deliver on objectives, it has already come to the fore that within the WLPS lobby and advocacy programme there is the ability to adapt the scope of the work to changing context.

On another level, the process of learning internally and adapting externally is inherent to the theory and practice of change that is the basis of the WLPS lobby and advocacy. WLPS lobby and advocacy considers the voice of the women as (among others) directing for what they do. This comes mostly to the fore in the result area of giving women's collectives a voice in security issues (see ToC). This 'voice' is given content by including what women consider an appropriate process of monitoring (the Barometer), or a good definition of security (Afghanistan). Hence, the input of women involved in projects is crucial; women's networks are involved in the process of decision making. Cordaid does facilitate the process of dialogue in these cases, for example in the localisation of the UNCSR 1325 in Colombia. So, this whole process of learning, reflection and adaptation is inherent to the way Cordaid works and in its ToC. This way of working, and hence the ability to adapt and self-renew, contribute to the outcomes of Afghan women being present at NATO meetings and meetings in Brussels, and building strong cases for WLPS lobby and advocacy to present at the international level and towards the Dutch NAP. Within Cordaid as an organisation, the space for reflective learning could be increased to maximise an enabling learning environment, as now much of the advocacy work is sitting with one or a few persons, and also monitoring mechanisms are in place but not always in use. Another example is the ToC, which could be considered and reflected on more often to learn and constantly (re-)consider the assumptions. This is closely linked to creating an *enabling organisation*. We learned that the space for reflective learning within the organisation could be increased to maximise an enabling learning environment. Linked to this is the accountability relations internally and externally with partners, which we were not able to comprehend fully and surface and, as such, to note down as a learning issue for the organisation to strengthen. To prevent repetition, this factor relates to all capabilities described above and below as it is about the internal enabling environment.

#### 14.5.1.4 The capability to relate

The capability to relate is about building and maintaining networks with constituents and allies as well as with external actors. The capability to relate is the core of the work of the WLPS lobby and advocacy; at the heart of Cordaid's way of working is relating in itself and brokering between the

different levels of lobby and advocacy. It is part of the ToC and part of the strategy, and at the same time constitutes an outcome in itself.

The central idea of the WLPS ToC of connecting local, national and international levels is intimately related to the ability to relate. Cordaid functions as a broker in the translation of constituency understandings, viewpoints and interests into an agenda that resonates with them and bringing this onto the international level. The Transition Monitoring, for example, collects women's local views on security, which have now actively been used in the discussions considering the NATO review. This means that in this process the NATO agenda is actually formed through this strategy. WLPS facilitated the former Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security of NATO, Mari Skare, at the National Consultation meeting in Kabul, organised by AWN. This was done to close the circle of accountability, bringing in an international policy maker to meet directly with WLPS partners and their constituencies. This also demonstrates the ability of WLPS lobby and advocacy to address, and engage with, a broad audience, to engage with a growing number of members, and to relate to 'supporters and comrades' at different levels. The same process can be observed in Colombia, where women monitor the peace process from the local level. The localisation of the 1325 has, however, been started from above. Another powerful example of 'agenda setting from below' comes from the case study on GNWP. In the UN Gender week in April 2014, several Afghan women of the AWN network brought to the fore their agenda, based on the experiences. Hence, the capability to relate to partners and organisations and functioning as a broker between these different levels has contributed to the outcomes related to the Transition Monitoring and the localisation of UNSCR1325 (through GNWP, also an example of how this umbrella organisation works).

At another level of relating, the WLPS lobby and advocacy officer is constantly building and maintaining networks, especially with allies, partners and external actors. Most important network building is realised through WO=MEN, GNWP, ICAN, national Cordaid partners such as AWN in Afghanistan, the Asia WPS Lobby and other CSOs in, for example, the Dutch Working group on the NAP. Additionally, important cooperating with the NL MoFA and other MoFAs such as Switzerland, Finland, etc. This is strategic networking and relations building contributes to results in the post-2015 agenda and Gender in the New Deal, as these are only reached by means of cooperation and relationships. This capability to relate is also reflected on the national level in the WO=MEN partnership. Cordaid puts in knowledge, experience, contacts and recommendations based on studies—partnership credibility with MoFA and other organisations—effecting influence on multiple levels through WO=MEN, who bundle knowledge, experience and content into a strategic lobby.

The ability to frame lobby/advocacy issue in a way that fits with inner and outer network can explain the outcome of AWN-NATO. Again, this example of the outcome is interconnected with the strategy that is pursued. Exactly because of the way of working, the lobby issue fits with the outer network. Cordaid as a broker between the different levels has helped to translate this or frame it to bring the different levels of its lobby work together.

Content-based evidence alone cannot provide for the advocacy in itself. Hence, *knowing the landscape and landscaping* is crucial to guide the strategic choices on whom to influence and work with, as well as on what, when, why and how. We have seen the content being used as a bridge to the partners and targets focusing on UNSCR 1325 and NAPs. It shows WLPS' awareness of the institutional landscapes and capacities. However, in our evaluation, we have not been able to surface a structured analysis underlying the choices such as context and stakeholder analysis. These factors represented in the WLPS advocacy relate to the focus to inform the strategic directions to landscape



and using the content as a bridge to link, learn and connect to partners, targets and other stakeholders.

Another factor we identified as relevant for the framing and wording of the advocacy message is knowing the network and networking. WLPS does not do this on its own, but has numerous strategic partners with whom they share their content-based evidence in order for the other actors to reach out with the advocacy message. In this sense, the network is being used strategically as a bundle of capacities and strengths and provides for the bundling of capacities to act, commit, relate, adapt and react. WLPS does this on national and international levels, being sensitive and flexible to the various arenas, political environments and complex conflict-affected contexts by working through partnerships and networks. Hence, this is a very strong aspect of the WLPS advocacy, although we noticed the struggle to constantly balance and bridge between the national needs identified and the international policy arenas.

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This relates to the factor of being able to relate to the (*external*) *environment*. This is about visibility and credibility, being able to cooperate in partnerships and mobilise efforts, inspiration and strengths. In this way, complementarity is sought and a cross-fertilisation between partners can be established. We have learned from WLPS that this is one of their core working structures, guiding their advocacy and as such a crucial factor in achieving the changes that have been achieved as the advocacy message came about with support of partners and is carried forward by partners mobilised and inspired.

#### 14.5.1.5 The capability to balance diversity and achieve coherence

The capability to balance diversity and achieve coherence includes the simultaneous engagement with diversity and the need for coherence within the organisation that will be expressed in vision, strategy and practices that achieves coherence while engaging with internal diversity. The capability to balance diversity and achieve coherence works out on different levels, shaping the outcomes in the same ways as the capabilities described above. Within WLPS lobby and advocacy, there is a clarity of roles, as there is only Cordaid working on the programme. We would say the different geographical areas are well represented when it comes to agenda setting; again we bring to the fore the example of AWN. They are defining the important lobby issues and thus into agenda setting, policy influence and changing practice. Some processes might, however, have been initiated top down, parallel to the processes of agenda setting from the ground, such as the localisation of the 1325, which was initiated from GNWP and via CIASE in Colombia reached the local level. In terms of

geographical representation, it is important to mention that Asia is included to make sure that also non-recognised conflicts have an impact on the lives of women.

#### *14.5.2 External factors*

In this section, we discuss the external factors that could explain some of the outcomes discussed above. We go into the specifics of the targets, the issue context and the general context.

##### *14.5.2.1 Targets*

The main targets for WLPS lobby and advocacy are UN Women, NATO, the NL MoFA and local governments. The politics, different contexts and realities on these various levels can influence the outcomes and results achieved. Local governments are difficult to influence, as they often have other, pragmatic interests or are not necessarily open to international organisations. One of the external factors that was mentioned by WLPS and partners is the issue of legitimacy in these various (local) contexts. As such, one of the reasons why the WLPS advocacy officer focuses the advocacy on international levels is because the legitimacy to lobby local governments lies with its local partners. WLPS seeks to strengthen and support its partners to advocate and lobby themselves. The international arena demands a different way of working than the local arenas and a different handling of partners. According to the WLPS lobbyist, the international arena is more of a lobby context in which targets are used to 'getting lobbied'. The targets are selected in line with the strategic and thematic issues advocated for their power on the issue, their focus on the specific issue, their alignment with the advocacy message or even their difficulties on specific issues.

Some examples are NATO and UN Women. NATO is difficult to target. For example, it was not possible to organise a side-event in Wales during a big NATO summit as it was not open for CSOs. At the same time, Cordaid WLPS did succeed in entering discussions with NATO representatives and now have ongoing policy engagements with NATO on women, peace and security. Another external factor in the international arena influencing the results achieved is the work with UN Women. The engagement and cooperation with UN Women has increased over the past two years, but UN Women itself does not have a prominent place within the UN or a great outreach, and, on top of this, has a scarcity of resources (especially compared with some of the other UN agencies).

##### *14.5.2.2 Specific contexts*

The specific contexts in which the issues are advocated (issue context) affect the (possible) outcomes. For example, the issue of gender related to peace and security in several countries cannot be easily brought forward within the UN space (Russia, Tunisia and Iraq are some examples of complicated contexts in multiple ways), as they only focus on gender in specific countries. Framing is used to integrate the issues on different agendas nonetheless.

Another example is the translation of issues from the abstract global level, such as the contents of the UNSCR 1325, into the local context. As such, the context of a specific issue might not always be the same. This differentiation takes place at two levels. First, there is the difference of translating the lobby issue into very specific contexts. In the case of localising the UNSCR 1325, it comes up that it is easier to make people aware of its importance in Bogotá than at a lower regional level where women are faced with more 'bread and butter' related issues. At the same time, it is also difficult to translate UN arena discussions, policies and decisions to the local context, as the UN language is often abstract and negotiated. Second, there is the difference in the specific sociocultural context. In Colombia, for example, where the localisation is part of a broader process of peace negotiations, this process is sometimes hindered by local actors who are not interested in peace at all (i.e. actors that are involved in lucrative activities related to the war). Besides this, Colombian society is very much

influenced by machismo and resistance against seeing women as suitable agents of change. Security and peace talks were and are domains mainly inhabited by men. At the same time, the issue of the UNSCR 1325 has gained new impetus because of the renewed peace talks. We have also observed that some issues, such as women's rights or UNSCR 1325 are not always taken up at local levels although they are ratified at global level or they may not even be ratified and recognised by stakeholders involved, because it is not seen as a priority. At the same time, some issues are pressed for such as in the case of MFM on UNSCR 1325 in Nepal, also because of the existence of the global resolution as a mechanism for leverage.

#### 14.5.2.3 Funding and political space

Changing funding conditions and changing political/legal space for civil society organisations can influence organisational capacity, which, in turn, can help to explain alliances' outcomes. At the level of WLPS lobby and advocacy in the Netherlands, the Dutch policy on funding has affected organisational structure, which, in turn, has affected the internal organisation of Cordaid. Besides that, the fact that the NL MoFA would like to profile itself on the Dutch NAP as gender-friendly explains its willingness and openness towards the WLPS lobby and advocacy (see the NL NAP 1325 website). The way the Dutch working group on the NAP works is also exemplary here. Everything happens under the umbrella of the Dutch NAP 1325 in close cooperation with the gender platform WO=MEN.

In the Netherlands, the Dutch budget changes regarding MFS II and the current changes in the policy and funding with regard to international development have affected the field, as this is felt as threatening, and changes need to be made with regard to securing funding. One of the effects these changes had on WLPS was the reorganisation of Cordaid into Business Units, which took some time of insecurity and internal staff changes before everyone is comfortable working in the new structure. We cannot answer whether it will also lead to securing more funding.

#### 14.5.2.4 Importance of the global landscape

There are many different kinds of external factors shaping the global landscape and specifically affecting those organisations working in conflict-affected areas and on sensitive political and international development issues relating to peace and security processes. Examples are conflicts, disasters and economic changes, which may take away the space and attention from women's rights. Such events may also trump priorities and might take away space for discussion, meetings and advocacy activities on all levels. There are always external factors that influence and also direct the work of the WLPS lobby and advocacy when there is a peace process or a conflict. In that sense, external processes always direct the activities of the ILA programme. On another level, the Dutch policies and financing mechanisms influence the work that can be done by the ILA programme. In this, there have been no changes since the baseline report.

#### 14.5.2.5 The role of the nature of the issue addressed

The scope of the issue that WLPS lobby and advocacy advocates is clear: on the one hand, the implementation of NAP 1325 at different levels, and on the other hand the strengthening of women's networks and inserting gender into policies more generally. In some cases, there are no identifiable victims, just 'women in general'. The case study on Colombia shows that the presence of identifiable victims helps to move things forward. With the identifiable victims of the slums in Bucaramanga, that, after the internal violence, are now threatened by drug dealers and street violence, it is possible to come to agreements and deals about what to do. The local character and adjustment to the local problems makes it easier to understand what UNSCR is about and translate this into action.

The MFM case illustrates the importance of a focused and content-based advocacy message for credibility and issue resonance, while at the same time the issue visibility needs to mature and takes time to land with those stakeholders you seek to cooperate with and influence. Taking up opportunities as they arise and perseverance to advocate the message in different arenas is shown to be valuable as well as not always predictable. The process is a constant balancing act between needs and gaps identified and the issue framing to resonate at and be relevant for all levels. Eventually, you need the message to be taken up and further by multiple actors in different arenas to ensure the outreach and uptake. To conclude, both the issue as well as the timing, space and opportunities matter for the uptake and outreach, which explains (see above) why financing as a challenging issue on implementing UNSCR 1325 was taken up in 2013/2014 but not earlier, although the first report was already published in 2011. UNSCR 1325 might also be a continuous issue on global level discussions, specifically at the UN, but has less room on national levels as it is seen as an abstract global resolution; the financing issue makes the issues that stand out as more concrete and practical.

#### 14.5.2.6 Reflections on internal and external factors

To better understand the interaction between internal and external factors, we think the following four perspectives on lobby and advocacy grasp the dynamics of the WLPS lobby and advocacy: 1) the idea of a 'policy window', 2) 'coalition framework', 3) 'power' and 4) 'regime'.<sup>539</sup>

The idea of a *policy window* means that it is believed that the issue advocated will receive serious attention when there are policy windows. This idea influences the problem definition and the way it is handled in terms of framing, monitoring, indicators and assessing existence and magnitude of issues. It often means that special studies are initiated, feedback and develop policy options through research and publications. We see this in the WLPS focus on policy and looking for policy opportunities. An important element of this pathway of change is the strategic positioning by the networks they partner with and their ways of contacting policy makers. We see this especially in the positioning in the Dutch NAP Working Group, UN Women, NATO and the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS)

The coalition framework is the idea that change happens through coordinated activity among individuals and organisations outside of government with the same core policy beliefs, influencing likeminded policy makers (amongst others). We see this in how the WLPS lobby is working through their various strategic partnerships and networks such as the Global Network for Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) in New York or the Dutch gender platform WO=MEN in the Netherlands.

The Power perspective means identifying those who have influence on a specific issue, focusing on the few who can make a difference rather than the many voices out there. This is about strategic choices and partnerships as well as about the efficient use of the capacities and strengths. It is also about being a credible voice and a valuable partner yourself. Cordaid WLPS lobby has increasingly put efforts towards being and sustaining itself as a 'thought leader' on specific issues, thereby making choices when it comes to content, focus, message and partners.

Working from the *regime* perspective means seeking cooperation and partnerships with governments and seeking to strengthen cooperation between CSOs and governments to achieve more effective and broadly carried changes that are more sustainable. This is about choosing insider strategies such as forms of silent diplomacy rather than outsider strategies such as activist approaches.

#### **14.6 Overview of, and reflections on, main alliance-level findings**

WLPS has accomplished many things over the evaluated period. The achievements are rooted in a committed, serious, consistent and continuous efforts to strengthen women's positions in peace and security processes and ensure the local voices in various policy arenas in different geographical settings. While many CSOs are active in the field of women's rights and there is an ever-increasing women's movement active in the various domains around women's rights, WLPS is focusing on identified niches in which they aim to make a difference in cooperation with partners and other stakeholders. Their aim and vision to first and foremost cooperate stands out, as this is, in their view, part of what they seek to achieve: inclusion and cooperation in peace and security processes.

The elements that stand out in the work of WLPS can be summarised as follows:

- The WLPS lobby and advocacy has a well-developed focus on several thematic areas (financing UNSCR 1325, localisation processes, women in peace and security). It has come to the fore that it is particularly important to work with evidence-based messages and dispose of a lot of commitment to develop and maintain such as focus. Besides this, a well-working and supportive CSU has proved to be important for developing and maintaining focus.
- The link between local needs and global-national policy arenas. Although it is not always easy to make it concrete and visible, WLPS has continuously worked towards ensuring a link between local needs and global or national policy arenas. The financing as well as the localisation and implementation of UNSCR 1325 are examples of this. At the same time, it remains a complex task at times to translate abstract messages into local needs and the other way around.
- The importance of partnerships in the realisation of changes accomplished. This is about WLPS partnerships with actors in the global policy arena and partnerships with networks in partner countries. It has come to the fore that these partnerships and networks cannot be understood by looking at them only within the MFS II timeframe, but that they are often rooted the work realised by Cordaid before MFS II.
- For WLPS lobby and advocacy, it is more important to get their message out there, based on local needs and reality on the ground and voiced by local voices, than it is to claim the contribution they have made to a change. This means that, at times, changes develop outside the direct reach of WLPS, whereas these changes are indeed inspired by or rooted in WLPS activities. Although this can make it difficult to trace the exact contribution of the WLPS lobby and advocacy to changes, WLPS sees this as the evidence of having accomplished their goal when they are not mentioned in the narrative of change; this means their work has been localised and internalised.
- To 'get the message out there' it is not only important to localise abstract policies and take into account local voices; it is also crucial to find the right entry points in the political process to be able to bring issues such as UNSCR 1325 to the table.

We have also identified several challenges/factors and learning points regarding the work of the WLPS lobby and advocacy. These can be summarised as follows:

- Many of the changes we identified remain works in progress in various stages of development. Changes and outcomes are part of a larger political process. As a consequence, we have seen most changes in agenda setting, although there are some examples of policy influence and change of practice as well. We do not consider this to be a weakness, but think it is important to mention that we consider the changes in the field of agenda setting as part

of a process, eventually going towards policy influence and/or policy change. The challenge then consists of keeping track of all of these smaller steps towards change.

- The WLPS lobby and advocacy is now mainly carried out by one staff member with 0.8 FTE, although with the support of the rest of the WLPS programme staff and cross-organisationally linked with the gender components. There is a lot of substantive coordination with thematically oriented staff members and with other lobbyists, as well as a balanced use of outsourcing research. We consider it important to monitor this way of working to keep it going as it does now. The balance can get easily be lost with staff changes.
- The ToC and its assumptions are not necessarily challenged and (re-)considered, which could result in missing opportunities to reflect, adjust and learn from the processes. Assumptions and the idea of change should be constantly revisited and reflected upon to maximise learning.
- The external context also provides some challenges to work with. WLPS lobby and advocacy works in different countries and in different policy arenas, facing different geographical and sociocultural contexts. As a consequence, the lobby and advocacy work needs to be adjusted to the specific 'field site'. The UN, for example, is a bureaucratic, 'slow', compartmentalised institution, posing other challenges to CSOs than a Colombian locality characterised by high levels of corruption and violence.

In conclusion, WLPS has developed considerable strengths over the past years, mostly in terms of strategic operationalisation of the advocacy through strategic decision making, partnerships, focused and evidence-based messages and more cooperation cross-Cordaid to combine strengths to maximise efforts. Additionally, we have seen relations with partners, stakeholders and policy makers being developed and strengthened even through staff changes and re-organisations, and we noticed an internal learning process with regard to efficiency. At the same time, although we have seen a continuous effort in practice, we have seen less challenging of the theory based on the practice or incorporation of the lessons learned. Hence, we consider reflection on the considerations of what needs to change, how, why and through which stakeholders to be a more structured and embedded way of working in the day-to-day working cycle. We think that constant reflection on the ToC is necessary to concretise strategies, possibilities and plans in line with practice and subsequent goals. We would also recommend further considerations in terms of embedded analyses of stakeholders, activities and outputs, and strategies in line with reflections on how change happens, what assumptions are underlying and what has been learned from the past processes.



## 15 FREEDOM FROM FEAR

### 15.1 Introduction

#### 15.1.1 Context and overview of the FFF Alliance

Violence, conflict and poverty constitute major threats to human security.<sup>540</sup> This was so at the moment of the baseline, and, since then, a number of conflicts have developed to exacerbate these threats in a range of regions around the world. Threats to human security cannot be taken up solely by states. Governments themselves can pose serious threats to human security,<sup>541</sup> and a merely state-centred focus on security would also fall short in addressing deeply rooted issues in societies that are inherently linked to trust building, feeling safe, health and environment. Since the 1990s, the development sector has seen a rise in the number of civil society organisations (CSOs) working on peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The assumption that civil society is a significant actor has been widely accepted.<sup>542</sup> Studies have shown the identification of a number of roles they pursue, dependent on the context and the type of CSO: early warning, protection, monitoring, advocacy, socialisation, social cohesion, facilitation or service delivery.<sup>543</sup> It is widely supported that civil society engagement can indeed contribute positively to peacebuilding and conflict transformation in a supportive manner.<sup>544</sup> In this light, many state and social actors argue that civil society engagement is essential and that strong state-society relations are a significant factor for conflict prevention. Often, however, civil society remains excluded from formal peace processes or is not accepted as legitimate partners because of limiting factors such as a strong, repressive and violent state; widespread violence; negative media attention; a lack of free speech, trust and recognition or restrained access.<sup>545</sup> This was so at the time of the baseline, and continues to be the case, with conditions having worsened in a number of contexts.

The Freedom from Fear Alliance (FFF) was established in the course of 2009–2010, when the MFS II programme proposals were drafted and tested. The partners in the Alliance were chosen with the purpose of strengthening capacity by collaboration.<sup>546</sup> The partners have strong thematic roots in human security, human rights and conflict prevention and transformation. They all have widespread networks on different levels, and they have the capacity to link local knowledge to international agendas. The partners in this alliance are PAX (lead CFA, formerly known as IKV Pax Christi), Amnesty International the Netherlands, Global Partnership for Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and Free Press Unlimited.

The Alliance is organised around four thematic programmes with a regional or global focus:

- Human security and human rights in fragile states—regional focus (Amnesty International the Netherlands/PAX);
- Human security and voice for civilians in repressive states—regional focus (Free Press Unlimited/PAX);
- Security and disarmament – global focus (PAX);
- Networking for conflict prevention and peacebuilding—global focus (GPPAC/PAX).

The main objective of the Alliance is a world in which human rights are respected, human security and development are guaranteed, independent media are free, and citizens are able and willing to cooperate in conflict prevention.<sup>547</sup> To work towards this objective, the FFF Alliance seeks to strengthen civil society in the global South through capacity building; linking and learning between CSOs; facilitating the bringing together of multiple stakeholders at local, national and international levels and contributing to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The four programmes in this alliance are structured to build on this main objective through their thematic and context-specific focus. The



aim of *Programme IV* is to influence and mobilise the UN, RIGOs and state actors to undertake more specific action, moving away from reaction and towards conflict prevention.

#### 15.1.1.1 ILA Programme

For this evaluation we specifically focus on *Programme IV, networking for conflict prevention and peacebuilding*, which was pre-selected for this evaluation by the MFS II Alliance, as requested by Partos. While PAX (formerly IKV Pax Christi) is responsible for the overall management and for programmes, GPPAC leads Programme IV and is responsible for thematic and financial coordination and implementation. Hence, our focus has been almost entirely on GPPAC. With Programme IV largely covering GPPAC's work as a whole, drawing strongly on its Strategic Plan 2011–2015, this evaluation can broadly be considered an evaluation of GPPAC, rather than a particular section of its activities. To a limited degree, PAX and GPPAC have cooperated in Programme IV. This cooperation is included in this evaluation.

Programme IV is financed by both MFS II and additional financial flows. The total of the budget is €15,266,000 of which 66% is MFS II. This does not include €1,061,000 management and administration costs. The total budget was divided according to the organisational set-up: 88% for GPPAC and 12% for PAX, and the total budget was divided per strategy.

GPPAC and PAX collaborated on several fronts within Programme IV. However, this collaboration was more limited than initially planned. Collaboration mainly consisted of advocacy through the joint campaign 'Breaking the Nuclear Chain'. GPPAC and PAX initially also collaborated in the campaign 'Human Security First', but in the course of the campaign, cooperation was discontinued. Other plans for joint advocacy did not materialise, or did so only to a limited degree, most importantly concerning advocacy towards the League of Arab States. From both sides, it is understood that these limitations are primarily rooted in the differences in organisational culture and, relatedly, approaches to advocacy. With PAX being more focused on relatively classical message-centred forms of advocacy, and confrontational if deemed necessary, and GPPAC being more non-confrontational and network-oriented, consistently seeking collaboration with targets rather than pressure, it turned out to be difficult to reach agreement on objectives and strategy.

In the course of the evaluated period, PAX decided to partly divert its funds assigned to Programme IV to Programmes I, II and III, more specifically and primarily, advocacy of the UN and the EU by its New York and Brussels Liaisons, and advocacy of the Dutch government by PAX headquarters staff. PAX reports that this advocacy has focused on protection of civilians in South Sudan, protection of civilians in Syria, extractive industries (specifically the coal chain in Colombia), and interethnic tensions in Kosovo, and between Kosovo and Serbia. PAX also reports having attained outcomes with regard to all four issues that we can classify as lying in the priority result areas 'agenda setting' and 'policy influencing'. Reported outcomes include, for example, the adoption of PAX recommendations on inclusiveness of reform and state development in South Sudan by the European Parliament; influence on Dutch members of parliament on Shell's presence in Syria and oil imports from Syria and influence on the position of Dutch Minister Ploumen and the Dutch energy sector with regard to violence and injustice associated with coal mining in Colombia. Because we as evaluators were not in a position to research these outcomes further, and because these outcomes do not result from Programme IV, we will not analyse PAX outcomes in this chapter.

If we consider the way GPPAC has allocated funds: consistently, around 50% of the budget was spent on 'Network strengthening & Regional Action'. Action learning has been the second most important strategy in terms of spending, consistently accounting for around 20% of spending. Policy & advocacy

and Public Outreach together counted for the remaining 30%, with spending showing moderate shifts across years. Below, we will further discuss these strategies.

GPPAC also receives funding other than MFS II, with this other funding increasing from 32% in 2011, to 37% in 2012 and 43% in 2013. These funds have been spent on a range of projects. These projects have largely been embedded within GPPAC overall. Excluding these would not make sense considering the way work is integrated within GPPAC. In this report, we will make mention of outcomes attained through these projects and will note when outcomes can be traced back to funding other than MFS II.

#### 15.1.1.2 GPPAC

The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), founded in 2003, is a civil society-led network that focuses on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The network aims to establish a new international consensus, moving away from reaction and towards the prevention of violent conflict, building on local ownership and multi-stakeholder processes. GPPAC seeks to increase the capacity of civil society in conflict-affected areas, enable partnerships and mobilise civil society through networks to bridge local with global agendas, to integrate gender perspectives and jointly collaborate in conflict prevention. GPPAC is organised through 15 regional networks and a set of global structures. At the regional level, GPPAC is governed by Regional Steering Groups (RSGs). Each GPPAC region is coordinated by a regional secretariat. At the global level, GPPAC is governed by an International Steering Group (ISG), supported by a Programme Steering Committee and overseen by a Board. The majority of these global structures are composed of representatives from GPPAC regional networks. GPPAC overall is coordinated by a Global Secretariat. In addition, working groups with membership drawn from across the network generate and coordinate activities that bring members together across regions, through a strategy of action learning. This strategy is implemented around four thematic priorities: preventive action, human security, dialogue and mediation, and peace education. Learning generated by the working groups informs more broadly the work that GPPAC does.

#### 15.1.2 *On data sources and analysis*

The fact that the programme under evaluation centres on networking implied that we had to study networking activities and their emerging outcomes. It meant that we had to engage with a range of networking activities, in different sites, that brought together actors within GPPAC. We observed and followed activities typical for the network as well as some more ad hoc activities. We conducted over 80 interviews with GPPAC staff, GPPAC members, GPPAC partners, external experts and policy makers.

Since the start of the evaluation in 2012, we observed various GPPAC meetings (often lasting several days) as part of the network structures, including Programme Steering Committee meetings, Regional Liaison Officer meetings, learning days, an International Steering Group meeting, a Regional Steering Group meeting (of GPPAC Southeast Asia), a Gender Focal Point meeting and a Working Group meeting. Our access to these internal meetings was graciously facilitated by the Global Secretariat, the 'central node' in the network through which the network is managed. In addition to these meetings we met individually with most Global Secretariat staff, in some cases multiple times and with most of the Regional Representatives, Regional Liaison Officers and the GPPAC liaison in New York. We observed over 20 interactions and meetings of GPPAC and meetings between GPPAC and the targets they seek to cooperate with and influence.

During the period of evaluation we also studied the regional and programme documents, including plans, analyses and reports by which GPPAC strategizes, plans, monitors and evaluates—in total more than 250 documents. In many cases, these documents were supplemented by evidence in the form of further information on activities and outcomes such as policy briefs, reports reflecting the nature of specific activities and outcomes, and email exchanges between staff and targets. Again, our access to these was facilitated by the Global Secretariat. In addition, we have also spoken with over 40 external resource persons, including staff from the UN and other (inter)governmental organisations and staff of other NGOs working in the field of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Data collection took place in the Netherlands, the Philippines, the United States and Ghana.

For the evaluation question on relevance, we assessed the plausibility of the relevance claim by looking at the link between outcomes and needs identified in the theory of change (ToC). We examined to what extent the changes achieved addressed the overall aims and needs identified in the programme's ToC. Through interviews with GPPAC staff and members, we collected data on the changes achieved and substantiated this through documentation and, where possible, with external resource persons. In addition, we looked at the use of advocacy products such as policy briefs or trainings by targets or other civil society organisations to understand the relevance. The relevance is discussed after each subsection on changes, because the programme is diverse and wide-ranging as a characteristic of its global nature.

The evaluation question on contribution was assessed through a contribution analysis, which we integrated into a more in-depth case study of specific parts of the advocacy processes.

#### *15.1.3 Case selection and the role of the cases in the report*

As part of the evaluation, we conducted two case studies to have a more in-depth look into GPPAC's networked ILA processes. These cases were selected in agreement with GPPAC staff and GPPAC representatives of the regions involved. The two cases were selected to provide more insights into the networked level advocacy processes and to conduct a contribution analysis on one chosen outcome. The contribution analyses we conducted have been integrated into these case studies, which provide an opportunity to develop higher quality analyses. One case study concerns GPPAC's advocacy at UN level, as the UN is a key advocacy target for GPPAC at global level. The contribution analysis here looks specifically into GPPAC's contribution to the advancement of human security at the UN. The other case study focuses on the contributions of GPPAC to peacebuilding and conflict prevention at regional level in Southeast Asia. The contribution analysis in this case focuses on GPPAC's claim to contribute to the Mindanao peace process in the Philippines. Through these case studies and included contribution analyses, we seek to obtain deeper insights into the workings and effectiveness of the network.

The main data sources for the case studies consisted of semi-structured interviews with GPPAC staff, regional representatives, regional liaison officers and partners. This was verified through semi-structured interviews with other civil society organisations working on the same thematic areas and, where possible, with policy officers from targeted institutions. The other main source of data collection was observation of the advocacy processes and meetings in New York in 2013 and 2014, and at regional level in the Philippines in 2014. Other data sources used to triangulate and substantiate the findings consisted of reports, public and non-public communications and policy briefs. We substantiated the information found as much as possible through documentation, interviews and other sources of evidence. The assessment was thus triangulated between internal and external sources of information, where possible substantiated with written documentation. This report and thorough data collection could not have been conducted without the cooperation of so

many, especially the full support of GPPAC staff and members, for which we are extremely thankful, also bearing in mind the already heavy workload in all organisations involved.

## **15.2 Evaluation questions 1 and 3: changes and relevance**

In this section, we address evaluation questions on outcomes and their relevance. These questions are: what are the changes achieved in the three priority result areas through international lobby and advocacy on the thematic clusters 'I - sustainable livelihood and economic justice', 'II - sexual and reproductive health and rights' and 'III - protection, human security and conflict prevention' during the 2011–2014 period? What is the relevance of these changes?

### *15.2.1 Theory of change from T0 to T2*

GPPAC has employed as ToC for Programme IV its own Strategic Plan 2011–2015. This plan informed GPPAC's planning and strategy in prominent ways, including the structuring of collaborations, allocation of funds and strategic decision-making through its central structures, the Global Secretariat, International Steering Group and Programme Steering Committee. A specific theorised ToC was not used in practice; hence we constructed the ToC based on the strategic plan and interviews with GPPAC staff. There has not been a significant shift in this strategic planning and, as such, we could not surface any competing ToCs over the course of MFS II. The prominent role of the Strategic Plan 2011–2015 does not imply, however, that all GPPAC members and network staff have approached the network and their role in it fully in line with all aspects of this Strategic Plan. In the following section, we first chart the basic elements of GPPAC's formal ToC, and then identify some of the (informal) divergences that emerged from observing practice, which will be further analysed in subsequent sections of this chapter. Because of the networked way of working and the broad focus of the strategic planning, we decided it would not be helpful to try to incorporate all the elements in a visual of the ToC. The organisation itself did not have a ToC visual, and trying to make a visual would not do justice to the complexities of the programme. Therefore, we discuss the ToC in the following sections.

#### **15.2.1.1 Context: conditions and the current state of the issue that GPPAC seeks to influence**

Violent conflicts increasingly require a global response. Contemporary security threats and conflicts occur within and across state borders. In a globalised world, this complexity and the interconnected nature of conflicts and their consequences pose enormous challenges for safeguarding human security in the long term. The concept of human security in itself came about in response to a realisation that state-centred security is an insufficient framework when considering the safety, security and wellbeing of people and communities. The prioritisation of national security does not contribute to development, conflict prevention or other related social challenges at any level. Human security conceptualises security to be rooted in the individual, rather than the state. It binds the notion of international security to the individual, expanding the concept beyond state boundaries to include a variety of other non-military threats. While there are no blueprint solutions for any conflict scenarios, there is no doubt they cannot be addressed by any one actor alone, or at any one level in isolation. Conflict stakeholders must be enabled to communicate with each other, to identify grievances and other causes of conflict and to negotiate a way forward in a peaceful manner. Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), RIGOs and their member states can and should play a role in ensuring that preventive measures are taken to protect human security when the state fails to do so. While there is no lack of formal agreements on this, in reality, there is a lack of institutional capacity and political will to support long-term preventive strategies. Preventive strategies are understood as having an emphasis on the explicit goal of preventing violent conflict at the front-end of the conflict

curve, the phase when disputes have not yet produced large-scale violence.<sup>548</sup> In these complex conditions, the need for collaboration with local civil society to reflect the voice and concerns of citizens in conflict-prone areas is paramount.

Among a range of functions of CSOs in peacebuilding that have been identified, the relationships, trust and solidarity that enable CSOs to work with local communities, including across conflict lines, and the capacity to collect (monitor-analyse-build) and articulate (publish-advocate) evidence-based knowledge and information are especially important from the perspective of prevention. However, despite the widespread recognition of their field-based and context-specific knowledge in conflict prevention, there is a lack of space for CSO input and engagement with IGOs and RIGOs, as well as formal conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes. While CSO participation in global policy debate on social and economic issues has taken on structured and sometimes institutionalised formats, CSO involvement in the deliberation of strategies to address human security-related or specific conflict situations is still unusual. Contemporary political, social or gender relations need to be understood not as having a distinct global, regional, national or local character, but as entailing an interplay of these geographical contexts. The challenge then is to redraw political processes in support of the prevention of violent conflict. This is where transnational or global CSO networks such as GPPAC can make an important contribution.

#### 15.2.1.2 The long-term change that GPPAC seeks to support

GPPAC seeks to build a new international consensus on moving from reaction to prevention of violent conflict. GPPAC works to strengthen civil society networks for peace and security, and to link local, national, regional and global levels of action. GPPAC seeks to enhance CSO collaboration in designing and implementing conflict prevention strategies and catalysing partnerships with relevant stakeholders. In doing so, it seeks to engage with governments, RIGOs and the United Nations (UN) system. Three types of changes in this area have been specified:

- GPPAC members and CSO partners initiate and implement conflict prevention interventions in collaboration with each other and through effective network structures.
- GPPAC members and CSO partners improve their own practice based on regional and international learning exchanges, and tools tailored to context.
- GPPAC members and CSO partners collectively lobby and raise awareness on multiple levels based on a common agenda.

These changes should make it possible to contribute to the goal of prevention of armed conflict by peaceful means through systematic and effective collaboration at all levels between CSOs, state actors, RIGOs, the UN and other relevant stakeholders. Three types of changes in this area have been specified by GPPAC:

- UN, RIGOs and state actors consult with, and adopt recommendations from, local CSOs in decision-making and conflict prevention policies and actions, taking into account related public manifestations.
- UN, RIGOs and state actors develop standards of effective coordination and government engagement for preventing conflicts.
- UN, RIGOs and state actors develop good practices in conflict prevention suggested by, or in alliance with, CSOs.

#### 15.2.1.3 The process of change anticipated

GPPAC seeks to contribute to the desired changes through the development of, and acting through, a global network of 15 regional networks consisting of regional peacebuilding and conflict prevention organisations. This is supported by a set of network structures that facilitates and coordinates network development, communications and actions, including the Global Secretariat, the International Steering Group, the Programme Steering Committee, the Board and thematic Working Groups. The development of global and regional network structures is to enable members to effectively steer the strategies and actions of the network through building capacity and linkages and the consolidation of the network's governance and operational structures. This is a bottom-up, member-steered process in which overlapping regional priorities determine the agenda of the global network, foster collaboration between CSOs in designing and implementing joint conflict prevention efforts at global and regional level, fostering synergies and cohesion between programmes, and regional and global levels of implementation.

GPPAC has defined four strategies through which the network is to work towards achievement of the identified changes. Across these four strategies, GPPAC seeks to mainstream attention to gender issues:

- Network strengthening and regional action: the development and maintenance of infrastructure for collaboration among members, and between members and other actors, including the UN, RIGO, state and other actors such as other civil society organisations. Joint action by the 15 regional networks at local/national and regional levels is also part of this strategy.
- Action learning: the regional and cross-regional exchange of knowledge including, but not limited to, that developed by working groups working on four selected thematic priorities: preventive action, dialogue and mediation, peace education and human security. Action learning aims to result in institutionalised access to, and facilitation of, information to CSOs; concepts, tools and methodologies developed, tested and adapted in the regions; knowledge products disseminated externally.
- Public outreach: capacity of GPPAC members built through working with the media and public campaigning to increase the visibility and public support for GPPAC initiatives, through development and implementation of a strategic communication plan.
- Policy and advocacy arise from the former three strategies. Strong regional and global networks share and generate knowledge—which subsequently informs the advocacy agenda—and influence the media and public, which will enhance GPPAC's visibility and potential to influence other actors. From this basis, GPPAC is to define an advocacy agenda, seeking accessible entry points for lobbying, conducting advocacy and building GPPAC members' capacity to do so. The strategy aims to enhance systematic and effective collaboration between GPPAC members and policymakers from governments, the UN and RIGOs. GPPAC's work in this area leads to the definition of an advocacy agenda and strategies to influence global and regional policy; the establishment of lobby infrastructure; the implementation of advocacy initiatives in key processes where GPPAC can provide added value through CSO perspectives, as identified by the network and member advocacy capacity building.

#### 15.2.1.4 Assumptions underlying the theory of change

GPPAC believes that when CSOs active in conflict prevention and peacebuilding join forces through strong regional and global networks, this will increase the capacity of civil society to contribute to

preventing violent conflicts. If the collaboration between civil society networks, the UN, RIGOs and state actors can be improved, a shift from reaction to prevention is possible, based on effective, locally-grounded conflict prevention strategies. If regional institutional structures can be mobilised to collaborate with civil society counterparts, they can build joint regional security mechanisms. This also necessitates CSOs to systematically engage with state actors on conflict prevention issues, leading states to invest in prevention within their countries and regions and advocate for regional and international organisations to do the same. Finally, if a critical mass of citizens campaign for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, supported by the media, this will strengthen the voice of CSOs and build the constituency for a culture of prevention.

#### 15.2.1.5 Some (informal) divergences

While GPPAC's formal ToC forms the basis of shared understandings and development of activities, we identified some divergences within the network in the way ToC is enacted in practice. First, the idea of GPPAC as a network that exists to support regional members turned out more prominent in practice than the ToC suggests. Second, the focus on the advancement of 'effective locally grounded conflict prevention strategies', which is central in the ToC, is somewhat less prevalent than the theory suggests. While work on this is certainly available in the network and growing, we find relatively more focus on linking and convening as the key way by which to advance civil society voices, compared with the development and implementation of strategies through the network. There is thus relatively more focus on the creation of inclusive processes than on the advancement of conflict prevention strategies and policy influence. Third, the starting point of networking as a key means and basis for cooperation to achieve objectives is not clearly upheld by all members; other benefits of being part of GPPAC, such as funding, sometimes appear more relevant for members. Finally, with the Global Secretariat functioning as a 'node' in the network with high centrality, as well as taking a leading role in many of GPPAC's functions, GPPAC enacts the belief that a strong centre is beneficial for the network. Calling this a divergence is not to suggest that networks should not work with strong centres or that this is unexpected; indeed, other organisational constellations calling themselves 'networks' can have similarly strong or even stronger centres. However, this choice is not made explicit, let alone argued for in the ToC, and we therefore consider this a form of informal divergence from the formal ToC. The analysis below shows the ways GPPAC's ToC, including these divergences, surface and shape their work.

#### 15.2.2 *Changes achieved and their relevance*

Below, we describe the outcomes GPPAC has reported over the evaluated period, categorised by the priority result areas 'agenda setting', 'policy influencing', and 'changing practice' and their broad outcome indicators. We verified and substantiated these reported outcomes through interviews and additional documentation. For each of the categories, we assess the relevance of outcomes in light of GPPAC's ToC. The text boxes are illustrative of the broader discussion on outcomes in the sense that they provide space to describe outcomes in more detail.

The outcomes and changes reported refer to the period under evaluation, 2011–2014, and the latest outcomes were collected up to September 2014.<sup>549</sup> The reporting on outcomes is according to the priority result areas, under which we structured broad outcome indicators. These indicators are used as guidelines to specify the indicators for the various ILA programmes under evaluation. Where necessary, we have adapted outcome indicators to fit GPPAC's work.

##### 15.2.2.1 Priority result area 'agenda setting'

For GPPAC, we specified and embedded the networking aspect as part of the broad indicators. For example, under broad outcome indicator: 'within the programme, the relevant members of an

alliance determine, share and keep up to date their policy positions and strategies', we include outcomes of network strengthening that form the necessary basis of internal agenda setting, the emerging positions and strategies. To explain this: within GPPAC's ToC, the strength of the network has been identified as foundational. This means that the network structures are seen as the ground from which content can grow and this content development is considered to emerge subsequently to these structures. Relatively large efforts have been invested in the development and functioning of internal structures and interactions. The structures and interactions have been the basis to pursue the development of, and work with, a collective agenda on themes and strategies.

Since GPPAC reported a multitude of outcomes fitting the priority result area 'agenda setting', we group the outcomes where necessary, for reasons of space. The boxes show in more detail fairly typical outcomes as reported by GPPAC to provide the reader a sense for the nature of outcomes.

#### A stronger network:

Relatively many of the reported outcomes contribute to the development of the network as such. These can be grouped under broad outcome indicator one, concerning: 'within the 'programme' relevant partners maintain coherent positions and strategies'. To specify further, the outcomes achieved are of a diverse nature. First of all, outcomes have been achieved in the development or improvement of formal and informal network structures. On the formal front, this involves the development or improvement of a number of structures for the governance of GPPAC and structures by which collaborations are to take shape. This includes, for example: the role and performance of the Programme Steering Committee; the development and performance of Working Groups that functions as hubs for interaction and collaboration on GPPAC thematic priorities; a community of Gender focal points; the establishment of an advocacy Liaison at the UN; and the development of the Peace Portal, set up to function as a hub for information exchange and collaboration within the network (until 1 April 2012 the Peace Portal has been supported by the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs and the City of The Hague and has been developed in partnership with other civil society organisations. From 1 April 2013 to end of 2015 the Peace Portal is being co-financed by MFS II). Additionally, the development and functioning of regional collaborative structures (including Regional Secretariat, a Regional Liaison officer and a Regional Steering Group in the Regions) can be seen as outcomes in this area.

A more informal outcome is the development of a shared understanding that regional priorities are leading within GPPAC, with the Global Secretariat having a supportive and facilitative role rather than a directive one. Regions tend to see this as the living reality of GPPAC. Another informal outcome is the development and maintenance of working relations, often warm and friendly, across a number of prominently involved staff of member organisations with each other and with Global Secretariat staff.

Another informal outcome, lying at the basis of much of the above, is the organisational culture of GPPAC, and the way this is advanced by the Global Secretariat. The Global Secretariat staff, having a central role in the development of the network, has had an important role in collectively enacting and advancing a shared vision on network strengthening, implementing key dimensions of the ToC such as: the central role of regional priorities, the importance of linking and collaborating, and the facilitating and supportive role that the Global Secretariat is to play. The important role of the Global Secretariat is also evident in that a relatively large proportion of linkages and flows is between the Global Secretariat and member organisations. Horizontal linking is mentioned as significant and sometimes of prime importance, but this mostly pertains to within-region interaction, as it takes place in some of the regions rather than across the network. Interactions across regions also take



place, from the same starting points of supportiveness and regional ownership, mostly taking the form of learning exchanges (through e.g. workshops, conferences and visits) and, in some cases, the supportive contribution of knowledge towards specific regional projects.

GPPAC facilitates regions' functioning by supporting (largely through the Global Secretariat), financially and organisationally, network interactions and the development of approaches and activities. Membership in fact mostly revolves around the development and implementation of peacebuilding and conflict prevention initiatives with GPPAC support. Many outcomes relate to this. It is important to keep in mind here that GPPAC is not an NGO but a network of organisations that all work independently of GPPAC, with their membership of GPPAC potentially contributing to their work in minor or major ways. Membership of GPPAC has thus advanced peacebuilding and conflict prevention by members. Regions report the development of relations and collaborations among member organisations in peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities of many kinds, matching regional priorities. Indeed, regions have developed shared understandings and activities, mostly focusing on national and regional issues. However, there is much diversity in the degree to which regions achieve outcomes on this front.

**Box 15.1 GPPAC South Africa Example**

GPPAC Southern Africa reports the results of its Regional Steering Group meeting as an outcome: 'The Regional Steering Group successfully developed and endorsed a work plan to guide implementation of activities during 2014 and 2015. The work plan was subsequently approved by the GPPAC Secretariat. The focus for the region during 2014–2015 includes activities focusing on: • provision of training for journalists on conflict-sensitive reporting, • enhancing levels of voter education, and • supporting capacity building in peace and security issues for grassroots organisations. A follow-up exchange visit aimed at supporting members from Angola, Mozambique and Namibia to exchange lessons from their work with former combatants is also planned for this period'

A necessary qualification here is the extent to which regions function as such. In some cases the 'region' is evidently productive as a construct. In such regions, the interaction and collaboration facilitated through GPPAC contributes to members' peacebuilding and conflict prevention practices. Regional collaboration makes it possible to work on conflict involving different countries in a region and can facilitate members' mutual support within regional contexts. However, this does not always happen. In some cases, little interaction or activity takes place beyond the yearly 'Regional Steering Group' meetings and the back-to-back engagements with targets and other stakeholders that are often organised around these. Regional Secretariats, the formal and key contact points between Global Secretariat and region, may also dominate the region to the extent that regional activities funded by GPPAC are carried out by the Regional Secretariat and perhaps a small number of other organisations rather than the regional network more broadly. In some cases, regional members, beyond members belonging to the Regional Steering Group may even have almost no involvement with GPPAC, or even little awareness of GPPAC as a global network. In a few cases, regional Secretariats have been found to be 'gatekeeping' – excluding potentially interested organisations within their region. Most regions, however, actively seek inclusion of new members, especially from countries that are not yet represented or active in GPPAC. Such problems regarding regional level collaboration have been identified and taken up by Global Secretariat staff and Regional Secretariat staff (in relevant regions).

As regional membership is managed by Regional Secretariats, there is no management of membership and member roles at the global level, nor has there been a policy to handle membership issues as mentioned above; such issues are being addressed through dialogue, however, and presently membership policy is being discussed in the face of experiences. In short, steps have

been taken to improve regional collaboration, but the fact also remains that some regions are weaker than others. Reasons for this are in some cases beyond GPPAC's control, such as the financial and political conditions under which civil society in specific regions needs to operate.

#### Interaction with targets:

Another broad outcome indicator under the priority result area of agenda setting on which GPPAC has achieved outcomes is: 'Alliance and other actors become aware of the issues at stake, organise themselves and adhere to the position of the ILA programme'. In the case of GPPAC, we approach this outcome indicator as addressing GPPAC's engagements with external actors. Because linking and convening towards shaping more inclusive and people-centred peacebuilding and conflict prevention practice is central to GPPAC advocacy, the framing of this outcome indicator needs to be adapted. It needs to include not only classic forms of advocacy advancing positions and recommendations, but also process-oriented engagements with external actors.

GPPAC has succeeded in bringing about interactions and often long-term collaborations with a range of targets and partners, on the full range of themes identified in the ToC. Interactions mostly take the form of consultation, dialogue and, in some cases, collaboration in the context of policy development, training and conflict prevention and peacebuilding practices such as dialogue and mediation, peace education and preventive action. Issues on which GPPAC has achieved outcomes in terms of gaining access and developing forms of collaboration and interaction with targets are the following:

- Gender, in particular advancement and implementation of UNSCR 1325 (state targets; RIGOs; UN)
- Human security (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat–PIFS; Mali (Through a joint project of WANEP, GPPAC and Human Security Collective, not MFS II funded but embedded within GPPAC and financed with match funding from GPPAC); UN)
- Infrastructures for Peace (targets in West-Africa including ECOWAS, Kyrgyzstan, UN, OSCE)
- Peace education (practitioners; national education institutions and systems; several international organisations); dialogue and mediation (UN, state targets)
- Civil-Military interactions (UN, CCOE, state targets)
- RIGO capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding (RIGOS including ECOWAS, EEAS, ASEAN, OAS, LAS, PIFS)
- Policies ensuring protection of civil society space in the context of repressive counterterrorism measures (UN).

On regional level, interaction with targets largely revolves around conflicts and issues within their own region. Hence, states and RIGOs are for regions the most selected targets, but engagements also include a number of civic diplomacy initiatives, such as:

- Civil society networking in order to contribute to regional security in Northeast Asia, in particular with regard to relations with DPRK (GPPAC Northeast Asia)
- Track 2 (recently developed into track 1.5) dialogue following the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict (GPPAC Caucasus)
- Track 2 dialogue on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (GPPAC Caucasus).

Targets and partners at UN level that we spoke with tended to appreciate GPPAC and see considerable legitimacy and potential for the network approach of GPPAC, with a clear (potential) added value in the field of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. At the same time, we found the

same targets and partners saying they had not seen much 'work' of GPPAC, or had not seen the potential of bringing in actors 'from the ground' materialise to a great extent yet. Indeed, important external contacts of GPPAC, including policy makers, conveyed during interviews their interest in GPPAC, but at the same time explained they are waiting to see more. GPPAC thus at least to some important contacts has come across as something like a promise that stands to be fulfilled. In the past year, we see some improvement on this front. There has been an increase in interaction with the UN involving the regions. Effective involvement and liaising by GPPAC's UN liaison has played an important role, as well as the production of advocacy materials that relate to the UN context. At the same time, interactions between GPPAC's New York Liaison and the regions has been limited to a small set of instances involving regions. While the liaison has facilitated some interactions between regional members and the UN, she has mostly been supporting the Global Secretariat's advocacy. Some regions engage with the UN relatively independently and do not always connect this to GPPAC. Examples here are GPPAC Latin America member CRIES' and GPPAC Pacific/FemlinkPacific's engagements with the UN. But these engagements are far fewer than those led by the Global Secretariat.

Many interactions with targets, while on similar or related themes, tend to develop in parallel. Initiatives sometimes link with each other, with experiences, knowledge, contacts and legitimacy gained in one arena contributing to access and interactions elsewhere. While in a sense ad hoc, this is a form of strategically navigating a complex and fluid terrain. This includes searching for opportunities to insert GPPAC where possible while keeping in view broadly formulated longer-term objectives. It also implies, however, that focus, demarcation and co-ordination of initiatives across levels has been limited. In fact, with the strong emphasis on regional priorities, regional ownership and supportiveness, it is even a question to what extent such coordination can be realistically expected from members – the network's key principles of collaboration are not geared to this.

#### Learning and knowledge sharing:

There is an observed lack of commitment to some formal network objectives among parts of the network. However, this does not imply that members do not see benefit in being part of GPPAC, beyond the facilitation of regional interaction and activities. Members acknowledge forms of support by the Global Secretariat, including organisational support, technical expertise, exchange of knowledge and assistance in obtaining funding. Also, cross-regional support, and the usefulness of GPPAC-produced knowledge and tools, is acknowledged. Members speak of learning and knowledge sharing in different ways. Regional Representatives and Regional Liaison Officers we spoke with referred to the process of learning through meeting and exchanging with other GPPAC members as an important contribution of GPPAC to their work, even though their descriptions of this learning remained generic. In fact, at meetings we observed numerous constructive exchanges of experiences and advice between members discussing challenges and options related to their work. Learning has also taken place through Working Groups, involving the exchange of knowledge, undertaking of collective activities such as participation and organisation of workshops and engagement with targets, as well as the development and sharing of (some) network-produced content across regions.

A prominent case of a working group product attaining significance across regions is the 'GPPAC Alert', an Early Warning tool developed by a GPPAC working group that is beginning to be taken up across regions. The development and sharing of a 'Conflict Analysis Field Guide' can also be mentioned here. A basic challenge with the Working Groups, supposedly the central network structures for advancement of learning, has been the trickling down of learning to actors outside of the groups. Within GPPAC, it has been noted that the working groups feed into the activities of the

regions to a degree that is more limited than was hoped. At the same time, much learning may have been of a tacit and multifaceted nature that cannot reasonably be expected to find direct reflection in planned activities and outcomes. In addition, learning has also taken place through direct involvement of Global Secretariat staff with regional programmes and activities, involving technical and organisational support as well as training.

**Box 15.2 GPPAC Dialogue and Mediation Example**

'The GPPAC Dialogue and Mediation Working Group met in Montenegro, which was hosted by the GPPAC Regional Secretariat for the Western Balkans, the Nansen Dialogue Centre (NDC) Montenegro in collaboration with the Nansen Dialogue Centre Serbia. The three day programme started with the political engagements programme. A number of high-level meetings and roundtables were held with the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Adviser to the Prime Minister, Parliamentarian Commissions, representatives of key academic centres, as well as UNDP office in Montenegro. During these events, the GPPAC Dialogue and Mediation Working Group members from the Caucasus, Eastern and Central Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, North America, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Western Balkans presented their experiences supporting and facilitating dialogue and mediation processes in different conflict-affected contexts. Having received very positive feedback from the officials about the role that GPPAC plays in the region, the working group members offered their diverse experiences to further enhance peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies pursued by regional actors. These meetings resulted in an offer extended by the Montenegrin Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration to collaborate with the Nansen Dialogue Centre – Montenegro as well as the GPPAC regional network on a number of country-specific projects'.

The Peace Portal, an online portal meant to further interaction at all levels, is a tool used to increase cross-regional sharing and collaboration and it shows considerable activity. However, in spite of the Portal receiving much attention and effort by Global Secretariat staff in the diversity of meetings, on the website and in the digital updates, it has turned out difficult to involve members across the network. Many members have not answered calls to join the Peace Portal. Underlying issues are difficulties with Internet access in more remote areas, language barriers, but also visibility of the GPPAC network and commitment to being part of GPPAC play a role.

Development of positions and strategies through networking:

GPPAC has consistently organised activities around the themes set out in the strategic plan: preventive action, human security, peace education, dialogue and mediation – and with the ambition to mainstream gender across the themes. Work on these themes has taken place at national, regional and global levels.

We should note that GPPAC's focus is often not on advancing specific positions, but rather about advancing development of civil society collaboration and engagement, people-centred peacebuilding or conflict prevention practices as such. Especially in efforts led by the Global Secretariat, the key message has been towards advancement of a normative framework centring on inclusiveness, advancing openness to 'local voices' and awareness of their prime importance, through positions and recommendations on this and by embodiment of the message embedded in the global network. This message is about inclusiveness embracing the diversity of the field and stakeholders involved, and is not expressed by a clearly delineated key message. One prominently involved Regional Representative described GPPAC's global agenda in a way that succinctly sheds light on this: 'the global agenda is an edited version of 15 regional action agendas. It is not coming from the Global Secretariat. It is very diverse and difficult to summarise'.

Linking the regional and global is embedded in the ambition to develop and work through a collective agenda. This has contributed to the development of more focus in the second half of the period

under evaluation. Progress has been made in operationalisation of key concepts and objectives, clearer articulation of positions and recommendations. At the same time, it continues to be difficult to do this. Much energy has been spent on internally oriented deliberation towards the accommodation and management of diversity and seeking common ground, rather than the more externally oriented work of identification of pathways of change, development of strategy, and the mobilisation, development, planning, and execution of activity towards the achievement of objectives through the network.

At regional levels, regions work largely on the basis of their own agendas, with a consistent focus on regional priorities. Regions produce and use content, including policy briefs, training manuals, courses and models. In some cases, such production draws on GPPAC-produced tools and models such as GPPAC's Conflict Analysis Field Guide, GPPAC's media training manual, or expertise on themes like Gender. Such production sometimes also benefits from cross-regional learning exchanges involving working groups or other regions. However, much of the content developed is not actively shared or adopted across regions. Similarly, defined network priorities, such as human security, carry legitimacy in the network, having been developed through deliberation in GPPAC structures. But this does not imply they are shared across the network. This is also not intended or pursued; regional priorities are to lead, and members are given opportunities to engage with cross-regional issues rather than a collective agenda being imposed. The framework for collaboration, being primarily set up to facilitate and stimulate regions, provides room for regions to develop their own approaches and activities that may disregard defined global priorities.

At the same time, looking at the nature of advocacy at global level, we may also say that in the development of positions and strategies, activity has not always stayed true to network principles. At global level, Global Secretariat staff has often operated relatively independently. This is in itself not uncommon; however, in the case of GPPAC, the Global Secretariat has no clear mandate to represent regional actors, nor do staff explicitly embrace this role. It is rather that theory and practice are slightly at odds here. It is not that staff do not seek to involve regions, it is rather that regions have tended to remain relatively uninvolved when it comes to development and execution of positions and strategies at global level. This is not to say that this involvement is fully absent. Some regions have been involved, and there has also been an increase in this involvement in the latter part of the evaluated period.

In engagement with global organisations, including a range of UN bodies (UNDP BCPR, PBC, the Human Security Unit, UNDP, UNITAR, UN Women and UNESCO) the Global Secretariat is often in the lead. Global Secretariat staff has represented GPPAC at venues worldwide not only to open doors, but also to contribute the insights learned from the network and the development of network positions and recommendations towards targets. This has contributed to the establishment of GPPAC as a network organisation. While there has been no opposition to these activities or positions taken there is some tension with GPPAC's networking principles, at least in the eyes of parts of the network. When it comes to GPPAC's engagement with the UN, there have been complaints of a 'disconnect' between some Global Secretariat engagements and many regions. From reports and interviews it became clear that around half of the regions do not engage with the UN directly or feel disconnected from the UN arena. Their projects do not relate to the UN and their patterns of activity do not convey ambitions to establish interactions with the UN as their focus is on regional and national issues and stakeholders. Limitations in involvement do not imply opposition though, and may in some cases be at least partly due to resource constraints. Among the regions that do engage with the UN it is often a minor part of their work in the context of GPPAC. In any case, in much

global-level advocacy, regions' role was limited through the involvement of—often, but not always— one or two representatives from the Regions and through information sharing. In the latter part of the evaluated period, this role has increased, and the challenge of connecting regional and global level has been taken up for the development of GPPAC's strategic plan for 2016–2020.

On the global level GPPAC has engaged in advocacy (often with partner NGOs) on multiple issues such as on two of the key ambitions stated in GPPAC's strategic plan: 'a shift from reaction to prevention' or, somewhat more concretely, 'UN, RIGOs and state actors develop good practices and standards of effective coordination and government engagement for preventing conflicts'. This is operationalised and translated into action by taking up specific issues in the production of advocacy materials and reports. For example: a policy note on the inclusion of a peace and stability objective in the post-2015 development goals; a position paper (project is supported by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund) and a scoping study on the New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States; a position paper and a conference report on human security. In these initiatives, direct regional involvement has mostly remained limited, with Global Secretariat staff taking up the role of representing GPPAC in advocacy coalitions with other civil society organisations.

In the recent past, higher regional involvement was achieved in the context of human security advocacy. An extensive research-based report, called, 'Empowerment and Protection. Stories of Human Security', brings together local perspectives on human security from members around the world, integrated and translated into a set of recommendations towards international, state and other actors. In addition, the online campaign 'Human Security First', which brings together videos and photos stressing the diverse meanings of human security in different contexts, directly involves regions.

#### Inclusion of CSOs in peacebuilding and conflict prevention processes:

A broad outcome indicator in the priority result area agenda setting in which Programme IV has attained outcomes is: Relevant NGOs and/or other stakeholders involved in the programme are invited to participate in meetings (or organise meetings) relevant for the issue(s) by lobby/advocacy targets on public/private sector policies or those of international institutions. In many ways, and at multiple levels, GPPAC has advanced positions, instruments and recommendations at state-level, at the level of RIGOs and at the United Nations. In many cases, outcomes come in series, as interactions frequently take the form of longer-term engagements. As implied above, advanced positions, instruments and recommendations relate to multiple issues and GPPAC themes. Regions advance these to a relatively large degree at the level of states. The Central Asia region, for example, has advanced Infrastructures for Peace (I4P) working with the state of Kyrgyzstan, and the Western Balkans has advanced tools and recommendations on Peace Education, collaborating with state institutions. A number of regions also succeeded at advancing positions, tools or recommendations at the level of RIGOs, including ASEAN, ECOWAS, EEAS, PIFS and LAS.

#### **Box 15.3 GPPAC Pacific Example**

'In 2013, GPPAC Pacific/FemlinkPacific was invited to make contributions and input into the development of Fiji's Human Security Framework. Not only was this a recognition of the work in this area but it was also a recognition of the 'interim government' recognising GPPAC Pacific/FemlinkPacific as experts in the area of Human Security. Throughout 2013 to present, the Executive Director (Gender Liaison) and Programme Director (Regional Liaison Officer) of FemlinkPacific have been actively inputting into the discussions related to Human Security and materials and resources have been shared with the Ministry of Defence for them to take into account during the development of Fiji's National Human Security Framework'.

These positions, tools and recommendations have involved specific policy issues, such as UNSCR 1325 (ASEAN, PIFS) as well as the broader GPPAC ambition of an enhanced role for civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding (ECOWAS, LAS, PIFS). Regions have also advanced positions and recommendations at other levels, including UNDP regional offices (GPPAC West-Africa, GPPAC Pacific, GPPAC Latin America and the Caribbean) and the UN General Assembly (GPPAC West Africa, GPPAC Pacific). Regions have also been involved in advancing positions, tools and recommendations in contexts beyond (inter)governmental organisations, most prominently through Track 2 diplomacy initiatives, through multi-stakeholder fora such as conferences, and through working with schools and training institutions.

At regional level, interactions with targets reported by GPPAC members as GPPAC outcomes are not always clearly a result of participation in the network. Often outcomes are more prominently the result of member organisation activity that draws on GPPAC to only a limited degree (not so much drawing on the network, but rather drawing on funding, technical assistance and organisational support by Global Secretariat staff). In many cases, positions advanced, tools developed and recommendations provided do not clearly involve GPPAC-produced content or GPPAC-related collaborations. In a few cases, outcomes that regions claim GPPAC outcomes have no clear link to GPPAC, other than the fact of the organisation that has achieved the outcome being a member of GPPAC. These qualifications do not imply, however, that interaction within the network has not in some way contributed to the development of positions, tools and recommendations

GPPAC has contributed to opening spaces by linking regional actors with targets previously inaccessible, or less accessible, to such members. Examples include prominent instances, like the invitation of Oulie Keita of GPPAC West Africa to speak at a UNGA debate on Human Security and assigning a civil society servant at the League of Arab States as a direct result of lobbying and relation building by GPPAC with key decision makers of LAS since 2011. The more invisible linking takes place between regional members and a range of different spaces that regional members obtain access to through GPPAC, more specifically through the efforts and contacts of Global Secretariat Staff and the Working Groups.

**Box 15.4 GPPAC Conflict Analysis Training Example**

'In 2013, GPPAC conducted a Training of Trainers on Conflict Analysis for the group of analysts and monitoring experts of the office of OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Having valued GPPAC's conflict analysis framework, as well as its training capacity OCSE HCNM office requested follow-up in-country trainings for their local experts. Building on the successful training, the OCSE office in Vienna requested GPPAC to conduct training on conflict analysis for OSCE's during their Annual Early Warning Focal Point meeting. Additionally, as a result of closer collaboration with OSCE, the GPPAC Regional Representative for Western Balkans, and the Director of Nansen Dialogue Centre in Montenegro was invited to attend OCSE's Regional Early Warning Focal Point meeting in Belgrade in 2014'.

GPPAC also reports having contributed to a number of formal or informal changes that increase inclusiveness of previously closed decision making spaces (i.e., CSOs, their networks, and their constituents' ability to participate in decision making has increased). Having lobbied (together with others including EPLO and PAX) for the League of Arab States' opening up to civil society, GPPAC reports that, as part of an internal restructuring process at the League of Arab States and as a way to underline the importance of civil society in the current political context in the region, the Secretary-General of the LAS appointed a special envoy for civil society. At the same time, a new director of the department of civil society was also appointed. Subsequently, the LAS Secretariat and GPPAC have worked closely together in the establishment of a civil society liaison to the LAS. This can be seen as a major step for the League, so far known as an institution with little openness to civil society. GPPAC

also reports that the agenda for the inclusion of civil society echoes a number of recommendations it made to the organisation on this front.

**Box 15.5 GPPAC National Action Plan 1325 Example**

'The Japanese and South Korean governments began to develop their respective National Action Plans on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace & Security in 2013, and GPPAC members have been centrally involved in developing and coordinating relevant civil society recommendations; in turn, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of each country have launched consultation processes with civil society (including GPPAC), representing the recognition of the importance of civil society input and participation, and with some recommendations taken up in the drafting and monitoring process. In South Korea, the government announced the first draft of its NAP on UNSCR 1325 in January 2013. Until then no civil society consultation had taken place; following this a civil society 1325 Network was launched and in late January the first consultation roundtable took place. This network continued to make numerous recommendations to the government, including for example the establishment of the high-level governmental and civil society consultative body for developing the NAP, which was later realised'.

Interactions to create space for civil society at global level are largely led by Global Secretariat staff. Staff members have sought to build relations with a set of UN institutions for the advancement of elements of GPPAC's global level agenda, most prominently the advancement of human security and, relatedly, the inclusion of peace and stability into the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. In this advocacy, member involvement has been sought and advanced, but this has been more limited than hoped for; the final year of the evaluated period shows some improvement on this front, with relatively more regional members collaborating and interaction towards advocacy at UN level.

**Partnerships:**

In many cases, interaction with targets takes its form through collaborating with other CSOs, (research) institutions and international organisations. At global levels GPPAC has developed more limited or tentative collaborations with other organisations working on the same issues, including, most importantly, alliance partner PAX, Alliance for Peacebuilding, the Human Security Collective, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, Cordaid, Quaker United Nations Office, World Federalist Movement, the Kroc Institute of the University of Notre Dame but also CSOs such as Saferworld, the Post-2015 Women's Coalition and intergovernmental organisations such as International IDEA – in the context of a range of themes and projects. GPPAC has also collaborated with other CSOs in specific policy processes, for example GPPAC North America, in partnership with other CSOs, targeted the Mexican government on legislation for the protection of Human Right Defenders and Journalists. Other examples include advocacy towards the League of Arab States led by GPPAC and involving PAX, EPLO and GPPAC Middle East and North Africa and other CSOs; GPPAC's joint advocacy with a range of other CSOs towards the inclusion of a peace and stability goal in the post-2015 sustainable development goals.

Finally, we have seen interactions increasingly involving developments towards relatively more substantial forms of collaboration between GPPAC and its targets, both at regional and global levels. Many of these are still in early stages. Reports speak, for example, of exploration of collaboration between GPPAC and other actors towards development of Track 2 dialogue in Venezuela (GPPAC Latin America and the Caribbean) or reaching agreement towards collaboration with UNDP BCPR in a future research project on Infrastructures for Peace and close collaboration with regional UNDP offices reported by at least 5 Regions. There are challenges, as one of the regional Representatives mentioned: 'The longer term relationship building and changing practices of e.g. UNDP is not easily captured adequately. The tensions at international levels between governments is also making the work of CSOs difficult.'



### Visibility and Engagement:

A broad outcome indicator in the priority result area ‘agenda setting’ that fits a number of outcomes achieved by GPPAC is: extent to which lobby/advocacy targets react upon the positions taken by the ILA programme. In the case of GPPAC, such reactions are in most cases not in the form of public endorsement or other forms of public reaction to activities. In most cases, these reactions have taken the forms that match GPPAC’s practice of engaging with targets through collaborative forms of interaction. Moreover, it is in the course of engagement that reactions are registered, and thus cannot be seen as separate from these processes. Members and global Secretariat staff report targets’ expressions of interest in GPPAC, development of access to targets in the form of invitations for consultation, to provide trainings, or to give presentations encouraging to further engagements. Other related outcomes are: 1) input being taken seriously; 2) the development of alliance-like collaborations, such as with the UN Human Security Unit; and 3) occasionally, members report using a ‘champion’ for a cause in a policy process. Members of GPPAC have also reported obtaining more standing in their work because of their association with GPPAC, as a global network. Reactions are not always tangible and often members are, self-evidently, not in a position to present evidence to back up their claims.

#### **Box 15.6 GPPAC Mali Example**

GPPAC received an official invitation to do a training session for the Dutch Ministry of Defence staff that will participate in the UN Mission to Mali—MINUSMA on civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). This means that GPPAC actually managed to train NL military personnel what a human security approach and a civilian approach for MINUSMA could mean in practice, as well as awareness of civil society and their role in the conflict situation in Mali. The training took place in December 2014 and the outcome is described as follows: [...] The relationship with the Ministry of Defence seems to lead to involvement of GPPAC and project partners to convey the HS and CSO approaches into military briefings of new MINUSMA staff to Mali.

At global level, the many sustained and increasing collaborations with targets indicate a certain significance of these relations for the targets. For example, the Officer-in-Charge of the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (the inter-agency programme of the United Nations, mandated to promote and develop constructive relations between the UN and CSOs) stressed how the two GPPAC-affiliated individuals who spoke at UN General Assembly debates in 2014 through the agency’s mediation offered a valuable contribution. The officer stressed this to be exactly because of their ability to speak from their connection to local communities and from a constructive stance. For this officer, who did not know about GPPAC until then, these contributions showed GPPAC’s practice of empowering locally grounded voices and as such a clear added value of GPPAC in the world of peacebuilding and conflict prevention, encouraging further involvement of GPPAC by her agency. The Officer-in-Charge of a UN body that GPPAC has been working with highly commended GPPAC as special and valuable for its capacity not only to bring forward and give access to voices on the ground, but also for having ‘as its whole purpose’ the creation of constructive relations, both horizontally and vertically; ‘a rare if not unique way of working in a context where INGOs generally work with ‘local’ partners on project basis’.

At regional level, interest or recognition is not prominently due to the member organisations being a member of GPPAC. Organisations build on their access, reputation and capacities developed outside of GPPAC, with GPPAC sometimes having a supportive role. In some cases, this also involves interaction at global level. Examples here include the invitation of Sharon Bhagwan Rolls (Regional Representative of GPPAC Pacific and director of FemLinkPacific) to speak at the UN General Assembly Thematic Debate ‘Ensuring Stable and Peaceful Societies’. In other cases, especially at global level, recognition is much more clearly and prominently the recognition of GPPAC itself. This is the

recognition as a network with the legitimacy or capacities such as knowledge of local conflict situations or expertise and the ability to collect, share and provide input on these situations to act quickly to changing circumstances. This is mentioned a number of times by external resource persons as 'GPPAC's potential'. Prime examples of these include invitations for GPPAC member from West Africa, Oulie Keita, to speak at a UN General Assembly Debate on human security; the mentioning of GPPAC's work on human security in the third UN Secretary-General (UNSG)'s report on Human Security; and agreement with UNITAR to officially partner with GPPAC to produce an SSR e-learning curriculum on the UN Learning Portal.

GPPAC has sought visibility and public support for the network and its goals through the public sphere through mainstream and alternative media. Some outreach is seen through newspaper articles and a BBC world service radio interview, all on specific issues that GPPAC has sought to advance its position and recommendations on. Several articles were published in the Global Observatory, an online journal of the International Peace Institute. Relatively substantial coverage in mainstream media was achieved by GPPAC Northeast Asia, focusing on regional conflict. Some further coverage was achieved by other regional members, again focusing on regional issues. In many of these publications, GPPAC is not mentioned or promoted. The emphasis is on engaging with media to advance conflict prevention and peacebuilding, not the GPPAC brand. Further media coverage was attained through alternative media, most prominently Pressenza, an international news agency dedicated to news about peace and nonviolence. This has been largely coordinated by the Global Secretariat, but has consistently involved regional members, their work and focusing on members' regional priorities. Indications of changed levels of visibility or public support for GPPAC resulting from this coverage are absent. The only available indications of visibility and public support can be found in the analysis of online activity, including communication through Facebook and Twitter. The two campaigns 'Breaking the Nuclear Chain' and 'Human Security First' (the Human Security First campaign has 1372 likes on Facebook; 258 followers on Twitter; the Breaking the Nuclear Chain campaign has 3050 likes on Facebook and 859 followers on Twitter).<sup>550</sup>

Visibility and engagement with the media have been acknowledged by GPPAC as issues needing attention. Action has been taken at the Global Secretariat, including a reshaping of the communications team and staff, development of a new website, an ongoing rebranding process and staff and member training on engagement with the media. Important and remaining (interrelated) challenges on this front of visibility and public support are the lack of an effective strategic plan towards visibility and public support and difficulties mobilising network members to contribute to these goals. Global Secretariat staff has started to address these issues internally, acknowledging and acting upon the insight that GPPAC's media strategy has been underdeveloped, under implemented, and not as effective as desired. However, apart from media coverage, visibility has been advanced by having GPPAC's work made visible in UN reports, UN General Assembly debates, and the channelling of some of GPPAC's work through the website of the UN Human Security Unit.

#### 15.2.2.2 Relevance of outcomes in priority result area 'agenda setting'

Internally, relatively many and substantial outcomes have been achieved that are relevant for further developing and strengthening the capacities of the network in terms of the development and maintenance of infrastructure for collaboration among members. To a more limited degree, outcomes have been achieved that are relevant in the sense that they contribute to the development, testing and adaptation of concepts, tools and methodologies that contribute to effective, locally grounded conflict strategies. While certainly parts of the network have been involved in this, and significant progress has been made on these fronts, interaction in the network

towards these objectives has been rather uneven and limited in light of stated ambitions. On the other hand, members do report the access to, and facilitation of, information to members through GPPAC as relevant and contributing to their (mostly region-centred) achievements.

Relatively substantial outcomes have been achieved that are relevant for developing and strengthening capacities of the network in terms of the development and maintenance of infrastructure for collaboration between members and other actors, primarily through successes in linking and convening. With that, outcomes contribute to GPPAC's ambition to improve conditions for a civil society role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The inclusion of civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes is a central ambition in GPPAC's ToC. Outcomes achieved on this front clearly contribute to this ambition. When it comes to inclusion in processes towards conflict prevention policy and practice, the linking and convening that takes place through GPPAC brings together targets, GPPAC members and other actors on the themes and issues that GPPAC and members are working on. This supports civil society actors to gain access to spaces otherwise less accessible to them.

Outcomes at regional as well as global levels pertain to the execution of peacebuilding and conflict prevention activity fitting the GPPAC themes of peace education, dialogue and mediation, preventive action, human security and gender. Themes are broadly formulated, and mostly accommodate organisations' own ambitions. This support is clearly relevant to members. Members' engagement in networking to develop and advance shared positions and strategies as formulated in GPPAC's ToC is less prevalent in the outcomes, though some significant outcomes can also be noted here. While goals of members and network can go hand in hand, they often do not seem to, since much attention is focused on regional priorities rather than the circulation and further advancement of lessons learned through the network more broadly, or coordination and interrelation of positions and strategies.

While networking has contributed to the development of an advocacy agenda informed by sharing and generating knowledge from within the network, the extent to which this agenda is in fact shared and generated by the network has important limits. While there have been strategies developed based on this agenda, relating to whom to target, by what means, and towards what objectives, these strategies and their implementation are constricted when compared with ambitions of achievements as stated in the ToC. This is also a matter of how ToC is related to within GPPAC. Within GPPAC, the overall ToC provides direction and a broadly framed understanding of how change is to happen, rather than that it involves an elaborate conceptualisation of more concrete objectives and elaborately developed pathways of change for members to pursue.

In conclusion, the changes achieved are relevant considering the objectives, showing particularly strong results in key dimensions central to GPPAC's ToC, emphasising principles of inclusiveness and the furthering of regional priorities. There are also limitations to the degree of relevance. The aims and objectives<sup>551</sup> as part of the ToC go much beyond what has been achieved. In addition, the networking reality brings important challenges when it comes to the advancement of these aims and objectives.

#### 15.2.2.3 Priority result area 'policy influencing'

GPPAC has attained outcomes on broad outcome indicator Demonstrable changes (including adoption of new policies and prevention of policy changes) take place by lobby/advocacy targets. Several of these changes involve the inclusion of instruments or recommendations in policy (partially) generated or promoted by the network. GPPAC West Africa reports having advanced

conflict prevention infrastructure and mechanisms in West Africa through collaboration with other stakeholders in the region, most prominently ECOWAS. These collaborations have evolved around WANEP's work on Early Warning and Early Response.

**Box 15.7 GPPAC ECOWAS Example**

'There are signs of increasing synergy between WANEP, ECOWAS, AU as well as others such as UNDP. The WANEP Peace Monitoring Centre (PMC) has become the reference point for most governments for information on human security not only at the local level but also at the national levels. The system has improved ECOWAS' ability to receive and act on critical information to protect and consolidate peace and security in the region. This was acknowledged by Ms. Florence Theme, acting Director of the Early Warning Directorate (EWD) of ECOWAS and representing the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace & Security in September 2012: 'The relationship with WANEP has been very useful to the Commission, because the early warning mechanism of WANEP complements the responses and feedback from various communities and states to the Commission; It has also helped communities and citizens to get more involved in early warning programmes'.

GPPAC North America reports having contributed to change in the area of legal protection for human rights defenders in Mexico. The contribution was through lobbying together with other CSOs. GPPAC Central Asia reports having contributed to the development of Infrastructures for Peace in Kyrgyzstan, in collaboration with the Regional Secretariat, FTI, UNDP's Programmes office in Kyrgyzstan and GPPAC. More concretely, outcomes contributed to the establishment of a State Agency on Local-Self Government and Interethnic Relations, to respond to peace and conflict processes in Kyrgyzstan. The mandate of the Agency is the implementation of strategies and programmes on LSG development and interethnic relations and the cooperation with civil society organisations on peacebuilding initiatives. GPPAC Pacific reports having contributed to the development of a Human Security Framework for The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (this is a RIGO). The aim of the framework is to provide a clear common foundation and strategic guidance to Forum Island Countries, its Secretariat and other stakeholders for improving the understanding, planning and implementation of human security approaches and peace and development initiatives in the Pacific context. Through long-term engagement, GPPAC Pacific reports it has contributed to the Secretariat's adoption of the Framework as well as elements of its content. Several regions report having successfully advanced peace education policies of schools, ministries and other institutions in the countries in which they are active (Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Western Balkans).

Other GPPAC outcomes fit the broad outcome indicator: 'Extent to which frames introduced or promoted by the network are taken up in policy documents and speeches of officials at national and international levels'. For example: 1) the points made by GPPAC North America's Regional secretariat included in a Majority Staff Report of the US Senate on Judicial and Police Reforms in Mexico; 2) The inclusion of GPPAC frames in three UN reports (most prominently the third UN Secretary-General (UNSG)'s report on Human Security); 3) The employment of a human security approach by a leading official of the League of Arab states, seen as at least partly an outcome of GPPAC advocacy by staff that has engaged with this organisation; 4) In the Great Lakes Project influence is reported with regard to the inclusion of content on linking youth unemployment with peace and security in a draft declaration by ICGLR, an intergovernmental organisation around the Great Lakes (The Great Lakes Project is not funded by MFS II but is embedded within GPPAC and for that reason this outcome is mentioned here) and 5) the public endorsement of Chile's Mission to the UN of GPPAC's Human Security campaign at an UNGA thematic debate on Human Security.

#### 15.2.2.4 Relevance of outcomes in priority result area ‘policy influencing’

Outcomes in this priority result area are limited, compared with the ambitions stated in GPPAC’s ToC, including: ‘targets (UN, RIGOs, State actors) adopt local CSOs’ recommendations in decision making and conflict prevention and policies’ and ‘targets (UN, RIGOs, State actors) develop standards for effective coordination and government engagement for preventing conflicts’. At the same time, it should be noted that these ambitions are very broadly formulated, and understood to be long-term affairs that GPPAC can contribute to rather than achieve. Nevertheless, limits stand out not only in terms of magnitude, but also in terms of the uneven distribution of success. Seven regions report demonstrable changes by targets, and only four of these report outcomes that clearly speak to the stated ambitions. It is noteworthy here that two of the regions reporting these outcomes exist as networks independent from GPPAC (FemLinkPacific, Regional Secretariat of GPPAC Pacific) and WANEP (equals GPPAC West Africa), with GPPAC having a supporting role. These regions largely advocate by their own content and achieved credibility as being part of their own organisational work scope and other networks they are a part of, rather than that of GPPAC per se – even if working with GPPAC has a clearly supportive role in both cases.

The relevance framing being taken up by targets has been limited to the degree that there is as yet no sign that these have directly contributed to the shifts in understanding and approach that GPPAC works for. However, such relevance would be hard to establish. Furthermore, it is likely that the visibility and legitimacy of GPPAC as a civil society actor associated with these frames have been enhanced by its mentioning and association with human security, within the UN.

#### 15.2.2.5 Changing practice

While GPPAC has not contributed to changes in practice as operationalised through the outcome indicators developed for the evaluation, we wish to include here certain practice-oriented outcomes specific for the domain of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. GPPAC has contributed to the creation of platforms for the inclusion of civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes. By (co-) organising conferences, workshops, roundtables and other forms of exchanges, GPPAC has advanced opportunities for interaction between civil society actors and other actors including states as well as international organisations on numerous occasions. Such occasions include, for example a conference with RIGOs, in which GPPAC in collaboration with the OAS convened 13 RIGOs, civil society and private sector actors to discuss the strengthening of a regional approach to peace and security. This is now progressing into further collaborations with RIGOs including the formation of a Global Working Group on RIGO-CSO collaboration established by GPPAC and the OAS. Thematic exchanges, such as the organisation of interactions on human security, bringing together regional members and UN actors can be included here.

#### **Box 15.8 GPPAC ASEAN Example**

‘GPPAC’s Executive Director Peter van Tuijl met with the Secretary General of ASEAN, Ambassador Le Luong Minh. They discussed ASEAN’s increasing institutional developments to address conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including the formal establishment of the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) and the newly established Asian Peace and Reconciliation Council. This is an initiative beyond ASEAN, which includes senior figures from more Asian countries, with the purpose of providing an ‘Eminent person’ kind of network that could intervene in crisis and conflict situations. The latter was linked to some discussion on whether ASEAN could benefit from some of the lessons learned from the Africa Union Panel of the Wise. Mr. Le Luong Minh was supportive of GPPAC’s efforts to enhance collaboration between RIGOs and CSOs on peace and security and agreed on the participation of this organisation in the Global Steering Group for RIGOs-CSOs cooperation. Former Secretary General of ASEAN, Ambassador Keng Yong Ong, was designated to represent the organisation in the working group’

In addition, GPPAC has contributed to the development of platforms for interaction between parties in conflict. Members report that GPPAC has provided a relatively neutral platform for interaction between parties in conflict. In such cases, the nature of the contribution lies in the generation, facilitation or continuation of process (interactions, nature and quality of process) among external actors (such as dialogue or other forms of contact). A prominent example here is a Track 2 diplomacy process involving dialogue between Georgian and Russian actors, in which a GPPAC member has played a central role, partly acting under the 'umbrella' of, and with support from, GPPAC (GPPAC Caucasus). A somewhat different type of the same contribution consists of the advancement of DPRK inclusion into GPPAC Northeast Asia. Following step-by-step relationship building and development of exchange between GPPAC and the North Korean organisation Korean National Peace Committee. The latter has become a full-fledged member of GPPAC North East Asia. While such contributions to the development and employment of platforms for interaction do not clearly signify inclusion into policy formulation, they do signify the creation of spaces where dialogue with targets can develop, or of spaces from which input to targets can emerge, as first steps towards reconciliation where there is otherwise little constructive interaction between parties in conflict.

#### 15.2.2.6 Relevance of outcomes in priority result area 'changing practice'

GPPAC has contributed to practice change by the creation and use of GPPAC as a platform providing previously non-existent space for dialogue, hence a change of practice. This contributes to inclusiveness in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, a key objective in GPPAC's ToC. The outcomes suggest practice changes in the sense of creation of inclusive practices, rather than that GPPAC's work contributes to a more general opening of space to civil society in the societies in which GPPAC is active. The achievements in the area of RIGOs, particularly the development of interaction on and between RIGOs through a global platform, is a unique achievement that came about due to GPPAC's global reach and strengths in linking and convening. Here, the added value of global networking, as well as benefits of GPPAC's approach to networking, make themselves highly evident.

#### 15.2.2.7 General commentary on categorisation of GPPAC outcomes under priority result areas

We wish to stress here also that categorisation of GPPAC's outcomes as above is debatable. For example, outcomes in the priority result area of 'agenda setting', as with those involving development of collaborations between CSOs, and between CSOs and targets, could, with a slightly different conceptualisation, fit well under the priority result area of 'changing practices'. The relatively strict separation between decision makers making policy and conducting practices, and their 'influencers', does not match well the collaborative structures by which GPPAC seeks to achieve change. Similarly, the strict separation between policy and practice does not do justice to complex reality where, as in the case of GPPAC, focus is on the way society deals with conflict rather than 'decision makers', and policy and practice are more interwoven. To give an example: when GPPAC trains 'targets' in the area of civil-military interaction, such an outcome can be seen as an opportunity to provide input, but might just as well be characterised under 'changing practice', depending on conceptualisation. The same goes where we find sustained collaborations between GPPAC and other actors. We have classified these under 'agenda setting', as they involved being invited and providing input. However, with a slightly different conceptualisation, such outcomes could be conceived in terms of 'changing practices'. In addition, also, internal network strengthening processes through the working groups leading to a change in the way of working of member organisations, for example, might be categorised under changes of practice, depending on the conceptualisation.

### 15.2.3 (Potential) underreporting and over-reporting of outcomes

#### 15.2.3.1 (Potential) underreporting of outcomes

Learning, including the development of shared understandings and approaches, is an important and tacit process that is hard to specify. With a tradition within GPPAC (but also more broadly in the international development context) to report outcomes that can be related to concrete activities such as workshops and meetings, tacit learning even further risks being underreported. It is likely that substantial learning has been underreported, as well as the usage of this learning in the development of approaches, positions and strategies.

Indeed, regions report as outcomes often only those outcomes that can be related to GPPAC funding or direct contributions of Global Secretariat staff – other contributions largely go unacknowledged, even as members, as stated above, do appreciate that they have learned through their involvement with GPPAC. During interviews, descriptions of this learning remained largely generic, which is likely to be at least partly due to the tacit learning that happened through the exchanges that have taken place, that often centre around the sharing of experiences and deliberation of ideas and approaches. The same problem of underreporting is potentially there when it comes to the outcomes that result from the linking and convening that GPPAC facilitates.

#### **Box 15.9 GPPAC Peace Education Example**

A Global Secretariat staff member explains: we hosted a Peace Education conference, together with George Mason University. We had a number of key actors from Washington, D.C., attending. Can I report an outcome from that? Probably not. But in six months I may hear that some of our members started working with the OAS on an event in Mexico, or that a GPPAC member started collaborating with another institution that attended the conference.

Considering the reporting of reaction and influence, for advocates, it can be hard to establish these. With the processes GPPAC seeks to influence being complex, non-transparent, and involving multiple actors, it will have been difficult in many cases to establish whether influence has taken place. In addition, there is good reason to suspect influence because of the quality and extensiveness of involvement with targets, the way they considered input, or the nature of subsequent developments such as target behaviour. We have indeed found members and staff hesitant to claim influence they feel they cannot substantiate. In addition, since within GPPAC, regions and programmes are not explicitly evaluated using this indicator, it may be that we have missed outcomes on this front. In addition, the idea and basis GPPAC works on/with are often not unique, which may again contribute to making influence hard to identify, also when it has taken place.

Within GPPAC, outcomes are conceptualised in terms of behavioural change; in some cases, results such as involvement of actors in deliberations that led to more shared understandings, or agreement of a target to take part in a GPPAC-organised collaboration, have not qualified in light of this definition, and have gone unreported.

Finally, GPPAC staff and evaluators find that outcomes in some cases go unreported because of staff and members sometimes not realising that a development can qualify as an outcome.

#### 15.2.3.2 (Potential) over-reporting of outcomes

When regions and programmes report outcomes, in some cases the information does not substantiate the claims made. For example, internal exchanges reported as contributing to network strengthening in themselves may or may not have had impact beyond the exchanges themselves. Regional Steering Group Meetings where agendas are officially established and plans formulated

sometimes do not subsequently lead to further development and implementation of the same. Externally, expressions of interest and support, achievement of access and collaboration may involve, or lead to, the influencing of agendas, policies and practice, but not necessarily so. In themselves, they do not automatically hold this promise. Expressions of support, for example, may be gratuitous. Collaboration may be the result of an existing agenda, in itself not necessarily influenced by GPPAC. The results of consultations may be laid aside.

In some cases, outcomes have arguably been overstated. We sometimes found member organisations reporting outcomes as 'GPPAC outcomes', by virtue of their organisation's membership of GPPAC rather than a concrete contribution of the network. In reporting, we also often found limited or no acknowledgement of the role of other actors, like other CSOs working for the same objectives. We also found a few cases where outcomes turned out not to be as substantial as reported, upon our follow-up.

### **15.3 Evaluation question 2: Case studies and Contribution**

This section deals with projects' contributions to changes, synthesising the findings on evaluation question 2: Do the international lobbying and advocacy efforts of MFS II alliances and their partners contribute to the identified changes (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

#### *15.3.1 General description of the way the alliance has made contributions*

GPPAC's contribution to the outcomes it has achieved can be approached from two angles. First of all, there is the consideration of the contribution of networking, as advanced through GPPAC, to outcomes claimed by GPPAC. The issue here is that GPPAC is not an NGO but a network of organisations that each work independently from GPPAC, with their membership of GPPAC potentially contributing to their work in minor or major ways. The second angle from which we can approach contribution analysis asks how GPPAC has contributed to changes to which also other actors and factors, beyond GPPAC membership, will have contributed.

We will take the first angle by broadly charting the relative contributions of GPPAC to outcomes to which members have also contributed in their own right. We will take the second angle through some general insights, and through zooming in on two contributions by GPPAC to peacebuilding and conflict prevention processes: GPPAC's advancement of human security at the United Nations, and GPPAC's contribution to the Mindanao peace process in the Philippines.

##### **15.3.1.1 Contribution of GPPAC membership**

As to the relative contributions of GPPAC to outcomes to which members have also contributed in their own right, we can identify different ways in which membership of GPPAC has advanced peacebuilding and conflict prevention by members. Members report three different types of contribution pertaining to their internal functioning as regions and peacebuilding organisations in their own right. The most prominently acknowledged form of contribution is that of funding of regional interaction and activities, thereby contributing to the formation of regional-level peacebuilding and conflict prevention networks and action. Secondly, members acknowledge other forms of support for the same by the Global Secretariat, including organisational support, technical expertise and assistance in obtaining funding. Thirdly, members speak of learning in terms of mutual exchange with fellow peacebuilders and, to a lesser extent, the learning and usage of approaches and tools; here, the Global Secretariat's support plays a role in the exchanges through the different structures and exchanges by which members meet and, in the case of working groups, collaborate.



### 15.3.1.2 Contribution to member engagement with targets

Members also report three different types of contributions of GPPAC to their engagements with targets. Firstly, they report the linking and convening by which members obtain relevant external contacts. An important role for Global Secretariat staff herein is their bringing together of international organisations and regional members, on the basis of their knowledge of international organisations and their familiarity with regions, their priorities and members/individuals from regions. Global Secretariat staff, closely involved with Working Groups and familiar with the work of regions, often performs a brokering role in linking between levels and actors, referring and stimulating interaction between external actors and members, and knowing who might be interesting for whom in the context of particular issues, opportunities or forms of exchange. Secondly, GPPAC has offered to members platforms for exchange with external actors, such as conferences and other events that members report as beneficial to their work.

#### **Box 15.10 GPPAC Northeast Asia Example**

‘The GPPAC platform in Northeast Asia, being truly regional, has allowed civil society representatives from countries with various tensions and conflicts on the state level to engage and cooperate. The composition of the Regional Steering Group with members with various respective experience working with the DPRK, such as Vladivostok Focal Point's academic exchanges, and Peace Boat's visits for engagement and exchange – have been of great importance in ensuring trust and cooperation from the DPRK partners. GPPAC's advocacy links to key policy arenas in the US, the UN and the EU have been highly valuable in ensuring recognition of the legitimacy and influence of the network, and showing added value for the KNPC to participate in the GPPAC process. And, the combination of cooperation on the global and local level, as symbolised by the composition of successive GPPAC delegations to the DPRK in 2012 and 2013 truly underlined the importance and added value of bringing in GPPAC regionally and globally. Furthermore, the sustained and dedicated engagement to reach out to DPRK partners, including on the regional level inviting them to GPPAC activities, and on the global level maintaining communication and a demonstrated commitment to working for peace on the Korean Peninsula as well as taking into account DPRK concerns, has in combination worked to allow the KNPC to invest confidence in the relationship with GPPAC’.

Thirdly, members mention the enhanced legitimacy they feel they obtain through their engagement with GPPAC, providing an enhanced image by association with a global network. In other cases, they report experiencing enhanced space because GPPAC provides the legitimising umbrella of a global network.<sup>552</sup> In some cases, direct intervention by Global Secretariat staff has played a role here.

Evidence of GPPAC's contribution to the work of members has been found in reports charting the nature of support, accounts of this support in interviews with members, as well as, to a lesser degree, documented evidence of members operating under the GPPAC umbrella. A prominent example can be found in agenda-setting work around the role of RIGOs in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including the organisation of the aforementioned conference in collaboration with the OAS, which convened 13 RIGOs, civil society and private sector actors to discuss the strengthening of a regional approach to peace and security, as well as follow-up activities, including the development of a Global Working Group on RIGO-CSO collaboration, again with OAS.

### 15.3.1.3 Analytical limitations

Asking how GPPAC has contributed to changes that other actors and factors, beyond GPPAC membership, will have also contributed, we have run into some limitations that we need to specify here. First of all, how GPPAC has contributed to such outcomes at regional level is impossible to assess in this evaluation, since information on this is not accessible to us, also because of the limited resources available to us. Secondly, important outcomes, key even to GPPAC's way of working, do not lend themselves to contribution analysis. Outcomes like having built the network, or having

achieved access to targets and other actors, and the building of connections, relations and collaborations involving targets, members and other CSOs may well have been influenced by other actors, or factors other than GPPAC's own skill and initiative, but contribution analysis is not a useful instrument for analysis here.

In other cases, a basic description of contribution is possible, as in cases where outcomes have been achieved through collaboration with CSO partners. GPPAC's work with partners has contributed towards agenda setting outcomes, including the development of positions and recommendations, on a range of themes. In most of these cases, GPPAC has been a participant or significant partner rather than a leader. An exception here is GPPAC's development of a policy note on the role of peace and stability in the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals.

### *15.3.2 GPPAC's advancement of human security at the United Nations*

#### 15.3.2.1 Introduction

Since the United Nations is a key target for GPPAC, advocacy directed to the United Nations is a suitable topic for a case study for the evaluation of GPPAC. GPPAC seeks to advance its objectives through networking, linking local voices and international arenas. Two objectives are to be served by this. First of all, activities are meant to advance the inclusion of civil society voices in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Secondly, activities are to contribute to the development and promotion of more people-centred approaches and strategies among state and international actors. GPPAC engages with the United Nations on several of its main themes, including mainly dialogue and mediation, gender and human security. For this case study, it was decided to focus on just one of these: human security. A reason for selecting this theme is that at an earlier stage of this evaluation, it was becoming clear that there was a significant outcome to report on the front of advocacy around human security: GPPAC was successful at developing collaborations with a UN body specifically focused on the advancement of human security, the Human Security Unit. This made it possible to combine a case study of a GPPAC advocacy on one of its main themes that focused on one of its key targets, with a contribution analysis, focusing on outcomes attained by this advocacy. In this text, we will show how GPPAC has proceeded in advancing human security at the United Nations in New York, while also analysing how its collaborations with the United Nations Human Security Unit have contributed to a set of outcomes.

#### 15.3.2.2 Human security

The concept of human security was first introduced into the United Nations arena by the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994. Human security was conceptualised in this report as a people-centred approach to security, oriented towards identification of, and response to, threats to the security of people, rather than on states and the international system. While human security has remained present as a concept around which multiple actors organise and rally, human security all this time has been a controversial idea. States have associated human security with 'Responsibility to Protect' and the associated risk of imposed intervention, and have therefore often rejected the notion for potentially threatening state sovereignty and leading to new conditions for receiving aid. Other critics have challenged human security for its ambiguity and broadness, which, they believe, stand in the way of utility for bringing about policy change.<sup>553</sup> Nonetheless, human security continues to be part of international engagement with security questions. This involves ongoing debate around concrete steps towards its promotion, such as the establishment of a Human Security Network, bringing together states supportive of the idea; the establishment of the United Nations Human Security Unit, mandated to promote the idea; and the establishment of the Human Security Trust Fund that supports human security projects worldwide.

In 2012, a concrete step was taken by the UN General Assembly, adopting Resolution 66/290 'Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human Security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome'. This constructs human security in terms of interplay between the three pillars of freedom from fear (peace and security), freedom from want (development) and freedom to live in dignity (human rights). The resolution provides a basis for a common understanding of human security as an approach that can 'assist member states in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people'.<sup>554</sup> In addition, even as states so far have not adopted human security as a goal around which policy is to be organised, some progress can be noted when it comes to the introduction of human security elements into state (Latvia, Costa Rica, Thailand) and RIGO policy (EU, ASEAN). For CSOs, human security 'has provided a means to get access to different UN bodies and to strengthen their quest for legitimacy'. A broader meaning of security strengthened the credibility of their arguments and contributed to their norm-building activities in the security sector.<sup>555</sup> Finally, human security offers a concept by which multidimensional analysis and evaluation of threats to people's security can be promoted and advanced – offering a potential way out of segmented approaches and operations.<sup>556</sup> In other words, human security is a difficult and controversial idea, but not without potential or progress

#### 15.3.2.3 GPPAC's work on human security

In 2010, GPPAC adopted human security as one of the four themes for its strategic plan 2011–2015. For GPPAC, this concept has a distinct appeal. Its broadness means that a wide range of GPPAC activities can be classified under this theme. Moreover, it fits well with GPPAC's ambition to help realise more people-centred approaches and strategies for peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Human security also offers an entry point by which GPPAC can engage with the UN and member states, while staying true to its principles of inclusiveness, being grounded in its members' realities and priorities. The selection of human security as a GPPAC theme was hereby largely motivated by understandings of the way the concept matched the network's internally defined understandings and priorities.<sup>557</sup> Estimations of chances of success were not much in play here. Certainly, the existence of the Human Security Unit with which relations could be built, and the presence of a debate on human security into which GPPAC and member perspectives could be inserted, was appreciated. However, there was also awareness that human security is a 'difficult' concept—not one on which successes are easily attained.

In 2011, the first year of the new strategic plan, work was started, coordinated by the Global Secretariat's Programme Manager and Programme Assistant for human security. A new Human Security Working Group was set up to work on the operationalisation of the concept for GPPAC, and develop activity. Working group meetings and discussions in Programme Steering Committee meetings showed that there were diverse understandings and ideas as to where GPPAC's space for working with human security should lie. For example, could GPPAC's approach centre on bringing in local communities' voices with regard to the impact of projects on hard security issues like DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration)? Should it be about how military spending affects human security? The impact of organised crime? And looking beyond operationalisation of the concept for the network, what should GPPAC do or seek to achieve with regard to human security? These matters were not easily resolved.

Discussions continued over the course of the evaluated period. It became clear, however, that it was important to facilitate context-specific use of the human security concept, allowing for flexibility for different regions to work on human security as they saw fit. It was soon decided, in line with this, that work on human security would not be restricted to a fixed Working Group, mandated to come

up with and advance a Working-Group defined engagement with the concept. Rather, flexible groupings were to work on human security according to their needs, also relating to experiences and perspectives within the network. At the same time, focus areas were still proposed and decided on in Programme Steering Committee meetings: GPPAC was to work on learning exchanges on Security Sector Reform; GPPAC would work on human security perspectives on violent extremism; GPPAC would carry out a cross-regional study of people's perspectives on human security. Partly, these decisions were informed by the development of meaningful opportunities for collaboration and action. GPPAC was working with Cordaid and others in newly formed civil society collaborative structures: the 'Human Security Collective' and the 'Civil Society Network for Human Security', which were adopting human security as an overarching framework for addressing violent extremism. And ASSET, a global network of SSR training providers and experts, was identified as a highly relevant partner for GPPAC's work on SSR and human security, and the development of relations with ASSET (as part of a collaboration with the Alliance for Peacebuilding, merged with 3P in 2012) looked promising.

Over the evaluated period, activities in terms of this range of themes continued, and a range of outcomes was attained through network collaboration. To name some important ones: GPPAC Pacific contributed to policy oriented towards human security in the Pacific region, supported through GPPAC. UNITAR (the research and training branch of the UN system) agreed to officially partner with GPPAC to produce an SSR e-learning curriculum on the UN Learning Portal. WANEP, GPPAC and the Human Security Collective initiated a joint project to promote civil society engagement with the development of a human security strategy for Mali – recently leading to an invitation to train Dutch military personnel for the MINUSMA mission in Mali. Finally, the NATO-accredited training centre CCOE (CIMIC Centre of Excellence) approached GPPAC as a 'civil society counterpart' in civil-military training matters. While partly these outcomes were initiated and led by GPPAC Global Secretariat staff, they also have included, or involved, leadership by members and partners, most importantly WANEP, Alliance for Peacebuilding, FemlinkPacific, the Human Security Core Group chair Mallika Joseph, Cordaid/Human Security Collective and PAX.

In these developments GPPAC has been pursuing different trajectories, involving different sets of actors, depending on sub-theme. While a set of priorities was established and acted on, these involved the Global Secretariat, CSO partners and a limited set of regional members rather than the network as a whole. The network, or at least the members taking part in key GPPAC structures such as Programme Steering Committee and International Steering Group, has been supportive of the theme of human security, but this has not meant that there has been broad involvement in collective engagement with human security as a guiding notion for the network to rally around. Some of the regions showed involvement with the theme of human security in the sense that they employed the concept in their activities, or provided input into the production of a Civil Society position paper. Some regions, like GPPAC Pacific and WANEP, adopted human security as a guiding concept for their regional work. Others again related to human security simply in the sense that many of their activities could fit under this theme.

At network meetings and in interviews with us, members stated their support for human security as a theme, but it was also clear that a main reason for this continues to be the accommodative nature of the concept, rather than the mobilising qualities of the idea, or its potential in terms of attaining results. Human security was something members could relate to, members made clear. It could bring members together under a single umbrella, combining a broad fit with priorities, while also giving room to diversity. At the same time, this use involved little articulation of common understanding,

direction or involvement in debate or collective activity on this theme. While network meetings concluded with support for the theme and activities around it, these meetings have tended not to engage with the difficulties the diversities implied. Notable is also that meeting participants sometimes did bring up challenges such as those involved with articulating the concept, and the lack of clarity on objectives, but resolution of such issues was not sought during such meetings.

Such challenges were addressed in collaborative projects and interactions that involved diverse members. Efforts towards more collective articulation and action took shape through a more broadly conceptualised engagement with human security, oriented towards the furthering of human security as a normative framework for engagement with security issues. Under the leadership of the Programme Manager Public Outreach and the Programme Manager and Programme Assistant for Human Security, two interconnected projects on this front got underway in 2013: the 'Human Security First' campaign and the development of a research-based publication that was to draw attention to human security issues as understood in different local contexts.<sup>558</sup> The 'Human Security First' campaign seeks to promote the broad adoption of human security. The main strategy by which the campaign seeks to do this is the presentation of personal videos and photos by which people stress their support of human security and the meaning that the concept has for them, on a campaign website. The campaign has been partly coordinated with the creation of, and communication around, a research-based publication, developed over 2013–2014, that presents different security realities of people in various countries, to promote people's perspectives on security. This publication was coordinated by the Global Secretariat, but centres around six research-based contributions from members in the Philippines, Palestine, Mexico, Zimbabwe, Ukraine and Afghanistan. Each of the chapters charts the meaning of security for people living in a particular context where security is under threat, providing space for people to present their accounts. This approach, is fully in line with other analysis that concludes that 'to be meaningful...human security needs to be recognised at the micro level in terms of people's everyday experiences',<sup>559</sup> as well as the added value of GPPAC as understood by actors in the UN context. At the same time, the publication seeks to work from the understanding and framework of human security as first presented in the UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report, and elaborated by the Human Security Unit. The publication operationalises human security as people-centred, comprehensive (as threats to it are interconnected), context-specific, preventive and involving mutual contracts between state and citizens, making human security involving both protection and empowerment. This dynamic between protection and empowerment became an organising starting point for the publication, with each chapter illustrating the nature of this dynamic in different contexts. This publication is meant to advance GPPAC's positioning in the wider human security debate, as well as form a foundation for further collaborations and advocacy, not only in New York but also within regions.

The campaign and publication, while led by Global Secretariat Staff, explicitly involve members. Member organisations and their constituencies were mobilised to take part by sending in their videos and photos, and by contributing to the publication. Initially, the campaign was to be developed and implemented by GPPAC and PAX. For different reasons, including differences in perspective, considerations of strategy, as well as contextual developments, PAX discontinued its participation. For the publication, GPPAC's Human Security Programme Manager and Programme Assistant collaborated with members and with the Human Security Working Group, and hired consultant Kristen Wall.

In October 2014, the authors and editors came together in New York to meet and prepare the launch of the publication, as well as to explore and initiate further advocacy options and strategies in New

York and elsewhere, building on the publications and the relations and understandings developed through the collaboration. To support this, training in engagement with the media and construction of messages also took place, as well as a meeting with Human Security Unit staff. The publication, entitled 'Empowerment and Protection. Stories of Human Security' was launched at a meeting targeting UN audiences, where a video combining segments of videos sent in for the campaign was shown, and photos sent in for the campaign were displayed, to communicate the importance and nature of human security for people. The meeting, co-sponsored by the Netherlands Permanent Mission at the United Nations and the UN Human Security Unit, was attended by an audience of about 35 people, including delegations of about 8 missions and other organisations, mostly NGOs. At the meeting, the authors of the report, charting locally understood forms of, and threats to, human security, presented their locally-based views on human security. At the same time, facilitation by the chair of the Human Security Working group and the conclusions provided by Kristen Wall centred on broader conclusions on human security as involving dynamics between empowerment and protection, in line with the aforementioned UNDP principles and the Human Security Unit's approach to human security, thus providing a clear linking with ongoing debates and understandings in the UN context.

#### 15.3.2.4 Advancing human security through collaboration with the Human Security Unit at the United Nations

Over the evaluated period, relations with the Human Security Unit developed from information exchange to collaboration. Much of this related to developments in the UN context to which the Unit could connect GPPAC. In September 2012, the General Assembly adopted, by consensus, resolution 66/290 'Follow-up to paragraph 143 on Human Security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome'. This adoption was followed by a UN High Level Panel debate in May of 2013, which aimed to reflect on the added value and lessons learned from implementing the human security approach and to consider the future integration of human security into the work of the United Nations. The UN Human Security Unit invited GPPAC to present civil society perspectives, and GPPAC forwarded Lisa Schirch of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, member of GPPAC, to represent the view on human security of the Civil Society Network for Human Security, GPPAC and PAX. Later in 2013, the Unit also sent a letter promoting the Human Security First Campaign to heads of state and promoted the campaign through its own website. In addition, the Unit mentioned GPPAC's work in a UNSG report of December that same year, written under its responsibility, stating that 'the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), a network of civil society organisations that actively promotes a more comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, recently launched the 'Human Security First' campaign. This campaign is a platform for gathering local perspectives on the added value of human security and its importance to the post-2015 development agenda. From the perspective of these non-governmental organisations, 'there can be no development without human security'.<sup>560</sup>

Collaboration continued in the following year. In June 2014, the President of the General Assembly convened a Thematic Debate on human security: 'Responding to the opportunities and challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: human security and the post-2015 development agenda.' Oulie Keita, an advisor on the Board of GPPAC's partner, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), was selected as the only civil society representative to share experiences on the panel, following negotiation and collaboration involving primarily GPPAC's UN Liaison, the Human Security Unit and the NGO Liaison Service, the UN body mandated to promote civil society involvement in the UN. Ms. Keita discussed the crisis in Mali from a human security perspective, stressing the importance of using a human security approach in Mali, also mentioning GPPAC in her speech. Also Sharon Bhagwan Rolls, director

of Fiji-based GPPAC Pacific Regional Secretariat FemlinkPacific, and Mauricio Salazar from GPPAC North America Regional Secretariat Serapaz, met with Human Security Unit Staff, now concretely linking 'local' CSOs and the UN.

Further collaboration with the Unit consisted of the alignment of the research-based human security publication GPPAC developed in this period, as well as adaptation of the Human Security First campaign to match the Unit's approach. Important here was an initial tension between GPPAC's centring on conflict, and the Unit's conceptualising human security involving three interconnected pillars of peace and security, development and human rights. This was an important issue for the Unit: emphasis on conflict was not only problematic in terms of the relation and role of the other pillars, it was also politically sensitive: advocacy that emphasises conflict touches upon states' sovereignty very directly and would not be meeting a welcoming ear from states, the Officer-in-Charge believes. As the campaign proceeded, and the publication developed, GPPAC sought to match more with the Unit's approach. The Human Security First campaign similarly went from emphasising conflict to emphasising linking the three UN pillars: security, development and human rights, thereby increasingly establishing alignment through a holistic approach to human security. In October 2014, GPPAC and the Unit co-hosted the launch of GPPAC's publication.

The different collaborations led to explorations towards further collaborations. After having been introduced to Oulie Keita and having seen her performance at the General Assembly debate, the Human Security Unit sought to collaborate with WANEP via the relations that had formed with Oulie Keita. Having learned more about GPPAC's involvement with RIGOs, the Human Security Unit, the OAS and GPPAC started exploring holding an event bringing together a range of human security practitioners from regional organisations, governments, civil society and the United Nations to share experiences and best practice examples from implementing the human security approach across Latin America and the Caribbean. Also, a meeting exploring further collaboration between GPPAC and the Human Security Unit building on the publication and the HS First campaign took place. More broadly speaking, engagements with the UN through collaboration with the Human Security Unit not only helped to develop relations with the Human Security Unit itself, but also opened up further possibilities for engagement with other actors in the UN context.

#### 15.3.2.5 GPPAC's contribution to advancement of human security at the UN

Through collaboration with the Human Security Unit, GPPAC succeeded in establishing links with the Human Security Unit that involved the development of alignment, mutual support and contacts between member CSOs and the United Nations. Through this, GPPAC has contributed to creating space for these CSOs' voices within the context of the UN. This has also contributed to opening up possibilities for further collaborations.

While there are no indications that efforts have led to outcomes in the area of policy influencing or changing practice, it should be noted that GPPAC's efforts in the context of human security are taking place in a difficult terrain. These efforts are, furthermore, oriented towards the advancement of a normative framework that is to guide practice, stressing the importance of people's understandings of their own security realities and priorities, as well as the creation of space for the expression of such understandings and priorities, to further inclusiveness in the context of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The changes sought are thus highly complex and of great magnitude. Direct influencing of more specific policy process or UN member states has taken place only minimally.

Outcomes have mostly been achieved over 2013–2014, but much of this has been based on previously built relations. Global Secretariat Staff and the UN liaison have played a pivotal role in this,

connecting GPPAC, regional members, the Human Security Unit and other UN bodies, most importantly the General Assembly and the UN NGO liaison Service. Evidence bears out that engaging with the Human Security Unit has been fruitful. But what has this relation consisted of? How do GPPAC and the Human Security Unit relate to each other? And what does that tell us about GPPAC's contribution to advancing the Human Security Unit through this collaboration? A basic reason why the Human Security Unit has been keen to collaborate with GPPAC lies in its having adopted, at least in some of the key efforts just described, the conceptualisation of human security as worked with by the Unit. Beyond this basic reason, the added value of collaborating with GPPAC for the Unit lies in the nature of GPPAC's networking. As the Officer-in-Charge of the Unit explained to us: in her view, many NGOs present in the UN arena are 'siloe'd', working on set issues and agendas without cross-fertilisation and -cooperation, and are donor-driven. Therefore, they are not a good match to the Unit's ambitions towards the advancement of the comprehensive approach to security that the human security approach is about. GPPAC, on the other hand, in its diversity, potentially offers the opportunity to bring into the UN arena evidence for the validity of this comprehensive approach to security.

At earlier stages of collaboration, through the presentation of GPPAC and its qualities as a network of member organisations, GPPAC was able to establish an image of GPPAC as a network that could offer access to a wide range of civil society organisations involved with conflict prevention and peacebuilding, spread across the globe in many areas where conflict or its threat are part of life. This was very attractive to the Human Security Unit. Indeed, the legitimacy and significance of GPPAC in the UN context thus lies largely with the (potential) role of GPPAC member CSOs in contributing to the Unit's ambitions to mainstream human security within the UN. GPPAC, as a network managed and supported by Global Secretariat staff and the UN liaison, can offer access to these, and facilitate interaction and collaboration. Importantly, for the Human Security Unit, GPPAC is thereby a network by which the 'evidence' could be offered for the validity and importance of the Human security approach it seeks to advance through its work. In addition, collaboration with GPPAC could play a role in helping to translate the unit's work on human security into terms to which people can relate. Thus far, the Officer-in-Charge aligns with the GPPAC Human Security publication, stating that human security has been too much a concept that has meaning only within the UN 'bubble' itself, lacking public understanding, legitimacy and support. For the Unit, GPPAC could, by its help in 'translating' the concept, make it a more public one, and this could help bring about the public mobilisation required for the mainstreaming of human security: When people start talking, governments will start listening.

GPPAC has found itself to be seen as a useful ally by the Human Security Unit. In interviews with us, the Officer-in-Charge also made it clear that cooperation with GPPAC had to be rooted in alignment with the Unit's own starting points, with deviations like emphasis on conflict particularly unwelcome. In addition, the Officer-in-Charge made clear that CSOs are to take a cooperative stance: states do not like to be told what to do, so direct confrontation with states is to be avoided, in the view of the Unit—an approach GPPAC does not concur with as, in their opinion, the role of civil society is to challenge states and is also to hold states accountable. This has led to disagreements arising between GPPAC and the Unit in late 2014. In other words: GPPAC's relations with the Human Security Unit have offered an entry point to the United Nations, but the starting points for collaboration also delimit the nature of its role in the collaboration, with the role offered by the Unit primarily lying in complementing the Human Security Unit's efforts, on the basis of the above. This does not mean that this collaboration offers no space for member organisations to present their viewpoints and



priorities; indeed, the Human Security Unit's support of GPPAC contributes to the creation of space for these, as well as their legitimacy within the highly state-centred context of the United Nations.

At the same time, a recurring challenge for GPPAC that presents itself here is the question of what contribution to what change is to emerge from GPPAC's advocacy. For GPPAC, 'the diversity is the message', as the Programme Manager Human Security argues. It is not that there is a single key message that is to emerge from the diversity; the key point is that it is this diversity itself that needs to be given its due role, and the sought changes are mostly in practice: inclusive peacebuilding and conflict prevention. However, while diversity and grounding in local realities provides GPPAC with important sources of legitimacy—for targets and partners, as well as for some internal actors—it remains an issue how the different 'voices' are to be taken up and contribute to change. While GPPAC's work on human security increasingly includes recommendations oriented to policymakers, for some, the ambiguities and complexities involved imply relative limits when it comes to articulation of a clear and compelling 'policy ask', involving highly coordinated advocacy efforts that strategically relate to specific actors and policy processes. For some, this can be seen as a weakness, at least partly rooted in GPPAC's way of working. For others, an argument against such classical advocacy thinking is that attainment of space for local voices is an important goal in itself, and one that is true to GPPAC's vision of its role and nature.

### *15.3.3 GPPAC SEA: case study of GPPAC SEA and analysis of contribution to the Mindanao (Phil.) peace process*

#### 15.3.3.1 Introduction

This paragraph describes the case study focusing on the network's regional phenomena and an included contribution analysis focusing on one outcome that was claimed by the Regional Secretariat. This outcome for contribution analysis was decided upon in discussion with GPPAC, GPPAC SEA and the evaluators. The contribution analysis conducted on the outcome claimed by GPPAC SEA but not reported in the official documents is: GPPAC SEA contributed to the current Mindanao peace processes (2013–2014).

In GPPAC's ToC, networking is central, and taken as a key means to change from reaction to prevention through increased collaboration between CSOs, enhancement of prevention practice and the influencing of policy based on regional or local experience, practice and collaboration. The regional CSOs, through regional secretariats and regional members, represent and are GPPAC, and thus have a prominent place within GPPAC's ToC. The targets, as in the ToC, are UN, RIGOs and states through a network of CSOs, organised regionally and coming together globally in the Global Secretariat. In practice in the region we observed prioritisation towards solidarity missions and also a prominent place for non-state actors and civil society itself also being targets. Because the region plays such a crucial role within the GPPAC network, this case study focuses on regional level phenomena. The case study and the embedded contribution analysis provide insights into the networked processes and show how the overall objective of peacebuilding and conflict prevention is translated to regional-level processes.

The field study was conducted in 2014 and is based on document study, the observation of regional activities that are representative for the recurring cycle of events in the region, documentation (GPPAC reports) as well as interviews with Regional Secretariat, regional members, external partners and GPPAC Global Secretariat staff. We aimed at understanding the regional processes and the region as part of a global network. Through the interviews, the reported outcomes were also verified and/or further substantiated if possible, as information was or could not always be shared.

Limitations and challenges to take into account here were the various levels of information from the interviewees. Some were involved in GPPAC for a number of years, others were just recently introduced in GPPAC or worked together with GPPAC. Another challenge was the information gathering as some members could not verify or substantiate the reported outcomes with additional information or share any other GPPAC affiliated outcomes with substantive information. Hence, this case study is based on the information gathered, verified and observed where possible, taking into account the limitation of the information available to the evaluators.

The events observed are the annual GPPAC Regional Steering Group meeting (RSG) accompanied by a solidarity mission in the Philippines and some activities specific to the Regional Secretariat, that is, the Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID), based in the Philippines. We are aware of the fact that we studied only one region limited also to a particular actor, time and space (the RSG; the Philippines and specific regional activities in 2014). However, based on interviews with numerous regional representatives and regional liaison officers, we do establish some trends (as discussed also in the reflections and explanatory factors paragraph) that are visible in other regions as well, although, due to the limitations of our study in time, space and budget, these could not be further verified in depth. The trends we identified are about the networked structure and inherent challenges of commitment and answerability, coherence and diversity, the type of outcomes and the issue of over-reporting and underreporting.

The Southeast Asia (SEA) region embraces GPPAC's ToC in the sense of adopting the GPPAC agenda, including the aims, directions, objectives and strategies, into a regional action plan, a regional agenda.<sup>561</sup> From the documentation received, we identified this as including, in theory, taking as the main targets the UN, RIGOs and states, as well as the main changes sought to be achieved as described in the previous paragraphs. SEA focuses on initiating, implementing and improving conflict prevention and collectively lobbying and raising awareness on multiple levels, based on a common agenda. In practice, however, we find differences from this theoretical understanding of change as the facilitating, convening and CSOs play a relatively more prominent role. This will be explained further in the case study and contribution analysis below.

It has to be taken into account that the theory is a planning tool and a theoretical idea of how change should happen, whereas in practice, reality is often different and affected by arising opportunities and threats. The basic idea on which GPPAC was founded is based in this challenge and seeks foundation in the existing practices of those organisations (members) already existing. Indeed, all the interviewees (GPPAC members) for this case study underlined the fact that they are part of GPPAC, but also have their own organisation, their own practice, ambitions, planning cycles and programmes.

As part of this case study we conducted a contribution analysis on one claimed outcome. For the contribution analysis we look at an outcome claimed by the SEA Regional Secretariat: that GPPAC contributed to the peace process in Mindanao. To explain this further: the claim was made that through GPPAC SEA the peace process is supported and that there is a direct contribution, in the sense that GPPAC and GPPAC SEA have furthered the peace process in Mindanao. This claim, and the evidence for it, will be analysed below, after assessing also the regional processes, which is part of the case study, to help understand the dynamics in which the contribution claim is embedded.

#### 15.3.3.2 The process at regional level

GPPAC as a network is constituted by its regional members and thus relies on the regional members to ensure the network's regionally grounded nature. In theory, this means regions are to provide

input on practices, implementation and improvement with regard to conflict prevention measures, to collectively lobby and raise awareness on multiple levels and to target UN, RIGOs and states with a common advocacy agenda. These are but a few of the main aspects of GPPAC's ToC in which the regions are central. The network exists of fifteen regions all hosted by Regional Secretariats that host regional members and are the direct link to the Global Secretariat in The Hague and vice versa. As such, the Southeast Asia region, on which this case study focuses, consists of Burma/Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, East Timor, Philippines, Malaysia and Cambodia and the Regional Secretariat is based in the Philippines and hosted by IID.<sup>562</sup>

IID was established in 1988 as an advocacy institution promoting human security, democratisation and people-to-people solidarity. IID is one of the co-founding organisations of GPPAC that started in 2003, then under the leading secretariat called the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP). Since then, IID has hosted the regional secretariat for GPPAC South East Asia (SEA) and the Regional Representative is also involved in the GPPAC Programme Steering Committee (PSC) and the Board. This implies a regional representation in global meetings, providing communication and regional input, ensuring network membership representative for the region as well as hosting, organising, supporting and inspiring regional activities. In theory this is based on a common agenda and collective effort.

The Regional Steering Group meeting is the main annual regional phenomenon around which we have gathered data as this is the main GPPAC activity in the region. In this meeting, the various GPPAC regional country representatives are present and it represents the GPPAC regional process of discussing the previous years, planning, strategizing and setting the agenda as well as updating each other on developments in the different countries. The RSG meeting was held in the Philippines in July 2014 and was preceded by a regional mission in which all present members took part. This was a solidarity mission to the Mindanao province in Southern Philippines and is thus linked to the contribution analysis conducted as part of this case study. During this mission, organised, hosted and supported by IID as the GPPAC Regional Secretariat, the representatives spoke to a number of key stakeholders in the Mindanao peace process. As was stressed by the SEA Regional Representative, the 'RSG meetings in SEA are always preceded/complemented by an actual activity (a solidarity mission, training, forum, etc.) in the host country so as to 'ground' the RSG members with the local context. This formulaic has since been adopted by the ISG in its regular meetings and has been a template for RSG meetings within the broader network'.

#### 15.3.3.3 Solidarity mission

The solidarity mission brought together representatives from the Philippines, Malaysia, South Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia and the Netherlands and was directed at the Mindanao peace process. The aim of the mission was to listen to and have a dialogue with some important stakeholders in the peace process to share solidarity and exchange experiences on peace processes in order to learn. The RSG members were only to different extents aware of the continuing Mindanao conflict and current developments around the peace process, and most were eager and willing to share and learn from the experiences everyone could offer.

IID, as the GPPAC SEA Regional Secretariat, organised the 'solidarity mission' meetings during the last week prior to the arrival of the RSG members and even on the last day meetings were scheduled. This illustrated the willingness of people to meet with the group, as most had busy schedules but still made sure to reserve time for a meeting. The last minute planning was pointed out by various interviewees as a challenge, since everyone is busy within their own organisations and planning the RSG meeting is not easily done. Two of the interviewees mentioned it to be 'just like that', a

recurring annual issue in planning the RSG. This has to do with busy schedules, time to travel and it was pointed out by interviewees as being embedded in the SEA cultural context. Within IID, arising (last minute) developments could provide for opportunities to take into account and hence, waiting to plan and schedule the meetings is also because of the opportunities that might arise.

Although it was arranged last minute, through IID's strong connections and relations with stakeholders in the peace process, they managed to organise meetings for the solidarity mission with many of the key stakeholders in the peace process: the Mindanao Bangsamoro CSOs, the first vice chair of the MILF (Muslim Islamic Liberation Front), the executive secretary of the ARMM (Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao), the chair of the BTC (Bangsamoro Transition Committee) and the Presidential Advisor to the peace processes in the OPAPP (Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Processes); the Department for ASEAN of the Philippines MoFA; and meetings with CSOs in Cotabato and Manila. In the context of the peace process, these are the main persons involved that can have influential roles to play through their direct involvement in the peace process. The representatives with whom the mission met were well aware of IID as a stakeholder in the Philippines and regional context, although they were less familiar with GPPAC. IID claimed GPPAC's support to the solidarity mission is important to be able to organise and fund these meetings, as it is an international voice to back-up the regional issues. In other words, more can be done, especially on these higher political levels, when there is an international network supporting the regional organisations. It was mentioned by the regional representative, though, that 'support from the international network leaves much to be desired despite the constant presence and engagement of the regional coordinator'.

The meetings were mostly organised around a presentation of the visiting office, a short presentation of IID, a presentation of GPPAC and a round of questions and remarks. Pictures were taken after every meeting, holding up the solidarity flag. During the meetings, questions were asked on the peace processes, lessons were shared, although discussions were not going into matters in depth as time (the meetings were short and fast) and space (politically sensitive issues) did not always allow for this. Discussions continued among the RSG members during car rides, dinners and lunches. This illustrated a sharing and learning environment, and this was also continuously stressed by the various representatives.

The mission was an activity used to share a solidarity message and to share, and learn from, experiences, being used strategically by IID to show their regional and global connections through GPPAC and to continue connecting to the stakeholders in the peace process. The aim of the mission was explained by the Regional Representative as follows: 1) the mission was intended to show the RSG IID's grounding on the Mindanao peace process; 2) the mission is considered a learning activity for RSG members prior to the RSG proper; give them a glimpse on the various actors we are engaging; update them on the peace process through direct interactions with the stakeholders; 3) an in-depth understanding of the Mindanao peace process was not a requisite; 4) it is reflective of the weakness of the network to go through a deeper understanding of the various conflict issues and processes we are engaged in in the region.<sup>563</sup>

Most of the interviewees were not specifically outspoken as to what the mission meant for their work, or how they would take this back home into their own work. In this sense, it is difficult to assess what such solidarity missions contribute to, and if it has an added value to either the peace process in Mindanao or the peace processes in which the GPPAC members are involved. Strategically, it was not clear from the mission and the interviews what, how and why this mission was supposed to contribute to the peace process, and what it means to have a solidarity mission. During the

reflection session at the first day of the RSG, all members were positive about the experience as they had not known about the current situation in Mindanao, and learned from the way it is handled in the Philippines. Some also mentioned taking back to their own contexts lessons with regard to dialogue, negotiation and the idea of sharing and learning. At the same time, this did not translate into a concrete outcome for this mission, although this may also have evolved during the time of this evaluation. Learning from the interviews with regard to previous solidarity missions where the mission was an activity without follow-up, it was noted by the interviewees that follow-up action should be taken into account in order to pursue a change. Although there are these limitations and challenges, it was stressed by the Regional Representative that 'the solidarity mission finds value in the presence of the RSG members as an expression of political support and of solidarity'.

During the feedback on this report, a number of remarks provided input on the follow-up and outcomes of the mission that are worth mentioning. Follow-up did take place, and was reported: 'during the weeks after the solidarity mission, the Global Secretariat staff who participated in the mission, as well as one of the RSG members, had the chance to go to Brussels and speak at a brownbag lunch organised by EPLO – another GPPAC member – to a Brussels-based audience about the mission and the state of the peace process overall. Participants included representatives of the European Commission and the European External Action Service'. Another outcome, only mentioned during the feedback on this report and thus not something we were informed of prior to December 2014, is the following: 'the principals, particularly members of Moro civil society, MILF, and even government elements involved in the peace process expressed their appreciation for missions such as this one, which they claim provide them with added inspiration to stay the course; knowing that a key segment of the regional, nay, international community are monitoring, 'watching' or shadowing the process; apart from learning from the mission members themselves about their respective contexts that in turn provide lessons'.<sup>564</sup>

#### 15.3.3.4 The RSG

The RSG is an annual meeting in the GPPAC format, involving a representation of GPPAC members and constituting an opportunity to meet face to face to discuss the past period and look ahead at planning, strategy and the agenda. The RSG was held in the Philippines back-to-back with the solidarity mission. The Philippine members besides IID as Regional Secretariat and Waging Peace Philippines as GPPAC Philippines were invited as well. Of the GPPAC SEA group besides the regional members, also a few key members of the Steering Committee joined the regional meeting. It was stressed though that because '[t]his was a primarily regional, and not a national, meeting the GPPAC Philippines members were not obliged to attend'.

The meeting was held over three days in Quezon City in Manila in July 2014. The objectives of the meeting were to: i) review past priorities and consider their realisation in relation to the Regional Action Agenda from 2004; ii) identify priorities for GPPAC SEA for new strategic plan 2016–2020; iii) a clear and concrete assessment of how GPPAC SEA should function to be able to address the identified priorities. However, most of the first half of the RSG was used to discuss country updates. The second half of the RSG was used for discussions on the regional plan, which focused mostly on naming and discussing activities to be conducted in the time frame of the next five months up to December 2014.

The country updates, which are used for further planning and strategizing, focused mostly only on context-specific issues explaining conflicts, politics and sensitivities in these contexts rather than GPPAC-specific updates and issues. The country presentations hardly mentioned GPPAC, the role of GPPAC, the activities, outputs and outcomes related to GPPAC or the added value of GPPAC to the

work on national or local levels. When asking the RSG members about examples of contributions of GPPAC to their work the answers were mixed. Some mentioned they did not know GPPAC that well. This is because GPPAC was not involved in the country activities, because they did not make an effort, or because they were relatively new in their organisation and had not been to RSG meetings before. Some mentioned GPPAC as being just the annual RSG meeting, as if no other activities were carried out. Others mentioned very abstract examples of learning and sharing without being able to make it more concrete. It was also mentioned that the organisations have full agendas and existed already before being members of GPPAC. Others do see GPPAC as an opportunity to link and share cross borders, but they were not able yet to fully enjoy the potential; they mentioned this to be so because the network is still not fully built and strengthened, but also time pressure and lack of funding were mentioned as reasons.

The discussions on the agenda and planning focused mostly on activities and the questions of what and who rather than on aims, objectives and strategy towards the attainment of these. Discussions lead to a very long list of activities to be scheduled in the subsequent five months. The GPPAC Global Secretariat representative described the planning as very ambitious, especially considering that the list contained more activities than were conducted over the previous three years. The RSG members did not seem to mind this, and most of the activities were kept on the planning list. One of the issues surfacing from making the activity priority list is the issue of responsibility. Who is responsible for what activity and who commits to them? Notably, most of the activities were, in the end, enlisted as IID lead responsibility.

Another issue that took up relatively less time was a brief explanation of what a ToC is, going through the strategies, actors and targets and prioritising themes from the national and regional updates. None of the organisations around the table were aware of the concept of ToC, or working with this concept. Although the discussion was meant to lead into a session whereby GPPAC SEA would come up with a ToC—or so it was laid out during the discussions<sup>565</sup>—or input for the development of a global strategic plan, this session remained restricted to an introduction to ToC as such. The slightly more strategic part of the meeting was led by the representative from the Global Secretariat, discussing the prioritisation of themes linking to strategies and actors. During this session, the need to be more selective and focused came up. A second issue concerned the actors, questioning whom to influence and why. However, these discussions were not taken further into depth. During the discussions on maximising the GPPAC network as an opportunity, the RSG members were very quiet and the discussions remained abstract. Asking the interviewees about this afterwards, their reactions gave the impression that GPPAC for them is more about having the connections and the international network to use when necessary. According to the interviewees, as an organisational structure of meetings and communicating in the network and being or representing GPPAC, GPPAC seemed to be obligatory as a once a year gathering.

At the end of the meeting, it was stressed again what GPPAC is and stands for, and there was an explanation on how to use the Peace Portal and information on the newsletters was shared. Most of the members had never seen the GPPAC website or Peace Portal, and mentioned, while discussing, that they would probably not use it in the future as there are already so many websites to look at. This opinion was shared amongst older and younger. However, the individual Facebook pages were used intensively. Some of the remarks made for the reluctance or not knowing the newsletters and peace portal were: lack of communication back and forth with the Regional Secretariat and the Global Secretariat; lack of Internet possibilities or speed of Internet; the enormous amount of webpages and spam everyone already receives.

#### 15.3.3.5 Reported regional outcomes 2011–2013/4

During the RSG, and through the interviews with the RSG members, it became clear that some of the outcomes reported by GPPAC SEA over 2011–2013 could not be verified or substantiated by those at the meeting. From the interviews conducted and the observations during the RSG it became clear that the regional action agenda was mostly a paper agenda being upheld by the Regional Secretariat, but not per se followed up on by either Regional Secretariat or the members. Also, looking at the reported outcomes over 2011–2014 neither these, nor the regional action agenda, were mentioned during the updates or other discussions during the RSG. Underneath we go further into the challenge to report (GPPAC) outcomes and, judging from the reports, it could be mentioned that there is either/and over-reporting or under-reporting.

The bulk of the reported outcomes focus on having held an RSG as being an outcome, having activities as the outcome and having developed an action agenda as an outcome. These first two are activities that might have led to an outcome; however, this did not become clear from the documents or the interviews either with members or with the Regional Representative. The latter is an internal outcome. However, when this agenda is not integrated into the work and not discussed, what really stands as the outcome? On external outcomes reported, a number of issues might be under-reported, although not all could be surfaced in the timeframe and scope of this evaluation. One of the outcomes missing from the outcome reports is the case of the Mindanao peace process. Although the claim of this outcome was made during an interview with the Regional Representative and Regional Liaison Officer, stating that GPPAC contributed to the peace process in Mindanao, we could not find any reference to this in the GPPAC outcome reporting. Another example of an outcome not reported or even mentioned by the representatives is the role of IID together with other partners under the umbrella of GPPAC in the conflict between Malaysia and Sulu.<sup>566</sup> Another outcome, mentioned only as activity and not reported as the change achieved is the mission to the Kachin State in 2013. It was mentioned that: 'IID was not known there, but it was a GPPAC-SEA mission and was appreciated as such even if it was IID that organised it. Other solidarity missions were launched in Timor Leste, South Thailand and during the ISG in 2009'. This resulted in network forming in the Kachin state, but also in space created for dialogue between CSO groups and other state and non-state actors. Other outcomes not reported are the role of GPPAC in the various peace processes, the exchange programmes and activities leading to the development of other networks in South Thailand and Burma. Hereby, it becomes clear that for members the activities are the outcomes whereas we understand this as the activity and output, with the take-up of this constituting outcomes. A discussion clarifying this could be helpful for members and representatives alike.

These issues could be taken into consideration when looking more closely into the internal processes and more time could be spent on surfacing the outcomes of the activities, meetings, events expressing what these have led to, what changes were achieved and how this relates to further strategic planning, considerations and decision making. Surfacing the changes achieved might also inform the further action agendas, planning and strategies.

#### 15.3.3.6 The contribution to change: the Mindanao peace process

The contribution assessed is based on the claim by GPPAC SEA that they contributed to the Mindanao peace process. This claim was made during an interview but is not reported in any documents. The claim is complex because of the many stakeholders involved, and the delicate political nature of the peace process, the multiple layers in and the long term character of such a peace process. The data collection can therefore never be exhaustive, as we were not able to access

all stakeholders, and can only grasp the complexity of such processes to a certain extent. Therefore, the contribution analysis specifically focuses on the role of the GPPAC network in assessing this claim.

The contribution claim was never fully explained other than being a contribution to the peace process as it was stressed these processes are very complex. GPPAC SEA underlined a specific change would be difficult to pinpoint. The context makes it difficult to establish a clear contribution in the sense of 'having contributed to the peace process'. It is also not shown that GPPAC or IID contributed to any changes of practice or policy with regard to the peace process. Through the interviews it became clear that the contribution could be further specified as consisting of bringing together the stakeholders involved and facilitation and convening of multi-stakeholder dialogue, rather than policy or practice as primarily conceived for this evaluation.

The conflict in Mindanao is a long-standing one, lasting for over thirty years, in which multiple stakeholders are involved. The conflict involves multiple-layered issues regarding self-determination, cultural and religious rights, land rights, land ownership, deeply rooted frustrations, anger and fear, political power issues and struggles. This does not even cover half of the complexity of the issues in which the conflict is rooted and as an outsider it is difficult to fully grasp the issues at stake. The peace process is complex and long-term, and the conflict knows different forms of peace processes including failed attempts, and many stakeholders involved.<sup>567</sup> The current peace process is not the first attempt, but it is the process we focused on for this case study, hereby stressing the fact that we looked into the role of GPPAC specifically with regard to the claim made by GPPAC SEA to have contributed to the current peace process.

The main finding in the assessment is the lack of visibility of GPPAC whereas the visibility of IID in the peace process is well established. This brings up questions regarding the inner workings of the network. Whereas GPPAC SEA Regional Secretariat is hosted by IID and *is* IID, to a certain extent, IID itself is not only GPPAC SEA but is wearing many different hats and is active in many different local, national and regional networks. IID hosts a number of other networks that are working in the Philippines, in the Mindanao region, on the peace process in Mindanao and also cross-regional. Whereas just a portion of IID's funding comes from GPPAC, other funding comes from MFS II through other partners and additional funding comes from external non-MFS II sources.

In the peace process in Mindanao IID has a great visibility and also credibility as an organisation and the individual staff members have been involved with the stakeholders and in the region for a long period of time, even before GPPAC existed. Many stakeholders know the individual staff members or the role of IID in the many networks. The credibility is based on the nuanced way of working, providing a voice to all stakeholders and bringing together the stakeholders in the conflict to dialogue. The role of IID is in this sense a convening and facilitating role on local levels, whereby they bring what they learn on these levels to national level arenas and political arenas.

So, what does it mean when IID is visible but GPPAC is not, and what does it say about the added value of the network? There are mixed messages when it comes to the role of GPPAC. Overall, GPPAC is rather unknown to many of the actors and stakeholders in the peace process interviewed, or some external experts regarding Mindanao. The few people interviewed who did know GPPAC were IID partners and were aware that IID was connected to an international network. It was mentioned by two interviewees that due to this connection and international funding of IID they are in a better position to advocate on national level and cross-regional level, but also support the process locally, without having the influence of divergent politically influenced agendas of national



donors. The Regional Representative stated: 'GPPAC is the sum of all its parts including what its Secretariat does. In fact, in any network, the key to its success is sometimes the capacity and competence of its Secretariat. So IID's work is GPPAC-SEA's work. And vice-versa. As IID's mandate is anyway akin, nay, expressed in what GPPAC-SEA is'. Others mentioned the risk of putting the stakes too high as it was said that the international connection can lead away from the reality on the ground: '(...) they are traveling so much and I think 'what are they talking about up there [global level, UN]?', because they fly in and out again and they did not even have time to listen'.<sup>568</sup> This gives insights into the balancing act between being active locally, nationally, regionally and globally, and the difficulties involved in ensuring connection and embedding across the different levels.

Connections and partnerships are linked to the visibility and credibility of an organisation. IID has a credible name in the Philippines, they have a lot of connections and partnerships amongst the stakeholders in the Mindanao peace process and conflict as well as elsewhere inside and outside of the region. However, studying the entire region or thematic area was beyond the scope of our evaluation, hence we focused on the role of GPPAC in a number of processes we were able to trace and follow. To focus on the observations, interviews and documentation in the limited scope of this evaluation: this is shown by the last-minute arranging of meetings with high level stakeholders for the solidarity mission to Mindanao, whereby these representatives showed willingness to meet and mentioned they had good connections with IID. It is also shown by the broad range of collaborations amongst CSOs and networks in its many forms and with its many different backgrounds, identities and standpoints. This is an intrinsic part of the conflict in Mindanao and IID manages to bring people together and to facilitate dialogue. However, the role of GPPAC is unclear, as this is mostly IID and none of the interviewees mentioned GPPAC as a factor. Herein, personal connections play an important role, as many of the issues are discussed during formal and informal meetings that are arranged on personal level or organisational level. Also, most of the interviewees were familiar with IID director Gus Micalat, sometimes based on personal relations dating over twenty years back. As mentioned by the Regional Representative: 'In Asia, the personal is political. That is how we work here. Unlike in the West, where one dichotomises personal life with career or work, we approach and do things here integrating both. Crass individualism is not a common trait here'.

Bridging arenas and bringing together stakeholders is the main standing ground for IID, facilitating and convening space for dialogue, space for (re-)presentation and space for multi-stakeholder dialogue. This is visible on two levels, the local and the national level. IID is working on the local levels with the specific stakeholders involved in the conflict and peace process on the ground. Bringing them together, providing a platform to present their cases, listening to the issues and collecting the issues. This is done by IID in partnerships. IID also hosts many of the networks involved in the peace process. On the national level they bring in these local issues to the national levels of civil society and policy arenas. They represent a grounded voice through the networks and partnerships they are part of and sometimes use GPPAC, as an international network, as a back-up to their national voice, but this is not by default. It was mentioned by one interviewee that being part of GPPAC sometimes opens doors and he gave an example of this in the dialogue process in the conflict between Sulu and Malaysia. However, in the case of the Mindanao peace process we did not surface this as a factor.

The peace process is an example where the GPPAC network does not necessarily play a visible, concrete and credible role or even has an added value to the specific process, but rather plays a role in the background. This role is a supportive role in the form of funding, which provides a means to work on the issues in the region. It is also, as is mentioned above, a role in the ideological sense of

inspiring a certain way of working in the networked sense on issues of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

#### 15.3.3.7 The region as part of the global network: some reflections

Taking into account the limitations in (geographic) scope and timeframe of the evaluation as well as the (sometimes) limited information provided, we do identify some issues for the reflections based on what we could observe: activities, insights into the processes, the documents reviewed and the interviews.

First of all, understanding outcomes and achievements is a key aspect to clarify when working in different contexts and with various organisational cultures. Hence, misunderstandings could be solved. For example, activities are considered outcomes, leading to less likely follow-up and realisation of achievements; but also the above illustrates the overlooked or underreported outcomes, which are key to the workings and dynamics of a network.

Secondly, a constant reflection on the roles, changes, opportunities and strategies could be embedded, although it is illustrated to be difficult as the network itself is seen by its members as an addition to their already heavy workload. The regional network seems very loosely connected and although there are GPPAC members, the members mostly conduct activities to some extent as part of GPPAC. Membership does not seem to extend beyond some annual activities. The activities focus on facilitating and convening civil society to come together, and to some extent focus on states, and only to a certain extent the Regional Secretariat as IID integrates this in their work towards ASEAN as well. Furthermore, the advancement of 'effective locally grounded conflict prevention strategies' is integrated in the regional work through exchanges and solidarity missions and via IID in regional policy processes at ASEAN. The regional network is hosted and steered by IID as the Regional Secretariat. In this sense, the Secretariat is the 'gatekeeper', but accountability is not integrated into the network flows.

Thirdly, based on this case study, GPPAC is not always visible to its members and often it is just a few individuals who are active and committed to bridging the different levels. To most regional members, GPPAC is an annual meeting (the RSG), and is as such not seen or used as a network for networking as a key means to achieve objectives. The question arises whether the regional network is a network or a number of partners working together with IID occasionally and sometimes funded by GPPAC. Besides, the connection to the global network did not surface from the interviews with the regional members. At the same time, the (in-)visibility can also be an asset when members take up issues within their own context and legitimacy and in a sense use the network to add pressure when necessary. For example, also many representatives and members mentioned the importance of sharing knowledge, coming together, being part of a network as important aspects for their work, visibility and internal learning processes.

Fourthly, it was mentioned a number of times by interviewees from the Regional Secretariat that GPPAC is the way of looking at things and as such has a more ideologically inspirational role than a concrete or direct visible influence on the work conducted in the region. It was even mentioned that, for example, the added value of solidarity missions is a 'feeling' that cannot be further explained. Other examples underlying this are that being part of a network inspires other networks (Burma, South-Thailand) and sharing information also inspires thinking about the issues shared. As to this latter point, there is a crux as the persons who mentioned this could not provide a concrete example or explain further how this works. Overall, the inspirational aspect, sharing knowledge and learning seem to be key for the GPPAC network. The Regional Representative said: 'The network comes

together not because they are financed to do so, but because they inspire each other, learn from each other, find strength among and from each other and feel and believe that they are not alone in their almost lonely daily struggle for dignity, progress, justice and peace in their communities and in their lives'. In addition, communication came up as an issue. From all interviewed GPPAC members, as well as the Regional Secretariat, the lack of communication was stressed at cross-regional level, to the global level as well as to and from the Regional Secretariat.

Fifthly, this raises questions with regard to commitment, responsibility and answerability within the network. Inherent to these seems to be that the network is set up as a network of regions and regional members, pushing the network forward, and the aims and objectives as set out in the ToC, which does not translate easily to the regions as such. The commitment is linked to, on the one hand, the structure of the network and, on the other hand, the added value that the members ascribe to being part of GPPAC as such. At the same time the SEA case study shows, a lack of commitment, translated into a lack of communication and active involvement in the network, does not necessarily imply a lack of added value, but can also mean a different idea of what GPPAC is. In this sense, GPPAC might just be a financial support for some activities to some of the members whereas at other points it is an inspiration to a way of working or a means to have an annual cross-regional dialogue. With regard to responsibility and answerability, the question arose during the case study observations with regard to who feels responsible to commit and pursue the agenda, the activities and the shared plans. From the interviews it was brought forward that heavy workloads on the one hand and lack of communication between the various levels in the network on the other hand underlie these issues, leading to a lack of awareness but also commitment, responsibility and answerability.

#### **15.4 Evaluation question 4: Efficiency**

This section addresses evaluation question 4: were the efforts of the MFS II alliances efficient?

##### *15.4.1 Theory of Efficiency*

GPPAC is ISO 9001-2008 certified, with its certification audited annually by LRQA (Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance). In a report, this organisation pointed out the maturity of GPPAC's management systems, mentioning GPPAC's monitoring and evaluation systems and annual management reviews. By these, GPPAC consistently maintains control over processes including finance, and seeks improvement, also considering efficiency issues. Having noted this, we look into efficiency beyond the process management orientation grounded in the above. Hereby we zoom into GPPAC's 'Theory of Efficiency', which we identified as not only engaging with processes, but also relating to GPPAC's fundamental choice to try and seek attainment of its objectives through networking.

While formally, budget is divided over strategies, within GPPAC also a more implicit division is maintained between spending on the Global Secretariat on the one hand, and spending on regions and programmes on the other. Over the past years, starting out from a more or less 50/50 division on this front, the ambition has been to shift to a larger share for regions by obtaining, through Global Secretariat support, extra funds for regions. With this setup, GPPAC opts for a strong centre partly also for reasons of efficiency. As a Global Secretariat staff member stated in an interview with us: 'when you're thinking you're efficient when you spend 10% in the Netherlands and 90% in the regions, you're making a mistake'. For GPPAC's director, having a strong centre is efficient in different ways. First of all, you need a well-equipped Global Secretariat to attain goals above national level, have the ability to provide services to members, including the capacity to assist members to raise funds. Secondly, to develop a strong centre is a deliberate choice for coherence over fragmentation. The latter is suspected to come with 'simply dividing the money over the regions'.

Finally, the choice for a strong centre comes with a conscious choice to bind Global Secretariat staff long-term. Flexibility is deemed less important than the benefits of staff having had the time to grow into GPPAC, and build staff commitment.

By networking in this way, GPPAC furthermore acts on the belief that thereby foundations for effective action in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding are built. Efficiency is a crucial dimension as on the one hand time and resources are scarce while on the other hand networking as such is assumed to be efficient. Through networking, knowledge is shared, synergies are found, heritage and existing activities are built on and it is assumed costs can be cut through collaboration. At the same time, this contradicts the high costs of bringing together the actors of the network in the diverse structures and external engagements, which are taken as a necessity. To the extent that efficiency becomes an issue, it is to be handled through the management of the costs.

#### *15.4.2 Efficiency in practice*

GPPAC consistently monitors and evaluates many different elements of its functioning, including primary processes in the activities of regions, monitoring and evaluating processes themselves. This includes questions of efficiency, be it that these mostly centre on the operations of the Global Secretariat. For example, efficiency of IT operations, human resource management and financial management have been reflected and acted on. Other issues reflected on relating to both efficiency and effectiveness are the cooperation between Global Secretariat and regions, the communications back and forth, the input provided and the time and resources used for Regional Secretariat administrative tasks and reporting. Finally, in line with the Theory of Efficiency, GPPAC managed (by obtaining additional funding to the benefit of region-centred activities) to shift the balance of expenditure to activities, with the relative proportion spent on the Global Secretariat decreasing from 48% in 2011 to 43% in 2013.

GPPAC's starting point that networking is the foundation from which to work is consistently maintained, also when this does not directly translate into results. Networking is seen as a process that takes time, with results coming in due course. As GPPAC's director stated in an interview: 'Look at what happens in the Ukraine. The network comes from far. You invest €37,500 per year. What are we talking about? But the network has been built. A lot of donors have withdrawn, but the network is there....Three years ago nobody thought there would be a crisis in Ukraine. And now you're in a place where you can take up a role in advancing dialogue where now hardly anybody can do that, at that civil society level. It's a moment where you see this network approach pay off. You're there. You don't have to make it up. You don't have to be a donor that's going to create a local organisation....you're there'. To the degree that outcomes in terms of content development, policy influence or changing practices has been limited, GPPAC Global Secretariat staff similarly tends to see such outcomes as 'slowly emerging' in particular 'now that structures are in place'. So far, limitations have thus not led to a reconsideration of the starting points of the Theory of Efficiency, including the efficiencies of investing in a strong Global Secretariat.

There are different other ways in which elements of the Theory of Efficiency pertaining to networking are maintained and enacted in practice. First, combining meetings for efficiency as well as synergy reasons is common throughout the network. Training together, having back-to-back activities and advocacy planned around network meetings, combining knowledge, building and expanding on existing experiences and processes are part of GPPAC practice. Here too, we see linking as the primary network function by which such efficiencies are sought. Second, management sees the benefits of seeking long-term staff commitment evident in Global Secretariat staff performance,

as well as the investment into the Global Secretariat paying off in the obtaining of extra funds that benefit regions.

#### *15.4.3 Mechanisms for improvement and adaptations*

Through GPPAC's consistent search towards improvement of processes, improvement towards more efficiency is built into management. While these improvements are not only geared towards more efficiency, efficiency is a consideration in analyses and responses to these. When it comes to elements of the Theory of Efficiency that have been subject to learning and improving, two stand out. Both pertain to networking.

First, within GPPAC, it has been found that linking global and local levels has been difficult, and that thus there are issues when it comes to the efficiencies of the theory of networking as the foundation from which to work towards developing and achieving objectives. Some of the issues are the difficulties that come with linking international arenas and local CSOs. With different frames of reference, cultures and languages, having a meaningful exchange, let alone results and a coherent way of working, is complex and difficult. An 'efficient way' of handling this issue is making sure that those members who are working in the various arenas are supported to be the 'right type', able to give what is expected in a compelling manner and in the right language. Within GPPAC, the temptation of the efficiencies of having a small 'cast of characters' participate (including a subset of Global Secretariat staff and prominent individuals from member organisations). However, it has been acknowledged that such temptation is out of line and must be countered. This is seen as a complicated task in three ways: 1) in terms of achieving that 'match' between advocate and target; 2) in terms of the tension inherent in seeking to create that 'match', working towards shifting the performance of members so that their voice is *altered* in order to be 'heard'; and 3) in terms of the difficulties of mobilisation of members beyond the aforementioned small 'cast of characters' towards objectives beyond their own organisation's and region's agenda.

Second, GPPAC has found that working through networking can be made more efficient by adapting the structures and collaboration within the network. First, it was learned that the principle of combining meetings 'back-to-back' (e.g. combining conferences with network meetings and adding some advocacy 'now that we have the actors available') can overstretch energies, leading to diminishing returns. Secondly, some network structures turned out less efficient and action has been taken towards further efficiency. The working groups generally meet annually regardless of the particular interests of members, which in some cases turned out inefficient. More flexibility is now being brought into the operations, offering a new way of working: 1) creating possibilities to have Working Group members get involved with issues they are already working on and also in subgroups, in which energies and resources towards working on a particular issue are already mobilised; 2) with the network getting more consolidated, it was decided that it was possible to cut down on the number of times the main structure of the network (and a relatively costly one), the International Steering Group, meets; and 3) it was decided for efficiency and effectiveness reasons that the ISG should rotate its meeting ground throughout the various regions so as to ensure activities and advocacy opportunities. The learning that has taken place is of an order that maintains basic principles and understandings, while, at the same time, fundamental issues with regard to efficiency have not been raised.

#### **15.5 Evaluation question 5: Explanatory factors**

In this section we answer evaluation question 5: what explains the findings? We seek to identify factors that may contribute to the explanation of findings, most importantly with regard to (contribution to) changes, taking into account the (often) long-term and complex character of the

advocacy processes involved. This relates to internal as well as external factors. For the internal factors we look into the organisational dynamics using the 5-C framework. The external factors are the contextual perspectives in which the ILA programme is embedded. Besides this, we also address the potential role of the nature of the issue addressed.

### *15.5.1 Internal factors*

To analyse internal factors that may contribute to explaining findings, we employ the 5Cs framework as developed by ECPDM, as described in chapter 2.

#### 15.5.1.1 Capability to act and commit

The ‘capability to act and commit’ is about the strategic intent and the organisational ability to act on this intent. This also relates to the dimension of relations within the alliance and wider network: to develop focus, to take decisions, plan, and translate these into organisational action - depending on, for example, organisational structure, action-oriented leadership and effective monitoring. Regarding this capability an explanatory factor to the successes of achieving outcomes is the consistent way in which the commitment to regional priorities and inclusion of local voices is enacted. The development of structures for interaction and collaboration, the network-like nature of relations within the network, in many ways supported by the facilitating role performed by the Global Secretariat staff help explain the development of the network as described under priority result area ‘agenda setting’, as well as the ability to link and convene CSOS and targets, on the basis of principles of inclusiveness and ownership. Relatively much effort has gone into institutionalising the network, which explains the sense of ownership found among at least part of the membership, as well as the development and sustenance of relations and collaborations. This includes the support to the regions. In terms of their own functioning as a network, their approaches and activities have been at the centre of attention, as well as the way members have given shape to their membership. Enactment of a shared vision has thus made for consistent translation of vision into practice, explaining many achievements in areas key to GPPAC’s ToC.

Successes can also be explained by the many efforts of GPPAC staff and members, building at least partly on the legitimacy that comes with the image of being a global network that brings together, and provides links to, peacebuilding organisations active on-the-ground in many contexts around the globe; or that, for members on the ‘local’ side, has a global network behind it.

The fact that structures that link and convene towards support for regional members form the core of GPPAC activity can help explain why content development and working collectively towards higher and multi-level objectives has been relatively limited. It is possible that this has contributed to the relatively limited results in ‘policy influencing’ and ‘changing practice’. While we cannot say this for sure, this potential explanatory factor deserves to be addressed, as ‘content’ is undeniably a great good in the world of lobbying and advocacy relating to a focused and content-based advocacy message underlying most efforts of influencing, also in GPPAC’s domain. Not denying GPPAC’s progress on this front, GPPAC can be seen as a set of relations around themes rather than as an organisation furthering, in a coordinated way, specific messages that arise from networking. In fact, within the Global Secretariat staff members understand the underlying idea of networking as the foundation for collaborations from which the substance or content will subsequently emerge. However, working with shared commitments to develop content is in tension with the way the network is organised as it is specifically focused on and embedded in diversity. The risk of trading diversity for coherence tends to be a tension or risk for networks generally, and as such not simply a consequence of the way GPPAC works. At the same time, a few specific dimensions can be mentioned as contributing to the challenge.

While within the leading structures agreement may be reached on global ambitions, including content development, this does not automatically imply commitment of the network more broadly. Structures and processes are to some extent geared towards this. However, the governance structures at global level that help define priorities consist of a small number of individuals. Moreover, there are a few of these same individuals across structures. Within the network infrastructure, communication with members towards accounting for decisions made within structures is not consistently facilitated, apart from the publication of meeting reports. In addition, criteria for membership are not conducive to commitment to shared objectives. While membership implies committing to supporting GPPAC's 'Global Action Agenda' and acting in accordance with the 'GPPAC Charter', which set the directions for the network and its collective operations and goals, in practice membership is not managed according to demands with regard to commitment to shared ambitions and joint activity as stated in these documents. One of the examples is that regions are required to work on GPPAC's broadly formulated themes rather than towards specified shared objectives. Also linking with different levels and arenas is not required or accounted for within the existing structures.

While such linking is encouraged, it is not necessary to get approval for plans and reports, and funding for activities. In addition, membership is largely managed at regional level. In line with the prioritisation of regional issues, membership is controlled by Regional Secretariats and therefore more likely to be aligned with regional agendas than with GPPAC's global agenda. In fact, the Global Secretariat has limited overview of membership (presently estimated at 150–200 organisations) and little communication with membership beyond the Regional Secretariats. We may add here membership is highly diverse, with many members working not across themes but with a focus on specific themes such as dialogue and mediation, peace education or gender, and with many different organisational focuses ranging from activism to facilitation, research or training, with highly diverse levels of capacity. This diversity is fully accommodated. The space for diversity, while key to GPPAC, is thereby also a factor that can help explain limits on the front of coordinated strategizing and action, in particular at global levels.

Programmes offer many opportunities for members to get involved with GPPAC, contribute to exchange, content production, advocacy and global outreach. The creation of such opportunities by GPPAC helps explain many achievements. At the same time, members often do not engage much with what is being facilitated, or even engage with GPPAC as to the question how local and global levels could be linked in ways that regional members would find useful. In other words, membership of the network and facilitation towards action through the network do not imply mobilisation towards the same. On the side of the Global Secretariat staff they seeking to involve members consistently and approach this from the perspective that the Global Secretariat is not in a position to integrate and articulate objectives for the network in any but a global way. The Global Secretariat is mostly to convene and facilitate rather than 'speak for' the network. In other words, while being the core of the network, the Global Secretariat tends to refrain from defining a direction for the network, formulating strategies for the network to implement, proposing task division or coordinating advocacy trajectories towards objectives. The Global Secretariat stimulates and facilitates these, offers opportunities for collaboration around broadly formulated objectives and themes that members may or may not buy into. This buying in does happen, but we have seen this does not always happen.

GPPAC's director spends much time building connections by which GPPAC can get doors opened, develop constructive relations and collaborations, and thereby strengthen its role. The programme

manager for policy and advocacy, relatedly, explained his work to us as geared towards navigating between worlds, translating, adapting, handling diversity, building confidence and trust with targets – rather than towards representation, involving the articulation of clear messages targeted towards specific influence of specific targets. In many ways, such connecting has served its purpose. We can see in the creation of access, forms of collaboration and building of relations that have taken place, which are at least partly due to such efforts. At the same time, it appears that a substantial part of this brokerage work does not clearly resonate with parts of membership. Indeed, many members experience disconnect between advocacy work at global level and their own work, and may not even be aware of much of the brokerage work that goes on.

There are also reasons for GPPAC's challenges on this front that go beyond the prioritising of local voices, and the self-imposed standards of inclusiveness these imply. Being a network of existing organisations, GPPAC is not an NGO that can expect from people involved a staff-like commitment to GPPAC. GPPAC may be for members 'the fourth thing on the list', as one staff member put it. In addition, the communication that would be necessary to develop coordination and coherence across diversities of language, context, time zones and understandings demands time and energy that may often not be available, even when priorities are shared.

#### 15.5.1.2 Capability to deliver on objectives

In the 5Cs framework, the 'capability to deliver on objectives' concerns an organisation's capability to achieve access to financial resources, knowledge and information sources, human resources, facilities, standards on measures of performance, embedded in a results-orientation and logic. In international lobbying and advocacy it also concerns the ability to relate to decision making actors, multi-layered arenas and processes.

GPPAC has successfully obtained access to financial resources beyond MFS II through its consistent efforts to obtain such funding through collaborations between Global Secretariat and members in the application for funding. Linking and convening capabilities help explain the important growth in access to targets and partners and the development of collaborations with targets and partners. Considering GPPAC's capability to deliver on objectives we found that limits in resources form an important factor explaining why GPPAC has encountered challenges on this point.

While the limited role for content and the working around global objectives within GPPAC may be partly due to the network's high level of attention for linking and convening towards inclusive peacebuilding and conflict prevention, it may also be partly due to the fact that the production of content, and even more so the production of content that has wider network significance, is highly labour and cost-intensive, and would demand a level of commitment by regional members to the network that runs short. Effective, coordinated efforts involving the network often require region-level capacity and resources that aren't available. Creating the interest and capability to relate to complex contexts like the UN would also involve intensive and consistent regional engagement, for which the necessary resources aren't there. In addition, creating a credible presence in political arenas like the UN requires frequent interaction with targets, preferably involving regional members as well as the production of content compellingly relating to processes in such arenas – all resource-intensive in many ways.

For the Global Secretariat to effectively connect different arenas and regions it would require them to have not only a good sense for the arenas and how to insert regional priorities there to particular actors, but also for (political) developments and potentially fruitful ways in which UN engagement might make a difference. Obtaining and working with that information is feasible for the Global



Secretariat to only a limited degree. While some Global Secretariat staff members have developed good relations at UN level and perspectives on how to insert GPPAC herein, linking this to members has proved challenging. Where such involvements happen, it is mostly through events that form occasions by which to bring together UN and regional members and where the work and perspectives of regions get to be presented. These are often short-term engagements rather than longer-term ones that could make for a more compelling 'presence' in such arenas.

Finally, financial resources that are available within GPPAC are allotted to programmes and regions, in fixed arrangements not allowing for much flexibility to respond to opportunities that arise in changing environments.

#### 15.5.1.3 Capability to adapt and self-renew

Within the 5Cs framework, the 'capability to adapt and self-renew' is about the ability to learn internally and to adjust to changing contexts. These capabilities are conceived as influenced by internal openness to learning; the ability to analyse important external factors; and the flexibility and openness to change. It could be argued that this is a core capability required for international lobbying and advocacy. Considering GPPAC's capability to adapt and self-renew, we found within GPPAC there is a consistent attention for learning. Through the action learning programme as well as the efforts towards gender mainstreaming, interactions in the network are for an important part geared towards contributing to member capacities and internal learning days with the Global Secretariat staff. A strong capability to adapt learning to the requirements and priorities of members is evident. Mutual support is also attuned through friendly and constructive mutual relating.

Another strong aspect is the Global Secretariat monitoring the network's development and seeking improvement in such fashion. The question how to network well based on the principle of inclusiveness is central. These capabilities contribute to the explanation of the development of GPPAC as a network that genuinely embodies and works towards inclusiveness and partnership. At the same time, and arguably related, there is within GPPAC besides the monitoring and evaluation cycle little open discussion on the surfaced internal challenges when it comes to the attainment of results and how to address them. Again, it appears that it is the nature of network collaboration that plays a role here. Membership within GPPAC is first of all to be productive for regions, with Global Secretariat and other structures such as Working Groups to perform a primarily supportive role. In addition, learning is generally of a 'first-order' nature: 'what can we do better?' without questioning basic assumptions, asking 'do we need to change what we do?' The same strong belief in the network vision that has contributed to many outcomes also appears to keep such fundamental questioning within bounds.

This may contribute to explaining the limits on the issue of strategy development that we identified. When it comes to network meetings partly meant for reflection and future strategizing, members and Global Secretariat do not question networking starting points. During network meetings, we find that participants do not take the stance that regions are answerable to critique, or can be held to account for commitment to objectives that may be in GPPAC's strategic plan but not in the regional plans. Regions also generally do not put on the table their internal challenges and external disappointments. While at meetings they present their work to each other and the Global Secretariat staff, such exchanges centre on information-sharing and focus on positive developments rather than taking stock with an eye for potential problems. While results are shared, celebrated and built on, results are rarely a topic for discussion or critique and participants in GPPAC structures, including Global Secretariat staff, rarely raised questions or challenges on this issue during meetings. There was certainly space for discussion of challenges, but these rarely involve reconsideration of

assumptions in the face of experiences. During the time of the writing of this report, in the context of the development of the Strategic Plan 2016–2020, however, some major issues including connections between regional and global, membership criteria and advocacy strategizing are reconsidered in the face of experience, and adjustment sought.

When it comes to management from the side of the Global Secretariat, we find that regions are held accountable to planning cycle requirements: plans must be in line with GPPAC themes, there is evaluation and monitoring as well as a reporting cycle and activities are assessed as to what has been agreed in regional plans. Realisation or failure to obtain results at regional level or absence of engagement with global objectives do not qualify as reasons to question regions. This changes when regions turn out relatively inactive or uninvolved. In some cases this led to efforts towards stimulation or further intervention and these interventions include major steps such as changing Regional Secretariats or Regional Liaison Officers, as well as the recent development of a new networking strategy that seeks to tackle these problems.

In the meantime monitoring and evaluation are largely process-oriented. In short, during the evaluated period, interaction in structures conveys the picture of a network where support to members is central, where a positive, constructive approach to each other can sometimes come at the expense of reflection, learning and accountability when it comes to results. This is not a matter easily solved. GPPAC is not an NGO that can easily hold partners to account, but a network of organisations that receive only a very limited part of their resources from GPPAC. Nor would such accounting be easily inserted into the existing organisational culture of support and inclusiveness. Furthermore, for its existence GPPAC depends on the readiness of members to take part, and so, on members' intrinsic motivation to do so. The dependence of the Global Secretariat and members is mutual.

#### 15.5.1.4 Capability to relate

The fourth C, the 'capability to relate' concerns building and maintaining networks with constituents, allies and external stakeholders. When it comes to the capability to relate, we can identify internal factors that can contribute to explain GPPAC's outcomes. First of all, the philosophy of regional priorities is leading as the living reality of GPPAC. This is largely due to the enactment of the shared vision of networking by the Global Secretariat and through the policies and structures of GPPAC that are consistently in line with this vision. The access to targets for civil society or opening (closed) spaces that GPPAC has achieved can to an important extent be explained by the consistent focus on linking and convening among Global Secretariat staff. Through the constant seeking out and creation of spaces and opportunities for interaction, linking targets, members and GPPAC priorities, GPPAC has made significant steps in the creation of access for GPPAC and members in the field of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Also, a collaborative and distinctly non-confrontational stance towards targets has contributed to gaining access to targets. At regional levels, it is largely the capability of specific member organisations that explains success at relating, with GPPAC often playing a supportive role.

At the same time, relating within GPPAC has had its limits, and these may contribute to explaining some of the limitations in collaboration and members' engagement with content development and shared objectives that we have identified. The GPPAC structures by which members and Global Secretariat staff meet to discuss GPPAC-wide issues involve a small number of members from the pool of RLOs and Regional Representatives of which a small number is also involved in the PSC and the Board. Indeed, most members have little or no direct interaction with GPPAC staff, let alone with members of other regions. And within regions, it is usually only the members of the Regional

Steering Group that get to meet, once a year, to discuss and devise their plans. Regular communications mostly take place between Global Secretariat Staff and Regional Secretariats. This interaction is often not primarily about matters of strategy, content or linkages between regional and global levels, but rather about the administrative sides of collaboration, planning and reporting and support with regard to regional issues. In other words, while the network depends on the development of mutual understandings and collaborations on communications, these communications do not occur frequently with most members. The communication that does take place may often not get to the level of explorations of issues beyond those most directly required, or relevant for regions. Such conditions of communication make it difficult to build relations beyond a select group of members, as well as the creation of engagement beyond regional levels. We do understand communication is important and in this assessment we also take into account the issues such as: language barriers, communication issues such as Internet and Skype availabilities and time differences, as well as time in itself, as everyone has busy and overloaded agendas. However, while we understand these issues are of importance in the explanation of limited communications, we also have seen the communications to be limited although there are the right conditions in place. Without communications it is difficult to maintain relations.

#### 15.5.1.5 Capability to balance diversity and achieve coherence

We employ for this evaluation an adapted version of the fifth C. Rather than speaking of the 'capability to achieve coherence', we speak here of the 'capability to balance diversity and achieve coherence'. For us, this includes the simultaneous engagement with diversity and the need for coherence within the organisation that will be expressed in vision, strategy and practices that achieve coherence while engaging with internal diversity. Organisations will have different ways of balancing these two, as well as concomitant different organisational structures and forms of operation.

GPPAC's perspective and way of working is embedded in the diversity of its members and their contexts. The explicit and enacted choice to not only accommodate this diversity, but to make the recognition of diversity in the world of peacebuilding and conflict prevention central on its agenda may help explain the attainment of many outcomes described above. These include the way the network has been structured and has developed, the image and legitimacy of the network among targets and access to these targets, as well as interactions and collaborations that have taken place. The diversity and broad scope, as well as the credibility that comes with truly being able to connect local voices with higher-level arenas, has opened doors to targets and has given true backing to local CSOs, largely on their terms. In other words, GPPAC's way of working with diversity helps explain its strength as a network as well as its credibility in the eye of other actors, including key targets. At the same time, this way of working can help explain why GPPAC's 'message' has remained relatively generic, with also the focus on human security, of late, being served by the ambiguity of this notion. The choice for diversity limits the possibilities to articulate clear and distinctive messages that may resonate with targets at international levels, but may have little relevance or immediate benefits for some members. It also stands in the way of swift and effective strategizing and coordination of action. This may help to explain why actual influence on policy and practice has remained limited in light of stated ambitions.

With accommodation of diversity grounding collaborations, strategic discussions within the network indeed often face difficulties finding, and committing to, shared objectives, including not only matters of conceptualisation and understanding, but also development and implementation of strategy, and collective rallying around the same. What GPPAC stands for, what it can bring to the

table, and towards what ends, therefore tends to remain relatively ambiguous, while also slow to emerge, develop and translate into action. With the relative lack of a clear and specified message to mobilise around and insert into specific change processes, it remains too unclear, for some actors, what it is that GPPAC seeks to achieve or effectively has to contribute – and this goes for some internal actors as well as some external actors that GPPAC has engaged with.

#### *15.5.2 External factors*

With this evaluation's focus on the network as such rather than a subset of programmes, the explanatory factors we could identify and substantiate to a reasonable degree are mostly internal in nature. Assessing the role of external explanatory factors for the different initiatives carried out worldwide would have demanded in-depth engagement with regional contexts; this was not possible due to resource limits. However, there is still a range of more generally applicable factors that we can mention, as well as some specific factors relating to the UN level, the nature of the issues worked on, and restrictions in political space for civil society. We focus here on the broader developments of GPPAC's increasing access to targets, while at the same time, influence remains relatively limited as compared with stated ambitions.

A primary external factor that may contribute to explaining the access GPPAC has gained to targets, is a basic openness to civil society that exists among at least some of GPPAC's targets. We also found that targets at least in a number of cases are specifically open to the idea that GPPAC, as a global network, offers access to 'on the ground' knowledge and experiences, and appreciates the centrality of 'local voices' in GPPAC's work. At the same time, access and interaction mostly have not translated into a wide variety of policy influence or changing practice yet. Partly, in the case of GPPAC it is 'early days' when it comes to achievement of such influence as it is stressed multiple times by staff members: 'we are a young network' and 'we only exist for ten years now'. The access to targets and forms of collaboration that GPPAC presently has achieved is the result of much work in recent years. On the other hand, not achieving influence is a fact of life for GPPAC as much as many other civil society actors who find themselves being consulted and granted a certain legitimacy by targets, at the United Nations and elsewhere. Since the UN forms one of the main international arena's GPPAC has focused on, we will here go more deeply into identifying factors that may help explain why we see as yet limited influence, at least at UN level.

The difficulties civil society actors face when it comes to achieving change at the UN has been aptly documented by analysts who see how conditions and powers are geared towards the status quo, and even question the present abilities of the UN to perform a role towards significant global change, and the UN's readiness to have itself influenced towards such change by civil society.<sup>569</sup> While this has been noted as a general problem for civil society influence as such, it is seen even more so for those civil society actors that do not belong to the set of well-established INGOs that have had the resources available to build a presence and reputation/brand name at the UN, and that have learned how to offer forms of knowledge and input that are geared to requirements set by the arena itself, in terms of content, presentation, and insertion into UN processes. The UN, like other arenas, is a complex world of its own, that members as well as GPPAC staff have been learning only in recent years how to relate to in order to build relations. Access, moreover, is regulated in the UN system, involving formal restrictions (e.g. GPPAC does not have ECOSOC status). These things in themselves require considerable investment and presence that is difficult to achieve through the networked operations of GPPAC. Presently, Global Secretariat staff and several regional members have succeeded in building a number of significant relations with UN bodies. But GPPAC runs into limitations building a name for itself, as resources are scarce and member involvement does not

allow for consistent presence and insertion of input that at least some important contacts would in fact be open to. Also, changes in UN staff have sometimes meant starting over with building the personal relations found necessary to develop meaningful interaction. These dynamics are also challenging within the civil society field and on national as well as regional levels.

Then there is the question of the nature of welcomed input. While international arenas like the UN have been entered into by many civil society actors, the question is to what extent local GPPAC members 'qualify' for such entry, and so, how open such arenas really are to the perspectives and knowledge such members may have and want to offer. This is a problem that GPPAC is faced with that is not easily fixed by 'capacity building', considering GPPAC's starting points of prioritising local voices. One factor is that relations between civil society and the UN can be tense, with mutual reservations and sometimes hostility limiting constructive engagement, and especially critique of states. Another matter is the openness to voices that do not fit the frames of thought of UN actors, around e.g. expertise and 'usefulness' for ongoing policy process.

**Box 15.11 Space in political arenas**

The openness of political arenas to civil society was problematised by a Global Secretariat staff member, responding to the question whether GPPAC brings in the right expertise to attain influence: 'Whose call is that? If you go by capacity alone, expertise looking at track record on paper. Really good publication on issue x. Then you're very easily passing by those organisations that are perhaps not there yet. We are dealing with an imperfect field. Countries with hundreds or thousands of organisations that are clouding this field. But they are there, and they are the ones that have to make it happen. If we do a capacity test, whose standards are to apply? Being able to write a good report? Or being able to connect with that community? Sometimes if we go by that tendency, do they have that capacity, you're going to be dealing with [prominent INGOs] because they have that type of capacity. But then you are not being inclusive of all those imperfect others...They are not the big experts. The big experts are already there... I was at this seminar on inclusive peacebuilding, they [prominent INGOs] were all there. Big, really capable organisations. Sometimes I envy them. I look at the stuff they do and go 'wow'. And we were all there, and were talking ABOUT inclusive peacebuilding. But where were the people from those countries who are supposed to do that work, the peacebuilding?'

Relatedly, and this can help explain the previously discussed lack of involvement among members with GPPAC's global ambitions: it often appears to remain unclear what could be achieved at UN level that could make a difference for members. In other words also, how to translate the global level processes back into the regional level arenas. A Global Secretariat staff member spoke about the relevance of global level arenas for on-the-ground situations, shedding light on the problem of connecting the levels GPPAC targets: 'to what degree does a high level panel somewhere, bringing these high profile ladies and gentlemen to talk about human security - to what degree does it impact the lives of community A that borders with community B in [country] figuring out where the fence should go through, to get a bit clearer how they share the water resources in that village'? Indeed, also in interviews with prominently involved members we sometimes found that they had difficulties identifying how advocacy at UN level could contribute to their goals. It was even questioned whether those involved in these high level processes were really still grounded in the reality, flying from one place to the next to sit in panels and meetings talking 'UN-ish'.

Scholarly analyses of the UN point out that the estimation of such engagement is likely not very relevant considering degrees of openness to alternative perspectives and/or chances of achieving change, is justified, and is a serious problem that deserves to be countered, as GPPAC also seeks to do.<sup>570</sup>

### *15.5.3 The nature of the issue*

GPPAC's conceptualisation of its issue in relatively non-political terms (inclusiveness) and as one that is to be approached through collaboration rather than confrontation, has had a positive influence on its access to at least some targets. At the same time, the fact that it is about inclusion into conflict prevention and peacebuilding is likely also to form a factor that can contribute to explaining why GPPAC's outcomes in priority areas 'policy influencing' and 'changing practice' are limited as compared with levels of engagement with targets.

First, a primary external factor that may contribute to limitations in influence (even with access) is that in the domain of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, state actors and international organisations have been highly reluctant to include civil society voices. This is the exact condition GPPAC is trying to amend. In fact, we could say that GPPAC's work faces consistent reservations from state, RIGO and UN actors—which is not the usual situation in lobbying and advocacy. Secondly, the issues GPPAC works on are complex in nature, involving many different actors, institutions, interpretations, interests and tensions that do not lend themselves to speedy resolution. The changes GPPAC seeks to contribute to involve many difficult, conflict-affected contexts where foundations for peaceful collaboration towards the sought changes are often not in place or unstable. The processes GPPAC seeks to advance are long-term. Furthermore, analysis points out that the role of civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding is essential, but must not be overestimated.<sup>571</sup> GPPAC's own aims and objectives as formulated, may be ambitious, but expectations of civil society must be realistic, acknowledging both potential contribution and limitations.<sup>572</sup> Results may thus also come to look limited in light of overstated ambitions.

Finally, external explanatory factors that we can point out are the lack of political space and increasing restrictions imposed on civil society in many regions: Eastern Europe, East and Central Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Northeast Asia, Caucasus, Central Asia, and parts of Southeast Asia.

## **15.6 Overview of and reflections on main alliance-level findings**

GPPAC has accomplished many things over the evaluated period. Importantly, these achievements are grounded in a serious and consistent effort to further regional civil society's ownership of priorities, strategies and activities. While it is common for NGOs to work with 'local' partner organisations, GPPAC stands out for its vision that centres on its facilitation and support for regional organisations and the enactment of this vision in the day-to-day building and operations of the network.

First of all, a major and multifaceted achievement rooted in these starting points is that GPPAC provides space for peacebuilding and conflict prevention organisations worldwide to come together as partners, and with targets, to act together. This happens also in complex contexts where such processes are sensitive and acting together is highly warranted. GPPAC is highly geared to the achievement of inclusiveness through facilitating, linking and convening and through shaping, and contributing to, collaborative practices by which space for civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding is enhanced. Increasingly, the network works through functioning structures that are consistently adapted and improved.

A second major achievement is that GPPAC provides a context where civil society organisations can find support in many different forms, geared towards these organisations' own priorities. This support comes in the form of financial support for activities, technical and organisational support,

support in fundraising, learning and input from fellow peacebuilding organisations towards projects, enhanced standing and legitimacy through the GPPAC umbrella, and the creation of relatively 'neutral' platforms by which interactions between parties in conflict can more easily take place.

A third major achievement is that, increasingly, GPPAC has identified targets in a whole range of arenas, widening its network to many different contexts and target actors. GPPAC increased and sustained relations and credibility with actors. Important steps have also been made in relations and cooperation with such actors, whereby influence increasingly becomes a real possibility. Collaborations with such actors are in line with the ToC, thematically, and often also in terms of membership involvement and ownership.

In some cases, policy influencing and changing practice has been achieved. At the same time, influence itself has remained relatively limited compared with stated ambitions. On the one hand, one could say that for actual influence it may be too early. Many collaborations are 'works in progress' in various stages of development or have just recently started to take shape. On the other hand, there are also structural challenges that the network is faced with. Some of these are external. The conflict prevention and peacebuilding field is a difficult context when it comes to civil society influence. Other challenges are internal in nature. While it cannot be claimed that these are the reasons for achieving limited influence, they deserve to be addressed and reflected upon as they touch upon the basics of GPPAC's ToC, and in particular the centring on regional ownership and the forms of collaboration that may develop through networking. This ToC has guided GPPAC's development and provides considerable legitimacy to the network as it seeks to advance local voices rather than its own profile or positions. At the same time, working through networking as GPPAC does also surfaces a set of dilemmas that may in some ways hinder the advancement of some of GPPAC's objectives.

A basic tension within GPPAC is that between an active, highly committed Global Secretariat that unitedly seeks to mobilise and activate network members and those members for whom the network or its above-regional objectives are often not a first priority. Much energy is thus spent on attempting to move members, whose response tends to fall short of ambitions as stated in the ToC. Certainly, one could ask to what extent one is to see this as a problem. A network will not be a coordinated machine. And indeed, the legitimacy of GPPAC crucially depends on the diversity it has been nurturing. Seeking to turn GPPAC into a coordinated machine would risk its very basis of credibility and even *raison d'être*. At the same time, there are some unresolved issues within GPPAC that emerge when we compare GPPAC's ToC with the actual functioning of the network. Four issues stand out.

First, within GPPAC there is a tension between the starting point that regional priorities are to be guiding and the perspective that GPPAC is to have global ambitions. An implicit assumption in GPPAC's ToC is that networking will catalyse activity oriented towards shared objectives. In practice, regional and global activities often tend to develop in parallel, with the Global Secretariat leading the latter. In a way this is sometimes relatively disconnected from regions. The ambitions of putting regional priorities first and of working through the connection of different levels, are in tension with such practices. Furthermore, global activities depend for their credibility on explicit and concrete linkages to regional organisations and the involvement of regional organisations. While there is a basic credibility for the network that opens doors at international levels, this promise also has to materialise in practice for it to be sustainable and to develop it further. Presently, activities at global and regional levels are sometimes too disconnected for this to happen as much as it could.

Secondly, the fundamental philosophy of 'regional priorities first' implies spreading as the living reality of the network. Within GPPAC, it is noted that this has led to engagement that is broad rather than focused. Indeed, GPPAC's energies are divided over many themes, regional contexts, strategies and targets. Within GPPAC, the question 'are we perhaps spreading too thin?' is one that has been asked in recent years and this questioning has contributed to an enhanced focus on a limited set of shared objectives. At the same time, this has not touched upon the space for regional priorities and has not implied demands of commitment by regional members.

Thirdly, with an emphasis on linking and convening, the network has developed internally and externally. Many meaningful connections and relations have developed, leading to a situation where GPPAC has almost global scope, offering extensive opportunities for making relative connections. But what GPPAC 'stands for' or what it 'has to contribute' has remained relatively ambiguous. The collaborative stance GPPAC takes means that positions and recommendations are not central to its style of advocacy. It is rather that through processes of building relations and exploring possibilities, options towards influencing can develop. However, GPPAC has in fact also sought to achieve policy influence in a more classical sense, as with the advancement of human security or implementation of UNSCR 1325. Here, the management of diversity takes up a lot of the precious and limited time network members have together, leading to situations where collective and coordinated development and execution of strategy gets relatively less attention and develops in slow and limited ways. Partly, the centrality of regional priorities and the focus on convening and linking leads to a situation where advocacy at international levels is relatively more geared towards the facilitation of local voices and emphasising their importance, than towards the integration and translation of these into options that translate into policy processes and dilemmas and needs of policymakers. This situation does not always serve well GPPAC's ambition to make substantive contributions towards ambitions like 'a shift from reaction to prevention' among targets. To put it differently: networking functions are relatively strongly developed as compared with advocacy functions, whereas the qualities of the network do in fact look promising when it comes to the realisation of influence, at least when we consider the extent to which conditions of access and legitimacy have been met. As one external resource person having a long-standing relation with GPPAC commented in an interview with us: 'they should invest more in advocacy training for Global Secretariat as well as members, including targeting recommendations. That would take their work to a whole new level. With that, they could be so much more effective'.

Finally, GPPAC has made the explicit choice not to approach the network as something that is to function as an instrument towards objectives. The prime goal of the network is to support members. At the same time, there is a basic assumption that networking is to make a difference. Networking is to lead to effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies on national, regional and global level. It is clear that results are also being realised. However, with support to members being central to the network's functioning, limits in achievement of results are not only rarely discussed, the starting point of the network as supporting also appears to favour orientation to process over orientation to results, limiting space for the type of learning based on analysis of whether GPPAC makes enough of a difference, and whether the answer to that question warrants any more fundamental change in course.

In conclusion, over the past years, GPPAC has developed considerable strengths, most prominently in terms of its foundations of structures, interactions, trust and operations around shared principles and practices of inclusiveness, many relations with targets as well as the legitimacy its way of working brings in the eyes of targets. But GPPAC also holds a set of ambiguities and tensions that pull



it into different directions at the same time. A reflection on these ambiguities and tensions, and thereby a reconsideration of its ToC, is due in order to build effectively on the many achievements and experiences of the past years.

## 16 Synthesis of Protection, Human Security and Conflict Prevention Cluster Findings

### 16.1 Key findings on changes achieved in the three priority result areas and their relevance

#### 16.1.1 Key findings on changes achieved

This section on the evaluation questions regarding changes seeks to highlight and summarise the outcomes achieved per ILA programme. The terms of reference of the evaluation distinguishes three priority result areas: agenda setting, policy influencing and change of practice.

The baseline study of the international lobby and advocacy evaluation observed some limitations of this distinction of priority result areas. First, large areas of results, which can lie, for example, in network strengthening, capacity building or institutional reform, are not adequately covered by the three areas defined in the framework. Second, results may be misrepresented because of being boxed into one of the predefined priority result areas. Third, the suggestion of the areas being related to each other as ‘phases’ may in some cases violate the realities and complexities of the ways alliances strategize.

Nonetheless, in view of the continuity of the evaluation, the three priority result areas have been maintained, and the observations thus stand to caution the distinction made in this section.

The first evaluation question concerns the following:

What are the changes achieved in the three priority result areas through international lobbying and advocacy on the thematic clusters, in this case: ‘protection, human security and conflict prevention’ during the 2011–2014 period?

Outcomes are defined as changes in the behaviour, relationships, activities or actions of the people, groups and organisations with whom a programme works directly.<sup>573</sup> In the programme-level evaluations, we have identified the outcomes claimed and substantiated by the alliances, as related to the three priority result areas and the theories of change (ToCs). We have further qualified these outcomes by relating them to developments in the broader context and the thematic and policy focus areas of the alliances. These qualifications were fed into the assessment of the relevance, contribution and explanations of findings of subsequent sections.

Here, the outcomes of the programmes per priority result area are summarised. For a comprehensive overview, see the alliance-level reports. Then, some patterns in the findings are highlighted, including similarities, differences and linkages.

The changes reported were achieved during the 2011–2014 period, and were funded (mainly) by MFS II. The list is not exhaustive, because of the complexities of the issues evaluated, where not all changes are tangible and identifiable. We have also had to omit certain findings for reasons of sensitivity and confidentiality. As remarked in the previous chapters, not all areas of work could be covered by the evaluation team.

#### 16.1.1.1 Together 4 Change (T4C)–African Child Policy Forum (ACPF)

ACPF (part of the T4C Alliance) hosts the ILA programme under evaluation and is a pan-African child rights organisation working from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Most of the outcomes and changes relate to the priority result area of agenda setting.

#### Agenda setting:

In the identification of changes, different layers of outcomes were taken into account: regional (pan-African) level, national and civil society level and global level. ACPF, unlike some of the other cases, is not a network organisation, and hence the first broad indicator of maintaining coherent positions and strategies within the (Alliance) programme does not apply.

The ToC of ACPF mainly targets the pan-African level, and that is indeed where most outcomes are found. In particular, ACPF has influenced the African Union (AU) and African Committee on the Rights and Wellbeing of the Child (ACERWC). ACPF has had substantial input on the policy on child rights of the AU, setting agendas, as well as contributing to changing policies and practices. Outcomes are not restricted to the AU level, but trickle down at member state level through the AU's ministerial conference. A concrete example is the input on the AU Common Africa Position on the post-2015 agenda (ACP), and the ACPF also had input in the 2063-agenda of the African Union at its 50th year anniversary (2013) and the AU/ACERWC campaign on the ratification of the African Charter for the Rights and Welfare of the Child. ACPF's role was explicitly mentioned by AU stakeholders as having a crucial contribution to the campaign.

Furthermore, ACPF's work was used as input for the periodic reporting on the Charter. The AU and its ACERWC give full recognition to the work of ACPF and highly appreciate its continuing and high quality contribution to the work of the Social Department on Child Rights in Africa. This is considered a major and crucial outcome of ACPF's programme.

ACPF has also been invited to give input on content and/or to participate in drafting guidelines or declarations for different Interagency Working Groups (IAWGs), on different subject matters and in different locations, related to child rights (post-2015 agenda, governance, child protection). These include working groups of the AU and its committees and various regional economic communities (ECOWAS, EAC and SADC) and the international governmental institutions. These ongoing invitations and ACPF's actual participation in such IAWGs are considered an important outcome of ACPF's advocacy work, as it brings about changes in agendas, policy and practice.

A good number of outcomes were noted at national level and in civil society. These are mainly spin-offs (indirect outcomes) of general ACPF activities and outputs, such as the production of the African Report, the IPCs and the support to the ACERWC and the AU. Examples on national level are the African Report on Child Wellbeing (ARCW) and the ranking list to influence governments (Swaziland), IPC 2012 led to more national research on inter-country adoption, national opinion leaders claim they are inspired by ACPF reports and messages and political leaders consult ACPF behind the scenes. Examples with regard to the civil society level are that ARCW has been used as a guiding and advocacy tool by some government officials and some CSOs, CSOs feel recognised by the ACERWC through the CSO reporting and the push for increasing budget allocations for children. Changes have also been seen in policy and even practice. It was found that ACPF's message on child rights formulated in 2011 and 2012 still resounds and stimulates actions in civil society and at governmental levels in 2014. The message ripples through the field and is taken forward by other actors.

Finally, at international or global level, ACPF is still developing and expanding its role. The majority of changes reported at this level were achieved over the last year and fall under the indicator of being invited for meetings. These include UNHRC in Geneva inviting ACPF to provide input in discussions on child rights, UNICEF Geneva inviting ACPF to advise and provide input in the strategic plan 2014–2017 and UNICEF headquarters in New York inviting ACPF to a Board meeting and side meetings where

state representatives were present. Beyond the UN circle, ACPF was also invited by Kids Rights Netherlands for discussions on and to provide input to their Kids Right Index based upon ACPF's Child Friendliness Index.

The outcomes achieved bear significance with regard to different broad indicators of agenda setting, for example, 'external partners are aware of issues at stake and adhere to the issue', 'extent to which ILA targets react to positions advocated', 'relevant stakeholders invited in/or organise meetings on relevant policies' and 'terms of public debate show influence of the advocated message'.

#### Policy influencing:

ACPF also achieved outcomes through providing advice and input on drafting policies. Some of these are directly influenced by ACPF, whereas some are beyond their control but inspired, and therefore indirectly influenced, by their advocacy message and reports. We found several instances of stakeholders that were not primarily targeted by ACPF and yet embraced ACPF's advocacy messages. We thus found evidence of 'demonstrable changes and adoption of new policies by lobby and advocacy targets'.

Examples on the global level are the changes in adoption policies in several national contexts including Australia and the Netherlands after the Inter-country Adoption International Policy Conference and reports facilitated, convened and written by ACPF, and the active role of ACPF in drafting and writing the UNCRC policy on the public allocation of spending for child rights. On regional level, the social protection guidelines for children have been adopted, ACPF provided input on the child marriage declaration by the AU and they also played a role in getting the child protection systems included in the Bujumbura Declaration. On national level, beyond its influence of control, ACPF inspired CSOs and government representatives in different ways on the issue of budgeting for children and in other thematic areas. An example is the development of a health policy in Mozambique.

#### Change of practice:

On regional level, we identified numerous outcomes directly related to ACPF's cooperation with the AU and their evidence-based reports, which provide the output (the report) and the message taken up by stakeholders in the field. ACPF contributed to the ACERWC child protection systems framework, which is now in use, and provided training on this. There is also an increased number of CSO progress reports on the African Charter on the Rights of the Child, which the AU considers a contribution of ACPF advice and support.

On national level, a specific and attributable practice change was reported from one country, where ACPF, together with others, established Child Legal Protection Centres that have been embedded in the government structures since 2012. On civil society level, we noticed examples of CSOs in various countries taking up issues advocated by ACPF in their programmes. For example, budgeting, accountability and anti-corruption is taken up as part of the child and governance programme in some NGOs, and CSOs and the government provide training on budget tracing in Kenya. With regard to changing practice at global level, these could not be observed, and it would in any case be too early to expect such changes, as ACPF's global-level profile started slowly rising only last year (2013).

#### 16.1.1.2 Communities of Change (CoC)–Cordaid Women's Leadership for Peace and Security Processes (WLPS)

The WLPS ILA programme forms a component of a larger Cordaid programme on Women's Leadership for Peace and Security, also called WLPS, and is part of the CoC Alliance, for which MFS II funding was received. The WLPS ILA programme contributed mainly to changes in agenda setting and

a number of changes leading up to policy change in the field of women, peace and security (WPS) and UNSCR 1325. Policy changes can be long-term processes beset with moments where achievements are set back when claimed space is shrinking. We therefore also take into account changes leading up to policy change, constituting achievements that are steps towards policy change. WLPS advocacy changes have been achieved at different levels: international, national and on the level of partnership, including the organisations of the Alliance.

#### Agenda setting:

With regard to the broad indicator 'internal coherence and communication', we have seen a number of internal changes in Cordaid, such as the reorganisation over the course of 2012 and the implementation of business units in 2013. This has resulted in a number of changes that enabled the internal coherence and communication of the international lobby and advocacy programmes of the Alliance, such as a cross-business unit exchanges. This increased the possibilities for working more strategically and strengthened capacity and knowledge building within Cordaid on women, peace and security and gender issues, as well as externally towards partners and other stakeholders.

In WLPS advocacy, partnerships and networking play a critical role, and we consider this as a strong aspect of the changes achieved, apart from the three priority result areas. The WLPS collaborates in different forms with partners—strategically as well as ad hoc—to build networks and enable a 'collective voice' for local women. Through these partnerships, strengths and knowledge are bundled, and messages are taken further to constituencies, partners, external stakeholders and targets. During the past years, we have noted an increase in invitations for the WLPS officer tasked with advocacy to share knowledge and experience during formal and informal meetings and at public events. In addition, numerous projects have been developed in which they cooperate with the EU, NATO, UN Women and other international and regional platforms. The increase in the number of invitations is seen as agenda setting: relevant stakeholders become aware of the issues advocated; opening closed spaces.

At the global level, WLPS advocacy has achieved a number of outcomes in the past years, falling under different indicators of agenda setting: stakeholders become aware of the issues at stake, organise themselves and adhere to the positions of the ILA programme; opening closed spaces and target's reactions to advocacy message and influencing discussions. WLPS provided substantial advice in discussions at the international level on different issues, namely on the UNSCR 1325 process, including critical lessons and perspectives on the implementation of National and Regional Action Plans (NAP/RAP); on the role of women as participants and leaders in peace and security processes and on the inclusion of gender in the New Deal. NATO also invited WLPS to give input on the transition monitoring in Afghanistan. WLPS advocacy focused on UN organisations, NATO, the EU, various representatives/missions of national governments to the UN and the international CSOs working on women, peace and security and gender. As lobby and advocacy constitutes a component of a wider programme, insights on the realities and concerns of local women formed the basis of the advocacy work, which aimed to link the local realities of women with the international policy processes that affect their daily lives.

The general WLPS programme, and especially the advocacy programme, works closely together with UN Women and NATO, as these stakeholders are aware of the issues at stake, adhere to the position of WLPS and invite WLPS to meetings for input and advice. These partnerships resulted in advancing the policy processes aiming to close the gap addressed by WLPS between the UNSCR 1325 policy and its implementation, including its financing. A paper produced by WLPS on Integrating Gender into the New Deal was listed as a resource on the OECD New Deal Website of the International Dialogue for

Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS), triggering a number of dialogues with IDPS and with various countries. WLPS developed and proposed a multi-stakeholder financing mechanism that is currently being considered by multiple global and national stakeholders. Various stakeholders (UN Women, the EU, NATO and national government representatives of Finland, Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sierra Leone and Nepal) have responded to the initiative and invited Cordaid WLPS for further discussions. The issue has been taken up by UN Women, in partnership with Cordaid and its network, to be further discussed while an international Financing Discussion Group on the issue has been formed and acknowledged in the UN Secretary-General Report on Women, Peace and Security (October 2014).

At national levels, numerous changes can be observed—opening closed spaces and creating awareness on the issues advocated—in the Netherlands and in partner countries. In this evaluation, we have focused on the advocacy directly conducted by WLPS, as well as the case studies of the lobby for the UNSCR multi-stakeholder financing mechanism in the international arena (in New York) and the advocacy around the NAP 1325 processes in Colombia. In the Netherlands, WLPS advocacy is mostly conducted through the NAP 1325 Working Group, in which CSOs are cooperating with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs to enable its effective implementation. While the process is still evolving, there are some initial achievements. Examples are triggering and maintaining parliamentary interest in the UNSCR 1325 implementation process; an increase in the number of invitations to the NL MoFA as well as the Dutch parliament and ensuring continued structural budgets for UNSCR 1325 and women, peace and security (WPS). In Colombia, WLPS helped to break the long resistance of the government to addressing UNSCR 1325 and raised awareness on the implementation and localisation of UNSCR 1325 through women’s groups and by working with local politicians. The issues were taken up by the stakeholders and have become part of the women’s movement agenda and, in some cases, also of the municipal policy.

#### Policy influencing:

There have been significant policy changes in the domain addressed by WLPS, notably the NATO/EAPC Policy for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security and related resolutions (June 2014), which was followed by the NATO Action Plan for the implementation of the policy. It is difficult to pinpoint the contribution of WLPS, because many actors were involved in the lobby for this policy, but WLPS was certainly part of this lobby. There are also more specific examples of how WLPS contributed to ‘demonstrable changes and adoption of new policies by lobby and advocacy targets’. These include the NATO-supported project on developing the NATO 1325 scorecard in which critical input from WLPS was integrated; NATO also used WLPS input in their UNSCR 1325 review on Afghanistan, advising UNSCR 1325 implementation. The advances made with the 1325 multi-stakeholder financing mechanism, as discussed above, can also be seen as initial steps towards changing policy.

#### Change of practice:

The WLPS sought outcomes at the national level, and the evaluation has been able to study such outcomes in South Sudan and Colombia. These concern women’s participation in peace negotiations in South Sudan, the support to women’s collectives in peace processes in South Sudan and Colombia and the women’s commission that has been implemented and become active in the Colombian peace process.

In the Netherlands, active lobby and advocacy take place only within the WO=MEN NGO working group. This has, however, led to a budget of €4 million available per year. Cordaid is involved in various programmes (Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, DR Congo, MENA). Joint advocacy in the NAP

Working Group led to the development of a new fund for smaller NAP initiatives and grassroots organisations in the NAP focus countries. Finally, Cordaid Nederland is going to host the NAP pilot fund. UN Women is now taking the co-leadership position in facilitating the Financing Discussion Group WPS (Global Acceleration Instrument WPS).

At the international level, it can be considered a change of practice that UN Women is now taking the co-leadership position in facilitating the Financing Discussion Group WPS (Global Acceleration Instrument WPS).

16.1.1.3 Freedom from Fear (FFF)–Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)  
GPPAC hosts the ILA programme under evaluation as part of the FFF Alliance. GPPAC is a civil society-led network that focuses on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The network aims to establish a new international consensus, moving away from reaction and towards the prevention of violent conflict, building on local ownership and multi-stakeholder processes through strengthening civil society networks for peace and security. GPPAC is a global network consisting of 15 regional networks of peacebuilding and conflict prevention organisations.

#### Agenda setting:

Many of the reported outcomes can be subdivided under the priority result area of agenda setting, and contribute to the development of the network as such. Outcomes have been achieved in the development or improvement of formal and informal network structures. The formal outcomes are, for example, the development or improvement of a number of structures for the governance of GPPAC, and structures by which collaborations are to take shape. GPPAC facilitates its regional networks by supporting them (largely through the Global Secretariat) financially and organisationally, network interactions and development of approaches and activities. More informal outcomes are the development of a shared understanding that regional priorities are leading within GPPAC (regions tend to see this as the living reality of GPPAC), as well as the development and maintenance of working relations, which are often warm and friendly, across a number of prominent staff of member organisations and the Global Secretariat.

At regional level, with GPPAC's focus on regional priorities, most outcomes lie in the support and advancement of regional priorities and positions, rather than the development of shared positions and strategies. At global level, ambitions towards development of positions and strategies have come to be operationalised and translated into action by taking up specific issues. The advancement of positions and strategies through collective work has been relatively limited, as compared with stated ambitions. Outcomes on this front have increased over the latter part of the evaluated period.

When it comes to interaction with targets, GPPAC has identified targets in a range of arenas and has increasingly developed relations and credibility with these targets, seeking and developing collaborations. Relations were established with state actors in many regions and a range of regional international governmental organisations (RIGOs) and UN bodies (at regional level and in New York). GPPAC has succeeded in bringing about interactions and often long-term collaborations with a range of targets and partners on the full range of themes identified in the ToC. Interactions mostly take the form of consultation, dialogue and, in some cases, collaboration in the context of policy development, training and conflict prevention and peacebuilding practices.

There are a number of thematic issues on which GPPAC has achieved outcomes. These include, most importantly gender, human security, infrastructures for peace, peace education, dialogue and mediation, civil–military interactions and RIGO capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Engagements also include a number of civic diplomacy initiatives, such as civil society networking to

contribute to regional security in Northeast Asia, in particular with regard to relations with the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK); Track-2 (recently developed into Track 1.5)<sup>574</sup> dialogue on the conflict between Russia and Georgia and Track-2 dialogue on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Finally, we see under agenda setting a number of changes brought about by GPPAC that increase inclusiveness to (previously) closed decision-making spaces (i.e. CSOs, their networks and their constituents' ability to participate in decision making has increased). GPPAC has contributed to opening spaces by linking regional actors with targets that were previously inaccessible, or less accessible, to such members. GPPAC staff and members also reported that the association with GPPAC contributes to opening closed spaces and policy arenas (DPRK process, LAS, ASEAN AIPR). In other cases, members reported that GPPAC provides and facilitates a relatively neutral platform for interaction between parties in conflict. Facilitation is through (co-)organising conferences, workshops, roundtables and other forms of exchange. GPPAC advanced opportunities for interaction and linking between civil society actors and other actors, including states, as well as international organisations, on numerous occasions (Georgia–Russia Track 2 diplomacy process, UNGA debate on human security input, DPRK process, peace education).

#### Policy influencing:

In some cases, policy influencing has been achieved, including the inclusion of instruments or recommendations in policy (partly) generated or promoted by the network and the taking up of frames introduced or promoted by the network in policy documents and speeches of officials. Mostly, these instances of policy influencing concern state or regional targets. Influence itself has remained relatively limited compared with ambitions, and mostly concerns intermediate outcomes towards change. At the global level, outcomes consist mainly of endorsement of GPPAC frames in three UN reports.

#### Change of practice:

GPPAC has contributed to the creation of platforms for the inclusion of civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes. By (co-) organising conferences, workshops, roundtables and other forms of exchanges, GPPAC has advanced opportunities for interaction between civil society actors and other actors including states as well as international organisations on numerous occasions. In addition, GPPAC has contributed to the development of platforms for interaction between parties in conflict. Members report that GPPAC has provided a relatively neutral platform for interaction between parties in conflict. In such cases, the nature of the contribution lies in the generation, facilitation or continuation of process (interactions, nature and quality of process) among external actors (such as dialogue or other forms of contact).

While we have placed the opening of space for civil society organisations under 'agenda setting' in the section above, arguably, such opening of spaces can also be understood as changes in practice when previously closed spaces open for civil society, beyond the actors involved in GPPAC, or when actors previously not open to civil society continue to cooperate with civil society actors, even after GPPAC's intervention. Examples where GPPAC has contributed to such practice change are the DPRK process, where cooperation with North Korean actors is established, and the cross-border cooperation between local groups in Russia and Georgia.

Generally, GPPAC's outcomes over the evaluated period mainly concern 1) the development of the network; 2) the realisation of forms of support to peacebuilding and conflict prevention initiatives through the network; 3) the building of relations and legitimacy for the network, involving (and



resulting in) the effective linking and convening of members, targets and other CSO actors and 4) intermediate outcomes towards policy influence. In this, GPPAC has built a basis for further influencing and inclusiveness. In view of the crucial importance of networking in the ToC, the linking and convening side of GPPAC's work has continued to be the most prominent. The development and advancement of effective strategies towards peacebuilding and conflict prevention have been less advanced. However, in the latter part of the evaluated period, focused development of advocacy materials and forms of collaboration with targets has advanced, suggesting the potential for progress on these fronts, building on strengths developed in earlier stages of the evaluated period, as well as in the preceding years.

#### 16.1.1.4 Patterns in changes

The three ILA programmes focus on the different thematic areas of child rights, women's rights and conflict prevention. They are very different in nature: a research organisation, a policy-influencing component of a larger development organisation and a network. Remarkably, all three programmes rely heavily on so-called insider advocacy strategies. They use research, publications, formal and informal meetings and forms of silent diplomacy in which they seek cooperation with targeted stakeholders. There are some patterns emerging in the changes achieved, as is discussed below.

The priority result areas:

Most of the outcomes are related to agenda setting, which is about developing coherent positions and strategies, raising awareness, receiving reactions to positions taken, opening closed spaces and influence public debate.

Many outcomes 'score' on multiple broad indicators. Awareness raising, opening (closed) spaces and target's reactions on positions taken are three of the broad indicators under agenda setting that appear to be strongly interrelated. Becoming more involved in the policy processes while the addressed issues are increasingly adopted is all about increasing visibility, credibility and legitimacy to advocate. In addition, changes have been achieved on internal communication and coherence. In all cases, advancing the knowledge and competencies of the partner network plays a role, for instance by mainstreaming notions on women in fragility throughout Cordaid. In GPPAC, internal communication and coherence was an important objective, and networking is at the heart of this alliance's ToC.

As all alliances rely on insider strategies more than outsider strategies, few changes have been achieved with regard to changing the terms of public debate. The alliances in this cluster are not geared towards organising public campaigns to influence the public at large, but rather towards formal and informal relations building to advance the advocacy. This does not mean, however, that through changing practice, the terms of debate do not change locally: In the concerned policy arenas or in local peace processes, voices of CSOs (GPPAC) or women (WLPS) are more prominently heard.

With regard to policy influencing, we also incorporated achievements in the drafting of policies when these were not yet adopted. Most of the outcomes under this priority result area are about support and advice given during policy drafting processes and the inclusion of policy recommendations based on content (co-) produced by the ILA programmes. Changes of practice were demonstrated in the implementation of policy, in tools or trainings previously not used or in the integration of different structures and mechanisms in mainstream practice based on or inspired by the advocacy message.

The difference between the priority result areas is not always immediately clear. Opening closed spaces can be viewed as changing practice. However, this would require that spaces are opened

beyond the immediate actors involved in the advocacy programme and that such opening sustains beyond the immediate intervention.

#### Multilevel scope:

The outcomes achieved show the transnational character and multileveled way of working of international lobby and advocacy. The programmes work cross-nationally, globally and regionally and involve large sets of actors, including state actors, RIGOs, IGOs and other CSOs, addressing personal, organisational and inter-organisational areas. Some outcomes travel along different levels or arenas, and are passed on by inspired stakeholders.

Although the objectives of the ILA programmes often focus on state arenas, it is important to note that outcomes in CSO or international arenas may be equally relevant for the realisation of the ultimate objectives to which the alliances envision contributing.

It is noteworthy that none of the three ILA programmes in this cluster have yet involved the private sector, although some initial attempts have been made.

#### Cooperation and partnerships in multi-stakeholder processes:

An overarching issue standing out from the evaluation is the strategy to cooperate to advocate in silent diplomacy rather than engage in forms of activism. This strategy is a known advocacy concept, mentioned as insider strategy.<sup>575</sup> All programmes in this cluster are geared towards such insider strategies. This is also visible in their language, where they tend to speak about stakeholders in policy processes, rather than targets for advocacy. Cooperation is sometimes on personal levels, whereas in other instances there is a strong institutional link and connection or a strategic or ad hoc partnership to pursue a specific aim. Networked advocacy and the formation of partnerships is found to be highly important in the achievement of outcomes. The multilevel networks can enhance the voice of local actors in their own arena while feeding and legitimising advocacy at other levels.

## **16.2 Relevance**

The relevance of the changes or outcomes is assessed against the background of the submitted MFS II proposals and the related ToCs. In addition, we discuss the relevance of the outcomes in relation to the priority result areas, the context of the thematic area of 'protection, human security and conflict prevention' and the policy aspect of civil society capacity strengthening. Relevance was assessed through interviews with staff, partners and external stakeholders and substantiated by observations of the evaluators, the examination of documents and interviews with external resource persons. The alliance reports provide a more extensive assessment of the relevance of the ILA programmes.

### *16.2.1 Relevance and ACPF*

Overall, the relevance of ACPF's advocacy is recognised on the pan-African level, as well as the country level, and in the last year (2013–2014), increasingly, in the international and global policy and public arenas. ACPF's work is acknowledged as voicing the African position on child rights and wellbeing. In terms of the ToC, the changes achieved fall in line with the ambitions expressed. It is hard to establish whether child wellbeing has been improved, but we did establish the contribution of ACPF to putting children on the public and policy agendas. ACPF's work is widely used, acknowledged and referenced, and staff is continuously invited to meetings—formal and informal—to provide input and advice. Recommendations by ACPF are taken up by CSOs, policy makers and (inter-)national institutions. ACPF could, however, have gained in relevance if there were a stronger outreach of their message to African CSOs, especially in different language zones. Intensifying the network of representatives and packaging advocacy messages in accessible language, coupled with

readymade suggestions for CSOs at the grassroots, could have enhanced the relevance of the advocacy programme.

#### *16.2.2 Relevance and WLPS*

The changes achieved show the relevance of WLPS' work in the broader context of the women, peace and security field in which women's rights, leadership and participation are relevant issues pursued by a wide variety of stakeholders. The changes achieved by the WLPS advocacy are in line with the expectations and ToC, but it becomes clear that that advocacy is a slow and long-term process and that not everything is tangible or can be anticipated. The advocacy component of the WLPS seeks to link practice on the ground to the numerous global policy instruments and arenas and vice versa, constantly brokering between the broader field and the specific local contexts. WLPS aims to increase the inclusion of women in local peace and security processes, and bring the experiences and voices of these levels into wider policy arenas. We have seen an increase in invitations to WLPS and in the use of their work in relevant policy discussions. Strategic partnerships and networking make it possible for WLPS lobby and advocacy to reach more stakeholders in different (policy) arenas, and thus to broaden their scope of (possible) influence.

The relevance of WLPS lobby and advocacy work is further related to the strengthening of women's networks, their international lobby and the way the two dialogue. The WLPS lobby and advocacy strengthening of local women's network is relevant in terms of local empowerment and processes of participation, as well as in terms of organising women to voice their needs in international lobby arenas. WLPS international lobby work is targeted to common issues raised by local partners. Addressing these issues will have global impacts, not only for their partners, but also for women broadly (e.g. financing for 1325, gender in fragile states, addressing WPS in unrecognised conflict countries).

#### *16.2.3 Relevance and GPPAC*

The changes achieved are relevant considering the objectives, showing particularly strong results in key dimensions central to GPPAC's ToC, emphasising principles of inclusiveness and the furthering of regional priorities. The relevance is related to network strengthening and to peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities. In terms of development and maintenance of network infrastructure and collaboration amongst members, there is a focus on the convening, linking and facilitating of a network structure, and on activities in which a number of members are involved at different levels of engagement. In terms of pertaining activities, it shows that the support by the network to its members through (regional) activities is deemed relevant to share knowledge, develop and advance shared positions and create platforms or opening closed spaces for discussions and dialogue. There are also limitations as to the degree of relevance. In relation to the aims and objectives, most changes that were reported concern achievements internal to the network and those in the development of relations and interactions with external actors. Although a number of policy changes and changes in practice were achieved, these are limited in light of ambitions. Changes in framing with regard to the issues advocated and uptake of issues advocated on policy agendas are also limited. In addition, the networking reality brings important challenges when it comes to collective strategizing and the implementation of strategies. It should be noted, though, that the limited role of civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding is a general problem and not specific to GPPAC; this is, in fact, the exact condition that GPPAC is seeking to change.

#### *16.2.4 Overall patterns and issues*

This section presents overall patterns and issues on the relevance of the advocacy programmes in the cluster.

Relevance in relation to the priority result areas:

Most of the changes achieved fit under the priority result area of agenda setting. Without underestimating the relevance of these changes, we note that far less has been visibly achieved with regard to changes of policies and practices. The changes achieved are part of longer-term processes including much smaller steps than the broadly and often ambitiously defined aims of the programmes. The changes also show the relevance and importance of cooperation, partnerships and networks, and, as such, also the civil society arena as an important sphere for influence. Most of the changes achieved fit under the indicators of opening closed spaces, raising awareness and developing sustained collaboration with state and civil society actors. Moreover, the changes achieved show the multileveled and transnational character of the processes; there is a sphere of direct and indirect influence and only a small extent of the process is under control of the ILA programme. Most of the influence lies in the sphere of what a third party or stakeholder does with the output of the advocate or with the advocacy message.

Relevance in the context of ‘protection, human security and conflict prevention’:

The three ILA programmes are part of a thematic cluster concerning protection, human security and conflict prevention. All three focus on different thematic areas. These areas are all inherently part of the concept of human security and are, in some way, all about forms of protection. Two of the programmes deal with human rights: one on child rights and one on women’s rights. The latter is also focusing on women, peace and security, and thereby touches on the field of conflict prevention. The third programme focuses on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Rights-based advocacy, for children’s rights or women’s rights, lends itself to readymade messages that CSOs can bring to policy arenas. Working for peacebuilding is a more political endeavour, where advocacy objectives and messages depend more strongly on the specifics of the context. A general message of advocacy concerns the importance of paying attention to conflict prevention and of including civil society in peace processes.

The main strategy of all three programmes is to provide evidence-based and grounded understanding of different complex situations and to seek cooperation with multiple levels of stakeholders to achieve change. This is relevant in the contexts of (post-) conflict-affected areas and political arenas, where space for civil society is shrinking.<sup>576</sup> The outcomes are relevant, because they contribute to inspiring cooperation, facilitate and create space for dialogue, support knowledge building and seek to advance the field of conflict prevention and human rights. It continues to be a challenge in complex environments to translate the space for dialogue into changes in policy and practice that lead to tangible results for women, children or peace. The ways in which programmes set goals, learn lessons and then adapt strategies accordingly are of crucial importance in these contexts.

Relevance for civil society strengthening:

The advocacy of each of the three ILA programmes is, in one way or another, related to civil society strengthening. In the case of WLPS, this is literally in the sense of advocacy trainings, but also through linking and embedding the different voices in the field into the advocacy message and thereby strengthening the position of civil society through a global message in which the local voices are usually invited. Through partnerships, they support trainings, but also build and strengthen their own capacities, as well as those of other CSOs. GPPAC focuses on network strengthening, which leans heavily on the notion of strengthening and empowering civil society, as a network and through the network. This is done through trainings and working groups, but also through the facilitation and convening of spaces for dialogue and sharing lessons learned from within the network, as well as

learning advocacy by doing. In the case of ACPF, civil society strengthening happens through the content-based outreach and sharing of knowledge, methods and lessons. Considering this, the three ILA programmes, to a greater or lesser extent, contribute to civil society strengthening in many different forms and on various levels. This contribution is sometimes inspirational and in other instances is more concrete.

#### *16.2.5 Conclusion*

Overall, the ILA programme changes achieved are relevant in relation to the ToC, the context and civil society strengthening. We have found ample evidence of increased invitations to formal and informal meetings, the use of reports and uptake of issues and recommendations by numerous stakeholders, the strategic and ad hoc partnerships and close cooperation with stakeholders in the field and the sometimes invisible advice and cooperation with stakeholders. Achievements were mainly, but not exclusively, found in the priority result area of agenda setting.

Although we can make positive conclusions about the relevance of the advocacy programme as such, it is difficult to be conclusive on the question of whether they were relevant enough. Could the programmes have been more relevant?

The overall aims of the programmes are very ambitious and are formulated in general terms. This means they cannot realistically be expected to be achieved, while at the same time everything an organisation does can easily be argued to be relevant under it. At the same time, the ToCs are not explicit in terms of linking activities and strategies to objectives and aims or on the underlying assumptions and how these relates to practice. The relevance of the outcomes in relation to the highly ambitious goals (WLPS: contributing to sustainable peace and security; ACPF: child wellbeing; GPPAC: moving from reaction to prevention) is difficult to assess.

The evaluation underlines the importance of applying a tool like the ToC for advocacy in such a way that the sphere of influence is clearly demarcated and assumptions regarding necessary interventions and expected outcomes towards the final objective are made clear. Doing this would enable programmes to find sufficient space for learning and adjustment in the face of experience. It would also facilitate external evaluation. Under the MFS II financing scheme, programmes were not required to work with the tool of ToCs. Rather, for the 2011–2015 period, the organisations worked with strategic plans that formed the basis for the MFS II proposals. Hence, the ToCs had to be reconstructed during the baseline study for WPLS and ACPF. While GPPAC had a ToC, this was conceived as an understanding of change process, built on a set of principles and starting points, rather than a ToC of a more concrete and specific kind. This presented limitations. We conclude that steps were set in the direction of the general objectives, but also that we cannot compare the results to the alliances' claims of what would have been reasonable to expect for the different priority result areas in the timeframe of the programme.

### **16.3 Contribution**

This chapter addresses evaluation question 2: Do the international lobbying and advocacy efforts of MFS II alliances and their partners contribute to the identified changes? The question recognises the complexity of advocacy, where often many actors and processes affect the changes advocacy aims to achieve.

The Cluster III ILA programme evaluations all take cases studies as a point of departure for the contribution analysis, resulting in a total of seven cases that analyse the contribution of the ILA programmes to changes reported. Following the processes towards the outcomes to which the alliances contributed is key to these analyses in order to provide more in-depth insights into the

workings of the diverse ILA processes. Below, we will first briefly discuss the outcomes claimed by the ILA programmes, before going on to analyse these contributions in terms of change, activities and patterns and linkages.

### 16.3.1 ACPF

The contribution analysis of ACPF concerns an analysis of two case studies: the African Report on Child Wellbeing (ACPF-ARCW) and the Africa-wide Movement for Children (ACPF-AMC). Additionally, we analyse ACPF's contribution to an unintended outcome in terms of child rights on the post-2015 agenda (ACPF-2015).

In the ACPF-ARCW case, we analysed how ACPF contributed to knowledge production, building relations and strengthened capacities through the publication of the African Report on Child Wellbeing. We concluded that ACPF indeed contributed to the changes mentioned, thanks to the strong content base of the messages in the report, the presentation of the Child Friendly Index per country and a few supportive workshops accompanying the launch of the report, although this was too incidental. The report is considered by many, including academia, to be a resource document and, at national levels, a tool for advocacy, as was demonstrated by CSOs, opinion leaders and individual advocates taking up the message and spreading it in spheres beyond ACPF's control and influence. From different corners, ACPF is invited to give input on dialogues, platforms and working sessions.

In the ACPF-AMC (Africa-wide Movement for Children) case, ACPF's contribution to network building was examined. It was concluded that this was a non-outcome, as, despite ACPF's efforts, the network did not perform its functions as foreseen. Through AMC, ACPF wished to reach out to regional and national actors and, as such, both to advocate the pan-African ACPF message and to generate a collective African voice on child rights to help monitor the implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. This did not materialise in a significant way. Among the reasons for not achieving a functional movement are a noted disconnect in the advocacy message (too academic for daily practice), untapped local voices and weak mutual accountability arrangements between ACPF and AMC.

The ACPF contribution to the post-2015 agenda is an unexpected outcome, which came to the fore during the evaluation interviews after the concept of outcome was clarified. ACPF contributed through the presentation of a background and position paper, which has served as an input in discussions, raising some significant challenges Africa is facing on children's wellbeing. Further spin-off effects of this outcome are noted in ACPF's direct input in the *global* post-2015 discussions through UNICEF and their participation in a number of high level discussions.

### 16.3.2 WLPS

The contribution analysis of the WLPS ILA programme centred on two outcomes: 1) the implementation of UNSCR 1325 through a multi-stakeholder financing mechanism (WLPS-MFM) and 2) the localisation of the UNSCR 1325 in Colombia (WLPS-COL).

In the WLPS-MFM case, we analysed WLPS' contribution to a multi-stakeholder financing mechanism. We concluded that WLPS indeed contributed to such a financing mechanism. The discussions on financing have led to the uptake of the issue by multiple stakeholders, numerous governments have made public commitments and UN Women has specifically taken the next step in the process to organise a global discussion group on the establishment of a global fund. It is mentioned in the UN Secretary-General Report on WPS (2014). Crucial in this has been the publication of a content-driven report. On the basis of this, WLPS representatives have been invited

to participate in numerous activities and side events, especially in the global (UN) arena, to discuss the possibilities and necessities of a multi-stakeholder financing mechanism. The message of the report is focused and accessible, and it was launched at the right moment.

After analysing WLPS' contribution to the outcome 'localisation of the UNSCR 1325 in Colombia', we have also concluded that WLPS has contributed to this outcome, especially through its partnership with GNWP. Through workshops focusing on awareness raising, implementation and localisation by the women's movement in Colombia, in partnership with GNWP on the global level and the National Network of Women at the national level, WLPS has supported the process of getting women's security needs on the local (security) agenda on the municipal level, as well as gaining recognition for UNSCR 1325 on the national level.

### *16.3.3 GPPAC*

The contribution analysis of GPPAC concerns two case studies: One is the Southeast Asia regional case study, with the contribution analysis conducted on the Mindanao peace process in the Philippines (GPPAC-SEA), exploring how GPPAC contributed to this process of change. The second involves human security at the UN (GPPAC-HUM) and how GPPAC contributed to the advancement of this.

In the GPPAC-HUM case, the contribution of GPPAC to a set of outcomes pertaining to the advancement of human security at the United Nations was analysed. It was concluded that GPPAC contributed to this outcome through network collaboration. Through collaboration with the Human Security Unit, GPPAC succeeded in establishing links with the Human Security Unit that involved the development of alignment, mutual support and contacts between member CSOs and the United Nations. As such, GPPAC contributed to creating space for CSOs' voices within the UN context and to opening up possibilities for further collaborations. GPPAC is now seen as a useful ally by the Human Security Unit, and GPPAC's relations with the Human Security Unit have offered it an entry point to the United Nations. The most important activities were the 'Human Security First' campaign and the development of a research-based publication that was to draw attention to human security issues as understood in different local contexts. Local cases and projects were brought to the attention at the global level. Collaborations took place at different levels: GPPAC's members were invited to the UN high-level meetings and debates, and the Unit also promoted the campaign and mentioned GPPAC's work in a UN Secretary-General's report on Human Security and in other UN documents.

In the GPPAC-SEA case, we aimed at understanding the processes at regional level in connection to regional- as well as global-level processes within the network. As part of understanding these regional dynamics, we also aimed to analyse the contribution claim of how GPPAC contributed to the Philippines peace process through IID (Initiatives for International Dialogue). The chapter specifically on GPPAC includes a more comprehensive description of the case study, while this synthesis focuses on the contribution analysis. IID works on the local level with the specific stakeholders involved in the peace process on the ground. GPPAC has facilitated IID in organising workshops and network meetings that aim at bridging arenas and bringing together stakeholders, which facilitates multi-stakeholder dialogue. Our findings showed that GPPAC has not visibly contributed to the outcome achieved by IID, but rather has contributed invisibly by facilitating and supporting the regional and local processes, as well as inspirationally through its way of working through sharing knowledge and contacts within the network. The regional dynamics in the network are loosely connected and, except for some annual activities, GPPAC seems less visible to the members, who are all involved in other networks, besides having their own organisational workload and the accompanying busy agendas. This makes it difficult to pinpoint the specific contribution of GPPAC to the IID

achievements. The GPPAC contribution is enabling, rather than direct, and concerns inspirational motivation and providing space for the exchange of knowledge and learning to its members through which awareness was also created among CSOs, members and some of the targets visited during the regional annual mission in 2014. In addition, the backing of a global network in regional or local processes is understood to create space, awareness and also leverage for the persons involved to advocate and provide space for dialogue.

#### *16.3.4 Patterns and analysis*

##### *16.3.4.1 The Theories of Change*

None of the ILA programmes under evaluation in Cluster III specifically used a theory of change, either in their MFS II proposals or in their way of working. Instead, all programmes used strategic planning documents. These documents are not used in the same way as ToCs are understood to be used, as flexible and as adaptive to changes. This made it difficult at points for the evaluators to construct a ToC. For example, the assumptions key in the ToC to understand the way change happens and is understood to happen according to the programme staff were not explicit in the documentation or explicitly addressed by the staff in the programmes evaluated. The inclusion of more explicit discussions and reflections on how change happens and what the programme's contribution is or should be therein, and thus also discussion of the underlying assumptions, are important learning points for the programmes evaluated.

##### *16.3.4.2 The scope and the character of the changes to which the alliances contributed*

The case studies, as well as a more general analysis of the contributions to change by the ILA programmes, show that the alliances have contributed to changes in the three priority result areas on local, national and global levels, and that they have made efforts to link these levels. Most contributions analysed in the case studies have influenced processes of change through agenda setting in the global arena. Global arenas in which the alliances have contributed to change are the post-2015 agenda, the UNHRC global initiative and UN women. In addition, programmes have had various contributions to change at national levels.

Among the seven cases singled out for contribution analysis, we found that, in two cases, there was underreporting (ACPF-2015; GPPAC-SEA), while both of these cases also provided information about over-reported outcomes (GPPAC-SEA; ACPF-AMC), and in the ACPF-AMC case, no change was effected at all. Over- and underreporting is related to different understandings of outcomes and to the fact that changes are often beyond the direct sphere of influence of the ILA programmes. Some actors may not realise what the advocacy resources have contributed, while alliance members are not able to follow their influence entirely. Conversely, alliances may overestimate the effects of their contributions.

Many contributions aim at bridging the gap between local–national–regional–global. Some important contributions have been made in this field. A good example is GPPAC's contribution to the UNSCHR, which incorporates local perspectives about the meaning of human security. WLPS in Colombia has put a lot of effort into bridging this gap, while ACPF succeeds in bringing national voices on children to the pan-African arena and an African voice to the global arena (although the local voice in the latter case would deserve more space to be heard). This linking of local voices to international arenas is the most challenging aspect of international lobby and advocacy work. It appears to be difficult to translate local need into global policy language and vice versa. At the same time, it is important to consider the changes that the ILA programmes have contributed to in their context of political change, such as the of opening space for UNSCR 1325 in Colombia and enabling local voices to be



heard in the UN Security Unit. These could be important steps towards larger political and social changes.

All of the case studies bring out that the ILA programmes mainly contribute to (political) processes in the priority result area of agenda setting. Establishing contribution is hampered by the lack of clearly defined outcomes, the non-linearity of change and the influence of many other actors and factors on the process.

#### 16.3.4.3 The activities that contributed to the outcomes analysed

While establishing the ILA programmes' contributions to change, we have also considered the type of activities that have contributed to change: research, the publication of documents (based on research) and their distribution, the organisation of and participation in (side) events and the organisation of workshops with multiple purposes.

The publication of evidence-based reports and the distribution of these reports is an important activity for most ILA programmes. In many cases, alliances develop materials that present evidence from regional or local voices, and frame this as a well-developed message for lobbying policy actors. Vice versa, reports and documents are produced and used in workshops in local contexts that aim at awareness rising about international policy, as was the case with the materials used for the localisation of the UNSCR 1325 in Colombia. By publishing sound and focused documents, ILA programmes can make themselves visible and prove themselves to be credible. In terms of accessibility, it is important to publish documents in the appropriate language and wording, and at the right moment.

The visibility of, as well as access to, such publications is important to effectuate change, and, as such, many activities evolve around increasing visibility and accessibility. To broaden visibility and accessibility, the ILA programmes all engage in organising (side) events, facilitating workshops and giving talks at meetings. Workshops are also organised with another goal: to host networks or to facilitate dialogues between different stakeholders. Workshops and consultations, however, can also be organised with the objective of developing ideas on, for example, the meaning of human security, and, as such, generate new knowledge and evidence that can be taken into the lobby and advocacy process.

#### Factors that make activities contribute to change:

Different factors determine whether these activities contribute to the change. In all of the ILA programmes, it is clear that personal commitment and personal relations are important for organising successful events and activities, as well as for putting an idea 'in the market' and following and supporting the process as such. This has everything to do with visibility, commitment and open and accountable relationships. An extension of this is building and maintaining open relations where information is mutually exchanged, which is important for maintaining visibility. Building relations often starts long before the change is affected. This, again, shows how important it is to see contribution as a process when it comes to lobby and advocacy. Being reliable is key in building and maintaining relationships and in being and becoming part of networks. The next step is to define the right entry points and to coordinate the different voices that might be involved. When looking into the contribution of the alliances, it is important to take into account that many contributions could only be made thanks to earlier work and established networks. Contributing to change thus entails long-term investments in building relations and cannot be considered isolated in space and time.

#### 16.3.4.4 Conclusion

Contribution analysis is considered a complicated aspect of evaluating lobby and advocacy, because changes in policy and practice usually come about through a multitude of actors and factors. We encountered a different problem: In the case of the ILA programmes under study, agenda setting and network strengthening are the most important processes to which the programmes contributed. A number of the cases were, in fact, outcomes of the programme, and hence the contribution was a given. Another group of cases concerned processes that did not translate into tangible outcomes that could serve as a unit for contribution analysis. In both cases, we could not do a 'classical' contribution analysis that singled out contributions of one programme against the contributions of other actors and factors. Instead, we established the factors that made the contribution effective and focused on the level of effect of cases compared with the claims in reporting.

### 16.4 Efficiency

Most evaluations on lobby and advocacy do not deal with issues of efficiency, which are deemed either irrelevant or unmeasurable. To give a small example of the difficulties involved: How do you judge the efficiency of holding a meeting in a five-star hotel? What if that is the only way to convince your primary lobby targets to participate? Efficiency in lobby and advocacy cannot be measured unless the story behind the expenditures is understood.

To respond to the research question, we had to develop a methodology that was suitable to the specifics of lobbying and advocacy, including the non-linearity and flexibility of these programmes. We developed this methodology to be consistent with the methodology of the evaluation at large, which judges the performance of lobbying and advocacy against a theory of change. Similarly, we have asked alliances about their theory of efficiency (ToE), and endeavoured to evaluate the quality of this ToE and how they perform against it. Alliances/partner organisations supposedly have working protocols (procedures) to enhance (or uphold) efficiency of interventions, as well as protocols to monitor efficiency. Together, these protocols could be considered their ToE.

The key is that we shift emphasis away from an evaluator determining and scoring programme efficiency, towards establishing how the ILA programmes build in and monitor optimal cost-effectiveness. We want to know how alliances deal with questions of efficiency, and to see how they deal in practice with realising, monitoring and safeguarding their explicit or implicit standards of efficiency. The entry point for the ToE is the unit of analysis, the ILA programme under evaluation.

All ILA programmes in the cluster have well-established procedures and mechanisms for programme management, which also comprise the lobbying and advocacy activities. In this section, we focus on the issues pertaining specifically to lobbying and advocacy ToEs.

#### 16.4.1 *Efficiency of the ILA programmes in ACPF*

ACPF has efficiency tools in place and incorporated these in the decision-making and answerability structures of the organisation, ensuring the theoretical basis for daily practice. There is no ToE pertaining specifically to the lobbying and advocacy of the alliance.

Against the background of a changing international development context and economic crisis leading to global budget cuts in donor funding, ACPF has proven to be a resilient organisation able to work effectively under budget constraints. ACPF is perceived by outsiders as modest, given the relatively small staff and location. At the same time, it is seen as efficient in its operations. ACPF's location in Addis Ababa, near the African Union—their primary target—contributes to this picture of cost-effectiveness and efficiency.

The organisation outsources a great deal of work to consultants, which is a strategic decision meant to enhance its overall efficiency. For its well-qualified consultants, relatively high rates are paid, which also applies to ACPF's staff, who compete in skills and standards with international experts. However, within the organisation, a certain imbalance is noted in remunerations between some management positions and research staff, creating some internal tensions, and, in our observation, also contributing to staff turnover.

ACPF ensures efficiency by maximising opportunities from meetings, for example by organising a back-to-back meeting alongside an external event, working in partnerships and carefully considering which meetings to attend in relation to expected gains for advocacy.

It can be concluded that ACPF has sufficient financial mechanisms in place and is organised in a cost-effective way, although salary inequalities are a concern. Efficiency considerations are part of everyday strategic decisions on lobbying and advocacy, but this could be done more systematically and explicitly.

#### *16.4.2 Efficiency of the ILA programmes in WLPS*

The WLPS is embedded in a business unit in Cordaid and subject to the process management and control of this unit. There is no explicit strategy on efficiency in relation to lobbying and advocacy. Interviews brought out that, because, in practice, costs mainly constitute staff time, cost-effectiveness is often expressed in terms of time efficiency. An important strategy to enhance efficiency in practice is engaging in partnerships, where a division of labour can be established. Another aspect is the strategic allocation of time by defining a clear advocacy niche. Within Cordaid, it is endeavoured to enhance efficiency and effectiveness by requesting staff members attending an international meeting to take on business or messages for other units. Observations in the evaluation indicate that this is not always successful, as staff are often boxed into their own projects and project thinking and hence may not maximise linking opportunities.

Cordaid also used consultants, but has learned that too much cost-reduction—for example by hiring a junior consultant—may put the effectiveness of the programme at risk.

It was concluded that WLPS is cost-conscious, and, to ensure quality and visibility, there is scope to improve the linking capacity between programmes and between programmes and communication staff.

#### *16.4.3 Efficiency of the ILA programmes in Freedom from Fear*

A central tenet of the ToE of programme IV of the FFF Alliance is that efficiency decisions need to be taken in view of the effectiveness of programming. Having a strong central component to the programme may be considered expensive, but this is considered crucial and hence efficient for different purposes: enabling international action, supplying coherence and building expertise. Efficiency, then, is seen as optimising cost-consciousness within this framework. For example, the efficiency of IT operations, human resource management and financial management have been reflected upon and addressed.

The special nature of programme IV of FFF as networking for conflict prevention means that it cannot be predicted what network capacity is required to cope with future political developments. To clarify this with an example from the crisis in Ukraine, the international development community had left Ukraine several years ago. GPPAC has a functioning CSO network that operated while the crisis broke out and was immediately able to absorb the emergency funding that was suddenly made available by the international community. As such, networking cannot be scrutinised for efficiency, although cost-

effectiveness remains important. This is partly achieved by combining purposes in meetings and hence reducing costs of networking and training.

FFF has many learning and feedback mechanisms in place, and considerations of efficiency are integral to these mechanisms.

Like ACPF, programme IV of FFF ensures efficiency by maximising the opportunities of meetings, for example by organising a back-to-back meeting alongside an external event, working in partnerships and carefully considering which meetings to attend in relation to expected gains for advocacy.

FFF has also experienced that too much emphasis on cost-effectiveness can have drawbacks. First, it may mean that activities centre on the same actors, who know the ropes, which is efficient but jeopardises the constituency of the Alliance and the development of new leaders in the long term. Second, it may lead to overstretching of staff to over-load the agenda of meetings and back-to-back events, at the expense of the effectiveness of the activities.

It was concluded that, in the case of programme IV of FFF, the ToC is more implicit than explicit, and that the Alliance has many functioning mechanisms in place to achieve cost-effectiveness.

#### *16.4.4 Cluster-wide patterns in theories, practices and adaptation of efficiency*

The main finding is that optimising efficiency and effectiveness requires a continuous balancing act. Even though the effectivity of lobbying and advocacy is considered more important, efficiency considerations play a major role in all three programmes. This is partly under the pressure of shrinking financial space.

While all alliances have strong financial management in place, they do not have explicit strategies or ToEs. Nonetheless, they have certain principles in practice, and efficiency plays a role in the everyday decisions of lobbying and advocacy.

Because staff costs are a major budget cost for lobbying and advocacy, efficiency is often translated into time efficiency. Strategies to enhance efficiency in every alliance are to *pile* and to *link*: piling activities and objectives of events and linking with other programmes or networking to divide workloads.

There are also experiences where efficiency considerations undermine the effectiveness of lobbying and advocacy. When the staff base becomes too thin, outsourcing too cheap or crucial activities are cancelled, the results are being jeopardised. Conversely, there are also experiences where a focus on efficiency leads to more effective partnerships.

### **16.5 Explanatory factors**

The final evaluation question asks what factors explain the findings drawn from the other questions. To answer this question, we focus on internal factors (using the 5Cs model as a reference) and external factors. Before going into the question, we will briefly summarise the main findings presented in the preceding sections.

#### *16.5.1 Core characteristics of advocacy programmes*

From the above section, the following core characteristics can be drawn about the ILA programmes of the cluster:

- All three ILA programmes understand advocacy processes as consisting of a number of smaller steps that address multiple institutional levels and stakeholders in a longer-term

process that is transnational and non-linear in nature but heads towards a bigger political or social outcomes.

- For all three ILA programmes, relevant outcomes were achieved although mostly in agenda setting.
- All ILA programmes rely on evidence-based advocacy. Evidence is not only derived from research, but, importantly, is provided by local experiences and local voices.
- Outcomes were identified at various layers of the institutional landscape at global, regional and national (state and civil society) levels, constituting multilevel outreach. With varying success, programmes find their legitimacy, content and strength in the linkages between levels.
- All programmes favour strategies of cooperation as highly essential for achieving relevant changes.
- In all programmes, the role of civil society and networking proved to be crucial for the advocacy processes but cannot be taken for granted.

### *16.5.2 Emerging and overarching questions*

In the following section, we present factors that help to explain why achievements were being realised and why outcomes were not always in line with the original ambitions. We will also pay attention to the question of why the vast majority of outcomes refer to the priority result area of agenda setting, rather than change in policy or change in practice.

We focus on three sets of factors that were identified in our methodology, namely 1) the nature of the issue, including its content and geographical scope; 2) the internal organisational factors and 3) external circumstances, and, where relevant, the interplay between these factors is considered.

For internal factors, we employed the five capabilities (5Cs) framework, which refers to organisational capabilities 1) to act and commit, 2) to deliver on objectives, 3) to adapt and renew, 4) to relate and 5) to achieve coherence. In our evaluation methodology, we adapted the capabilities to what we considered more appropriate for ILA.

External factors are understood to create opportunities and threats for advocacy and lobby work and, as such, affect the outreach, uptake and outcomes achieved. For obvious reasons, the factors we identified are far from exhaustive. Not only do the geographical dimensions and scope of the ILA programmes interfere, but unforeseen developments and feedback loops<sup>577</sup> also make it impossible to ever get an overview of such factors. Nonetheless, some clusters of factors emerged as explaining—to a certain degree—the outcomes.

### *16.5.3 Explanatory factors: Why have these outcomes been achieved?*

#### *16.5.3.1 The nature of the issue, its content and geographical scope*

The issues that are tackled through lobby and advocacy are all highly political. However, the ILA programmes tend to frame the issues as non-political in order to allow a collaborative approach rather than confrontation. All programmes seek to include civil society actors in policy processes. The wide geographical scope enables broad mobilisation and effective linkages, and it also facilitates this non-political framing of issues outside of their context.

#### *16.5.3.2 Internal factors that explain why outcomes were achieved*

Overall, organisations are staffed with committed and knowledgeable people, who show a strategic drive to act at multiple levels and work through various partnerships and networks. Personal connections and relations help to act effectively, keeping the network going, and these connections

are more or less independent from the number of staff involved. The evidence-based and focused content of the advocacy messages proved to be instrumental in the networking and mobilisation of partners, as is noted in the uptake of the message by stakeholders also in other arenas of influence. Overall, the organisations are conceived to have developed capabilities to act and commit.

The capability to deliver on objectives is also well established in the quality of the message, in relatively appropriate advocacy strategies looking for consensus among likeminded groups while gently pushing the non-likeminded and in realising a credible and visible presence in political and civil society arenas. All three programmes have been supportive in creating conditions for a receptive environment for a content message to land, though access to financial means has been a limiting factor.

The capability to adapt and self-renew was demonstrated in all three advocating bodies. We noted impressive perseverance and flexibility in staff's personal attitude, as well as a willingness to learn. However, staff members were also heavily loaded and did not have much space for reflecting on their work. Additionally, addressing the lack of the systematic setting of strategies in such a way as to define clear assumptions and outcomes in a defined sphere of influence could contribute to more relevance.

In all three programmes, we see very strong capabilities to relate, and there is a shared organisational vision, a consistent focus on linking with others and a preparedness to create space for and access to dialogue. Network building and maintaining networks is high on the programmes' agendas, although this is not always successful. Organisations broker between a diverse set of stakeholders in various political arenas, and the non-confrontational stance towards targets contributes to effective relationship building and bridges power imbalances.

Balancing diversity and achieving coherence works out at different levels. At alliance level, we found that the linking approach to advocacy did not result in the adequate linking of activities and projects within the alliance (i.e. with the broader components of the alliances, or with other units or programmes of the same organisations). At country and partner level, it appears more complicated to balance diversity and coherence in a network/relationship-oriented organisation focusing on political processes (GPPAC) than in a message-oriented, rights-based organisation (ACPF/ WLPS). The evaluation revealed that, where GPPAC is focusing on diversity in the network rather than on coherence, we have seen the opposite in ACPF, which has a strong focus on coherence of message and is less attentive to issue resonance at societal level, although they are very aware of the diversity in the voices of targets. For Cordaid, this capability to balance (embedding the diversity in voices in a coherent message) is conceived to be well developed, but anchored in one staff member only. In a bigger organisation, it definitely is more difficult to strike the balance.

#### 16.5.3.3 External factors that explain achievements

The MFS II funding, which is institutional funding, facilitated the three programmes to run their activities and implement the advocacy processes as envisaged in their own planning. Institutional funding offers a certain degree of flexibility to the implementing agency.

Geographical and institutional dimensions of the programmes and receptive external partners:

Reaching out to the UN<sup>578</sup> (and other IGO) level requires perseverance and special approaches, as these are complex arenas for civil society to influence. Having accredited observer status at international agencies (ACPF, Cordaid via Caritas; GPPAC via WFM-IGP) enhances visibility in international circles and thus helps to gain access, which is conceived as easier to achieve in

specialised UN bodies like UNICEF, UNCRC and UN Women than in highly political bodies such as the UN general assembly. We identified that personal, face-to-face approaches are rather successful in this respect, as is having a solid content message and recognition of its value among peers resulting in credibility.

In all three cases, 'issue resonance' appeared to be a relevant factor for the success of the advocacy process. Maintaining issue resonance is not only in the hands of the advocating agency, but is part of the discretionary power of partners and targets in the process, and thus deserves full recognition. The fact that the three issues advocated resound widely in society around the globe opens doors to mobilise likeminded civil society groups and supports the establishment of networks and strategic partnerships.

#### 16.5.3.4 Explanatory factors: Why did ILA programmes not achieve everything that was intended?

As discussed above, the programmes have been guided by broadly defined or not that strong ToCs that laid out the real ambitions or expectations of the programmes. Nonetheless, as was made clear above, interviews and other evidence indicates that each of the programmes had aimed or could have expected to deliver more on certain aspects. Here, we discuss factors that explain why ILA programmes have not achieved what they intended or claimed.

Before we deal with these limitations, it is important to note that there were sometimes more outcomes than were reported. The complexity of the advocacy processes, the wide range of targets, the geographical scale of the programmes and the wide outreach of advocacy messages complicates the tracking of outcomes, and advocacy effects may ripple beyond what is observed by the programme partners.

#### 16.5.3.5 Nature of the issue

As mentioned above, the programmes tend to frame issues as non-political. In reality, all of the issues are highly political, and state actors, politicians and international bodies may be reluctant to address the issue for change as called for by CSOs. Moreover, most of the issues are rather complex in nature, involving many actors with different perspectives on the issues and interests, as well as many different institutions and levels, requiring complicated, conflict-ridden and lengthy decision-making processes for change. This is one explanation for why programmes have not (yet) achieved what they had planned.

#### 16.5.3.6 Internal factors that may explain why certain ambitions were not realised

Whereas all programmes were relevant, we also found evidence that they could have been more relevant, or that they were not able to deliver on their ambitions. The capability *to act and commit* could be strengthened in different ways. Importantly, we noted that the ToC as tool to express and discuss advocacy strategies geared to *deliver on objectives* was used by all three programmes as a rather static tool. Programmes were not familiar with the tool, and tended to consider it as a donor requirement rather than an internalised approach to plan, reflect and adapt. ToCs were reported to be revisited rarely or not at all within the organisation, and this adversely affected internal reflection, learning and adapting strategies. Together with barriers experienced in accessing financial means, it prevented organisations from fully delivering on the objectives in their original plans, as demonstrated in limitations in developing content (GPPAC), in broadening its advocacy strategy (ACPF) and in little staffing, although supported by the broader organisational structure (WLPS).

Adapting and renewing requires organisational and network accountability as a mechanism for collective sharing. Reflection and learning is found to be rather weakly developed in all programmes.

Overall, working iteratively is not observed as common practice in the programmes. In some cases, strategies were adjusted as part of the learning process.

The capability to relate is not systematically applied, which explains why certain outcomes were not achieved. Some poor accountability mechanisms (reluctance to table and address difficult problems, reluctance to discuss inequality in networks or difficulties with funding) or too heavy a workload, as well as daily administrative minutiae are among the reasons that explain problems with networking, in particular why the AMC-ACPF did not really take off and why members' commitment within GPPAC has its limits. The capability to relate to stakeholders includes investing in creating level playing fields and dealing with power. In the case of WLPS, the capability to relate proved to be quite strong.

As to balancing diversity and achieving coherence, it is remarkable that we have seen little cross-pollination with other MFS II or Dutch bilateral programme components. Strategies do not include the wider alliance or back donors, and, as a result, coherence is not conceived upward (towards the donor agencies) but downward or sideways only, towards targets and partners. The reorganisations within Cordaid and ACPF initially affected the internal coherence, but both actors proved to be very resilient and succeeded in getting their act successfully together again.

#### 16.5.3.7 External factors that limit outcomes

In addition to internal factors, external forces (gain or loss of attention, rise and fall of support or opposition, unexpected feedback loops, unforeseen developments) also influence daily activities. Achieving outcomes through ILA is challenging and not to be taken for granted in most circumstances.

We observed that the geographical ambition of the programmes sometimes stood in the way of success because of distance, socio-cultural and language barriers (ACPF), different perspectives (GPPAC) or unfamiliarity with or misunderstanding of the advocacy message (ACPF), but also because of political barriers (GPPAC, WLPS). In advocacy processes, *willing* partners (as the evaluation showed to be bound by common interests), but also *unwilling* partners are encountered. Common interests vary from shared concern on the subject matter (likemindedness) to more opportunistic interest in access to other fora or specific local knowledge, or envisaged benefits from joint activities. Understanding and mobilising the unwilling is more difficult when the geographical scope is wide.

Related to this, institutional contexts also may not be conducive to the achievement of objectives. To name a prominent example, at UN level, institutional contexts faced by ILA shows important limits when it comes to access, well as space for finding a hearing. However, in some case access was gained. Furthermore, the effective linking between UN and local actors can be challenging, although not impossible as some cases show, considering the disconnect that actors experience between processes at the global, New York level and local realities and priorities.

Internal civil society forces and dynamics (including donor funding) also play a role in reaching outcomes. We noted how the duplication of work and competition between CSOs stands in the way of a common civil society voice on child rights. For WLPS, competition is also an issue, as the women's movement is large and diverse, despite the fact that few advocates are active in this domain. GPPAC's wish to be an inclusive network, facing a diversity of voices of civil society network members, absorbs a lot of its efforts and may adversely affect the force of its peacebuilding argument.

CSOs are also affected by limitations of donor funding. In the past years, the donor landscape for civil society funding has changed dramatically; besides less funding being made available, funding



modalities are also changing, affecting outcomes (project-oriented versus institutional funding) and donor requirements of accounting for (pre-planned) results, obscuring the unplanned and unachieved results and, thus, the learning curve. It also affects the ability of programmes to adapt to new circumstances.

Additionally, working inter-culturally and around the globe presents the advocates with an array of different cultural, social and political structures that are not easy to directly understand and require organisational and personal adaptability.

Lastly, staff turnover and recurring organisational changes among both civil and public advocacy partners is conceived to affect advocacy processes that heavily depend on established networks and relationships (both in civil society as well as in the public arena), as we identified in all three cases.

Limited access to other sources of funding prevented organisations from undertaking additional tasks emerging as relevant for their ongoing work. For GPPAC, this meant insufficient funding for development of content messages, and, for ACPF and WLPS, not being able to or, having difficulties to, do additional recruitment.

Political space is a factor that explains why certain outcomes may not have been reached. Notably, the space granted to CSOs to influence national levels is noted to be shrinking around the globe. NNGOs, although they may have a national status, once financed by foreign funding, are often reported to be limited in their space to perform. This also affects the information flow from international to national bodies, and has consequences for messages trickling both down and up, as was noted regarding child rights advocacy. Political space is also determined by the sensitivity of the issues advocated (women's right, child rights, government accountability and budgeting).

Conflict and disasters, such as, recently, the Ebola outbreak or the Middle East crisis, are part of the daily realities of organisations working in conflict-affected areas and/or on sensitive political and international development issues relating to peace and security processes. They take away space and attention from the issues, or they result in agenda shifts, tabling new priorities that demand urgent attention and affecting planned outreach and outcomes.

As stated above, issue resonance was found to be an important factor in achieving outcomes. This could also be a hampering factor. It is especially challenging in multilevel advocacy work, where an issue deemed relevant at the global arena may not resonate with national and local views and priorities. This poses the challenge for advocacy programmes to frame and reframe messages to resonate in different arenas. In some cases, the Alliances have found ways to translate global issues into local languages successfully.

#### *16.5.4 Why were achievements most on agenda setting, and less on policy influence and change of practice?*

A major finding of the evaluation with regard to the outcomes of advocacy is that these have mainly, but not exclusively, been achieved in the priority result area of agenda setting. This can be explained with reference to a number of factors discussed in the previous sections:

- The nature of the issues are complex, which inhibits quick results in terms of policy influencing and change in practice.
- The time frame of MFS II and the high ambitions of the programmes are conceived as limiting factors to achievement in the field of policy influencing and practice change.
- Organisations, networks, issues, programmes and relations with targets take time to mature.

- Targets' agendas, positions and actions are shaped by many forces other than their engagement with ILA actors, including institutional and other contextual factors.
- Programmes tend to develop effective linkages within the advocacy programme, but they could have improved their linkages with other types of programmes within the alliance or in the context of intervention.

## **16.6 Conclusion**

In this section, we have provided factors related to the advocacy issue, internal capabilities and external forces that impact the relevance and results of advocacy. Logically, the same factors that are conditional for success can become explanations for limited results when they are not sufficiently fulfilled. For example, the tendency to deploy non-political frames may be instrumental for cooperative advocacy strategies, but, when they are not underpinned by a political analysis, the results may be limited.

Obviously, external conditions can provide strong limitations to advocacy efforts. The shrinking space for civil society or reduced funding opportunities may severely restrict opportunities, and should sober expectations for results, especially beyond agenda setting. Conversely, we emphasise that advocacy comes about at the interface between internal and external factors. It is essential for advocacy to adapt to changing circumstances and make the best of opportunities as they present themselves. A number of limitations in the results of the programmes are due to a lack of conceptualisation of opportunities and objectives, which is part of the capability to act and commit, as well as deficiencies in the capability to adapt. While staff members of the studied programmes are all highly committed and personally creative and adaptive in their everyday practice, there is not always systematic use of tools, such as the ToC, to plan and adjust for effective advocacy.

## **16.7 Reflections, lessons learned and looking forward**

In this final section, we look back to the evaluation process in the 'Protection, Human Security and Conflict Prevention' Cluster to identify some key lessons that we can draw for evaluators, donors and advocates. These reflections will not dwell on the thematic commonalities of the cluster as such. The three evaluated programmes are highly diverse in terms of the thematic content and organisational constructs by which they operate. However, reviewing the insights we developed and comparing these across programmes led to the identification of commonalities on other fronts, not necessarily theme-related. These lessons concern the nature and challenges of international lobbying and advocacy, and the implications of these for its evaluation.

### *16.7.1 Identification of outcomes*

The conceptualisation of the three priority result areas of agenda setting, policy influencing and changing practice that the evaluation team was required to use as part of the foundation from which to work made it difficult to do justice to the complexity of advocacy in this cluster. This conceptualisation turned out to have serious shortcomings when it came to charting outcomes, and this problem presented itself across the three programmes. For example, outcomes in the areas of capacity building, the building and maintenance of relations and networks, the facilitation of interactions and the convening of advocates, targets and other stakeholders did not naturally fit into these areas. For the ILA programmes and evaluators, it was evident that these were, in fact, important outcomes, sometimes in their own right, but sometimes also as forming part of the foundations towards achieving outcomes in other areas. Such results could now only be included as outcomes through an artificial and sometimes awkward widening of priority result area conceptualisations. In addition, we round that the constrictions of such conceptualisations can lead to underreporting of outcomes by alliances. Elusive results, such as the maintenance of an important

relation or staying 'in the loop' on an important political process, did not straightforwardly qualify as outcomes for internal PME or required reporting, even though they were crucial for the achievement of further results. In addition, imposed frameworks that do not relate well to such sensitivities can also lead to advocates' 'spinning' of outcomes to fit imposed frameworks, impacting even internal communications within organisations.<sup>579</sup> This stands in the way of getting a well-balanced and complete view of what ILA programmes do and achieve, inside as well as outside of organisations. For future evaluations, we recommend an alternative conceptualisation of priority result areas that is more accommodating of such outcomes.<sup>580</sup>

#### *16.7.2 Conceptualisations of advocacy*

An issue related to the priority result areas, also finding expression in the outcome indicators, is the state-centred conceptualisation of advocacy developed for this evaluation. This conceptualisation implicitly takes advocacy as oriented towards the influencing of 'decision makers', whereas, in many contexts, the programmes evaluated within the 'Protection, Human Security and Conflict' Cluster work through networks of different kinds, often involving many partnership-like relations with CSOs, as well as other organisations with whom coalitions and collaborations are developed. When it comes to engaging with targets, there too we find that much of the interaction takes place through forms of collaboration, in longer-term process, rather than being clear-cut 'influencing' through clearly demarcated messages and actions 'towards' targets. In short, the approach to advocacy that this evaluation started out with, while broad and open, does not explicitly and coherently conceptualise the realities of present-day governance with which the evaluated programmes engage, including, for example, intergovernmental, governmental, research, CSO, military and semi-governmental organisations, in collaborative and multilevel structures. We have sought to accommodate these realities in the course of the evaluation, but a conceptualisation of advocacy that explicitly does justice to them is due. Such a conceptualisation, as we propose, has to include a more refined and elaborated understanding of the nature and role of relations between CSOs and between CSOs and other actors, as well as the diversity, dynamics, and long-term nature of engagements and interactions. Like funders and evaluators, programmes also need to adjust their theory of advocacy, especially in fragile contexts, where the formal policy process may not be decisive in service delivery and the provision of rights.

#### *16.7.3 Assessment of outcomes*

In this evaluation, we have sought to uphold a nuanced understanding of effectiveness that does justice to the complexity of advocacy. In each of the three alliance-specific chapters, we see that advocacy is to be understood as a long-term investment, with outcomes mostly consisting of steps towards desired outcomes, and with agenda-setting outcomes often understood as a step towards achieving policy influence or a change in practice. There are fewer cases where policies or practices have demonstrably changed. In some cases, influence may be seen as possibly taking more time, with 'failure' to attain influence not automatically needing to be seen as ineffectiveness. In some contexts and moments in time, simply being able to keep an issue in view and maintain a network functioning in the face of targets' reluctance, rejection or inattention can be an important achievement, involving a need for persistence even if a programme has little to show for it in the short term. The general insight that we draw on the basis of our analyses is that funders, advocates and evaluators need not only to establish effectiveness on the basis of achieved outcomes, but also on the merits of advocates' way of understanding and strategizing in the face of the complexity and challenges of the environment they operate in and seek to change.<sup>581</sup>

#### *16.7.4 Organisational dimensions of advocacy: advocacy collaborations*

In all three programmes, we find issues with the development of focus. Where resources (of all kinds) are scarce, defining choices and acting accordingly involves collective reflection on priorities, interests and opportunities. However, networked structures of collaboration do not easily lend themselves to the development of strategic coherence. At the same time, recognition of diversity and local ownership are similarly crucial. The objective of coherence can run, in detrimental ways, against these. Effectiveness and ownership can be fundamentally in tension with each other, with potential important trade-offs between these leading to sacrifices on either front in networks bringing together diverse actors.<sup>582</sup> We see this tension between effectiveness and ownership as an issue that deserves to be approached as integral to ILA, by funders, advocates and evaluators.

Specifically, attaining the quality and quantity of communication necessary to identify a truly common ground from which to work in ways that combine effectiveness and ownership can be difficult. Finding complementarity and synergies and developing of shared or distributed ownership can be difficult, even when coherent visions have developed, as we found to be the case for the networked structures through which advocacy took place in this cluster. Moreover, when such common ground is established, coordinating action can be challenging. Related to this, developing and maintaining commitment to shared objectives can be challenging in such networked structures. At the same time, these things are key to the attainment of results that are inclusive in nature. Identification of common interests and the co-creation of activities and programmes seem crucial to the achievement of ownership among partners.<sup>583</sup>

#### *16.7.5 Learning and accountability in programmes*

Advocacy planning, monitoring and evaluation in this cluster often turned out to be centred on activity and process rather than result-oriented strategizing. Centring on activity also often meant working with short-term orientations, rather than working along longer-term pathways of change, or even the development of actual envisioning of such pathways. In some cases, it appeared as if the formulated programmes performed the role of anchor, or glue that brings actors together, without there being adequate room for reflection on the qualities and shortcomings of the programme.<sup>584</sup> There is a clear tension here between the need to work in a structured fashion and the ability to adjust to changing circumstances and to learn from experience. We found that the actors involved would be well-served by revisiting the ToCs, employing these as tools for introspection. Taking a step back to reconsider assumptions and incorporate lessons learned would have helped in adjusting programmes. Especially in network structures, where tendencies may be found to emphasise successes, nurture relations and look to possibilities of future collaboration, learning can be well served by such exercises. Funders, advocates and evaluators can further learning, and thereby effectiveness, by systematically working with ToCs as tools for developing and adjusting understandings and strategies.

We found that the networked structure of advocacy in this cluster led to other organisational challenges that deserve to be addressed. Within collaborations, the networked nature of advocacy has given rise to ambiguities with regard to accountability. With relatively egalitarian and open-ended, mutually supportive relations forming the foundation for collaboration, it can become unclear who is responsible for what, who is to answer to whom, when it comes to actions undertaken or the consequences of these actions. While such relations are inherent to networked advocacy, they also can stand in the way of learning and adjustment on the basis of lessons learned. Difficult conversations appeared to be avoided, with actors sometimes appearing to be 'on their toes' to avoid confrontation and maintain 'good' working relations. Networked relations thus involve not

only questions of accountability, but also raise challenges when it comes to building on the rich experiences that are gained. A systematic way of working with, and reflecting on, ToC and making such (often under-addressed) challenges more explicit and could serve as a starting point for addressing these challenges—for funders, advocates and evaluators.

## 17 Conclusions, lessons learnt and recommendations

### 17.1 Introduction

The aims of this evaluation of International Lobby and Advocacy in the Netherlands co-financing programme of MFS II were 1) to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of ILA programmes funded by MFS II; 2) to develop and apply innovative methodologies for the evaluation of ILA programmes and 3) to provide justified recommendations that enable Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners to draw lessons for future development interventions.

This evaluation has included eight highly diverse ILA programmes. They differed in thematic focus, geographical basis, organisational setup and culture, target types, objectives and strategies. The Alliance and Cluster reports zoom in on the specifics of the programmes and their outcomes. In these reports, in-depth insights into the specifics of programmes and their results can be found. In this chapter, we will provide cross-cutting findings and draw conclusions for all programmes together.

This chapter starts with a discussion in line with the questions for the evaluation, regarding:

- The nature and extent of outcomes;
- The contribution to outcomes of the Alliances;
- The relevance of achieved outcomes;
- The efficiency of efforts; and
- Factors explaining findings.

Building on our findings, we subsequently present lessons and recommendations to donors, advocacy and development professionals, and evaluators.

### 17.2 Outcomes

This evaluation has identified and analysed outcomes of a sample of eight ILA programmes, co-funded by MFS II. It does not cover the entirety of ILA programmes co-funded by MFS II and thus cannot provide a full overview of what has been achieved. The sample of programmes, very diverse in terms of nature, context, budget, and the extent to which evaluated programmes are representative for the work of particular Alliances, also does not permit comparison of programmes in terms of effectiveness. What this evaluation does permit, however, is an assessment of effectiveness in terms of the nature of outcomes the Alliances reported having contributed to. The next sub-sections address the questions: what outcomes have been contributed to? How do these outcomes relate to priority result areas? To Theories of Change? How to the objectives of evaluated programmes as a whole?

#### *17.2.1 What outcomes do Alliance claim to have contributed to?*

##### *17.2.1.1 Clusters of outcomes in ongoing policy processes:*

For all Alliances, many outcomes have come in clusters, crossing priority result areas. To provide a sense for the nature of these clusters, we can point to the processes of which these outcomes form part, and the way outcomes form part of such processes.

We find that almost all Alliances, to a larger or smaller degree, have contributed to changes in transnational policy processes around key development issues such as VGGT, UNSCR 1325, REDD+, EU Biofuels policy, RSPO, RTRS and the Post-2015 sustainable development goals. Alliances have thereby inserted civil society voices into ongoing policymaking, often crossing national/international

levels, crossing civil society/state/private actor target types, and often also crossing themes such as environment/social justice, or peace/development. Such clusters of outcomes have typically included a range of different types of outcomes. They have often included organizing CSO collaboration relating to such processes and the provision of input into processes. In some cases, such clusters (also) included increased attention to certain dimensions of issues the uptake of positions by targets, and the incorporation of positions or recommendations into e.g. policy drafting, adjustments of plans, and company behaviours.

Achieved (clusters of) outcomes have in some cases been of major transnational significance, as with the UN Committee on World Food Security's adoption of the VGGT (Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security) and the subsequent endorsement thereof by other actors like the World Bank and the Dutch government (Impact Alliance). The Communities of Change Alliance contributed to a cluster of outcomes around policy dialogues on financing UNSCR 1325 on international level, now developing in more concrete discussions to set-up a global discussion group on financing UNSCR 11325 together with UNWOMEN. Another example of such cluster of outcomes concerns the Renewable Energy Directive of the European Union. The Fair Green and Global Alliance contributed to changed policy in which the increase of the allowed mix of biofuels in fuels for transport is seriously limited now, while reporting on the way the biofuels are produced has become a serious policy issue. But also ACPF's contribution to the policy dialogue on inter-country adoption is a case in point of transnational significance influencing national policy processes across Africa and also beyond. Targets that changed their position included the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Commission and the Dutch Government. Also with other forms of transnational institution such clusters of outcome have been attained, as with the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil: a set of outcomes including, among other things, its adopting of a policy for outreach to local NGOs and CBOs and its adoption of a dispute settlement facility to resolve community and company disputes (Ecosystem Alliance). In many such clusters, outcomes with the Dutch government were part of achieved clusters of outcomes, as e.g. with the raising of attention to issues among Dutch Parliamentarians and the endorsement of Alliance positions by Dutch ministers, most prominently minister Ploumen.

A few major clusters of outcomes were achieved rather primarily at (mostly Dutch) national level, as with the reaching of agreement on sustainability criteria for solid biomass among Dutch government, industry and NGOs (Ecosystem Alliance) or the continuation of support for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights by the Dutch government, in terms of priority and budget (Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance).

Not all clusters of outcomes pertained to existing policymaking processes. Three Alliances achieved major clusters of outcomes on issues through (partly) strategizing relatively independent from such processes. Impact Alliance has contributed to public awareness, issue uptake, adoption of positions and policy change pertaining to large food and beverage companies' behaviour, with regard to different themes including e.g. gender, land and small-scale food producers by its innovative 'Behind the Brands' campaign. ACPF, part of the Together4Change Alliance, achieved a range of agenda setting outcomes and also some policy changes concerning child rights in Africa, with the AU, UN, and African states, Inter-Agency Working Groups and CSOs, on the basis of its research, reports, expertise and reputation. GPPAC, of the Freedom from Fear Alliance, advanced the development of

networks connecting CSOs and a range of other actors including states, RIGOs and international institutions to advance more inclusive and people-centred conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

#### 17.2.1.2 Spread outcomes:

While clusters of interconnected outcomes have been a prominent pattern, clearly found with, in particular, Fair Green and Global Alliance and Impact Alliance, a few Alliances have more predominantly achieved outcomes that form relatively smaller clusters of outcomes, and in some cases do not (yet) as clearly connect to a larger policy process, even though the themes addressed may be clearly related. This then may be at least partly the result of Alliance partners being involved in different sub-programmes simultaneously, and/or the geographic spread of activities, or of certain (sub) programme being relatively limited in terms of size or success. Alliances where we prominently find such patterns of spread outcomes are Ecosystem Alliance and Freedom from Fear Alliance. Such outcomes are mostly agenda setting in nature, as with the decision of 12 companies to seek collaboration with IUCN in a long-term programme on ecosystems and biodiversity (Ecosystem Alliance). Another example is the mentioning of Alliance work in UN reports (Freedom from Fear Alliance), thus far not clearly contributing to other or further outcomes in desired directions such as policy influence. But they also in some cases do involve policy influence or changes in practice, e.g. the development of a governance framework for delta areas in Kenya (Ecosystem Alliance) or the development of attention, plans and action among Dutch data centres to increase the sustainability of their energy supplies (Hivos Alliance).

#### 17.2.1.3 The intermediate nature of outcomes:

The processes of change Alliances are involved in are long-term and highly complex. Individual outcomes, part of such clusters of outcomes, are naturally then mostly intermediate in nature, consisting of steps into the desired direction. Agenda setting outcomes like increased awareness of an issue among targets, or enhanced collaboration with targets, important for all Alliances, are often geared at intermediary target groups. In Clusters I and II, for example, Parliamentary questions, asked in the Dutch and European Parliaments, influenced the terms of debates, as when Dutch Parliament asks the government to do research on Investor-State Dispute Settlement system (Fair Green and Global Alliance). In clusters II and III, we see intermediate nature of outcomes also in relation to targets. Especially when collaborations with UN bodies or RIGOs are developed for the influencing of members states, as with the development of Alliance-like relations between Alliance partner GPPAC and the Human Security Unit at the United Nations for the advancement of Human Security within the UN context (Freedom from Fear Alliance). But also more generally, the intermediate nature of many outcomes is characteristic for most outcomes. Examples of such outcomes showing their nature and broad range:

- The EU Commissioner for Development strengthened the EU policy regarding access to renewable energy by publishing a Green Paper that, amongst other things, addressed the issue of energy access (Hivos Alliance)
- The Dutch Economics Affairs minister sent a letter to Parliament on optimal biomass use (Fair Green and Global Alliance)
- The World Bank included in its second draft energy policy improvements regarding stricter rules to finance coal power plants and more attention and budget for rural access to sustainable energy (HIVOS Alliance)



- Palm oil and wood pulp players made public commitments to avoid further expansion on peat (Ecosystem Alliance)
- The RTRS produced broad-scale conservation maps and indication of High Conservation Value Areas (Ecosystem Alliance)
- The UNCRC included budgeting and allocation of spending on Child Rights into their policy discussions and policy drafting or the International Policy Conference on Inter-country adoption (ACPF, Together4Change)

Such individual, intermediate outcomes are often interconnected, with changes in one actor (e.g. a Dutch minister, UN body) contributing to change in another (e.g. companies, governments), or the same process contributing to changes in different actors.

#### 17.2.1.4 Contributions to articulating and conveying civil society voices:

For all Alliances, at least some outcomes involve contributing to a voice for civil society. While in some cases, these efforts have contributed to further changes such as policy influence, in other cases, this is not so (yet), though such influencing is aimed for. For some Alliances, most clearly Communities of Change Alliance, Freedom from Fear Alliance and Together4Change Alliance, such outcomes are most frequent and prominent among the achieved changes. We believe this type of outcome deserves a separate discussion since, contributions to articulating and conveying civil society voices can be seen as primary foundation and condition for effective ILA, also when further influence on targets is not (yet) attained.

Outcomes have contributed to articulating and conveying civil society voices in diverse ways. One such way is the organizing of civil society. Clusters of such outcomes include, for example, the facilitation of networked collaborations of civil society organisations (Freedom From Fear Alliance), a central and fundamental outcome for the evaluated programme here. In some cases, such clusters of outcomes are rather integrated into a programme's broader cluster of outcomes, as with the development of a new coalition of CSOs in soy producing countries (Ecosystem Alliance). Such outcomes are, to a relatively large degree, geared towards advancement of Southern partner capacities. Outcomes also contribute to the articulation of views, interests and expertise on the nature of problems and solutions from civil society perspectives. For example, we see this with Southern partners putting the implementation issues around UNSCR 1325 on discussion tables of e.g. UN Women and NATO (Communities of Change Alliance) and with Ugandan CSOs' mainstreaming of energy issues into their programmes (Hivos Alliance). Such (clusters of) outcomes have been attained with Alliance members in the lead, in collaboration with Southern partners, or with Southern partners in the lead within their national or regional contexts.

Outcomes have also contributed to the building of connections and interaction between civil society and targets. An example of access to policymaking arenas and participation therein that was found among several Alliances' outcomes, is being invited by the government or by international governmental organisations to be part of official delegations to intergovernmental meetings (Fair Green and Global Alliance; Ecosystem Alliance; Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance). A form of outcome of this kind particularly enhancing the voice of Southern opinions that was found among several Alliances' outcomes is: the facilitation of Southern voices in international arenas by developing opportunities for Southern partners to build relations with actors otherwise less accessible to them, including South–South connections and connections with international

institutions such as the UN and the EU, (e.g. Communities of Change Alliance, Freedom from Fear Alliance; Impact Alliance).

Outcomes have also contributed to the organization and facilitation of platforms and other forms of mutual engagement in collaborative process that open spaces for civil society, facilitating dialogue and more inclusive policy processes in different national and regional contexts, such as the development of a governance model that clarifies and formalises rights to benefits for local communities in the context of Cocoa production in Ghana (Ecosystem Alliance) or the offering of relatively neutral platforms for interaction between parties in conflict, such as a Track 2 diplomacy process involving dialogue between Georgian and Russian actors (Freedom From Fear Alliance). In attaining such outcomes, Southern partners were generally in the lead.

#### 17.2.1.5 Geographical distribution of outcomes:

In Cluster I, outcomes are distributed across the Netherlands, the EU, multilateral and international institutions and organisations, private companies, and targets at national levels in the South. In many cases, outcomes are connected in multi-level processes of change (e.g. Impact Alliance, Fair Green and Global Alliance). In Cluster II, outcomes are primarily with the Dutch government, the EU and the UN. External opportunities and challenges—especially those associated with the new Dutch government in 2012—meant that more outcomes were achieved in the Netherlands during the first period of the evaluation. In the latter part of the of the MFS II period, the decisions being made at the UN meant that more outcomes were seen at international level.<sup>585</sup> In Cluster III, the outcomes are distributed differently per ILA programme. One focuses on the international (UN, NATO, the EU, IDPS and others) and national levels (pilot countries). Another focuses on regional level and national level (AU, African governments) and more recently also the UN (UNICEF, UNHRC, UNCRC). The third focuses on national, regional and international levels through RIGOs, the UN, the EU and states.

Looking across Alliances, we may note that for most programmes, outcomes with the Dutch Government have been part of important clusters of outcomes, often in interplay with other targets, prominently including the EU and companies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been a key target. Relatively many with outcomes have been achieved with this ministry, but also with other Dutch Ministries, outcomes have been reported. Also at regional intergovernmental level, relatively many outcomes were achieved, in particular the EU, (but also including also, AU, OAS, LAS and others). Outcomes have also been achieved at the level of UN organisations at regional level. Most of the ILA programmes, to a greater or lesser extent, have attained outcomes at UN level. Achieving outcomes at the central UN level was identified as relatively challenging, as was, in some cases, connecting between global and local/regional levels. Finally, across most programmes, outcomes were achieved at the Southern national level, in collaboration with Southern partners.

#### 17.2.2 Priority result areas

Outcomes have been mostly achieved in the priority result area of agenda setting. These outcomes are geared towards enhancing the legitimacy, credibility, visibility, recognition and collective voice for lobby and advocacy. Agenda setting outcomes often involve the acceptance of the legitimacy and input of civil society in processes around issues. Enhanced attention for issues, the acknowledgement of, interest in, and response to reports, testimonies, positions and other forms of input, the uptake of positions, all signify forms of meaningful inclusion of Alliances input in processes of change. Many outcomes that were classified under this priority result area can be seen as results of investments in

relations, networks and internal capabilities to enable effective lobby and advocacy, as with the development of collaborations and shared positions among CSOs. One of the questions raised during the evaluation is whether such investments in networks and internal capabilities can be seen as mere outputs or also outcomes towards the objectives of Alliances. First of all, for this evaluation we conceptualized such results as outcomes since they are crucial steps towards the achievement of further outcomes and are at least by some Alliances members as important outcomes. Civil society voice, in terms of organizing, articulating, and finding a hearing, are not a given or a technically defined 'output', but a result of intricate and complicated political and social process in its own right. In addition, in many cases, such agenda setting changes also often have potential lobby targets as part of the network; agenda setting outcomes are frequently achieved in collaborative process with targets. Also, civil society actors that are part of ILA Alliances may themselves have a domain of policy influence. We thus find it justified to consider the results of these investments as outcomes.

That relatively many agenda setting outcomes were achieved can at least partly be seen as inherent to advocacy; many agenda setting changes will be needed to attain one policy change. However, we also note that some programmes were successful at attaining both agenda setting outcomes and policy influence outcomes, whereas others attained mostly agenda setting outcomes.

Certain outcomes in this area of agenda setting could also have been categorised in other priority result areas. For example, sometimes there was participation in multi-stakeholder working groups organised by the Dutch government. This can be framed as signals of the opening of spaces (agenda setting), changed accountability structures (under policy influencing) or a changed way of policy formulation (under changing practice). This is very much context dependent. This was resolved, in part, by taking into account the durability of the outcome. A single invitation would be considered an outcome for agenda setting, whereas a more permanent inclusion could be considered a change in policy or practice. Nonetheless, some outcomes could be categorised under multiple outcome indicators.

The degree to which policy influence has been achieved varies considerably amongst the evaluated programmes. In Clusters I and II, more policy influencing outcomes were identified than in Cluster III. Outcomes have been achieved with private, state and non-state targets. Most outcomes have been achieved at national levels in North and South, as well international levels.

Where policy influence was reported, this was often preceded by agenda setting outcomes that were achieved over a long period before the MFS II period started in 2011, building a foundation from which to achieve further results. For example, coalitions that deal with issues related to international trade agreements were already there, at least in Europe and the United States. In other cases, networks, coalitions and programmes around issues were younger, with chances of policy influence further out of reach, often requiring a focus on achieving agenda-setting outcomes.

Relatively few outcomes have been achieved in the priority result area of practice change; this is also not what most programmes have focused on. Rather than seeking e.g. the furthering or improvement of policy implementation at lower, 'on the ground' levels, most programmes have focused on policy processes and normative frameworks in national and international institutional arenas. In some cases, programmes did seek changes in practices amongst governments, companies and other actors and, in a number of cases, achieved these, as with the REDD+ Cocoa Landscape

Programme in Ghana, which provides the development of technical capacities and facilitation of learning, and the formalization of rights for local communities (Ecosystem Alliance).

The changes in practice that were found usually concerned changed patterns in inclusion and behaviour among actors. The establishment of a neutral platform for mediation can be a change in practice, when this signifies more voice for civil society for achieving peace or women's rights. An organisation that was previously inaccessible for CSOs and now (permanently) opening its doors—like, for example, the League of Arab States or NATO—can be, besides agenda setting, a change of practice (Freedom from Fear Alliance). However, the inclusion of civil society may not in itself yet lead to significant changes towards the final population or process of concern. Hence, the framing of these outcomes is also context specific.

It was found that practice outcomes in a private company can have a considerable impact and spill over to the behaviour of other companies, and sometimes even to governmental policies. The majority of programmes did not focus on the private sector. To a large extent, this is related to the themes programmes focus on. Environmental and social issues usually imply the private sector as one of the responsible actors, whereas this is less the case with an issue like the protection of sexual and reproductive rights. The question can nonetheless be raised whether, in some cases, lobby and advocacy misses opportunities in neglecting the private sector.

In some cases, the fact that we found relatively few practice changes may be because a significant part of the evaluation focused on activities that started under MFS II, since 2011. Many programmes seeking agenda setting, policy influence and (often subsequent) practice change have not reached the stage of achieving practice changes.

### *17.2.3 How outcomes relate to Theories of Change, including overall programme objectives*

Theories of Change have been constructed and used in diverse ways by Alliances. The nature and reach of ambitions, articulation of assumptions and pathways of change have been very different. In some cases, Theories of Change are very broadly and generally charted, without involving an actual assessment of what is realistically achievable through the Alliance's programme, whereas in other cases, ToCs are more specified. This makes the drawing of general conclusions on the way outcomes relate to Theories of Change impossible. However, we can distil some basic insights.

Outcomes mostly tend to address issues, actors, processes, levels, as foreseen in Theories of Change. At the same time, the extent to which outcomes match Theories of Change varies substantially between programmes. In some cases, clusters of outcomes cover complexities and ambitions of Theories of Change to a relatively large degree (e.g. Impact Alliance; Fair Green and Global Alliance). In other cases, outcomes are more partially in line with Theories of Change. We see this for example, where agenda setting outcomes contribute to more inclusive policy processes, but (as yet) mostly do not, or only in a very limited way, translate into changed policy or practice as charted in Theories of Change (e.g. Communities of Change Alliance; Freedom From Fear Alliance). In addition, assumptions, which are key to ToC, were not in all cases addressed, discussed or reflected on in the formulation or practice of the ILA programs. This does not have to mean the Theory of Change is flawed; it may also speak, e.g. of more challenging conditions under which Alliances have to work, Alliance capacities, or combinations of these and other factors.

When it comes to the way outcomes relate to programmes' overall objectives: Alliances' ILA programmes have sought to advance a range of objectives, and these typically tend to be broadly formulated. To name some examples: Ecosystem Alliance's overall programme objective is to improve the livelihood of the poor and create a sustainable economy through participatory, responsible and transparent management and governance of ecosystems (Ecosystem Alliance). Fair Green and Global Alliance's programme objective is to contribute to poverty reduction and to socially just and environmentally sustainable development by enhancing the capacity of civil society in the South. Communities of Change Alliance seeks to contribute to sustainable peace and security by supporting women's involvement and participation and gender equality in collective peace processes. This evaluation does not analyse the impact of ILA, and thus does not evaluate the extent to which such overall objectives have been attained (typically formulated in terms of impact). However, we can make some observations as to the extent to which ILA programmes have advanced such objectives.

A number of outcomes and outcome clusters clearly involve steps towards change in the behaviour of societal actors that may contribute to objectives. For some objectives, like 'participatory, responsible and transparent management and governance of ecosystems' or 'women's involvement and participation and gender equality in collective peace processes', contributions of outcomes to programme objectives are relatively clear. Outcomes like the organization of civil society, articulation of views and interests, invitations to provide input in policymaking arenas, or the facilitation of interaction between Southern Partners and actors at international institutions, contribute to objectives in the domain of inclusiveness such as inclusion of women in peace process; these changes are evident at present. In other cases, contributions of outcomes to objectives are less clear, even when they evidently constitute desired changes, because such objectives lie more in the domain of final outcomes that are formulated in terms of impact. Uptake of positions by targets, collaboration in the shaping of a governance framework or a draft policy document outcomes such as policy changes in the policies of international institutions may, in the future, contribute to objectives like poverty reduction or sustainable peace. This goes also, or even more so, for instances where policy has reached formal acceptance and implementation has progressed. While in some cases, we see on-the-ground changes promising impact, like the resolution of land grab cases in different countries (Impact Alliance), by and large, the contribution of outcomes to final aims is impossible to assess for the evaluated programmes at present. This is at least partly due to the time-span covered by the evaluation: for policy changes to find translation into implementation and then impact, and for practice changes into observable impact takes time that this evaluation does not allow for.

We do see clear differences when it comes to the degree to which programmes have achieved outcomes towards overall objectives. All programmes seek to achieve changes lying in the domains of agenda setting, policy influence and practice change (generally conceived as interconnected and often also as mostly developing sequentially). However, some have mostly achieved outcomes within the domain of agenda setting, whereas others have also achieved policy influence and practice change. Again, this does not necessarily mean that the programmes achieving mostly success in agenda setting are necessarily to be seen as less successful, since they may be operating in more difficult conditions with e.g. relatively much opposition, less attention or lack of alignment with important targets. However, such differences do at least indicate relatively larger or smaller progress towards objectives, as conceived in programmes' own Theories of Change.

### 17.3 Relevance

The achieved outcomes have been relevant in light of programmes' Theories of Change. This implies, more generally, that the outcomes contribute to giving shape and influence to civil society on a range of key issues and objectives as selected for support by MFS II.

Outcomes arguably contribute to programme objectives in the sense that they constitute significant steps in pathways of change that Alliances envisaged and worked towards. In some cases, relevance of outcomes is high, in this regard. In these cases, signs of advocacy contributing to policy change highly relevant to programme objectives are obvious, or signs of policy being translated into actual action are evident and significant. In other cases, achieved steps towards objectives were relatively minor, with the ultimate desired changes still far off.

It is not self-evident that achieved outcomes that fit into the Theories of Change are also relevant for the ultimate impact Alliances were aiming for. This impact is outside of the domain of influence of the advocates and the Theory of Change forwards assumptions on the relation between outputs and ultimate effect. Whether these assumptions hold and such relevance indeed exist cannot always be assessed. Achieved changes, also when they can be classified as policy influence, are often at a remove from local realities and implementation, and, the relation between policy influence and benefits for the end-target groups is often indirect. This is especially the case with multilateral policy changes, where we asked the question how likely it is that they will result in significant change in practice in the desired direction. Often, such outcomes refer to the establishment of internationally accepted frameworks, for example the establishment of roundtables for commodities like soya and palm oil (with a certification scheme and rules connected to it; Fair Green and Global Alliance) or international UN-related frameworks. We found that Southern partners sometimes question their effectiveness and relevance (e.g. Freedom from Fear Alliance).

Another reason why the relevance of outcomes for local realities may not be clear, is the time-span of the evaluation that can be out of sync with the often longer-term advocacy processes Alliances are involved in. Also, civil society influence is but one among multiple factors in the attainment of often long-term processes of change.

#### 17.3.1 *Relevance to constituencies in the South*

We have also focused on the relevance to constituencies in the South, the primary focus of the MFS-II programme. Relevance to the ToC and to constituencies largely coincides, but there are also perceived discrepancies. The programmes varied in the level in which they built on, or involved Southern partners. In some programmes, Southern partners were highly involved; occasionally even leading. In other cases, there was little involvement of Southern partners; Northern Alliance members acted more independently in some (parts of) programmes than initial plans stipulated (Ecosystem Alliance, Freedom From Fear Alliance). A higher involvement of Southern partners would not necessarily have led to more relevant outcomes. We need to note here that North/South collaborations in a number of cases did not materialize as proposed or expected, leading to risks as to the relevance of outcomes as understood in Southern contexts. Also the potential missing of opportunities due to the inability to involve Southern partners in a constructive way is a risk here, while such involvement is increasingly expected in policymaking arenas, lending credibility and legitimacy to ILA. This is especially important when we realize that a major ingredient of success of

international CSO lobby and advocacy is the legitimacy that comes with credible representation, integration and inclusion of voices from the South.

In the collaboration with Southern partners, attaining the quality and quantity of communication necessary to establish common ground was often difficult. Once a certain common ground has been established, continued effort is required to find complementarity and synergies, and coordinating action can be challenging. Similarly, developing and maintaining commitment to shared objectives can be challenging. However, all these elements are important for the attainment of results that are inclusive in nature. The identification of common interests and the co-creation of activities and programmes seem crucial for the achievement of ownership among partners. It appears to us that adequate processes towards establishing a common ground from which to attain such ownership and commitment did not always take place for some of the evaluated programmes, leading to situations where problems arose in achieving shared ownership, commitment and/or coordination, most prominently between Alliance members and Southern partners. In these programmes, the extent to which Alliance members' and Southern partners' objectives were aligned in theories of change and activities has been low. This leads to concern, in cases across the three Clusters, as to what extent contributions result from the effective connection between Alliance members and Southern partners, and effectively relate to needs as Southern partners see them.

#### **17.4 Contribution**

This section deals with programmes' contributions to changes, synthesising the findings on evaluation question 2: Do the international lobbying and advocacy efforts of MFS II Alliances and their partners contribute to the identified changes (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

##### *17.4.1 Links between Alliance strategies/activities and identified outcomes*

Outcomes are rarely achieved with Alliances as a sole contributor. Alliances tend to be part of coalitions and networks, sometimes involving many other CSOs. In many cases, contributions will also have been made by many other types of stakeholders, including e.g. politicians, national governments, international institutions, the public, media and private actors. Furthermore, outcomes showing influence on targets can in some cases be based in already existing alignment or near-alignment in terms of objectives, and results of CSO activities preceding MFS II and Alliance activity more broadly. It would therefore also be not correct to simply equate impressive outcome with impressive contribution.

This being said, plausible links between activities and outcomes have been established for all evaluated programmes. However, the degree of plausibility is differentiated. In a number of programmes, we found evidence of many direct interactions between Alliance members and targets, as well as change processes that indicate a relatively high degree of plausibility of the influence of the Alliances' activities. This is the case, for example, when an Alliance is a nationally leading organisation that is frequently consulted directly by politicians, and the viewpoints of such an Alliance are directly reflected in arguments such politicians subsequently make, or instances where actions of private actors follow collaboration or negotiation between Alliance members and these actors.

With regard to outcomes in the priority result area of agenda setting, the contribution was often obvious, as the outcome concerned the capabilities and position of the advocating body and directly resulted from efforts of the advocates (e.g. Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance,

Communities of Change Alliance, Together4Change Alliance, Freedom From Fear Alliance). Many of the outcomes in this priority result area did not consist of visible changes in viewpoints by targets, but rather enhanced the space for civil society actors and viewpoints in policy processes. Examples of this type include having built relations with targets by which access was developed; recognition as a legitimate civil society actor or as a credible source; invitations to participate in meetings, also involving relatively institutionalised forms of collaboration and the uptake of content developed by Alliances by targets and other actors in debate and policy development. Contributions of the ILA programmes, in these cases, can be characterised in their contribution to inclusive (political) processes that have the potential to lead to further aspired changes.

We can establish with confidence that the MFS II-funded activities made a contribution with regard to outcomes in policy change. The *extent* of the contribution can often not be established. Where activities are conducted in a domain where many actors operate or come about through complex networked collaboration, outcomes in line with theories of change and activities suggest contribution yet the level of contribution remains hidden (see Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance for an explicit discussion of this problem). Likewise, in the case of complex combinations of insider and outsider strategies, involving significant contributions by media coverage, contribution to outcomes has been established, yet cannot be substantiated properly within the means of this evaluation (Fair Green and Global Alliance). Activities at international level, frequently in collaboration with other CSOs, similarly did not lend themselves well to clearly establishing the nature and extent of the contribution to outcomes (Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance). In some cases, contribution may remain hidden because of the sensitivity of the question of influence. Both Alliance and target interests may want to keep such influence away from public view.

With regard to change in practice, as stated above, we found fewer outcomes, and contribution was more diffuse. Remarkably, clear and attributable outcomes with regard to change in practice were mainly found with private sector targets. For example, Fair Green and Global Alliance member Milieudefensie and its Indonesian partner Walhi contributed to the fact that the Waterland company stopped its programme with growing *Jatropha* on Java. Practice changes with state target could be identified though, as with, for example, ACPF. Child Legal Protection Centres set up by this agency in one country (amongst others) became embedded in government structures.

As is common in the practice of lobbying and advocacy: some of the activities did not evidently contribute to outcomes, and, for some outcomes, contribution could not be made plausible. While explanatory factors may certainly include Alliance capacity or performance issues and questions around the validity of Theories of Change, we have to be careful to label these as failed interventions. Actual change processes sought can last several decades, and activities of MFS II may lay the groundwork for or contribute to outcomes in years to come (e.g. Ecosystem Alliance, Freedom From Fear Alliance; Communities of Change Alliance, Together4Change Alliance).

In conclusion, in many of the cases, we could establish that a programme had a role in the developing and shaping of policy processes. We can be specific about the qualities and nature of that role in terms of participation, the nature and role of activities and the response to these by other actors, including targets, as well as other actors. The exact magnitude or nature of the influence often remains hidden.



#### *17.4.2 How did activities under Alliances' control contribute to outcomes?*

This section considers how outcomes came about, i.e. what strategies and methods were used by Alliances? Literature on advocacy often distinguishes insider from outsider strategies. In our evaluation we also maintain this distinction. In section 1.3 we defined insider strategies as concerning behind the scenes activities that are usually directed at co-operation and persuasion with decision makers. Outsider strategies concern public activities and are usually directed at awareness raising, through pressure and confrontation directed at decision makers.

Evaluated programmes mostly worked through insider strategies. We have observed different settings for such insiders' strategies, meetings in person but just as well by use of social media. It included formal and informal (tele-) meetings with targeted decision makers, sometimes even one-to-one or confidential consultations (all Alliances). But also, participation in non-public events (e.g. round table discussions and closed meetings) with like-minded (not necessarily decision-makers) or with a selection of stakeholders interested in the topic and participation in strategic partnership or (ad hoc) inter-agency working groups tasked to prepare a specific advice or appeal are seen as insiders' strategies (e.g. Together4Change Alliance, Ecosystem Alliance).

Presentations given during conferences, and policy meetings, conducting workshops and trainings open for a wider public as well as teleconferences may not be conceived as purely insiders' strategy but rather a hybrid form as it combines elements of both strategies. Actually what started as insiders' approach (undertaking activities behind-the-scenes) acquired features of an outsiders' strategy. Cluster III gives some examples such as the International Policy Conferences (T4C) that are designed from an insiders' perspective, resulting in activities relating to outsiders' strategies. But it happened also the other way around. What was meant to exert public pressure becomes strategic partnership such as appeals made to individuals especially opinion leaders and highly placed officials by way of personally addressed letters, emails or telephone calls with 'unrequested' input or with a petition. We have seen such hybrid strategies applied in all Clusters, resulting in uptake of the issue at stake and subsequent mutual acceptance of complementarity. Cluster II offers an interesting case in point where close working relationships developed in this way between the Alliance and the MoFA.

Outsider strategies were mostly reported in Cluster I programmes that contributed to outcomes through public campaigns, mobilising public opinion through mainstream and social media activities (web platforms, teleconferencing, intranet facilities, tweets, initiations to write letters to target companies and governments, signing of petitions, demonstrations). These strategies primarily addressed the behaviour of private sector organisations. Outsiders' strategies were also identified in Cluster III, for example on African child rights, where shaming and blaming is applied as a tool to raise awareness at national levels. Although a confrontational approach was chosen, this was done with deliberation and care as this African-based Alliance usually preferred to take a consent approach in outsider strategies rather than an approach based on dissent and confrontation.

In almost all cases outsider strategies were combined with constructive engagement, either within the programme itself or through cooperation with other NGOs. In the latter cases a division of labour evolved where some advocates use outsider strategies while other advocates fill in the space for insider strategies forged by the activists. Hybrid strategies evolved, that were often grounded in evidence-based approaches, based on the development of cases which provide evidence and testimonies. Often, but not always, interactions evolved around (partially) Alliance-produced reports,

briefs, statements, recommendations and testimonies, and, in many cases, the quality and credibility of such products were key to contributions made. In this way, outsider strategies like campaigns explicitly combine tactics, substantiating the momentum created with media attention through different forms of public action and stakeholder engagement.

Contributions were made through the building and maintenance of relationships within coalitions and CSO networks by which objectives could be advanced collectively, as has been common practice in the evaluated programmes. When it comes to targets, contributions were made by addressing targets at many national and international levels. Often, efforts addressed multilevel governance structures, targeting national and international/multilateral levels—most prominently the EU and the UN—simultaneously. In Cluster I, different programmes also targeted private sector actors in different ways, including public campaigning, negotiation (including multi-stakeholder processes and lobby) and allying, also in the collaborative targeting of state actors. Such efforts showed differentiated levels of integration and coordination between multiple advocates in different sites, many of which beyond the Alliances. For a part, evaluated programmes did not have Alliance as the key collaborative actor constellation, as all Alliances in several cases turned out not to lead to highly effective collaborations.

#### *17.4.3 Revisiting the distinction between insider and outsider strategies*

The evaluation found that the relation between advocates and their targets at times shifted, and targets sometimes developed into allies. In the case of cluster II, for example, the MoFA of the Netherlands can be seen not just as a 'target', but also as an 'ally', and, increasingly, as a part of the Alliance's network that also engages in advocacy work. Similarly, 'frontrunners' in the private sectors developed into allies to target the 'laggards' in some Alliances in Cluster I. Contributions were thus made by actively linking and convening advocates (including Southern partners) and targets, as well as organising events and participating in events through which positions could be advanced. This aspect also relates to the issue referred to in section 17.2.1, with regards to the distinction between outputs and outcomes looking to outcomes such as networks. While one may debate whether the development of the ILA network is to be considered an output or outcome of ILA, when decision-makers increasingly become part of the ILA network, this is more evidently an outcome.

There have been Alliances working with multi-stakeholder platforms. These platforms deliberately bring together key decision-makers with implementers and stakeholders, in order to bring about inclusive policies. Although decision-making power in these platforms is rarely equal, the image of insiders and outsiders becomes increasingly blurred. This is especially the case when the advocates convene multi-stakeholder platforms and hence facilitate decision processes, rather than only influencing advocacy 'targets'.

Several ILA programmes comprise capacity development of Southern partners in their objectives. Capacity development, including funding and organisational and technical support also contributed to outcomes. NGOs and civil society in the South often have their own sphere of influence, and capacity development then gets additional meaning, not only rendering advocacy more effective, but also capacitating influential actors to become more responsive decision-makers. This falls outside of the gamut of insider/ outsider strategies.

The evaluation concludes that the nature of strategies in itself cannot be judged as more or less effective. ILA is not a one-size fits all endeavour and each context and objective appears to require its specific mix of strategies. Often, strategies work complementary to each other. Alliance members recognised, for example, the role of Milieudefensie and Friends of the Earth in bringing about the roundtable for palm oil, even though they were not affiliated to the roundtable (Fair Green and Global Alliance).

No matter which strategy is chosen, the success of ILA depends ultimately on the credibility of the lobby and advocacy. Insider, outsider and hybrid strategies were successful because of the credibility of the messages and materials produced and advanced. Credibility lay also in reputation: the perceived added value of organisations or programme staff, rooted in (perceptions of) experience, knowledgeability, expertise and the 'usefulness' to the targets. Credibility was also attained by representing legitimate civil society views, and through the ability to link different levels of influence: bringing local voices to international tables and, vice versa, equipping local actors with knowledge on international policy. This latter type of credibility of the representativeness of international advocates can be compromised when collaborations with Southern partners become limited or problematic.

## **17.5 Efficiency**

This section synthesises the findings on the evaluation question on how efficient the ILA interventions were. To establish efficiency, we have developed a methodology that centres on what we have called in sync with the framework of the evaluation: the 'theory of efficiency' (ToE). This methodology shifts the emphasis away from the evaluators determining and scoring the efficiency of the programmes and instead establishes how Alliances built in, understood and monitored cost-effectiveness in their programmes. This methodology is experimental and was designed in the course of the process; hence, it was not yet incorporated in the baseline report in February 2013.

### *17.5.1 Theory of efficiency of the ILA programmes*

All programmes under evaluation have systematic approaches to efficiency and accountability in place as part of their broader operations in which ILA is embedded. Activities for advocacy were accounted for according to these standard procedures. In this section, we consider efficiency in relation to decisions and practices specifically pertaining to advocacy.

Alliances consider efficiency a fundamental principle of their way of working in order to maximise effectiveness. They did not have a specific policy on efficiency to guide everyday decisions of their advocacy work, except for the Fair Green and Global Alliance, which had rather specific guidelines on efficiency from the start of the MFS II period. By introducing the idea of the theory of efficiency, we were able to tease out how programmes viewed and dealt with the issue, and how they incorporated ongoing learning in this regard. We were thus able to bring out a number of elements characterising the efficiency of the organisations' decision-making processes.

First, it is considered that clear objectives, a shared vision and alignment and also clear lines of responsibility and transparency ensure efficiency.

Second, efficiency is understood as a fundamental part of the philosophy of most organisations: maximising the effectiveness at the lowest cost. This is being done through having organisational

structures and mechanisms in place, but also through considering time, travel and meeting efficiency.

Third, internal decisions regarding strategy integrate questions of how to do the most with the least resources. Most of the organisations thereby consider costs and effectiveness values linked to their organisational principles and identities. Efficiency considerations are consequently integral to strategizing.

Fourth, investing in long-term benefits can be an important consideration in allocating funds for activities. This means that some activities or strategies may be high in cost in the short term but are implemented anyway, as the effectiveness of the outputs is assumed to outweigh the initial costs in the long run. A prime example is efforts of capacity development of local partners. This is part of the philosophy of giving people a space and voice in advocacy processes, and it has an instrumental value to make interventions more sustainable in the long run. Another example is an Alliance that needs to uphold its identity as being green and eco-friendly, which may at times be less efficient, but is important for the future credibility of the organisation.

Fifth, quality is given priority over cost saving in order to ensure effectiveness. This can be observed, for example, in the case of coaching partners and organising face-to-face meetings. It is also considered acceptable to sometimes deviate from budgets when opportunities or unforeseen issues arise. Another example is the way consultants are selected, as it was mentioned as a learning point to work with more experienced and often more expensive consultants in order to be time-efficient and effective. With regard to working with consultants, different considerations are made, with some Alliances finding it efficient to work with consultants, whereas other Alliances try to avoid employing consultants. An entirely different example concerns dealing with security. International lobbying and advocacy often concerns sensitive issues. Lobbying for an issue at international level can have repercussions at the national level and translate into security risks. Efficiency gains at the international level may then need to be forfeited to protect the national-level partners.

Sixth, time efficiency is considered the most prominent factor of efficiency in all of the organisations involved. ILA is considered time- and staff-intensive, and, organisations have to consider their scarce time and resources in the strategies they deploy. Being flexible, adaptive and lean—as long as this does not jeopardise effectiveness—are characteristics used to describe efficiency in the organisations.

Finally, other elements of efficiency that surfaced included the smart collaboration and internal division of tasks within the organisations, as well as between partners. Adding to this, some of the programmes also mentioned partnerships and networks as part of their ToE, in the sense of combining strengths, as well as using networks and relations to ensure efficient decisions on services rendered.

The 'theory of efficiency' of Alliances can thus be understood as balancing between effectiveness and efficiency, while ensuring the organisation's identity and principles, including the principle of pursuing a type of efficiency that is considered ethical and a way to retain credibility. All organisations are dealing with efficiency, as time and resources are scarce and ambitions are high, and it is thus embedded in their operations and organisational philosophies. It is understood by the

organisations that you cannot always be efficient when you want to be effective, and balancing time, quality and resources plays a major role in decision making on tactics and activities.

#### *17.5.2 Practice and improvements of the efficiency of the ILA programmes*

In practice, efficiency is upheld in different ways, in what may be labelled as organisational, time, travel, meeting and output efficiency. Organisational efficiency refers to the efficient organisation of working processes, such as frameworks, planning and monitoring, as well as reporting. Timeliness of reporting, communication and transparency ensure efficient ways of working. Organisations stress being lean and flexible, as well as having clear objectives and divisions of responsibility, to be able to adapt to changing circumstances and opportunities. Partnerships, cooperation and task division are stressed as underlying efficiency. There is an example where the division of recurring tasks was made based on a SWOT analysis amongst the partners involved. Avoiding the duplication of efforts is also part of seeking cooperation and partnerships in order to work efficiently and combine strengths.

Time and staff are considered the main cost in advocacy work, and time efficiency is an important aspect. One example of practice in this regard is the organisation of back-to-back meetings to increase opportunities and strengthen relations. Another example, already mentioned above, is the use of consultants. Some organisations use consultants in order to be efficient, while others choose not to for the same reason.

Regarding meetings, there are also policies and decision-making procedures with regard to the venues (costs and representation), representation (who is asked and why?) and sequence of meetings. We have seen conferences and meetings in expensive and less expensive locations, where the considerations were made with regard to whom to invite and why and how to gain most outreach, seeking an optimum balance between outcomes and costs. Sometimes, representative locations can be costly, and it is almost impossible to make a judgment on whether or not this is more effective. In some cases, we have noticed relations affected by low budget meetings, as resources were scarce. Another example of the efficient use of time and resources in meetings is the implementation of subgroup meetings to work more intensively on various topics, divide tasks and responsibilities and increase effective decision making. With regard to the content of the meetings, it is considered efficient to have clear outputs and preparations beforehand and to avoid having too many objectives piled up in one meeting.

There is also the issue of travel efficiency. Travel constitutes another bulky cost item of advocacy, as many advocates seek to influence different geographical arenas. In practice, the organisations have policies regarding travel and accommodation as well as daily expenses. Some use partnerships to reduce travel costs while maintaining the ability to advocate in different arenas. All of the organisations also use email and Skype or other software to be able to communicate and call across the globe. In a number of cases, it was also mentioned that, often, organisations are invited to present or provide input, meaning that they can travel without costs. They then consider the effectiveness for what they want to achieve as the main criterion for deciding whether or not to go. It was also mentioned that organisations negotiate expenses paid by the inviting parties for other mostly Southern partners. In another example, the location of the main office was deemed as efficient, considering travel and time efficiency, as it is closely located to the main target. In other cases, involving regional and local partners is considered an efficient investment, because they can

take issues further in different geographical locations and arenas, which is assumed to be effective in the longer run.

Output efficiency is also important. Organisations constantly balance effectiveness with cost and time efficiency in their decisions on strategies, activities and types of output to be produced. There are different examples of learning with regard to this. Campaigns are considered effective and can be cost-effective, but not in all situations and for all topics. Additionally, outreach through publications is considered cost-intensive, especially when sending out hard copies, although, at the same time, in some cases, hard copies were more effective (the Internet is not available everywhere).

There were also some inefficient practices noted by the organisations related to external requirements (e.g. for donor funding) resulting in restrictions in terms of flexibility and adaptability. One of the issues brought forward was the MFS II Framework and the requirements leading to inefficient and bureaucratic processes and the spending of resources on services such as legal advice and accountancy. Another related issue mentioned as having resulted in inefficiency is the set-up of having Alliances. Organisations mentioned this to be inefficient because of coordination and the extra time and resources spent on alignment. Moreover, efficiency did not play a large role in the preparation phases, and it was mentioned that starting up a cooperation programme like this demands a lot of time and resources. Another issue that surfaced was that many regulations do not facilitate efficiency, but rather promote bureaucracy.

Most of the organisations uphold efficiency in practice through embedding this concern in their strategic planning, monitoring and reporting, as well as decision making and constant consideration of choices, weighing efficiency against effectiveness. In this exercise, we also determined some main learning points in balancing efficiency with effectiveness. These learning points include strategic decisions on activities and output (decisions on what to do), meeting and organisational structures (adjusted and/or adapted), cooperation with partners (nature of the relation, the task division, the structure of communications) and capacity development. We may conclude that for all Alliances, efficiency considerations are integrated in strategic planning, reflection and learning.

### *17.5.3 Interpretations and observations*

As stated above, most of the programmes have implicit theories of efficiency in relation to decisions on tactics and activities of advocacy. All of the Alliances consider efficiency an important element in their strategizing and everyday practices of international lobby and advocacy. Efficiency is an element that is automatically considered during meetings and in evaluating activities, whether or not this is done under the label of efficiency. While we can positively conclude that efficiency is well-considered and practiced by the Alliances, there are certain setbacks that we can observe as a result of the implicit nature of dealing with efficiency in advocacy decisions:

- First, as efficiency is not very explicit in most Alliances, the efficiency choices embedded in decisions on tactics and activities tend to disappear from accountability processes. This is equally the case for upward accountability to the donor, sideways accountability within networks and downward accountability to the end-users.
- Secondly, as has been observed above, efficiency turns out to be a complex issue. It requires balancing cost efficiency with considerations of effectiveness, hidden costs and long-term

implications. As efficiency of advocacy activities is often dealt with implicitly, these considerations are rarely subject to systematic deliberation or systematic evaluation.

Efficiency gains tend to have diminishing returns and may become counter-productive. There are a number of ways in which Alliances experienced how efficiency can stand in the way of effective lobby and advocacy. To give some examples:

A major asset of the ILA programmes is that they are being implemented by highly motivated staff members. They are often intrinsically inclined to push up the results per time unit. Because most of the budget is being spent on personnel, programme efficiency is mainly translated into time efficiency. In case of budget cuts without an equal reduction of objectives, staff members tend to become overburdened, with all kinds of negative consequences for the programme. With regard to time efficiency, it was also remarked that outsourcing research to consultants may require hiring high-level, and hence costly, consultants to reach the objectives in a time-efficient way.

As mentioned above, resource constraints can reduce the flexibility of programmes to seize opportunities for lobby and advocacy.

Partnerships and networking are important strategies of ILA where many gains are to be made in terms of efficiency and relevance. However, this requires a certain balance, and, at some point, the expansion of networks and partnerships runs into diminishing returns. Partnership also requires investments in meetings and coordination. With regard to meeting efficiency, it was remarked that piling up too many objectives in one meeting may be counter-productive.

Short-term considerations of efficiency can work against prioritising capacity development. An example was offered, where one of the lessons learned was that one tended to invite the same people over and over again to meetings in order to be more efficient, resulting in a lack of investment in capacity development. Capacity development is a long-term investment, and this needs to be taken into account when evaluating efficiency.

A critical note mentioned by some of the programmes is the relation between certain frameworks and structures and efficiency. The MFS II programme itself can be seen as an attempt to strike a better balance between efficiency and effectiveness in development collaboration. The experiences of Alliances diverge, but several observations stand out. The procedures pertaining to MFS II are not considered efficient, but rather bureaucratic and complex. There are hidden costs of taxes (VAT), legal advice and accountancy, but also with regard to meetings necessary for cooperating in Alliances, which requires time and resources. Such costs tend to be hidden, yet may have significant repercussions on efficiency.

## **17.6 Explanatory factors**

In this section, we present patterns found for evaluation question 5, which asks for factors explaining the findings. We also sought to explain limits to these achievements. It was not possible for the evaluators to cover all potential explanatory factors, if only because of limits in access and resources. However, we identified several patterns across the evaluated programmes. Overall, we find that (contributions) to outcomes can be explained by interplay between internal factors, external factors and the nature of the issue being addressed.

### *17.6.1 Internal explanatory factors*

While many internal factors contribute to the attainment of outcomes, we can establish some that stand out. First, the capability to develop, and commit to, a longer-term vision, including the capability to develop focus, take decisions, plan and translate these into organisational action. A closely related explanatory factor found of importance here is the capability to select and execute a strategy effectively, based in a Theory of Change while relating to the context. We call this advocacy competence. In light of the internal strategies that were favoured in many programmes, we found advocacy competence important with regards to issue expertise, as also the capability to build credible and compelling cases and arguments. Also the capability to devise and carry out public campaigns can be included here. The capability to develop legitimacy as CS representative in the eyes of partners, other CSOs and targets can also be mentioned. All this pertains to programme actors' credibility and reputation, often built up over time and through repeated and successful interactions with targets, which contributes to visibility, access and voice. But it also pertains to the ability to actually contribute content that resonates with targets in terms of e.g. quality, timeliness and legitimacy. More confrontationally, it pertains to the capability to develop oppositional voices that resonate with media, citizens and targets by which space, attention and support for such voices were attained.

A closely related explanatory factor is staff's capability to monitor environments; adapt to or act relating to that environment and changes in it; building and maintaining presence and visibility in arenas form factors that contribute to explaining outcomes. This capability involves continuous context analysis, adjusting over time; selection of strategies adequate for context, target and moment, and using momentum to make the most of opportunities; these are also part of advocacy competencies. This capability to adapt and renew also had an internal side. In some cases, programmes showed flexibility and a capacity to learn and adjust in the face of experiences; in a few cases, we saw a limited capability to question assumptions in ToCs. In these cases, programmes performed the role of organising actors and activities, rather than being taken as points of departure for continuous reflection and reconsideration.

Crucial are capabilities to build and maintain relations. With regards to targets, explanatory factors involve the capability to relate including the capability to identify and engage relevant targets; the capability to credibly present oneself or one's organisation as having added value within the CSO landscape; the capability to relate constructively and maintain and develop relations; and the capability to identify the most effective strategy to influence particular targets. Equally important is the capability to build and maintain relations and collaborations with partner CSOs. Important here are the capability to relate to other CSOs working on similar themes, networking, building coalitions and Alliances, as well as collaborations with Southern partners. But also, the development of agreements on objectives and commitments, effective communication and coordination of roles and actions come in here as highly relevant. Finally, the way Southern partners are involved in the programmes' ILA and the credibility of such involvement as reflecting 'Southern', 'local' or 'on the ground' voices and information can be mentioned as an factor explaining our findings.

Some programmes worked through focused and coordinated action, thus contributing to their success. However, the same focus may risk implying a limited involvement and accommodation of diversity, especially with regards to Southern partners. In one programme, accommodation of diversity was central to the programme, contributing to certain outcomes, such as the building of



relations with multiple partners and targets and the building of legitimacy and credibility. At the same time, these qualities led to difficulties developing and executing coordinated action.

Finally, we identified the internal factor of maturity of networks involved with ILA as well as the maturity of the programme funded through MFS II. Because building relations with CSOs and targets and the development of agreements on objectives and actions, as well as their execution, can take years to develop, we found that the amount of time that has passed since the initiation of programmes can be an explanatory factor for outcomes. Some results suggest that more mature programmes had an advantage over less mature ones in terms of attaining outcomes. Funding cycles lasting only a few years may in many cases work against effectiveness.

### *17.6.2 External explanatory factors*

Apart from internal factors, external factors contributed to outcomes. It is important to see here that external conditions and dynamics provide openings or present barriers for Alliances that create opportunities to attain results or limited these. While Alliances can sometimes influence these external factors and create openings, we here focus on external factors outside of Alliances' sphere of influence.

First, we can consider the way other actors—including targets, CSOs and other audiences—relate to ILA programmes. Targets emerge as an explanatory factor in different ways. Important aspects include the target's agenda, positions on issues and their power to influence developments around an issue, and the way they exercise power. This often relates to dynamics around targets: Personnel turnover within target organisations, power changes among targets (also positive) and the timing of policy processes were sometimes decisive for ILA opportunities.

Across the evaluated programmes, dimensions of context also emerged as explanatory factors. Political space for CSOs in specific geographic contexts impacted the possibilities to undertake activities, affecting the outcomes achieved. The cultural context of activities and of the issue or agenda on which ILA is conducted sometimes similarly influenced the opportunities to undertake activities and find a hearing or establish forms of collaboration. Institutional openness to civil society participation and influence also emerged as a factor. Changed conditions through wars and disasters too impacted the extent and nature of outcomes. Another contextual factor can be identified in the political support for ILA by CS, including budget and budget cuts for ILA.

ILA is also affected by changes in development policy. At the start of the programme, budget cuts in 2011 severely affected some programmes, ACPF for example experienced a 50% budget cut. After the change of Dutch cabinet in 2012, when the portfolio of the Minister for development cooperation was expanded to combine international trade and development cooperation, calling for incorporation of social and environmental concerns in trade issues with other countries, especially in the South, issues not prioritised by the new policy noticeably lost attention.

### *17.6.3 The issue addressed*

Finally, the nature and context of the issues that the ILA addressed emerged as an explanatory factor in a range of ways.

First of all, the way specific audiences (i.e. targets, publics and partners) relate to issues partly defined opportunities for programmes to achieve outcomes. The construction and resonance of issues within societies and with targets is a factor that explains Alliances' chances of success at

attaining outcomes. Gaining attention can be very difficult or relatively easy, depending on the issue. Likewise, establishing collaborations with CSOs and targets, identifying processes to influence and finding a hearing and legitimacy for advanced agendas and viewpoints showed to be more or less difficult, depending on the positioning of the issue. More specifically, the emergence and character of issues were important factors. For example, the emergence/construction of a clearly identifiable wrong and of the perpetrator (Fair Green and Global Alliance), or the emergence of a specific policy agenda—such as UNSCR 1325—offered opportunities for ILA or limited these (Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance). Such emergence of issues involves a complex process that programmes can influence only to a limited degree.

Issues can also be highly sensitive in specific contexts, and we found that this can influence the possibilities for advocacy, as ILA on such issues may be considered controversial and may be countered by other actors including targets as well as other CS actors (Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance). Similarly, ILA on certain issues was controversial because it threatened vested interests; such situations had consequences for the space for ILA, also because opposition threatened the security of CS actors (Impact Alliance).

Finally, the complexity of the issues on which the Alliances conducted ILA may have implicated programmes' chances for achieving results. ILA in this evaluation involved multiple actors, understandings, agendas, institutions and levels to a degree that it made the advancement of objectives challenging (e.g. FFF Alliance).

In conclusion: organisational capacity helps to explain the effectiveness of the evaluated programmes, and we could identify a range of capabilities that came out as important. However, these capabilities are only one factor among several that need to be taken into account while assessing programmes' effectiveness. The nature and contribution of different factors to explanation differ per programme.

## **17.7 Lessons learnt and recommendations: programmes and effectiveness**

Based on the results of research focused on the answering of the five evaluation questions, the development and application of methodology, as also a range of unexpected learnings that could take place because of our close involvement with the Alliances' work over 2012-2014, the evaluation lead to the identification of a number of 'lessons learnt' that may further ILA effectiveness. It needs to be stressed that these lessons emerge from our study of the work of the Alliances, and are often based on good practices that were observed. The lessons form the foundation for a set of recommendations to funders, development and advocacy professionals and evaluators.

### *17.7.1 Conceptualizations of advocacy*

Evaluation of advocacy has been an emergent field for a number of years.<sup>586</sup> While many insights from literature were helpful for this evaluation, evaluators also ran into challenges to which existing approaches offered no clear answer. The evaluation of ILA as undertaken for these Alliance programmes, which are international and mostly multi-level in nature, with ambitions of inclusiveness, is relatively uncharted territory. The classical approach to advocacy implicitly takes it as oriented towards the influencing of decision makers' understandings, views and actions. Our evaluation revealed that advocacy or ILA for that matter, needs to be approached differently.

While this holds to a large degree, this approach does not explicitly conceptualize coherently the realities of present-day governance that evaluated programmes engage with. . Such realities include bilateral and multilateral engagements with intergovernmental, governmental, research, CSO, private sector, military and semi-governmental organisations. Influencing is done in collaborative structures, which to some extent may blur the distinction between lobbyist/ advocates and targets. Some advocates express this as a focus on (inclusive) decision making processes rather than a focus on decision-makers.

A conceptualization of advocacy that explicitly does justice to these realities is due for ILA. To a large extent, the Alliances in this evaluation consciously work with such a conceptualization, whereas for some Alliances this is more tacit. It is important that donors and evaluators also shift the conceptualization to a more refined and elaborated understanding of the nature of and role of relations between CSOs, between CSOs and targets and other actors, as also the diversity, dynamics, and long-term nature of engagements and interactions.

**Recommendation 1: Funders and evaluators, and to some extent Alliances, need to approach ILA with an eye for the complex realities of governance, where the nature of relations between CSOs, decision-makers and other actors often defies a simple relation of advocates influencing targets, and where engagements and interactions are diverse, dynamic, and often long-term.**

#### *17.7.2 Working with Theories of Change*

The MFS-II programme did not specify that Alliances should work with Theories of Change. Some Alliances, such as the Impact Alliance and Fair, Green and Global did have a tradition of working with ToCs and did so in the programme, whereas others did not base their planning into a ToC. The Freedom from Fear Alliance worked on the basis of a 4 year strategic plan, and Together4Change did eventually formulate a ToC, yet continued to consider it an alien (donor-imposed) instrument. As the evaluation questions were using the idea of the ToC, these were reconstructed in dialogue with the Alliances in those cases where there was no ToC. Because the ToC was not a required element in MFS-II we have not incorporated judgments on the use of ToCs as a tool in the evaluation. Yet, as we have gathered insights on this use, we can spell out some (tentative) lessons learnt.

In general, we can state that programmes do not employ Theories of Change effectively for articulation, organization, analysis, action, reflection, and adjustment on the base of experience. Programmes that have used Theories of Change had either ToCs that were broad rather than specific, or in case of specific ToCs deviations through time were not explicitly entered into adapted ToCs. Having said that, we found that in several of the Alliances, the ToCs were used as a reference for discussing change.

We did find indications that an implicit way of working with ToCs, rather than explicit, could have some drawbacks in practice. Some examples are:

- In the Ecosystem Alliance there were different approaches, labelled rights-based and evidence-based. These were considered important differences, and markers of the identity of Alliance members, but they were not explicitly discussed and although the complementarity of the two strategies was generally assumed, their specific use was not incorporated in the story the Alliance was able to tell about itself.

- The Fair Green and Global Alliance had two members working on biofuels with very different ToCs: one centring on policy coherence and the other on the 'green myth' of biofuels. The two ToCs were used in parallel and considered complementary, yet also in this case the Alliance had not brought about an overarching story of how these two strategies worked together and perhaps could draw on each other for mutual effectiveness.
- In most programmes, few changes tended to be made in ToCs throughout the years. Rather than an indication of stability and unchanging environments, this was considered the result of ToCs tending to be generic and unspecific so that many assumptions and steps were not represented in them. While in some cases, changes were made, these were often not translated into explicitly changed ToCs. This means that the value of the ToC to be the basis of monitoring progress and underpinning the Alliance's narrative about intended outcomes, unintended outcomes and failed outcomes in response to changing conditions was often underutilized.
- In some Alliances, the fact that strategies were not spelt out in the ToC also resulted in a lack of communication within the Alliance. In the case of Together4Change, where the Alliance did not work with a ToC (or a related tool), we found that certain key functions of lobby and advocacy (including networking and the convening of processes) were not articulated, not known through the Alliance and hence not subject to strategic discussions among the Alliance partners.
- In the case of the Freedom from Fear Alliance, we found several informal divergences of the ToC, where the Alliance worked differently in practice than according to the story it maintained about the Alliance. This concerned, for example, the role of local strategy development, and the roles of the coordinating centre. Not having the routine of revisiting the ToC, had the result that these informal divergences were not discussed, and not brought into the assumptions about effectiveness.

We learn from these findings that Alliances will gain in effectiveness, in their ways of working, and in the ways they can plausibly claim their successes when they work more systematically with Theories of Change. Alliances all learn and adapt, yet they miss out some opportunities of improvement by not making these adaptations explicit and not adapting their ToC accordingly. This would have implications within the Alliance (making changes and strategies more subject to discussion) and in the relations with the outside world (having a more plausible story to tell about the (non-) achievements).

An important lesson stemming from the evaluation, is thus that ILA programmes could use tools like the Theory of Change in an active way throughout the programme: revisiting Theories of Change and employing these as tools for introspection. Taking steps back to reconsider assumptions, and incorporate lessons learnt, helps in adjusting programmes. This evaluation underlines the importance of applying a tool like the Theory of Change for advocacy in such a way that the sphere of influence remain subject to constant attention and assumptions remain in sights and are kept up to date.

That would enable programmes to find sufficient space for learning and adjustment in the face of experience. This can also contribute to more explicit consideration of, and reflection on, the relevance of certain outcomes in the light of programme objectives. This is especially important since impact tends to remain elusive for ILA outcomes as attained by the evaluated programmes. It would

also facilitate monitoring and evaluation specifically geared to the complexities and dynamic nature of ILA.

**Recommendation 2: Funders, advocates and evaluators can increase learning, and thereby effectiveness, by systematically working with and revisiting specific Theories of Change (or similar/related tools) as tools for developing and adjusting understandings and strategies.**

**Recommendation 3: Funders, advocates and evaluators can work with Theories of Change (or similar/related tools) for making explicit and assessing programmes' potential relevance in the light of constituency needs and priorities.**

### *17.7.3 Assessment of outcomes*

In this evaluation, we have sought to uphold a nuanced understanding of effectiveness that does justice to the realities of advocacy. Advocacy is often understood as long-term investment, with activities mostly consisting of steps towards desired outcomes, with agenda setting outcomes often understood as a step towards achieving policy influence or change in practice. In some cases influence may be seen as possibly taking more time, with 'failure' to attain influence not automatically needing to be seen as ineffectiveness. In some contexts and moments in time, simply being able to keep an issue in view, and a network functioning in the face of targets' reluctance, rejection or inattention can be an important achievement, involving a need for persistence even if a programme has little to show for on the short term. The fact that it takes time for relations to develop, for issues and networks to mature, for ILA to be learnt, needs to be taken into account. With ILA, there is often a time to sow and a time to harvest, and this in unpredictable ways.

It is important for advocates to incorporate process indicators in their monitoring, and avoid overly emphasizing results. Funding and evaluation cycles need to move away from a linear input-output-outcome approach to assessing effectiveness, and towards an approach that focuses on the qualities of programmes and processes and the ways they relate to the complex challenges of ILA. Internal and external monitoring systems and assessment needs to put more emphasis on organisations' capacity to analyse where strengths and opportunities lie for their programmes and the qualities of their acting on such analyses.

**Recommendation 4: Funders, advocates and evaluators should not establish effectiveness on the basis of achieved outcomes alone, but also on the merits of advocates' way of strategizing in the face of the complex challenges of the environment they operate in and seek to change.**

For the assessment of Alliances' contribution to outcomes, the evaluation team has done in-depth analysis of a limited set of outcomes. However, we learnt that contribution analysis in the context of ILA is so resource-intensive that we ran the serious risk of seeking rigour at the expense of other objectives of the evaluation. Instead, evaluators could consider aiming for more overview-like analyses of contribution.

While establishing contribution was often feasible in case of the priority result areas of agenda-setting, it was less doable for policy change or change in practice. Especially in international arenas involving multiple CSOs, targets and institutional levels, the more modest ambition of establishing plausibility for the claim of having contributed is often the more realistic option. We also learnt that the contribution analysis tool we sought to work with (see chapter 2) is not equally applicable in all situations and to all outcomes; building relations with civil society and targets, gaining access to a

relevant policymaking arena, or changes in a rather closed multi-stakeholder arena, for example, do not easily lend themselves to such analyses, while often being highly important outcomes.

**Recommendation 5: Be realistic about the feasibility of contribution analysis for different types of outcome and adapt methods for contribution analysis accordingly.**

#### *17.7.4 How to enhance effectiveness*

The evaluation concludes that strategies in themselves cannot be judged as more or less effective. ILA is not a one-size fits all endeavour and each context and objective appears to require its specific mix of strategies. Often, strategies work complementary to each other. Organizational capacities, external factors and issue-related factors, all in diverse ways, contribute to explanations of success and failure. Success therefore cannot be equated with effectiveness, and failure can happen in spite of high organizational capacities. The evaluation thus points to the need to consider different factors explaining effectiveness, in their interrelatedness.

**Recommendation 6: To further effectiveness, funders, advocates and evaluators need to consider internal, external and 'issue-related' factors together. By this they can identify organizational and programme strengths and weaknesses, see where challenges lie and learn how to handle these.**

#### *17.7.5 Connecting 'global' and 'local'*

Alliances commonly invested in relations with civil society in the South. In some cases, choices of partners were based on the added value expected from specific actors, while in a few cases, considerations of inclusiveness and openness were more central to the development of networks. Programmes have contributed to giving a voice to Southern civil society actors in multiple ways. Relations took the form of different forms of support, learning, research and collaboration. Often this involved facilitation of interaction with targets: participation in meetings and the provision of local evidence (e.g. case studies) and testimony in Northern and international arenas. Support of advocacy in the South was less prominent.

Collaborations with Southern partners contributed to outcomes in important ways, and Alliances sought and often succeeded in developing relations, outputs and outcomes effective for the different actors involved. But this also turned out challenging. An important problem that needs to be acknowledged here is that the speed by which advocates need to act, and the autonomy they need in order to relate to targets and jump on opportunities effectively, may run against the requirement to keep on touching base with other actors within one's organisation and with partners.

A tension that emerges here is that of the reality or experience (among at least some Southern partners) of 'disconnect' between Alliance efforts and local realities or priorities in the South that we sometimes found. This also pertains to potential tensions between effectiveness looking to objectives in terms of policy change and longer-term benefit in the form of civil society strengthening in the South, also in light of legitimacy and effectiveness more broadly understood, considering the multi-level nature of issues and processes.

While relations and collaborations with Southern partners have been important for almost all programmes, we note that communication, collaboration and accountability structures in relation with Southern partners and constituencies have not been explicit issues for ILA under MFS II, or the Terms of Reference for this evaluation. While this does not imply that CFAs and partners were not

accountable to each other, this is a lacuna. Working with ‘partners’ as such is no guarantee for the constitution of a voice that reflects constituency views and priorities.

**Recommendation 7: To further inclusiveness of ILA outcomes, funders, advocates and evaluators need to make communication, collaboration and accountability structures in relation with Southern partners and constituencies integral to development, execution, monitoring and evaluation of ILA programmes.**

#### *17.7.6 Ownership and effectiveness*

The networked nature of advocacy often added to effectiveness. The diversity amongst Alliance members and partners was often fruitful, with different actors contributing different strengths and voices, leading to synergies and complementarities. However, the diversity of networks sometimes also brought about problems. The most important of these were focus and ownership – with these two often being in tension with each other. Acting in a focused and well-coordinated way furthers the attainment of result, and programmes often also sought such coordination. However, networked structures of ILA collaborations often do not easily lend themselves to the development of strategic coherence. At the same time, recognition of diversity and local ownership are crucial to making sure that results are inclusive in nature, especially considering that programmes often seek to advance the interests of Southern stakeholders. The objective of strategic coherence can run against this. Effectiveness and ownership can thus be at odds with each other, with potentially important trade-offs leading to sacrifices on either front in networks bringing together diverse actors. Balancing effectiveness and ownership emerged as a key tension in this evaluation (see Freedom From Fear Alliance for an in-depth discussion of this issue).

**Recommendation 8: Funders, advocates and evaluators of ILA need to explicitly address potential tensions between effectiveness and ownership in the development, execution and evaluation of partnerships and programmes.**

#### *17.7.7 Time-frames and effectiveness*

Articulating and conveying civil society voices, and achieving influence by this, takes time. In some Alliances, depending, for example, on the ‘age’ of the issue and the existence of potential partners and coalitions at the start of the MFS II period, achieving outcomes such as credibility and recognition took several years. Only after having achieved recognition will invitations for further collaboration and expressions of interest come.

**Recommendation 9: To further effectiveness of programmes, donors and advocates need to consider the time frames required to develop a credible voice, recognition and relations. As time frames often exceed project durations, this asks for medium- to long term visions and funding strategies.**

#### *17.7.8 Reflexive monitoring of efficiency*

All programmes under evaluation have systematic approaches to efficiency and accountability in place as part of their broader operations in which ILA is embedded. Activities for advocacy were accounted for according to these standard procedures. Our focus in the evaluation was how efficiency played a role in decisions and practices specifically pertaining to advocacy. While positively concluding that efficiency is well-considered and practiced by Alliances, we also observe that these considerations are not subject to systematic deliberation, or systematic evaluation. They are also not

brought into accountability relations. With resources scarce and with effectiveness holding no direct and self-evident relation to spending, result-orientation as much as accountability across partnerships would be well served by inclusive and reflexive monitoring of efficiency choices and their outcomes.

**Recommendation 10: The field of ILA would be well served by the development and use of inclusive ways to monitor, reflect on and account for efficiency choices and their outcomes.**

### **17.8 Lessons learnt and recommendations in relation to the design of the evaluation.**

With regards to this evaluation, we have two specific recommendations to take into account in designing future evaluations.

#### *17.8.1 Evaluation of programmes*

This evaluation took up 8 very different programmes, and was carried out by a team of 12 evaluators. While the diversity allowed the emergence of a number of cross-cutting insights, the requirements of consistency and coherence across evaluated programmes was very challenging and time-consuming. The grouping of the 8 Alliances in three Clusters was useful as a structure for the evaluation team, but the requirement to submit Cluster-level assessments was unproductive, in the view of the evaluation team. The Alliances within the Clusters and their programmes under evaluation were differing from each other so much that comparing them had little added value over comparing across the eight programmes.

**Recommendation 11: For (possible) future joint evaluations, devise a structure that does more justice to diversity and seeks to develop cross-cutting analyses in more productive ways.**

#### *17.8.2 Evaluation orientation*

The five evaluation questions and evaluation structure devised for this evaluation focus on assessment of effectiveness with most analysis taking place at the start and end of the funding cycle, which was not conducive to learning during the programmes. In hindsight, the evaluation team and the Alliances could perhaps have been more pro-active in incorporating a learning agenda. Nonetheless, inclusion of more learning oriented evaluation questions, and a more learning-oriented process structure, is advisable for future evaluations. Such a setup might also facilitate trust-building better than the present setup.

**Recommendation 12: To facilitate learning, evaluation design needs to be better tailored to learning ambitions.**





# Appendix 1. Documents and Websites consulted

## Ecosystem Alliance

### *EA Alliance documents*

Ecosystem Alliance. 2010. MFS II proposal Phase 1  
Ecosystem Alliance. 2010. MFS II proposal Phase 2  
Ecosystem Alliance. 2011. MFS II Baseline Assessment  
Ecosystem Alliance. 2011. MFS II Monitoring Protocol  
Ecosystem Alliance. 2012. MFS II Annual report 2011  
Ecosystem Alliance. 2014. MFS II Annual report 2013  
15 strategic internal documents  
12 planning documents  
4 internal reports (feedback from external/lobby meetings)  
3 meeting minutes  
1 letter to partners  
17 policy letters/position papers/presentations or letters to lobby targets/press releases  
13 research reports from EA member(s) or commissioned and published by EA member(s)  
9 submissions to UNFCCC

### *Websites*

IUCN NL: [www.iucn.nl](http://www.iucn.nl)  
Both ENDS: [www.bothends.org](http://www.bothends.org)  
Wetlands International: [www.wetlands.org](http://www.wetlands.org)  
RSPO: [www.rspo.org](http://www.rspo.org)  
RTRS: [www.responsiblesoy.org](http://www.responsiblesoy.org)  
NCIV: [www.indigenouspeoples.nl](http://www.indigenouspeoples.nl)  
EITI: <https://eiti.org>  
UNFCCC: <http://newsroom.unfccc.int>  
CBD: [www.cbd.int](http://www.cbd.int)  
UN-REDD: <http://www.un-redd.org/>  
SER Energieakkoord: <http://www.energieakkoordser.nl>  
World Water Forum: [www.worldwaterforum6.org](http://www.worldwaterforum6.org)

### *Case study documents*

Sawit Watch Project Proposal to EA, titled : To enhance capacities of CSOs and influence policy for better management of ecosystem, version 13 March 2012  
Concept note IC Projects : RSPO 2012, undates  
NCIV Eco Alliance Logframe Rev4, Aug July 2012  
NCIV Full Proposal Rev 2

### *Published books and reports*

Colchester, Marcus et al (2007) Promised Land. Palm Oil and Land Acquisition in Indonesia; Implications for Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples. Moreton-in-Marsh: Forest Peoples Programme  
Chao, Sophie and Colchester, Marcus (eds) (2012) Human Rights and Agribusiness. Plural Legal Approaches to Conflict Resolution, Institutional Strengthening and Legal reform. Moreton-in-Marsh: Forrest Peoples Programme  
Colchester, Marcus et al (2007) land is Life. Land Rights and Oil Palm Development in Sarawak. Moreton-in-Marsh: Forrest Peoples Programme  
Chao, Sophie (2013) Agribusiness Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Human Rights in South East Asia. Updates from Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, Timor-Leste and Burma. Moreton-in-Marsh: Forrest Peoples Programme  
Saptaningrum, Indriaswati (2013) Brief # 2 of 8: Republic of Indonesia in Chao, Sophie (2013) Agribusiness Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Human Rights in South East Asia. Updates from Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, Timor-Leste and Burma. Moreton-in-Marsh: Forrest Peoples Programme

## **Hivos Alliance, People Unlimited 4.1**

Hivos Alliance. 2010. MFS II Proposal. Phase I  
Hivos Alliance. 2010. MFS II Proposal. Phase II  
Hivos Bureau Externe Relaties. Annual Plan 2010 and Annual Plan 2011  
Hivos Management contract 2012  
Hivos. 2011. Climate and Energy Campaign. Final plan  
2 other/general strategy or planning documents

*Documents per project (Internal strategic or planning documents, publications, research, positions/lobby letters, official policy documents*

13 documents on Access to Energy  
36 documents on World Bank Energy Policy (case study)  
7 documents on EU policy  
21 documents on lobby in Uganda (case study)  
37 documents on 100% Green IT campaign

### *Websites*

Hivos: [www.hivos.nl](http://www.hivos.nl)  
EEPA: [www.eepa.eu](http://www.eepa.eu)  
UN initiative Sustainable Energy 4 All: [www.sustainableenergyforall.org](http://www.sustainableenergyforall.org)  
Green IT Amsterdam: [www.greenitamsterdam.nl](http://www.greenitamsterdam.nl)  
Nederland ICT: [www.nederlandict.nl](http://www.nederlandict.nl)  
Wise: [www.groenestroomjagraag.nl](http://www.groenestroomjagraag.nl)

## **FGG**

FGG Alliance. 2010. MFS II Application, Phase II  
FGG Alliance. 2014. Outcome descriptions for ILA by FGG alliance; trade and investment and agrofuels (15 + 43 p)  
FGG Alliance Annual reports 2011, 2012 and 2013  
FGG and members. Internal documents: project plans, lobby and advocacy plans, campaign plans.

### *Parliamentarian documents*

Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2011-2012, 2012-2013, 2013-2014 Vragen: many parliamentary questions about biofuels and land grab

Letters (4) to parliament by Minister Ploumen (2013), mentioning land grab

### *Websites consulted For FGG*

ActionAid: [www.actionaid.org/](http://www.actionaid.org/)  
Andes Info: [www.andes.info](http://www.andes.info).  
BothENDS: [www.bothends.org](http://www.bothends.org)  
Bund (Friends of the Earth Germany): [www.bund.net](http://www.bund.net)  
BusinessDay Live: [www.bdlive.co.za/](http://www.bdlive.co.za/)  
CE Delft: [www.ce.nl/](http://www.ce.nl/)  
Citizens Trade: [www.citizenstrade.org](http://www.citizenstrade.org)  
Client Earth: [www.clientearth.org/](http://www.clientearth.org/)  
Comhlamh: [www.comhlamh.org](http://www.comhlamh.org)  
Common Frontiers: [www.commonfrontiers.ca](http://www.commonfrontiers.ca)  
Council of the European Union: [www.consilium.europa.eu](http://www.consilium.europa.eu)  
Countercurrents: [www.countercurrents.org](http://www.countercurrents.org)  
Deutsche Bank: [www.db.com/](http://www.db.com/)  
Ecofair Trade: [www.ecofair-trade.org/](http://www.ecofair-trade.org/)  
Eenvandaag: [www.eenvandaag.nl/](http://www.eenvandaag.nl/)  
El País: <http://economia.elpais.com/>  
Energies Renouvelables: [www.energies-renouvelables.org/](http://www.energies-renouvelables.org/)  
EndsEurope: [www.endseurope.com/](http://www.endseurope.com/)  
Euro observer: [euobserver.com/](http://euobserver.com/)  
Euroactiv: [www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com)  
European Commission: [ec.europa.eu/](http://ec.europa.eu/)  
European Parliament: [www.europarl.europa.eu](http://www.europarl.europa.eu)

European Parliamentary Research Service: <http://epthinktank.eu/>  
European Voice: [www.europeanvoice.com](http://www.europeanvoice.com)  
Facebook: [www.facebook.com/](http://www.facebook.com/)  
FAO: [www.fao.org/](http://www.fao.org/)  
FGG: [www.fairgreenandglobal.org](http://www.fairgreenandglobal.org)  
Financial Express: [www.financialexpress.com](http://www.financialexpress.com)  
Financial Mail [www.financialmail.co.za/](http://www.financialmail.co.za/)  
Financial Times: [www.ft.com](http://www.ft.com)  
Flicker: [www.flickr.com/](http://www.flickr.com/)  
Forest Peoples: [www.forestpeoples.org/](http://www.forestpeoples.org/)  
Friends of the Earth Europe : [www.foeeurope.org](http://www.foeeurope.org)  
Friends of the Earth International: [www.foei.org/](http://www.foei.org/)  
Government of Ecuador: <http://cancilleria.gob.ec>  
Government of India, Min. of Finance: <http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/>  
Government of The Netherlands (rijksoverheid) : [www.rijksoverheid.nl/](http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/)  
India Times: [www.indiatimes.com](http://www.indiatimes.com)  
Jan Vos: [www.janvos.nl](http://www.janvos.nl)  
Just Investment: <http://justinvestment.org/>  
KLM: [www.klm.com](http://www.klm.com)  
Madhyam: [www.madhyam.org.in](http://www.madhyam.org.in)  
Milieudedefensie: [www.milieudedefensie.nl/](http://www.milieudedefensie.nl/)  
Myanmar Times: [www.mmtimes.com](http://www.mmtimes.com)  
Neue Zürcher Zeitung: [www.nzz.ch/](http://www.nzz.ch/)  
Nieuwsuur-NOS: <http://nos.nl/nieuwsuur>  
NRC Handelsblad: [www.nrc.nl/handelsblad](http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad)  
NWO: [www.nwo.nl/](http://www.nwo.nl/)  
OECD: [www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org)  
OECD Watch: <http://oecdwatch.org/>  
Overheid.NL: <http://wetten.overheid.nl/>  
Principles for Responsible Investments: [www.unpri.org/](http://www.unpri.org/)  
Public Eye Awards: <http://publiceye.ch/>  
Rabobank: [www.rabobank.com](http://www.rabobank.com)  
Reuters: <http://uk.reuters.com/>  
RSPO: <http://www.rspo.org/>  
Scribd: <http://www.scribd.com/>  
Seattle to Brussels network: <http://www.s2bnetwork.org>  
SOMO: [www.somo.nl/](http://www.somo.nl/)  
RNW: <http://www.rnw.nl/>  
RTLXL: [www.rtlxl.nl/](http://www.rtlxl.nl/)  
SER: [www.ser.nl](http://www.ser.nl)  
Special Rapporteur on the rights to food: [www.srfood.org](http://www.srfood.org)  
Stuff: [www.stuff.co.nz](http://www.stuff.co.nz)  
Sustainable Development Institute: [www.sdiliberia.org/](http://www.sdiliberia.org/)  
RVO: [www.rvo.nl](http://www.rvo.nl)  
The Guardian: [www.theguardian.com](http://www.theguardian.com)  
The Hindu: <http://www.thehindu.com/>  
Transnational Institute (TNI): [www.tni.org](http://www.tni.org)  
Tweede Kamer: [www.tweedekamer.nl/](http://www.tweedekamer.nl/)  
Twitter: [www.twitter.com](http://www.twitter.com)  
UNCTAD: [www.unctad.org](http://www.unctad.org)  
Uitzending gemist: [www.uitzendinggemist.nl](http://www.uitzendinggemist.nl)  
ViceVersa: [www.viceversaonline.nl/](http://www.viceversaonline.nl/)  
Vimeo: <http://vimeo.com/>  
Vrij Nederland: [www.vn.nl/](http://www.vn.nl/)  
Voxy: [www.voxy.co.nz](http://www.voxy.co.nz)  
Wilmar: [www.wilmar-international.com/](http://www.wilmar-international.com/)  
Youtube: [www.youtube.com/](http://www.youtube.com/)

ZDF: [www.zdf.de/](http://www.zdf.de/)

Zembla: <http://zembla.incontxt.nl/>

## **Impact Alliance**

Land governance track record (2014, May 26), Global influencing – cases intervention logic 3; Global influencing

Land governance track record (2014, May 14), NL influencing – financial sector

Oxfam International. (2011 May). *OI Economic Justice Campaign 2011-15, Operational Plan 2011-2013*, Final version. Economic Justice Campaign.

Oxfam International. (2011 May). *Land grabs, A Growing Scandal, draft v.3, June 1st 2011*.

Oxfam International. (2012, February). *Committee on World Food Security – Strategy, Final Draft*. Economic Justice Campaign.

Oxfam International. (2012, August). *GROW Land Freeze Campaign: strategy, signed off*. Economic Justice Campaign.

Oxfam International. (Several dates). GROW Land Grab Campaign, planning documents.

Oxfam International. (2011, May). Operational Plan 2011-2013, Final version. Economic Justice Campaign 2011-15.

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Oxfam International. (2011, May). Alliances Strategy, 2011-2013 Economic Justice Campaign 2011-15. Oxfam

Oxfam International. (2011, May). International Public Campaign (IPC) Framework, 2011-15. Economic Justice Campaign.

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Oxfam International (2011, November). GROW Campaign Architecture, Revised version. Economic Justice Campaign.

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Oxfam International. (Several dates). Meeting minutes with FBCs and investors

Oxfam Novib. (2012, February 23). Mini record Land

Oxfam Novib (2014, February 23). Mini record BtB

Oxfam Novib (2014, May). Track records land governance, 8 different foci

Oxfam International. (Several dates). After Action Reviews of UN CFS campaign, land freeze campaign, BtB women and cocoa spike, BtB land and sugar spike

Oxfam Novib. (Several dates). Funding agreements between Oxfam Novib and Oxfam International

Oxfam International (2013, November). External Assessment Behind the Brands.

Oxfam International. (Several dates). Behind the Brands Advocacy Strategy for several FBCs

*e-mail correspondences with lobby targets and allies:*

Oxfam Novib. (Several dates). Management letters

Oxfam Novib. (Several dates). Oxfam Novib Fair Bank Guide land Research; several updates

Oxfam International (Several dates). GROW campaign progress reports.

Oxfam Novib. (Several dates). Oxfam Social Media BtB land and women&cococa

Oxfam International. (Several dates). BtB ally updates, strategic plan and MEL

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Oxfam Mozambique and Novib. (Several dates). Documents related to the ProSavanah campaign in Mozambique.

## **SRHR Alliance**

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SRHR Alliance. 2010. MFS II Application, Phase II

SRHR Alliance. 2011. Revised MFS II Application

SRHR Alliance. 2012. Unite for Body Rights Programme, SRHR Alliance: Annual Report 2011

SRHR Alliance. 2013. Unite for Body Rights Programme, SRHR Alliance: Annual Report 2012

SRHR Alliance. 2014. Unite for Body Rights Programme, SRHR Alliance: Annual Report 2013

SRHR Alliance advocacy working group, 2012 Workplan

SRHR Alliance advocacy working group, 2011 monitoring document for the Netherlands MoFA

16 meeting minutes and notes, advocacy working group

18 parliamentary factsheets and other briefing materials

10 letters and other input to the MoFA  
7 internal monitoring documents  
6 copies of information sent by email to Southern partners  
3 SRHR Alliance internal memos  
3 press releases and public statements  
5 reports on international conferences, SRHR results achieved  
1 budget mapping 2011–2015  
1 draft SRHR Alliance position paper  
1 international training terms of reference and programme  
SRHR Alliance. State of affairs advocacy in the UFBR programme of the SRHR Alliance in Malawi. (Internal document)  
YONECO (2013) Media Networking and Advocacy Plans on Sexual and Reproductive Health. Zomba, YouthNet and Counselling (YONECO).

#### *Parliamentarian documents*

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Tweede Kamer, Amendement van de Caluwe en Ferrier. 21 November 2011  
Tweede Kamer, Amendement van Dijkers. 21 November 2011  
Tweede Kamer, Amendement van Hachchi. 21 November 2011  
Rijksoverheid, Focusbrief ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 18 march 2011  
Rijksoverheid, Wat de wereld verdient. Een nieuwe agenda voor hulp, handel en investeringen. 5 April 2013  
Rijksoverheid, Kamerbrief over Beleidsvoornemens Seksuele en Reproductieve Gezondheid en Rechten. May 2012  
Rijksoverheid, Beantwoording Kamervragen. 21 October 2014.  
Tweede Kamer, Focusbrief ontwikkelingssamenwerking. 18 March 2011  
Tweede Kamer, Nadere uitwerking van het beleid op gebied van seksuele en reproductieve gezondheid en rechten, en hiv/aids. 18 April 2011  
Tweede Kamer, AO Beleid op gebied van seksuele en reproductieve gezondheid en rechten, en hiv/aids. 18 May 2011  
Tweede Kamer, Schriftelijke vragen Hacchi over onveilige seks en extra bezuinigingen op seksuele en reproductieve gezondheid en rechten. 28 September 2011  
Tweede Kamer, Antwoord vragen Hacchi over onveilige seks en extra bezuinigingen op seksuele en reproductieve gezondheid en rechten. 7 October 2011  
Tweede Kamer, Amt. De Caluwé/Ferrier 33000 V nr. 32 beoogt via een toekenning van 8,0 miljoen euro aan artikel 5.4 de bezuinigingen die de regering heeft voorzien op SRGR/ Hiv-Aids te beperken. 21 November 2011  
Tweede Kamer, Amt. Hachchi c.s. 33000 V nr. 30 dat beoogt via een toekenning van 10 miljoen euro aan artikel 5.4 de bezuinigingen die de regering heeft voorzien op SRGR, hiv/aids en gezondheid te beperken. 21 November, 2011  
Tweede Kamer, Amendement van het lid Dijkers over het toekennen van gelden SRGR. 21 November 2011  
Tweede Kamer, Nadere toelichting op de middelen die gereserveerd zijn voor het speerpunt SRGR en het thema gender in de begroting van 2012. 22 November 2011  
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Tweede Kamer, Beleidsbrief 'Respect en recht voor ieder mens. 14 June 2013  
Tweede Kamer, Verslag notaoverleg over mensenrechtenbeleid. 30 September 2013  
Tweede Kamer, Lijst van vragen over begroting van Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (XVII) voor het jaar 2014. 18 October 2013  
Tweede Kamer, Verslag houdende een lijst van vragen over begroting van Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (XVII) voor het jaar 2014. 7 November 2013  
Tweede Kamer, Besluitenlijst van de procedurevergadering van donderdag 5 december 2013. December 2013  
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Tweede Kamer, Motie Van Dijk over rapportage over besteding financiële middelen op SRGR-gebied per organisatie. 6 March 2014  
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Tweede Kamer, AO over Meerjarige Strategische Plannen 2014-2017. 2 April 2014  
Tweede Kamer, Kamerbrief over hulp, handel en investeringen. 10 April 2014  
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All letters to parliament mentioning SRHR (SRGR) 2010–2014

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SRHR Alliance: <http://www.rutgerswpf.org/content/srhr-alliance-unite-body-rights>

CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality: <http://www.choiceforyouth.org/>  
 dance4life: <http://www.dance4life.nl/en/organisation/organisation/dance4life-international/>  
 Rutgers WPF: <http://www.rutgerswfp.nl/>  
 Simavi: <http://www.simavi.nl/>  
 FPAM: <http://www.fpamalawi.org/>  
 YECE: <http://www.yecemalawi.org/>  
 YONECO: <http://www.yoneco.org/>  
 Amnesty International: <http://www.amnesty.org/>  
 Association for Women's Rights in Development: <http://www.awid.org/>  
 ASTRA Central and Eastern European Women's Network for Sexual and Reproductive Rights and Health:  
<http://www.astra.org.pl/>  
 Civil Society Platform to Promote SRHR Beyond 2015: <http://archive.wgnrr.org/news/civil-society-platform-promote-srhr-beyond-2015>  
 EuroNGOs: <http://www.eurongos.org/>  
 Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development: <http://health.bmz.de/>  
 ICPD Beyond2014: <http://icpdbeyond2014.org/>  
 International Planned Parenthood Federation: <http://www.ippf.org/>  
 International Women's Health Coalition: <http://iwhc.org/>  
 London Summit on Family Planning: <https://www.gov.uk/government/ngos-beyond-2014>  
 NGOs Beyond 2014: <http://ngosbeyond2014.org/>  
 Partos: <http://partos.nl/>  
 PvdA: <http://www.pvda.nl/>  
 Rijksoverheid: <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/>  
 Tweede Kamer: <http://www.tweedekamer.nl/>  
 Population Action International: <http://populationaction.org/>  
 UNFPA: <http://www.unfpa.org/>  
 United Nations: <http://www.un.org/en>  
 Youth Coalition: <http://www.youthcoalition.org/>  
 Vice Versa: <http://www.viceversaonline.nl/>  
 WO=MEN in New York: <http://www.womeninnewyork.blogspot.nl/>  
 WO=MEN. Dutch gender platform: <http://www.wo-men.nl/>

### **Communities of Change Alliance**

In addition to the internal and external documents, we received through WLPS numerous valuable internal email communications and strategic documents and other information which is not public and which we used to verify and substantiate our the information received through interviews and other reports. Besides, we referred to the organizational mechanisms, IATI, Daisy and the organization scan, the financial manuals and guidelines. These are not included in the reference list below.

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<http://www.cordaid.nl/>

<http://www.wo-men.nl/>

<http://www.gnwp.org/>

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In addition to the internal and external documents, strategic reports, programme highlights and publications we refer to underneath, we received through ACPF numerous valuable internal reflections and strategic documents, formal and informal letters and other information which is not public and which we used to verify and substantiate the information received through interviews and other reports. Besides, we referred to the organizational statutes, statutes of the IBoT, Organizational chart and organizational policies such as the ACPF staff rules and regulations, gender equality policy, child protection policy, staff development plans and the financial manuals, guidelines and audit reports. These are not included in the reference list below.

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AMC: <http://www.africawidemovement.org/en/>

CSO Forum: <http://www.csforum.info/>

ACERWC: <http://acerwc.org/>

Childwatch <http://www.childwatch.uio.no/key-institutions/africa/>

ICS: <http://www.ics.nl/>

Wereldkinderen: <http://www.wereldkinderen.nl/>

### Freedom from Fear Alliance

In addition to the internal and external documents, strategic reports, outcome reports and publications we refer to underneath, we received through GPPAC numerous valuable internal reflections and strategic documents, formal and informal letters and other information which is not public and which we used to verify and substantiate our the information received through interviews and other reports. Overall we reviewed over 300 documents and the list below might thus not entail all documents studied. Besides, we referred to the internal organizational structures and statutes which are not included in the reference list below.

GPPAC Strategic Plan 2011-2015

GPPAC Board meeting notes 2011-2014

13 GPPAC Regional Annual Plans 2011-2012

30 GPPAC Regional Annual Plans 2013-2014

12 GPPAC Regional Long Terms Plans

5 GPPAC Program Annual Plans 2011-2012

5 GPPAC Program Annual Plans 2013

45 GPPAC Regional Reports 2011-2013

5 GPPAC Reports Subprograms 2011-2013

2 GPPAC back to office reports by the Programme Manager Policy and Advocacy

GPPAC Staff October 2011 (overview)

GPPAC PME Cycles Explained with Additions

GPPAC Organization Chart GS 2012 with Latest Changes

GPPAC database on activities, outputs and outcomes 2011-2014

GPPAC email exchanges with targets and with members over the period 2011-2014

GPPAC internal presentations  
GPPAC internal (Global Secretariat and network) meeting reports  
GPPAC documents prepared for internal (Global Secretariat and network) meetings  
GPPAC accountants' report  
GPPAC evaluation 2006-2011  
Reports of GPPAC/PAX meetings concerning the Freedom From Fear Alliance  
8 IKV PAX internal documents  
Freedom From Fear MFS II Application 2010  
Freedom From Fear Annual Reports 2011-2014  
Freedom From Fear Financial Reports 2011-2014  
Freedom From Fear Annual Plan 2013 Trends Developments Program 4  
Freedom From Fear revised Results Table Program 4  
Letter to Ms. Keita from the President of the General Assembly, 2 June 2014

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Adam J., B. Verbrugge, D. van den Boer (2014) 'Hybrid systems of conflict management and community-level efforts to improve local security in Mindanao', in: *Theories in practice series Asia Foundation*, March 2014.  
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GPPAC (2014). *Position Paper on the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. GPPAC Policy Note*  
International Alert (2014) 'Mindanao's shadow economies, minimising risks, maximising peace dividends', Policy brief April 2014.  
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World Vision et al. (2014). *Open letter to members of the UN Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals: effective targets to promote sustainable peace*.

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[www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/en/](http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/en/)  
[www.ikvpaxchristi.org](http://www.ikvpaxchristi.org)  
[www.humansecurityfirst.org](http://www.humansecurityfirst.org)  
[www.breakingthenuclearchain.org](http://www.breakingthenuclearchain.org)  
<http://unocha.org/humansecurity/>  
<http://www.iidnet.org/>  
<http://www.international-alert.org/>  
<http://www.quno.org/>  
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Speech Sharon Bhagwan Rolls, Femlink Pacific, 24 April 2014, UN GA debate on post-2015 development agenda, online

reference: [http://www.peaceportal.org/web/taking-women-beyond-1325/blogs/-/blogs/-ensuring-stable-and-peaceful-societies-statement-during-the-un-general-assembly-debate-on-the-post-2015-development-agenda-by-sharon-bhagwan-rolls?\\_33\\_redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.peaceportal.org%2Fweb%2Ftaking-women-beyond-1325%2Fblogs%3Fp\\_p\\_id%3D33%26p\\_p\\_lifecycle%3D0%26p\\_p\\_state%3Dnormal%26p\\_p\\_mode%3Dview%26p\\_p\\_col\\_id%3Dcolumn-1%26p\\_p\\_col\\_count%3D1](http://www.peaceportal.org/web/taking-women-beyond-1325/blogs/-/blogs/-ensuring-stable-and-peaceful-societies-statement-during-the-un-general-assembly-debate-on-the-post-2015-development-agenda-by-sharon-bhagwan-rolls?_33_redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.peaceportal.org%2Fweb%2Ftaking-women-beyond-1325%2Fblogs%3Fp_p_id%3D33%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-1%26p_p_col_count%3D1)

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## Appendix 2 Interview respondents

Ecosystem Alliance		
Organization	Name Contact Person	Year(s) interviewed
IUCN NL	Rob Glastra – PME officer, EA IC Coordinator Theme 1	2012, 2013, 2014
IUCN NL	Henk Simons – Coordinator EA International Component, Coordinator EA IC Theme 2, contact person for Flaws of economic system	2012, 2013, 2014
IUCN NL	Evelien van den Broek – Contact person for case study on Indonesia/PO (via email)	2013, 2014
IUCN NL	Heleen van den Hombergh – contact person for Soy	2014
IUCN NL	Marieke Hartevelde - contact person for Biomass NL	2014
IUCN NL	Mark van der Wal – contact person for Mining	2014
IUCN NL	Jan Willem den Besten – contact person for REDD+	2014
IUCN NL	Joost van Montfort – on efficiency	2014
IUCN NL	Cas Besslink – on efficiency	2014
Both ENDS	Annelieke Douma – Cluster coordinator water and EA Coordinator Theme 3b	2012
Both ENDS	Paul Wolvekamp – contact person for PO/RSPO	2014
Both ENDS	Tamara Mohr – on efficiency (and via Heleen van den Hombergh on Soy)	2014
Wetlands International	Chris Baker	2012
Wetlands International	Marcel Silvius – contact person for Biofuels EU and for PO/pulp/peatlands	2014
Wetlands International	Susanna Tol – contact person for UNFCCC	2014
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Anonymous - Senior official	2012
WWF	Sandra Mulder - Senior Advisor Markets	2012
Groene 11	Anonymous - Public Affairs Advisor for Dutch NGOs	2012
IIED	Hannah Reid - Consultant to IIED	2012
Sawit Watch	Carlo Nainggolan - Head of Department, Environmental and Policy Initiative Department	2013, 2014
Sawit Watch	Maryo Saputra Sanuddin - Officer for forestry and coastal areas, Environmental and Policy Initiative Department	2013, 2014
Sawit Watch	Jefri Gideon Saragih - Executive Director	2013, 2014
Sawit Watch	Bondan Andriyanu - Head of Department Campaign	2014
Sawit Watch	Rambo Nurhanuddin Achmad	2014
Wetlands International Indonesia Programme	I Nyoman N Suryadiputra	2013
Wetlands International Indonesia Programme	Iwom In Calyo Wibsono	2013
WALHI (Friends of the Earth Indonesia)	Abetnego Tarigan - Executive Director	2013
WALHI (Friends of the Earth Indonesia)	Deddy Ratih - Bioregion and Spatial Planning Advocacy Manager	2013
AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara)	Patricia Miranda Wattimena - Officer on Human Rights and International Affairs	2013
RSPO	Imam A. El Marzuq - Taskforce on Smallholder & Dispute Settlement Facility Executive (via email)	2013
Netherlands Centre for Indigenous Peoples (NCIV)	Leo van der Vlist – Director	2013
Independent researcher	Teguh Surya	2013

Oil Palm Small Holders' Union	Darto Mansuetus	2013
Aidenvironment Asia	Erik Wakker – Director	2014
Independent expert	Claudia Theile – Former campaigner on palm oil and on biofuels for Milieudefensie (Friends of the Earth NL)	2014
Friends of the Earth Europe	Anne van Schaik – Campaign Coordinator	2014
Greenpeace Netherlands	Willem Wiskerke – Campaign Coordinator bioenergy	2014
Forest Peoples Programme (FPP)	Marcus Colchester – Director	2014
Transformasi untuk Keadilan Indonesia (Transformation for Justice Indonesia) – TuK INDONESIA	Norman Jiwan - Executive Director	2014
MVO – The Netherlands oils and fats industry	Eddy Esselink - Responsible for sustainable development within MVO. Also chair of the Taskforce Duurzame Palmolie in Nederland. Chairman of the Trade and traceability committee of the RSPO	2014
NL Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment	Rob Cornelissen – Directie Duurzaamheid (responding to issues of solid biomass)	2014
NL Ministry of Economic Affairs	Irene Mouthaan - Programmadirectie Groene Groei en Biobased Economy (responding to issues of solid biomass)	2014
Milieudefensie (Friends of the Earth NL)	Anouk van Balen – Campaigner palm oil, biofuels and biomass	2014

<b>Impact Alliance</b>		
<b>Organization</b>	<b>Name Contact Person</b>	<b>Year(s) interviewed</b>
Oxfam International	Kate Geary	2014
Oxfam International	Monique van Zijl	2012, 2013, 2014
Oxfam International	Marc Wegerif	2012
Oxfam International	Sasanka Thilakasiri	2014
Oxfam International	Nicolas Mombrial	2014
Oxfam International	Desire Y. Assogbavi	2014
Oxfam Novib	Marita Hutjes	2012, 2013, 2014
Oxfam Novib	Duncan Pruettt	2012, 2013, 2014
Oxfam Novib	Jacqueline Persson	2012, 2013
Oxfam Novib	Willemijn de Jongh	2014
Oxfam Novib	Tom van der Lee	2014
Oxfam Novib	Frank Mechielsen	2013, 2014
Oxfam Novib	Marlies Filbri	2014
Oxfam Novib	Harrie Oostingh	2014
Oxfam Novib	Adelson Rafael	2013, 2014
Oxfam Novib	Carmen Munhequete	2014
Oxfam Great Brittan	Erinch Sahan	2014
Oxfam Solidarité	Veronique Legeait	2014
Oxfam Intermon	Gloria Bigne	2014
Oxfam GB, West Africa Regional Management Centre	Mouhamet Lamine Ndiaye	2012
Oxfam Brazil	Simon Ticehurst	2012
Bank Information Centre	Jelson Garcia	2014
Oxfam Mozambique	Renaud Leray	2014
GAIN	Bärbel Weiligmann	2014
Solidaridad	Nico Roozen	2013
Solidaridad	Hans Perk	2013
Owl RE	Glenn O'Neil	2013, 2014
International Cocoa Initiative	Nick Weatherill	2014
UTZ certified	Han de Groot	2013
Centre for Development Innovation	Herman Brouwer	2013, 2014
Rights Action	Annie Bird	2014
CIEL currently SOMO	Kristen Genovese	2014
Directorate General International Cooperation	Frits van der Wal	2012, 2014
Periscope Advisors	Rachel Crossley	2014
Bretton Woods Project – currently UNDP	Peter Chowla	2014
Independent consultant	Frank van der Linde	2014
Sustainable Food Lab	Don Seville	2014
Executive Director WBG/IFC	Frank Heemskerk	2014
WWF	Sandra Mulder	2014
WWF	Nina Haase	2014
WWF	Richard Holland	2014
Greetje Schouten	Wageningen University	2014



International Land Coalition	Michael Taylor	2012
International Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism	Ashley von Anrep	2012
International Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism	Sofia Monsalve	2012
GIZ	Antti Seelaff	2012
Profundo	Jan Willem van Gelder	2012
TNI Netherlands	Sylvia Kay	2012
TNI Netherlands	Pietje Vervest	2012
TNI Netherlands	Jenny Franco	2012
BankTrack	Johan Frijns	2012
FIAN Netherlands	Camille Domici	2012
SNV	Joost Nelen	2012
WUR	Michiel Kohne	2012
Solidaridad	Marieke Leegwater	2012
EKN Mozambique	Celia Jordão	2012
MVO Nederland	Michiel van Yperen	2012
ROSA/ORAM	Abel Sainda	2014
ActionAid Mozambique	Márcia Cossa	2014
RADEZA	Daniel Maula	2014
Government- Zambezia	Paulo Cordeiro	2014
<b>Respondents online survey</b>		
TUC Indonesia	Norman Jiwan	2014
UNAC Mozambique	Vicente Adriano	2014
Oxfam Italy	Elisa Bacciotti	2014
Oxfam International	Simon Starling	2014
PACJA Pan Africa	Mithika Mwenda	2014
Oxfam Novib Mozambique	Adelson Rafael	2014
Oxfam Novib Cambodia	Chris Eijkemans	2014
Oxfam Novib Pakistan	Javeria Afzal	2014
SCOPE Pakistan	Tanveer Arif	2014
Oxfam International	Kate Geary	2014

<b>Fair, Green and Global Alliance</b>		
<b>Organization</b>	<b>Name Contact Person</b>	<b>Year(s) interviewed</b>
ActionAid Netherlands	Barbara van Paassen – Policy Advisor	2012, 2014
Both ENDS	Burkhard Ilge – Program officer	2012, 2014
	Lieke Ruimschoot – PME officer FGG Alliance	2012, 2014
Friends of the Earth Europe	Natacha Cingotti	2014
Greenpeace Netherlands	Willem Wiskerke – Campaigner biofuels/bioenergy	2012
Milieudefensie	Valentijn van 't Riet – Secretary of the International Campaign	2012, 2014
	Claudia Theile – Campaigner biofuels/bioenergy and palm oil	2012
	Anouk van Baalen – Program officer	2014
LEI	Dr. Siemen van Berkum	2012
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Drs. J. Lubbers	2014
Rijks Universiteit Groningen	Prof.Dr. B.Bruin	2014
SOMO	Ronald Gijsbersen, Director	2014
	Roos van Os – Researcher	2012, 2014
Transnational Institute	Pietje Vervest - Coordinator of economic justice program	2012, 2014
Wageningen University	Dr. P. Oosterveer	2012, 2014
	Dr. G. Schouten	2014
University of Amsterdam	Prof. Dr. P.J. Kuijper	2014
University of Utrecht	Dr. G. Faber	2014
University of Leiden	Dr. J.A.C. Vel	2014
11.11.11	Marc Maes – Policy officer trade policies	2012

<b>Hivos alliance</b>		
<b>Organization</b>	<b>Name Contact Person</b>	<b>Year(s) interviewed</b>
Hivos	Eco Matser – Coordinator Climate, Energy and Development	2012, 2013, 2014
	Marieke Kragten – Advocacy officer	2012, 2013, 2014
	Manuela Monteiro – Director	2013
CE Delft	Maarten Afman – Consultant in the energy group	2012
Green IT Amsterdam Region	Jaak Vlasveld - Secretary and Program Manager	2012
Greenpeace NL	Sanne van Keulen – Climate and Energy Campaigner	2012
Wise	Peer de Rijk – Director	2012
SNV	Wim van Nes - Renewable energy network leader at SNV	2012
Practical Action	Helen Morton	2012
EEPA	Mirjam van Reisen – Director (per email)	2014
EvoSwitch Global Services B.V	Eric Lisica - Operations Director	2014
GreenIT	Maikel Bouricius (per email)	2014
Wise	Markus Schmid (per email)	2014
Bank Information Center (BIC)	Chad Dobson - Director	2013
	Alvin Carlos – Development director	2013
Sierra Club	Justin Guay - Associate director for the international climate programme	2013
Oil Change	Heike Mainhardt – Senior Subsidies Analyst	2013
World Resources Institute (WRI)	Athena Ronquillo-Ballesteros - Leader of WRI's Sustainable Finance work, since 2008. Is also Board Member of BIC	2013
US Treasury	One response on the questionnaire per email	2013
NL Ministry of Foreign Affairs	One response on the questionnaire per email	2013
East African Energy Technology Development Network – Uganda (EAETDN - U)	May Sengendo – Executive director	2014
	Jude Kabanda	2014
	Sarah Musoke – Financial Officer	2014
Makerere University Uganda	Moses Kiiza Musaaazi – Lecturer, Managing director, Technology for Tomorrow	2014
<i>Renewable Energy Option Ltd (Uganda)</i>	Christopher Kato	2014
Volunteer Efforts for Development Concerns (VEDCO, Uganda)	Christine Kaaya – Resource Mobilisation manager, Liaison staff on Land and Climate Change,	2014
	Charles Olweny Mulozi - Communication and Advocacy officer	2014
Gabula Atudde (Uganda)	Esther Chiwazi Asanga	2014
National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), Uganda	Kaggwa Ronald – Acting Director Policy, Planning and Information	2014
Civil Society Coalition Budget Advocacy Group (CSBAG, Uganda)	Julius Mukunda - Coordinator	2014
Climate and Development Initiatives (CDI) Uganda	Samuel Kabuye	2014
	Edward Nyakahuma – Programmes Officer, Climate and Energy	2014

<b>Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance</b>		
Organisation	Interviewee	Year(s) interviewed
<i>Netherlands Alliance members</i>		
AMREF	Thirza Bronner, Policy Advisor, SRHR Alliance advocacy working group member	2012
	Bertine Pries, Public Affairs Officer, SRHR Alliance advocacy working group member	2014
CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality	Paulien Boone, Partnerships Officer, SRHR Alliance advocacy working group member	2012
	Stéphanie van der Wijk, Partnerships Officer, SRHR Alliance advocacy working group member (joined by Stéphan Hennis, General Board Member and youth delegate to CPD 47)	2014
dance4life	Susan van Esch, Manager Advocacy and Youth Involvement, SRHR Alliance advocacy working group vice-chair for 2012; chair for 2013; member for 2014	2012 2013 2014
	Sara Vida Coumans, Advocacy Officer, SRHR Alliance advocacy working group member	2014
Rutgers WPF	Hilde Kroes, Advocacy Officer, SRHR Alliance advocacy working group chair for 2011–2012; seconded to the MoFA as Policy Officer SRHR, ICPD and post-2015 Jan–Sept 2014	2012 2014 (Oct)
	Barbara Oosters, Advocacy Officer, SRHR Alliance advocacy working group member	2012 2014
	Yvonne Bogaarts, Advocacy Manager	2014
	Merel Heilmann, Advocacy Officer, SRHR Alliance advocacy working group member	2014
Simavi	Rineke van Dam, SRHR Advocacy Officer 2012–2013; Public Affairs Officer SRHR 2014; SRHR Alliance advocacy working group member for 2012, vice-chair for 2013, chair for 2014	2012 2013 2014
<i>Malawian partners</i>		
Youth Empowerment and Civic Education (SRHR Alliance partner organisation, Malawi)	Edward Chikhwana, Programme Officer	2012
	Lucky Crown Mbewe, Executive Director	2012 2014
	Chisomo Chonner, SRHR Programme Officer	2014
YouthNet and Counselling (SRHR Alliance partner organisation, Malawi)	Sewenthe Chipofya Mahwayo, District Manager, and Hughes Munthali, Project Officer	2012
	Charles Banda, Media Networking and Advocacy Officer	2014
Family Planning Association Malawi (SRHR Alliance partner organisation, Malawi)	Mathias Ghatsha Chatuluka, Executive Director, Chair of Advisory Council (joined by M&E Officer and District Manager)	2012
<i>Indonesian partners</i>		
Rutgers WPF Indonesia	Sri Kusyuniati, National Programme Coordinator, SRHR Alliance Indonesia 2011–2013; resigned in spring 2014	2012 2014
	Monique Soesman, Country Representative (joined by Ismi Wulandari, Programme Manager Coordinator; Nurul Agustina, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator; and Rinaldi (Inal) Ridwan, Communication Officer)	2014
Aliansi Satu Visi (ASV)	Sri Agustini (Ardhanary Institute) and Usep Solehudin (Yayasan Pelita), ASV Board Members	2014
PKBI, Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association	Inang Winarso, Executive Director (joined by Frenia Nababan, Advocacy and Communication Officer)	2014
Aliansi Remaja Independen (ARI)	Faiqoh, National Coordinator, and Ryan Febrianto, Coordinator of	2014

	Research and Development	
<i>External experts</i>		
Netherlands MoFA	Desirée Ooft, MoFA staff, Social Development Department, Health and AIDS Division	2012
	Lily Talapessy, Former MoFA staff, Social Development Department (UNFPA staff at time of interview)	2012
	Marijke Wijnroks, Senior Health and HIV/AIDS Advisor of the MoFA, AIDS Ambassador of the Netherlands	2012
UNFPA Indonesia	Riznawaty Imma Aryanty Batubara, Temporary National Programme Officer on Reproductive Health	2014
UNFPA Malawi	Dorothy Nyasulu, Assistant Representative	2012 2014
USAID Malawi	Lilly Banda, Deputy Health Team Leader	2014
	Ruth Madison, Health Population Nutrition Officer	2014
	Veronica Chipeta Chirwa, Family Planning and Reproductive Health Specialist	2014
Malawi Ministry of Economic Planning and Development	Isaac Dambula, Chief Economist (Population and Development)	2014
External CSO (general)	Koos de Bruijn, Advocacy Manager, Partos	2014
External CSO (focus on HIV/AIDS)	Moniek van der Kroef, Policy advisor for the AIDS Fund: STOP AIDS NOW!, member of Share-Net	2012
External CSO (focus on gender)	Joni van de Sand, Senior Policy Officer, WO=MEN Dutch Gender Platform (until July 2014); Global Advocacy Coordinator, MenEngage	2014
External CSO (focus on SRHR)	Neha Sood, Advocacy and Policy Officer, Action Canada for Population and Development	2014
	Katie Lau, Project Coordinator-ICPD, International Planned Parenthood Federation (UK)	2014
	Inne Silviane, Executive Director, Yayasan Cipta Cara Padu (YCCP) (Jakarta) (former Executive Director of PKBI, until 2012)	2014
	Dyana (Vina) Hutadjulu, Programme Officer for SRHR, Hivos (Jakarta)	2014
Netherlands Parliament	Ewout Irrgang, Former parliamentarian (SP), spokesperson for finances and development cooperation, and president of the Multiparty Initiative on SRHR and HIV/AIDS	2012
	Riekje Camara, Secretariat of the Multi-party Initiative on SRHR and HIV/AIDS, formerly based in parliament; Currently Head of Policy and Spokesperson, Save the Children	2014
	Sara Murawski, Policy Advisor for Development and Finance (SP)	2014
Indonesian National Population and Family Planning Board (BKKBN)	Prof. Fasli Jalal, Chairperson	2014
	Nofrijal, Director of International Training and Collaboration (joined by three department staff members)	2014

<b>Together 4 Change</b>		
<b>Organization</b>	<b>Name Contact Person</b>	<b>Year(s) interviewed</b>
ACPF	Mr Theophane Nikyema - Executive Director ACPF (2013-current)	2013, 2014
	Ms Annalies Borrel - Program Director ACPF (2013-current)	2013, 2014
	Ms Sarah Guebreyes - (ACPF)Director, Program Monitoring and Operations	2012, 2013, 2014
	Mr David Mugawe - Former Executive Director ACPF (till 2013)	2012
	Ms Dorothy Rozga - UNICEF retiree and former interim Executive Director ACPF (end 2012-2013)	2013
	Ms Olivia Yambi - UNICEF retiree and former interim Executive Director ACPF (2013)	2014
	Mr Shimelis Tsegaye - Senior Policy Research Specialist, later Head Children and family	2012, 2013, 2014
	Mr Yehualashet Mekonen - Senior Program Manager – Family and Child Program	2012, 2013, 2014
	Ms Violet Odala - Head African Child Observatory (until 2014)	2012, 2013
	Ms Nkatha Murungi - Head African Child Observatory	2014
	Ms Belete Reth - Senior Project Officer (until 2013)	2012, 2013
	Ms Gamu Anifasi - Senior Program Staff, Law program	2013, 2014
	Ms Saba Lishan - programme officer	2012, 2013, 2014
	Ms Eskedar Beyene - Senior Office Manager ACPF	2012, 2013, 2014
	Mr Asteway Teshome - ICT manager	2012, 2013
	Ms Clemence Muzard - Resource mobilization and programme director assistant ACPF	2013, 2014
	Ms Patricia Martinache - Communications officer and Infohub ACPF	2013, 2014
	Mr Ashenafi Tesema - Publications Officer ACPF	2013, 2014
ACPF Board	H.E. Dr Joaquim Chissano	2014
	Ms Catherine Mbengue	2014
	Dr. Agnes Akosua Aidoo	2013
	Mr Per Engebak	2013
	Mr Hamid Tabatabai	2013
	Dr Benyam Dawit Mezmur	2012, 2013
NI Embassy Ethiopia	H.E. Mr Hans Blankenberg - (Former) Ambassador – until 2013	2012
	Mr Gerrit Noordam - First Secretary	2012
	Mr Bouwe-Jan Smeding - First Secretary of Health HIV/Aids started 2013	2014
	Mr Marius de Jong- First Secretary of Health and HIV/AIDS until 2013	2012, 2013

AU – ACERWC	H.E. Ambassador Olawale - Director, AU Department of Social Affairs	2013
	H.E. Mrs Bience Gawanas - Former Commissioner Social Affairs AU (until 2012)	2013
	Dr Johan Strijdom - Head of Division, Social Welfare, Vulnerable Groups, Drug Control and Crime prevention, Department of Social Affairs	2013, 2014
	Mme Mariama Mohamen Cissé - Secretary/Coordinator of the ACERWC, AU Department of Social Affairs	2013, 2014
	H.E. Mme Agnes Kaboré - former Chairperson, African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child	2013
	Dr. Benyam Dawit Mezmur - Chair, African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child	2012, 2013
	Mrs Maryam Uwais - Member ACERWC Principal partner, Wali Uwais, Barristers, Solicitors and Notary Public, Nigeria	2012
	Mr Cyprien Yanclo - 1 <sup>st</sup> Vice- Chairman ACERWC, Bénin	2012
African Wide Movement for Children	Mr Deogratias Yiga - AMC Coordinator – Uganda	2012
	Mr Léon Bertrand Enama - AMC Custodian Central Africa	2012
	Ms Stella Ayo-Odongo - former chair and AMC custodian and currently (2014) member to AMC	2012, 2014
	Mr Moses Adedeji - Executive Director Children's Rights Network and Custodian AMC Nigeria	2012
	Mr Bola Olanrewaju - Custodian AMC Nigeria, Director of Children Mobilisation, Campaign for Democracy (CD)	2012
	Mr George Nyakora - President AMC SOS Children's Villages Int'l Kenya	2012, 2013, 2014
	Mr MacBain Mkandawire - Custodian Malawi, Executive Director YONECO, Lilongwe, Malawai	2012
	Mr Mohamdou Lamine Cissé - AMC Custodian, representative Western Africa, Regional Director africa Office of Envarts International	2013, 2014
	Mr Eric Shemweta Guga - AMC custodian, Childrights Forum	2012
UNICEF	Mme Akila Aggoune - Unicef Rep to the AU and the UNECA	2013
Child Fund	Mr Thomas John Mc Cormack - Program Manager East/South Africa region	2014
	Ms Tenagne Mekonnen - Communications and Admistration Manager	2014
Ethiopian Center for People with Disabilities	Ms Yet Nebersh - Executive Director	2014

Uganda	Mr Anslem Wandega - ANPPCAN	2014
	Ms Connie Kekihebo - Former Executive Director of Katakemwa Cheshire Home	2014
	Mr David Mugawe - former director ACPF	2014
	Ms Helen Grace Namulwana - Save the Children	2014
	Ms Jessica Syenyonjo - Plan International	2014
	Mr Milton Muwuuwa - representing south Lganga in parliament	2014
	Ms Stella Ayo-Odongo - Executive Director Uganda Child Rights Network and former AMC chair	2014
	Mr Deogratias Yiga - Consultant and Former Executive Director ANPPCAN Uganda Government	2014
	Mr Kyateka Mundu - assistant commissioner in the Department of Youth and Children, Uganda Government	2014
Kenya	Ms Beatrice Ogutu - ICS Africa	2014
	Mr Dominic Lukorito - Nairobi based lawyer	2014
	Mr George Nyakora - President AMC	2014
	Mr Gilbert Onyango - Director and founder East Africa Center for Human Rights (EACH Rights)	2014
	Mr Ahmed Hussein - Director children's services, Government of Kenya; secretary National Council for Children's Services.	2014
	Mr Jared Ogeda - Research and monitoring Officer Parenting in Africa Network (PAN)	2014
	Mr John Njoka - pan-African child rights governance programme manager, Save the Children International; lecturer Nairobi University Institute of Development studies	2014
	Mr Luthur Anuku - Deputy regional director eastern and southern Africa, Plan International	2014
	Ms Marion Ouma - African Platform for social protection	2014
	Prof Dr Eusebio Wanyama - Partner in charge of education and training, Capacity Development Institute; member NGO Child Rights Committee	2014
	Ms Ruth Koshal - Senior programme manager Save the Children, East Africa Office	2014
	Mr Timothy Ekesa - Director Kenya alliance for the advancement of children (KAACR)	2014
	Ms Violet Odala - Regional Coordinator Child Rights Governance Initiative in Africa, Save the Children	2014
	Ms Garnet Maina - Policy and advocacy officer Undugu Society	2014
	Ms Florence Annan - Deputy Director Capacity development, Gender and advocacy Director, Girl Child Network	2014
	Ms Wambu Njuguna - Director of programmes ANPPCAN	2014



Mozambique	Mr Michel Le Pechoux - Deputy Res. Rep. UNICEF	2014
	Ms Carla Cangela de Mendonca Mussa - Child Protection Officer UNICEF	2014
	Mr Emidio Machiana - Partnership Officer	2014
	Ms Amelia Fernanda - Executive Director Rede de Crianca	2014
	Mr Rui Antonio - Information and communication manager Rede de Crianca	2014
	H.E. Dr Leonardo Simao - Executive Director Chissano Foundation, former Minister of Foreign Affairs	2014
	Mr Judas Xavier Massingue - Senior Child Rights Governance Program Manager Save the Children International	2014
	Ms Bettina Maas – Resident Representative UNFPA	2014
	Ms Astrid Bant - Deputy Res. Rep. UNFPA	2014
	Ms Deborah Nandja - Programme Officer youth UNFPA	2014
	Mr Ngugi Chege - Director Child Fund Mozambique	2014
	Mr Marco Gerritsen - First Secretary of Health HIV/AIDS, Netherland Embassy in Maputo	2014
	Ms Eleasana Antunes - Programmes officer for gender, HiV/AIDS and Social Protection, Netherland Embassy in Maputo	2014
	South Africa	Dr Ann Skelton - University of Pretoria Child Law Center
Dr Rosaline September - Chief Director Monitoring and Evaluation Government Department of Women, Children and People with Disabilities		2014
Ms Mary Mononela - Institutional support and capacity development, Government Department of Women, Children and People with Disabilities		2014
Ms Sinah Moruane - Advocacy and Mainstreaming, Government Department of Women, Children and People with Disabilities		2014
Ms Moipone Buda - Acting CEA and Programme Director, Mandela Foundation		2014
Ms Anneck Ayong - Senior Management Advocacy		2014
Namibia		Ms Laura Cronje - Chief of Party Church Alliance for Orphans (CAFO)
	Ms Bernadette Harases - Life Line, Child Helpline	2014
	Ms Helena Andjamba - Director of Welfare services, Ministry of Gender Equality and child welfare	2014
	Ms Joyce Mukuti - Ministry of Gender Equality and child welfare	2014
Child Helpline Netherlands	Mr Ravi R. Prasad - Head of Policy and Research Child Helpline International Based in Amsterdam	2014
Humane Africa- UK	Mr Simon Fellows - Director	2014
OPRIFS Ethiopia	Mr Menelik Negussu - Operations Manager OPRIFS	2013
	Ms Zinash Bezabih - Country Director OPRIFS	2013
	Bahir Dar: Community Based Groups; self-help groups; youth and women Woreda and Kebele; Children safe houses	2013
OSSA - Ethiopia	Mr Mekdime Admassie - Senior Prevention Officer OSSA	2013
	Mr Baye Temesgen - Prevention officer Debra Markus OSSA	2013
	Debre Markos : Woreda of Women and Children affairs Community based groups; Self-Help Groups; The Children's Parliament; Kebele Women, Children Affairs	2013

	Officers and leaders in and around Debre Markos	
ICS - Netherlands	Mr Eric Roetman - Monitoring & Evaluations Officer ICS Creating Change	2012, 2013
	Ms Lis Ostergaard - ICS Senior Program Officer	2013
	Ms Maaïke Stolte - ICS Manager Child Program, 1 <sup>st</sup> contact ACPF programme	2013, 2014
SOS Kinderdorpen Netherlands	Mr Stefan van der Swaluw - Head Institutional Fundraising and Programmes, former ACPF Director of Programmes (2003-2006) ; Senior Advisor 2010-2011	2012
Wereldkinderen Netherlands	Ms Margot Klute - Program Coordinator T4C & regular projects	2012, 2013
PLAN Netherlands	(email contact) Ms Helen Evertsz	2013

<b>Communities of Change</b>		
<b>Organization</b>	<b>Name Contact person</b>	<b>Year(s) interviewed</b>
Cordaid	Dewi Suralaga – Policy Officer	2012, 2013, 2014
	Rens Rutten – P&M Coordinator	2012, 2013, 2014
	Cornelieke Keizer – Interim Director WLPS Cordaid (currently WO=MEN)	2012
	Erica Zwaan – Policy Officer Conflict Transformation Program Cordaid	2012
	Magreet Houdijk – Policy Officer WLPS Research and Development Cordaid	2012, 2013, 2014
	Jose Utrera – Program Officer Guatemala/Colombia	2012
	Madelon de Wit – Program Officer Burundi	2012
	Roos Wilhelm – Program Officer DR Congo	2012
	Frederique van Drumpt – Program Officer Afghanistan	2012
	Akinyi Wallander – Program manager WLPS	2013, 2014
	Mirian G. Torres – Finance officer Cordaid/WLPS	2014
WO=MEN	Elisabeth van der Steenhoven – Director WO=MEN	2012
	Anne Sophie Kesselaar – Policy Officer	2014
IKV Pax Christi	Nikki de Zwaan – Program Officer Gender IKV Pax Christi	2012
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Mirjam Krijnen	2014
	Hinke Nauta – Permanent NL Mission to the UN	2014
GNWP	Mavic Cabrera-Belleza – Program Director	2013, 2014
	Eleonore Veillet Chowdhury – Program Officer	2013, 2014
UNWOMEN	Natalia Zacharova	2013, 2014
	Sarah Douglas	2014
Conciliation Resources	Sanne Tielemans	2013, 2014
UK Womankind – GAP	Lee Webster	2013, 2014
Swiss MFA	Ursula Keller	2014
Afghan Women's Network Afghanistan	Various respondents	2014
EVE Organization for women development in South Sudan	Rita Martin – director	2014
Netherlands Institute Clingendael	Rosan Smits	2012
	Natalie Raaber – Independent consultant	2013, 2014
	Karen Barnes - independent consultant	2014
National Women's Network (Red Nacional de Mujeres)	Gloria Tobón	2013
	Beatriz Quintero	2013
Sisma Mujer	Claudia Mejia	2013
CIASE	Carolina Dávila	2013
Hypocaria	Graciliana Moreno	2013, 2014
Red Metropolitana de Mujeres	Jenny Carolina Rodriguez	2013, 2014

<b>Freedom From Fear</b>		
<b>Organization</b>	<b>Name Contact Person</b>	<b>Year(s) interviewed</b>
GPPAC	Paul Kosterink – Coordinator PME	2012, 2013
	Peter van Tuijl – Executive Director	2012, 2013
	Darynell Rodriguez Torres – Program Manager Policy and Advocacy	2012, 2013, 2014
	Kees Kolsteeg - Manager Finance	2013
	Marte Hellema – Program Manager Public Outreach	2013, 2014
	Jenny Aulin –Action Learning Program Manager	2012, 2014
	Zahid Movlazadeh –Action Learning Program Manager	2014
	Charlot Crockett – Network strengthening program manager	2014
	Gesa Bent – Gender program manager	2014
	Deniz Duzenli – Content manager	2014
	Gabriella Vogelaar – Programme assistent human security	2014
	Laura Ribeiro Rodrigues Pereira - advocacy liaison officer GPPAC in New York	2013, 2014
	GPPAC Regional Liaison Officers	Caroline Ndhlovu – NPI Africa
Petronella Mugoni – ACCORD South Africa		2013
Francis Acquah Junior – WANEP Ghana		2013, 2014
Andrei Serbin Pont – CRIES Argentina		2014
Rocio Eslava – SERAPAZ Mexico		2014
Aaranya Rajasingham – RCSS Sri Lanka		2014
Veena Singh Bryar – FemlinkPacific Fiji		2014
Ruby Rose Lara – IID Philippines		2013
Meredith Joyce – Peaceboat Japan		2013, 2014
Grace Ghaleb – PPM MENAPPAC Lebanon		2012, 2013, 2014
Igor Savin – NVI Caucasus		2014
Dragana Sarengaca – NDC Serbia		2014
GPPAC Regional Representatives		Emmanuel Bombande – Executive Director WANEP
	Ana Bourse – Coorindator capacity building CRIES	2014
	Malika Joseph Anila – Executive Director RCSS Sri Lanka	2013, 2014
	Sharon Baghwan Rolls – Executive Director FemLinkPacific	2012, 2013
	Augusto Miclat – IID Philippines	2013, 2014
	Yoshioka Tatsuya – Director Peaceboat	2013
	Fadi Abi Allam – PPM MENAPPAC Lebanon	2012, 2013
	Andre Kamenshikov – NVI	2013
	Ivana Gajovic – Director NDCMN	2013, 2014
	Catherine Woollard – Executive Director EPLO	2013, 2014
	Alvito de Souza – SIGNIS	2013

Other GPPAC members	Kim Jong Hun - Korean National Peace Committee	2014
	Kang Mun Ryol - Korean National Peace Committee	2014
	Vincent Azumah – WANEP	2013
Board members	Joris Voorhoeve	2013
	Mariska van Beijnum	2013
GPPAC founder	Paul van Tongeren	2014
WFM Institute for Global Policy	Justine Brouillard - UN Advocacy Liaison	2012
	Bill Pace – Executive Director	2013
	Jelena Pia-Comella – Deputy Executive Director	2014
Saferworld	Thomas Wheeler	2014
Pax	Erik Laan - Policy Officer Public Affairs PAX	2012
	Wouter Kolk - Policy Officer Public Affairs PAX	2012
	Alexandra Hiniker – PAX UN Liaison	2014
	Rene Schoenmakers – P&M Coordinator FFF	2012
World Vision	James Cox	2014
Quakers UN	Andrew Tomlinson - director	2014
KROC	Kristen Wall - former KROC staff/independent consultant	2014
UN NGLS	Susan Alzner – Officer in Charge	2014
Post-2015 Women’s Coalition	Selamawit Tesfaye	2014
NL Permanent Mission to UN	Hinke Nauta	2013
PBSO (UN)	Henk Jan Brinkman	2014
UNHS Unit	Mehrnaz Mostafavi – Officer in Charge	2014
UNDP	Gay Rosenblum Kumar	2014
	Ozonnia Ojielo	2014
2014 Case study SEA		
CODE NGO - MINCODE	Pat Serenas – director and chairperson	2014
SUCCEED	Joselito ‘Pen Pen’ Libres - president	2014
ZABIDA University Zamboanga	Grace Rebollos	2014
Peacebuilder community Phil.	Dan Patoja – chief executive director	2014
CBCS	Guiamel Alim - chairperson	2014
AGONG	Tony Apat - chairperson	2014
UNYPAD	Rahib Kudto - president	2014
	Datuan Magon – vice president	2014
	Yusoph Lumamban - chairperson	2014
ARMM	Lisa Atim – executive secretary	2014
Centre for Peace Education	Loreta Castro	2014
GZO -WPP	Karen Tanada – executive director	2014
SEACA	Corinna Lopa – regional coordinator	2014
	Joey Dimaandal – program associate	2014
AER	Jenina Joy Chavez	2014
PAZ	Father Angel Calvo - president	2014
Independent consultant	Ed Quitariano	2014
IID Manila	Malou Tabios Nuera	2014
IID Mindanao	Ruby Rose Lara	2014

IID	Augusto Miclat	2014
Women Legal Bureau Manila Quezon City Philippines	Mdm. Chang	2014
Mindanao CSO	Gerardo Gamboha	2014
Asia Foundation	Derkie Alfonso	2014
Cordaid	Mariet Mulders	2014
CRS	Myla Leguro	2014
KIO Burma	Khon Jar Koon – civilian member of technical advisory team of the Kahin independence organization	2014
Suaram Malaysia	Arumugam Kalimuthu	2014
KSI – Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosae	Antero Benedito da Silva	2014
Peacebuilding Institute Indonesia	Ichsan Malilk	2014
Muslim student federation of Thailand	Azhar Sarimachi	2014
NDI Cambodia	Kimsrun Chiv	2014
Community leaders Mindanao Phillippines	Datu Al Saliling	2014
	Timuay Alim Bandara	2014
OPAPP	Secretary Teresita Quintos-Deles	2014
	Johaira Jalijali	2014
Vice chair MILF	Ghazali Jaafar	2014
CSOs	Numerous Bangsamoro CSOs	2014
List of Meetings and GPPAC staff meetings:		
GPPAC	Regular meetings with: Paul Kosterink – Coordinator PME; Peter van Tuijl – Executive Director	2012-2013-2014
GPPAC/PAX	Feedback meeting after baseline report: GPPAC: Paul Kosterink – Coordinator PME; Peter van Tuijl – Executive Director; from PAX: Erik Laan – Policy Officer; Wouter Kolk – Policy Officer; Rene Schoenmakers – PME Coordinator	2013
	Meetings with several GPPAC staff	2012-2014
	GPPAC UNITAR Geneva Meeting	2013
	GPPAC Regional Steering Group Meeting The Hague	2013
	GPPAC Programme Steering Group Meeting The Hague	2013
	GPPAC Regional Liaison Officer Meeting The Hague	2013
	GPPAC International Steering Group Meeting Ghana	2013
	GPPAC Regional Steering Group Meeting The Hague	2014
	GPPAC Programme Steering Group Meeting The Hague	2014
	GPPAC Regional Liaison Officer Meeting The Hague	2014
	Several GPPAC lobby meetings in New York	2013-2014
	GPPAC Gender Liaison Meeting in New York	2013

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup>Both academic (COM, HAR, SDC, ECS, HSO) and research (Centre for Development Innovation) components of Wageningen UR contributed to the report.

<sup>2</sup> Coffman, J. (2011). Revolutionary lessons about interim outcomes. *Advocacy evaluation update*, 11(Summer), 1–2.

<sup>3</sup> Morariu J. and Brennan, K. (2009). Effective advocacy evaluation: the role of funders. *The Foundation Review*, 13, 100.

<sup>4</sup> Hudson, Alan (2001) 'NGOs' transnational advocacy networks: from 'legitimacy' to 'political responsibility'? *Global Networks*, 1(4), 331–352; Teles, S. and Schmitt, M. (2011). *The elusive craft of evaluating advocacy*. Stanford Social Innovation Review, May; Keck, M. E. and Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists beyond borders*. New York Cornell University Press; Ringsing, B. and Leeuwis, C. (2008). 'Learning about advocacy: a case-study of challenges, everyday practices and tensions. *Evaluation*, 14(4), 413–436.

<sup>5</sup> Morariu J. and Brennan, K. (2009). Effective advocacy evaluation: the role of funders. *The Foundation Review*, 13, 100.

<sup>6</sup> Teles, S. and Schmitt, M. (2011). *The elusive craft of evaluating advocacy*. Stanford Social Innovation Review, May; Ringsing, B., and Leeuwis, C. (2008). Learning about Advocacy A Case-Study of Challenges, Everyday Practices and Tensions. *Evaluation*, 14(4), 413–436.

<sup>7</sup> Systems thinking or a systemic approach takes complexity into account, trying to unravel the 'systems' that perpetually change the context through which lobbying and advocacy organisations seek to exert their influence. A system is constituted by its elements, that is, all the parts that make up the whole; the links between the parts, that is, the process and interrelationships that hold the parts together in view of the whole; and its boundary, that is, the limit that determines what is inside and outside. Williams, B., & Hummelbrunner, R. (2010). *Systems concepts in action: a practitioner's toolkit*. Stanford University Press.

<sup>8</sup> Wong, W. H. (2012). *Internal affairs: How the structure of NGOs transforms human rights*. Cornell University Press; Risse, T. (2002). Transnational actors and world politics, in Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and Simmons, B. (eds.), *Handbook of international relations*, London et al., Sage, pp. 255–274; Keck, M. E., and Sikkink, K. (1999). Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. *International Social Science Journal*, 51(159), 89–101.

<sup>9</sup> Hudson, A. (2001). NGOs' transnational advocacy networks: from 'legitimacy' to 'political responsibility'? *Global Networks*, 1(4), 331–352.

<sup>10</sup> Coates, B. and David, R. (2002). Learning for change: the art of assessing the impact of advocacy Work. *Development in practice*, vol. 12, no. 3–4, August, 530–541; Hudson, A. (2001). NGOs' transnational advocacy networks: from 'legitimacy' to 'political responsibility'? *Global Networks*, 1(4), 331–352.

<sup>11</sup> Keck, M. E., and Sikkink, K. (1999). Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. *International Social Science Journal*, 51(159), 89–101; Keck, M. E. and Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists beyond borders*. New York Cornell University Press.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Teles, S. and Schmitt, M. (2011). *The elusive craft of evaluating advocacy*. Stanford Social Innovation Review, May.; Risse, T. (2002). Transnational actors and world politics, in Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and Simmons, B. (eds.), *Handbook of international relations*, London et al., Sage, pp. 255–274.

<sup>13</sup> See for example: IOB Evaluations. (2007). *Chatting and playing chess with policy makers*. The Hague: IOB

<sup>14</sup> See: ECDPM (2012) Policy and management insights. The road to the 2014 summit. Challenges for Africa-EU relations in 2013. Maastricht: ECDPM; Van Houtum, H and Van Vugt, J. (eds.). (2012) *Eerlijke nieuwe wereld. Voorbij de grenzen van de natiestaat*, p. 23–50. Nijmegen: Klement; Kremer, M., Lieshout van, P and, Went, R (eds.). (2009). *Doing Good or doing better. Development policies in a globalizing world*. The Hague: WRR; See for debates on shifting development paradigm: The Broker (2012). *Special report. The Future calling: A second life for INGOs*. Issue 28, March; Mosse D. (2005). 'Global governance and the ethnography of international aid', in: D. Mosse and D. Lewis (eds.), *The aid effect*, p. 1–36.

<sup>15</sup> Ringsing, B., and Leeuwis, C. (2008). Learning about Advocacy A Case-Study of Challenges, Everyday Practices and Tensions. *Evaluation*, 14(4), 413–436; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Schokland akkoorden (2007): one of the central themes here was to bring together the multiple stakeholders working in conflict-affected areas. Other sources are: Mosse D. (2005) 'Global governance and the ethnography of international aid', in: D. Mosse and D. Lewis (eds.), *The aid effect*, p. 1–36; Mosse, D. (2004). Is good policy unimplementable? Reflections on the ethnography of aid policy and practice. *Development and change*, 35(4), 639–671.

<sup>16</sup> Chandler, D. (2003). New Rights for Old? Cosmopolitan citizenship and the Critique of State Sovereignty. *Political Studies*, vol. 51, 332–349.

<sup>17</sup> Kremer, M., Lieshout van, P and, Went, R (eds.). (2009). *Doing Good or doing better. Development policies in a globalizing world*. The Hague: WRR; The Broker (2012) *Special report. The Future calling: A second life for INGOs*. Issue 28, March.

<sup>18</sup> World Bank. (2011). *World Development Report 2011: Conflict security and development*. Washington: The World Bank

<sup>19</sup> UNDP. (2011). *Human Development Report. Sustainability and Equity: A better future for all*. New York: UNFP

<sup>20</sup> See e.g.. Riddell, R.C. (2009). Does foreign aid work? in Kremer, M., Lieshout van, P and, Went, R (eds.). (2009). *Doing Good or doing better. Development policies in a globalizing world*. The Hague: WRR.

<sup>21</sup> [www.theoryofchange.org](http://www.theoryofchange.org)

<sup>22</sup> Vogel, I. (2012). Review of the use of 'Theory of Change' in international development. Review Report. London: UK

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Department of International Development.

<sup>23</sup>The NWO-WOTRO call for proposals defined the ILA work selected for each consortium as a 'programme'. Each of these programmes consisted of one or more 'projects'. In practice, the entities listed as 'programmes' or 'projects' differed extensively between alliances, and there was significant variation in how the Alliances themselves used these terms. To some extent, this variation in terminology will be reflected in the individual Alliance chapters. In the present chapter, and in all other chapters dealing with the evaluation as a whole, we use NWO-WOTRO's definitions.

<sup>24</sup>It is important not to note, however, that for three of the eight alliances under evaluation, only one project was listed per programme. In one case, this was because the alliance had identified one project in the selected programme as most suitable for evaluation. In the other two cases, the selected programme contained only one project. For the other five alliances, the selected programmes include at least two projects.

<sup>25</sup>The synthesis applies to Clusters I and III, each of which contained more than one alliance.

<sup>26</sup>One evaluator (working across Cluster III) combined her evaluation work with her PhD research on related topics, resulting in an additional time investment.

<sup>27</sup>Mayne, J. (2011). Contribution analysis: Addressing cause and effect. *Evaluating the complex: Attribution, contribution, and beyond*, 18, 53–96.

<sup>28</sup>This is broader than the OECD/DAC definition, which focuses on objectives leading to (intended) results, suggesting a causal relation. The OECD/DAC focus is on achieving policy objectives, whereas NWO-WOTRO focus is on achieving results, including those beyond policy objectives.

<sup>29</sup>Mayne, J. (2012). 'Contribution analysis: coming of age'. *Evaluation* 18: 270–280.

<sup>30</sup>Mayne, J. (2012). 'Contribution analysis: coming of age'. *Evaluation* 18: 270–280.

<sup>31</sup>For an overview of existing methods to assess efficiency, see Palenberg, M. (2011): Tools and Methods for Evaluating the Efficiency of Development Interventions. Evaluation Working Papers. Bonn: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung.

<sup>32</sup>ECPDM. (2011). Bringing the invisible into perspective. Reference document for using the 5Cs framework to plan, monitor and evaluate capacity and results of capacity development processes. Maastricht: ECPDM.

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- <sup>235</sup> Classen S. F. (2013, January). *Analysis of the Discourse and Background of the ProSAVANA Programme in Mozambique – focusing on Japan's role*. Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Retrieved from [http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/ProSavana%20Analysis%20based%20on%20Japanese%20source%20\(FUNADA2013\).pdf](http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/ProSavana%20Analysis%20based%20on%20Japanese%20source%20(FUNADA2013).pdf)
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- <sup>240</sup> Hongo J. (2013, May 9). *TICAD to redefine Japan aid to Africa; Decades-long economic slump means Tokyo has to change track*. Japan Times. Retrieved from <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/05/09/national/ticad-to-redefine-japan-aid-to-africa/>
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- <sup>242</sup> Respondents to online questionnaire.
- <sup>243</sup> Woolcock, S. 2007. 'European Union policy towards Free Trade Agreements.'
- <sup>244</sup> See e.g.: <http://www.nu.nl/economie/3842428/india-blokkeert-wto-deal.html> accessed 04-08-2014
- <sup>245</sup> Outcome 3.1 is 'International lobby [is] strengthened resulting in (at least) 4 Southern governments and 2 European governments taking measures to improve coherence between international trade and investment policies and development policies'.
- <sup>246</sup> The S2B network is the European part of the global 'Our World Is Not For Sale' network (OWINFS). It includes development, environment, human rights, women and farmers organisations, trade unions and social movements, as well as research institutes. See: <http://www.s2bnetwork.org/>
- <sup>247</sup> FGG also considers the cancellation of a Bilateral Investment Treaty an improvement in comparison with the continuation of existing BITs that are not considered favourable for Southern countries.
- <sup>248</sup> First generation biofuels: Fuels produced primarily from food crops such as grains, sugar beet, sugar cane and oil seeds.
- <sup>249</sup> This was the situation at the start of MFS II. Since 2013, it is: The Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation
- <sup>250</sup> Outcome 3.1 is: 'International lobby [is] strengthened resulting in (at least) 4 Southern governments and 2 European governments taking measures to improve coherence between international trade and investment policies and development policies'.
- <sup>251</sup> In August 2014, India announced that it would not sign the treaty because of food security issues (stock piling). In November 2014, India and the USA made an agreement on the issue (<http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/wto-impasse-over-india-s-food-security-concerns-taken-on-board-626921>).
- <sup>252</sup> ISDS: international arbitration and dispute settlement. ISDS is an instrument of public international law that grants a foreign investor the right to initiate dispute settlement proceedings against a foreign government (the 'Host State') - source: Wikipedia
- <sup>253</sup> *Jatropha* is a genus of plant. In 2007, Goldman Sachs cited *Jatropha curcas* as one of the best candidates for future biodiesel production. It is resistant to drought and pests and produces seeds containing 27–40% oil. The remaining press cake of *jatropha* seeds after oil extraction could also be considered for energy production. (source: Wikipedia)
- <sup>254</sup> [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc\\_151916.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151916.pdf)
- <sup>255</sup> South Africa considers these aspects to be in danger if it were to continue the BIT.
- <sup>256</sup> See e.g. the November 02, 2011 article in Der Spiegel, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/vattenfall-vs-germany-nuclear-phase-out-faces-billion-euro-lawsuit-a-795466.html>
- <sup>257</sup> Resource person C made the following comment: Bilateral Investment Treaties originally took weak juridical systems in developing countries as a starting point. In case of serious problems, an international company can use an international



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arbitration system. In some Southern countries it is still difficult to get a fair trial. But this is also the case within the EU. Romania and Bulgaria are under direct supervision of the EU and the situation in these two EU countries is still far from perfect, without using an ISDS system. So the criteria for whether or not using an ISDS system are not clear. In addition to this remark from the resource person the FGG Alliance argument should be considered that under no circumstances the current (unfair and expensive) ISDS system is a good system and a solution for a weak juridical system in a (Southern) country.

<sup>258</sup> Source: independent resource person D.

<sup>259</sup> However, there is (at least) one example of an EU policy where trade and aid were and are combined: the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) process which aims at stopping import into the EU of illegally produced timber. This process has been going on since 2003.

<sup>260</sup> Only a reporting obligation for the EC is included, not—as Milieudefensie and ActionAid had been lobbying for—the obligation to take ILUC into account in determining the CO<sub>2</sub> effect of a certain biofuel.

<sup>261</sup> To change a certain EU policy, three actors have direct influence: 1) the European Commission proposes a certain policy, 2) The European Parliament takes a position and 3) the European Council (the ministers of the member states) takes a position. Then, the Council and the Parliament have to come to an agreement. This process has already taken several years, and it is not yet finished. Each actor was and is a lobby target.

<sup>262</sup> Source: independent resource person B.

<sup>263</sup> Source: Independent resource person C.

<sup>264</sup> This section is based on observations made by resource person B.

<sup>265</sup> Since the visit of the evaluation team member, the military in Thailand seized power in July 2014. The committee has been dissolved because of the coup. There is no sign that the junta will re-establish it. For this reason, a few months back FTA Watch wrote a public letter addressed to the EC not to engage with the Junta.

<sup>266</sup> Success here would very much depend on existing regional cooperation between the governments. If all real decisions are taken at country level, at regional level you can hardly expect any outcome for lobby organisations. Compare this with the totally different situation in the EU where the 27 governments have handed over the power to make FTAs (with countries outside the EU) to the European Commission. Here indeed regional results are achieved by the EU. If NGOs influence the EU, they can achieve regional results.

<sup>267</sup> The State Forest Service Perhutani may have been the official ‘owner’ of the land, but it is quite possible that farmers have been using the land for centuries to grow food crops.

<sup>268</sup> <http://www.jatoilwaterland.com/> (accessed on 22 09, 2014)

<sup>269</sup> <http://law.leiden.edu/organisation/metajuridica/vvi/research/jarak/jarak/article-iias-newsletter.html>

<sup>270</sup> Based on an interview with resource person G. See also <http://jarak.iias.asia/>

<sup>271</sup> Largely based on discussions in a small group during the learning event for MFS II - ILA, 1 April 2014, Utrecht

<sup>272</sup> See [http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/trade-time\\_for\\_a\\_new\\_vision.pdf](http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/trade-time_for_a_new_vision.pdf)

<sup>273</sup> It is important to note that these are four out of a total of 25 capabilities identified.

<sup>274</sup> Certain terminology in this section on Hivos may be different from NWO-WOTRO terminology and from other Alliance reports. NWO-WOTRO’s Call for Proposals distinguishes between programmes and projects. What Hivos calls its 100% Sustainable *campaign* was selected by WOTRO as the *programme* for this evaluation. What Hivos calls in some formal documents *strategies* are called *projects* or *campaigns* in other documents and in the informal communication. This level is called *projects* by WOTRO. In other words, the unit of analysis of this evaluation are the projects (or campaigns). The two projects (or campaigns) under evaluation are Access to Energy and 100% Green IT.

<sup>275</sup> Sumba is a relatively unknown island in the Indonesian archipelago. The majority of its 650,000 inhabitants are poor, self-subsistence farmers without access to energy. On this remote island, Hivos decided to develop an ambitious plan to provide the people of Sumba with 100% renewable, locally-produced energy by 2025, and make Sumba an iconic island, a replicable model for comparable areas in the world.

<sup>276</sup> <http://www.sustainableenergyforall.org/objectives/universal-access>. Sustainable Energy for All is a global initiative led by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to mobilise action from all sectors of society in support of three interlinked objectives to be achieved by 2030: providing universal access to modern energy services, doubling the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency and doubling the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix.

<sup>277</sup> International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook. At: [www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/energyaccessdatabase/#d.en.8609](http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/energyaccessdatabase/#d.en.8609)

<sup>278</sup> <https://hivos.org/news/who-research-underlines-importance-hivos-and-snv-biogas-digester-programmes>, and <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs292/en/>

<sup>279</sup> Hivos. 2009. ‘Duurzame energie als motor voor ontwikkeling.’, Hivos 2013 People empowering change. 100% renewable energy worldwide.

<sup>280</sup> SOMO and Rank a Brand. 2011. ‘Hoe groen is het internet?’

<sup>281</sup> CE Delft. 2012. ‘Vergroenen datacenters 2012-2015.’

<sup>282</sup> See MJA III and ICT Routekaart 2030.

<sup>283</sup> Case study 1: Reforming the World Bank Energy Strategy; A case study on Hivos Access to Energy Campaign. By Wolfgang Richert. Final report: March 2014.

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Case study 2: Stimulating national debate for pro-poor access to renewable and sustainable energy: Energy Network-Uganda's Advocacy for Energy Access Project. By Winnie W. Wairimu. Final Report, September 2014.

<sup>284</sup> [www.bicusa.org](http://www.bicusa.org)

<sup>285</sup> The Uganda case study did not implement this final step of (additional) contribution analysis.

<sup>286</sup> Not partners that were selected for this project or programme-specific partnerships are as such new partners for Hivos. Some are new partners and some are existing partners, but this partnership is new.

<sup>287</sup> Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Indonesia.

<sup>288</sup> Internal document BIC/Hivos (2010).

<sup>289</sup> Internal document BIC/Hivos (2011).

<sup>290</sup> Nine specific key criteria for the content of the WB's new Energy Strategy were defined.

<sup>291</sup> ICT Office is the branch organisation of more than 550 IT companies in the Netherlands ([www.NederlandICT.nl](http://www.NederlandICT.nl))

<sup>292</sup> Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland (RVO.nl)

<sup>293</sup> Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Indonesia.

<sup>294</sup> See: [www.se4all.org/2014/06/04/se4all-results-deliverables-partners-making-progress-1/](http://www.se4all.org/2014/06/04/se4all-results-deliverables-partners-making-progress-1/). Viewed in June 2014.

<sup>295</sup> This is the exact wording in the document: 'No new coal-based power generation projects will be financed in IDA-blend or IBRD countries. In those countries, the WBG will focus support more on renewable energy, energy efficiency and projects that lower GHG emissions, for which concessional financing is needed more than on conventional energy. In IDA countries, the WBG will consider supporting new coal power generation projects in strict compliance with WBG guidelines: when the project can significantly increase electricity access, reliability, or both; coal power generation is the least-cost option after incorporating externalities; and no concessional financing is available for more expensive, lower-emissions alternatives.'

<sup>296</sup> <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTENERGY2/EXTESC/0,,contentMDK:22477367~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:6297515,00.html>

<sup>297</sup> [http://www.pnowb.org/sites/default/files/SM\\_2011\\_PNoWB\\_Resolution\\_on\\_energy.pdf](http://www.pnowb.org/sites/default/files/SM_2011_PNoWB_Resolution_on_energy.pdf)

<sup>298</sup> US Treasury 2011.

<sup>299</sup> About €30 million.

<sup>300</sup> We distinguish between the following geographical levels: one or more Southern countries, NL, EU and Global/Intl. The latter includes global institutions such as the World Bank and international initiatives such as the UN SE4All.

<sup>301</sup> There are no hard data for the latter, but it is a plausible conclusion based on the other findings.

<sup>302</sup> Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Indonesia.

<sup>303</sup> Arensman, B., Barrett, J.B., Bodegom, A. J. van, Buchanan, K.S., Fernando, U., Hilhorst, D., Klaver, D. C., Mongbo, R.L., Rasch, E.D., Richert, W., Waegeningh, C. van, Wagemakers, A. & Wessel, M. van. (2013). *MFS II Joint Evaluation of International Lobbying and Advocacy: Baseline Report*. Wageningen UR, Social Sciences Group.

<sup>304</sup> MFS II proposal Phase I, Annex VI

<sup>305</sup> 'More sustainability' is not necessarily a 'SMART' objective but it is further described in EA's documents.

<sup>306</sup> See for example: [http://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/tana\\_seaplan\\_tcm9-312844.pdf](http://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/tana_seaplan_tcm9-312844.pdf)

<sup>307</sup> <http://www.unece.org/env/water/>

<sup>308</sup> See for example: <http://www.unece.org/index.php?id=34460>

<sup>309</sup> <http://www.cbd.int/traditional/>

<sup>310</sup> The EA informed the evaluation team that during the COP12 (Conference of Parties in October 2014) this action plan was adopted by the COP, which makes this in fact a new outcome of higher relevance. But as this change happened after 01 October 2014, it is not within the evaluation period anymore and the evaluation team has not checked this fact and not taken this change into account further on in this report.

<sup>311</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/internal\\_market/accounting/non-financial\\_reporting](http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/non-financial_reporting)

<sup>312</sup> Kamp, H. (2014). Meer waarde uit biomassa door cascadering. 18 June 2014.

<sup>313</sup> Rutte, M. & Samsom, D. (2012). *Bruggen slaan: Regeerakkoord VVD - PvdA*. 29 oktober 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.kabinetsformatie2012.nl/actueel/documenten/regeerakkoord.html>

<sup>314</sup> See also: Brinkmann, A. (2014). *Biomassa als grondstof of als brandstof. Praktijkvoorbeelden van ongewenste concurrentie om Nederlandse biomassaströmen*. Brinkmann Consultancy. Commissioned and published by Greenpeace Nederland, Stichting Natuur & Milieu, IUCN NL and Wereld Natuur Fonds (WWF NL).

<sup>315</sup> SER (2013). *Energy agreement for Sustainable Growth*. Retrieved from [www.ser.nl](http://www.ser.nl)

<sup>316</sup> Amendment number unknown and source not verified: European Parliament legislative resolution of 11 September 2013 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 98/70/EC relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (COM(2012)0595 – C7-0337/2012 – 2012/0288(COD)).

<sup>317</sup> Source unknown and not verified.

<sup>318</sup> See [www.rspo.org](http://www.rspo.org). See also for example:

RSPO (2012). RSPO Dispute Settlement Facility (DSF). Framework, Terms of Reference and Protocol. January 2012.

RSPO (2013). RSPO Dispute Settlement Facility; Strategic Plan 2013 – 2015/Business Plan. November 2013.

<sup>319</sup> The last sentence was added because of a suggestion of EA in comments to the 06012015 Draft version of this evaluation report. The evaluation team finds this addition plausible but it is not included in the interviews and other forms

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of triangulation.

<sup>320</sup> Several informants. See also: RSPO (2013). *Dispute Settlement Facility; Case Updates*. Report. October 2013.

<sup>321</sup> [www.rspo.org](http://www.rspo.org)

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[http://www.rspo.org/file/RSPO%20P&C2013\\_with%20Major%20Indicators\\_Endorsed%20by%20BOG\\_FINAL\\_A5\\_25thApril2014.pdf](http://www.rspo.org/file/RSPO%20P&C2013_with%20Major%20Indicators_Endorsed%20by%20BOG_FINAL_A5_25thApril2014.pdf)

<sup>323</sup> All information from WI staff.

<sup>324</sup> See RTRS standard at: <http://www.responsiblesoy.org/documentos/rtrs-standard-for-responsible-soy-production-pdf/>

<sup>325</sup> Both ENDS is staffing the secretariat of this NGO coalition for over 10 years).

<sup>326</sup> Statement from EA staff. No specific data provided.

<sup>327</sup> See for example: IUCN NL, Both ENDS, Wetlands International et al. (2014). *Zorg m.b.t. behalen doelstelling 100% verantwoorde soja in 2015*. Letter to members of Dutch parliamentary commission on economic affairs and commission on foreign trade and development cooperation. IUCN NL, Both ENDS, Wetlands International, Oxfam Novib, Natuur&Milieu, Solidaridad and WWF NL. 17 June 2014.

See also: Soy Barometer 2012, Soy Barometer 2013, Soy Barometer 2014. On: [www.bothends.org](http://www.bothends.org)

<sup>328</sup> Both ENDS and IUCN NL were key in the establishment of OSAS.

<sup>329</sup> Evaluatie Beleidsprogrammema 'Biodiversiteit Werkt'. Peter Wilms, Carlien Schrijvershof, Karlien Douma (APE) and Jan Paul van Soest. In opdracht van Agentschap NL. Den Haag, 24 February 2012.

<sup>330</sup> EA 2013. Annual report, p. 44.

<sup>331</sup> See: (1) FMO (2013). Press release: *Private sector and government take big step towards a sustainable economy*.

Retrieved from: [HTTPS://WWW.FMO.NL/K/NEWS/VIEW/10701/538/PRIVATE-SECTOR-AND-GOVERNMENT-TAKE-BIG-STEP-TOWARDS-A-SUSTAINABLE-ECONOMY.HTML](https://www.fmo.nl/k/news/view/10701/538/private-sector-and-government-take-big-step-towards-a-sustainable-economy.html). (2) SER (2013). *C-161 Green Deal Samenwerken aan transparantie van Natuurlijk en Sociaal Kapitaal*. (3) Kamp, H. (2013). *Uitvoeringsagenda Natuurlijk Kapitaal: behoud en duurzaam gebruik van biodiversiteit*. Letter from the Minister of Economic Affairs to the Dutch parliament, 22 June 2013.

<sup>332</sup> See for example: Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Carbon Fund (2014). Emission Reductions Program Idea Note (ER-PIN). Country: GHANA. ER Program Name: Ghana's Emission Reductions Program for the Cocoa Forest Mosaic Landscape (Cocoa Forest REDD+ Program). Date of Submission or Revision: 7th March, 2014

<sup>333</sup> Ibid

<sup>334</sup> According to EA's comments to the draft report (version 06012015), this workshop was organised by Both ENDS, FPP and TUK with the participation of over 50 local NGO and community representatives.

<sup>335</sup> In many instances, Both ENDS indicated that it involved teamwork together with, especially local, partners.

<sup>336</sup> The case study was carried out by Udan Fernando. The full case report will be provided upon request.

<sup>337</sup> Facilitated by the evaluator; see Appendix 3 with all outcome descriptions including their relevance and EA's contribution.

<sup>338</sup> Earl, S., Carden, F. and Smutylo, T. (2001). Outcome mapping. Building learning and reflection into development programs. Ottawa: IDRC.

<sup>339</sup> Oxfam is also member of the RSPO board and is chairing/member of groups. Its engagement is done through its private sector programme, which is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

<sup>340</sup> Lemire et al. (2012) makes a distinction between *rival explanations* that are different from the intervention by the alliance, and commingled rival explanations, referring to other contributions alongside those of the alliance that both contribute to and explain the observed outcomes.

Sebastian T. Lemire, Steffen Bohni Nielsen and Line Dybdal (2012), Making contribution analysis work: A practical framework for handling influencing factors and alternative explanations, in *Evaluation* 2012 18: 294

<sup>341</sup> Oxfam also is heavily engaged in the RSPO, but this is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

<sup>342</sup> This is also very much our own experience as an evaluation team with members in the South. It is a challenge to communicate and discuss the ideas developed in a group process in the North to Southern partners, who cannot be directly involved in these discussions.

<sup>343</sup> Lemire et al. (2012) make a distinction between *rival explanations* that are different from the intervention by the alliance, and commingled rival explanations, referring to other contributions alongside those of the alliance that both contribute to and explain the observed outcomes.

Sebastian T. Lemire, Steffen Bohni Nielsen and Line Dybdal (2012), Making contribution analysis work: A practical framework for handling influencing factors and alternative explanations, in *Evaluation* 2012 18: 294

<sup>344</sup> Earl, S., Carden, F. and Smutylo, T. (2001). Outcome mapping. Building learning and reflection into development programs. Ottawa: IDRC.

<sup>345</sup> World Health Organization. (2014). *Maternal mortality*. Factsheet No. 348. Retrieved from <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs348/en/>

<sup>346</sup> Singh, S. & J.E. Darroch. (2012). *Adding it up: costs and benefits of contraceptive services, estimates for 2012*. New York: Guttmacher Institute and UNFPA. Retrieved from <http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/AIU-2012-estimates.pdf>

<sup>347</sup> World Health Organization. (2008). *Unsafe abortion: global and regional estimates of incidence of unsafe abortion and associated mortality in 2008*. Sixth Edition. World Health Organization. Retrieved from

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- [http://www.who.int/entity/reproductivehealth/publications/unsafe\\_abortion/9789241501118/en/index.html](http://www.who.int/entity/reproductivehealth/publications/unsafe_abortion/9789241501118/en/index.html)
- <sup>348</sup> Sen, G. (2014). Sexual and reproductive health and rights in the post-2015 development agenda. *Global Public Health*, 9(6), 599–606.
- <sup>349</sup> UNFPA. (2014). *State of the world population 2014: the power of 1.8 billion: adolescents, youth and the transformation of the future*. UNFPA. Retrieved from [http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/EN-SWOP14-Report\\_FINAL-web.pdf](http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/EN-SWOP14-Report_FINAL-web.pdf); World Health Organization. (2013). *Every woman, every child: strengthening equity and dignity through health*. The second report of the Independent Expert Review Group on Information and Accountability for Women’s and Children’s Health. Geneva: World Health Organisation. Retrieved from [http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85757/1/9789241505949\\_eng.pdf](http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85757/1/9789241505949_eng.pdf)
- <sup>350</sup> Haselgrave, M. (2013). Ensuring the inclusion of sexual and reproductive health and rights under a sustainable development goal on health in the post-2015 human rights framework for development. *Reproductive Health Matters*, 21(42), 61–73. DOI: 10.1016/S0968-8080(13)42742-8
- <sup>351</sup> Sen, G. (2014). Sexual and reproductive health and rights in the post-2015 development agenda. *Global Public Health*, 9(6), 599–606.
- <sup>352</sup> UN. (2014). Framework of actions for the follow-up to the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development Beyond 2014: report of the Secretary-General. Retrieved from <http://icpdbeyond2014.org/about/view/29-global-review-report>
- <sup>353</sup> Oral amendments to the resolution adopted by the UNGA on 10 September 2014 state that ‘the proposal of the Open Working Group shall be the main basis for integrating the sustainable development goals into the future development agenda.’ Retrieved from <http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015.html>
- <sup>354</sup> Seims, S. (2011). Improving the impact of sexual and reproductive health development assistance from the like-minded European donors. *Reproductive Health Matters*, 19(38), 129–140; Yamin, A.E. & Boulanger, V.M. (2014). Why global goals and indicators matter: the experience of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the Millennium Development Goals. *Journal of Human Development Capabilities*, 15(2–3), 218–231. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2014.896322>
- <sup>355</sup> Seims, S. (2011). Improving the impact of sexual and reproductive health development assistance from the like-minded European donors. *Reproductive Health Matters*, 19(38), 129–140
- <sup>356</sup> Knapen, B. (2010). *Bijlage - Kamerbrief inzake basisbrief ontwikkelingssamenwerking*. Kamerstuk, 26-11-2010. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid>
- <sup>357</sup> Knapen, B. (2011). *Focusbrief ontwikkelingssamenwerking*. 18 March 2011. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2011/03/18/aanbiedingsbrief-focusbrief-ontwikkelingssamenwerking.html>
- <sup>358</sup> De Jager, J.C. (2012). *Stabiliteitsprogramma Nederland*. 27 April 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/brieven/2012/04/27/geactualiseerde-stabiliteitsprogramma/geactualiseerde-stabiliteitsprogramma.pdf>
- <sup>359</sup> Knapen, B. (2012). *Kamerbrief over Beleidsvoornemens Seksuele en Reproductieve Gezondheid en Rechten*. May 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2012/05/07/kamerbrief-over-beleidsvoornemens-seksuele-en-reproductieve-gezondheid-en-rechten.html>
- <sup>360</sup> Rutte, M. & Samsom, D. (2012). *Bruggen slaan: Regeerakkoord VVD - PvdA*. 29 October 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.kabinetsformatie2012.nl/actueel/documenten/regeerakkoord.html>
- <sup>361</sup> Spitz, G., Muskens, R. & Ewijk, E. van. (2013). *The Dutch and development cooperation: ahead of the crowd or trailing behind?* NCDO, Amsterdam. Retrieved from <http://www.ncdo.nl/search/site/report>
- <sup>362</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013). *Wat de wereld verdient: een nieuwe agenda voor hulp, handel en investeringen*. 5 April 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/ontwikkelingssamenwerking/documenten-en-publicaties/notas/2013/04/05/wat-de-wereld-verdient-een-nieuwe-agenda-voor-hulp-handel-en-investeringen.html>
- <sup>363</sup> SRHR Alliance. (2014). *Annual report 2013*. SRHR Alliance. Rutgers WPF – AMREF Flying Doctors – CHOICE – dance4life – Simavi . Retrieved from <http://srhralliance.org/news/presenting-the-srhr-alliance-year-report-2013/>
- <sup>364</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013). *Balancing ideals with practice. Policy evaluation of Dutch involvement in sexual and reproductive health and rights 2007–2012*. IOB-evaluation, no. 381. The Hague. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2013/11/22/balancing-ideals-with-practice-policy-evaluation-of-dutch-involvement-in-sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-rights-2007-2012.html>
- <sup>365</sup> See for example: Knapen, B. (2012). *Kamerbrief over Beleidsvoornemens Seksuele en Reproductieve Gezondheid en Rechten*. May 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2012/05/07/kamerbrief-over-beleidsvoornemens-seksuele-en-reproductieve-gezondheid-en-rechten.html>
- <sup>366</sup> Meredith, S. & Back, E. (2012). Finalising of the Netherlands reproductive health commodities strategy. Report on key issues affecting access to sexual and reproductive health commodities and options for future DGIS engagement. Global Health Consulting, Switzerland. Retrieved from <http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/reports/2012/08/24/final-report-on-key-issues-affecting-access-to-sexual-and-reproductive-health-commodities-and-options-for-future-dgis-engagement.html>
- <sup>367</sup> Details of the process by which the IACA programme was cut are found in the baseline report, along with a description of

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how funding was established for ILA at a much reduced level.

<sup>368</sup> SRHR Alliance. (2011). Revised MFS II application, appendix 1. Explaining the adjustments in the MFS II application 'Unite for Body Rights' of the SRHR Alliance. 28 February 2011.

<sup>369</sup> CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality advocates contribute time on a voluntary basis to work on international advocacy activities.

<sup>370</sup> The synergy meetings are also attended by partners working on ASK.

<sup>371</sup> SRHR alliance. *The ASK Programme: access, Services and Knowledge*. Retrieved from <http://srhralliance.org/who-we-are/links-with-other-programmes/>

<sup>372</sup> Simavi. (2014). *Unite against child marriage*. Retrieved from <http://dev.simavi.nl/actueel-nieuws/nieuws/archief/unite-against-child-marriage/>

<sup>373</sup> Because no specific SRHR Alliance budget was allocated to linking Southern partners, as an Alliance, to international-level processes, the Southern partners contacted for this evaluation were informed that their participation in the evaluation was also voluntary. Although a small number of partners did not respond, all partners reached agreed to be interviewed.

<sup>374</sup> UN. Special Session of the General Assembly on the follow-up to the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development beyond 2014. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/other/4/en/special\\_session.html#overview](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/other/4/en/special_session.html#overview)

<sup>375</sup> Follow-up activities and outcomes related to but coming after the UNGASS and UNGA meetings are not included in the evaluation period.

<sup>376</sup> Arensman, B., Barrett, J.B., Bodegom, A. J. van, Buchanan, K.S., Fernando, U., Hilhorst, D., Klaver, D. C., Mongbo, R.L., Rasch, E.D., Richert, W., Waegeningh, C. van, Wagemakers, A. & Wessel, M. van. (2013). *MFS II joint evaluation of international lobbying and advocacy: baseline report*. Wageningen UR, Social Sciences Group.

<sup>377</sup> Because of increased individual specialisation within the Alliance on either the national- or the international-level project, only one individual Alliance member was interviewed twice for the endline data collection.

<sup>378</sup> Two of the interviews were group interviews with two Alliance members, and one Alliance member (working at both national and international level and chairing the ILA working group in 2014) was interviewed twice—resulting in a total of eight interviews with Alliance members in the Netherlands.

<sup>379</sup> In Indonesia, three interviews were group interviews, resulting in a total of five separate interviews with Alliance partners. The interviewees included the former NPC for the Alliance in Indonesia, who resigned her position in Spring 2014.

<sup>380</sup> This includes one international expert independently identified by the evaluation team as a resource person on the role of the international SRHR advocate networks, generally. This interviewee was not selected as an informant on the work of the SRHR Alliance, specifically, but she was coincidentally able to provide further information on this.

<sup>381</sup> The three national-level external informant interviews were conducted in Dutch and transcribed into English. All other interviews were conducted in English.

<sup>382</sup> NVivo qualitative data analysis software. QSR International Pty Ltd. Version 10, 2012.

<sup>383</sup> Arensman B, Barrett JB, Bodegom AJ van, Buchanan KS, Fernando U, Hilhorst D, Klaver DC, Mongbo RL, Rasch ED, Richert W, Waegeningh C van, Wagemakers A, Wessel M van. *MFS II joint evaluation of international lobbying and advocacy: baseline report* (21 March 2013). Wageningen UR, Social Sciences Group, 2015.

<sup>384</sup> WO=MEN. (2012). *Vrouwenrechten brengen Nederlandse politiek bij elkaar*. Press release, The Hague, 6 December 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.wo-men.nl/vrouwenrechten-brengen-nederlandse-politiek-bij-elkaar/>; **Maij, M. (2012).**

**Meerpartijen Initiatief Gender van start**. Press Release 17 December 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.pvda.nl/berichten/2012/12/meerpartijen+initiatief+gender+van+start>

<sup>385</sup> The uniform outcome indicators (see chapter 2) are listed in parentheses after each outcome. They are elaborated in section 11.2 of the following chapter.

<sup>386</sup> Knapen, B. (2011). *Focusbrief ontwikkelingssamenwerking*. 18 March 2011. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2011/03/18/aanbiedingsbrief-focusbrief-ontwikkelingssamenwerking.html>

<sup>387</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013). *Wat de wereld verdient: een nieuwe agenda voor hulp, handel en investeringen*. 5 April 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/ontwikkelingssamenwerking/documenten-en-publicaties/notas/2013/04/05/wat-de-wereld-verdient-een-nieuwe-agenda-voor-hulp-handel-en-investeringen.html>

<sup>388</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013). *Balancing ideals with practice. Policy evaluation of Dutch involvement in sexual and reproductive health and rights 2007–2012*. IOB-evaluation, no. 381. The Hague. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2013/11/22/balancing-ideals-with-practice-policy-evaluation-of-dutch-involvement-in-sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-rights-2007-2012.html>

<sup>389</sup> The SRHR budget line is a combined budget line of SRHR, HIV/AIDS and health. The SRHR Alliance is trying to monitor the relative increase of the specific budget for SRHR within this combined budget line as was promised by former State Secretary for Development Cooperation Knapen.

<sup>390</sup> The motion was filed in February: Tweede Kamer. (2014). Motie van het lid Jasper Van Dijk c.s. over een rapportage over de besteding van de financiële middelen op SRGR-gebied per organisatie. Retrieved from <http://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2014Z04140&did=2014D08131>. The motion was revised and accepted in March 2014.

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<sup>391</sup> Tweede Kamer. (2014). *Algemeen overleg voortgang speerpunten OS*. Algemene Commissie voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. 12 Februari 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.tweedekamer.nl/vergaderingen/commissievergaderingen/details/index.jsp?id=2013A05624>

<sup>392</sup> The sentence requiring the government to indicate the impact of organisations by scorecards was removed. Minister Ploumen argued that scorecards would be too specific and be similar to an evaluation. Another sentence was adapted, and 'impact' was still included. Tweede Kamer. (2014). *VAO voortgang speerpunten ontwikkelingssamenwerking (AO d.d. 12/02)*. Transcript. Retrieved from [http://www.tweedekamer.nl/vergaderingen/plenaire\\_vergaderingen/details/index.jsp?date=06-03-2014](http://www.tweedekamer.nl/vergaderingen/plenaire_vergaderingen/details/index.jsp?date=06-03-2014)

<sup>393</sup> Van Dijk (SP), De Caluwé (VVD), Van Laar (PvdA), Sjoerdsma (D66), Mulder (CDA), Voordewind (CU) and Ouwehand (PvdD).

<sup>394</sup> Minister Ploumen. (2014). *Kamerbrief over hulp, handel en investeringen*. 10 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/ontwikkelingssamenwerking/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2014/04/10/kamerbrief-over-hulp-handel-en-investeringen.html>

<sup>395</sup> For more information on CPD 47 outcomes, see: Population Action International. (2014). *The good, the bad, and the ugly at CPD*. Newsletter, 21 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://populationaction.org/newsletters/cpd/>

<sup>396</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Danida International Development Cooperation. (2014). Evaluation of the Danish strategy for the promotion of sexual and reproductive health and rights 2006–2013. Pathways to Change in SRHR. Synthesis Report. Kit and Euro Health Group, p 33. Retrieved from <http://www.oecd.org/derec/denmark/>

<sup>397</sup> UN. (2014). Assessment of the status of implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development. Forty-seventh session. Commission on Population and Development. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division. E/2014/25 E/CN.9/2014/7. <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/commission/previous-sessions/2014/index.shtml>

<sup>398</sup> UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2014). Commission on Population and Development concludes 47<sup>th</sup> session. *DESA News: Global dialogue on development*, 18(5). Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/newsletter/desanews/dialogue/2014/05/index.html>

<sup>399</sup> A complete overview of youth participation at the 47<sup>th</sup> Session of CPD can be found at [http://issuu.com/youthcoalition/docs/cpd47\\_youth\\_caucus\\_press\\_kit](http://issuu.com/youthcoalition/docs/cpd47_youth_caucus_press_kit). Other sources that document the successful participation and contribution of youth at CPD 47 include: NGOs beyond 2014. (2014). *Young people speak up for their sexual and reproductive rights at 47<sup>th</sup> CPD*. 16 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.youthcoalition.org/un-processes/young-people-speak-sexual-reproductive-rights-47th-cpd-2/>; UNFPA. (2014). *Making youth participation a reality*. 13 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.unfpa.org/public/cache/offonce/home/news/pid/16987;jsessionid=08BA09EAE21DB2D8B784746AC049481B.jahia01>

<sup>400</sup> At CPD 47, 176 country statements were made. Most statements stressed the importance of adhering, implementing and following up the ICPD Programme of Action beyond 2014, followed by recurrent issues in their countries. The Dutch statement of 7 April, for example, calls attention to young people, HIV/AIDS and SRHR. UN. (2014). Statements forty-seventh session. Commission on Population and Development. Retrieved from <http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ecosoc/cpd/47th-session/statements/>

<sup>401</sup> Other outcomes leading up to CPD 47 are included in the evaluation but, for practical reasons, not in the contribution analysis. This analysis is not a complete examination of the SRHR Alliance's full contribution to the ICPD process.

<sup>402</sup> Chair of the CPD, Ambassador Gonzalo Koncke (Uruguay). Briefing on the CPD. 20 March 2014. Retrieved from <https://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/15190628/1400902959/name/CPD+47+Briefing+session.docx?download=1>

<sup>403</sup> Dam, R. van. (2014). *Outcome of the 47<sup>th</sup> CPD: a struggle for sexual rights*. 15 April 2014. Retrieved from [www.womeninnewyork.blogspot.nl](http://www.womeninnewyork.blogspot.nl); Banda, R. (2014). *3:40 and still no 47<sup>th</sup> CPD outcome, reflections from a Malawi NGO*. 12 April, 2014. Retrieved from [www.womeninnewyork.blogspot.nl](http://www.womeninnewyork.blogspot.nl); Dam, R. Van, (2014). *Silence before the storm*. 10 April 2014. Retrieved from [www.womeninnewyork.blogspot.nl](http://www.womeninnewyork.blogspot.nl); NGOs beyond 2014. (2014). *Young people speak up for their sexual and reproductive rights at 47<sup>th</sup> CPD*. 16 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.youthcoalition.org/un-processes/young-people-speak-sexual-reproductive-rights-47th-cpd-2/>. *Some country statements, for example that of the Nigerian delegation, demonstrate the resistance to renegotiations*. UN. (2014). Statements forty-seventh session. Commission on Population and Development. Retrieved from <http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ecosoc/cpd/47th-session/statements/>

<sup>404</sup> At CPD, several statements express the concern over the procedures and negotiation processes, which lack transparency, inclusiveness and dialogue. See, for example, the country statements of Indonesia and Qatar. UN. (2014). Statements forty-seventh session. Commission on Population and Development. Retrieved from <http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ecosoc/cpd/47th-session/statements/>

<sup>405</sup> UN. (2014). Statements forty-seventh session. Commission on Population and Development. Retrieved from <http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ecosoc/cpd/47th-session/statements/>; See also: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2014). Commission on Population and Development concludes 47<sup>th</sup> session. *DESA News: Global dialogue on development*, 18(5). Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/newsletter/desanews/dialogue/2014/05/index.html>



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<sup>406</sup> A complete overview of youth participation at the 47<sup>th</sup> Session of CPD can be found at [http://issuu.com/youthcoalition/docs/cpd47\\_youth\\_caucus\\_press\\_kit](http://issuu.com/youthcoalition/docs/cpd47_youth_caucus_press_kit). Other sources that document the successful participation and contribution of youth at CPD 47 include: NGOs beyond 2014. (2014). *Young people speak up for their sexual and reproductive rights at 47<sup>th</sup> CPD*. 16 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.youthcoalition.org/un-processes/young-people-speak-sexual-reproductive-rights-47th-cpd-2/>; UNFPA. (2014). *Making youth participation a reality*. 13 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.unfpa.org/public/cache/offonce/home/news/pid/16987;jsessionid=08BA09EAE21DB2D8B784746AC049481B.jahia01>

<sup>407</sup> The pro-SRHR statements include CSOs in African and Arab countries. For example, there was a pro-SRHR statement by the Arab Youth Action Network. Two statements were in Spanish and could not be read. The other nine CSO statements did not specifically address SRHR. Seven focused on (prohibiting the legalisation of) abortion and/or advocated for putting reproductive health services and/or the family centre at the core, one focused on migration and one was very explicitly against 'controversial references' including sexual and reproductive rights. UN. (2014). Statements forty-seventh session. Commission on Population and Development. Retrieved from <http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ecosoc/cpd/47th-session/statements/>

<sup>408</sup> German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2014). *Taking stock of the implementation of the Cairo Programme of Action*. News and Events. Retrieved from <http://www.bmz.de/en>

<sup>409</sup> IPPF. (2014). Governments call for increased efforts to promote sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights in development policies. News, New York, 14 April, 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.ippf.org/news/Governments-Call-Increased-Efforts-Promote-Sexual-and-Reproductive-Health-and-Reproductive-Righ>

<sup>410</sup> UN. (2014). Statements forty-seventh session. Commission on Population and Development. Retrieved from <http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ecosoc/cpd/47th-session/statements/>. Evidence of commitments by governments can also be found on websites of many different organisations, for example: Amnesty International. (2014). *Document - 47th session of the Commission on Population and Development: governments commit to promoting sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights in development policies*. Public statement, 14 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR41/011/2014/en/3b80c549-1e50-4faf-a583-9541a14c1c7b/ior410112014en.html>; NGOs beyond 2014. (2014). *Commission on Population and Development ends— governments call for increased efforts to promote sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights in development policies*. Posted 13 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://ngosbeyond2014.org/articles/2014/4/13/commission-on-population-and-development-ends-governments-ca.html>. Also the country (and regional) statements made on each day of CPD 47 document the efforts for SRHR: UN (2014). Statements forty-seventh session. Commission on Population and Development. Retrieved from <http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ecosoc/cpd/47th-session/statements/>

<sup>411</sup> Statement of the Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN after the adoption of the resolution on the 'Assessment of the Status of Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development'. 12 April 2014. Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%208/Netherlands\\_Item8.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%208/Netherlands_Item8.pdf);

Statement dir DSO, agendapunt 3, Commission on Population and Development (CPD). 7 April 2014. Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%203/Netherlands\\_Item3.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%203/Netherlands_Item3.pdf); [National statement on agenda item 4 by Mr. Stefan Hennis, youth representative and member of the official delegation of the Netherlands to the 47th Commission on Population and development. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%204/Netherlands\\_Item4.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%204/Netherlands_Item4.pdf);

Statement on agenda item 5 by Mr. Lambert Grijns, Ambassador for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights & HIV/AIDS and Director of the Social Development Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. Agenda item 5: The relation between population and development issues and the theme of this year's Annual Ministerial Review (ECOSOC). Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%205/Netherlands\\_Item5.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%205/Netherlands_Item5.pdf)

<sup>412</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013). *Balancing ideals with practice. Policy evaluation of Dutch involvement in sexual and reproductive health and rights 2007–2012*. IOB-evaluation, no. 381. The Hague. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2013/11/22/balancing-ideals-with-practice-policy-evaluation-of-dutch-involvement-in-sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-rights-2007-2012.html>

<sup>413</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation. (2013). *Beleidsdoorlichting buitenlandse zaken*. Kamerbrief, Session year 2013–2014, 31 271, nr. 12. Den Haag, 22 November 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/ontwikkelingssamenwerking/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/11/22/kamerbrief-over-beleidsdoorlichting-srgr-in-de-periode-2007-2012.html>

<sup>414</sup> On average, during the IOB evaluation period (2007–2011), €435 million was spent on health including SRHR each year. Over 50% of the budget was spent on contributions to multilateral organisations and global initiatives such as the Global Fund. The percentage allocated to public sector institutions was 17%. The private channel, including the co-financing

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system and international and national NGOs, accounted for 22%. Public-private partnerships accounted for about 4% of the budget. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013). *Balancing ideals with practice. Policy evaluation of Dutch involvement in sexual and reproductive health and rights 2007–2012*. IOB-evaluation, no. 381. The Hague, p. 43. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2013/11/22/balancing-ideals-with-practice-policy-evaluation-of-dutch-involvement-in-sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-rights-2007-2012.html>

<sup>415</sup> Algemene Commissie voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. (2013). Besluitenlijst van de procedurevergadering van donderdag 5 December 2013. Vaste Commissie voor Binnenlandse Zaken. Retrieved from [www.tweedekamer.nl](http://www.tweedekamer.nl)

<sup>416</sup> The points raised by Rutgers WPF were the allocation of budget to different organisations and the disadvantages of using multilateral organisations instead of NGOs for topics like inequity, family planning, abortion, HIV/AIDS and promoting sexual health. Rutgers WPF analysis of the IOB-evaluation ‘Balancing ideals with practice policy evaluation of Dutch government in sexual and reproductive health and rights 2007–2012.’ Unpublished document. Rutgers WPF, 25 November 2013.

<sup>417</sup> Tweede Kamer. (2014). *Algemeen Overleg voortgang speerpunten OS*. Algemene commissie voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. 12 February 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.tweedekamer.nl/vergaderingen/commissievergaderingen/details/index.jsp?id=2013A05624>

<sup>418</sup> SRHR Alliance. (2014). Reactie op de IOB evaluatie van het SRGR-beleid ‘Balancing Ideals with Practice’. Factsheet. Unpublished document.

<sup>419</sup> Partos. (2014). *Nederlandse ontwikkelingsorganisaties en hun relatie met de Nederlandse overheid. Een plaatsbepaling*. Vereniging Partos, 14 February 2013. Retrieved from [www.partos.nl](http://www.partos.nl)

<sup>420</sup> e.g. Kretzschmar, A. (2014). IOB maakt inzichtelijk dat impact Nederlandse inzet op private ontwikkeling tekortschiet. Amsterdam, 30 April 2014; Kretzschmar, A. (2014). Vertrouwen centraal in nieuwe beleidskader Minister Ploumen, Press release, Amsterdam 14 May 2014. Retrieved from <https://partos.nl/actueel/persberichten/>

<sup>421</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013). *Wat de wereld verdient: een nieuwe agenda voor hulp, handel en investeringen*. 5 April 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/ontwikkelingssamenwerking/documenten-en-publicaties/notas/2013/04/05/wat-de-wereld- verdient-een-nieuwe-agenda-voor-hulp-handel-en-investeringen.html>

<sup>422</sup> Tweede Kamer. (2014). Motie van het lid Jasper Van Dijk c.s. over een rapportage over de besteding van de financiële middelen op SRGR-gebied per organisatie. Retrieved from

<http://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2014Z04140&did=2014D08131>

<sup>423</sup> Tweede Kamer. (2014). *Algemeen Overleg voortgang speerpunten OS*. Algemene commissie voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. 12 February 2014. Retrieved from

<http://www.tweedekamer.nl/vergaderingen/commissievergaderingen/details/index.jsp?id=2013A05624>

<sup>424</sup> Interview with external informant.

<sup>425</sup> During the AO on the progress of the policy focal areas (12 February 2014), the budget allocation to NGOs and the effectiveness and impact of NGOs on SRHR policy was discussed on multiple occasions (e.g. Mulder, p. 1–2; Voordewind, p. 4; Sjoerdsma, p. 10–11; Smaling, p. 11–12; Van der Staaij, p. 17). The Minister noted, ‘According to some, I am thinking too much in channels, according to others, too little. [...]. Of course, effectiveness is what it is about’ (p. 22). Tweede Kamer. (2014). *Algemeen Overleg voortgang speerpunten OS*. Algemene commissie voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. 12 February 2014. Retrieved from

<http://www.tweedekamer.nl/vergaderingen/commissievergaderingen/details/index.jsp?id=2013A05624>. The written answers to remaining questions of the AO on the progress of the policy focal areas (12 February 2014) also demonstrate the awareness of the Minister: ‘I do not steer based on channels’ (p. 2). Ploumen, L. (2014). *Herziene versie schriftelijke beantwoording van vragen uit AO Voortgang Speerpunten OS (12 februari 2014)*. 28 February 2014. Retrieved from [www.tweedekamer.nl](http://www.tweedekamer.nl). The same applies to the VAO on the policy focal areas and the IOB-evaluation on SRHR (6 March 2014): ‘As has been told before, and I repeat here, I do not want to steer a priori on budget channels. Effectiveness is the first priority...’ and ‘I repeat once again for security [...]: I will not steer on channels, but on the basis of effectiveness’.

Tweede Kamer. (2014). *VAO voortgang speerpunten ontwikkelingssamenwerking (AO d.d. 12/02)*. Transcript. Retrieved from [http://www.tweedekamer.nl/vergaderingen/plenaire\\_vergaderingen/details/index.jsp?date=06-03-2014](http://www.tweedekamer.nl/vergaderingen/plenaire_vergaderingen/details/index.jsp?date=06-03-2014);

Additionally, in other letters, the Minister affirms to have ceased ‘channel thinking’ (e.g. Ploumen, L. (2014). *Kamerbrief over hulp, handel en investeringen*. 10 April 2014. Retrieved from

<http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/ontwikkelingssamenwerking/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2014/04/10/kamerbrief-over-hulp-handel-en-investeringen.html>

<sup>426</sup> ISRRRC is a platform through which the international civil society advocates with different governments for the Commission on Population and Development process. There are more than 100 organisations who try to influence the CPD process at all levels. See for example Gillesberg, O. (2012). *Behind the scenes with Hilde Kroes*. Retrieved from <http://www.rutgerswfp.org>

<sup>427</sup> Interview with external expert.

<sup>428</sup> The Civil Society Platform to promote SRHR Beyond 2015 is a global advocacy led by 13 SRHR networks united around the common goal to include SRHR in the post-2015 development agenda. Retrieved from <http://www.astra.org.pl>

<sup>429</sup> EuroNGOs is a regional network of European-based NGOs that promotes comprehensive and progressive SRHR in



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development cooperation and global frameworks. EuroNGOs brings together 38 CSOs from Europe, Canada and New Zealand. <http://www.eurongos.org/Default.aspx?ID=25096>

<sup>430</sup> The WEOG is one of the several unofficial Regional Groups in the UN that act as voting blocs and negotiation fora.

<sup>431</sup> Rutgers WPF is full member of EuroNGOs. <http://www.eurongos.org/Default.aspx?ID=1495>

The advocacy manager of one Alliance member organisation is a Steering Committee Member (Vice-chair) of EuroNGOs. EuroNGOs. (2012). *Sexual and reproductive health and rights in the next global framework*. Report on the EuroNGOs annual conference. Brussels, p. 13–14. Retrieved from

[http://www.eurongos.org/Files/HTML/EuroNGOs/AGM/AGM%202012/EuroNGOs\\_Annual%20Conference%20Report%20012.pdf](http://www.eurongos.org/Files/HTML/EuroNGOs/AGM/AGM%202012/EuroNGOs_Annual%20Conference%20Report%20012.pdf)

<sup>432</sup> Rutgers WPF is one of the consortium partners of the Countdown 2015 advocates. See:

<http://www.countdown2015europe.org/>

<sup>433</sup> Rutgers WPF and CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality were speakers/moderators. In the conference, the Netherlands was also represented by Lambert Grijns, Ambassador for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights & HIV/AIDS. EuroNGOs. (2013). *Next steps: sexual and reproductive health and rights on the post-2015 agenda. Fulfilling rights, achieving international access to SRHR, empowering women, investing in youth, through a coherent post-2015 development framework*. Report on the EuroNGOs International Conference, 24 October 2013. Next steps: Sexual and reproductive health and rights. Retrieved from

[http://www.eurongos.org/Files/HTML/EuroNGOs/AGM/AGM%202013/EuroNGOs\\_2013%20Conference%20Report.pdf](http://www.eurongos.org/Files/HTML/EuroNGOs/AGM/AGM%202013/EuroNGOs_2013%20Conference%20Report.pdf)

<sup>434</sup> EuroNGOs, Countdown 2015 Europe, IPPF European Network, ASTRA. (2014). *Everyone, always, everywhere: the European SRHR community's position on the post-2015 agenda*. Joint EuroNGOs, Countdown 2015 Europe, IPPF European Network, ASTRA position paper. [http://www.eurongos.org/Files/HTML/EuroNGOs/news/EuroNGOs-C2015E-IPPFEN-ASTRA\\_Post-2015%20position%20paper\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.eurongos.org/Files/HTML/EuroNGOs/news/EuroNGOs-C2015E-IPPFEN-ASTRA_Post-2015%20position%20paper_FINAL.pdf)

<sup>435</sup> More information about this network can be retrieved from: <http://archive.wgnrr.org/news/civil-society-platform-promote-srhr-beyond-2015> and <http://www.beyond2015.org/sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-rights-next-global-framework>

<sup>436</sup> This refers to the above-referenced secondment of an individual SRHR Alliance member to the MoFA beginning in January 2014.

<sup>437</sup> EuroNGOs. Steering Committee. Retrieved from <http://www.eurongos.org/Default.aspx?ID=1506>

<sup>438</sup> Simavi. (2013). Simavi beïnvloedt positie SRGR in internationale agenda's. Nieuwsbericht.

<http://www.simavi.nl/actueel/nieuws/archief/simavi-beinvloedt-positie-srgr-in-internationale-agendas/>

<sup>439</sup> The two organisations in Indonesia confirming receipt of this information comprised two of the three Indonesian partners with a history of being active in advocacy at international level.

<sup>440</sup> See for example the statement made on behalf of members of the Sexual and Reproductive Rights Youth Caucus at CPD 47. CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, Netherlands is one of the endorsing organisations. <http://www.youthcoalition.org/un-processes/cpd47-oral-statement/>. See also the flyer announcing the side event at CPD 47:

[http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/documents/SideEvent\\_Hilton\\_08042014.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/documents/SideEvent_Hilton_08042014.pdf)

<sup>441</sup> CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality was at the CPD with all partners: YECE (Malawi), TaYa (Ethiopia), YP Foundation (Kenya) and ARI (Indonesia). CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality. (2014). *Strong youth representation at CPD 47*. 10 April 2014.

Retrieved from <http://www.choiceforyouth.org/news/strong-youth-representation-at-cpd-47>; CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality. (2014). *Eventful days for Choice at the UN CPD 47*. 11 April 2014. Retrieved from

<http://www.choiceforyouth.org/news/eventful-days-for-choice-at-the-un-cpd47>

<sup>442</sup> dance4life. (2014). *Joining forces for youth participation: successful side event at the UN CPD 47*. 11 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.dance4life.com/en/news-blogs/news/2014/joining-forces-for-youth-participation-successful-side-event-at-the-un-cpd47/>;

UNFPA. (2014). *Making youth participation a reality*. 13 April 2014. Retrieved from

<http://www.unfpa.org/public/cache/offonce/home/news/pid/16987;jsessionid=08BA09EAE21DB2D8B784746AC049481B.jahia01>

<sup>443</sup> NGO Statement by Rutgers WPF and partners on behalf of a cross-regional group of civil society advocates from Asia, Arica and the Arab World. Delivered on April 10<sup>th</sup> by Natasha Sajjad. UN. (2014). Statements forty-seventh session.

Commission on Population and Development. Retrieved from <http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ecosoc/cpd/47th-session/statements/>

<sup>444</sup> CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality endorsed the statements delivered by the Arab Youth Network for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights and the statement on behalf of the Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression (SOGIE) Caucus. UN. (2014). Statements forty-seventh session. Commission on Population and Development. Retrieved from <http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ecosoc/cpd/47th-session/statements/>

<sup>445</sup> Of the 27 English-language statements made by CSOs at CPD, 18 were explicitly pro-SRHR. UN. (2014). Statements forty-seventh session. Commission on Population and Development. Retrieved from

<http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ecosoc/cpd/47th-session/statements/>

<sup>446</sup> National statement on agenda item 4 by Mr. Stefan Hennis, youth representative and member of the official delegation of the Netherlands to the 47th Commission on Population and Development. Retrieved from

<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%204/Netherlands>

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[Item4.pdf](#)

<sup>447</sup> UNFPA. (2014). *Making youth participation a reality*. 13 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.unfpa.org/news/making-youth-participation-reality>; *WO = MEN in New York*. (2014). *Roaring applause for youth representative Stefan Hennis*. 10 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://womeninnewyork.blogspot.nl/2014/04/roaring-applause-for-youth.html>

<sup>448</sup> For more information on IWHC, see: <http://iwhc.org/>

<sup>449</sup> For more information on AWID, see: <http://www.awid.org/>

<sup>450</sup> For more information on IPPF, see: <http://www.ippf.org/>

<sup>451</sup> Both internal and external interviewees mentioned this.

<sup>452</sup> For example, the Civil Society Platform to Promote SRHR Beyond 2015 led by 13 SRHR networks represents over 2000 organisations. See for more information: <http://archive.wgnrr.org/news/civil-society-platform-promote-srhr-beyond-2015>; EuroNGOs brings together 38 non-governmental organisations. EuroNGO. (2012). *Sexual and reproductive health and rights in the next global framework*. Report on the annual conference EuroNGOs. Brussels. Retrieved from [http://www.eurongos.org/Files/HTML/EuroNGOs/AGM/AGM%202012/EuroNGOs\\_Annual%20Conference%20Report%20012.pdf](http://www.eurongos.org/Files/HTML/EuroNGOs/AGM/AGM%202012/EuroNGOs_Annual%20Conference%20Report%20012.pdf)

<sup>453</sup> This rule was also mentioned spontaneously by many partner organisations visited in Indonesia and Malawi, although the procedures for spending by Southern partners (usually on travel) varied across organisations.

<sup>454</sup> Keijzer, N., Spierings, E. & Fowler, A. (2011). Bringing the invisible into perspective. Reference document for using the 5Cs framework to plan, monitor and evaluate capacity and results of capacity development processes. ECDDP Maastricht, the Netherlands. [http://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/5CS\\_Reference\\_Document\\_2011.pdf](http://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/5CS_Reference_Document_2011.pdf)

<sup>455</sup> SRHR Alliance. (2011). *Revised MFS II Application*. Appendix 1. Explaining the Adjustments in the MFS II Application 'Unite for Body Rights' of the SRHR Alliance.

<sup>456</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013). *Balancing ideals with practice. Policy evaluation of Dutch involvement in sexual and reproductive health and rights 2007–2012*. IOB-evaluation, no. 381. The Hague. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2013/11/22/balancing-ideals-with-practice-policy-evaluation-of-dutch-involvement-in-sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-rights-2007-2012.html>

<sup>457</sup> Ploumen, L. (2014). *Beantwoording kamervragen over de trendbreuk van Nederland als voortrekker in het agenderen van taboedoorbrekende onderwerpen*. 21 October 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2014/10/21/beantwoording-kamervragen-over-de-trendbreuk-van-nederland-als-voortrekker-in-het-agenderen-van-taboedoorbrekende-onderwerpen.html>

<sup>458</sup> World Bank. (2011). *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, security and development*.

<sup>459</sup> UNSCR A/RES/66/290, 3 (b).

<sup>460</sup> NL MoFA Kamerbrief over het speerpunt veiligheid en rechtsorde, 21 May 2012, EFV-190/2012; NL MoFA, Focusbrief ontwikkelingssamenwerking.

<sup>461</sup> World Bank (2011) *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, security and development*.

<sup>462</sup> WOTRO and evaluation steering committee, on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

<sup>463</sup> [www.theoryofchange.org](http://www.theoryofchange.org)

<sup>464</sup> Southern partners could not be admitted as full-fledged Alliance members according to MFS II requirements and in conformity with Dutch law.

<sup>465</sup> We will use the abbreviation WLPS and WLPS lobby and advocacy interchangeably, always referring to the unit of analysis unless stated otherwise.

<sup>466</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (30-10-2009) *Aanvraagstramien MFS II (2011–2015)*

<sup>467</sup> For further background and information on ACPF, please refer to: MFS II ILA Evaluation (2013) 'Baseline report MFS II ILA Evaluation' and ACPF's website. For further background and information on the African Charter, please refer to: ACERWC's website

<sup>468</sup> Debriefing note MFS II Evaluation Team (April 2013)

<sup>469</sup> T4C Alliance (2010), MFS II Proposal, June 2010 (Baseline report page 154)

<sup>470</sup> Letter of Agreement and contract between ICS and ACPF, signed 30 May 2011

<sup>471</sup> The African Union has 54 members, though the continent counts officially 55 states.

<sup>472</sup> In January 2015 explained as 'incremental geographic approach' with strategic partnerships.

<sup>473</sup> Not all interviews were recorded for various reasons (e.g. considered inappropriate, confidentiality or no recording device at hand).

<sup>474</sup> During the last period of evaluating ACPF, the evaluators spend three weeks (September 2014) in Addis for further interviews, verifications and also discussions and feedback sessions with ACPF management and staff.

<sup>475</sup> MFS II ILA Evaluation (2013) 'Baseline report'.

<sup>476</sup> Workshop organised by PLAN International Netherlands and ICS in collaboration with ACPF (4–6 July 2012) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>477</sup> p. 149 ff Baseline Report

<sup>478</sup> Under the Dialogue and Dissent programme by The Yichalal Consortium, September 2014

<sup>479</sup> In full Division of Social Welfare, Vulnerable Groups, Drug Control and Crime Prevention

<sup>480</sup> The 3 Track record cases in the Yichalal Consortium proposal refer to outcome/changes in the way we understand

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outcomes and are well substantiated.

<sup>481</sup> See also the baseline report where we identified the tension between MFS II theory and ACPF practice (page 155 ff)

<sup>482</sup> The MOU between ACPF and Commission of the AU was signed 18 July 2012.

<sup>483</sup> The observer status was granted to ACPF by ACERWC on 21 April 2010.

<sup>484</sup> 27<sup>th</sup> Session of the Human Rights Council (2014) 'Towards better spending to realize children's rights', 10 September 2014, Palais des Nations, Geneva

<sup>485</sup> Also reflected in the CAP: Common Africa Position on Post-2015 development agenda

<sup>486</sup> Besides ACPF, Save International, Plan International, Community Law Centre (South Africa), and the Institute for Human Rights and Development in The Gambia (IHRDA),

<sup>487</sup> ACPF with World Vision, SOS Child Villages, UNICEF, Terre des Hommes

<sup>488</sup> ACPF with Save the Children (its eastern-African Regional Office), ACPF, PLAN International, World Vision, Elizabeth Glaser Paediatric AIDS Foundation (EGPAF), African Platform for Social Protection (APSP), and Better Care Network.

<sup>489</sup> Formal letter of endorsement sent to ACPF by ACERWC on 22 November 2012

<sup>490</sup> See baseline report page 20

<sup>491</sup> The first African Report was published in 2008, before MFS II funding materialised.

<sup>492</sup> Criteria applied (Ch 6.2.1 pg 146 Baseline report) representativeness, traceability, change related to MFS II, feasibility. Having a start and end in MFS II period proved unrealistic, as ACPF's work is not interrupted by its funding sources.

<sup>493</sup> <http://www.africawidemovement.org/en/>, accessed September 2014

<sup>494</sup> <http://www.csoforum.info/>, accessed September 2014

<sup>495</sup> ACPF (2010) 'Towards an era of accountability for children, African Child Policy Forum 2010-2015' and ACPF (2012) 'Programme highlights 2011'

<sup>496</sup> Save International – Child Friendliness Index South Asia (see:

<http://www.kidsrightsindex.org/Portals/5/Users/033/33/33/Docs%20KRI/The%20South%20Asia%20Report%20short%20version.pdf>)

<sup>497</sup> ACPF (2012) 'ACPF, Programmes – Outreach – Impact'

<sup>498</sup> Website AMC (September 2013)

<sup>499</sup> 25 countries and approximately 400 participants attended from national, regional and international organisations.

<sup>500</sup> Source: <http://www.csoforum.info/>

<sup>501</sup> This was discussed in depth with ACPF management and staff during two feedback sessions on 19-09-2014 in Addis Ababa.

<sup>502</sup> According to MFS II requirements, ACPF needed to mobilise a minimum of 25% additional funds to operate during the five-year period, to address issues of dependence vis-à-vis the T4C funds.

<sup>503</sup> Amount so far confirmed by funding partners

<sup>504</sup> Inclusive staff & consultants' time/launch/reports/networks etc. and staff travel

<sup>505</sup> Included are costs related to Finance and Administration of the Office support staff and other related costs (audit/evaluation etc.)

<sup>506</sup> Most IBoT members serve in their individual capacity (with the exception of two), each having longstanding impressive international records mostly acquired in the non-profit (development and academic) sector.

<sup>507</sup> Teles B. and Schmitt M. (2011) 'The elusive craft of evaluating advocacy', in: *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, May, p. 39–43; Jones, H. (2011) 'A guide to monitoring and evaluating policy influence', *ODI Background notes*, February; Coffman, J., E. Reed (2008) 'Unique methods in advocacy evaluation'.

<sup>508</sup> The 5C frame was originally designed to assess capacity and performance of *development-oriented* organisations within the context of the MDGs developed (see ECPDM discussion paper # 58A)

<sup>509</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (30-10-2009) Aanvraagstramien MFS II (2011-2015) , fase 1

<sup>510</sup> Agreement between ICS and ACPF (project code B-INL-AFR-ACPF-11\_15) signed May 30, 2011

<sup>511</sup> ACPF towards an Era of Accountability for Children in Africa , programme of work 2010–2015 (ACPF 2009)

<sup>512</sup> MFS II criteria specified three complementary intervention strategies for the proposals viz. direct poverty alleviation, capacity development within civil society; and Influencing policies and practices (international lobby and advocacy).

<sup>513</sup> Brodtkin, E.Z. (2008) Accountability in Street-Level Organizations, *Intl Journal of Public Administration* # 31: 317–336, Routledge <http://faculty.cbpp.uaa.alaska.edu/afgjp/PADM601%20Fall%202009/Accountability%20in%20street-level%20bureaucracies.pdf>

<sup>514</sup> Parenting in Africa network, ICS participating in research

<sup>515</sup> Wierdsma, A. F. M. (1999). Co-creatie van verandering. Eburon Uitgeverij BV

<sup>516</sup> We will use the abbreviation WLPS and WLP lobby and advocacy interchangeably, always referring to the unit of analysis unless stated otherwise.

<sup>517</sup> Based on financial details provided by the CSU and Financial department within Cordaid on 18-11-2014, as a reaction to the question 'what was the MFS II budget of the ILA programme under evaluation?'

<sup>518</sup> The theory of change has also been described in the baseline report of this evaluation and for that reason will only be briefly summarised here.

<sup>519</sup> ILA Evaluation MFS II Baseline Report (February 2013). This section is based on the official MFS II proposal, as this is the

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starting reference point for the evaluation at T0. Therefore, the strategies and objectives may differ from what is realised in practice.

<sup>520</sup> Hereafter described as NAP 1325 Working Group or NAP 1325 WG. This is the NL-based Gender platform that advocates issues in Dutch internal and international policies.

<sup>521</sup> New Deal for engagement in fragile states to ensure aid effectiveness is an international dialogue on peacebuilding and statebuilding (IDPS) consisting of the G7+ group of 19 fragile and conflict-affected countries, development partners and international organisations. See for more information: <http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document/>

<sup>522</sup> UN Security Resolution 1325 is about women, peace and security and was ratified on 31 October 2000.

<sup>523</sup> GNWP is the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders in New York: <http://www.gnwp.org/>

<sup>524</sup> The coherence within the MFS II Alliance, which the broad indicator specifically refers to is not relevant for our unit of analysis.

<sup>525</sup> The Post-2015 discussions are held worldwide and consider the development goals after the Millennium goals have come to an end in 2015. The discussions are about leadership, accountability and efforts should be achieved post-2015. See for more information: <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/beyond2015.shtml>

<sup>526</sup> See note 292 on the New Deal.

<sup>527</sup> Transition monitoring is about monitoring security transitions specifically also for women during the NATO transition of responsibilities to the Afghan government and security forces.

<sup>528</sup> Based on observations, interviews with external and internal resource persons, email exchanges and documentation regarding the MFM.

<sup>529</sup> Based on internal email exchanges and changes in UK NAP 1325 document; and interviews with external resource persons.

<sup>530</sup> Commission on the Status of Women, following the Beijing conference in 2010 where the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action were signed. The CSW is the commission's meeting on the status of women and around this meeting is a two week event in New York, focusing on women's rights and where women's organisations, movements and groups come together for (formal and informal) meetings, side events and discussions.

<sup>531</sup> This becomes very clear in, among others in an email conversation between the different actors.

<sup>532</sup> UNSC, 23 September 2014: Report of the Secretary-General on women, peace and security, S/2014/693.

<sup>533</sup> Ibid, point 67, page 30.

<sup>534</sup> Commission on the Status of Women, following the Beijing conference in 2010 where the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action were signed. The CSW is the commission's meeting on the status of women and around this meeting is a two week event in New York, focusing on women's rights and where women's organisations, movements and groups come together for (formal and informal) meetings, side events and discussions.

<sup>535</sup> Based on (in-) formal email exchanges, interviews with internal and external resource persons, conversations and observations during the meetings in 2013 and 2014 in New York and documents regarding the UK NAP 1325.

<sup>536</sup> In a public event on 14-03-2014 during the CSW 58 weeks. Event by Cordaid and GNWP.

<sup>537</sup> The *Mesa Interredes Santander* brings together the networks of the province of Santander: the Red Metropolitana de Mujeres, the Red para el Empoderamiento Político y Económico de la Provincia de Vélez, the Red de Mujeres del Nororiente Colombiano - Provincia García Rovira and the Red de Mujeres del Magdalena Medio.

<sup>538</sup> See <http://iatiregistry.org/dataset/cordaid-activities> for Cordaid in IATI.

<sup>539</sup> Stachowiak, S. (2013). Pathways for change: 6 theories about how policy change happens.

<sup>540</sup> Owen, T. (2008). 'Measuring human security. Methodological challenges and the importance of geographically referenced determinants', in: P.H. Liotta et al. (eds.), *Environmental change and human security* (2008), p. 35-64, p. 43.

<sup>541</sup> Paffenholz, T. (2009). *Civil society and peacebuilding*. CCDP Working Paper, p. 14.

<sup>542</sup> Paffenholz, T and Spurk, C. (2006). *Civil society, civic engagement and peacebuilding*. World Bank Social development papers: conflict prevention and reconstruction, no. 36, October.

<sup>543</sup> Ibid, 12; Fischer, M. (2011). 'Civil Society in Conflict Transformation: Strengths and Limitations', in Austin, B., Fischer, M. and Giessmann, H.J., (eds.) *Advancing Conflict Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II*. Leverkusen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 291-294.

<sup>544</sup> Paffenholz, T. (2009). *Civil society and peacebuilding*. CCDP Working Paper, p. 7.

<sup>545</sup> Ibid: p. 14; McKeon, N. (2009). *The United Nations and civil society. Legitimizing global governance – whose voice?* London: Zed Books.

<sup>546</sup> Interviews Alliance staff, October 2012

<sup>547</sup> FFF MFS II Proposal (2010)

<sup>548</sup> Woocher, L. (2009). *Preventing violent conflict. Assessing progress, meeting challenges*. Washington: United States Institute for Peace.

<sup>549</sup> A few outcomes deemed important by GPPAC that were achieved beyond September 2014 were also included.

<sup>550</sup> By October 2014

<sup>551</sup> Referred to as 'goals' in the strategic plan that formed the basis for the ToC.

<sup>552</sup> This is not to suggest that visible association with a global network is beneficial for members in all contexts.

<sup>553</sup> Tadjbaksh, S. (2014). *Human security twenty years on*. Oslo: Noref.

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- <sup>554</sup> UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). 2012. Follow-up to Paragraph 143 on Human Security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome. A/RES/66/290 of September 10th.
- <sup>555</sup> Wisotzi, Simone (2009). 'Negotiating human security at the UN. Transnational civil society, arms control and disarmament' in *Transnational activism in the UN and the EU. A comparative study*. J. Joachim and B. Locher (eds.). London: Routledge, p. 77, quoting Thakur and Newman 2000 and Fisher 1999).
- <sup>556</sup> Tadjbaksh, S. (2014). *Human security twenty years on*. Oslo: Noref.
- <sup>557</sup> A common practice among CSOs, see Carpenter, C. (2014). *'Lost' causes: agenda vetting in global Issue networks and the shaping of human security*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- <sup>558</sup> Wall, K., Aulin, J and Vogelaar, G. (eds.). (2014). *Empowerment and protection. Stories of human security*. The Hague: GPPAC.
- <sup>559</sup> Tadjbaksh, S. (2014). *Human security twenty years on*. Oslo: Noref, p. 2.
- <sup>560</sup> United Nations General Assembly. A/68/685. Follow-up to General Assembly resolution 66/290 on human security. Report of the Secretary-General. December 23, 2013.
- <sup>561</sup> This can be surfaced from the many internal documents: annual plans, strategic planning, annual reporting, annual narrative reports and the action agenda by GPPAC South East Asia.
- <sup>562</sup> Not all Southeast Asian countries are included, because it is difficult to ensure membership in some of the countries due to the lack of political space for CSOs.
- <sup>563</sup> Based on interviews with the Regional Secretariat staff, the Regional Representative; and observations during the meeting days.
- <sup>564</sup> Unfortunately no further substantiation was possible to test this claim.
- <sup>565</sup> Observed during the RSG meeting, transcribed notes.
- <sup>566</sup> An external Interviewee mentioned this and showed pictures of the meetings that were held including notes with the GPPAC logo on it.
- <sup>567</sup> Interesting literature on the context and the conflict in Mindanao to read are, amongst others: Adam, J, Verbrugge, B., van den Boer, D. (2014). *Hybrid systems of conflict management and community-level efforts to improve local security in Mindanao*. Theories in practice series Asia Foundation; International Alert. (2014). *Mindanao's shadow economies, minimising risks, maximising peace dividends*, Policy brief April; Lara, F and Champain, P. (2009). *Inclusive peace in Muslim Mindanao: revisiting the dynamics of conflict and exclusion*. International Alert; Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. (2011). *Armed violence in Mindanao. Militia and private armies*. Lausanne: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; D. Hilhorst (2003) *The real world of NGOs*. London: Zed Books.
- <sup>568</sup> Interviewee in Mindanao.
- <sup>569</sup> Nora McKeon 2009. *The United Nations and Civil Society. Legitimizing Global Governance – whose voice?* London: Zed Books.
- <sup>570</sup> Ibid
- <sup>571</sup> Fischer, M. (2011). 'Civil Society in Conflict Transformation: Strengths and Limitations', in Austin, B., Fischer, M. and Giessmann, H.J., (eds.) *Advancing Conflict Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II*. Leverkusen: Barbara Budrich Publishers.
- <sup>572</sup> Ibid
- <sup>573</sup> Earl, S., Carden, F. and Smutylo, T. (2001). *Outcome mapping. Building learning and reflection into development programs*. Ottawa: IDRC.
- <sup>574</sup> Track 2 processes refer to non-governmental, informal and unofficial processes, contacts and activities. These are the processes happening outside of the official realm of the governmental channels and diplomacy.
- <sup>575</sup> Keck, M. E., and Sikkink, K. (1999). Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. *International Social Science Journal*, 51(159), 89-101; Price, R. (2003). Transnational civil society and advocacy in world politics. *World politics* 55: 579-606; Berkeley Centre for religion, peace and world affairs (2007). *Insider/outsider advocacy strategies*; Carbert, A. (2004). *Learning from experience: activist reflections on insider-outsider strategies.*, AWID Spotlight 4, December 2004.
- <sup>576</sup> CIVICUS. (2013). *State of Civil Society 2013: creating and enabling environment*.
- <sup>577</sup> Ramalingam, B., Jones, H., Reba, T., & Young, J. (2008). *Exploring the science of complexity: Ideas and implications for development and humanitarian efforts* (Vol. 285). London: Overseas Development Institute.
- <sup>578</sup> According to analysts not only the abilities of the UN to perform a role towards global change is questioned also reluctance to civil society influence is noted (McKeon 2009)
- <sup>579</sup> One of a range of perverse effects of results-based approaches, see Eyben, R. (Ed.). (2006). *Relationships for aid*. London: Routledge
- <sup>580</sup> Lowery, D. (2013). Lobbying influence: Meaning, measurement and missing. *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 2(1), 1-26
- <sup>581</sup> Cf. Teles, S. and Schmitt, M. (2011). *The elusive craft of evaluating advocacy*. Stanford Social Innovation Review, May.
- <sup>582</sup> Wong, W. H. (2012). *Internal affairs: How the structure of NGOs transforms human rights*. Cornell University Press.
- <sup>583</sup> Wierdsma, A. F. M. (1999). *Co-creatie van verandering*. Eburon Uitgeverij BV
- <sup>584</sup> Mosse, D. (2004). Is good policy unimplementable? Reflections on the ethnography of aid policy and practice. *Development and change*, 35(4), 639-671.

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<sup>585</sup> For this cluster, the North–South connection is missing, to some extent. In the Alliance in this cluster, the build-up from local South to North and international level was taken out of the programme because of a budget cut. In fact, the international lobby and advocacy component was initially cut entirely and afterwards reintroduced—in a much more modest way—by this Alliance.

<sup>586</sup> See e.g. Teles B. and Schmitt M. (2011) ‘The elusive craft of evaluating advocacy’, in: *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, May, p. 39–43; Jones, H. (2011) ‘A guide to monitoring and evaluating policy influence’, *ODI Background notes*, February; Coffman, J., E. Reed (2008) ‘Unique methods in advocacy evaluation’; Tsui, J. (2013). *The effectiveness of measuring influence*. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 911; Patton, M. Q. (2008). Advocacy impact evaluation. *Journal of MultiDisciplinary Evaluation*, 5(9), 1-10

# MFS II EVALUATIONS

Joint evaluations of the Dutch Co-Financing System 2011 - 2015

*Civil Society contribution to policy change*

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## International Lobbying & Advocacy report

Outcomes Annex

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July 2015

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Please be aware that this report is still confidential, pending an assessment of whether its contents could put at risk the safety of any partners mentioned. Once this assessment is completed, the report can be made public.

**SGE** Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties



Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research  
WOTRO Science for Global Development

# **MFS II Joint Evaluation of International Lobbying and Advocacy**

## **Outcomes Annex**

Bodille Arensman

Jennifer B. Barrett

Arend Jan van Bodegom

Dorothea Hilhorst

Dieuwke C. Klaver

Elisabet D. Rasch

Wolfgang Richert

Cornélie van Waegeningh

Annemarie Wagemakers

Margit van Wessel





## **Preface**

This document contains overviews of outcomes for each of the eight evaluated programmes, as well as brief discussions of the outcomes' relevance and way programmes have contributed to the outcomes.



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# 1 Ecosystem Alliance: outcomes, relevance, contribution

*Introductory remark.* Regarding most of the themes assessed in this evaluation with outcomes to which the EA contributed, have one of the three EA members as lead partner and as major contributor. The contribution descriptions below have a focus on this leading EA partner but in many cases the other EA partners have also contributed, but often more indirectly, through the coordination that takes place because the three organizations together are one Alliance or through own separate, but coordinated activities. These (indirect) contributions are not all mentioned/listed.

## 1.1 Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) / Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM) (theme 1)

*Outcome 1 (IWRM): In 2011, the preparation of a land use plan for the Tana delta was initiated by the Government of Kenya and a strategic environmental assessment was carried out.*

Description:

The Tana delta is a vast wetland system on the Indian Ocean coast of Kenya and was designated as a Ramsar site in 2012. At the same time, the delta has been designated by the Kenyan government as a priority area for large-scale developments, such as biofuel production and the construction of hydroelectric dams. Up to now, there is no integrated land use plan for the Tana delta and competing claims on natural resources are a continuous cause of conflict in the area. The Kenyan government has tried to suppress the surge of violent conflicts in the area by a series of military interventions. As a result, there is very little trust in the authorities among local communities in the delta.

The advocacy campaigns of this Alliance resulted in the formation of an Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee in August 2010 tasked to develop a governance framework for all delta areas in Kenya, starting with the Tana delta.<sup>1</sup> In 2011, the preparation of a land use plan for the Tana delta was initiated by the Government of Kenya and a strategic environmental assessment was carried out.<sup>2</sup>

Relevance:

The Tana River Delta Land Use Plan is a collaborative effort of various stakeholders at national, local and international levels. It is the most comprehensive milestone so far in the preparation of policy that will contribute to sustainable development of the delta. Preparation of the Land Use Plan for Tana River Delta to guide policy formulation and decision-making on future development of the Delta started in September 2011 through the Ministry of Lands and with involvement of other agencies. It is part of a programme to coordinate the sustainable management of Deltas in Kenya, initiated in July 2011 by the Office of the Prime Minister with an Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee composed of 18 ministries. Consultations were carried out in 106 villages in the Delta and the new County government has fully supported the LUP and SEA.

Contribution:

Since 2007, Nature Kenya has campaigned against haphazard development of the Tana delta. Together with local communities, the organisation advocates small-scale, sustainable development alternatives. For greater impact, Nature Kenya has joined forces with Wetlands International Africa, ELCI and WLR in the Ecosystem Alliance Kenya.

The process of drafting the land use plan involves extensive stakeholder consultations at the national and the local level. Nature Kenya and the Ecosystem Alliance Kenya have played an important role in organising the input for the land use plan at the local level and executing the strategic environmental assessment. By actively involving local communities, Nature Kenya aims at building trust among

different stakeholders and including local communities in the planning process. In their words, Nature Kenya thus contributes to sustainable development by leading from behind.

*Outcome 2 (IWRM): In 2011, the governments of Togo and Benin initiated the process of establishing the Mono River Basin Authority (MBA).*

**Description:**

The basin of the Mono River, in the border region of Togo and Benin, is one of West-Africa's many transboundary river basins. The river Mono, meaning mother of the road in one of the local languages, has since time immemorial served as a transport route and a reliable source of water for the local population. Like many transboundary rivers in Africa, however, the Mono basin has been subject to top-down, technocratic planning and poor coordination between government authorities on either side of the border. Over time, the river has become increasingly fragmented and polluted by hydroelectric dams, mining activities and large-scale agriculture. As a result, for many of those depending on the river for their livelihood, the mother of the road has turned into the mother of troubles.

From Cotonou to Lomè, since 2012 series of meetings between the Ministries of Water of Togo and Benin were held, leading to the validation of legal texts, creating the Mono Basin Authority (MBA) in early 2014.

**Relevance:**

Although it may be a step towards an integrated way of managing the transboundary basin, the formation of the MBA has largely been a top-down process.

Although serious challenges remain, JVE's efforts (a Both ENDS partner; see 'Contribution') have been instrumental in mobilizing local communities and making their voices heard in the planning process for the Mono River basin.

**Contribution:**

The *Jeunes Volontaires pour l'Environnement* (JVE) are a Togo-headquartered environmental NGO operating in 22 countries, predominantly in francophone Africa. Since its foundation in the early 2000s, JVE has advocated against the construction of dams in the Mono River and other forms of large-scale development which have involved displacement of thousands of people. Currently, JVE campaigns against the plans to construct the massive Adjaralla dam, which is supposed to make Togo less dependent on energy imports. By raising awareness and uniting local communities, JVE strive to achieve equitable and sustainable development in the Mono River basin.

In 2011, the governments of Togo and Benin initiated the process of establishing the Mono River Basin Authority (MBA). Although it may be a step towards an integrated way of managing the transboundary basin, the formation of the MBA has largely been a top-down process. With the support of Both Ends, nevertheless, JVE has successfully engaged in dialogue with government authorities and has been the only CSO playing an active role in the creation of the MBA. Moreover, JVE has set up a Mono users committee in Togo and is in the process of establishing a Mono citizens board and a Mono CSO forum. By adopting the Negotiated Approach, JVE has evolved from a militant group countering large-scale development projects and the private sector, into a constructive ally in achieving sustainable development.

*Outcome 3 (IWRM): The UNECE Water Convention and partners is currently developing a protocol to analyse the water-food-energy nexus at river basin level.*

Description:

The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Water Convention) is intended to strengthen national measures for the protection and ecologically sound management of transboundary surface waters and groundwaters.<sup>3</sup> The UNECE Water Convention and partners is currently developing a protocol to analyse the water-food-energy nexus at river basin level. This protocol is being rolled out in 8 river basins around the world.<sup>4</sup> The aim is to ensure that analyses of the nexus include consideration of the role ecosystems play in the regulation of water supply and are not just considered as users of water or nature.

Relevance:

In this way the importance of wetland ecosystems to supporting the livelihoods of communities can be more easily factored into decisions on water investments and operational decision-making.

Contribution:

Wetlands International has and is continuing to work with the UNECE Water Convention and partners to develop the protocol.

Wetlands International has also successfully advocated for the Niger Basin represented by the Niger Basin Authority to be represented as one of the basins in the study.

## **1.2 Customary Use and Traditional Knowledge at the CBD (theme 1)**

*Outcome 4 (CBD): In the context of the UN Convention on Biodiversity, the Working Group on Article 8(j) adopted in 2013 an action plan with concrete measures to respect and support for customary sustainable use of biodiversity by indigenous and local communities.*

Description:

This action plan has been adopted during the eight meeting of this working group (WG8(j)-8) for formal approval by COP12 in 2014.<sup>5</sup>

Relevance:

International (binding) biodiversity agreements, which national governments commit to implementing at (sub)national levels, needs to include specific aspects related to respect and support for customary sustainable use of biodiversity by indigenous and local communities and more broadly related issues of land tenure, traditional knowledge and occupation. The adoption of the proposal marks a shift in decision-making approaches and acknowledgement of the value and important contributions to biodiversity by local knowledge holders and practitioners. The local realities and initiatives are increasingly translated into international policy.

The approach of acknowledging the value and contribution of local biodiversity knowledge, for instance in measuring trends in local ecosystems, or in communities' well-being, livelihoods and practices, is also relatively new and can be called a break-through vis-à-vis the dominance of science and top-down biodiversity planning and decision-making. The ground-breaking new approach of IPBoth ENDSS, which is a diverse knowledge platform rather than a science platform, where indigenous and local communities actively participate, is a clear sign of this shift.



Contribution:

EA funds were used to enable FPP and partners to attend and actively engage in relevant meetings to share materials and put forward ideas and recommendations that have informed some of the outcomes (both in formal meeting sessions and in information-sharing side events).

This outcome is not only the achievement of FPP and partners, but also of other active participants from wider networks such as IIFB network on CBMIS.

### **1.3 Mining (theme 2)**

*Outcome 5 (Mining): On 17 December 2013 the European Parliament took a final position on the Non-Financial Reporting Directive asking the Commission to enhance the transparency and other CSR aspects of this Directive.*

Description:

The objective of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFR) is to increase EU companies' transparency and performance on environmental and social matters.<sup>6</sup>

The directive will require large listed companies to report annually on principal risks to human rights, the environmental and social impacts linked to their operations, relationships, products and services – as well as aspects related to bribery and diversity – and their due diligence procedures for identifying, preventing and mitigating those risks. The reform recognizes that such risks must be disclosed regardless of what a company considers being relevant, i.e. material, to the interests of its shareholders, which was the organizing principle of the accounting law until now.

As has been often the case, the EP was more progressive than the EU member states. Tripartite meetings between EP, EC and European Council are currently (April 2014) going on.

Specifically, the Parliament asks the Commission to develop (1) guidance to help companies to report on four resource indicators, (2) a requirement to report on the most severe risks in supply chains to communities and the environment, (3) a clear definition of the risks that are to be reported, that should include impacts that a company has on communities and the environment, (4) strengthening of the reference to international reporting standards that should be used: the OECD guidelines and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and (5) a review clause arranging that the effectiveness of the new law will be monitored.<sup>7</sup>

Although NGOs advocated for it the Parliament did NOT include a reporting requirement on the resource indicators in its final position.

Relevance:

Investors looking for companies with good environmental, social and governance track records will [now] find the job easier among other things, non-financial reporting requirements will make it more difficult for investors to plead ignorance—and, therefore, avoid questions of potential divestment—when it comes to the social responsibility (or not) of the investments in their portfolios.

This legislation is the first step in embedding into EU law the corporate responsibility to respect human rights and the environment as it is expressed in the UN Guiding Principles and OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

Civil society can become a player in the implementation, e.g. by identifying best practices and providing input to the Commission for the future review process, especially on scope, enforcement and quality

of the reporting on key aspect (supply chain, risks, due diligence, comply or explain...). The directive will provide civil society with a strong legal basis to address non-compliance. The private sector annual reports will have to provide this information. So the annual report now gives civil society a clear point of engagement with the company - an opening for a discussion on their performance.

**Contribution:**

EA gave financial support to Milieudedefensie. The lobby in Brussels was primarily done by the ECCJ (European Coalition for Corporate Justice) and FoE Europe. Milieudedefensie had a strong working relationship with ECCJ and FoE Europe.

To rally support for the EC proposal and to counter the lobby from Business Europe, Milieudedefensie approached DSM, Philips, Tata Steel and De Groene Zaak. After meetings none of them was willing to make a public statement in favour of the NFR and the NGO proposals to strengthen the directive, but Philips allowed Milieudedefensie to quote them positively on the NFR, which FoE EWNI did in an opinion article in the Independent. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD, approached by FoE EWNI), and the investors' community (Eumedion for the Netherlands, approached by Milieudedefensie) were the only pro transparency voices from the side of business.

Efforts by Milieudedefensie and the Dutch NGO coalition called MVO Platform to build relationships with the Dutch ministries of Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs were not very successful. The position of the Dutch government remained supportive of the EC proposal but did not become more progressive.

*Outcome 6 (Mining): In 2013/14 Dutch political parties meet NGOs to discuss the issue of EU's conflict metals policy but do not yet prioritize progressive standpoints in their EU election programmes.*

**Description:**

In 2013 DG Trade from the European Commission started a *Public consultation on a possible EU initiative on responsible sourcing of minerals originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.*

The new European Parliament, which was elected on 25 May 2014, has/will have an important role in defining the EU's conflict metals policy, which will be proposed by the new European Commission. In September 2013 Milieudedefensie together with ActionAid NL therefore approached the Dutch political parties, that were preparing themselves for the EP elections, with concrete suggestions for their election programmes. Not much of this NGO-language about this technical subject became visible in the manifestos of the Dutch parties. This is one of the first steps in a policy making process that possibly takes a few years.

In July 2013 the Commission published the consultation report<sup>8</sup> and in March 2014 the Commission presented its proposal regarding the responsible trade in conflict minerals.<sup>9</sup>

**Relevance:**

An EU initiative on responsible sourcing of conflict minerals would help the lobby for IMVO (International Corporate Social Responsibility) and would facilitate the levelling of the corporate playing field with regard to responsible sourcing.

Setting the agenda of Dutch political parties is one way to influence the position of the new European Parliament which has an important role to play in defining the EU's future conflict metals policy. Milieudedefensie considers the correspondence as the overture to a round of lobbying among the newly elected MEPs after the elections.

Contribution:

- In June 2013, Milieudefensie sent a formal response to EC DG Trade Public consultation. There were 280 replies altogether.<sup>10</sup>
- In September 2013, Milieudefensie together with ActionAid NL approached the Dutch political parties that were preparing themselves for the EP elections.
- In March 2014, in response to the draft regulation by the Commission, Milieudefensie, together with SOMO, PAX and the Foundation Max van der Stoel (FMS) sent a letter to the Dutch Minister Ploumen of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation and Minister Kamp of Economic Affairs.

*Outcome 7 (Mining): In 2013 the Cameroon NGO SEEAC, which is a regional EIA association for Central Africa, provided coaching and technical back-stopping to a number of Cameroonian NGOs (including the IUCN country office) with regard to an official letter to the WB and Minister of Mining regarding the obligation of the Government of Cameroon to conduct a full SEA process for the Waza Logone Floodplain in relation to a number of mega impact projects under development. One of these projects is the oil exploration by Chinese Yang Chang Development Company just North of Waza Logone National Park (RAMSAR / UNESCO MaB status and part of the international Lake Chad Treaty [CBLT]).*

Relevance:

First, this was a capacity strengthening exercise for the Cameroonian partner NGOs and the IUCN country office to convene a meeting amongst high level 'non willing actors'. The meeting proved that it was a needed and useful effort to sometimes convene meeting between opposites in order to make progress. Second, this whole process, which is ongoing, had a positive influence on awareness in Cameroon EIA / SEA compliance and on network building between civil society groups.

Contribution EA:

The EA financially supported the SEEAC.<sup>11</sup>

#### **1.4 Biomass NL (theme 2)**

*Outcome 8 (Biomass NL): In June 2014 the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs sent a letter to the parliament to implement a coalition agreement of the Dutch Rutte-Asscher administration on the optimal use of biomass through cascading. (Policy change)*

Description:

After the inclusion of the cascading principle for biomass in the government agreement in October 2012, the Ministry of Economic Affairs has sent a letter to the parliament on 18 June 2014 on more value from biomass through cascading. The fact that there is a letter from the ministry on this subject and that the letter contains concrete plans is a step forward to more efficient use of biomass. Most useful policies proposed in this letter are: 1) Monitoring and analysis of the impact of bioenergy and biofuels on other sectors using biomass, including the statement that action will be taken when negative impacts occur; 2) a sector agreement with the packaging industry to stop the decline in recycling and to stop the use of good quality material for electricity production; 3) development of a strategy for optimal use of biomass by 2030; 4) support for innovation and R&D on bio-refinery and cascading technologies.

#### Relevance:

Cascading or rather the optimal use of biomass is a critical element of good resource governance. There is a growing demand for biomass for food, feed, fibre, chemicals and energy and the amount of biomass that can be produced in a sustainable way is limited. If the society wants to cater for all these markets and wants to protect ecosystems, we have to make smarter use of the resources we have. Reducing the overall demand for biomass feedstock by using feedstock smarter - doing less with more - is key to realizing sustainable development of the Bio-based economy (BBE) and to reducing the impact of the BBE on valuable ecosystems.

In principal this so-called *coalition agreement* is used as a blueprint for policy development by the current government. In preparation for a letter to the parliament on the implementation of cascading in the Bio-based economy, the ministry of Economic affairs did consult with the Dutch Committee on Biomass Sustainability (Corbey Committee) of which IUCN NL and Both ENDS are both members.

The policies proposed in the ministerial letter from June 2014 are definitely a step in the right direction, but still a lot remains to be done. For example: although it is important to monitor effects and to invest in innovations, this will not immediately lead to action to halt sub-optimal use. The sector agreement for the packaging industry is a concrete step, but only for a specific group. Also the strong financial support for biomass use in coal fired power plants remains unaltered; this is not a long term sustainable solution. Moreover there is no level playing field between the energy, chemical and material sectors. More innovative and more sustainable uses of biomass don't get equal support compared to energy.

#### Contribution:

Together with representatives of the Dutch private sector, IUCN NL actively promoted the inclusion of optimal use of biomass through cascading in the green growth chapter of the government agreement of the current Rutte-Asscher government. The starting point for the joint lobby for inclusion of cascading in the government agreement was a workshop with members of the parliament and private sector representatives on 31 May 2012 (Werkgroep Den Haag) titled "How sustainable is the Biobased Economy" chaired by Alexander Rinnooy Kan. In parallel Dutch MPs were consulted directly by the NGO biomass consortium "Biomassa Binnenste Buiten" on this subject. In the follow-up of these activities private sector partners took the idea further and pushed for inclusion in the government agreement. Further IUCN NL and Both ENDS contributed to several relevant advices of the Corbey Committee on sustainable biomass development<sup>12</sup> which were also referred to in the advice of the Social Economic Council on Biomass. Wetlands offered advice on the need for avoidance of biofuel plantation development (notably palm oil) on peat and offered evidence on the negative impacts of wood chips – e.g. from the US - with forest management standards in the US which, for example, do not meet Dutch and EU sustainability requirements. In addition IUCN NL, together with Natuur & Milieu, Oxfam Novib and WWF, sent a letter on 25 April 2013 to the parliament committee on economic affairs explaining the importance of optimal use of biomass and requesting them to inquire about the actions taken to implement this during their May 2013 meeting with the Minister of Economic Affairs on Biomass policy.

Furthermore, in May 2014, IUCN NL, Greenpeace, Natuur & Milieu and WWF published the report "Biomassa als grondstof of als brandstof"<sup>13</sup> that provided new insights in the way that current policies negatively impact the optimal use of biomass. The report and its main conclusions were directly shared with the involved Ministries (EZ/I&M) as input for their policy letter on cascading. At the same time MP's were informed by a joint letter by the NGO partners. The NGO input was supported by 2 letters from the private sector that also concluded that a lack of level playing field between the biobased sectors leads to sub-optimal use of biomass resources. Also the report got media attention (among others Radio1, BNR News Radio, Trouw). The combination of these efforts has led to the recognition

of the issue in the policy letter and directly by the Minister of Economic affairs in a radio interview on the subject.

In the advice from the Corbey Committee on sustainability in the food sector published 27 June 2014, in which IUCN NL played an active role cascading and optimal use of biomass is also presented as important solution. Through intervention of IUCN NL and Natuur & Milieu questions will be asked by MP's during the AO Food that is planned fall 2014 on what the Minister will do with the recommendations in the Committee Corbey advice.

*Outcome 9 (Biomass NL): In September 2013, the Dutch government, industry representatives and environmental organisations agreed on sustainability criteria for solid biomass as a prerequisite for the use of biomass in coal fired power plants.*

Description:

This agreement is part of the larger agreement on energy and climate goals for 2020, the so-called SER Energy agreement. The criteria for solid biomass include the criteria set in the NTA8080 standard and additional criteria for sustainable forest management, indirect land use change and carbon debt. Moreover parties have agreed to use these sustainability criteria as their input in the European discussions on sustainability of solid biomass.

Relevance:

The inclusion of these criteria in the SER Energy agreement is an important step in extending the sustainability requirements for biofuels to all uses of biomass. Currently the market for wood pellets is increasing rapidly due to renewable energy policies in Europe. This is causing adverse effects in for example the South of the US, where swamp forests are felled for the pellet industry. By setting strict sustainability requirements for pellets used for co-firing in power plants these negative effects can be avoided. The Dutch government will implement the SER energy agreement and the sustainability requirements for solid biomass. Further it has agreed to use these requirements as the Dutch input in the discussions in Brussels.

These criteria are strict because they go beyond the criteria in the EU RED and also incorporate sustainable forest management and social sustainability criteria. At the time of writing the negotiations are still ongoing on how to implement the criteria, but the agreement is that the certification systems used to prove sustainability should be equivalent to the NTA8080 norm plus FSC. Both standards are recognised as high quality both in content as in level of assurance.

Interventions therefore took place on a national level, but also have an impact on the Dutch input in Brussels.

Contribution:

The coalition of Dutch environmental NGOs, Greenpeace, WWF NL, Natuur & Milieu and IUCN NL, organised a seminar on sustainability of solid biomass for energy on 4 April 2013 in The Hague.<sup>14</sup> The seminar was well attended by representatives from the Dutch government, Dutch companies and academia/NGOs. In addition to this seminar, on 15 March 2013 the organising NGOs sent a letter to the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs highlighting the importance of sustainability criteria for solid biomass and the ineffectiveness of using biomass in coal fired power plants as a long term renewable energy strategy.<sup>15</sup> In response the Minister invited the NGOs for a meeting to discuss these issues in more detail. In the meantime the other members of the described NGO coalition actively participated

in the negotiations for the SER energy agreement. IUCN NL, though not participating, was consulted for input in these discussions by the other NGOs.

## 1.5 Biofuels EU (theme 2)

*Outcome 10 (Biofuels EU): In September 2013, the European Parliament included in its first reading position on the proposal to amend the FQD and the RED the mandatory accounting of ILUC emissions through a series of feedstock-specific emission factors.*

### Description:

The Commission prepared the proposal to change the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD) and the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) in 2012. On 11 September 2013 the European Parliament adopted its first reading position.<sup>16</sup> This included a large number of amendments including the mandatory accounting of ILUC emissions through a series of feedstock-specific emission factors.<sup>17</sup> However, the Council of Ministers failed to reach a political agreement on the subject at the Energy Council in December 2013, and the file is currently stalled until the Council reaches an agreement. The issue already was on the agenda of the debate in 2008 when the RED and FQD were adopted and was awaiting political decision-making ever since.

### Relevance:

Although the file is stalled in Council while this evaluation takes place, the discussions on ILUC have made sure the issue is high on the political agenda. The high exposure of the issue seems to have played an important role in the Commission's thinking about the climate and energy package for the period between 2020 and 2030. The Commission opposed the proposal to include ILUC and based on informal information it seems that ILUC will be included only in 2020.

In the Commission proposal, published in January 2014,<sup>18</sup> there are no more quantitative targets for renewable energy in the transport sector (effectively removing the perverse incentive to biofuels that currently exists due to the 10% target enshrined in the RED), and the Commission acknowledges the need for strict safeguards (not just for biofuels but also for biomass used for energy production).

### Contribution:

Throughout the whole period, Wetlands International operated in cooperation with several Brussels-based NGOs, mainly the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), BirdLife, Friends of the Earth and Transport & Environment, Wetlands International reviewed several research reports and shared the information with other NGOs. Wetlands International promoted the inclusion of mandatory ILUC accounting in the RED and FQD. Wetlands International did not do the lobbying itself but introduced it via the other NGOs that were better positioned in order to have the influence. Wetlands International produced a policy brief<sup>19</sup> and sent it to relevant Members of the European Parliament and to all European Ministers of Environment.

Recently Wetlands International hired a new policy officer for the EU who has the task to follow these developments. And the organization is currently re-assessing its strategy for the next half year.

### Related outcome:

As a result of the explicit clauses safeguarding wetlands and peatlands from possible degradation from biofuel production in the RED and FQD the forestry sectors in Finland and Sweden and the European sector on peat excavation started to become of this issue. This is relevant because both countries manage large forests on peat and drain this peat for the purpose of wood production, including biomass.

## 1.6 Palm oil (theme 2)

*Outcome 11 (Palm oil): Between 2011 and 2014, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) endorses and establishes a dispute settlement facility to help assist both communities and plantation companies to resolve their conflicts with external mediation assistance*

Description and intermediate outcomes:

- 2009-2011: A RSPO DSF Working Group organized a series of consultations and formulated DSF Protocol and action plan which was endorsed by the RSPO Executive Board and, after public consultations, formally agreed in January 2012
- In 2012, a DSF Unit with staff was established within the RSPO Secretariat in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta and fully resourced.
- The Chair of RSPO Board formally announces the DSF during the plenary opening at the Round Table 10 in November 2012.
- In 2013 the RSPO Board accepts a proposal to set up a multi-stakeholder DSF Advisory Group. This DSF AG is active since 2013 with Both ENDS as co-chair.
- In 2013 the General Assembly of the RSPO votes in favour of a resolution to review the RSPO Complaints Procedure and agreed to the following: 'To guarantee Fairness, Transparency & Impartiality in the Complaints Mechanism, the EB shall ensure that there is a strict separation of executive powers in handling complaints and grievances, in order for the Complaints System to be in line with the UNGP (...)' A report with conclusions and recommendations will be ready for Round Table 13 (Nov. 2014).
- A proposal for a "RSPO Outreach programme to intermediary organizations in palm oil producing countries" was endorsed by the RSPO Executive board. A CSO capacity and information needs assessment is now being conducted, based on the outcomes a multiple year action plan and budget will be formulated and resourced by RSPO to strengthen the role of local CSOs and other go-betweens to enable constructive dialogue between local CSOs, communities, companies and RSPO, and support for small holders.
- In 2014, the RSPO Board accepts a proposal to set up a DSF Trust Fund. This fund supports local communities and therefore gives them the opportunity to have ownership of the negotiation process in case of conflicts and complaints.
- 2014: The buy-in from plantation companies for the DSF increases.

*Outcome 12 (Palm oil): Key actors support and improve outreach to communities*

In 2013 the RSPO Board adopts the proposal from Both ENDS for a RSPO Outreach to intermediary organizations (local NGOs, community-based organisations). A needs assessment, an action plan and a budget are prepared for adoption of the RSPO board in November 2014.

*Outcome 13 (Palm oil): RSPO adopts the revised Principles & Criteria which include stronger social and environmental safeguards*

In 2012, Both ENDS is chosen by social NGOs and all RSPO members as representative in the RSPO Board. In 2013: The RSPO members (General Assembly) adopt the revised RSPO P&C.

*Outcome 14 (Palm oil): Alternative land uses and participatory land use planning are on the agenda of RSPO key actors*

In 2013 in NGO booth during RT 11 actors showed an increased level of interest in alternative land use. During the plenary opening RT 11 a film from Both ENDS, ICRAF, Mekon Ecology et al was presented: Mapping our Future. , highlighting need for local communities to make informed decisions about the future of their land use and the relevance of other land and forest based sources of basic needs, income and well being (e.g. medicinal plants, clean water) rather than only palm oil.

Relevance of outcomes 11-14:

- First ever agri-commodity round table mediation facility established;
- Sector takes responsibility for resolving land disputes;
- Sector takes responsibility, aslo financial, for information provision and capacity building loca civil society; and
- About 5 cases being handled by the DSF since it commenced. Since progress needs to be accelerated, RSPO decided to engage an outside professional agency to offer larger reach out and follow up with field offices. This is now in development. The RSPO DSF makes RSPO certified palm oil more credible since it helps safeguard that members producing, trading and buying RSPO certified palm oil adhere also in practice to the RSPO standard or, in case of land disputes, i.e. non-compliance, now have a means to resolve that.

Contribution EA to outcomes 11-14:

- Both ENDS is member of RSPO since 2005;
- Paul Wolvekamp from Both ENDS is member of RSPO Board since 2012;
- Both ENDS initiated a land dispute facility initiative within RSPO to help assist both communities and plantation companies to resolve their conflicts with external mediation assistance;
- Both ENDS led the RSPO DSF Working Group;
- Both ENDS is co-chair of the DSF Advisory Group which was established in 2013;
- EA members Both ENDS and IUCN NL and EA partners FPP and Sawit Watch et al. support local/national and international initiatives to enhance participatory land use planning to empower communities to make informed decisions regarding acceptance of rejection of plantation development on their land;
- EA partner Sawit Watch cs submitted a resolution during the 10th Round Table of the RSPO in Medan in November 2013 that was supported by EA-members, Both ENDS and Wetlands International and EA partners FPP et al.;
- Both ENDS proposed and actively advocated for the “RSPO Outreach programme to intermediary organisation in palm oil producing countries” and got this unanimously endorsed by RSOPO Board;
- In 2013, a ‘Conflict or Consent’ Workshop was organized by Both ENDS, FPP and TUK enabled over 50 community and local CSO representatives from Asia and Africa to discuss experiences with RSPO DSF and the IFC’s CAO grievances process, share concerns and express their demands – a.o. by issuing a joint statement to the RSPO General Assembly in Medan (Nov. 2013) and the Dutch Task Force on Sustainable Palm Oil;
- In 2013 and 2014 EA organized two trainings for Indonesian NGOs to learn effective lobbying with regard to national negotiations in Indonesia about the national interpretation of the RSPO standard;



- Both ENDS and partners developed a film ‘Mapping our Future’ which explains the process of decision making at village level with the aid of a community mapping process and to negotiate with companies and local government for recognition of their land rights and their right to make decisions based on their Free Prior Informed Consent – a key criterion of the RSPO Standard. The film was shown at the RSPO Plenary opening of RT 11 in Medan and at various other fora – in Indonesia and in the Netherlands and 600 hard copies made available to equip local trainers empowering communities;
- Next to the focus on dispute settlement, Both ENDS constantly discussed the issue of alternative land uses and participatory land use planning with stakeholders and decision makers; and
- Both ENDS (via Verite, Both ENDS as alternate), FPP and Wetlands International were active within the RSPO P&C working group that prepared the revised P&C.

*Outcome 15: The Dutch government supports RSPO, DSF mechanisms in commodity supply chains and support to communities’ capacity development*

In 2012, Both ENDS advocated for support from the Netherlands for the DSF-mechanisms in commodity supply chains. In response the Ministry of Economic Affairs commissions the The Hague Institute of Global Justice and IMI to assess the opportunities to develop DSF-mechanisms for biomass. Both ENDS participated in the advisory group. In 2013, ACCESS organizes an international seminar for grievances and conflict resolutions. In addition, the Dutch Commission Corbey presents a unanimous advice on social responsibility regarding biofuels (Advies Sociale verantwoordelijkheid biobrandstoffen) to the Dutch government, which included the DSF mechanism. The advice was shared with the European Commission.

In 2014, a number of Dutch Members of Parliament join an event of the ‘Werkgroep Den Haag’ which discusses the issue of land conflicts from biofuels expansions. In the same year, the Dutch minister Ploumen and her Indonesian counterparts sign an agreement to develop a Centre of Social Excellence and support for so called “One Map approach” to strengthen land use planning.

Relevance:

It is relevant that the issues dispute settlement and participatory land use planning get accepted as priority area where the Netherlands needs to step up its involvement and support. The Agreement by the Dutch minister Ploumen and her Indonesian counterparts to develop a Centre of Social Excellence is derived from the RSPO DSF and subsequent discussions to pool resources in Indonesia in support of land conflict resolution and capacity building.

Contribution:

- Two meetings between RSPO members (companies and NGO’s) and Dutch parliamentarians.
- Both ENDS participated in a meeting between members of the Board of RSPO and minister Ploumen.
- Both ENDS organized a meeting between representatives of the industry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss challenges and solutions for palm oil related issues.
- Organization of an agri-commodity event in The Hague, 30th October with representatives of the industry, Dutch government and EC and EA’s Southern partners – providing them a platform in Dutch and EU policy arena.
- 2008-2014: Several meetings and hearings with Dutch parlementarians and ministers in the Netherlands, Indonesia and Malaysia.

- Both ENDS was and still is member of the Commission Corbey and was co-coordinator of the writing group for the advice from the Commission to the Dutch government.
- 2012-2014. Several PBL studies with contributions from Both ENDS and other EA partners, such as FPP West Africa and NAPE, Uganda. Studies included local case studies. Presented to Dutch government with recommendations.
- Both ENDS presentation at Werkgroep Den Haag in 2014 about measures to regulate plantation development for the production of biofuels and the potential role for the Netherlands.

### 1.7 PO, Pulp and Peatlands (theme 2)

*Outcome 16 (PO, Pulp and Peatlands): In April 2013 the RSPO adopted revised Principles and Criteria, with key clauses and guidance regarding peatlands, GHG emissions and HCV area management.*

Key clauses are: (i) All peatlands under management must be mapped, (ii) no extensive expansion of oil palm on peatland, (iii) requirement of a drainability assessment: how long can the company continue before the land cannot be drained anymore (the guidance that was also adopted says that two cycles before this situation occurs re-planting should be considered, (iv) measure and publish GHG emissions, and (v) obligation to decrease the carbon footprint and report on it.<sup>20</sup>

Intermediate outcomes were:

Adoption of a resolution to establish a RSPO Peatland Working Group which was established in April 2010;

Broad understanding and acceptance in the RSPO of the issues at hand as expressed in public statements and in RSPO policies, especially with regard to the GHG issue; and

At the GA in 2013 the RSPO published a review of the environmental and social impacts of oil palm plantations on peat, as a result of the Peatland Working Group.

*Outcome 17 (PO, Pulp and Peatlands): Since 2013, an increasing number of major players in the industry (both palm oil and pulp wood sectors, upstream and downstream) make public commitments to avoid further expansion on peat.*

Most relevant examples are:

- Palm oil industry: Sime Darby, Wilmar (also made commitment 'no PO from peatlands' but withdrew this commitment), Unilever, Nestle, GAR (already in 2010; as result of Greenpeace campaign; similar to 'other worlds growers'), Kellogs;
  - Wetlands International has no data whether these companies adhere to these statements in their practice; but they must publish this information in 2016.
- Paper industry: APP ('no further development on peat'; is largely Greenpeace success. Wetlands International contributes by supporting the monitoring and APP's knowledge base and advocating that APP removes plantations from peatland), APRIL (no relevant public commitments, only trials regarding marginal changes), and over one hundred downstream companies such as Xerox, Disney, National Geographic, L'Oreal.

*Outcome 18 (PO, Pulp and Peatlands): A Presidential Decree in 2011 declares an Indonesian Moratorium on the development of peatlands and primary forest.*

**Description:**

In principal this results in the protection of all peatlands for which no concessions were given before the moratorium. Unfortunately a lot of concessions were given away before the moratorium. There are also large amounts of illegal activities, meaning that there are still a lot of new developments on peatlands. The moratorium was originally for two years and is extended for another two years. Next year there will be elections and a new government. The fear is that all these developments will be off the table.

**Relevance:**

Based on the above concrete results, according to Wetlands International, the rate of peatland conversion has decreased in Indonesia. In addition, all large companies that are RSPO certified do not use fire anymore in the development of new plantations. However, government needs to create a level playing field for responsible industry, and this is not yet the case. In Malaysia the conversion of peat swamp forests continues unabated, as most entrepreneurs in the palm oil sector are not member of the RSPO and government refuses to accept the science base on the issues.

**Contribution:**

The achieved successes are a result of continuous advocacy interventions from Wetlands International since 2006. The last three years this was done through the Ecosystem Alliance. On social issues Both Ends has been leading EA's advocacy work. Wetlands International put the issues on the agenda of both developed and developing countries, and provided continuous scientific, technical and policy input at relevant international meetings. The network of local partners is leading the lobby and advocacy on the issues and solutions nationally and locally, with scientific and technical support of the international EA partners.

**Specific to outcome:**

16. EA organized workshop with mainly Indonesian NGOs to share our knowledge. Wetlands International is RSPO member. Wetlands International contributed to the adoption of a resolution to set up the RSPO Peatland Working Group and then helped develop this group. This working group has informed the process for the RSPO principles and criteria.

17. Specific lobby on the president and on climate advisors of the president in which Wetlands International put peatlands on the agenda. Also lobby on government of Norway because this moratorium was one of tools to make the Indonesian commitment at the UNFCCC Bali Conference more concrete and trustworthy, including lobby on other key players, such as the Worldbank and the Netherlands embassy. Also Marcel Silvius placed a blog on RSPO website in summer 2014 in which he, amongst others, argues that RSPO needs to advocate for changes in the Indonesian public policy, otherwise there will never be a sustainable sector (the latter is also related to outcomes 1-3).

18. Wetlands International financed and supported Indonesian NGOs to participate in this process, bring their knowledge to the table and advocate for the right solutions.

## 1.8 Soy (theme 2)

*Outcome 19 (Soy): During the period 2012-2013 the RTRS produced broad scale conservation maps and indication of High Conservation Value Areas.*

### Description:

As a result of IUCN advocacy, a HCVA criterion has been included in the RTRS standard that was finalized in 2010, and it is mentioned under Criterion 4. This includes the plan to make conservation maps to come to nuanced decision-making about conservation priorities in case of expansion.<sup>21</sup>

In 2012-13 these maps were produced by a Technical Team, supported by an Advisory Committee, and went through extensive stakeholder consultation. Because these maps imply a reduction of expansion possibilities they have been met with resistance from producer organizations in RTRS, particularly for the implications in the Cerrado area. This led to the threat that those maps would not be accepted and used. The NGOs then advocated for a pilot period in order to verify the accuracy of the maps and to search for PES mechanisms for those farmers that suffer damage from the fact that they have to contribute to conservation (instead of conversion to farm land). At the end of 2012 an Advisory Committee was set up by the RTRS and accepted IUCN NL as participant. In its original proposal HCVA's were isolated and not well connected. This was changed by the Advisory Committee by acknowledging the need for *connectivity*. Another aspect that was changed is that the Committee added rules for field controls, which were not part of the original proposal.

### Relevance:

As a co-operation mechanism between Brazilian government and a voluntary standard setting mechanism, this is a ground-breaking governance tool. Results are expected in 2014-15.

The fact that the Advisory Committee added the connectivity and the rules for field controls in the standard makes this stronger and more relevant. These types of activities are important in Brazil and in the Netherlands but do not directly translate into hectares of saved biodiversity. That is why it remains very important to support NGOs and companies / producers who protect high conservation value areas against unbridled expansion.

### Contribution:

Until 2011 Both ENDS was rather critical about the RTRS. Since then the EA has actively promoted the RTRS in Brazil (and Paraguay) to develop broad scale conservation maps and indication of High Conservation Value Areas.

IUCN NL took seat in the advisory committee of the mapping process, and successfully advised RTRS to have a pilot phase to search for and test Payments for Environmental Services mechanisms to help conserve the High Conservation Value Areas. IUCN NL advocated for the need of *connectivity* and for field controls. Both elements were not well developed in the original proposal.

EA co-finances this PES mechanism. EA finances the search for a PES mechanism in soy landscapes, through or in combination with RTRS certification, and spends about 40.000 max on identification of potential existing mechanisms, and design and testing-out of a potential mechanisms

*Outcome 20 (Soy): The Dutch government and the Dutch soy sector, key stakeholders in the Dutch Soy Chain Transition Process (Ketentransitie), become aware that the sector has achieved insufficient progress towards the 2015 objective of 100% sourcing from RTRS or equivalent and take additional actions.*

Description:

In 2011 the Dutch soy sector, with pressure from IDH and NGOs such as in the Dutch Soy Coalition, decided and publically stated that they will source for 100 per cent from RTRS for the Dutch use in 2015, which would be 1.8 million ton. This was prior to this MFSII period and all stakeholders are now focusing on the question ‘and how are we going to achieve that?’

Mid March 2014 an additional tripartite meeting<sup>22</sup> was organized to discuss especially the progress towards to agreed goal of 100% RTRS in 2014. Not only NGOs but also the government representatives asked the sector critical questions to show the current results regarding the percentage of RTRS volumes. It showed that they are not going to make it, as a result of all kinds of reasons.

The government was not aware that the sector was sliding away from the objective and civil servants thought that the sector would achieve the objective in 2015. NGOs were aware that that would not be the case and that the sector is not open about not going to achieve the objective.

Whether or not the objective will be reached also depends on how the objective itself is being interpreted. The statement says 100% ‘RTRS or equivalent’. The Dutch government has had the position that the sector itself must determine what ‘equivalent’ means while the NGOs have the standpoint that this must be jointly agreed.

IUCN NL in cooperation with the Dutch government and the sector organized a meeting in April 2014 to discuss the technical details of equivalence. This is expected to become a tough battle. EA prepared the report *Betting on best quality* which is a kind of benchmark of benchmarks. In any case it is a complicated and technical debate in which the government each time has the tendency to withdraw from taking a clear standpoint.

Related and follow up outcomes: Government, NGOs, private sector actors and coalitions, as well as standards systems have greater insight into the quality differences of soy (and biomass and palm oil) standards and act upon it:

- The Soy Retailers Group (international, Europe), uses the Betting on Best Quality study as reference to decide for RTRS and Pro Terra;
- Through intervention of IUCN NL the Dutch Government (the relevant policy staff of Economic Affairs and External Affairs) has become more aware that the devil is in the detail of standards and keeps a critical eye on definition of equivalence (check!) and stimulates harmonization of insights;
- Through intervention of IUCN NL relevant EU biomass file holders as well as some major Dutch multinationals have become more aware of the relevance of “level of assurance” in allowing standards to prove sustainability;
- Through intervention of IUCN NL The Foundation Dutch Soy Transition, Consumer Goods Forum (international retail/manufacturers), Soy Retailers Group and European Federation of Feed Industry collaborate in further benchmarking process for transparent and well-based decision-making;
- The highest standard existing, the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomass uses the Betting on Best Quality study as backup for their work; and

- The Global Gap standard for pigs and poultry integrated the requirement that a clear list must be developed by 2015 what 'equivalent RTRS' is.

Relevance:

A jointly agreed and strict interpretation of 'equivalent to RTRS' is relevant because the risk of a 'race to the bottom' is real if the criteria or standards are not strict. It is also a political risk if a Dutch minister makes statements about how well the sector is doing while he/she does not know for sure what the rules of the game in fact are.

Over the years the Dutch government continuously withdraws from taking a pro-active standpoint with the result that systems threaten to slide to a weaker standard or that economic actors choose for weaker systems. It is therefore important that the NGOs hold the government and the sector accountable.

As a result of the above developments RTRS became a relevant lobby target for the EA with the main objective that this at least remains the minimum standard and that it does not slip further below. The result of THAT is practice change: buying the right type of soy.

Contribution:

IUCN NL and Both ENDS, in cooperation with Solidaridad and WWF NL, hold the sector accountable and we make sure that the government is aware of the too limited improvements within the Stichting Ketentransitie. Tools and activities are:

- Soy Barometer;
- Betting on best quality plus organizing in cooperation with the government/ministry and the sector to discuss the technical details of equivalence;
- IUCN NL cooperated in the organization of the tri-partite meeting (in April, May) to discuss the technical details of equivalence.

*Outcome 21 (Soy): Mid-2013 the Observatorio Socio-Ambiental de la Soja (OSAS) was formed as a new coalition of NGOs/CSOs in five soy producing countries.*

The initiative to create this coalition was taken in 2012 by South-American national NGO/CSO partners. Founding partners were Proyungas & Humedales (Wetlands from Argentina), ICV (Brazil), Probioma (Bolivia), Guyra Paraguay.

The objectives of this socio-environmental soy observer are (1) to monitor the expansion and impact of soybean in the five countries in the Southern Cone: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, (2) to improve the regional knowledge, and (3) to seek concerted responses to the situation.<sup>23</sup>

Relevance:

The formation of the Observatorio has already resulted in intensive information exchange on data, monitoring and mapping of land use particularly. Results of OSAS cumulative monitoring at regional level are expected in autumn 2014, to be actively promoted in Latin America and NL/EU.

Because of the vastness of the problem, intense collaboration between NGOs, and their collective and synergetic interaction with other players (such as companies, retail, and government) is key. This is the case in Northern countries as well as in the South. Challenges have to be overcome to make NGO interventions even more complementary, but the soy case is certainly a strong experiment in this. The OSAS- Dutch Soy Coalition connection is a potentially strong one, but it needs much further scope beyond 2015.

Contribution:

In 2012-2013, the EA supported the OSAS initiative financially (150.000 Euro plus extra meetings) and content-wise (feeding with Dutch and EU policy knowledge, links to reports, Betting on Best Quality, Soy Barometer, and through personal dialogue).

In the Netherlands, Both ENDS leading the secretariat of the Dutch Soy Coalition is pivotal. IUCN NL often plays the additional role of stimulating critical reflection on strategies.

### **1.9 Flaws in Economic System (theme 2)**

*Outcome 22 (Flaws economic system): On 22 June 2013, the Dutch government, coordinated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs presented its broad biodiversity policy, 'Uitvoeringsagenda Natuurlijk Kapitaal', which includes the international biodiversity policy.*

Description:

The Dutch government had two previous policy programs for biodiversity: Internationaal Beleidsprogramma Biodiversiteit (2002-2008) and Biodiversiteit Werkt (2008-2012). The Uitvoeringsagenda Natuurlijk Kapitaal (UNK) is the third biodiversity policy in succession.

According to the Dutch government, the UNK focuses on conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity – national and international. This focus makes this policy coherent with the attempts to achieve a *circular economy* and with the Dutch international policy.

The UNK takes the CBD 2020 Aichi targets as reference, and is focusing on four key areas or theme's: 1. Sustainable production and consumption: sustainable value chains; 2. Sustainable fisheries and conservation of marine biodiversity; 3. Sustainable agriculture and biodiversity conservation; and 4. Valuing natural capital.

Relevance:

This outcome is highly relevant for the EA as the UNK is the guiding government policy on biodiversity, which relates to various working areas of the EA, particularly greening the economy and livelihoods and ecosystems (integrated landscape approach).

The former biodiversity policy 'Biodiversiteit Werkt' ended in 2012 and a new policy had to be formulated by Ministries of EZ, BuZA, and I&M. The evaluation of this former policy had been rather negative, and the main critique included that coordination and coherence among the three Ministries has been inadequate and a too fragmented project approach (many different activities). The evaluation concludes that it is unlikely that this former biodiversity policy had a demonstrable effect on the biodiversity." (Evaluation, page 10)<sup>24</sup>

EA or IUCN NL have not made their own evaluations of the Dutch biodiversity policies. Their ideas are in line with the conclusions from the evaluation, namely that the governmental policy programme was a hail shot with some good elements in it but with too little programmatic focus and coherence. This is partly influenced by the decrease in priorities for the whole biodiversity policy, national as well as international.

The UNK includes the international biodiversity policy which is the focus of IUCN NL's intervention. The level of ambition is lower than the previous policies, or at least the pretention. IUCN NL is as such not in favour of 'lower ambitions', but prefers such more realistic ambitions that are being achieved and is positive about the priorities that are set in this policy document. It is then, as with the earlier policy positions, the question how these will be implemented and how much resources will be made

available, considering the fact that the Dutch government has moderate ambitions with its national nature policy. This is not different on international level but certain programs are being continued. DGIS does continue to invest in IDH which focuses on sustainable commodity chains. IDH also started an initiative for sustainable land and water.

Furthermore there are three issues within the bi-lateral international development policy that are the most related to biodiversity, namely food security, climate and water. It is important to follow how the ministry further deals with these issues, next to its involvement in IDH.

Contribution:

- IUCN NL is a long-time stakeholder consulted by the Dutch government for formulation, implementation and evaluation of biodiversity policies, e.g. in context of International Biodiversity Policy Program 2003-2008, and 'Biodiversiteit Werkt' (2008-2011). IUCN NL is focusing on the international dimension and provided input through a joint working session with the coordinating Ministry of Economy in early 2013 on priority setting followed by proposing concrete text suggestions.
- The main factor for success is IUCN NL's position and reputation as trusted partner for the Dutch ministries responsible for biodiversity policy. This strategic position has been established through its platform role for Dutch IUCN NL member organizations, its network with the Dutch business sector (LfN and Platform Both ENDSE) and its track record / expertise to support CSOs in the South.
- IUCN NL is convinced that its position is been taken more seriously, especially within the Ministry of Economic Affairs, because they have partnered with the private sector. Therefore, these partnerships with the business sector are an important asset in the lobby. If IUCN NL has a plea for an issue it makes more impression if VNO/NCW joins than only IUCN NL's NGO-members. And this also goes the other way round: EZ is thinking themselves how they can get the business sector to support a new policy.
- The next crucial step will involve policy implementation that leads to impacts, e.g. ecosystems improved and biodiversity protected. IUCN NL, through the EA and other programs/projects, is already contributing to its implementation and will continue to do so.

*Outcome 23 (Flaws economic system): During the Leaders for Nature annual Forum in February 2014, a coalition of fourteen large Dutch companies, two business platforms and one NGO signed a Green Deal with the Dutch government regarding Natural Capital Accounting.*

'During the Dutch 'Natuurtop' in 2013, a memorandum was signed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, IUCN NL, MVO Nederland, True Price, and various companies (EY, Deloitte, PwC, DSM, Eneco, Akzo Nobel, Philips, FMO en NBA) with the joint intention to increase transparency on natural and social capital. In February 2014, this led to the signing of a green deal with these companies and organizations and the Ministries of Economic Affairs, and Ministry of I&M. This so-called 'Natural capital green deal' (Green deal Samenwerken aan transparantie van natuurlijk en sociaal kapitaal) is taking steps to make the impact of the companies on natural and social capital visible, with the help of civil society organizations. 'The goal is the development of adequate methods and tools on (positive and negative) impacts and dependency on natural and social capital to accelerate the transition to a green economy. (EA 2013 Annual report, p. 44) Central element in this green deal is thus the delivery of more information about the use and the development of natural and social capital. One of the ideas behind this green deal is that the companies and the government work together in the methodology development at two levels: in order to make it applicable for the national accounting and for the



company level accounting. But at this moment it is not yet fully clear what will be done and how because they are still in the phase of an assessment of possibilities and challenges for developing the natural capital accounting.

All this will be coordinated with the developments of developing the natural capital accounting on international level.

The signatories are: IUCN NL, CSR Netherlands, True Price, Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, AkzoNobel, ARCADIS, BAM, Deloitte, DSM, EY, FMO, Interface, Heijmans, KPMG, Philips, PwC, Thermaflex, and VBDO.

Relevance:

The methods and tools that will be developed for the accounting “will give the companies insight in the possibilities to accelerate the transition to a sustainable economy.” (Green Deal)

“Up till now the damages to the natural and social capital are not visible in the results of companies or in the activities of governments.” “By neglecting these costs, the society as a whole has to pay the price. The signers of the agreement want to end this situation. With this step the companies and government are ahead of EU-legislation for non-financial reporting that was announced recently.”<sup>25</sup>

The intention to achieve this balance between financial/economic, social and ecological capital as such is not new but the relevance of this specific new approach and development is the attempt to find better cooperation with the business sector in achieving more transparency and in order to convince the business sector to act differently. The hope is that the terminology better resonates with the business sector than earlier attempts and that the methodology’s applicability is better. In addition IUCN NL believes that this goes hand in hand with the increasing acknowledgement of the business sector that the increasing scarcity of natural resources is an issue because we are all depending on them and that it is therefore important to behave differently.

Contribution:

- The Statement at Natuurtop 2013 was an initiative of IUCN NL, MVO Nederland, True Price and the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
- 7 out of the 13 companies that signed this Green Deal are members of Leaders for Nature.

*Outcome 24 (Flaws economic system): In December 2011, 12 companies seek to work jointly with IUCN NL in a long-term programme on ecosystems and biodiversity. (Policy change)*

Relevance:

This outcome was already reported in the Baseline report in 2012. It refers to the Leaders for Nature (LfN) programme which did not report new outcomes for the rest of the evaluation period. Having this said, some EA staff responsible for other programmes under evaluation have mentioned contributions of some these LfN business partners to other outcomes explaining that these contributions had a strong added value, because it is rather unique and because it is ‘eye catching’ that NGOs and business advocate for the same issue.

Contribution:

IUCN NL initiated, hosts and facilitates the Leaders for Nature partnership.

### 1.10 UNFCCC (theme 3)

*Outcome 25 (UNFCCC): In 2012 the UNFCCC reached two important decisions. 1) A new accounting activity named “wetland drainage and rewetting” was adopted under the Kyoto Protocol. This opens the opportunity for countries to reduce their emissions from peatlands. 2) A decision that all REDD+ projects (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation), need to monitor, report and verify “all significant sinks and sources, and pools and gases”, meaning that when peatsoils in forest areas are a significant source, these need to be included.*

Relevance:

Ad (1+2): The mitigation potential of peatlands is recognized Ad (2): With this counting mechanism, if a country like Indonesia - with a lot of deforestation and also peat drainage – continues with its drainage of peat it can protect forest elsewhere in the country but that will never compensate for the losses caused by the emissions from peat. It must therefore effectively limit these emissions if it wants to engage in the REDD+ mechanism. This is possibly a reason why Indonesia included peat in the moratorium.

In the discussions with negotiators after 2012, Wetlands International builds forth on these two earlier important UNFCCC decisions reached in 2012. Wetlands International’s strategy is to maintain and preferably enhance these results in a new global treaty to be agreed in 2015.

Contribution:

This outcome is considered to be a direct result of interventions from Wetlands International such as: long term commitment to engage in the process with many different interventions and activities, evidence-based advocacy, scientific research and publications, awareness raising within NGO networks, governments and private sector, network building.

Related outcomes:

- **China agrees with a proposal for the ‘wetlands drainage and rewetting’:** China had some problems with this proposal. Wetlands International arranged a meeting together with Wetlands China, who know the negotiator personally. During the meeting information and explanations were given. This contributed to China agreeing with the proposal.
- **Several countries made submissions in which they advocate for the land-based approach and/or on comprehensive accounting:** Switzerland, New Zealand, Norway, US, Australia, EU, Papua New Guinea. Also the Worldbank made a submission. The submissions all discuss different options for discussion, and aren't per se the country position, because this will be on the table for scientific and technical discussion in Lima this year.

*Outcome 26 (UNFCCC): In 2011 the FAO acknowledges that emissions from peatlands are significant and actively advocates for incentives in the new global agreement to reduce emissions from peatlands.*

Relevance:

FAO is a UN body and one of the large and important global players, especially with regards to forests and agriculture. This is a change of FAO position. It is also important in order to get agriculture on peat on the agenda, not only for mitigation but also for adaptation.

Contribution:

Since 2012 Wetlands International has a partnership with FAO.<sup>26</sup> For example, a recent joint publication about climate-responsible use of peat.

### **1.11 REDD+ (theme 3)**

*Outcome 27 (REDD+): In November 2013, convening parties at the 19th Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreed on the 'Warsaw Framework for REDD Plus'.*

#### **Description:**

COP19 took place in Warsaw, Poland. Negotiations already took place for seven years with no certainty that a final text would be agreed upon and what its content would be. The 'Warsaw Framework for REDD Plus' includes guidance on Assessing Reference Emission Levels, Monitoring, Reporting and Verification, National Forest Monitoring, Drivers of Deforestation and Results-based financing. Together with the decisions adopted at previous COPs this provides international policy guidance ("the Rulebook on REDD+") on how countries should deal with REDD+ in the framework of the UNFCCC. In the view of the negotiators, the International Policy Building for REDD+ is now ready for application.

#### **Relevance:**

IUCN NL considers the Warsaw Framework a landmark decision with a final text on REDD+ to be incorporated in a new climate agreement to be decided on at COP21 in Paris. Although REDD+ is developing slowly as a global instrument, it has the potential to become a major programme for rural development in the developing world. The development of such an extensive global instrument requires the building of governance structures at local, national and international level. They also require inclusive decision making processes and attention for the rights and interests of local actors and attention to the safeguarding of environmental and ecosystem functions.

#### **Contribution:**

IUCN NL has contributed to the strengthening of this attention to the role of ecosystems and biodiversity as well as the interests of indigenous peoples and local communities at all three levels. Constructive, practical input, demonstration and capacity building along with policy influencing has been timely and very relevant for the development of REDD+. See the overview of activities above and the other outcomes below.

A large number of IUCN NL interventions lead to intermediate outcomes and are part of a long change process with many contributors. One example: EA partners have over the years informed the Dutch/EU REDD+ negotiator Bas Clabbers about work with the private sector on REDD+. At COP19 in Warsaw, IUCN NL and Platform Both ENDSE launched the REDD+ Business Initiative that was initiated through IUCN NL's EA work on REDD+. Three of the four Dutch companies taking part in the initiative were also present. The launch drew considerable attention among delegates from private sector, research, NGO and governments. EU negotiator Bas Clabbers was also present at the launch and shared information about the initiative with various negotiators, notably from UK and Brazil. He later reported that the PBoth ENDSE REDD+ Business Initiative enthused and inspired various parties that were at that point in the last stages of the REDD+ negotiation process. The launch also triggered interest among German and UK partners. Both the UK DECC and the German GIZ expressed interest to take the IUCN NL – Platform Both ENDSE initiative as an example of a Public-Private Initiative on REDD+.

*Outcome 28 (REDD+): In 2013 in the Philippines, diverging REDD+ partners in the region improved their collaboration, speed up the process of a REDD+ project in Mindanao and took social and environmental safeguards on board.*

Description and relevance:

In 2011 Trees for All, a Dutch organisation initially focused on tree plantations as carbon offset projects, became isolated from key REDD+ partners in the region such as GIZ, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and local indigenous groups after collaboration around its nascent REDD+ project in Mindanao had failed to gain their confidence with regard to arrangements around the rights to carbon and processes required to apply Free Prior and Informed Consent. In 2013, EA partner organisation PARTS was chosen as an implementing partner for this REDD+ project in Mindanao. Nonoy Apanorel, director of PARTS, was selected for this role on the basis of the REDD+ training he received through the EA workshops and interactions. Currently, PARTS plays an essential part in helping speed up the process to develop the right legal, procedural and governance framework between various partners, including the Indigenous Peoples' Council, DENR, local and regional government staff and the local communities themselves. How important inclusive REDD+ preparations on the ground are to ensure equitable interventions is illustrated by the comment of a staff of Trees for All recently during a meeting with IUCN NL, "(this REDD+ project and the involvement of local community organisations and NGOs) forced us to take all these various issues (such as FPIC, community engagement, government agency buy-in) very thoroughly on board."

Contribution:

- IUCN NL REDD+ capacity building activities under the EA helped local partner PARTS.
- The choice to engage PARTS was a direct outcome of the EA REDD+ capacity building workshops and engagements, and PARTS' strong base in the region to which long-time IUCN NL-support contributed.

*Outcome 29 (REDD+): Since 2012 the government of Ghana, NGOs, CSOs and private sector organisations are developing the REDD+ Cocoa Landscape program in Ghana.*

Description and relevance:

The REDD+ Cocoa Landscape programme in Ghana builds in part on the work of NCRC in providing technical capacity and facilitating learning. The Nature Conservation Research Centre (NCRC) is a local conservation NGO from Ghana. NCRC has been instrumental in setting up the REDD+ working group which is an informal group of NGOs, Cocoa Farmers Cooperatives, private sector actors (Olam, Amarjao, Pricewaterhouse Coopers Ghana), and NGOs. This group meets regularly with the Forestry Commission of the government of Ghana and provides essential inputs into the development of the REDD+ cocoa landscape program. Currently, the Assumura Community Resource Management Area (CREMA), which NCRC develops, is further developed as a start-up project where certification of cocoa crops will be scaled up to groups of farmers or to landscape certification. The latter includes forest fragments and shade trees in shade-tolerant cocoa that will be more effective to achieve reduced deforestation and increased forest restoration across the landscape. Capacity building efforts have managed to bring together government agencies that so far have not cooperated, such as the Cocoa Board and the Forestry Commission in Ghana.

CREMA is a governance model that clarifies and formalises rights to benefits for local communities. This model can be used to clarify and formalise community access to carbon rights and the

arrangement of benefit sharing arrangements for the proceeds. Currently, the CREMA model is used to prepare communities for group or landscape certification of cocoa production. This is developed in the context of Ghana's Cocoa Landscape REDD+ Program. The CREMA model and IUCN NL's contribution to its development is extensively referenced as a key component of the Government of Ghana's 7 March 2014 Submission for an Emission Reductions Program to the World Bank FCPF (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) - Carbon Fund: Emission Reductions Idea Note (ER-PIN)). At the presentation for the Carbon Fund in Brussels on 7 March 2014, the proposal stood out, with representatives from government (Forestry Commission and Cocoa Board), civil society and traditional leaders being present to give presentations.

#### Contribution:

- IUCN NL has been partnering with the Nature Conservation Research Centre (NCRC) since 2008;
- Since 2010 NCRC develops the Assumura CREMA with support from the EA;
- NCRC has developed its REDD+ expertise along with capacity building work since 2008. IUCN NL has been supporting their work on REDD+ ever since and in particular under the EA since 2011. In the context of the Ecosystem Alliance NCRC and A Rocha are the partners that work most extensively on the development of CREMA arrangements;
- EA partners NCRC and Forest Trends, together with Solidaridad, Forestry Commission, Ghana Cocoa Board, now play an important role in the upscaling of the application of CREMA to larger landscapes;
- The EA now supports NCRC to prepare the Rock Fowl CREMA and the communities that are part of it, for the first group or landscape certification; and
- These activities prepare various partners in and around the CREMA program for a larger program that will be developed after the closing of the EA program and which will also focus on other important commodities in the cocoa landscape such as timber and oil palm.
- For the upscaling of the REDD+ cocoa landscape program partnerships are being developed with: (1) Private sector actors, notably cocoa trading partners, (2) National and local civil society organisations, (3) National government of Ghana, and (4) An international network of stakeholders.

## 2 Impact Alliance: outcomes, relevance, contribution

### 2.1 Land grab campaign

*Outcome 1: As of September 2011, the issue of land grabbing is reaching a global audience*

Description:

After September 2011, a wider audience has been reached and made aware at the global level of the need to stop land grabbing (numbers yet unknown) and Oxfam's Land and Power report is being circulated and referred to in at, quoted and covered by renowned news agencies such as BBC World Service, BBC World TV, New York Times, Voice of America, CNN Spanish, Canada Broadcasting Corporation, Al Jazeera, the Wall Street Journal, Brazil's O Valor, France's Le Monde and The Australian.

Relevance:

Land issues are on the global agenda since September 2011 and they have been kept on the global agenda since that moment. Oxfam's Land and Power report has been referred to in at least the High Level Panel of Experts of the UN CFS, the World Bank and in the RSPO.

Contribution:

After GRAIN published for the first time 100 cases of land grab in 2008 and global press agencies were covering this, Oxfam succeeded in putting it again on the global agenda with the publication of its 'Land and Power' briefing note<sup>27</sup>.

*Outcome 2: During Oxfam's public land freeze campaign (October 2012 – April 2013), the World Bank reacts several times publicly, and the last time endorses the UN CFS VGGTs.*

Description:

The World Bank several times reacted to Oxfam's public land freeze campaign:

October 2012: 2 statements: WBG shares Oxfam's concern but does not agree with a land freeze<sup>282930</sup>. In April 2013, before the annual WB Land and Poverty Conference, the WBG publicly states that that land access for poor people was critical; endorsed the UN CFS VGGT to inform the safeguards review; highlighted the importance of strengthening the capacities of national governments for improved land governance; committed to make basic information about land transfers public<sup>31</sup>.

Relevance:

Land grabbing is on the agenda of the WBG, and some of Oxfam's requests are reflected in the WBG statement of April 2013.

WBG public statements provided the opportunity to other NGOs to use these as leverage to push for further change. For instance, in April 2013, Right and Resources organized a letter signed by its network, calling on the World Bank to develop a new land policy, building on the momentum created by the campaign.

Contribution:

The October 2012 statements refer to Oxfam and were published just after the land freeze campaign became public on 2 October 2012.

The public WBG statement confirms 4 of the 9 issues presented in an Oxfam briefing note on land governance for the WBG.

The WBG was already aware in July 2012 that Oxfam and ActionAid would launch a campaign on land rights targeting the WBG, and that discussions were held with Vice President Rachel Kyte and WBG staff.<sup>32</sup>

*Outcome 3: During Oxfam's public land freeze campaign (October 2012 – April 2013), the World Bank reacts to public pressure on social media on the issue of land grabbing*

Description:

The World Bank showed to be sensitive to public pressure on social media in the October 2012 – April 2013 period. Crowd-sourced video of Coldplay's song 'in my place' seen by 65,000 supporters between April 2013 – March 2014 and the WB sent a tweet in reaction that it was protecting land of farmers to end poverty<sup>33</sup>.

Relevance:

The WBG shows to be sensitive to global citizens and in particular to celebrities who in turn can mobilise millions of people. It also shows that the WBG is carefully monitoring its reputation worldwide.

Contribution:

Coldplay is one of the most high profile Ambassadors of Oxfam. A petition to be signed by citizens, asking the WBG for a land freeze period, only received 50,000 signatures of 200,000 expected. It is not known if WBG reacted to this petition

*Outcome 4: After the public land freeze campaign, land issues continue to be on the agenda of the World Bank Group*

Description:

Land issues continue to be on the agenda of the WBG after the public land freeze campaign. The WBG several times produced press releases and stated it is open for dialogue with civil society regarding Private Sector Investments in December 2013<sup>34</sup>. Apart from this and some other public statements from the WBG, minutes of meetings organised during the WBG spring meetings and the annual Land and Poverty conference highlight discussions between Civil Society Organisations and WB staff and Executive Directors on land issues.

Relevance:

There is a space of debate created where the WBG and NGOs exchange their ideas and seemingly now has entered into a more constructive dialogue on how the IFC can ensure that local communities are not negatively affected by WBG investments and even can benefit from this. This should ultimately lead into changes in policies and practices within the IFC.

At the same time, land issues seem to be on the agenda of both WBG staff, the WBG President and the Board of EDs, which might lead to better oversight on effects of IFC investments for local populations.

Contribution:

Oxfam is one of the NGOs that attended meetings with EDs that have been published on the website of the BWP. Most regular NGOs are Oxfam, CIEL, BIC, BWP. WB President Kim published a blog on Oxfam's website, which should be interpreted as a token of the good relations between Oxfam and the WBG. Although these meeting minutes exist, no information has been shared about Oxfam's own lobbying efforts with the WBG and the results of these interventions.

*Outcome 5: In July 2014, the first World Bank draft of the Environmental and Social Safeguards incorporates land issues.*

**Description:**

WB draft version of the safeguards contains 2 specific safeguards (ESS1 and ESS5) with regards to land acquisition and tenure and involuntary resettlement (July 2014) <sup>35</sup>

**Relevance:**

The WB safeguards are the standard that influences other donor agencies and investors.

Some of Oxfam's concerns seem to be reflected in ESS 1 and ESS 5, but the most important critics of NGOs after the review of the first draft is that they provide considerable loopholes to national governments to use their own standards rather than those of the WBG. This increases the risks of local communities being negatively affected by WBG investments and grants.

**Contribution:**

The first consultation round involved more than 2000 persons from 40 countries and during which 81 position papers were submitted with 1,257 signatory organisations<sup>36</sup>.

Oxfam, together with IDI<sup>37</sup> formulated one position paper to incorporate the VGs into the safeguards. Some of Oxfam and IDI's concerns seem to be reflected in the ESS.

*Outcome 6: In the period September 2013 – 2014, the International Finance Corporation improves regulations and practices with regards to lending through financial intermediaries*

**Description:**

In the period September 2013 – September 2014, the IFC has introduced new regulations and practices with regards to lending through Financial Intermediaries (FIs)<sup>38394041</sup>

- The IFC Environmental and Social Review Procedures (ESRPs) contain 3 new procedures concerning FIs in the Environmental and Social review procedures manual since June/July 2014 (IFC).
- Some FIs are now required to disclose information concerning loans.
- The thresholds for risk categorisation of loans have changed.
- Staff in charge of environmental and social risk assessment is more involved in assessing loans and development proposals, whereas previously mostly economic experts were involved.
- The IFC has intensified its advisory services in order to assist its clients to put in place appropriate monitoring systems to measure environmental and social risks (and impact)

In October 2014, the CAO monitored progress being made by IFC and concluded that the changes introduced 'have the potential to improve the quality of Environmental and Social outcomes', but that they do not yet reflect the changes needed to correspond with IFC's higher level E&S commitments<sup>42</sup>.

**Relevance:**

The IFC increasingly finances development through FIs) such as banks, insurance companies, microfinance institutions and private equity funds. These FIs in their turn provide finance to sub clients. Between 40 – 60 % of all IFC financing is occurring through FIs. Although the IFC states that its main orientation is development oriented, it cannot guarantee outcomes at the sub-client level and it does not have an assessment system in place that prevents that local communities are negatively affected by IFC's investments. A fundamental question within the Bank is if IFC should concentrate on identifying FIs that are capable of implementing IFC standards, resulting in a decrease of its investment



portfolio in the short term, or prioritising an increase in its investment portfolio which might have negative consequences for local communities.

Stronger standards for FI will also incorporate procedures to prevent large scale land acquisitions to the detriment of local populations or environmental values.

Improved standards are meant to influence other development banks, credit agencies and the 80 private banks that adhere to the Equator Principles will align their standards to those of the IFC.

In the second place they are meant to disclose information regarding investments at local level, in order to provide NGOs in developing countries the opportunity to file complaints regarding IFC investments with the CAO.

Contribution:

Together with other NGOs like CIEL, BWP, BIC, EURODAD, Oxfam contributed to these changes regarding FIs. CAO's publications were a condition to ensure that the NGOs could contribute to this outcome. The working group is coordinated by the BWP; Oxfam's role is critical in using Honduras as a case; leading lobby efforts at the Spring and Annual Meeting; giving introductions on the FIs.

*Outcome 7: Between January and October 2014, the World Bank Group introduces new policies and practices with regards to large scale land acquisitions financed by the International Finance Corporation.*

Description:

IFC's policies and intentions with regards to large scale land acquisitions funded by the IFC changed in the following way<sup>43</sup>:

- During appraisal of a loan request, assess the wider political economy of the country and its governance; assess tenure rights and conditions of public to private land transfers. This requires more collaboration with other colleagues in the WBG
- Guidance note on land and a new guidance on land-intensive investments based upon the Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRIA) to be developed
- Guidance note on the use of security forces by IFC clients to be developed
- Increased involvement of senior management on high risk transactions, use of "High-Risk List" to prioritize supervision and brief IFC management.
- Collaboration with external partners such as industry associations, academia and ongoing dialogue with stakeholders, Board and civil society

It is yet too early to see to what extent these commitments have been introduced in IFCs systems, given the conclusions by the CAO of monitoring commitments made by the IFC with regards to FIs (see above)

Relevance:

Improved standards with regards to large scale land acquisitions are meant to influence other development banks, credit agencies and the 80 private banks that adhere to the Equator Principles will align their standards to those of the IFC.

Apart from this, the case that triggered these changes was the Honduras case that Oxfam documented in its first briefing paper on land grabbing in September 2011. The case is both about farmers being evicted from their lands and about Human Rights Violations.

The case in the first place associated the WBG with Human Rights Violations which challenged its reputation of being a Bank that 'does-no-harm'. In consequence the Board of Executives was 'forced' to increase its supervision on investments proposed by the IFC. Although the case was framed around

human rights issues, the Board of EDs asked the IFC to draw lessons on more cases. In consequence IFC also learned lessons about large scale land acquisitions.

The CAO audit has convinced at least one other NGO to file another complaint with the CAO, because its confidence in the CAO has increased.

The Honduras audit leading to the internal review is big because the case and the IFC's mishandling of it has been treated as a systemic failure by the board, and has led them to call for a wide enquiry into how projects are assessed and handled. This shows how evidence-based advocacy, linked to on the ground experiences of communities, can play a powerful role if managed effectively in local-to-global linked advocacy tactics.

#### Contribution:

Together with other NGOs like CIEL, BWP, BIC, EURODAD, Oxfam contributed to these changes regarding FIs. CAO's publications were a condition to ensure that the NGOs could contribute to this outcome.

The Honduras case and a critical CAO audit<sup>44</sup>, followed by a very weak management response by the IFC<sup>45</sup>, led to a global media coverage associating the WBG with Human Rights violations<sup>46474849</sup>. Oxfam, having worked on the case in Honduras, being able to mobilise media, contributed considerably to the changes in the IFC policies and to remedy for the communities affected<sup>50</sup>.

### *Outcome 8: The Civil Society Mechanism of the UN Committee on Food Security is effectively negotiating with the UN CFS regarding the VGGTs*

#### Description:

The Civil Society Mechanism (CSM) - as the officially recognized Civil Society structure to the UN CFS and in particular the working group on land tenure - was very effective in the negotiation process. The CSM proposed major changes in the final texts of the VGGTs that improved its content during three negotiation rounds in July 2011, September 2011 and May 2012

#### Relevance:

For the first time in history Civil Society was represented at global level with a strong constituency representing farmers, pastoralists, fishermen, women etc.

UNEP is looking at the CSM model as a new way of engaging with Civil Society and in particular those organisations directly representing those most affected by environmental issues, rather than by NGOs

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#### Contribution:

Oxfam joined the working group on land tenure in July 2010 and knew its position as an NGO; ensured a positive and significant contribution in securing progressive guidelines, in particular with regards to gender equality and supported the movements in following their own process<sup>52 53</sup>

### *Outcome 9: In May 2012, the UN CFS adopts the VGGTs and in consequence the UN CFS positions itself as the global land and natural resource governance mechanism.*

#### Description:

The UN CFS adopts the VGGT in May 2012, and the UN CFS is being respected as a global land governance mechanism on land and natural resources. As of 2012, the PRAI are being negotiated in the UN CFS in a more participatory way as they used to be discussed previously under the leadership of the WB, IFAD, UNCTAD and FAO

Relevance:

The VGs set global principles for land issues that are being integrated in other standards such as the WB safeguards. Also the private sector fora, such as the Interlaken Group, the G20, and the UN Global Compact take up the VGGT and make these operational for their constituencies. The UN Global Compact for example is planning to use Environmental, Social and Governance reporting systems that will help to incorporate the VGGT into business reporting<sup>54</sup>

The endorsement of the UN CFS VGGT is to be considered as a milestone in increasing the legitimacy of the UN CFS VGGT as a global standard for large scale land acquisitions and good practices of land governance

Contribution:

Oxfam gave support to the Civil Society Mechanism and lobbied Western Governments; Latin American Governments; African Governments and Asian Governments to endorse the VGs in May 2012.

*Outcome 10: In October 2012, the Dutch Government discusses the role of the World Bank Group in land grabbing with the WBG.*

Description:

Dutch Government discusses the WBG's role in land grabbing in October 2012 with VP Rachel Kyte: Government understands Oxfam's concerns but agrees with the WBG that not all 21 large scale acquisitions are to be classified as land grabs<sup>55</sup>. This is later followed by a debate in parliament (Bram van Ojik)<sup>56</sup>.

Relevance:

Similar processes were planned to prepare the EDs of other countries, mainly European and the North Americas. This was to set the role of the WBG in land issues on the agenda of the Board of EDs

Contribution:

Oxfam Novib presented its briefing note to the Dutch Executive Director of the WBG on 5 October 2012 during the regular meeting between Dutch NGOs and the Dutch ED<sup>57</sup>. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Oxfam Novib had a discussion regarding the landfreeze campaign in August 2012. During WB meeting Tokyo DGIS discussed Oxfam's report with WB Vice-President Rachel Kyte.<sup>58</sup>

*Outcome 11: The Dutch Government publicly commits to support the adoption of the VGGTs in May 2012 and to use these for Dutch companies.*

Description:

The Dutch Government publicly committed itself to work towards the adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines and to comply with these when Dutch based multinationals breach these guidelines and in particular those that receive public support for private sector work (FMO, IDH, etc.)<sup>5960</sup>. It mentioned the Transparency Benchmark, the Principles of Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises.

Relevance: This is one of the first indications that the Dutch Government is formulating intentions to hold Dutch companies to account when necessary.

Contribution:

Minister Knapen wrote a letter to the ONL director as a reaction to the Oxfam paper "Land and Power" used for the launch of the land grab campaign

*Outcome 12: By the end of 2012, the new Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation plays a more prominent role in addressing land issues both in the Netherlands and at outside*

Description:

By the end of 2012, the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation plays a more prominent role in addressing land issues both in the Netherlands and internationally. Land grab issues are more frequently being discussed in Dutch parliament since 2013, including a hearing organised in February 2013 including the WB. In 2014, the minister launches a land governance Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue, to strengthen land governance in countries where Dutch actors are intervening. In the 2012-2013 period more than 50 cases of landgrab with Dutch involvement have been tabled in parliament<sup>61</sup>

Relevance:

The Netherlands take a proactive approach towards stopping land grabbing taking place that is being associated with Dutch investments and they take a pro-active approach towards improving current standards for multi-national companies (OECD guidelines)

Contribution:

Oxfam triggered the proactive approach in the NL. A meeting between the Minister and the Dutch Banks and pension funds in November 2013, was a direct consequence of the Nieuwsuur emission on the Brazilian land grab case<sup>62,63</sup>. Other Dutch NGOs frequently publish cases of land grabbing and the hearing by Dutch parliament in early 2013 can be seen as the accumulation of many initiatives to address land grabs and the involvement of Dutch organisations. Increased attention on land grabs and Dutch involvement then lead into the organisation of the multi-stakeholder dialogue initiative<sup>64</sup>.

*Outcome 13: In 2012, Delta Lloyd, SNS Asset management (later ACTIAM) and ABN AMRO changed their policies with regards to investments in land*

Description:

In 2012, three out of ten Dutch Banks targeted by the campaign "Eerlijke Bankwijzer" changed their policies with regards to land issues: Delta Lloyd<sup>65</sup>, SNS Asset Management<sup>66</sup>, ABN AMRO<sup>67</sup>, ACTIAM<sup>68</sup>. AEGON followed when it was again targeted during the BtB campaign in October 2013.

Relevance:

Improved investment policies help to stop financing land grabbing. Investors as shareholders of companies can hold these to account.

Triodos' portfolio regarding investments in land is not very important and therefore changes in policies less important.

ING and Rabobank are also mentioned as those investors that are involved in large scale land acquisitions but did not change their policies<sup>69</sup>

Contribution:

Upon Request of Eerlijke Bankwijzer, Profundo conducted research on land policies of ten Dutch Banks<sup>70</sup>. This publication, direct engagement of Oxfam since October 2011 with the Dutch Banks prior to the public campaign that was launched in February 2012, is to be seen as the explanation of the changes. Delta Lloyd already published a thematic paper on land grabbing *before* the Eerlijke Bankwijzer campaign was launched in October 2011 but refers to Oxfam's Land and Power report<sup>71</sup>.

*Outcome 14: In April 2014, the International Finance Corporation reviews its management response to the CAO audit with regards to its involvement in a land grab and a human rights case in Honduras.*

**Description:**

Remedy for the Honduras case mentioned in Oxfam's Land and Power Briefing Note<sup>72</sup> after the IFC had to revise its management response to the CAO IFC audit. It currently implements its Consultation Draft Enhanced Action Plan (April 2014)<sup>73</sup>.

**Relevance:**

This case has to be interpreted as a wakeup call for the WBG, that despite commitments made and all the attention on the role of the WBG in land conflicts and Human Rights violations, the IFC still did not manage to implement its performance standards as prescribed.

**Contribution:**

Oxfam highlighted the case in the Land and Power paper in 2011; together with 70 NGOs and CSOs it signed a letter to the WBG to react to the very weak first management response of the IFC<sup>74</sup>. Rights Action started to work on the case with campesinos movements before 2010 when it published a letter that addressed the WBG<sup>75</sup>. Based upon that letter the CAO decided to do the audit. Human Rights Watch and Friends of the Earth also worked on the case<sup>7677</sup>: there was coordination in Honduras between Oxfam, Rights Action<sup>78</sup> and HRW.

*Outcome 15: In July 2011, a land deal by Nile Trading & Development Inc and a cooperative in South Sudan was cancelled by the President of the country.*

**Description:**

In March 2008, Nile Trading & Development Inc. (NTD), a for-profit corporation established under Delaware law, secured a 49-year lease for 600,000 hectares (6,000 km<sup>2</sup>) of extremely fertile community land in South Sudan. The deal was concluded between NTD and the 'Mukaya Payam Cooperative' who then concluded a lease agreement between the CES government (October 2008). The community claims to have been bypassed on the basis that the 'cooperative' did not represent them.

When the community was informed of the lease contract by either Oxfam or Oakland Institute, they organised a protest in July 2011 and the deal was cancelled by the President of South Sudan in August 2011<sup>7980</sup>.

**Relevance:**

This case was described in Oxfam's Land and Power report in September 2011<sup>81</sup>

**Contribution:**

Both Oxfam and the Oakland Institute claim to have contributed to the resolution of the claim. In fact the deal was already cancelled before Oxfam's Land and Power brief was published<sup>82</sup>.

*Outcome 16: As of November 2014, a conflict between communities in West Kalimantan, Indonesia and Sime Darby, a multinational is nearly solved, the remaining of the demands of the communities needs to be resolved by the government of Indonesia.*

**Description:**

A subsidiary of palm oil multinational, Sime Darby, allegedly grabbed land in West Kalimantan, Indonesia, depriving 24 communities of their lands, and made false promises as well. To date 10 of the '14 demands' formulated by those communities are resolved under the grievance mechanism of the

RSPO and the remaining demands are mainly related to land matters which involve local government/authorities and are beyond Sime Darby Plantation jurisdiction<sup>8384</sup>

Relevance:

This case is said to have contributed to testing the RSPO grievance mechanism, but no documentation was found if this intention was achieved. There seems to be some remedy for the affected communities.

Contribution:

Oxfam, together with local partners researched the case and published it in Oxfam's Land and Power report in October 2011<sup>85</sup>.

On 3 November 2012, Sime Darby made the commitment to Oxfam, in presence of SG of RSPO to work on the case. Oxfam and TuK, on behalf of affected communities, sent responses on progress reports by Sime Darby to the Board in 2013 and Oxfam, TuK and Wahli Kalbar attend meetings with Sime Darby and affected communities on 13 November 2013.

*Outcome 17: A land grab case involving the New Forest Company and two communities in Uganda, has been solved by the Office of the Compliance Advisor of the International Finance Corporation in August 2014.*

Description:

New Forest Company obtains a licence from the Ugandan National Forestry Authority for a plantation area, allegedly resulting in 20.000 persons being evicted from their lands. Investors include the EIB, HSBC and the IFC. CAO-IFC facilitated the mediation between the NFC and two communities concerned, resulting in agreements in August 2013 and June 2014. Both communities formed cooperatives and received contributions toward restoring their livelihoods. CAO is still monitoring progress with regards to the implementation of the agreement<sup>86</sup>.

Relevance:

The case has resolved a land conflict between communities and a company.

Contribution:

Oxfam and ULA supported the communities in filing a complaint with the CAO. Oxfam is an advisor to the communities

The new CAO VP, congratulates ULA and Oxfam with results achieved.

*Outcome 18: 140 of 769 families affected by a land grab case in Guatemala have received new land in April 2013*

Description:

With regards to the Guatemala land grab case presented in Oxfam's 2011 Briefing note<sup>87</sup>, the last information is that the Government of Guatemala promised to redress the situation but in October 2013, 140 of the 769 families affected had received land so far<sup>8889</sup>.

Relevance:

Seeking remedy for the Guatemalan people affected by land grabbing is relevant. There is no relation between this case being addressed and other Oxfam objectives, like for instance holding institutions (such as the WBG) to account, or integration of the Voluntary Guidelines into national policies and practices. However the case shows that many landgrab cases cannot be solved by international mechanisms, but seeks these mechanisms in-country

Contribution:

Oxfam's "Vamos al Grano" organised a petition to ask the government to return back with 107,000 signatures from 55 countries<sup>9091</sup>. The families concerned, with Oxfam as an international observer were received by the minister of agriculture who was informed by the president to solve the case<sup>92</sup>. Oxfam has been working on the issue since October 2011.

Other actors have also been working on these evictions since 2011, amongst which Rights Action, ActionAid, the Guatemalan Human Rights involving IACHR<sup>93</sup> of the Organization. Both actors (Oxfam and the others each claim to be at the source of this change)

## **2.2 Behind the Brands Campaign – women&cocoa and land&sugar spike**

*Outcome 1: Oxfam allies reach 18 million followers on twitter and facebook to put pressure upon companies to change their land policies between October and December 2013.*

Description:

Global level: Allies (NGOs and CSOs) reach 18 million followers on twitter and facebook to put pressure upon companies to change policies in the first 2 months of the land and sugar spike. Most important outreach happens through twitter, followed by facebook and then by public statements.

Apart from this, a few allies (NGOs/CSOs) have provided meaningful information on FBCs, in support of Oxfam.

Relevance:

Pressure is being built up upon the 10 FBCs to prevent brand reputation going down or to praise them when they have change their policies: Information helpful to Oxfam to decide on approach.

Contribution:

It is possible to link peaks in online activity, for instance twitter feeds with Oxfam interventions such as Oxfam publications, calls for action and the like.

*Outcome 2: In September 2013, investors worth over \$1.4 trillion USD increase their pressure upon FBCs by publicly supporting the Behind the Brands campaign*

Description:

Apart from NGOs/CSOs operating as allies, investors have increased their pressure on FBCs. 35 investors worth over \$1.4 trillion USD published a statement in support of the Behind the Brands campaign in September 2013<sup>94</sup>. Oxfam (together with others) filed shareholder resolutions or undertook specific shareholder action in at least 3 instances (for either the gender inequality or land grabbing) spikes. The companies in those instances were; ABF, PepsiCo, Mondelez.

Relevance:

Investors use their power to influence the policies and practices of FBCs.

Contribution:

Oxfam has engaged with investors individually but also collectively and organised meetings and webinars with them.

*Outcome 3: In March and April 2013 Nestlé, Mars and Mondelez fully commit to Oxfam’s asks for gender in the cocoa sector.*

Description:

Nestlé, Mars and Mondelez fully commit to Oxfam’s asks for gender in the cocoa sector. This implies that they will conduct third party assessments and publishing the data; that they have adopted a corresponding “plan of action” to address the findings of these assessments, and; that the three FBCs will engage with and influence other powerful public and private actors including governments and cocoa certifiers to address gender inequality.

Relevance:

Mars, Nestle and Mondelez together have 30 - 40% of the cocoa market in their hands.

Contribution:

The debate on gender in the cocoa sector started in the Netherlands before the Behind the Brands campaign: In 2012, for the first time, gender inequality was included into the list of critical issues to be assessed in the Cocoa Barometer<sup>95</sup>: Oxfam Novib, Hivos, Solidaridad en KIT have worked on gender in the cocoa sector since 2010<sup>96</sup>. UTZ, certification body published its position paper on gender in the cocoa sector in March 2011<sup>97</sup>. The BtB campaign builds upon experience gained with the sector. Meanwhile the sector itself has been working to improve its reputation with regards to child labour and adopted sector wide approaches to improve conditions in the supply chains of in particular Ghana and Ivory Coast<sup>98</sup>. Gender issues can be mainstreamed into these collective actions.

*Outcome 4: Between Feb 2013 and Feb 2014, 7 of the 10 FBCs had changed their scores on gender*

Description:

Between Feb 2013 and Feb 2014, 7 of the 10 FBCs had changed their scores on gender. In addition to Nestlé, Mondelez and Mars, Coca-Cola, Kellogg, Unilever and PepsiCo subscribed to the UN Women Empowerment Principles.

Relevance:

Although subscribing to the UN Women Empowerment Principles requires mandatory reporting on gender issues, these reports are not publically available.

Contribution:

Nestlé, Mars and Mondelez were publically targeted by Oxfam, the other four not. Oxfam’s contribution is to be explained by either; the race-to-the-top; direct engagement with these four FBCs or other Oxfam allies holding the companies to account. Pepsico already subscribed to the UN WEP in 2011, this is before the BtB campaign started and cannot be ‘attributed’ to Oxfam.

*Outcome 5: Between April 2013 and May 2014, Mars, Mondelez and Nestlé exert an influence regarding gender upon other companies and governments*

Description:

Mars, Mondelez and Nestlé exert an influence regarding gender upon other companies and governments: They joined the WCF CocoaAction initiative that was published in May 2014 in which gender parity is one of the issues<sup>99</sup>. Ten other companies adhere to this Cocoa Action plan and an agreement was signed with the government of Ivory Coast to implement the plan<sup>100</sup>



Relevance:

Ivory Coast and Ghana produce 55 % of the worlds' cocoa. In total 300,000 cocoa farmers and their communities are involved. CocoaAction regroups the 12 biggest cocoa and chocolate companies in the world that will work together on sustainable cocoa. Together they buy and process more than 70% of worldwide cocoa.

Contribution:

Evidence exists with Oxfam that Mondelez and Nestlé have introduced gender issues in CocoaAction. (not verified by evaluator)

*Outcome 6: Coca-Cola (November 2013) and PepsiCo (March 2014) declare zero-tolerance for land grab in their supply chains*

Description:

Coca-Cola<sup>101</sup> (November 2013) and PepsiCo<sup>102</sup> (March 2014) declare zero-tolerance for landgrab, but ABF who was publicly targeted did not. ABF did however commit to FPIC in May 2014<sup>103</sup> and moved up 2 points on the BtB Scorecard from 1 to 3 points. Coca-Cola now gets 8 points for land as opposed to PepsiCo who gets 7 points, the former scores higher due to additional supply chain commitments.

Coca-Cola and PepsiCo also adhere to the UN CFS VGs

They start their independent assessments in top sourcing countries to better understand land grabbing risks in their supply chains. Coca Cola discusses the issue with the government of Cambodia and along with PepsiCo is investigating the cases in Brasil and Cambodia.

Relevance:

Disclosure of information by FBCs and their commitment to act enables NGOs/CSO to directly address land grab issues. Their zero-tolerance for land grabbing also entails that they will address land governance across their supply chains and engage all actors as necessary.

Contribution:

Direct engagement between FBC and Oxfam, combined with regular scorecard updates has created a race-to-the-top. Oxfam's public offline and online actions have generated momentum within the companies to change their policies and practices. Additional momentum was generated when companies published their zero tolerance– land grab policies on their website. Oxfam additionally employed the tactics of leveraging investor influence.

*Outcome 7: Nestlé (August 2014) and Unilever (April 2014) both declared zero-tolerance for land grab*

Description:

Nestlé<sup>104</sup> (August 2014) and Unilever<sup>105</sup> (April 2014) both declared zero-tolerance for land grab and Nestlé additionally committed to actively implement the UN CFS VGs as well as advocate and work with other private sector actors to do the same.

Relevance:

Disclosure of information by FBCs and their commitment to act enables NGOs/CSO to directly address land grab issues. Their zero-tolerance for land grabbing also entails that they will address land governance across their supply chains and engage all actors as necessary.

Contribution:

Direct engagement between FBC and Oxfam, with public praises for incremental steps and global public attention when zero-land grab policies are published

*Outcome 8: Between February 2013 and 2104, in total 8 of 10 FBCs improved their BtB scores for land.*

Description:

Between February 2013 and February 2014 Mondelez, Kellogg and General Mills also included the principle of FPIC in their supplier codes. In total 8 of 10 FBCs improved their BtB scores for land in that period.

Relevance:

Though the iconic commitment of Coca-Cola and later Pepsi as well as the public discourse generated around land rights and the Food and Beverage sector, it is assumed that momentum was generated which has seen a widespread trend for the sector to address land rights across their supply chains.

Contribution:

To be explained by regular update scorecard, race-to-the-top and direct engagement with Oxfam.

*Outcome 9: ABF's subsidiaries Illovo and Twinings improve their own codes of conducts for land*

Description:

ABF's subsidiaries Illovo and Twinings improve their own codes of conducts, in particular the inclusion of FPIC for all communities<sup>106107</sup>. In addition Illovo uses the wording 'zero-tolerance for land grabbing.

Relevance:

Integration of these policies into supply chains to prevent land grabs might have real impact on the livelihoods of smallholders, and local communities

Contribution

Direct engagement with Illovo and Twining after ABF was publicly targeted.

*Outcome 10: In November 2013, the Dutch Government engages directly with four Dutch Banks and two Pension Funds who allegedly are involved in land grabbing in Brazil.*

Description:

The Dutch Government engages directly with four Dutch Banks and two Pension Funds after the publication of a Profundo report and "Nieuwsuur" TV broadcast that links these investors to a trader allegedly being involved in land grab in Brazil and supplies to Coca-Cola and PepsiCo. She also addresses the issue with the Brazilian government, Trade Minister and, Dutch Embassy and reports back to Dutch Parliament<sup>108</sup>.

Relevance:

As a follow up on that TV broadcast and other Dutch NGOs repeatedly reporting on the role of the Dutch financial sector in large scale land acquisitions the ministers started a multi-stakeholder dialogue in August 2014.

Contribution :

Oxfam's contribution consists of commissioning the Profundo report<sup>109</sup>, preparing the Nieuwsuur mission<sup>110</sup> (including facilitating the field trip in Brasil) and seeking response from the Minister<sup>111</sup>. As a result the Dutch Embassy and Dutch Banks have been engaging in the cases in Brasil and advocating for better land governance in that country.

*Outcome 11: Two Brazilian land grab cases were brought to the attention to the Brazilian government by the Dutch Government and Oxfam Brazil in October 2013.*

Description:

The two Brazilian land grab cases mentioned by Oxfam in its briefing note<sup>112</sup> were brought to the attention of the Brazilian government by Oxfam as well as the Dutch Government<sup>113</sup> in response to the TV programme. These remain unresolved but substantial progress has been made.

In one case the trader will not engage in new contract with those who 'grabbed the land' by the end of 2014 and the Brazilian government has to finalise its demarcation process to give the land back to the original community.

The second case also awaits a formal position from the Brazilian government after a hearing was organised. In March 2014, PepsiCo, in line with its zero-tolerance commitment stated that it would investigate the case because it sources sugar from the processor who evicted the people from their land.

Relevance:

The Matto Grosso do Sul case (Brazil) which was featured in Nieuwsuur, got a new push with the BtB campaign, and a public hearing on a dormant RESEX<sup>114</sup> court case on allocation of a reserve (which previously belonged to the community in Matto Grosso do Sul) was organised with a presence of representatives from local communities, the president of ICMBio and his staff, two federal legislators (lower house), CPT (local NGO) and Oxfam. The goal was setting a strategy to get the case moving again, sizing the momentum of Oxfam's campaign and the new national context due to presidential elections.

Contribution:

Oxfam highlighted the land grab cases in its briefing note, facilitated a broadcast on Dutch TV and engaged the Dutch Government to discuss the issue with the Brazilian Government.

The first case has been in the global spotlights for 2010 and the BtB campaign reopened the debate but the case remains unresolved<sup>115</sup> (Survival International (28 November 2012).

*Outcome 12: In January – February 2014, Coca-Cola hires an independent auditor to investigate allegations of being involved in land grab in Cambodia.*

Description:

The Cambodian land grab case mentioned in Oxfam's briefing note<sup>116</sup> is being investigated by an independent auditor hired by Coca-Cola. Significant progress has been made and a process is now underway with the trader, government of Cambodia, local partners and other relevant stakeholders.

Relevance:

The Cambodian land grab case attracted the attention of the European Union, who addressed land grabbing in the sugar sector with the Cambodian government. The EU expressed its hope that

Cambodia will find a comprehensive solution for the thousands of families that lost land to sugarcane plantations<sup>117</sup>.

**Contribution:**

Publication of the case in Oxfam's briefing note, followed by Coca Cola's commitment to zero-tolerance to land grabbing. Oxfam has also been closely working together with relevant stakeholders in Cambodia and abroad. This has included work with national partner organisations of Oxfam in Cambodia and globally as well as work with Coca-Cola

*Outcome 13: Another land grab case in which Coca-Cola is allegedly being involved is being identified by civil society in Cambodia.*

**Description:**

One Cambodian case identified where NGOs/Civil society have taken action after FBCs disclosed their top three supplying countries and suppliers (Mitr Pohl for instance is a case where Coca-Cola is now as a result engaging in Cambodia).

**Relevance:**

Disclosure of information by FBCs and their commitment to act enables NGOs/CSO to hold companies to account for commitments made and to directly address land grab allegations. However this is only one case, other cases in the public domain have not been mapped. However, it is assumed that through the process of the impact assessments in other countries Coca-Cola and PepsiCo are most likely engaging with land controversies identified through those assessments.

**Contribution:**

Coca-Cola committed to zero-tolerance for land grab due to the BtB campaign exclusively.



### 3. Fair Green and Global Alliance: outcomes, relevance, contribution

#### 3.1 EU and Dutch position on investment arbitration and FTAs

##### *Outcomes*

1. December 2013 Minister Ploumen acknowledges that it is needed to build filtering systems in the dispute settlement system in order to avoid too easy claims. (agenda setting, target reacts)
2. Resolution in Dutch Parliament which asks the government to do research on Investor-State Dispute Settlement system. (agenda setting, terms of the debate influenced).
3. Human Rights and investors obligations from now on included in Dutch BITs (agenda setting, target reacts).
4. The EU Commission recognised that there are imperfections of the current system of international investment agreements and the need to improve investment protection rules. (policy change, demonstrable shift). In a November 2013 factsheet [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc\\_151916.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151916.pdf) it stated :
  - a. "Preventing investors from bringing multiple or frivolous claims (investor who loses case will be obliged pay all litigation costs including those of the state)
  - b. Making the arbitration system more transparent: documents available to the public, access to hearings and allow interested parties (e.g. NGOs) to make submissions
  - c. Dealing with conflicts of interests and consistency of arbitral awards (e.g. introduction of a binding code of conduct for arbitrators)
  - d. Introducing safeguards for Parties (this will allow states to maintain control over how the investment provisions are being interpreted)
5. The EU initiated a public consultation on the ISDS in the context of the TTIP, and the negotiations on the ISDS chapter in TTIP have been paused in the meantime (results of the consultation awaited). (policy change, changed accountability structure)
6. A leaked draft text tabled by the EU in the TTIP negotiations dated 2 July 2013 also revealed the willingness of the EU to potentially drop a chapter on investment protection from the TTIP, which is one of the key demands of CSOs.(agenda setting, target reacts)

##### *Relevance:*

- In the context of the trade negotiations between the EU and the US, a growing number of organisations have raised concerns that the ISDS mechanism will be used by investors against governments that want to make regulations in favour of citizens and the environment.
- The outcomes are signals that the European Commission is responding to civil society concerns in relation to the EU investment policy, in particular in the context of TTIP. While it is impossible to foresee the exact format and the outcome of the consultations on ISDS, it means that the controversial ISDS mechanism will not automatically go in the EU-US trade agreement.
- Investor to state dispute settlement are very relevant for trade agreements with developing countries. The power of companies may threaten sovereignty of states, or put whole policies at stake (e.g. environmental policies). Companies can sue governments, which results in enormous juridical costs for these governments and high claims may result.
- This problem has now been recognised for the EU-Canada free trade agreement and the EU-USA free trade agreement (TTIP) and most probably it will also be on the agenda of other trade agreements.
- However, these settlements have also been designed to protect companies against corruption in developing countries and against fraudulent juridical systems, so to protect their

investments. This problem needs to be balanced with the recognition that the ISDS system can have detrimental effects.

Contribution:

FGG members SOMO, TNI, Both Ends and Friends of the Earth have been active members in the EU broad coalition. Friends of the Earth Europe has been particularly active in the work related to the EU-USA free trade Agreement. Activities include:

- Public awareness materials like factsheets, public presentations on the EU-USA Free Trade agreement,
- Strategy meeting, in Brussels, also to build the coalition;
- Publications by among others SOMO and TNI, of which 2000 copies were distributed during meetings organised by society, policy makers and academia;
- Media coverage, including a press conference and direct phone contacts and meetings;
- Organisation of seminars: at Nijmegen University and at the Ministry of Foreign affairs in the Netherlands;
- Meetings with EU decision-makers: EU DG Trade, EU Member States' permanent representations, European parliament
- Advocacy work among Dutch parliamentarians: regular meetings with Dutch political parties, Questions asked in parliament, expert meeting October 2013 where various Dutch parliamentarians were present.

One of our independent resource persons mentioned the SOMO contribution as important for the ISDS discussion.

### **3.2 Investment arbitration and framework in Latin America**

*Outcomes*

1. President Correa of Ecuador mentions explicitly the TNI report 'Profiting from Injustice' during the opening of the 128th Assembly of the World Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in front of 1500 MPs and during the act of possession for new term as President, and quotes from the report in front of 12 other Presidents and 5 Vice-Presidents and delegations from 90 other countries. (agenda setting-, and changed policies: lobby target reacts upon positions from the alliance, puts it on the agenda for other nations and apparently completely agrees with the report)
2. Creation of the Ecuadorian Auditing Commission that will analyse all Ecuadorian BITs and arbitration cases (2013).
3. The Foreign Affairs Minister of Ecuador tweets a recommendation to his 39.000 followers to read the TNI report. Minister Fander Falconi posted on 17 March in his Facebook account a recommendation to the report (5.500 people like his page) and informed the government's argument in favour of an auditing of BITs with the National Secretary of Planning and Development and with the President who included evidence from the report in his speech announcing the auditing. (*agenda setting*)
4. The report is brought to the attention of the people interested in developments in and around UNCTAD. It is referenced in UNCTAD's "Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) - No 1, March 2013". In June 2013 the report is referenced in UNCTAD's "Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: in Search of a roadmap" as a reference to the literature that documents the deficiencies in the ISDS system. (*agenda setting*).

5. TNI Address to ministerial meeting of Latin American States affected by Transnational Companies Interests. July 2013 (*agenda setting*).
6. In Canada a MP Elizabeth May reacted to the TNI report, and raised the issue on the floor of her parliament , suggesting international investment treaties put us in the hands of “global ambulance chasers.” . The Green Party in New Zealand co-leader Metiria Turei launched the Profiting from Injustice report during a press conference. German MEP Ska Keller posted the report in the front page of her website.

Relevance:

Investment agreements and the international investment arbitration system were justified and put in place with support from Western governments with the argument that a fair and neutral dispute settlement system was needed to protect corporations’ investments from perceived bias and corruption within national courts. Investment arbitrators were to be the guardians and guarantors of this regime. Countries in Latin America are the most hit by investor to state lawsuits at international tribunals. Countries such as Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador and Venezuela face multi-billion dollar claims. Exposing the system as not neutral made an impact in several Latin American countries. Besides, some advising companies make much profit because of the system and advise companies to demand high fines from governments.

Contribution:

- TNI published a report ‘Profiting from injustice’ with CEO in English and Spanish, which examined the key players in the investment arbitration industry . In his inaugural speech president Correa of Ecuador mentioned explicitly the TNI report
- TNI was invited to develop ToR for the Auditing Commission and is now co-chair.
- TNI distributed hard copies of its report in Ecuador, Argentina and Uruguay during sessions with policy makers, university students, media and CSOs. Via twitter more than 50,000 accounts were reached.
- Reactions from target audience shows that the report had much impact.

### **3.3 Investment policies in India**

*Outcomes*

- India started a review process of its international investment policies. It has been reported that under this new proposal investors will not be able to challenge the legality of an unfavourable verdict from the Supreme Court of India and that they would have to exhaust remedies under local laws before seeking international arbitration under bilateral investment protection agreements (*agenda setting, target reacts*).



Relevance:

India is in the process of reviewing its investment agreements with 83 countries. 72 of these agreements are already in force and will have to be cancelled or renegotiated. 21 of these agreements are with EU member states. This will also have implications for an investment agreement between the EU and India which is currently under negotiations.

Contribution :

While it has to be expected that the growing number of investment claims under the current investment agreements of India have been main drivers of this review process, the debate about the negotiations of an investment agreements between the EU and India will also have contributed to this process.

- Analysis and articles published on this issue
- Public events like the Workshop on “India-EU FTA: For Whom?” February 8-9, 2012, New Delhi or a 3 day conference "India - European Union Free Trade Agreement: Implications on Indian Economy, Society and Polity" Organized by Centre for European Studies, SSS&IS (Pondicherry University) and FGG partner Madhyam (MARCH 3-5, 2014) are believed to have contributed to the agenda setting and the debate in India on India's laws on foreign investment.

### **3.4 South Africa Netherlands BIT terminated**

*Outcome*

- In Oct. 2013 the Government of South Africa terminated the Bilateral Investment Treaty with the Netherlands.(policy change)

Relevance:

In 2009 South Africa initiated a review of its BIT framework because of concerns of risks BITs pose to sustainable development objectives and the government’s capacity to regulate. As a consequence of this review South Africa decide to replace its BITs by a new national investment policy. South Africa had terminated its first bilateral investment treaty autumn 2012 with Belgium and Luxembourg and in summer 2013 Spain. This provoked a heavy-handed response by EU trade Commissioner de Gucht , questioning during a public meeting (the EU South Africa business forum) if such actions would still allow for a “predictable” framework for EU relations with South Africa. This led to something of a 'push back' in the media that the decision of South Africa to terminate BITs could be bad policy, that this might have a negative impact on investor perception and consequently might reduce investment in South Africa . This gave rise to discussions what the consequences might be If South Africa would continue with the termination of its BITs and put doubts on the foreseen cancelling of the BIT with the Netherlands. So if the cancellation of the BIT with The Netherlands would not have taken place, this would have been a turning point.

Contribution:

- In spring 2013 Both ENDS was invited to participate in a process to organize an international expert meeting on the Investor-State system, which took place august 3-7, 2013 in New York. There were also representatives from the South African government. Both ENDS was able to discuss in more detail the reform plans of the South African government and the specificities of the South African agreement with the Netherlands.
- Publication of opinion articles in the press. Based on this discussion it was identified to be useful if CSOs outside of South Africa could publicly formulate their concerns about BITs and the importance that the South African government should terminate the bilateral investment treaty with the Netherlands before the 1 Nov deadline. So Both ENDS was able to publish an

opinion article in the paper Business Day (South Africa), and TNI, Both ENDS and SOMO published a joint article in the Financial Mail (South Africa) and in the NRC Handelsblad .

### **3.5 Economic Partnership Agreements - EPAs**

#### *Outcomes*

1. On 12 September 2012 the EU parliament rejected a 2011 proposal by the EU commission to withdraw market access under Market Access Regulation (MAR) 1528/2007 by 1 January 2014 - for a group of 18 countries which, according to the European Commission, had not taken the necessary steps towards signing or applying (for those that signed) an EPA agreement- and demanded to postpone the deadline from 1 Jan 2014 to 1 Jan 2016 (agenda setting, target reacts)
2. In April 2013, after negotiation , the original proposal made by the European Commission in September 2011 was postponed by 9 months (from 1 January to 1 October 2014). (policy change).
3. On 16 January 2014 the EU Commissioner announced the willingness of the EU to address the issue of agricultural subsidies in the text of EPAs and to stop export subsidies for agricultural products to those countries that sign an EPA (policy change).
4. Several EU ministers United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Ireland and The Netherlands) suggested to reconsider the EU request that ACP countries have to liberalize at least 80% of their trade in an EPA and that the Commission should consider a lower level of liberalization requirements and that this suggestion should be discussed at a meeting end of January 2014. On the 6th of February 2014 the EU negotiators apparently agreed to less ambitious liberalization requirements for the foreseen EPA with countries in West Africa (ECOWAS). While text of that agreement and its precise status are not known the liberalization requirement seems to have to been reduced to 75% or less (policy change)
5. Establishment and maintenance of a core-group of NGOs in the EU working on EPAs. (Agenda setting: organisation of actors, coalition forming).
6. Harmonised strategies as a result of a meeting in October 2012 on future strategies with participants from African NGOs and NGOs from Europe. (agenda setting, organisation of actors, coalition forming)

#### Relevance:

This threat by the EU commission is particularly a problem for non-Least Developed Countries that cannot export duty and quota-free under the EU's Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme. It puts these (African) countries in the precarious situation to make a choice between two evils. To either agree to a proposed EPA which is not in their interest and which might undermine their economic development objectives or to loss preferential market access to the EU for some of their exports.

That the unilaterally imposed new deadline by the EU for the ratifications of EPAs has been postponed by nine month must be seen as a gain. It provided more time for CSOs in the ACP for mobilization awareness raising and advocacy in their countries and region. This had been a key demand formulated by African NGOs in the EPA strategy meeting on 27 September 2012 in Brussels. Besides it provided more time to address the remaining "controversial issues of the EPAs". ACP countries can benefit nine months longer from trade benefits under MAR 1528.

#### Contribution:

- Building of a coalition. Both Ends was part of the coordination group to take up the EPA issue. Immediately after the European Commission proposed on 30 September 2011 to withdraw market access under Market Access Regulation (MAR) 1528/2007 the core group picked up this issue. This core groups consisted of 11.11.11. (Belgium), Both ENDS (the Netherlands), Traidcraft (UK), and Afrikagrupperna (Sweden), and APRODEV (EU wide), coordination took place via email and more or less regular conference calls.
- Joint letter to a British MP who was the appointed rapporteur in the European parliament for international trade.
- Both ENDS gave inputs for a briefing letter for Members of the European Parliament.
- Organisation of a panel discussion. After the vote in the European Parliament (2012) Both ENDS was one of the organisers of a panel discussion on the future of EPA negotiations. EU civil servants participated and many NGOs. The second part of the meeting was dedicated to exchange of views and harmonisation of strategies with NGOs from Africa.
- Support to an international workshop. Both ENDS supported in 2012 a workshop with 25 participants from SADC countries to discuss strategies how to respond to the situation created by the EU and how to reinvigorate the public debate and engage with decision makers in Africa.
- Another NGO letter to the EU parliament in January 2013.
- Face-to-face meetings with MEP in Brussels
- Awareness raising via social media.

### 3.6 WTO

#### *Outcome*

- During the 9th WTO ministerial in Bali on 7 December 2013 the WTO members agree to negotiate on an agreement for a permanent solution for the issue of governments maintaining stocks for food security purposes and put in place an interim mechanism to prevent related WTO disputes.(policy change)

#### Relevance:

The flaw of the existing WTO rules with respect to food security became apparent once it was found that the "Food Security Act" of India would be in breach of current WTO rules. Under the "Food Security Act" of India the Indian state would buy staple crops from vulnerable small holder farmers at above local market price, store it, and sell it at subsidized prices to the poor families. However the existing WTO rules would have made "Food Security Act" of India to be in breach of WTO subsidies rules. As a consequence CSOs demanded that the WTO rules should be amended to allow for a permanent rectification of WTO law and to provide an interim solution (a waiver) for India to ensure that India would not be sued at the WTO.

The EU and US were originally opposed to such a revision of the existing WTO rules and a permanent solution for the issue of public stockholding for food security purposes, but instead only were willing to grant India limited 4 year exception in the form of a waiver. In the end however the EU and US expressed their preparedness to negotiate for an agreement on the issue of public stockholding for food security purposes.

This new situation will allow India's government to continue procurement of staple crops at a minimum support price from low-income resource-poor producers (comprising approx. 98.97 per cent of India's farmer population with operational landholdings of ten hectares or less). These poor farmers survive

in agriculture because of government procurement of their produce under the food security (public distribution) programme. This law aims to provide subsidies for food grains to poor people in India. The same applies for similar programs other development countries might have decided to implement.

The decision to revise the WTO rules so that they do not undermine other important policy objectives (here now specifically to ensure food security in a country) creates an important precedent for possible other rules which could be an obstacle for sustainable development.

Contribution:

- Meetings with government and the EU. Both ENDS started to highlight this problem with respect of policy coherence for development in early 2013 in consultations with the EU commission and with the Dutch Government.
- Coalition forming and maintenance. For international advocacy and awareness raising on this issue Both ENDS cooperated with the SouthCentre, Third World Network and other members of the Our World Is Not for Sale (OWINFS) network. A joint letter to Mr. Roberto Azevedo the new Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on this subject matter was sent in Nov. 2013 with broad support by global civil society (the letter was signed by more than 300 NGOs) .
- Both ENDS was appointed to represent the FGG Alliance and the Alternative Trade Mandate Alliance as a member of the Dutch Government delegation to the WTO and was able to provide the Dutch government and the EU commission during the WTO negotiations in Bali with the views of CSOs and by this to increase support to strive for a permanent solution for this food security problem at the WTO.
- Actions near the conference place. TNI closely worked with CSOs and movements prior and during the WTO ministerial in Bali (December 2013). Besides activities outside the premises of the WTO ministerial conference, symbolic action also took place at the conference site which helped to get media attention and helped to increase the public pressure on the EU and US to change their blockade of a permanent solution.

### **3.7 EU-ASEAN FTA Campaign**

*Outcomes*

- Coalition forming among campaigners from Southeast Asia (including the EU-ASEAN network) about free trade and access to medicines, rights to jobs, and livelihood, food and health. New countries and areas were included in the network like the Mekong region and Myanmar. (agenda setting, organisation of actors)
- In response to demands for more transparency, the Thai government created a civil society committee for discussions on FTAs and gave a slot to local FGG partner FTA Watch to participate. (changing practice as to trade policy formulation).
- Myanmar:
  - a. Letter signed by 78 Myanmar CSOs to the EU and member state trade ministries, calling for proper consultation and due time for all stakeholders in Myanmar to first start understanding what investment treaties entail. (agenda setting, stakeholders organise themselves)
  - b. EU delegation in Myanmar responds to Myanmar CSO concerns (agenda setting, target reacts)
  - c. In early June 2014 Myanmar government informed UNDP that, as a result of CSO and media attention on the issue, the Myanmar government was going to hold a public

consultation on investment treaties on June 23. TNI was one of the key experts the EC actively consulted.(policy change, changing accountability structures)

- d. Strong statement in June 2014 by 223 Myanmar CSOs saying this is not the moment to negotiate investment treaties (agenda setting, stakeholders organise themselves).
- ASEAN Leaders are aware of the position of the EU-ASEAN network as to FTAs, e.g. : threats to peoples' access to medicines and right to health and investment-state arbitration.(agenda setting, terms of debate influenced)
  - The Philippine platform organized and led discussions with top trade negotiators of the Philippines. (agenda setting, invited to participate in meetings)

#### Relevance:

Investments and access to medicines continued to be key issues at the regional and national levels. The chapters on investment and intellectual property rights in FTAs are the clearest manifestations of the level of ambition that these so called 21st Century trade agreements are aiming for. Apart from these main concerns, sector specific and thematic issues have also emerged as key areas of the campaign including issues around alcoholic beverage in Thailand, fisheries export in the Philippines, and financial services liberalization in Thailand and Malaysia.

The case for Myanmar is rather specific. Myanmar is in its very early phase of democratic development and many laws and policies will need to be revised in the coming years, in order to leave military rule behind. An investment treaty would lock this process in in a very early stage, or make policy making in the public interest very costly. Myanmar is entering the global investment regime at a very late stage and can learn from experiences elsewhere, in particular from experiences in countries that to follow the same "development" path based on extractivism and large-scale industrial agricultural production. These countries, such as Indonesia, Ecuador, El Salvador have received many claims at international tribunals. There is no knowledge in Myanmar on investment treaties, neither in government, nor in parliament, nor among CSOs, local businesses and among media.

#### Contribution:

- Organisation of an FTA Roundtable in New Delhi (March 2011), a regional forum on investment (September 2011) and AEPF Sub Regional Consultations (Jakarta, June 2012 and Hanoi August 2012, Vientiane, October 2012).
- Sending of an open letter to ASEAN leaders on threats to people's access to medicines and rights to health during ASEAN Peoples Forum / ASEAN Civil Society Conference (May 2011)
- In Thailand the national partner FTA Watch brought issues of peoples participation in trade negotiations, access to medicines , alcohol and investor to state dispute mechanism firstly in a media campaign to the attention of the general public and later on in dialogue to the attention of the Thai government.
- In Philippines the network organized a dialogue with the governmental Department for Trade and Industry
- Articles in the press
- Myanmar:
  - organisation of 3 workshops for 25 CSOs from Myanmar, 34 Members of Parliament and 33 media representatives.
  - TNI published a Burmese version of the animation film "Dangerous Weapons" , Burmese version of TNI's popular leaflet "Dangerous Weapons", and wrote an introductory briefing to EU-Myanmar investment treaty in Burmese.

- In November 2013 TNI and local partner Paung Ku organised a second set of workshops in Yangon, this time for over 40 campaigners from the Myanmar Alliance for Transparency and Accountability (MATA – an alliance of over 250 CSOs in Myanmar).
- The EC held a public online consultation on ISDS in the EU-Myanmar investment treaty, deadline 15 July 2013. TNI gave technical advice to Myanmar CSOs Paung Ku and KESAN in order for them to submit their concerns.
- The European network S2B called for a halt to the negotiations, a statement drafted by TNI
- In order to prepare CSOs to participate in the June 2014 consultation workshop organised by the Myanmar government, TNI co-organised on a very short notice a workshop for CSOs planning to take part in the consultation. This workshop was organised in Mandalay on June 21, together with MATA, Kesan and Paung Ku. For the purpose of the workshop TNI brought Malaysian MP Charles Santiago to Burma.
- Key newspaper Myanmar Times published an interview with Pietje Vervest from TNI in March 2014 and with Charles Santiago in June 2014 and addressed the Myanmar CSO statement in its July 7 issue.

### **3.8 RSPO and palm oil company IOI**

#### *Outcomes*

1. In response to a complaint filed by Milieudefensie and other CSOs 21 March 2011 at the RSPO Grievance Panel against palm oil company IOI, RSPO – for the first time - concluded that a company had breached the RSPO code of conduct and the sustainability criteria of RSPO, and subsequently suspended certification of new plantations of the company (5 April 2011). (changing practice).
2. Questions on IOI in the Dutch Parliament (before MFSII started) and questions in the European Parliament in September 2011 as a result of Milieudefensie's IOI report (agenda setting, target reacts)
3. A coalition formed of local communities, peasant organisations and several Indonesian and Western NGOs which sent in March 2011 a complaint about misconduct of the IOI group in Sarawak (Malaysia) and Ketapang (Indonesia).(agenda setting, organisation of actors, coalition forming)

#### *Relevance:*

- IOI is one of the biggest palm oil producers in the world. The company until 2010 had a 'green' reputation. Milieudefensie's research report on IOI from 2010 (see 'Contribution') and the subsequent RSPO complaint from 2011 that was in part based on that report, exposed that despite the company's extensive commitments to sustainability via CSR policies and engagement in multi-stakeholder initiatives, the IOI corporation is failing to live up to its green reputation.
- Milieudefensie's IOI report and the RSPO complaint case constituted a warning towards Dutch and EU decision-makers in biofuel policies, and to purchasers of palm oil. They are ill-advised by the sector and take alleged sustainability performance for granted, without due checks in the field, while the study and the complaint show that they cannot rely on the perceived sustainable reputations.

- In 2012 NGOs and especially the complainants in Sarawak (Malaysia) and Ketapang (Indonesia) are dismayed and disillusioned by the way the RSPO's Executive Board and Grievance Panel have bent their own rules to accommodate IOI's corporate interests. After years of bad experiences (2007-2012), Milieudefensie in 2012 concludes that the RSPO's Grievance Procedure is compromised. Milieudefensie attributes the failure of the RSPO Grievance Panel to the business interests of the members of the RSPO's Executive Board, Secretariat and Grievance Panel. That the grievance procedure is compromised again, shows in Milieudefensie's view the little relevance of the RSPO for protecting forests and land rights. Milieudefensie will probably not use the very time consuming and ineffective grievance procedure anymore (efficiency). Some of Milieudefensie's FoE colleagues, like SDI (FoE Liberia) however make another estimation.
- Milieudefensie adapted its ToC and now focusses more on Banks that do financial investments (loans) in palm oil companies.

#### Contribution:

- Before MFS II started, in 2010, Milieudefensie issued a report on the problems around plantations of IOI. This report received broad attention in the press and on Dutch television. It also received attention in Indonesia.
- Milieudefensie was active in forming a coalition of local and international organisations to hand in a complaint at the RSPO in 2011.
- Milieudefensie had meetings with the Dutch IOI subsidiary Loders Croklaan and (before MFSII started) meetings with IOI in Switzerland.
- Public pressure was used by issuing an Earth Alarm letter directed at Unilever. 4500 Dutch citizens sent that letter or an email to Unilever, a buyer of IOI palm oil and active member of the RSPO.
- Handing out a public award. At the World Economic Forum 2011 in Davos, after nomination by Milieudefensie, energy corporation Neste Oil (with over 17,000 votes) won the international Public Eye Award 2011 -for the worst company of the year- for its contribution to deforestation and land rights conflicts with communities in South East Asia resulting from the unsustainable palm oil it buys from a.o. palm oil company IOI.
- Manual for dealing with oil palm companies. In 2012, Walhi Kalimantan Barat, with the aid of Milieudefensie, produced and launched a 105 page booklet documenting the many activities of the villagers of Semunying Jaya and the CSOs that supported them over the years, aiming at addressing and mitigating damages to their livelihoods and environment that resulted from the unsustainable expansion of palm oil company PT Ledo Lestari (part of the Duta Palma Group) in Bengkayang District (West Kalimantan), their failed struggle for FPIC (free, prior and informed consent), and the meager responses from local and regional government institutions, the company itself and the RSPO. The book serves as a learning tool for other communities about the impact of oil palm plantation expansion, about what actions can be taken to express and address grievances and about the limitations and chances of those actions.

One independent source mentions Greenpeace and FGG Alliance member Milieudefensie as important actors 'who kept the RSPO sharp' without being a formal member.

## *Palm oil, investors and the Dutch Government*

### Outcomes:

1. The political parties SP and GroenLinks raised questions in Dutch Parliament on 14 May 2013 about FoE's Uganda case and urged Secretary of State for Finances Mr. Weekers to address the Wilmar case at ING Bank. (agenda setting, target reacts)
2. In June 2013 the Dutch government takes steps to ensure that Dutch investors, when financing projects that involve land acquisition, comply with international sustainability standards. (policy change).
  - a. She will contribute to it that Dutch companies and banks will be leading in promoting better land governance and preventing land grab.
  - b. She expects from investors that they take the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the IFC Performance Standards as norm in investments abroad involving land acquisitions, as well as in other investments.
  - c. Recommends that the pension funds follow the Farmland Principles and the banks follow the Equator Principles.
  - d. It is crucial that investors develop binding agreements with the companies they provide financial services to on implementation of monitoring, improvement and complaints procedures, and on the compliance to these agreements.
  - e. The Dutch government will insist that the OECD puts 'due diligence in land acquisition' at the agenda of the Working Party for Responsible Business Conduct. The Minister has subsequently done so in the OECD Global Forum on Responsible Business Conduct, 26-27 June 2013 .
3. Progress in the dialogue, which the minister started with investors ABNAMRO, ABP, Aegon, FMO, ING Bank, Nederlandse vereniging van Banken, Pensioenfederatie, Pensioenfonds Zorg en Welzijn and Rabobank. Minister Ploumen reported on this dialogue in letters to the Dutch parliament in 2013. (changing practice of government)
4. The Dutch and Indonesian governments announced 22 November 2013 that they will cooperate in prohibiting the production (in Indonesia) and the import (in the Netherlands) of unsustainable palm oil.(agenda setting, target reacts)
5. Dutch investors ING, Rabobank, ABN Amro, PfZW/PGGM and ABP engage with palm oil companies Wilmar, Bumitama and Sime Darby to improve their sustainability performance. (changing practice of investors)
6. In reaction to the pressure two companies state that they will improve their sustainability performance(policy change):
  - a. Palm oil company Wilmar International publishes on 5 December 2013 a sustainability policy, called 'No Deforestation, No Peat, No Exploitation Policy '.
  - b. Sime Darby (Liberia) pstates in February 2013 to apply Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) for jits oiol plantation concessions in Liberia. This is despite the fact that in the contract with the Liberian government no requirements are included.
7. A multi-stakeholder committee in which the Kalangala Local Government in Uganda participated recognises effects of illegal land acquisition for oil palm plantations by palm oil company BIDCO (policy influencing: new accountability structure)
8. In a landmark March 5 meeting between the affected communities from District no.4, Grand Bassa County and the President of Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the government committed to supporting communities in protecting their land (just over 20,000 hectares) from further encroachment by the company. May 2014 the Liberian Government recognised the



communities' (from District no.4, Grand Bassa County) rights to their land and resources, forcing company EPO to retreat from their land. (changing practice of government)

Relevance:

Dutch government: After years of campaigning by Milieudefensie, ActionAid and colleague NGOs, banks and also pension funds have developed ESG policies (environmental, social and corporate governance) for their investment. However, implementation of these policies remains a challenge for the investors. Pressure by Dutch government will help that implementation and verification by the investors of their policies is taken more seriously by the investors. The relevance of the outcome may also be in the general engagement of the Minister with the issue of land grab for oil palm plantations.

Banks: Banks are important players in establishing new oil palm plantations by providing investment funds. Groups in the South, like FoE groups from Liberia and Uganda have asked FoE Europe and its member groups to target investors about their investments in companies involved in land grabbing, and to stimulate them to use their influence over these palm oil companies to solve the problems on the ground and to prevent further land grabbing.

Wilmar (policy): FoE International and many FoE member groups have campaigned for years to end Wilmar's unsustainable, and often illegal practices. So a voluntary commitment by Wilmar, surely is an achievement, but can only be fully effective when accompanied and overseen by strong national legislation and international norms to prevent systematic exploitation of lands, lives and livelihoods, and by the local governance systems where local communities and NGOs can exercise influence. May 2014, six months after Wilmar published its new policy, FoE groups issued a new report showing that on the ground in the cases in Indonesia, Uganda, Liberia (and additionally: Nigeria) nothing has improved yet. So the relevance of the new policy must still be proven.

Kalangala government (Uganda): The outcome implies engagement of the government as well as other important stakeholders with the affected citizens as well as recognition by the local government that there are serious concerns about the impact of these palm oil companies' operations.

Government, EPO company and Sime Darby (Liberia): If Sime Darby would really live up to its promises, this would prevent a lot of environmental and social damage in parts of the company's concession. The international attention (as a result of the engagement of banks) for its promises about Free Prior and Informed Consent may contribute to an improved compliance by the company. The Liberian government's steps around EPO mark a bold move in recognising community rights to their customary land in a country where over 50% (5 million hectares) of the land has been leased to corporations.

Contribution:

The contribution of the FGG Alliance, particularly Milieudefensie and Friends of the Earth organisations in other countries, were manifold and are only very briefly summarised here.

- Presentation of case studies: In 2012 and 2013 FoE Europe and Milieudefensie researched and presented 4 cases of land acquisition for oil palm plantation expansion in which European investors were involved: Wilmar in Uganda (with NAPE, FoE Uganda), Sime Darby in Liberia (with SDI, FoE Liberia), Wilmar in Nigeria (with ERA, FoE Nigeria and RRDC), Bumitama Agri (that sells palm oil to Wilmar) in Indonesia and of IOI in Indonesia (with Walhi West Kalimantan, regional office of FoE Indonesia, and AIDEnvironment) that owns 30% of Bumitama and is on Bumitama's board. The findings have been published in reports and factsheets.
- Media exposure: Media-work and speakers tours around the launching of the publications. Interviews on television, production of a small movie published on YouTube, television programmes e.g. on the Dutch television.

- Visits from representatives from Southern organisations: FoEE and Milieudedefensie arranged a round table with a representative of the Indonesian NGO Walhi (FoE Indonesia, national office), Ms. Nur Hidayati, in September 2013, with the participation of SNS, Robeco, ABN Amro, ING Insurance, ING Bank, ABN AMRO, Rabobank and PGGM. In November 2013 a representative of the Walhi West Kalimantan (regional office of FoE Indonesia), visited six European countries (Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, France, Germany and Belgium) to speak with the financiers involved in the oil palm companies active in his country. He also spoke with MPs, MEPs, several civil servants within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NGOs.
- Direct letters to Dutch ministers and parliamentarians: A direct letter from Mileudedefensie to the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and the Minister of Finance in response to a letter from the Minister (11 June 2013) and a letter together with other members of the FGG Alliance and other Dutch NGOs to Dutch parliament 9 September 2013 to prepare parliamentarians for the parliamentary meeting (Algemeen Overleg) on land grab.
- Engagements with banks financing oil palm activities: Milieudedefensie engaged with several banks in The Netherlands that financed Wilmar, Sime Darby, and IOI. Other country offices of Friends of the Earth and the Europe office of FoE developed comparable activities in their respective countries.
- Pressure by the general public: Milieudedefensie issued an Earth Alarm letter directed at ING Bank in September 2013 and to Rabobank in February 2014. In response 2,500 persons sent a letter to ING and 4,000 to Rabobank (paper and email). Such pressure lead to direct meetings between Milieudedefensie and the banks.
- Support to local organisation to organize local stakeholders. FOE Europe and Milieudedefensie supported local NGOs to organize stakeholders in oil palm affected areas in Uganda and Liberia.

### **3.9 Biokerosine and jatropa**

#### *Outcomes*

- Awareness in parliament and the government about potential social and environmental problems when using biofuels. On 20 February 2012, the Dutch MP Mrs. S. Dijkers, (Dutch Labor Party) asked written questions on the Dutch biofuel policy and on bio-kerosene policies that were based on the report produced by FGG partner Milieudedefensie and its local partner on Jatropa production in Java, Indonesia, for the European bio-kerosene market. In its reply on 12 March 2012 the Dutch government (Secretary of State for Infrastructure and Environment, Mr. Atsma) admitted that the value of the report is that it shows that the sustainability of agrofuels must prove itself continuously, and that it is good to continue checking agrofuels on their sustainability. (agenda setting, target reacts)
- Lufthansa and KLM are more critical when selecting their biokerosene. 8 February 2012, Lufthansa stated in a meeting with Milieudedefensie that it will not continue its pilot with Waterland International. It was a big blow for Lufthansa that in the pilot stadium of their jatropa flights, the use of jatropa was shown to be unsustainable. 21 March 2012, KLM promised that it will not start any purchase of biofuels from Waterland International. In its research, Milieudedefensie found that KLM is very carefully not using any agrofuel commodity that could have a negative impact on nature, people and climate. KLM started a weekly biokerosine flight to New York in March 2013 and uses a sustainably produced biokerosine. (changing practice).
- Awareness among the private sector about potential social and environmental problems when using biofuels. (agenda setting, terms of the debate influenced).

- The palm oil company Waterland has stopped its Jatropha activities in Grobogan District, the area where Milieudefensie supported an in-depth study into the negative impacts of extension of Jatropha plantations. (changing practice, see also separate case description).

Relevance:

- The struggle here is about unrealistically high biofuel targets set by governments and the EU, leading to poor people and the environment in the South paying the bill for unsustainable practices of palm oil companies. As a representative of Walhi (FoE Indonesia) put it already in 2008: "The Dutch and EU governments are acting irresponsibly by adopting biofuel targets of which the feasibility to meet them in a sustainable way is unproven and unrealistic, which leads to the conclusion that the Dutch and EU biofuel policies in fact constitute experiments at the cost of the lives of my Indonesian fellow-citizens". Walhi called upon the Dutch government "to take Indonesian citizens from its learning curve".
- Jatropha was still seen in 2011 as a 'miracle crop' without sustainability problems. So it could legitimize high agrofuel targets in the Netherlands, the European Union and in policies of companies. However, as jatropha would in reality not be able to meet the expectations (neither regarding sustainability, nor regarding economic feasibility), Milieudefensie expected that the biokerosine targets would thus inevitably lead to additional use of palm oil and would further contribute to large-scale oil palm plantation expansion and the related deforestation, land grab, the loss of natural livelihood resources for many persons and families, and food price rises.
- In 2012 a large Dutch energy company said that Milieudefensie's Jatropha report has had a big impact on the agro-fuels sector, also outside of the air transport sector. Until that report, the companies and politicians were still hoping that Jatropha would be the 'miracle crop' that would provide unproblematic agro-fuel and provide an alternative for palm oil that had been discredited through Milieudefensie research reports since 2004. A big player in the agro-fuels sector told Milieudefensie that it was a worst-case scenario for Lufthansa that in the pilot stadium of their Jatropha flights, the use of Jatropha was shown to be unsustainable.
- However the European Advanced Biofuels Flight Path' signed in June 2011 by the European Commission and the air transport sector, aiming at an annual use of 2 million tons of biokerosine by 2020, is still in place. A new Dutch initiative has started aiming at contributing to the Flight path goals: the declaration of intention 'Bioport for jet fuels in the Netherlands' signed in November 2013 by the Dutch Government, KLM, Schiphol, SkyNRG, Neste Oil and Havenbedrijf Rotterdam. This means that this dossier is not yet closed.

#### Contribution:

- Milieudedefensie produced four research reports, of which two were published and two were used internally. The first published report was in 2012, together with Walhi Central Java, about the production of jatropha in Central Java by Dutch company Waterland International for Lufthansa. It showed the rapid developments of aviation biofuels, and the impacts of jatropha cultivation on local people in Central Java: a severe loss of income for the farmers involved and had negative influence on food security. The report was also published in Indonesian language. A second research report, published February 2012 by Milieudedefensie was about Agrofuels in Planes. A third research in 2012 was a reality-check on the availability of Used Cooking Oil. A fourth research was on problems related to sugar cane production for aviation fuel. The findings of that one were published via a Dutch television.
- Lobby towards parliament, ministers and high civil servants. Milieudedefensie informed Dutch MP Ms. S. Dijkers (Labour party) about the jatropha report and she subsequently raised questions in Dutch parliament. Milieudedefensie also spoke with a Secretary of State, a minister and high officials in the ministry of Infrastructure and Environment and of Foreign Affairs.
- Pressure by the general public. Through its Earth Alarm letter writing initiative Milieudedefensie collected 7500 letters, e-mails and signatures calling airline Lufthansa to stop buying jatropha oil from Dutch company Waterland.
- Media coverage: press releases, advertisements, and videoclips were produced.
- Support to organise local resistance against large scale jatropha cultivation. Milieudedefensie supported the Indonesian NGO Walhi in its efforts to inform and organise local farmers against the practices and plans of jatropha company Waterland.

### **3.10 Dutch biofuel policy**

#### *Outcomes*

- 18 December 2012, the adopted vote of Dutch MP Leegte of 1 December 2011 for speeding up targets for the biofuel mix for road transport from 2012 on (aiming for 10% biofuel already in 2016 instead of 2020), has been postponed by the new State Secretary for Infrastructure and Environment, Ms. Mansveld, and will only start in 2015. The Dutch government commits to out phasing unsustainable biofuels and strengthening sustainability standards. (policy change)
- Parliamentary questions about timber cut and land grab in Tanzania for biofuels in May 2012, in response to an ActionAid report (agenda setting, target reacts).
- In the period 2012-2014 on many occasions the Dutch parliament calls upon the Dutch government to introduce a 5% conventional biofuel cap in the Netherlands, to entirely phase out or limit conventional (first generation) biofuels and to increase transparency on the origin of biofuels.(agenda setting: target reacts)

#### Relevance:

Influencing Dutch policies regarding biofuel should be considered within the efforts to influence EU biofuel policies. EU member states have much influence on EU policies. So changing position in The Netherlands is one step to influence the change in position of the EU. In the EU it is the European Commission that proposes a certain policy. Then the European Parliament and the European Council (the member states) have to negotiate the ultimate policy.

Both in The Netherlands and the EU the opposition against biofuel targets are considerable and the number of NGOs expressing their opposition is big. This is because the problem is perceived to be caused purely by policy. Biofuels as such are from an economic point of view not interesting, they are not cheaper than conventional fuels. The need and desire to produce them is based on the prescription of a mix percentage in conventional fuels by policies in the EU and its member states.

The Dutch State Secretary says that she can't stop the increase of the current (2012) Dutch biofuel mix percentage of 4.5% or entirely phase-out conventional biofuels, because of the EU RED, and also because the biofuel sector has invested in the production of conventional biofuels on the basis of the increasing target values in the government policy. However:

- The Dutch government and the EU governments are adopting biofuel targets of which the feasibility to meet them in a sustainable way is unproven and unrealistic. They could constitute experiments at the cost of the lives of people in biofuel producing countries. Indonesian and Malaysian NGOs have been warning the Dutch and EU governments for this since 2005
- Already before the enactment of the EU RED in 2008, there were clear signals from Southern NGOs of negative impacts, in particular social impacts that were hardly considered and did not get addressed in the policy in a proper way (only reporting on these issues, no criteria). Criticism focused, among other things, on the lack of policy coherence between environmental and development policies. Biofuels are often a key driver for land grab and displacement of local food producers – in particular also violating women's rights.
- FoE Europe's study "The EU biofuel policy and palm oil: cutting subsidies or cutting rainforest?" from September 2013 reveals that currently 20% of the EU biofuel mix consists of palm oil ( in 2006: 8%). Between 2006 and 2012 palm oil imports for EU biofuels increased 365%. In the Netherlands, imports doubled between 2006 and 2012. This rise is not only due to an increase in demand for biofuels, but biofuels are a contributing factor.

Contribution:

ActionAid most of all focusses in the biofuel issue on social aspects and especially the land rights dimensions of biofuel policies. Milieudefensie has put pressure on investors and palm oil companies (see also section 8). Contributions were concretely:

- Lobby and advocacy work of towards members of Parliament in The Netherlands.
- A joint letter to State Secretary Knapen of ActionAid and Oxfam who raised the issue of biofuels and the EU impacts assessment as an opportunity for policy coherence in development in a European Council meeting in May 2012.
- A European ActionAid petition entitled "Stop Biofuels Causing Hunger" which obtained almost 2,000 signatures in The Netherlands and almost 90,000 in Europe. This petition was presented in person to Minister Ploumen.
- Letters to the Dutch parliament in October and December 2012, signed by several NGOs.
- Publication of fact sheets and reports, on the role of the industry lobby, and the harmful effects of biofuel policies on land rights, food security and women's rights. The reports and factsheets were used to influence parliamentarians and civil servants in various Dutch ministries. Another report was published on the relation between subsidies for biofuel in Europe and the further extension of oil palm plantations (and cutting of rainforest). Furthermore, a report on alternatives for biofuels.
- Organization of visits for representatives of ActionAid from Kenya and Tanzania (2012) and Sierra Leone (2013) to share their experiences and expertise on the impact of biofuels and investments on specific communities with whom they work. This included discussions with

several Dutch parliamentarians. In September and November 2013 Milieudefensie organized two visits by representatives of FoE Indonesia about land grab and land conflicts in Indonesia. This was prior to a general meeting (Algemeen Overleg - AO) of the Dutch parliament on Land Grab in September and November 2013.

- Draw the attention through public and media outreach: website and articles in papers.
- Milieudefensie organised 2,000 Earth Alarm letters and e-mails mainly from Dutch citizens in October 2012 .

### **3.11 Dutch biomass policy as part of Dutch energy policy**

#### *Outcome*

- The Dutch energy company Delta did not receive a 1 billion euro funding of SDE+ (a fund from the Dutch government for stimulation of sustainable energy production) for converting its Zeeland based coal fired electricity plant into a 100% biomass fired plant.(changing practice of government)
- In the Dutch Energy Agreement, signed by the Dutch government, the Dutch corporate sector and Dutch environmental NGOs 6 September 2013, the co-firing volume of biomass in electricity production in the Netherlands is limited to 25 PJ (which is a reduction of ca. 50% as compared to the previous governmental policy), and that far-reaching sustainability criteria will be formulated for biomass production, carbon debt, indirect land-use change and sustainable forest management (Forest Stewardship Council - FSC), in addition to the 2009 rules under NTA8080, the so-called "Cramer criteria". In the Energy Agreement it has been agreed that the parties that signed the agreement will also promote the Dutch sustainability requirements in EU discussions on European norms for biomass. (policy change)

#### Relevance:

The main aims with the cap and the sustainability requirements (social and environmental) are to prevent that (1) Dutch and EU climate policies regarding biomass will contribute to deforestation, loss of valuable ecosystems and biodiversity, and land grab in developing countries (as well as in Northern countries like Russia and the USA), and that (2) co-firing of biomass, e.g. via expansion of tree plantations or by logging existing forests that are replanted, on balance results in an undesired climate impact (less forests, with less carbon stored in them, so more carbon dioxide in the air).

It is also important to apply the 'cascade principle' while using biomass (i.e. a mechanism for prioritising its use for socially preferable products, notably materials over its use for energy).

The Netherlands currently are the only EU country that has a cap and sustainability criteria for biomass and the Dutch policy is as such mentioned at the EU level as an example.

#### Contribution:

- ClientEarth, Greenpeace and Milieudefensie with an opinion submitted 3 April 2013 at the Province of Zeeland, contributed to preventing the 1 billion subsidy to the Delta energy company.
- In order to negotiate the Dutch Energy agreement with the other stakeholders, environmental NGOs worked together: a cooperation between Natuur & Milieu, Greenpeace, WNF and Milieudefensie.
- Milieudefensie participated in two working groups for the 'Dutch Energy Agreement' where the themes 'biomass' and 'biofuel' were discussion topics. Milieudefensie is still active in a

working group which should define criteria for sustainability for biomass production and in another working group on mobility and transport (and the role of biofuels).

- Position papers: (a) 16 October 2012 asking the Dutch parliament commission for economic affairs and Agriculture for sustainability criteria for woody biomass (WWF, Natuur&Milieu, Greenpeace, IUCN NL, Oxfam Novib, Milieudefensie, NCIV): (b) April 2011 'Woody Biomass for Energy: NGO Concerns and Recommendations' (input to EC biomass consultation from a CSO network including Milieudefensie).

### **3.12 EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED)**

#### *Outcomes*

1. Increasing acknowledgement of negative impacts of conventional biofuels on land rights, food security, climate and biodiversity; prominent people and organisations speaking out. International organisations like IMF, FAO, UNCTAD, OECD and WB call for revising biofuel mandates.(agenda setting: terms of the debate influenced)
2. European Commission ILUC proposal 17 October 2012 includes Indirect Land Use Change (ILUC) (reporting) and includes a 5% cap on food-based biofuels, as well as phasing out subsidies after 2020 (policy change)
3. Dutch government supports EC proposal on 5% cap and inclusion of ILUC factors. Netherlands sticks to this position in negotiations in European Council throughout 2013. (policy change)  
Some preparatory steps:
  - a. 2012, parliamentary questions GroenLinks about social impacts of biofuels; 2013 questions by Dutch MP.(agenda setting,
  - b. Dutch MPs strongly speak out on the need to limit food-based biofuels and call upon State Secretary to support EC proposal (and introduce lower cap in Netherlands)
  - c. 12 December 2013 Netherlands votes against proposal of Lithuanian president, as they feel it is 'lacking ambition': It had a cap of 7%, almost no ILUC reporting (let alone accounting), no social issues and criteria mentioned, no push for sustainable alternatives
4. European Parliament 11 September 2013 adopts position on EC proposal including (policy change):
  - a. 6% cap on land-based biofuel,
  - b. stronger accounting standards for Indirect Land Use Change (ILUC)
  - c. the inclusion of land-based biofuel crops (those crops that occupy land/space instead of only food producing crops – now this includes also crops like Jatropha))
  - d. Free prior and informed consent' (FPIC: the principle that a community has the right to give or withhold its consent to proposed projects that may affect the lands they customarily own, occupy or otherwise use).
5. As a preparatory step: The Environment Committee of the European Parliament votes in favor of Le Page's report (2013), including a 5% cap on all land-based biofuels, ILUC accounting and social criteria. The plenary of the European Parliament voted afterwards in favour of 6% cap on land-based biofuels and ILUC reporting (a compromise was made because of trade interests) (policy change).
6. The January 2014 European Commission communication on post-2020 climate and energy ("A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030", or the 'White paper') does not include a sub-target on transport, nor any references to biofuels being a part of future energy mix, which implies that from 2020 the 10% blending target would be entirely dropped. The EC writes in its policy document: "The assessment of how to minimise indirect

land-use change emissions made clear that first generation biofuels have a limited role in decarbonising the transport sector.”(agenda setting, target reacts).

7. 13 June 2014 the European Council adopts a compromise position on the ILUC proposal that includes a 7% cap on food-based biofuels, includes some ILUC obligations (only a reporting obligation for the EC, not -as FGG has been lobbying for- the obligation to take ILUC into account in determining the CO2 effect of a certain biofuel), an indicative non-binding subtarget of 0.5% for advanced biofuels that count double, and some other sustainability references (but no reporting obligations). (policy change)

#### Relevance:

In the past few years it has become increasingly clear that biofuels based on food crops or other land-intensive crops are not the sustainable alternative to fossil fuels they were thought to be. An increasing body of evidence shows that the promotion of biofuels by Europe and other parts of the world has resulted in rising food prices, land grabs and conflicts and biodiversity loss, often disproportionately affecting the world's poor whilst failing to reduce CO2 emissions. ActionAid, Friends of the Earth and other NGOs have long raised concerns on the impacts of these so-called conventional (or first-generation) biofuels. The EU Renewable Energy Directive, which originally (= at the start of MFS II) was a 10% target for biofuels, was therefore considered incoherent with development and environment objectives.

In order to change a certain EU policy, three actors have direct influence: (a) the European Commission proposes a certain policy, (b) The European Parliament takes a position, (c) the European Council (the ministers of the member states) takes a position. Then the Council and the Parliament have to make an agreement. So during the process - which took already several years, each of these actors came up with a certain position (e.g. regarding the maximum percentage of biofuels in fuels for transport). Each actor was and is a lobby target. The above outcomes 2-5 are considered as 'policy changes', although no final agreement has been reached until date (October 2014). This is because all relevant actors have positions that are quite different in comparison with the original pre-2012 EU RED policy.

Both in The Netherlands and the EU the opposition against biofuel targets are considerable and the number of NGOs expressing their opposition is big. This is because the problem is perceived to be caused purely by policy. Biofuels as such are from an economic point of view not interesting, they are not cheaper than conventional fuels. The need and desire to produce them is based on the prescription of a mix percentage in conventional fuels by policies in the EU and its member states.

#### Contribution:

- Research and case studies of ActionAid and Milieudéfense: a.o. 'Fuel for Thought: Addressing the social impacts of EU biofuel policies' (2012) and cases of Sun Biofuels (Tanzania 2011), Dakatcha (Kenya 2011/12; resulting in a Volkskrant article) and Addax (Sierra Leone 2013; MP questions and Volkskrant article). 9 September 2013, two days before the vote in European Parliament about the proposal of the European Commission to reduce the food crops based biofuel cap FoE Europe released the study "The EU biofuel policy and palm oil: cutting subsidies or cutting rainforest?".
- Public mobilization, e.g. a petition offered in 2013 to Minister Ploumen, signed by more than 56,000 persons in Europe.
- Organizing debates (e.g. Afrikadag panel with ActionAid Tanzania and MPs), which have contributed to getting Dutch policy makers on board.
- Milieudéfense issued press releases in September 2013 and in December 2013, around the votes in the European Parliament and the European Council regarding the RED. On the



agrofuels topic in 2011, 2012 and 2013 in total 1.098 media items in the Dutch press of which 119 newspaper, radio and TV, and 979 new internet items (mentioning both an activity and/or position of Milieudedefensie and Milieudedefensie's name). Many items cover the impact of European agrofuel targets on communities in the South: deforestation, food security and land grab problems. Also releases of studies drew the attention of the media.

- Lobbying: over the years there has been much contact between ActionAid and Milieudedefensie/FoE Europe and various MEPs, in particular Dutch MEPs. Colleagues in the network in Brussels and other European colleagues engaged with other MEPs. The vote in the Environment Committee of the European Parliament in July 2013 was particularly important and ActionAid has called upon the Dutch members (in particular CU, CDA, D66) to support the proposal and shared voting recommendations. The vote was successful and Dutch MEPs played a positive role (vote is anonymous so based on informal feedback).
- In September 2013 there was a mass mobilization week of ActionAid, Friends of the Earth and several other NGOs ahead of the final vote in the European Parliament (EP) in Strasbourg.
- Coalition building: there has also been much effort to work together with other NGOs, resulting in a strong biofuels civil society network that has effectively put the issue on the EP agenda. In 2013 there has been increased focus on the EP.
- Visits: ActionAid invited Abbas Kamara from the Sierra Leone Network on the Right to Food to present his experiences with European biofuel investments (2013). In meetings where Dutch MPs were present, these were urged to ask for further commitment of the State Secretary to limit the use of food-based biofuels – which the MPs addressed in a debate with Mansveld. September 2013, Nur Hidayati, head of campaigns for Walhi (FoE Indonesia) was invited by FoE Europe and Milieudedefensie to speak with MEPs about the necessity for a low cap on food based biodiesel. Ms. Hidayati spoke with several Dutch MPs before the AO Landroof of 18 September 2013 and with civil servants of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
- Informing civil servants: engagement of ActionAid with civil servants of the Ministry of Infrastructure & Environment and to a lesser extent Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs to ensure support of the Netherlands in Brussels for a 5% cap and the inclusion of so-called ILUC factors.
- Social media actions to raise awareness with Members of the European Parliament.
- Dialogue of Milieudedefensie with Unilever and Rabobank may have contributed to statements of these companies from September and October 2011 against the EU biofuel target.

### **3.13 Reporting on social impacts of biofuels**

#### *Outcomes*

1. Criticisms and suggestions from ActionAid on the baseline for EC reporting were partly adopted by the consultants (Ecofys) in their report coming out early 2013, which also referred to ActionAid reports and suggestions on this (agenda setting, target reacts).
2. Parliamentary questions were asked (2012, Groenlinks) on the EC reporting on social impacts (agenda setting, target reacts)
3. The State Secretary of Development (Knapen) in 2012 acknowledged the importance of adequate reporting and addressed the issue in a Foreign Affairs Council (agenda setting- target reacts )
4. The State Secretary of Environment in 2013 criticized the EC reporting and the lack of action proposed to mitigate negative social impacts, in particular on poor and vulnerable communities (agenda setting, target reacts)

#### Relevance:

Considering the concerns on negative impacts of biofuels on social issues, besides environmental, and the lack of social criteria to prevent/ tackle these, the obligation of the EC (as stipulated in the RED policy) to report on the impacts of its policy is of key relevance. It is also an important obligation of the EU (Lisbon Treaty) to ensure 'Policy coherence for Development' by knowing and addressing any potential negative impacts of policies on developing countries.

What is unclear at this point is to what extent the Dutch government has taken the concerns on the report and lack of action to Brussels and to what extent the next report will take into account the analysis of ActionAid. What is clear of course is that there is increasing acknowledgement of negative social impacts, which means the flawed reporting – which also stated there was limited evidence of impacts on land and food security - has not changed perceptions much, possibly due to criticisms on the report itself. Work at EU level to influence this process more directly is still ongoing.

#### Contribution:

ActionAid has specifically focused on getting more attention to and better evidence of social impacts of biofuels, including in official EC processes and reporting. In the Netherlands it has been the most active organization working on the EC obligation to report on social impacts.

1. The report 'Fuel for Thought: addressing social impacts of EU biofuels policies' (2012) was a 'shadow report' by ActionAid of the EC impact study to come. It included critical reflections of the baseline, which was considered inadequate to understand the scale (use of figures/ trade data) and depth of impacts (e.g. on women) and recommendations were made for the report to come. These were shared with Dutch civil servants and MPs, who took note and also asked parliamentary questions based on the ActionAid report. On top of this a letter was sent by Oxfam and ActionAid to State Secretary Knapen, resulting in conversations with BuZa where ActionAid shared concerns on biofuels more generally as well as the reporting process.
2. The ActionAid report was also shared with the European Commission and the consultancy (Ecofys) responsible for the research, who in their report published in early 2013 included some of the recommendations and referred to ActionAid.
3. Unfortunately ActionAid was still very unhappy with the result and decided to engage a consultant for in-depth analysis of the figures and sources used, which we indeed found to be highly flawed. This resulted in a longer analysis and an ActionAid exposé of the EC report which was widely shared, including civil servants, MPs, MEPs, civil society partners and media. Still another report was published and an interview on the radio took place.
4. This also generated debate in Brussels, where ActionAid also filed an official complaint on EC conduct with the Ombudsman as a result of the analysis and exposé.

Considering the fact ActionAid was in The Netherlands the only NGO doing a large analysis and exposé on the EC report and the arguments of the State Secretary in her reflections are largely similar, it seems likely that there has been significant contribution to this position of the State Secretary.

### 3.14 Biofuels and 'land grab'

Biofuel production can cause illegitimate land acquisition and land rights conflicts, also called 'land grab'. But land grab can be caused by many more factors than just biofuels. So we are entering here a subject of which it is debateable to what extent it is within the unit of analysis of this evaluation. The evaluation team recognises the link and the importance of the subject, but we will only give a brief description.

#### *Outcomes*

1. Land grab on the agenda of the Parliament and the Minister of Foreign Trade & Development Cooperation, showing from parliamentary questions, many references to the issue in debates and policy letters, a separate hearing and debate (AO) on land grab (February and September 2013) – including specific mentioning of biofuels as key driver and need for stronger criteria for companies investing, especially with public money. (agenda setting, target reacts)
2. MPs have proposed a motion (2013) and asked Ministers Ploumen and Mansveld whether the government is financing any biofuel investments, which Ploumen and Mansveld responded they don't (directly). (agenda setting, target reacts)
3. In 2012 a land grab (Italian-led jatropha plantation and large scale deforestation without any consultation) was stopped in Dakatcha woodlands in Kenya as a result of pressure from the community together with ActionAid Kenya, Birdlife and local partners and with large international support (petition) from European citizens, including Dutch. (policy change and changing practice)
4. MPs have asked the Minister questions on the FMO financed biofuel plantation of Addax and concerns raised on land rights violations and negative food security impacts by Silnorf (Sierra Leone), State Secretary Mansveld extensively reports on Addax and ActionAid in a policy brief June 2014 (agenda setting, target reacts)
5. 26 August 2014, Minister Ploumen started a Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on land governance in which ActionAid, Milieudefensie and Both ENDS as well as several financial institutions participate. In this dialogue the participating organisations can bring their land governance cases.(changing policies: change in accountability structures).
6. A dialogue has also taken place between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FMO, ActionAid, Silnorf and Cordaid on the Addax oil palm plantation in Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone an ongoing dialogue has been started between the relevant stakeholders(policy change: change in accountability structure).
7. A large government-led (executed by KPMG) sector risk analysis of CSR for Dutch companies addresses land grabs and biofuels. Final report forthcoming (situation October 2014).(agenda setting – target reacts).
8. In Sierra Leone the FMO financed Addax sugar cane plantation company has returned some land to farmers and is in the process of changing its farmer development programme (2014). (changing practice of a company)

#### Relevance:

The 'rush for land' in developing countries and particularly in Africa, strongly risen since around 2008, has resulted in displacement of local communities, land and human rights violations and negative impacts on food security amongst others. Most investors come from Europe and in many cases they are acting on incentives given by governments, including biofuel targets as well as subsidies/direct financing of activities – which is increasingly common with the growing support for private sector development. It is important that public money is not leading to land grab and human rights violations,

and displacement of vulnerable groups (including women). This is also stipulated in international treaties on human rights (and business) and the Voluntary Guidelines on Land Tenure. As part of the goal of downscaling harmful biofuels it is key that governments and development banks don't actively finance any biofuel plantations, which the Dutch government claims they don't but the Dutch development banks and others do. It is pertinent that the risks are recognized and land grab and negative food security impacts are prevented.

Contribution:

ActionAid has been very active in putting land rights risk on the Dutch political and policy agenda, including with specific focus on private sector funding criteria (FMO, Agentschap). Before 2011 there was limited attention for this and ActionAid was one of few developing extensive analysis and recommendations to the Ministry and later to Parliament. ActionAid was invited by the Ministry to provide more specific inputs in 2012 to strengthen land rights safeguards for private sector funding. ActionAid, FoEI, TNI and others have been active in suggesting inputs for the Voluntary Guidelines on Land Tenure that were then recently adopted in the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) in Rome. Both Ends, SOMO and ActionAid have also included land grab issues in various reports on Private sector funding and the Dutch Good Growth Fund, as well as in letters to – and meetings with the Minister and Parliament. Since 2012 ActionAid has also been raising the issue of incoherence with civil servants and MPs (in particular GL and PvdA) if the government is funding large scale biofuels investments in developing countries as part of ODA, whilst at the same time acknowledging negative impacts – which are also visible from specific investments.

The ActionAid Kenya and International research and advocacy, together with the European (including Dutch) public support to the appeal to stop Dakatcha investment contributed to preventing land grab and banning jatropha production in the area. ActionAid has shared knowledge on this and other cases of jatropha failures in reports, the website and recent role in Jatropha Conference (IS-Academy). The report 'Broken Promises' that ActionAid published in September on Addax, a biofuel plantation funded by FMO, together with a visit from Silnorf (Sierra Leone Network on the Right to Food) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Parliament contributed to commitments from MPs and responses from two Ministers. A joint lobby (letter to Minister and parliament, meeting with Minister Ploumen) was implemented for setting up a multi-stakeholder dialogue and implementing tenure guidelines in the area where Addex works, as well as improvements on the ground and the set-up of a local multi-stakeholder dialogue.

ActionAid and Milieudéfense have also contributed to the establishment of the sector risk analysis of KPMG and the KPMG assessment, which had land rights as a key focus assigned by the Minister (a commitment she made to ActionAid and others during the meeting in September 2013). Biofuels seemed to be off the radar of KPMG but ActionAid provided a lot of written and verbal inputs between February and June 2014 and was also asked by KPMG to review several parts, which included some of the issues ActionAid had raised. Milieudéfense also raised the issue when attending a meeting with KPMG.



## 4 Hivos Alliance: outcomes, relevance, contribution

### 4.1 Access to Energy - UN Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All)

*Outcome 1: After Rio+20 in 2012, national civil society organizations in 11 countries<sup>118</sup> became aware of and have engaged in the national SE4All processes. (Agenda setting)*

Description:

Since the launch of the UN Energy for All (SE4All)<sup>119</sup> initiative in 2011, 83 developing countries have “opted in” and joined the efforts of SE4All indicating their desire to engage with the Initiative to strive towards the three global goals on energy access, efficiency and renewables. Country Action plans are underway in nearly 30 of these. The goals of the UN SE4All initiative originally were to double the share of renewable energy and energy efficiency plus universal energy access in 2030. Joining SE4All means a commitment to deliver two key activities:

- A Gaps Analysis - highlighting key areas where attention and investment need to be focused at national level to ensure progress towards each of the three SE4All objectives; and
- A National Implementation Plan - providing a rigorous assessment of the national energy situation and a year-by-year framework outlining the action and funding required achieving the SE4All goals by 2030 at country level.

The first step, the gaps analysis on country level, went as planned in a few countries but was more chaotic in most of the participating countries. The second step, making national implementation plans, was planned in 2013 but the UN has almost no budget to invest in the progress. The World Bank (WB), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and some donor countries offered budget but then discussions started between these actors about who was leading the planning and implementation of the projects. This resulted in a chaotic management process in 2013 and only very few national implementation plans were made. Other reasons for this delay, as far as Hivos can assess because of its engagement in 11 countries, were governments that were not very active, poor communication between UN and governments and, most important, there is a lack in strong coordination and strategy.

An analysis from Hivos<sup>120</sup> about the 11 countries in which the organization is involved, shows that in about one-third the gaps analysis is either not ready or flawed and that in another half of these countries the gaps analysis is ready but often weak or waiting for approval.

In June 2014, a UN conference was held to discuss progress on country level. The update given by the UN was not strong content wise.

Relevance:

The three-folded goal of the SE4All initiative offers a great opportunity for Hivos to push for its agenda to increase share of renewable and increase energy access. In other words, SE4All has been identified by Hivos as an important opportunity to influence both donors and recipient countries to give more support to decentralized, renewable energy access. Another reason to engage is that the global SE4All initiative lacks focus on country level action and civil society involvement which is an important failure that Hivos want and can help to address.<sup>121</sup>

In many cases local and national CSOs working with local energy projects have not been aware of their country has opted-in for SE4All and that civil society should be involved in that process on national

level. Being engaged creates opportunities to be involved in the process and, ultimately and most important, to influence the national energy policy developments.

In some cases NGOs/CSOs were not included in the process of the gap analysis on country-level while the donors were. Although donors such as GIZ have a lot of knowledge, they are not in a position to represent local communities and their perspectives. By engaging in the process, local NGOs/CSOs, including Hivos and/or its partners, civil society became more visible and got more access to decision makers, which is a positive achievement in the light of the planned second step when the national implementation plans will be made.

As the national implementation plans were not developed as originally planned, Hivos also did not achieve its objectives which was, and still is, the influencing of national programmes related to SE4ALL. Results on this national level can be seen as process results mainly knowledge building, network building and enhanced involvement. However, some progress was made directly with governments, e.g. the joined effort of writing a new renewable energy policy on Zimbabwe. This is however not strictly part of SE4ALL. Furthermore Hivos and his partners have been able to push the SE4ALL frame work specifically and the issue of energy poverty in these countries through stakeholder contacts but also through media coverage. While this is positive it is less than expected – but this expectation was related to progress on UN level and this was beyond Hivos control.

At the end of 2013 Hivos re-assessed its involvement and whether ongoing investment is worthwhile. Conclusion was to continue because it is still seen as an important process and it will probably remain to be the framework within which the relevant discussions take place. It is therefore still the best chance to influence national and international policies.

#### Contribution:

- Hivos invested relatively heavily in this process and works on both levels, national and international;
- National: After Rio+20, Hivos entered into cooperation with Practical Action to step up its advocacy work. Jointly, Hivos and Practical Action organized regional workshop in East Africa and Southern Africa in a train the trainer approach, followed by a regional workshop in Central America without Practical Action and in Indonesia. In Indonesia Hivos supported IESR, an Indonesian NGO working on energy policy, with a specific focus on energy subsidies reform. Hivos works IESR on SE4ALL: organizing workshops for CSO and lobbying government. IESR is also supporting and engaged in our Sumba programme. National workshops in 11 countries were organized and CSO partners were selected. The selected local civil society organizations are engaged in energy access for especially the rural poor. Hivos assessed that it was important to identify these organizations and not those – more visible – organization that work on Climate Change. Focus of these organizations is more on global climate problems and negotiations while for SE4ALL CSOs are needed that represent and understand the position of people that have a lack of energy in the involved developing countries. Hivos has organized regional and national workshops in East and Southern Africa, Central America and Indonesia. Support has been given to the CSO and various entry points to influence energy policies at national level have been identified. A wide range of activities has been undertaken tailor-made for the country context;<sup>122</sup>
- Hivos and its partners have joined the advocacy efforts in all countries in which they were present – see for example below the outcomes harvested during the case study on Uganda; and
- International: Hivos staff participated in SE4All conferences in The Hague, New York and in Mexico.

## 4.2 Outcome Package 2: Access to Energy - European Union

*Outcome 2: In November 2011, EU Commissioner for Development, Andris Piebalgs, strengthened the EU policy regarding access to renewable energy through publishing a Green Paper which, among others, addressed the issue of energy access. (Policy change)*

In line with this renewed policy Commissioner Piebalgs later made sure the EU allocates € 50 million a Technical Assistance Facility to run through to early 2014. In addition the European Commission committed € 500 million to support concrete energy access projects (implementation) through to early 2014 and will then, likely, make significant Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) contributions through 2014-2020 in line with their recent prioritization of energy.

Relevance:

“The recently released European Commission Green Paper on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development addresses the issue of energy access. This paper states that “one of the many challenges of sustainable development [is] access to sustainable energy for all citizens.” Hivos fully endorses the view of the European Commission.

This new position is a substantial change in EU’s position regarding access to energy. It may well be that Mr. Piebalgs, who was the Commissioner for Energy prior to being the Commissioner for Development and who has a Head of Cabinet with a background in energy, brought the issue to the EC’s development agenda.<sup>123</sup> This means that he is not a follower but a leader on this issue which can be important for the implementation of the policy and for future policy decisions.

The EU is an important policy actor and donor. It has direct influence with regard to contributions to developing countries and it is one of the key players of the UN SE4All initiative.

The € 50 million from the EU are considered by Hivos as a “substantial amount” and a “reasonable beginning.” This amount can have a considerable impact on the ground. An external informant is of the opinion that “this underplays the significance of the shift at the EC in terms of energy being prioritized as this is just for the 2012-2014 period. This is supplemented by some € 500 million over the same period and after 2014, into the next MFF it is fully anticipated that the amount for energy access will be very significant in comparison with other cycles.”

One of the lessons learned from the hearing and the associated talks with many different units of the EU, Hivos concluded that it needs to work on both sides: donor (EU, WB) and receiving side (recipient countries). That is why Hivos instigated workshops in East Africa and Central America later on in 2011 and engaged in the UN SE4ALL initiative from both sides, national and international, with the aim to let the national developments profit from the international process.

Contribution:

- In 2010 Hivos, in cooperation with EEPA, published a report assessing the EU policy regarding sustainable energy in developing countries. This report was published in order to influence the evaluation of a number of country strategy papers;
- Hivos also initiated a hearing of the EU parliament based on this report. Besides MPs also Piebalgs attended this hearing. The hearing took place on 11/05/2010; and
- Contribution to the public consultation on the Green Paper. Hivos was one of the few organizations emphasizing the issue of access to sustainable energy.



*Outcome 3: In 2013, the European Parliament strengthens the support to small farmers through renewable energy with specific amendments during the 2013 parliament meeting on the agreement on the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) for the period 2014 - 2020. (Policy change)*

The legal regulation, called the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), governs especially the thematic policies, including energy. Therefore the DCI is also crucially important instrument to ensure the increased support for decentralised renewable energy access.

The DCI regulates € 19 billion in support to development cooperation in the period 2014 – 2020. Moreover the regulation will inform the other relevant regulation, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which is € 29 billion up to 2020.

There was ample possibility for advocacy with key actors as the legislation was passed through ordinary legislative procedure what means that the European Parliament and the Council had to agree and the legislation passed through two readings in each house. Given that the EU needs legal bases providing a foundation for any spending the wording in the regulation in favour of decentralized renewable energy is crucial.

The European Parliament originally tabled a total 244 amendments. Seven (7) out of the 159 amendments that were adopted by the EP sought to strengthen the DCI's focus on sustainability development and on increasing capacity for renewable energy, with an emphasis on the importance that needed to be given to the energy needs of smallholder farmers and rural communities through decentralized renewable energy schemes.<sup>124,125</sup>

“The adopted amendments strengthen the DCI legislation on the role that decentralised renewable plays in supporting small farmers. It also links the general development goals with energy access especially in amendments 206 and 209.”

Relevance:

The adoption of these amendments to the text of the DCI means a change of the legal guidance of the European Commission in the next five years. The text of the DCI is to be followed by the European Commission in its actions and spendings.

This process between Parliament and Commission provides opportunities to influence the legal decision in the European Union. The described outcome is a process outcome and at the same time a change in the policy position of the EP. Hivos has been able to influence and strengthen the position of MEP in voicing their support for decentralised renewable energy and, although this is not a complete position, the activities and voting for the amendments renewed and improved the position of the Parliament.

The direct relevance for the shift in budget for access to energy cannot be assessed because that depends on future decisions regarding implementation.

Contribution:

Hivos and EEPA cooperate on a longer term in advocacy towards the EU so that energy needs of rural communities are addressed through decentralised renewable energy as part of the sizeable development programme of the EU.

The activities aimed to ensure increased budget for renewable energy in the DCI. For that, targeted actions were undertaken to the European Commission, Council and European Parliament at several occasions but with a particular emphasis given to working with MEPs and representatives of member states in the Council working group involved in the legislative procedure.

EEPA built the 8 amendments on an earlier involvement of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs related to the negotiations on DCI, in which work was done on decentralised rural services for sustainable agriculture. This preparatory work included Wageningen University, who prepared a background paper on the relevance of decentralised rural services for development and food sovereignty and validated the assumptions underlying the 8 amendments. This preparation further included an extensive consultation and participation process of Indian and African organisations, looking at sustainable agriculture. Finally, EEPA also worked with researchers from the Dutch RIVM Institute.

Hivos and EEPA focused their attention on the support for a number of amendments to be tabled within the Parliament. Positive voting on these amendments would strengthen the DCI's focus on sustainability development and on increasing capacity for renewable energy, with an emphasis on the importance that needed to be given to the energy needs of smallholder farmers and rural communities through decentralized renewable energy schemes. Member States had already been informed by Hivos on the need for rural energy access in the context of DCI. For the purpose to get the wording in the regulation in favour of decentralized energy, Hivos and EEPA chose 9 relevant amendments out of a total of 244 amendments that were tabled. The objective to include 'coherence' was submitted twice to increase the chance of one of the amendments getting through. The objective was therefore for 8 amendments to be adopted.

Seven out of eight amendments were adopted, providing an approval rate of 89%. The approval rate of other amendments was 68%. This is an indication that the accompanying lobbying measures have been successful to increase the rate of success of the adoption of the amendments.

Activities by Hivos and EEPA in detail:

- On 28 August 2013, Hivos (acting on behalf of the Alliance 2015<sup>126</sup>) has sent a letter to the European Union presidency (Lithuania), Ministers of Foreign Affairs of all member states, Commissioner Piebalgs, and copies to Committee on Development (CODEV)<sup>127</sup> members and MEPs, to explain the importance of access to energy for rural people. In September 2013 Alliance 2015 members have followed up by direct contact with their own ministry or CODEV representatives (including Hivos contacting the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs);
- EEPA staff, on behalf of Hivos, has arranged face to face meetings with the troika of the CODEV member states presidencies chairing the member states committee and seek their advice on timing and framing of letters and meetings;
- EEPA staff, also on behalf of Hivos, has arranged face to face meetings with MEPs, especially those participating in the negotiations, and the rapporteur, Thijs Berman (MEP), arranged regular update phone calls with the staff of the MEPs and involved the secretariat of the rapporteur in the design of the advocacy; and
- On 30 October 2013, prior to the voting in the Parliament, Hivos received a letter from Commissioner Piebalgs stating his support for renewable energy access. This as such could be listed as a separate outcome and it shows that all activities of Hivos together have put pressure on the energy access agenda both in the Parliament and the European Commission.

#### **4.3 Access to Energy - World Bank Energy Strategy**

Introductory remark: The following outcomes 4, 5 and 6 are achieved with contributions from a campaign that was led by the Washington-based NGO Bank Information Center (BIC) and in which Hivos was one of the important partners. The relevance section for each outcome describes the

relevance in the light of the objectives of this BIC-led campaign and in the light of Hivos' objectives. The contribution sections describe the contribution of BIC-led campaign as a whole.

*Outcome 4 (the period mid-2009 until mid-2011): In spring 2011, the World Bank included in its second draft energy policy improvements regarding stricter rules to finance coal power plants and more attention and budget for rural access to sustainable energy.<sup>128</sup> (Agenda setting)*

Although this proposed new energy policy was not accepted by the World Bank Board of Directors, this draft new energy policy was a positive change regarding two aspects. First, the World Bank included a draft new policy to stop financing coal power plants in middle income countries while the Bank kept this option open – under strict conditions - for least developed countries.<sup>129</sup> In other words, in Mozambique, for example, the World Bank could still finance a coal power plant but not in South Africa. A result of this was that countries such as China were strongly opposing and did not agree to the draft (USA and EU were supporting the draft).

Second, this draft policy included increased attention for the access to sustainable energy in rural areas in developing countries, including strong arguments for prioritizing on the rural poor: “electricity services need to be extended to nearly six times as many people in rural rather than urban areas” and “high costs of electricity in rural areas and limited capacity of households to pay for service deter investment in rural electrification.”

Relevance:

Both described changes in the draft text of the new policy would have been direct contributions to Hivos' overall campaign objectives. Unfortunately the draft was not accepted as new policy position.

The proposed new policy makes important progress in a number of key areas, including new limitations on support for coal-fired power plants; a new prioritization of end-use efficiency as a critical tool for meeting both strategic objectives; and targets to significantly raise investment in clean energy. Details are below:

- A ban on new coal-fired power plants in middle-income countries;
- A new prioritization of end-use efficiency as a critical tool for meeting both strategic objectives;
- An expanded focus on delivering clean energy services to poor households;
- Targets to significantly raise investment in clean energy;
- A commitment to work to reduce or eliminate fossil fuel subsidies;
- A commitment to empower local communities and women in decision-making around local energy initiatives;
- New requirements for lifecycle GHG emissions analysis and accounting;

One informant added to the relevance: “BIC was aware that (i) its campaign and the proposed policy did not discuss the World Bank's lending policy and (ii) that they had more work to do towards the role of the Bank regarding financial intermediates which can provide funds to coal subprojects. Therefore ‘strict rules’ does not apply to all types of World Bank lending.”

In the light of Hivos' theory of change, these developments are relevant. In the context of the World Bank organization, a policy is more a guidance to specific financing decision and it is not necessarily binding. But the existence of such a draft, the debate that took place and the position taken by the EU and the US already influence the agenda of future concrete financing decisions. For example, there is a recent internal debate and struggle around the decision to finance a coal power plant in Kosovo.

The above is supported by the fact that at the Rio+20 summit in June 2012, the World Bank Group has committed to doubling the leverage of its energy portfolio by mobilizing private, donor and public contributions to World Bank-supported projects, as well as supportive policies to expand energy access, renewable energy and energy efficiency.<sup>130</sup> Part of that commitment was that the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation will expand existing programs such as Lighting Africa, which aims to provide affordable lighting to 70 million low-income households by 2020, as well as undertake new initiatives with the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program, such as mapping of renewable energy resources. The World Bank will also work with others, including the International Energy Agency, to produce a global baseline report tracking progress to date in achieving Sustainable Energy for All's three objectives.

Comments from BIC staff indicate that this is not the case to a great extent. Nevertheless, BIC mentions that one of the goals of this activity was to have a rippling effect. If the World Bank takes the 'high moral ground' others can use the Bank policies and standards, such as regional development banks and also the private sector.

Nevertheless, evidence for the implementation of this commitment would have to show that the World Bank devotes more resources into sustainable energy for the poor and that the share of this budget increases compared to fossil fuel-based energy sources and grid extensions. Here are the facts known so far that could answer this question:

- According to one of the substantiators, the World Bank had put more money into so-called distributed renewables (projects) in the recent years which counts as energy access to the poor;
- The lending towards renewables has increased between 2008-2013<sup>131</sup>, but still remains much smaller than lending to fossil fuels;
- "World Bank Group's energy projects largely do not target increased energy access for the poor." In the overall WB's energy portfolio<sup>132</sup> from 2008-2013, the access-to-energy lending never exceeded 10%.<sup>133</sup>

In conclusion, data have yet to be presented that demonstrate that the World Bank has lived up to its Rio+20 commitment.

Other relevant indirect effects of all this work were mentioned by informants:

- Board education on this issue; and
- Catalyst of good relationship between environmental groups, development groups and trade organization; see for example the large number of joint NGO letters to the Board.

Linked to this: NGOs learned to try to get the voices from the Global South into the campaign. People from India, Indonesia and South Africa were speaking with the Board; leading to empowerment of these Southern partners.

Contribution:

BIC:

- See BIC's activities that contributed to the five intermediate outcomes as described below;
- BIC was the coordinating NGO;
- Developed the Model Energy Policy; and
- Was one of the key actors within the campaign with specific focus on advocating towards the US government and WB staff.

Hivos:

- Was one of the partners active in the development of the alternative energy policy for the World Bank;
- Undertook a direct lobby towards the Executive Director representing Netherlands and other countries at the World Bank, including several personal meetings in Washington as well as in The Hague;
- Supported several partners to lobby in Washington; and
- Contributed several times to earlier draft versions directly to the Dutch representative Mr. Treffer, through the Dutch ministry and with BIC to WB staff.

*Intermediate outcome 4.1: On 8 April 2010, five World Bank Executive Directors abstained on the decision to fund the Eskom coal-fired power plant in South Africa. (Agenda setting)*

The US\$17.8 billion 4800 MW Medupi coal-fired power plant in South Africa is the seventh largest in the world.<sup>134</sup> The World Bank decision included a \$3.75 billion loan as requested by the South African government.<sup>135</sup> Opposition against the Eskom power plant came from local farmers as well as from environmental NGOs. The key argument is that the financing of the Medupi power plant only further contributes to energy poverty and environmental degradation in South Africa, at the same time that viable alternatives exist. Michael Stulman of Africa Action said the entire project was misguided, and would do little to help poor South Africans. "This is one of those stereotypical development disaster stories," he said.<sup>136</sup> In a statement, the US treasury department said the loan was incompatible with the bank's stated commitment to promoting low carbon economic development.<sup>137</sup>

The project has served as a lightning rod for criticism from activists in South Africa and abroad, who came together to launch a campaign to halt the loan, which the World Bank fast-tracked with little regard to outstanding issues with the project. The following World Bank Executive Directors abstained: Netherlands, United States, Italy, Norway, United Kingdom – a virtually unprecedented outcome in a board that typically operates by consensus. When the African Development Bank approved a similar loan to Eskom the previous year, only the United States abstained. While the board still approved the loan, outside pressure served to introduce important measures to mitigate some of the worst impacts on local communities.

Relevance:

It has now become more "costly" for the World Bank group to fund coal projects. Due to the vibrant CSO opposition to the Eskom project, the World Bank will likely view future coal projects as too controversial and avoid recommending such projects. The abstaining of the five World Bank Executive Directors serves as a marker for future actions of the board on this issue, particularly in the context of the World Bank's Energy Strategy review. The elevation of this Bank-funded coal project into a high-profile issue has spotlighted the World Bank's continued role in fossil fuel lending, and has increased pressure for them to phase it out. The Eskom issue has also led to the formation of a broad-based coalition of groups, including new actors such as the Sierra Club and the National Resources Defense Council, into the fight to pressure the World Bank to phase out its coal lending.

Contribution BIC/NGO campaign:

BIC directed advocacy around the World Bank, and worked closely with its South African counterparts in raising their concerns to the World Bank Executive Directors and elevating the issue to the general public through media.

*Intermediate outcome 4.2: In 2010, the World Bank conducts an extensive global consultation on its “Energy Strategy Approach Paper” in 36 countries<sup>138</sup>, significantly larger than initially proposed. (Practice change)*

Originally the World Bank planned one consultation in Washington and one in Brussels.

Relevance:

The extensive global consultations allowed civil society actors in developing countries to share their concerns and recommendations on the World Bank’s energy strategy, particularly around promoting renewable energy and ensuring projects are targeted to address energy access for the poor.

Contribution BIC/NGO campaign:

BIC advocated for a more robust consultation process with the Bank’s energy team. BIC submitted to them a list of cities where they should be organizing consultations, leveraging on its extensive partner network. BIC was able to organize and work with local groups in 18 countries worldwide with the objective that the World Bank receives a strong and consistent message during the consultations.

*Intermediate outcome 4.3: In 2010, the World Bank created 2 new internal positions on climate, and filled the positions with renowned international experts on clean energy. (Agenda setting)*

In June 2010, Andrew Steer was appointed as Special Envoy for Climate Change. Steer was the chief author of the World Bank’s first World Development Report on the environment and is the former head of the bank’s environment department. In September 2010, the World Bank hired Daniel M. Kammen as Chief Technical Specialist for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency. The position is meant to enhance the Bank’s renewable energy and energy efficiency activities, in order to address the continued lack of clean, reliable, and affordable energy services to one-and-a-half billion people. Kammen is a Professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and has 25 years of experience on the technical and policy aspects in enabling low-carbon energy systems.

Relevance:

BIC explains that Bank critics have praised these two appointments. The hope was that Steer and Kammen’s technical expertise and belief in the urgency to combat climate change will help steer the World Bank to commit more to helping developing countries in promoting low-carbon development. One of the informants adds another point of view. This person explains that in that period the go/no-go for coal financing became a sort of focus of some NGOs. That divided the Board and it divided the NGOs from the Bank. Also, two types of framing appeared: one that links energy use to climate change and looks for a solution, the other that sees energy as a basic need for development and that no one should tell which technology to use. According to this informant this polarization did the campaign no good because it isolated the NGO-allies, namely the US and EU EDs. The relevance of having Dan Kammen joining the Bank again is that he came with a model to assess options. This options assessment is a crucial capacity for the World Bank because if all options for serving energy needs are assessed it might lead to site-specific, informed solutions and out of the polarized dilemma described above. See also under outcome 2.

Contribution BIC/NGO campaign:

BIC has raised this issue of Bank staff capacity on climate in its engagements with Bank management. BIC has also been pressuring the Bank to devote more resources to renewable energy and energy efficiency lending during consultations.

*Intermediate outcome 4.4: In April 2011, at the World Bank/IMF Spring Meetings, the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB) adopted a resolution<sup>139</sup> that urges its members to ask their government ministers to explain their policies on World Bank's involvement in large-scale fossil fuel electricity generation, and invites the World Bank to review parliamentary feedback. (Agenda setting)*

The PNoWB is a network of parliamentarians from 140 countries to advocate for increased accountability and transparency.<sup>140</sup> It has no formal role in the WBG structure.

Relevance:

According to BIC, this is one more chance to raise the issue as this is a different kind of actor. This resolution puts more pressure to the World Bank in adopting an energy strategy that reduces carbon emissions.

Contribution BIC/NGO campaign:

BIC encouraged the Parliamentary Network Secretariat to initiate this resolution.

*Intermediate outcome 4.5: In April 2011, the US Treasury supported a World Bank Energy strategy that restricts coal lending in middle-income borrowing countries, states explicit targets for energy efficiency, and requires greenhouse gas accounting for new energy projects.<sup>141</sup> (Policy change)*

Relevance:

The US Treasury position is binding for the US position in the Board of Directors.

Contribution BIC/NGO campaign:

Next to its convening role of the campaign BIC also was the main advocate towards the US governmental actors. BIC director Chad Dobson summarizes this as: "BIC delivered the US."

*Outcome 5 (The period mid 2011 until summer 2013): In the summer of 2013 the WB actually revised its energy policy and put out a new directions paper for the World Bank Group's Energy Sector.<sup>142 143</sup> (Policy change)*

The new policy paper *Toward a Sustainable Energy Future for All: Directions for the World Bank Group's Energy Sector*, in short called Energy Directions, has not a formal position within the World Bank structure decision-making, unlike a Policy, a Guidance or a Safeguard paper would have.<sup>144</sup> According to one informant, this is the first time that the term 'Directions' paper has been used. In fact, the earlier draft Energy Strategy also would have had no formal position which means that this is not a difference between the two papers.

According to one informant who was very closely involved in the process since 2009 (and earlier) the above mentioned change of title of the paper might have been one reason why countries like China stopped to oppose the proposed new policy so fiercely.

Another reason could be the changes in the content. Although content-wise both papers are very similar there is a certain change in the wording regarding the coal issue. The new Directions paper puts more emphasis on the decision making process. This policy therefore does not directly exclude coal. It rather focuses on the objectives, (1) increasing modern energy access and reliability with a special emphasis on the poor, and (2) facilitating the shift to environmentally sustainable energy sector development, and emphasizes the assessment of situation-specific options to achieve the objectives. In that process coal should be avoided but is not ruled out. This section summarizes this issue: "The

WBG acknowledges the global challenge of balancing energy for development with its impact on climate change and will help client countries realize affordable alternatives to coal power. The WBG will provide financial support for Greenfield coal power generation projects only in rare circumstances. Considerations such as meeting basic energy needs in countries with no feasible alternatives to coal and a lack of financing for coal power would define such rare cases.” The paper further mentions the criteria that will apply to such projects.

One informant put it this way: “It is not only about the coal issue, it is about sovereignty: they just don’t want a prescription of what’s right and what’s wrong. Countries are not supporting the idea of coal necessarily, they just don’t want it to be taken off the list they could get money for. It’s a principle. And that is not only China.”

Regarding access to energy for the poor the new Energy Directions are in fact more positive in the light of the NGO objectives compared to the draft from 2011 because it says that off grid is as valuable as grid expansion: “In countries with low energy access, the priority will be affordable and reliable energy. Grid, mini-grid, and off-grid solutions will all be pursued for electricity. In rural, remote or isolated areas, off-grid solutions based on renewable energy combined with energy-efficient technologies could be the most rapid means of providing cost-effective energy services.”

Relevance:

The opinions regarding the relevance of this outcome are not unanimous. BIC did not mention this change in their written responses prior to the first interview and when it was mentioned during that interview, the emphasis was put on the fact that the Directions paper had no ban on coal and that it was a weak paper. BIC had not studied it in detail. Overall, the evaluator did not get the impression that BIC thought that this was a relevant outcome. Other respondents did not share this opinion and think that it is a relevant change. That viewpoint is further described:

The new Energy Directions will make it very difficult to finance coal-fired power plants. It is basically decided that it will not support coal fired power plant except in rare circumstances. But these are not defined in hard criteria but in conditions that need to be assessed per situation. The emphasis on the options assessment and this should support better informed decision-making and more transparent discussions about the alternatives to coal. Altogether it also makes the signal stronger that the WB sends regarding no longer supporting these types of power plants.

It is plausible to assess that the biggest bottleneck in 2011 was that the politics at the Bank were not on the side of the NGOs. And this is not about the energy strategy as such but it is about voice of the developing countries board members. Brazil, China, India, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, all the big developing countries, organized themselves and call themselves G11. They are beginning to say what they want in a very aggressive and assertive way. They wrote a paper to the board saying ‘no to this crap’, this energy strategy draft. Their main reasons are: 1. It is too prescriptive. 2. They don’t want to link climate with development. 3. Completely against any language stopping coal financing.<sup>145</sup>

One informant said that the go/no-go for coal financing became sort of BIC’s focus. That divided the Board and it separated the NGOs from the World Bank. Two types of framing appeared. One links energy use to climate change and looks for a solution. The other sees energy as a basic need for development and that no one should tell which technology to use. This polarization did hurt the campaign because it isolated NGO’s allies, the US and EU Executive Directors. Somewhere in this period Dan Kammen joined the Bank (see intermediate outcome 3, above). He came with a model to assess options.



While that did not help toward the decision in 2011 this vision was the solution towards the making and the adoption of the Energy Directions in 2013. This new frame is the main change between the 2011-Strategy and the 2013-Directions: options assessment and integrated research planning.

It is relevant for many NGOs, and especially Hivos, that off-grid is equal to grid extensions because this is a step forward although it is certainly not considered to be the final desired policy position. In addition it is also a fact that the money has not yet been mainstreamed or that the Bank has put money into it. One informant: “There is a very difference between what they say in the policy paper as a guidance and where the money actually goes.”

Contribution BIC/NGO campaign:

The NGO campaign convened by BIC ended in 2011 after the decision of the WBG described in outcome 4. As the talks were stalled because of the controversy BRIC vs US/EU, Hivos’ assessment was that more external advocacy activities would only be in vain and that insiders within the World Bank would continue the silent diplomacy. For Hivos this was a conscious strategy decision after the campaign created that political space for the NGO allies inside the World Bank.

One informant: “What happened after the initial draft was sidelined, was that all of the NGOs who had initially been working on this issue essentially stopped”, which does not necessarily mean that they did not continue to have an influence on actors. In addition, the following activities are assessed to have had a contribution:

- The only pressure that was sustained was pressure from the Sierra Club, BIC and European CSO(s) around the Kosovo coal plant. Essentially this maintained pressure on coal at the institution by making the next coal plant in their pipeline a headache and a controversy. Analytical work showed that there are alternatives and that the coal plant is not necessary at all. It was essentially using that process as a proxy to the policy and at least maintain the pressure;
- Sierra Club also brought in the voice of enterprises: 12 social enterprises asking for large budgets from the bank to give to off-grid decentralized energy projects; and
- World Resources Institute (WRI) was one of the partners in the campaign 2009-2011, playing a role of insider and as technical adviser to the World Bank (staff). After 2011, WRI maintained the good relationships, continued to give technical input and supported key Bank staff to develop language that helped to develop a position that could be accepted by the Board of Directors.

Other activities from BIC which had a more indirect contribution in this period can be summarized as follows:<sup>146</sup>

- BIC with support from its allies convinced the World Bank to include climate change among a limited set of 7 key issues. BIC convened and coordinated the activities of civil society allies to prepare a set of policy recommendations, and using BIC’s unique knowledge of the institution and its levers of power, conveyed them to key decision makers inside and outside the Bank;
- In addition to preparing and submitting 11 initial policy recommendations in late 2012, BIC and the Sierra Club submitted in February 2013 a briefing that describes in some detail how the Bank could address climate mitigation and adaptation in its safeguard policies;
- BIC and its partners have elevated the issue of climate change within the context of safeguards in its discussions with allies in U.S. Congress; and
- In April 2012, BIC convened a meeting of close to 50 CSO organizations from around the world that work on World Bank advocacy. The meeting served well to further strengthen the

collaboration that will carry forward the climate change agenda as the World Bank continues to review its environmental standards and energy policy.

In 2012, as continuation of the earlier campaign, Hivos targeted the WB again, now without a BIC-coordinated campaign. This activity aimed to ensure the WB will contribute more resources to access to energy during the Rio+20 negotiations. For that it worked closely with BIC and Sierra Club, worked with Mr. Treffers to organize a round table at the WB headquarters, ensured and financed the presence of a CSO from Africa at the round table (Tatedo, Tanzania), wrote letters etc. After the Rio+20 summit the UN SE4ALL became more and more the driving force on this issue. That is why Hivos focused in the second half of 2012 and 2013 on influencing the SE4ALL process in the “opt in” countries.

In conclusion, the above means that NGO contribution to this outcome 5 was mostly indirect and that the main contribution was the campaign until 2011 which created that political space for the NGO allies inside the Bank to have that conversation and come to that decision.

*Outcome 6: On 24 March 2014, the United States of America and the Netherlands made a joint statement on climate change and financing the transition to low-carbon investments abroad which included an agreement to end support for public financing of new coal-fired power plants abroad except in rare circumstances.<sup>147</sup> (Policy change)*

The joint statement was released during the visit of US President Obama to the Netherlands. President Obama had a face-to-face meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Rutte. When both gave a press conference in the Rijksmuseum in front Rembrandt’s painting ‘the nightwatch’, which drew a lot of attention, in his short statement Obama said: “We’re pleased that the Netherlands has joined our initiative that will virtually end all public financing for coal-fired plants abroad.”<sup>148</sup> The joint statement further mentions the United Kingdom “and others” and makes explicit that this “includes our bilateral development finance institutions and projects financed through multilateral development banks”.<sup>149</sup> The latter includes the Worldbank.

Relevance:

This statement is fully in line with the policy developments as discussed in outcomes 4 and 5 above. It is a substantiation of that process and a public manifestation of its results.

Contribution:

See outcomes 4 and 5.

#### **4.4 Access to Energy – Case Energy Network-Uganda<sup>150</sup>**

*Outcome 7: In 2013 several governmental institutions increased their awareness for renewable energy and started to recognize Energy Network-Uganda as a relevant national stakeholder. (Agenda setting)*

There has been greater understanding and attentiveness among various government actors and institutions on the importance of renewable energy and its role in achieving sustainable development in Uganda. As part of this supportive national outlook, Energy Network-Uganda is increasingly recognized as a credible stakeholder and has been invited to a number of high profile meetings, delegations, events and organizing committees relevant to the discussion and promotion of renewable energy in Uganda. Some relevant examples include:

- The August/September 2013 invitation by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD), through the office of the commissioner of renewable energy, to join the planning committee for the energy week held on 24-28 September 2013: The Uganda energy week is a week-long annual event by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, dedicated to energy activities. It's a show case and exhibition by various actors from government, private sector and research institutes on Uganda's progress on efficient and sustainable, affordable and reliable energy technologies and often draws media attention to energy issues in Uganda. In 2013, the theme was 'Save Energy, Save the Environment, You Can Make a Difference' and aimed to draw attention and awareness to energy efficiency issues, to stimulate debate on the same while also promoting sustainable energy technologies amongst the public and various institutions. The guest minister at the event, Minister of Energy, Hon. Irene Muloni unveiled in her speech the new Energy brand, 'Energy for Sustainable Development'. Although Energy Network-Uganda had been a participant - as one of the exhibitors of energy technologies - in the Energy Week since 2008, the form of its involvement in this event was more enhanced in the year 2013. Energy Network-Uganda was invited by Ministry of Energy two months before September to be part of the planning committee as the organizer for Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and energy entrepreneurs (Private Sector). The tasks which Energy Network-Uganda undertook included providing information about the Energy week and how CSOs and energy entrepreneurs could participate; key energy access concerns which were key contributions to efforts for Sustainable Energy for All151; cost of exhibition space; dates for the energy Week. This enabled CSOs and energy entrepreneurs to have easier access to information about the Energy Week and were able to exhibit their energy products. As part of its advocacy work on alternative and sustainable energy, Energy Network-Uganda rented exhibition stalls for some of its network members who showcased innovative technologies for sustainable energy. Energy Network-Uganda also hosted a workshop parallel to the exhibitions.
- As a result of its high profile participation, Energy Network-Uganda was able to receive three expressions of interest from organizations interested in becoming members of the network and as well establishing new partnerships and collaborations.
- In February 2014, the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) Uganda invited Energy Network-Uganda to join as a member of the Think Tank Group of the SE4ALL and participate in the meeting, held on 18th February 2014. NEMA is the institution responsible to oversee the guidance, planning, resources mobilization and implementation of SE4ALL in Uganda. NEMA steers the SE4ALL deliberations in collaboration with the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, the Ministry of Water and Environment and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Uganda. They are responsible to bring on board other actors, including government ministries (energy, tourism), the National Planning Authority (NPA), civil society and the private sector to set priorities for the government and donors on the implementation of SE4ALL. Since energy is currently pursued as a tool for social and economic transformation and is a priority sector for the government of Uganda, the meeting looked at greening the economy in the context of sustainable development and economy. It was also meant to set priorities for the government and decide on relevant SE4ALL actions for Uganda. Energy Network-Uganda's (and its partner UCSD) unsolicited for invitation and participation was a result of the realization of the 'need for civil society representation on matters of national policy especially in relation to widening the pool of energy beyond the oil and gas that was recently discovered in Uganda'.

#### Relevance:

The invitation of Energy Network-Uganda shows it is a credible and recognized partner that works closely with the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. Its participation in various events at the national level helps cement important and relevant relationships with the government, towards closer collaboration on energy issues and activities. The energy week proved to be a useful platform for Energy Network-Uganda to carry out key activities under the advocacy project, including distribution of policy briefs developed by the network and its partners to a wider audience.

In addition, the Think Tank guides Ugandan policy formulation, evaluation and interventions on sustainable development. It informs national debates and positions on environment and sustainable development, and Energy Network-Uganda's participation in this top body organ gives opportunity to influence government positions on pro poor energy. The importance of the meeting needs to be understood in the light of the Ugandan Minister for Energy speech during the energy week in 2013, of the need to pursue *'energy for sustainable development' in the midst of growing reliance on mining oil and gas as a primary growth area for the government. According to the acting NEMA director, this was the first meeting focusing on sustainable development but with energy featuring as a key component of the discussions. This means Energy Network-Uganda got an opportunity to be part of the discussions relevant for pushing for sustainable energy options in light of competing forces and the push for oil exploration. This is in line with its objective to stimulate national debate focused on prioritizing pro-poor access to efficient energy.*

#### Energy Network-Uganda's Contribution:

In addition to its contribution to other outcomes, Energy Network-Uganda works closely with the office of the Uganda commissioner for energy often inviting the commissioner to their activities. This has created linkages with the broader Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and other relevant institutions.

Energy Network-Uganda provided information about the key energy concerns that have been identified within the process of the Energy Access Advocacy project. Such information was in response to some of the resources persons of the Think Tank who had indicated that energy for sustainable development was difficult to incorporate as one of the key areas of focus for the National Development Plan. This was because they lacked data and information on energy that links to producers and users. Such a process of integrating sustainable energy could then guide the allocation of funds to government priorities.

*Outcome 8: In 2013, renewable energy emerged as a key sector with increased recognition by the Ugandan government culminating in increased budgeting for research, innovation, testing and knowledge dissemination on alternative technologies. (Practice change)*

Although renewable energy was recognized by the government of Uganda as a key sub-sector and promoted through the Renewable Energy Policy of 2007, its allocation in the budget through the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development has been considerably low since 2007. For instance in the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 approved budget estimates, the sector received 460,000 (thousands Uganda shillings) and which was mainly allocated to paying wages for government officials. However, 2013 showed a major improvement. In the 2013/2014 approved budget estimates, the promotion of renewable energy & energy efficiency was awarded a total 23,375,594 (thousand Ugandan shillings). Of this amount, only eight percent (1,926,894 thousand Uganda shillings) was allocated to wages, with the rest going to non-wage related developments. This was a positive increase as opposed to the 1,060,000 (thousand Ugandan shillings) figures in the 2012/2013 budget.

Relevance:

Although the actual use of the additional funds allocated to renewable energy promotion is not indicated in the budget, an increase in renewable energy budgeting can be assumed to mean an increase in funding for the development of renewable energy products such as briquettes and biogas as core alternative products and sources for energy. This is important because when products such as solar systems, biogas, briquettes feature high on the agenda of the government, members of the Energy Network-Uganda network who work on energy entrepreneurship gain means of improving on their energy products, which is one of the ways of increasing access to markets for the members. Energy in Uganda is largely private sector controlled. Furthermore, the members who are at the user level within community groups also gain by accessing quality energy products that are efficient in use.

Energy Network-Uganda's budget analysis noted that the majority of this additional funding however is mainly indicated as external financing. The funds earmarked for wages which are a paltry 1,926,894 thousands shillings come from the Ugandan government. The non-wage developments (i.e. 21,448.70 thousands shillings) are provided directly by the German Federation Republic. This shows that it is donors (and not the government of Uganda per se) that are keen on renewable energy. This in the long run is an unsustainable way of funding given the presence of an unclear external funding climate in Uganda as witnessed in recent withdrawal of funding by donors due to Uganda's stance on homosexuality.

Energy Network-Uganda Contribution:

In addition to its contributions to other outcomes, Energy Network-Uganda lobbied the commissioner of Renewable Energy Department and also provided data in order to sustain interest on renewable energy. Energy Network-Uganda advocates for alternative energy technologies such as biogas, briquettes and solar.

*Outcome 9: In the draft 2014 budget allocations, the government of Uganda has proposed to increase the funding for rural electrification programme to 111,736 Billion Uganda Shillings compared to 102,938 Billion in the 2013/2014 budget allocations. (Policy change, Practice change)*

The draft National Budget Framework Paper FY 2014/15 contains an increase (1.1 percent) towards more spending on the energy sector. This is meant to continue implementing rural electrification schemes to extend power generated from the hydro-electric plants to district, headquarters and rural growth centres and household connections country wide. Over 93% of available funding will be used for construction of rural electrification power lines and to achieve at least 70,000 connections per year.

Relevance:

An increase in budgeting for rural electrification would be important towards more access to energy for Uganda's rural population and ensures more households are connected to the national grid. However, an increase of 10% considering inflation rates in 2013 around 4 – 5 % is not a substantial policy change. In addition, at the time of writing the actual relevance of this can only be known when the funds actually materialize given the budget is heavily reliant on donor funds in a context where some donors have announced aid cuts to Uganda in the aftermath of corruption scandals and the recently-passed Anti-Homosexuality Bill. Furthermore, rural electrification often supports centralized power production as opposed to decentralised energy production.

Although Energy Network-Uganda reported this outcome as a relevant change, the evaluation team concludes that it is in fact hardly any change, showing that Energy Network-Uganda has not yet been successful in positively influencing Uganda's budget for energy for the poor.

Energy Network-Uganda contribution:

In addition to its contribution to other outcomes, Energy Network-Uganda lobbied for increased funding for pro poor energy through their workshops and interactions with the commissioner.

*Outcome 10: In 2013 several CSOs from Uganda mainstreamed energy issues into their strategies, activities and programmes. (Agenda setting)*

A number of CSOs (members of the network) have taken up renewable energy as a key concern and set it up as core to their agenda and work. Previously, a few had energy concerns as an integrated activity but there has since been a change of agenda and priorities, with energy emerging as a key concern amongst these CSOs. Others such as Joint Energy Partnership (JEEP) have strengthened its focus on renewable energy, culminating into several new activities. A community based organization, Gabula Atudde in Mukono district, has developed a strategy for fundraising for their energy-related activities, participates in national debates, the energy for water conference – where they were selected to demonstrate on energy linkage with water by the United Nations Capital Development Fund in November 2013.

Relevance:

Strengthened CSOs are relevant for Energy Network-Uganda's objectives and strategy, as the network relies on the capability of these organizations to help the people, especially the poor and vulnerable communities, to amplify their energy concerns so that policy and decision makers at various levels take actions that promote access to renewable and sustainable energy. Some CSOs like Gabula Today are strategic as they also interact a lot with district authorities where the budget process starts.

Energy Network-Uganda's contribution:

In addition to its contribution to other outcomes, Energy Network-Uganda undertook capacity building for the CSOs.

*Outcome 11: In 2013, several new CSOs joined new networks for advocacy on energy. (Agenda setting)*

In 2013, the network membership increased with new actors coming on board. In addition, several activities undertaken by the network (such as the energy week) has exposed the member CSOs of Energy Network-Uganda to new actors like the government and the commissioner of energy. In some instances, these activities brought together the private sector and the civil society organizations, increasing the size of networks for member CSOs which have proved useful in a number of ways. The increase in network was relevant for CSOs (for instance) to access markets for their renewable energy products and to also access renewable energy technologies for their own production.

Relevance:

An increase in the size of networks by CSOs is relevant for advocacy work and to achieve Energy Network-Uganda's expected outcome of generating a national debate. However, this network is not necessarily for advocacy work. One particular organization indicates they had no intention to get involved in advocacy work and their participation in the network and access to a larger network is mainly for business.

Energy Network-Uganda's Contribution:

In addition to its contribution to other outcomes, Energy Network-Uganda through the various capacity building workshops, meetings and through facilitation of the CSOs participation in the energy week, led to the exposure of member CSOs.

*Outcome 12: In April 2014, the Civil Society Coalition Budget Advocacy Group (CSBAG) invited Energy Network-Uganda as the only energy related network to their 2014 workshop on analysing the draft National Budget Framework Paper FY 2014-2015. (Agenda setting)*

CSBAG is a coalition of 52 civil society organizations in Uganda aimed at dialogue with the government and more so influencing the budget process in Uganda, towards more 'pro poor, gender sensitive and sustainable' outcomes.' Energy Network-Uganda was invited to the 2014 three-day workshop in which they contributed towards a draft analysis of the government's proposed energy budget for 2014/2015. In 2013, Energy Network-Uganda lobbied and 'worked' to be included in the workshops. However, this year was a voluntary request and approach from CSBAG for Energy Network-Uganda to analyse the energy proposal in the budget given their 'technical expertise in the subject matter'. Energy Network-Uganda did not have to solicit for an invitation.

Relevance:

CSBAG provides both the power of collective voice and risk (in parliament) for Energy Network-Uganda to be able to have a chance in contributing to changing policy.<sup>152</sup> Both are relevant in light of the Ugandan lobbying and advocacy context as CSBAG often meets parliamentary committees including one on energy. Parliamentary committees are responsible for analysing draft budgets and providing recommendations to parliament before the budget is finalized. Working with CSBAG makes that platform accessible to Energy Network-Uganda. While CSBAG has no capacity on analysis of energy matters it has budget expertise and especially knows how to influence budget processes, making it very relevant for Energy Network-Uganda's advocacy objectives. This might actually be Energy Network-Uganda's first opportunity to meet the parliamentary committee on energy.

Energy Network-Uganda's contribution:

In addition to its contribution to other outcomes, Energy Network-Uganda lobbied CSBAG and invited them to their September 2013 advocacy workshop. However, they also stated that CSBAG realized they had a gap as they did not have a relevant partner/actor with expertise on energy unlike other sectors such as agriculture, water and trade where they already had established partners.

#### **4.5 100% Green IT in the Netherlands**

*Outcome 13: Since 2012, Dutch data centers are involved in the discussion about the realization of several wind farms. Five large data centers in the Amsterdam region are actively involved in a research to link data centers to sustainable energy producers or production, including windmills. The research is coordinated by GreenIT. (Agenda setting, Practice change)*

Relevance:

This is substantial change in agenda and attitude of an important part of the sector. They are actively involved in this market research, which means that their practice is already changing.

Contribution:

Hivos published the CE Delft report *Vergroenen datacenters 2012-2015*, commissioned in March 2012. In June a workshop was organized together with GreenIT workshop. Important speakers: Maarten van Poelgeest (wethouder), ASN Bank (potential investor), Eneco (energy supplier). Data centers as participants. Marga Blom, director energy management of KPN, did a significant presentation.

This outcome was fully substantiated by two external resource persons with one additional comment. It was pointed out that this outcome was a joint effort with also a role by GreenIT and the City of Amsterdam. Also supportive was the fact that the city of Amsterdam just had published a new wind policy.

*Outcome 14: During the second half of 2012, GreenIT, an important service provider to the data centers, introduced the use of sustainable energy as an issue within it services from the Energy Desk. (Practice change)*

Relevance:

GreenIT is an important service provider to the sector and has a role in the expected change. Data centers still prefer to focus on energy efficiency for financial reasons but this change of practice of one of the relevant actors in this sector is relevant as agenda setting for the whole sector.

Contribution:

See the overview of Hivos' activities in the main report. This outcome is substantiated by one external resource person. He fully agrees with the description but keeps some reservations as to how important the contribution of Hivos was.

*Outcome 15: By the end of February 2014, the majority of the 23 biggest data centers in the Netherlands are paying more attention to the subject of a sustainable energy supply than in 2012 and have either formulated plans to increase the sustainability of their energy supply or (already) taken concrete actions. (Agenda setting, Policy change, Practice change)*

In the course of 2013, the majority of the 23 biggest data centers have an increased awareness about the different types of 'green energy' and their different impact on CO<sub>2</sub> reduction, available on the Dutch energy market.<sup>153</sup> Some of these data centers have made known to Hivos that they were in communication with energy suppliers about the increase of the green energy supply. Others do not want Hivos to publish that their green energy is not as green as they always thought. The branch association Nederland ICT admits during a conference that not all data centers agree with their interpretation of what green energy is or should be.<sup>154</sup>

Several of these data centers have put additional information on their website about the energy product used by them. The main examples are Interxion and Equinix.

In the course of 2013 several data centers (for example Schuberg Philis) have developed concrete plans to reuse the warmth of their data centers for their implementation in new building/renovation plans (end 2014 is their target).

In March 2014 at least two data centres have changed the type of energy used towards more sustainable energy, i.e. Interxion and Atos Origin. Project documents show the earlier information and the latest information on the type of energy product used by these data centres). Another data centre (Interoute) is negotiating a new contract for type electricity category C (in addition to D).

Relevance:

This is a substantial change in agenda, attitude and practice of an important part of the sector.



Data centers prefer to focus on energy efficiency instead of a sustainable energy supply for financial reasons. Their increased awareness on the fact that the energy supply of their data centre is not so sustainable as they thought made the story they communicate to their customers vulnerable and made them reconsider their choice of type of energy.

Experts have pointed out that no matter how much is done on energy efficiency, energy consumption of the sector will continue to grow as well as the CO<sub>2</sub> emission. Therefore, increasing the sustainability of the energy supply is a must for the sector to reduce their CO<sub>2</sub> emission.

Contribution:

- Hivos published the CE Delft report *Zakelijke groene stroom producten* in December 2012.<sup>155</sup> Based on this report Hivos made an infographic.<sup>156</sup> The report and the infographic were distributed in February 2013 to the 23 biggest data centres in the Netherlands.
- In the course of 2013 Hivos continued the research on the type of energy used by the 23 biggest data centres and had discussions with 19 of these data centres on the differences in “groene stroom” products (usually by phone calls).
- In April 2013 a report was published by Hivos<sup>157</sup> and send to the 23 data centres and other stakeholders in the field of data centres’ developments in the Netherlands, such as consultants, think tanks, branch associations, Data centre managers, GreenIT, Agentschap NL.
- In June 2013 Hivos organized a workshop (40 participants) based on the outcomes of the report and focusing on a sustainable energy supply for data centres: Important speakers/panel members were key figures in the data centre world: Jan Wiersma (Datacenter Pulse.org), Marc Samsom (CISCO), Menno Chang (Movares), Wim Buters (Deerns), Kees Loer (TCN).
- Media attention following the workshop: three articles were published, including an opinion paper on nu.online.<sup>158</sup>
- Hivos has attended several important conferences and workshop and has brought forward its position.
- Hivos has built a network of specialists/ stakeholders in the data centre world who support its position and effort (within the government, data centres, consultants, Agentschap, knowledge centres).
- Prior to publishing the report in March 2014, Hivos pointed out to the data centers, through the above mentioned reports and publications in combination with direct, internal, constructive advocacy, the fact that their energy supply is not so sustainable as they thought and that the story they communicate to their customers is vulnerable. This and the fact Hivos was going to publish the report made them reconsider their choice of type of energy.

*Outcome 16: In February/March 2014 four data centers have increased their transparency regarding their energy supply. (Practice change)*

Evoswitch, Equinix, Atos Origin, and Interxion have provided the information requested by Hivos just before the publication date of the report. Earlier attempts by Hivos to get this information from them did not work out. Two of these data centers also have put additional information on their website about the energy product used by them, i.e. Interxion and Equinix.

Relevance:

More transparency on the type of electricity used by data centres makes their claim of being a sustainable data centre easier to verify. Before many data centers did not give any information about

the type of electricity used or just mentioned “groene stroom” and based on an impressive record in terms of energy efficiency claimed to be a sustainable data centre. The report of Hivos has raised quite some discussion among the so-called most sustainable data centres in the Netherlands because in terms of type of electricity used they are not so sustainable.

Contribution:

See **outcome 15**.

*Outcome 17: Between January 2013 and December 2013, Agentschap NL, ICT Nederland, consultants and at least a majority of the 23 biggest data centres in the Netherlands have accepted Hivos as a stakeholder and started to approach Hivos to engage in discussions and dialogue. (Agenda setting)*

Hivos was completely new to this sector and until early 2013 was a kind of “tolerated” by different stakeholders in the sector. Only in this year Hivos was approached by several data centres, government officials (municipality of Amsterdam, Logius, Agentschap) and consultants themselves for discussion, information exchange and exploration of co-operation possibilities.

Examples of observable changes in attitude are:

- Duurzaambedrijfsleven.nl (online information site for business on sustainable business models) for the first time approached Hivos for a priority partnership for the sector ICT.
- In December 2013 Duurzaambedrijfsleven.nl signed a contract with Hivos for a priority partnership in the sector ICT, providing exposure for Hivos for our programme/activities/ideas on green ICT to our target group.
- Hivos is approached by two different organizations/ businesses who requested Hivos to pay attention on its website on 100% Green ICT to their tools (Data Center Infrastructure Management.) and research (Software Improvement Group) on energy efficiency in datacenters. Apart from that, Hivos is approached by persons within the municipal (Amsterdam) and central government to lobby for sustainability issues in datacenters.

Relevance:

This change in attitude is an important step in Hivos’ strategy as it gets Hivos information and its message across to the target group. This will become more visible in the report Hivos will publish in April 2014: more sustainable energy used.

Contribution:

All the activities mentioned above have contributed to the recognition of Hivos as a stakeholder in 2013. In addition, Hivos chose, in its theory of change, a constructive advocacy strategy. This means that the aim is to convince the target actors to change their policy and practice by cooperating with them – instead of choosing the confrontation. This strategy meant that Hivos communicates carefully, seeks to have an added value by delivering fact-based reports, information and insights, which help the target actor to improve their practice. This communication strategy which is observable in all our communication activities helped to gain recognition.



## 5 Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance: outcomes, relevance, contribution

### 5.1 National-level outcomes: Netherlands Government and parliamentary policy position and public commitments on SRHR

*Outcome 1<sup>159</sup> (Knapen's commitment to SRHR budget): State Secretary Knapen committed to improving SRHR for women and girls globally and to giving at least half of the €400 million for SRHR-Health-HIV/AIDS to SRHR by 2014 (16 May 2011). (Agenda setting)*

*Outcome 2 (Knapen's commitment to SRHR budget): Parliamentary questions were posed on funding for SRHR, and State Secretary Knapen repeated the amount from Outcome 1 in the parliamentary debate in his April 2011 letter (18 May 2011). (Agenda setting)*

*Outcome 3 (Knapen's commitment to SRHR budget): State Secretary Knapen committed to spending €370 million on SRHR including HIV and health in 2012 and expressed the intention to increase this amount to €413 million in 2015 (London Summit on Family Planning, 11 July 2012). (Agenda setting)*

Description:

- At Moedernacht (16 May 2011), State Secretary Knapen committed to improving SRHR for women and girls globally and stated that at least half of the €400 million to be allocated for SRHR-Health-HIV/AIDS by 2014 would go to SRHR.
- Knapen repeated this amount on 18 May 2011 in response to parliamentary questions in the debate<sup>160</sup> in the parliament on Knapen's 18 April 2011 letter on the further elaboration of policies on SRHR and HIV/AIDS.<sup>161</sup>
- At the London Summit on Family Planning (11 July 2012), Knapen committed to spending €370 million on SRHR, HIV and health in 2012 and expressed an intention to extend the amount from €381 million in 2013 to €413 million in 2015 and to increase the focus on SRHR.<sup>162</sup>

Relevance:

As is reflected in the SRHR Alliance's overall national-level goal, it is important that, in addition to being listed as a formal policy priority, concrete resources are reserved for development cooperation on SRHR by the Dutch government. Knapen's statements about future funding levels could be used in lobbying efforts to secure more funds for SRHR. For example, when the budget cut proposed in the autumn budget for 2012 revealed the plan to spend 33.5% of overall health funding on SRHR (instead of the promised 50%), civil society were able to call attention to the discrepancy.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- Long-term lobby efforts of the Alliance contributed to these outcomes. Over the two years preceding these commitments, the SRHR Alliance conducted direct lobby for the Dutch Government SRHR policy and for keeping SRHR high on the political agenda (through the MoFA and parliament). These commitments resulted from having that policy in place.
- Three Alliance member organisations (Rutgers WPF, Simavi and Amref Flying Doctors) participated in the organisation of Moedernacht 2011, with other Alliance members attending and supporting.
- Alliance members provided suggestions for parliamentary questions, in response to which State Secretary Knapen made official his statements about the planned funding amount for SRHR.

- The SRHR Alliance issued a joint opinion piece in *Vice Versa* to call attention to the proposed budget cut and put pressure on State Secretary Knapen to reverse it.
- The reversal of the 2012 SRHR budget cut put pressure on State Secretary Knapen to continue augmenting this line of funding. The amount mentioned in London was similar to the budget amounts for 2012 prepared in the spring.
- Shortly before the London Summit, the SRHR Alliance organised a photo exhibition to raise awareness on SRHR issues (spring 2012).
- One Alliance member organisation (Rutgers WPF) took part in the London Summit through the international network and was in direct contact with the MoFA about the Summit.

*Outcome 4: SRHR was mentioned in the programmes of most political parties before the September 2012 election. In several cases, SRHR was added or adapted in amendments during Spring–Summer 2012. (Agenda setting)*

**Description:**

Most party plans included some statements on SRHR, health and/or HIV/AIDS. Some parties that did not have a good SRHR statement in their party programme added it in Spring–Summer 2012. Certain parties introduced SRHR in their programmes through amendments adopted by the party congress. In some cases (for example, D66), the party programme said, ‘sexual and reproductive health’, and then ‘rights’ was added. The party programme of GroenLinks was adapted. VVD stated that HIV/AIDS was their priority but later explained publicly that they meant SRHR including HIV/AIDS.

**Relevance:**

Even though SRHR was previously a policy priority, it was important to continue to assure support from politicians. Without continued work to keep SRHR central in the minds of parliamentarians from all parties, SRHR would cease to be a policy priority area. The election programmes form the basis for negotiations for the new coalition government. No attention for SRHR in the election programme would have diminished chances to get it in the governmental agreement. Being in the governmental agreement is important for achieving policy commitments.

**Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:**

- The SRHR Alliance and health organisations sent a letter to all political parties suggesting SRHR as a continuing priority area within development cooperation (May 9 2012), and individual Alliance members had multiple contacts with parliamentarians, party bureaus and international cooperation working groups from different parties on this issue.
- The SRHR Alliance organised a photo exhibition in the parliament (24 May 2012). At the event’s opening, almost all parliamentarian spokespersons for development cooperation (except CU, SGP and PVV) made promises to keep SRHR high on the agenda of the new parliament and to ensure that SRHR remained focal theme.
- An SRHR Alliance partner (Simavi) hosted an event (One Minute against Maternal Mortality) outside the parliamentary building just before the 2012 elections.<sup>163</sup> At the event, nine politicians committed to SRHR as a policy priority, and another did so during the surrounding campaign.
- SRHR Alliance members worked with WO=MEN, the Dutch gender platform, to lobby D66 to add ‘rights’ to the language of their programme. One Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) worked through its own contacts within the different parties.

- The SRHR Alliance is the most consistently active group working toward progressive SRHR policy in the Netherlands,<sup>164</sup> as they are able to commit the time and money necessary to work toward these goals as part of their larger programme.

*Outcome 5: The Multiparty Initiative on SRHR and HIV/AIDS was continued by the new parliament in 2012 (announced 31 October 2012). (Agenda setting)*

**Description:**

After the government collapsed in April 2012, many parliamentarians who were spokespersons for development aid and champions on SRHR, gender and HIV/AIDS departed, including the chair and vice-chair of the Multiparty Initiative on SRHR and HIV/AIDS. Especially considering the newly formed Multiparty Initiative on Gender, there was cause for concern that the Multiparty Initiative on SRHR might not be continued. However, the new parliament continued the Multiparty Initiative on SRHR on 31 October 2012, with broad renewed commitment across the parties. The new parliamentarians elected a chair and vice-chair for the Multiparty Initiative, committing themselves to these roles at a breakfast organised by the SRHR Alliance and STOP AIDS NOW! and the AIDS Fund (31 October 2012).

**Relevance:**

The Multiparty Initiative for SRHR and HIV/AIDS gets all the parties to commit to SRHR issues, which is relevant for a broad range of advocacy issues. The Multiparty Initiative keeps SRHR on the agenda and encourages the entire parliament to support SRHR. This can be especially important when the parliament debates the policy priority areas and their associated budgets.

**Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:**

- The commitment to continue the Multiparty Initiative and the election of the new chair and vice-chair took place at a breakfast meeting for parliamentarians organised by the SRHR Alliance together with STOP AIDS NOW! and the AIDS Fund on 31 October 2012.
- Ahead of this meeting, the SRHR Alliance informed the new parliamentarians on this initiative and asked them if they were interested to continue. Much of the SRHR Alliance effort to continue the Multiparty Initiative consisted of informal meetings, calls and discussions with parliamentarians (both new parliamentarians as well as the former chair and vice-chair of the Multiparty Initiative) about who would take up the newly vacant roles.
- During the event, One Minute against Maternal Mortality, organised by an SRHR Alliance member organisation (Simavi) outside the parliamentary building just before the 2012 elections, attention was drawn to the need for continuing the Multiparty Initiative. Promises were secured from many parliamentarians present that they would serve as chair, vice-chair or member of the Multiparty Initiative on SRHR and HIV/AIDS if they had the opportunity. This set the stage for the Alliance to continue pressuring for the Multiparty Initiative to continue, based on promises made by party representatives.
- On 30 October 2012, the SRHR Alliance offered a 'happy box' to parliamentarians, containing information on SRHR as a welcome gift for the new members of the Commission for Foreign Affairs in parliament to remind the politicians of the importance of SRHR.
- The Alliance prepared and distributed an information leaflet with WO=MEN on the importance of multiparty initiatives that also explained the difference between issues related to gender and SRHR and also discussed this at the breakfast on 31 October 2012.

*Outcome 6 (SRHR expertise in transitional countries): A parliamentarian requested that the MoFA ensure expertise on SRHR in the embassies of transitional countries moving from aid to the trade sector (March 2014). (Agenda setting)*

*Outcome 16 (SRHR expertise in transitional countries): In response to Outcome 6, Minister Ploumen committed to informing the embassies of the need to gain expertise and find a balance between taboo topics and topics related to the private sector (March 2014). (Policy influencing)*

**Description:**

The Multi-Annual Strategic Plans of the embassies were reviewed following Minister Ploumen's new policy. Of the eight development countries whose embassies selected SRHR as a focus area, five are classified as transition countries. Previously, during the debate on the IOB evaluation and the progress of the policy focal points (6 March 2014), Sjoerd Sjoerdsma (D66) filed a motion for a commitment to SRHR capacity in the embassies, but this motion was rejected.<sup>165</sup> In the debate in parliament over the Multi-Annual Strategic Plans of the Dutch embassies (27 March 2014),<sup>166</sup> Sjoerdsma (D66) and van Laar (PvdA) stressed the need for expertise and sustainability on SRHR topics in the Dutch embassies in countries that will transition from aid to trade in the coming years. During her response, Minister Ploumen said that she will take up the issue of balancing private sector-related issues with taboo topics in SRHR, and that she will convey the issue to the embassies and suggest that they ensure sufficient expertise to address difficult issues.

**Relevance:**

Good SRHR is crucial for economic development, so it is necessary to ensure the sustainability of work on SRHR in the move from aid to trade. However, it is difficult to incorporate SRHR in a trade agenda, meaning that more difficult SRHR issues are likely to fall off the agenda as countries move from aid to trade. This is especially true of the rights-based and taboo issues of abortion, comprehensive sexuality education, forced child marriage and female genital cutting—exactly the topics on which the Netherlands' reputation as a defender and leading voice in favour of SRHR is built. It is necessary to make sure that the embassies retain or acquire the expertise necessary to continue their work on SRHR and support local civil society working on SRHR, especially in transition countries. Because SRHR is so important in Dutch policy, embassies should be able to support civil society working on SRHR, regardless of whether the embassy has chosen SRHR as a focus.

**Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:**

- In late 2013, the SRHR experts from the embassies expressed concern to the Alliance members present at a meeting in the Netherlands about the phasing out of aid countries and implications for SRHR in their countries.
- The SRHR Alliance conducted an analysis of the Multi-Annual Strategic Plans and then provided a factsheet to parliamentarians ahead of the 27 March 2014 debate (sent in November 2013). Amongst other things, the factsheet urged that the MoFA should commit to maintaining expertise in the five transition embassies that have chosen SRHR as a focus. Some suggestions of the Alliance were used by a parliamentarian (PvdA) in the debate.<sup>167</sup>
- Alliance members also had one-on-one contact with the relevant members of parliament (by phone and in person). The good reputation of the SRHR Alliance with the members of parliament gave credence to their input.<sup>168</sup>
- The Alliance sent a letter to the MoFA and ensured the inclusion of SRHR in a letter focusing on gender sent through WO=MEN and a third letter sent through Partos focusing on human rights in the Multi-Annual Strategic Plans.

*Outcome 7 (Transparency in funding channel choices: Parliamentarians requested a separate debate about the IOB evaluation after the Christmas recess in 2014. (Agenda setting)*

*Outcome 17 (Transparency in funding channel choices): A parliamentary motion (February 2014) on transparency in allocating SRHR funding to multilateral organisations was made and passed with broad political support. (Policy influencing)*

*Outcome 18 (Transparency in funding channel choices): In a letter to parliament, Minister Ploumen stated that the next focal areas update will state clearly what amounts of funding are going to different organisations, how this is linked to different policy priority areas of the Netherlands and what the impact has been (April 2014). (Changing practice)*

**Description:**

Parliamentarians requested a separate debate on the IOB evaluation of SRHR for after the Christmas recess on 11 February 2014. In the context of this debate, Jasper van Dijk (SP parliamentarian and chair of the Multiparty Initiative for SRHR and HIV/AIDS) filed a motion<sup>169</sup> requesting more transparency in reporting on the rationale for SRHR funding going to multilateral partners, what their impact has been and how this supports the specific goals of Dutch SRHR policy. After a small adaptation based on comments by Minister Ploumen,<sup>170</sup> this motion was passed, receiving support by most parties. In a letter to parliament regarding another motion, Minister Ploumen said that, in the next focal areas update, it will be stated clearly what amounts of funding are going to different organisations, how this is linked to different policy priority areas of the Netherlands and what the impact has been.<sup>171</sup>

**Relevance:**

This outcome represents a development of the Alliance's theory of change. Previously, the focus was more singularly on increasing the percentage of ODA dedicated to SRHR. Defending the budget continues to be just as important, but the Alliance increasingly focuses on the quality of spending on SRHR. A large percentage (more than half) of Dutch ODA funding for SRHR is given to multilateral organisations. The IOB evaluation indicated that multilaterals are not as effective as civil society at taking on taboo topics (e.g. abortion, LGBT rights) or at reaching marginalised or difficult-to-reach populations. Because addressing taboo topics and reaching these populations are explicit aims of Dutch SRHR policy, the IOB evaluation pointed to an inconsistency between policy goals and the practice of using multilaterals so heavily to distribute Dutch money. While multilateral organisations have a clear added value to the overall SRHR policy, it is not clear that half of the total SRHR budget should be spent via this funding channel, and clarity is needed on how and through which channel the MoFA decides to allocate additional budget to SRHR when it becomes available. In line with Minister Ploumen's position, coalition parties VVD and PvdA oppose the idea of fixed funding percentages for each channel. The motion in this set of outcomes addresses the underlying issue of reporting on impact. When that information is made public, it may provide possibilities for convincing opposing parties about the need for balance in funding channels. However, it is not yet clear that this will be the outcome.

**Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:**

- The SRHR Alliance has long lobbied for the importance of SRHR funding to civil society in relation to other channels (especially multilaterals).
- During the meeting with the Multiparty Initiative on SRHR and HIV/AIDS where Lambert Grijns was introduced (28 Nov 2013), the SRHR Alliance brought attention to this issue.
- After seeing the results of the IOB evaluation informally, the SRHR Alliance recognised the results of the evaluation as strong and important and called the attention of members of parliament to the need for scheduling a separate debate on the IOB evaluation after the



Christmas recess (at the Multiparty Initiative meeting and in subsequent contacts with parliamentarians). The realisation of a separate debate for the evaluation and the progress of the four policy priority areas was crucial in this motion being proposed and passed.<sup>172</sup>

- Around this debate, the SRHR Alliance used the results of the IOB evaluation to make the point for the need for transparency in funding to multilateral organisations (briefing paper sent to parliamentarians, individual in-person and telephone contact with parliamentarians).
- The SRHR Alliance shared the idea for a motion and contributed to its formulation. To increase the chance the motion would be adopted, the Alliance knew that this motion had to focus particularly on the results of the IOB evaluation, where it is argued that little is known about the effectiveness of multilateral organisations at beneficiary level and that results on three priorities (unsafe abortion, equal access to services, key populations) lag behind.
- The Alliance was in contact with parliamentarians to inform them about this motion and to help build support.

*Outcome 8: Parliament voiced strong support for SRHR in debates on the Dutch position in the post-2015 development agenda, taking up points of the SRHR Alliance to focus on rights in SRHR and maintaining the forerunner role of the Netherlands in this process (18 September 2013<sup>173</sup> and 11 September 2014<sup>174</sup> parliamentary debates). (Agenda setting)*

**Description:**

Dutch parliamentarians have actively participated in the post-2015 debate and have expressed support publicly for the incorporation of progressive language on SRHR in the post-2015 agenda. Especially on the MDGs/SDGs, parliamentarians were receptive to inputs from the SRHR Alliance in 2013, taking them on board and bringing them into relevant parliamentary debates. These messages include the focus on rights in SRHR and maintaining the forerunner role of the Netherlands in this process. For instance, after Minister Ploumen mentioned during a UN conference in New York that she is looking for alternative language for 'rights',<sup>175</sup> parliamentarians asked her whether she was still supporting SRHR and the human rights agenda in the international processes and whether she would advocate this agenda at UN level. In parliament, the Minister expressed her commitment for full SRHR and the rights agenda.<sup>176</sup>

**Relevance:**

The Dutch government has a strong reputation as a leading voice in favour of progressive SRHR, internationally. As part of the UN, the perspective of the Dutch government taken forward through the various post-2015 processes can have a strong impact on the resultant development agenda. The Netherlands has also consistently provided a progressive voice for SRHR in the international development agenda within the EU. It is important that parliament supports the progressive Dutch position internationally. It was also important that the Minister took her apparent reservations around the 'rights' language back, as the Dutch government will be very instrumental in the coming period in advocating the advancement of the ICPD agenda after 2014 and the inclusion of SRHR in the post-2015 agenda.

**Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:**

- The Alliance's work to build support for the Multiparty Initiative, as described in Outcome 5 above, also contributed to this outcome.
- Alliance members had regular contact with a number of parliamentarians whom they knew to have an interest in the post-2015 agenda and who would take their points on SRHR to parliamentary debates. These contacts included face-to-face, telephone and written

communication with MPs; a briefing sent to MPs to put pressure on the MoFA to include a comprehensive, integrated approach to SRHR with equal emphasis on rights and health and to integrate the results of the ICPD beyond 2014 process and the post-2015 agenda in their policy (sent in May 2013); and regular updates sent to parliament, including analyses regarding the ongoing international processes.

- The SRHR Alliance held a general meeting with parliamentarians about Minister Ploumen's policy on 23 May 2013 to encourage parliamentarians to put pressure on Minister Ploumen to maintain support for SRHR. The SRHR Alliance provided input to parliamentarians as well as having individual meetings with them ahead of parliamentary debates on the post-2015 agenda (18 September 2013,<sup>177</sup> 11 September 2014<sup>178</sup>) in follow-up to updates of the Minister to the parliament through letters to the parliament (22 January 2013,<sup>179</sup> 7 May 2014,<sup>180</sup> 4 July 2014). The SRHR Alliance also provided parliamentarians with regular update briefings on progress between the official debates.

*Outcome 9: SRHR was included in Dutch State Secretary for Development Cooperation Knapen's four spearhead development priorities. This was approved with support from all members of parliament. (Policy influencing)*

Description:

The MoFA announced that the government approved Dutch State Secretary for Development Cooperation Knapen's proposal to focus on four spearhead development priorities (food security, water and sexual and reproductive health and rights and security and the rule of law) in his focus letter (18 March 2011)<sup>181</sup>—five months after the start of the new government. Two parliamentary debates were held about the letter, and all members of parliament confirmed the importance of SRHR as a focal point.

Specifically, goals established for the Netherlands under SRHR in the focus letter are: '1. Improved access to quality contraceptives, medicines, vaccines and resources for reproductive health; 2. Information for young people about sexuality, so that they themselves can make choices in relationships, sex and using contraception; 3. Improving the quality of and the access to public and private health services related to SRHR; and 4. Elimination of barriers to access to health care for marginalised groups such as drug users, prostitutes, homosexuals and prisoners in various countries'.

Relevance:

Although the Dutch government (2011) made severe changes in development policies, it chose SRHR as one of its four priorities. The significance of this was reflected in Knapen's focal letter, mentioning the aim of doubling the percentage of funding to the focal points from 2011 to 2014. Selecting SRHR as a policy priority also enabled future commitments of funding for SRHR (described below). The renewed official commitment to SRHR by the government and parliament allowed for the continued implementation and advancement of SRHR policy and programs and encouraged parliamentarians from all parties to show active support for SRHR.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- Over 20 contact moments took place with decision makers and policymakers at national level January–June 2011 on the new Dutch development policy. Contact included Netherlands-based and embassy-based MoFA staff and members of parliament (all parties, with regular contact with PvdA, D66, SP, VVD, GroenLinks, ChristenUnie, SGP and CDA). Contact types included organising formal group meetings, holding formal and informal individual meetings,

providing factsheets, suggesting parliamentary questions and giving input on key issues and using email and telephone.

- All contacted parliamentarians were involved in asking parliamentary questions,<sup>182</sup> and one contacted parliamentarian filed a motion linked to SRHR.<sup>183</sup>
- A good network with parliament and the MoFA led to requests for SRHR Alliance input in shaping the SRHR policy, including for a hearing about the new development policy.
- The SRHR Alliance met with State Secretary Knapen to discuss SRHR strategies and collaboration.
- Also contributing was the Alliance's participation in ongoing discussions with the MoFA on the Dutch position in international meetings (e.g. CPD, High Level Meeting on AIDS).

*Outcome 10: State Secretary Knapen's policy on SRHR reaffirmed the position of the Netherlands as a strong supporter of SRHR, supported SRHR Alliance goals and laid out increases to the SRHR budget scheduled up to €427 million in 2015 (7 May 2012 letter to parliament). (Policy influencing)*

#### Description:

State Secretary Knapen laid out the policy on sexual and reproductive health and rights in a letter to parliament on 7 May 2012.<sup>184</sup> This policy letter reaffirmed the position of the Netherlands as a strong supporter of SRHR, focusing on four result areas: 1. 'more knowledge and choice for young people about their sexuality', 2. 'improved access to contraceptives and medicines', 3. 'better healthcare surrounding pregnancy and childbirth, including safe abortion' and 4. 'more respect for sexual and reproductive rights of groups for whom these rights are denied'. The letter also explicitly mentioned the links between SRHR and other development and broader foreign policy priorities and stated that the total expenditure for SRHR would increase from €396 million (2011) to €427 million (2015). The policy was supported by parliament with no major amendments.

#### Relevance:

A strong policy is of high importance. The Ministry implements this policy in terms of showing political support, building the expertise of embassies and sending out calls for proposals. This positive policy environment amplifies the work of the SRHR Alliance. This new policy reconfirmed the effort of the Dutch government related to SRHR. It is progressive and rights-based and gives a basis for continuing the Dutch leading position on SRHR, politically and programmatically. This was crucial given the current importance of discussions around the continuation of the ICPD after 2014 and the framework for the MDGs after 2015.

#### Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- Written input for the MoFA SRHR policy was developed and sent jointly with NGOs from the health sector (Wemos, Cordaid) and HIV/AIDS (STOP AIDS NOW!, AIDS Fund) (February 2012).
- Regular contacts were made with the MoFA to inform them about the Alliance's views.
- Continuous contact with parliamentarians was made to ensure the policy was discussed and approved by parliament before the summer holiday and the elections.

*Outcome 11: Eight Dutch Government development cooperation partner countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Yemen, Benin and Burundi) chose SRHR as a policy priority in 2012 in their Multi-Annual Strategic Plans. (Policy influencing)*

Description:

State Secretary Knapen announced in a letter to parliament (13 April 2012)<sup>185</sup> that SRHR was central in the bilateral programmes of eight partner countries: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Yemen, Benin and Burundi. These bilateral programmes are mostly in line with the overall SRHR programme.

Relevance:

Although SRHR is a policy priority area at the Dutch national level, little can be accomplished locally if partner countries do not select SRHR as one of their priority areas. Bilateral aid (via the embassies) is one of three funding channels for the SRHR focal point. Moreover, embassies can financially and diplomatically support the SRHR efforts made by NGOs.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- The SRHR Alliance organised and participated in meetings with the embassies as they were deciding on their focus areas.
- Letters were sent to all 15 embassies pressing for the importance of focusing on SRHR in their country.
- Meetings were held to discuss SRHR and to acquaint the embassies with the SRHR Alliance and its goals. One Alliance member organisation (Rutgers WPF) met with ambassadors in The Hague during their yearly return to the Netherlands in January 2012.
- Two Alliance member organisations (Rutgers WPF and Simavi) were involved when the Multiannual Strategic Plans of the embassies were discussed in the Dutch Parliament (through analysing the Multiannual Strategic Plans, writing up a factsheet and meeting with parliamentarians).

*Outcome 12: Following the government collapse in April 2012 before the SRHR policy was in place, parliament did not declare SRHR a controversial topic. (Policy influencing)*

Description:

When the government fell in April 2012, the detailed policy on SRHR was not yet in place. At that time, it was possible that the parliament could have said that this was a controversial topic. Parliament did not declare SRHR as controversial.

Relevance:

Just before a policy letter on SRHR was expected, setting out the new goals and objectives of the overall policy, the government collapsed. This policy letter is of importance to amplify the work of the SRHR Alliance. If parliament had declared SRHR controversial, it would have meant that there could have been no SRHR policy, and no forward movement on SRHR would have occurred until after the election of new parliamentarians, who were unknown at that time. Additionally, the upwards direction of the budget allocation and the focus within SRHR might have been altered. If it was declared controversial, which is likely to happen to a policy that hasn't been fully shaped yet (as a new government always makes new policies), it would also mean that there was less to build on with the new government.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

Between 30 April 2012 and 8 May 2012, the SRHR Alliance had multiple contacts with the MoFA and parliamentarians to ensure that SRHR would not be declared controversial.

*Outcome 13: SRHR was selected as a priority area by the VVD/PvdA coalition government. (Policy influencing)*

Description:

In the coalition government agreement, 'Building Bridges: Government Agreement VVD-PvdA' ('Bruggen Slaan: Regeerakkoord VVD-PvdA') (29 October 2012),<sup>186</sup> SRHR was maintained as one of the four priority areas for development cooperation.

Relevance:

As is detailed in the outcomes above, it is important that SRHR remains one of the four policy priority areas. In the face of the large budget cut, many expected the government to drop one priority, and SRHR seems one of the most vulnerable policy priorities, particularly because of the discourse shift towards trade, the role of the private sector and global public goods.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- Direct lobby towards parliamentarians from all parties was used to keep all parties aware of and informed about the issues at stake regarding SRHR, especially within PvdA and VVD.
- The opening of the SRHR Alliance photo exhibition event in the parliament (24 May 2012) was used to ensure promises by all parties to prioritise SRHR and keep it high on the agenda.
- The commitments achieved at the One Minute against Maternal Mortality event outside the parliamentary building (September 2012, described above) were also useful for the SRHR Alliance's further lobbying efforts. The PvdA candidate also said that she would put SRHR in the Regeerakkoord.
- When the governmental agreement was being negotiated, the SRHR Alliance (together with STOP AIDS NOW!) sent a short letter to the informateurs pressing for the continuation of SRHR as a policy priority. One Alliance member organisation (Rutgers WPF) sent an additional letter to the informateurs related to national and international issues.

*Outcome 14: SRHR remained one of the development cooperation focal points of Minister Ploumen's new policy, and despite cuts to many areas of civil society, Minister Ploumen's letter promised no cuts to SRHR (April 2013). (Policy influencing)*

Description:

Minister Ploumen's vision letter ('Wat de Wereld Verdient', April 2013)<sup>187</sup> included SRHR as one of the four priorities of Dutch policy. This choice was strengthened by the promise of no cuts to the previous SRHR budget, although all of the other priority areas faced significant cuts at this stage; the overall ODA budget had to be cut by €1 billion.

Relevance:

The relevance of this outcome is similar to the relevance of the initial selection of SRHR as one of the four policy priority areas, as it was not certain that SRHR would be included again as a policy priority. This outcome is relevant to the SRHR Alliance's overall objective: The Netherlands delivers very important contributions to improve SRHR in developing countries as it invests in prevention (education, contraceptives, better services, etc.), including those topics that other countries might shy

away from giving their aid to (controversial issues such as sexuality education to young people, contraceptives to unmarried couples, safe abortion, etc.) The progressive voice of the Netherlands on SRHR internationally was especially important at this moment, as the ICPD Review Process and the MDGs were both coming to an end. The promise of no cuts for SRHR and the importance given to SRHR in Minister Ploumen's policy were crucial for determining the amount of actual ODA funding being spent on SRHR.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

Advocacy for the continuation of SRHR as a policy priority and maintaining the existing SRHR budget took the form of parliamentary input and face-to-face meetings, direct contact with the MoFA (participation in consultation with Minister, input and letters to the Minister, beginning in early 2013 before the Minister's first vision document was sent in March), public statements, contribution to a roundtable on SRHR organised by MPs, briefing MPs (who then put pressure on MoFA) and drafting parliamentary questions.

*Outcome 15: The 2013 Human Rights Policy (debated September 2013) and Human Rights Report 2013 (submitted 24 April 2014) have significant coverage of SRHR. (Policy influencing)*

Description:

Minister Frans Timmermans' 2013 Human Rights Policy for the Netherlands ('Respect and Recht voor Ieder Mens', sent 14 June 2013 and discussed 30 September 2013)<sup>188,189</sup> devote significant space to SRHR, women's rights and LGBT rights. The policy included SRHR as a separate bullet point under the theme of 'Equal Rights for Women', and there is a separate theme for 'Equal Rights for lesbians, homosexuals, bisexuals and transgendered individuals'. The Human Rights Report 2013 (24 April 2014)<sup>190</sup> maintains the same language as the policy, but SRHR is even more strongly represented in the report. The report also states that the Netherlands strongly supports 'gender equality and SRHR' in the post-2015 development agenda.

Relevance:

The Human Rights Policy, followed by the 2013 Human Rights Report, show that the Netherlands has a true commitment to the topics of SRHR, women's rights and LGBT rights. The 2013 report was the first time the yearly Human Rights Report had included such a strong statement of SRHR. It is very important that SRHR is seen not merely as a development issue but as well as a human rights issue and in the broader foreign interests of the Netherlands.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

Input was given for the online Human Rights Consultation in 2013, stressing SRHR as a human right that should be available to all people. This input emphasised the key role of the Netherlands in supporting women's rights and LGBT rights (including equal SRHR); protecting human rights defenders of SRHR; stressing SRHR in corporate social responsibility for private companies; supporting freedom of expression in providing information on SRHR; advocating for SRHR and gender equality; defending agreed language on SRHR; supporting consultation with civil society on SRHR issues; encouraging Dutch embassies to support SRHR within their countries and providing earmarked funds for SRHR projects.

## 5.2 National-level outcomes: Netherlands Government SRHR ODA funding

*Outcome 1 (2012 budget): Parliamentary questions were raised to clarify and justify the extent of cuts to the SRHR ODA budget for 2012 (October and November 2011). (Agenda setting)*

*Outcome 2 (2012 budget): Beginning with a joint response to the threatened SRHR budget cuts for 2012, CSOs working on SRHR, HIV/AIDS and health worked collectively to issue joint input on SRHR issues. (Agenda setting)*

*Outcome 3 (2012 budget): Following State Secretary Knapen's response to the questions posed in the Outcome 1 above, two amendments were filed proposing to reverse the proposed cuts and to increase the SRHR ODA budget for 2012 (budget debates in parliament, 2011). (Policy influencing)*

*Outcome 5 (2012 budget): State Secretary Knapen reversed the cut of €35 million to the SRHR ODA budget for 2012 and took up the amendment (Outcome 3) that proposed an additional €8 million of funding for SRHR. (Changing practice)*

### Description:

On 20 September 2011, the autumn budget was released. In the former budget, SRHR and health were under one budget line, and HIV/AIDS was a separate line. For the 2012 budget, this was reclassified, with three separate lines for SRHR, health and HIV/AIDS, making it difficult to compare SRHR funding for 2012 with the previous year. Civil society identified and drew public attention to SRHR budget cuts of €35 million, resulting in a large political response. Parliamentary questions were posed about cuts to the SRHR budget for 2012.<sup>191,192</sup> State Secretary Knapen responded to these questions in October and November 2011,<sup>193,194</sup> describing the autumn budget initially as a €3 million increase for SRHR and later specifying what was previously and currently funded under SRHR and under HIV/AIDS. These answers revealed a shift of topics previously funded under HIV/AIDS into the SRHR funding stream, as SRHR was newly made a priority area. During the budget debates in parliament, two amendments were filed proposing to reverse the cut and to increase the SRHR budget.<sup>195,196</sup>

Following the debates, State Secretary Knapen sent a letter to parliament specifically on the 2012 budget for SRHR and gender,<sup>197</sup> reversing the cut of €35 million and taking up the amendment filed by parliamentarians Caluwe and Ferrier (33 000 V, nr. 32)<sup>198</sup> proposing an additional €8 million in funding for SRHR. With this amendment, 2012 funding for SRHR, health and HIV/AIDS was returned to the level of €370 million.

### Relevance:

The percentage ODA for SRHR corresponds directly to the national-level advocacy goal of the SRHR Alliance. Despite making SRHR one of the four priority area, the planned 2012 budget represented a large cut to SRHR, whereas it increased the budget for the priority areas of water and food security and left the budget for rule of law untouched. This cut was highly surprising, given promises made regarding SRHR spending earlier in the year. Because of the new merging of budgets for SRHR, HIV/AIDS and general health, changes compared with previous years were difficult to detect and could easily have gone unnoticed. The final 2012 budget (with the cuts to SRHR reversed) provided a solid starting point for budgets in years to follow.

### Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- Prior to the release of the budget, the SRHR Alliance maintained good contacts with the MoFA and with parliamentarians, suggesting parliamentary questions to secure visible support from the government for SRHR as one of the priority areas.

- The autumn budget was officially communicated as an increase in funding, but, through careful monitoring and tracing changes compared with previous years, the SRHR Alliance identified a €35 million cut to SRHR funding in the 2012 budget.
- After identifying a probable cut to SRHR funding for 2012, the SRHR Alliance issued a joint opinion piece in *Vice Versa* (21 September 2011)<sup>199</sup> calling attention to a cut of €40 million.
- The 2011 Estafette voor Wereldmoeders (Simavi) closely coincided with the announcement of the planned budget cut for SRHR in 2012 (27 September 2011). In cooperation with the SRHR Alliance, the Estafette was used as a platform to address these proposed cuts. Parliamentarians attending the Estafette were publicly interviewed on the budget cuts, and strong statements against the cuts were made by members of several parties (CDA, SGP, PvdA, SP, CU and D66).
- The Alliance statement on budget cuts, as well as the highlighting of budget cuts through the Estafette campaign, were picked up rapidly by the national and regional media.
- During a roundtable session organised by one of the political parties (CDA), Alliance members together with representatives from STOP AIDS NOW! and the AIDS Fund made an appeal to the politicians present to reverse the budget cut on SRHR and work towards clarity on budget lines so that future budgets could be better monitored.
- In conjunction with the budget cycle, Alliance representatives strategized together to communicate with as many key parliamentarians as possible in a short time. They organised 16 meetings with representatives of eight different parties, sent eight parliamentary questions to parliamentarians (eight different parties) and broadly circulated in parliament a factsheet (written jointly with STOP AIDS NOW! and the AIDS Fund) on the budget cuts related to SRHR.
- Parliamentarians contacted by the Alliance asked parliamentary questions on the budget and the budget cut related to SRHR, addressed the SRHR budget cut during the November 2011 budget discussions and filed three amendments related to the budget.<sup>200,201,202</sup> An SRHR Alliance factsheet was discussed directly during the parliamentary debate on the budget. The SRHR Alliance members, in close collaboration with STOP AIDS NOW! and the AIDS Fund, were the only civil society actors engaged in repairing the budget cut to SRHR.

*Outcome 4 (Funding for safe abortion): A motion on funding for projects on safe abortion was filed during the parliamentary debate on the IOB evaluation and the progress of the policy focal points (11 March 2014) (Policy influencing).*

*Outcome 7 (Funding for safe abortion): The motion filed in Outcome 4 resulted in €5 million that will be specifically earmarked for abortion projects in the SRHR Fund beginning in 2016. (Changing practice)*

**Description:**

Sjoerdsma (D66) and van Laar (PvdA) filed a motion citing the IOB evaluation finding that a limited number of projects related to safe abortion are funded by the Netherlands and calling for a specific amount from the 2015 call for proposals on SRHR to be earmarked for safe abortion.<sup>203</sup> A new call for proposals on SRHR will be issued in 2015, and, as result of this motion, this will include 5 million funding earmarked for abortion.

**Relevance:**

The IOB evaluation pointed out that, despite Dutch policy stating that abortion is an important topic, the Netherlands has contributed a fairly small amount of ODA towards abortion-related issues. The funding for safe abortion achieved through this motion amounts to a doubling of the previous Dutch



budget for abortion. This brings the funding for this internationally controversial topic more in line with expressed Dutch policy.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- A briefing paper on the results of the IOB evaluation was prepared by the Alliance and shared with parliamentarians.
- An SRHR Alliance member (Rutgers WPF) met with Sjoerdsma's Policy Advisor to discuss the debate on the IOB evaluation. The Alliance member explained how Dutch policy on abortion does not match with implementation in practice and suggested a motion on safe abortion. This Alliance member also prepared a one-page briefing paper for Sjoerdsma on abortion.
- Working closely with Ipas, an American CSO that lobbies on abortion, this Alliance member (Rutgers WPF) provided in-depth input for preparing the motion that was eventually filed. Alliance members provided follow-up in preparation for the VAO and arguments for keeping the pressure high following Ploumen's initially negative reaction.

*Outcome 6: After adjustments, the final SRHR ODA budget for 2014 was somewhat higher than the 2013 budget, and the percentage of Dutch ODA to be spent on SRHR increased (to approximately 5.2% in 2014, compared with 4% in 2013). (Changing practice)*

Description:

When the 2014 budget was announced in September 2013, reductions in the GNP led to overall cuts to ODA, including a relatively small cut for SRHR (€15 million). This cut was lower than the cuts to the ODA budgets for the other focal points. Although the changing reporting systems and budget lines and lack of transparency in reporting made a clear monitoring of the amount of ODA to be spent specifically on SRHR<sup>204</sup> difficult, a conservative estimate of funds going to SRHR yield a 2014 budget of €193 million, or approximately 5.2% of ODA spending—increased from €168.5 million (or 4% of the ODA budget) for 2013.

After the initial budget announcement, ChristenUnie, an opposition party, used its influence given the non-majority government (coalition between VVD and PvdA) to divert €50 million from the Good Growth Fund to the development cooperation budget, and specifically towards the advancement of children's rights. After the extra budget for development cooperation was announced, the Alliance organised a meeting of the Multiparty Initiative in November 2013. There, the SRHR Alliance raised the issue of the €15 million cut but especially the need for a better balance between funding of multilateral channels versus civil society. The SRHR and HIV/AIDS ambassador agreed with this analysis and gave examples from the not yet published IOB evaluation. The SRHR Alliance did not succeed in using this budget to increase the funding for the announced SRHR advocacy fund, but €33 million of this €50 million was allocated to SRHR-related issues: €20 million for the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM); €5 million for UNICEF to fight child prostitution, child marriage and related issues; and €8 million for interventions by NGOs across education, SRHR and gender. The latter resulted in the Child Marriage Fund for NGO work on the SRHR of adolescents, reducing adolescent pregnancies and early and forced marriages. The SRHR Alliance, in a new consortium, was allocated part of that funding to work on these issues.

Relevance:

As is explained in the descriptions of outcomes related to the 2012 budget, this outcome equals the realisation of the SRHR Alliance's overall objective at national level (that the % of ODA funding for SRHR increases or stays the same), especially important because of the Netherlands' strong role worldwide in supporting sexual and reproductive health and rights and providing a progressive voice on controversial issues. However, the additional funding made available for SRHR activities from money

taken from the Dutch Good Growth fund was mostly allocated to multilateral organisations. This is potentially problematic, precisely because multilateral organisations are not as effective as civil society in reaching underserved populations and in addressing taboo topics.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- Longer-term work of the SRHR Alliance with parliamentarians (detailed in the baseline and in other outcomes in this list) contributed to an overall climate conducive to SRHR funding.
- The Alliance has continually monitored the budget, reviewing all budget announcements and updates and carefully monitoring and analysing changes in SRHR budget lines over time.
- Given that SRHR had been spared the major cuts made to the other topics, the SRHR Alliance decided not to dedicate too much effort to trying to undo this budget cut, because this could backfire. However, the Alliance did have a press release after the budget came out in September 2013 to draw attention to the SRHR budget cut. Parliamentary questions regarding the 2014 budget for SRHR were taken up and asked by MPs.<sup>205</sup>
- After the announcement of the extra funding for development cooperation on the initiative of ChristenUnie, the Alliance organised a meeting with the Multiparty Initiative and the SRHR and HIV/AIDS Ambassador in November 2013. During this meeting, the Alliance asked for increased funding for the announced SRHR advocacy fund and made clear that there was a misbalance within the SRHR budget between funding for the multilateral sector versus funding for civil society based on their own analysis and the (then unreleased) IOB evaluation on SRHR.
- The SRHR Alliance was not directly involved in the allocation of a portion of the funds taken away from the Dutch Good Growth fund to SRHR-relevant activities, but they did try to influence this indirectly through contacts with Prisma and STOP AIDS NOW!

### **5.3 International-level outcomes: ICPD process**

*Outcome 1: Mobilisation of progressive SRHR CSOs including youth organisations around CPD 44, 45 and 47 increased each year (April 2011, 2012 and 2014). (Agenda setting)*

Description:

The CPD has met yearly since 1994 to monitor developments in population and development, review the Programme of Action of the ICPD and provide related recommendations to the Economic and Social Council.

The ISRRC is an international network important for organisation and mobilisation of SRHR advocates around the CPD meetings, amongst other things. The ISRRC operates through an information-sharing listserv for individuals working for organisations in the field of SRHR. Beginning with the lead-up to CPD 44, a separate sub-group of individuals interested in working on a joint lobby and advocacy strategy was formed. The group consisted of several different working groups, who focused on specific issues at the CPD 2011. Within the ISRRC, a strategy sub-group was successfully organised, beginning at the end of 2010 and leading up to the April 2011 CPD meeting. This sub-group continues to operate and became increasingly active around CPD 45 and CPD 46, when the organisational structure of the movement was further enhanced, and CPD 47.

In 2011, a high level of coordination was necessary because the CPD 44 theme was highly relevant to SRHR advocates ('Fertility and Reproductive Health'). In 2010, only 10 SRHR advocates participated at the CPD meeting. In 2011, 100 advocates were organised to influence the agenda. For the 2012 CPD meeting, SRHR advocates were more highly organised around CPD 45 than they had been in the previous year, with preparations beginning in June 2011 and approximately 150 people being

mobilised. The topic of the 2013 CPD (on New Trends in Migration: Demographic Aspects) was less directly relevant for SRHR, but still a significant number of advocates were present and active in maintaining previously agreed language and achieving advancements on human rights language for migrants, including reproductive rights and access to basic social services. CPD 47 (2014) set a new record for civil society participation at the CPD, with more than 800 NGO representatives registering to attend,<sup>206</sup> including both pro- and anti-SRHR advocates. Sixty civil society representatives were included in 47 country delegations, and plenary statements were made by 29 NGOs.<sup>207</sup> Of the 27 statements presented in English, 18 were explicitly pro-SRHR, and only one was explicitly anti-SRHR.<sup>208</sup>

At the CPD 44, 45, 46 and 47, youth participation also became more visible, with youth organisations taking part in coordinated action, including making joint statements. Youth participation at CPD 47 was unprecedentedly high, with over 100 young people participating.<sup>209</sup>

The unprecedented level of participation at CPD 47 did lead to some logistical challenges: The meeting rooms for CSOs was insufficient to accommodate all CSO representatives, and there were difficulties with UN entry passes. These issues were, to some extent, resolved later in the week.

#### Relevance:

In the complex ICPD process, it is important for likeminded civil society organisations to be organised and linked by a strong network to bring about desired changes. It is also important to have a broader movement with a diverse group of people, including youth, from different countries, so that they can influence their own governments, who play a major role in the UN. The increasingly large presence of many SRHR advocates at the CPD 44, 45 and 47 sent a message to delegations worldwide that SRHR is widely supported. Reaching a critical mass of active individuals beginning with CPD 44 also allowed SRHR advocates to divide tasks and accomplish much. Civil society in the different countries was able to work with their governments to prepare them for the CPD process, and then to use the CPD resolution to advocate towards their own governments.

SRHR advocates coming together in this broader movement has also had a longer-term impact. The experience gained through being involved in the CPD meetings built capacity within the network. A great deal of trust was also built amongst these advocates, especially in the core group that was most active in organising and strategizing. This core group continues to work closely together, not only around the CPD meetings, but also around other SRHR-related events and processes.

#### Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- Over the long term, individual SRHR Alliance organisations have been heavily involved in the strengthening and broadening of networks of SRHR advocates, including setting up and taking a leading role in the Civil Society Platform to Promote SRHR Beyond 2015 and its listserv. The Coordinating Committee of the SRHR Platform, with an Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) as one of its co-chairs, advocated towards the CPD Bureau for increased participation of civil society, including for non-ECOSOC civil society organisations.
- Two Alliance organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and Rutgers WPF) attended CPD 44, three (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, dance4life and Rutgers WPF) attended CPD 45, three (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, dance4life and Rutgers WPF) attended CPD 46 and four (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, dance4life, Rutgers WPF and Simavi) attended CPD 47.<sup>210</sup>
- One Alliance organisation (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality) took an active role in mobilising and strategizing with young people attending CPD 44, 45 and 47 through jointly hosting and organising the Youth Caucus. At CPD 47, this was organised through the Youth Leadership Working Group (described below in a separate outcome), whose reach and financial support

allowed for more geographically diverse participation in the Youth Caucus than at previous CPDs. Over 100 young people representing CSOs attended the Youth Caucus at CPD 47.

- Two Alliance member organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and dance4life), along with the Dutch MoFA, developed the Youth and ICPD Partnership (described below under a separate outcome). Through the Youth and ICPD Partnership, these two Alliance organisations collaborated with the Dutch MoFA in 2014 to organise a side event<sup>211</sup> on meaningful youth participation at CPD attended by more than 100 people.
- Ahead of CPD 44, the strategy working group of SRHR advocates worldwide was initiated by an SRHR Alliance member (Rutgers WPF), who took a leading role in organising and mobilising representatives of 100 CSOs in this group. This leading organisational role for this Alliance organisation continued in subsequent years, although it may have declined somewhat in 2014 because of personnel shifts (the staff member primarily responsible for initiating the working group was not part of the Alliance in 2014).<sup>212</sup>
- SRHR Alliance representatives organised a Friends of ICPD networking dinner attended by 20 country delegations at CPD 44.
- At NGO strategy sessions held at CPD 44 and CPD 45, SRHR Alliance representatives took the lead in working groups on lobbying country negotiations and language.
- Around CPD 45, three Alliance organisation took leading roles in strategy sub-groups (Rutgers WPF in the core planning group, language group and mission seminar group; CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality in the youth group; and dance4life in the youth group and the language group).
- Where relevant and feasible, the SRHR Alliance worked with their Southern partners to increase capacity towards international advocacy through sending targeted informative email communications, training sessions and working one-on-one with individual organisational partners. Ahead of CPD 47, three Alliance organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, Rutgers WPF and Simavi) held training sessions covering international advocacy for their organisational partners, with one of these sessions being (partly) open to other Alliance partners.
- One Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) took Alliance partners (field offices) to CPD 44, CPD 45 and CPD 46. Three Alliance organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, Rutgers WPF and Simavi) took Southern partners to CPD 47.
- Four SRHR Alliance organisations (dance4life, CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, Rutgers WPF and Simavi) had Southern partners (or, in one case, a field office) on their government delegations to CPD 47, including partners from Ghana (2 partners), Indonesia, Malawi, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal and Uganda. One Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) had staff from their field office in Pakistan included in the delegation in 2011, 2012 and 2014, and from their Indonesian field office in 2012.
- The SRHR Alliance contributed to building the movement of SRHR advocates through organising and distributing an 'SRHR for All' pin and information leaflet at CPD 47.

*Outcome 2 (Representation on Dutch CPD delegation): Two SRHR Alliance organisations were invited to be part of the Dutch delegation, including one youth delegate, to CPD 45 (April 2012) and CPD 46 (April 2013). (Agenda setting, Changing practice)*

*Outcome 9 (Representation on Dutch CPD delegation): One Alliance member was invited to serve as a youth delegate on the Dutch delegation to CPD 47, and another Alliance member seconded to the MoFA was a member of the Dutch delegation (April 2014). (Agenda setting)*

**Description:**

Until 2011, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a policy not to include civil society in the official delegation to the CPD. Two SRHR Alliance organisations (Rutgers WPF and CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality) were invited to be part of the Dutch delegation to CPD 45 (theme on adolescents and youth). One SRHR Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) was invited to be part of the Dutch delegation to CPD 46. One SRHR Alliance organisation (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality) had a representative on the CPD 47 Dutch delegation as a youth delegate. This representative prepared one of the four statements made by the Netherlands at the CPD 47.<sup>213</sup> A staff member of another Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) was seconded to the MoFA in 2014 and was also on the Dutch delegation to CPD 47.

**Relevance:**

Having SRHR Alliance representatives on the official CPD 2012 delegation allowed for a more direct impact on the negotiated outcome document of the meeting—a central part of the Alliance’s international-level theory of change. In terms of individual and organisational capacity for future lobbying and advocacy work, it was also very informative to be in the negotiation room and to be able to follow the dynamics and the process of negotiation so closely.

**Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:**

- Past experience and reputation of the SRHR Alliance organisations at previous CPD meetings was crucial in being invited to join the CPD 45 and 47 delegations. In addition to the experience of these organisations as civil society representatives around the CPD meetings, participation in past meetings helped them to strengthen contacts with the Dutch MoFA.
- SRHR Alliance organisations worked very closely with the Dutch delegation members at CPD 44, contributing to the MoFA’s insight on the added value of including civil society and youth in the delegation.
- In 2011, two Alliance organisations (Rutgers WPF and CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality) requested to be included on the CPD 45 Dutch delegation. These requests were approved, resulting in the first direct invitation to CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and Rutgers WPF to join the Dutch delegation.
- Participation of the SRHR Alliance in information sharing and strategizing around each CPD meeting contributed to Alliance members being invited to join the delegation in each subsequent year.

*Outcome 3: Two member organisations of the SRHR Alliance were invited to the UNFPA ICPD Beyond 2014 Civil Society Stakeholder Meeting (global consultation meeting on the ICPD beyond 2014 process, 9–10 Dec 2011). (Agenda setting)*

**Description:**

The UNFPA ICPD Beyond 2014 Civil Society Stakeholder Meeting was a global consultation meeting on the ICPD beyond 2014 process (Istanbul, 9–10 December 2011).<sup>214</sup> The purpose of this meeting was to consult with civil society on UNFPA’s plan to do the entire operational review. Approximately 50

representatives from global NGOs, including representatives from two Alliance organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and Rutgers WPF), attended the meeting in Istanbul on 9–10 December 2011. The civil society representatives began preparing and strategizing over breakfast. At the meeting, UNFPA first provided attendees with an overview of how UNFPA planned to handle the review process. The civil society representatives then responded to the plans and raised concerns.

Relevance:

The outcome of the meeting was a report that reflected the discussions. Major concerns centred mostly on the question of how civil society will be involved in this process. UNFPA took notice of the principle concerns of the civil society representatives, but UNFPA is dependent on the responses of governments regarding civil society participation.

This first consultation meeting marked the beginning of the Operational Review of the ICPD Programme of Action. The SRHR Alliance's participation in this consultation enabled them to begin shaping the future of the international development framework at UN level.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- One Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) obtained an invitation after email conversations with UNFPA in which it was reasoned that this organisation has been actively involved in the shaping, implementing, monitoring and reviewing the ICPD Programme of Action since its establishment. This organisation also organised the The Hague Forum (the ICPD+5 review meeting in 1999), leading to UNFPA inviting them for this review process leading up to ICPD+20.
- One Alliance organisation (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality) was invited following email conversations about their consistent involvement in youth-led advocacy with regard to the ICPD Programme of Action, their role as a youth-led organisation and the importance of meaningful youth participation in the process leading up to ICPD+20.

*Outcome 4 (Southern partner involvement): SRHR Alliance partners in Indonesia and Uganda were invited by their governments to be involved in the consultation process that is part of the review of the ICPD Programme of Action (August 2012). (Agenda setting, Changing Practice)*

*Outcome 8 (Southern partner involvement): Ten Southern partners of SRHR Alliance organisations (including partners in the SRHR Alliance) were invited to join their official national government delegations to CPD 47 (April 2014). (Agenda setting)*

Description:

The governments of Indonesia and Uganda in August 2012 invited SRHR Alliance partners in those countries to join the ICPD programme of Action review consultation process, working toward filling in the UN questionnaire. In Indonesia and Uganda, the UNFPA office is coordinating the consultation process. This is part of the Operational Review on the ICPD Programme of Action, which began at national level in 2012. This review process involved regional consultations, national meetings with civil society and governments, and, in 2013, regional political meetings with regional Economic and Social Commissions. However, in many countries, civil society was not invited to participate in these consultation meetings.

Four SRHR Alliance organisations (dance4life, CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, Rutgers WPF and Simavi) had Southern partners (or, in one case, a field office) on their government delegations to CPD 47. This included partners from Ghana (2 partners), Indonesia, Malawi (plus one invitation to join the delegation that was declined), Pakistan, Peru, Senegal and Uganda.

#### Relevance:

This consultation process was supposed to be part of the official procedure, but in many countries the process of consulting civil society was not followed. It is important for civil society to have a strong voice in this process, because the new SRHR agenda after 2014 is being shaped and agreed by governments worldwide, and this is an explicit part of the SRHR Alliance's international-level theory of change. By being engaged in country level and being invited by their governments for consultations, civil society can influence the agenda and hold their governments accountable. As described above, CSO participation as part of official government delegations is important because it allows a more direct involvement in the ICPD process.

#### Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- A colleague through ISRRRC informed a Dutch Alliance member that the Ugandan government was planning consultation meetings and asked for names of civil society in Uganda to put on the invitation list. The Dutch Alliance member put down names of all four SRHR Alliance partners in Uganda, and they were subsequently all invited to participate in the consultation.
- In Indonesia, the contribution of the SRHR Alliance should be explained in terms of capacity building of an individual Indonesian partner (the Rutgers WPF country representative in Indonesia). The SRHR Alliance sponsored this partner to attend CPD 44 in 2011, where she gained experience and strengthened her relations with the Indonesian government. She was able to attend CPD 45 as part of the official Indonesian delegation. As Indonesia was chairing CPD 45, this was very strategic. After learning from the SRHR Alliance that the ICPD review process was soon to begin, she approached UNFPA and was then asked to lead a consultation at the national level on the role of civil society in the review of the ICPD Programme of Action.
- Where relevant and feasible, the SRHR Alliance worked with their Southern partners to increase capacity towards international advocacy through sending targeted informative email communications, training sessions and working one-on-one with individual organisational partners. Ahead of CPD 47, three Alliance organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, Rutgers WPF and Simavi) held training sessions covering international advocacy for their organisational partners, with one of these sessions being (partly) open to other Alliance partners.

*Outcome 5: The ICPD Global Review Report (February 2014) and the UN Secretary-General's Summary Report (January 2014) contained progressive language on SRHR. (Agenda setting)*

#### Description:

The Global Review Report ('Framework of Actions for the Follow-up to the Programme of Action of the ICPD Beyond 2014',<sup>215</sup> final version published in February 2014) is the result of an operational review of the implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action adopted in Cairo in 1994. The Global Review Report synthesises data collected from 176 member states, contributions from civil society and academic research. The Secretary-General's summary report (of the Global Review Report) was released on 20 January 2014.<sup>216</sup>

The Global Review Report includes references to sexual and reproductive health and rights, comprehensive sexuality education, non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, meaningful participation of young people, eliminating violence against women and girls, eliminating female genital mutilation, rights of sex workers, access to legal and safe abortion and post-abortion care, the changing structure of the household, future funding for SRHR and the link between the ICPD Programme of Action and the post-2015 development agenda. The S-G's Summary Report

contains much of the same progressive language found in the Global Review Report. However, unlike the Global Review Report, the S-G's summary presents SRHR, comprehensive sexuality education and the SRHR of young people in a chapter on 'Health'. The Global Review Report, in contrast, presents these issues in a chapter on 'Dignity and Human Rights'.

Relevance:

Both the Global Review Report and the S-G's summary influenced the Zero Draft for the CPD 47 outcome document. Advocates additionally worked towards the Global Review Report being taken into account in the post-2015 development agenda. Besides identifying the lack of progress in some areas of the ICPD Programme of Action, it is a very important report for SRHR advocacy as it identifies gaps and challenges not addressed by the ICPD Programme of Action that require political commitment beyond 2015.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance

- All of the activities described separately under the outcomes from the regional and thematic meetings (below) contributed to this outcome, as the Global Review Report is based on the outcomes of the regional and thematic conferences, the ICPD Beyond 2014 Global Survey and an evidence-based analysis of progress since 1994.
- One Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) also compiled information from CSOs working in the Netherlands on domestic issues and sent this as input for the Dutch government contribution to the Global Review Report. This organisation also mobilised civil society to be engaged in this process, requesting a separate CSO survey. This survey was conducted, with a large response.<sup>217</sup>
- One SRHR Alliance partner (Rutgers WPF) was a member of the Dutch delegation to the UN ECE ICPD regional review meeting in 2013. Two additional Alliance partners attended this meeting as civil society representatives (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and Rutgers WPF). The Rutgers WPF field offices in Pakistan and Indonesia attended the UN ESCAP regional meeting on ICPD. They contributed to the regional outcome document for the ECE region and the ESCAP region, respectively.

*Outcome 6: The CPD 47 chair (Uruguay) decided for a negotiated substantive outcome (March 2014). (Agenda setting)*

Description:

In the lead-up to CPD 47 (7–11 April 2014, United Nations, New York), there was significant resistance to negotiations taking place. For various reasons, many countries were opposed to a substantive negotiated outcome. The Commission countries failed to reach consensus about whether negotiations would take place or only a procedural resolution would be issued. Finally, only in late March 2014, the CPD 2014 Chair, Mr. Ambassador Gonzalo Koncke (Uruguay) announced that there would be negotiations. After the CPD began, a group of African countries led by Nigeria, Egypt and Cameroon continued to call to reverse the Chair's decision and to produce a procedural document without substantive content, but the decision was not overturned.

Relevance:

As the last CPD before the UNGASS on ICPD in September 2014, CPD 47 represented an important step in the ICPD beyond 2014 process. CPD 47 came after thematic and regional CSO consultations and the publication of the Global Review Report, which largely included very progressive language on SRHR. The CPD 2014 session resulted in the Index Report on the main implementation issues identified at the session. This report, along with the ICPD Review Outcome Report and the Summary ICPD Review



Outcome Report, were later the basis for the September 2014 UNGASS. It is also hoped that the Index Report would feed into the post-2015 development agenda, but many countries failed to mention the Index Report during their UNGASS statements.

Having negotiations at CPD 47 opened possibilities for language advancement, especially considering the strong outcomes in the thematic and regional consultations leading up to this CPD. In the end, organisational issues (described more fully in the contribution analysis section of the main text of this report, section 10.3.2.2) led to very limited negotiation taking place, but the decision to have negotiations remains significant—without this, there would certainly have been no chance of getting new language into the resolution. Also, if CPD 47 had reaffirmed previous resolutions without producing a negotiated outcome, it would have had less timeliness and power moving forward to the UNGASS and UNGA in September 2014.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- The international network of SRHR advocates, including the SRHR Alliance, took a strong standpoint in favour of negotiations. Between September 2013 and the decision for negotiations, there were many contacts with Uruguay and others in the Bureau to push through direct lobby for negotiations.
- A primary way of working was through Southern partner organisations to reach out to their governments on the issue of a negotiated outcome. The SRHR Alliance, through Rutgers WPF, has been collaborating closely with several EuroNGOs members, notably partners from the Countdown 2015 Europe consortium. With Countdown 2015 Europe partners, a meeting for civil servants from the Nordic countries plus Netherlands, UK and France was organised to discuss and prepare for CSW, CPD and post-2015. These partners are also part of the international network, and worked together on joint messages for the progressive European countries. This resulted in governments changing their perspectives to be in favour of (or less opposed to) negotiations.
- The SRHR Alliance used direct lobby to push for negotiations through the Netherlands MoFA, who were initially undecided on their standpoint but later supported the CPD Chair's decision for negotiations in the EU bloc. SRHR Alliance members also actively encouraged their organisational Southern partners, particularly in Africa, to advocate their own governments to support a negotiated outcome at CPD 47.

*Outcome 7: An unprecedented (at CPD) number of country statements expressed support for SRHR at CPD 47 (April 2014). (Agenda setting)*

Description:

Many countries (more than 50, according to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development,<sup>218</sup> and 59 on SOGI alone according to IPPF<sup>219</sup>) from around the globe, including a number who had not spoken out before, made progressive statements about SRHR issues (including the inclusion of language on 'SRHR', comprehensive sexuality education, abortion and non-discrimination on the basis of SOGI) at CPD 2014. These countries included Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Cook Islands, Lebanon, Mongolia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, South Africa, Suriname, the United States, Vietnam, several European countries and many Latin America countries.<sup>220</sup> This level of support for SRHR was unprecedented, compared with CPD sessions of previous years.

Relevance:

Although the strong support from many countries was not fully paralleled in the CPD 47 resolution, it is indicative of progress and the moving forward of progressive SRHR. The unprecedented support from governments around the world sets the scene for advancing the Cairo Programme of Action in the longer term.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- The SRHR Alliance's long-term work with the Netherlands MoFA throughout the ICPD Review Process (and efforts to tie this to the Dutch position on the post-2015 agenda) were critical for the Dutch position at CPD 47. An important activity was a preparation and strategizing meeting organised in collaboration with the Knowledge Platform Share-Net International and held with the full Netherlands-based Dutch delegation and civil society representatives who would attend CPD 47 (SRHR Alliance members and one other CSO representative). At this meeting, SRHR Alliance members presented a joint analysis of the Global Review Report and Chair's summary, including joint language recommendations based on the Zero Draft (later finalised and sent to the Dutch delegation in writing).
- An advocacy officer at one SRHR Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) was on secondment as Policy Officer for SRHR, ICPD and Post-2015 at the Netherlands MoFA and led negotiations for the Netherlands as part of their delegation to CPD 47.
- Another SRHR Alliance organisation (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality) had a representative on the Dutch delegation as a youth delegate. This representative prepared one of the four statements made by the Netherlands at the CPD 47.221
- Through their work in an EU-level network (as well as with the Dutch government directly), the SRHR Alliance worked to influence the voice of the EU bloc at CPD 47. As in previous years, the EU broke on issues of SRHR, in line with an SRHR Alliance advocacy goal.
- Along with the international network, the SRHR Alliance participated in a continuous push at country and regional level around the regional and thematic meetings as well as the national consultations leading up to CPD 47. The progressive language on SRHR resulting from many of these meetings likely fuelled the vocal support for SRHR at CPD 47.
- The collaboration with Southern partners to develop their capacity for international advocacy described in above outcomes also contributed to this outcome.

*Outcome 10: The SRHR Alliance was invited for extensive preparation and strategizing with the MoFA ahead of CPD 47, as well as a debriefing session following CPD 47 (2014). (Agenda setting)*

Description:

Ahead of CPD 47, the MoFA invited the SRHR Alliance to engage in extensive joint preparation and strategizing. Following CPD 47, the SRHR Alliance was also invited to a debriefing session with the MoFA.

Relevance:

Across SRHR Alliance organisations, already strong relationships with the MoFA have been maintained or strengthened, evidenced (and also further strengthened) by, among other things, the Alliance being included in extensive preparations with the Ministry ahead of CPD 47—sharing information and being invited to meetings on strategy with members of the Dutch delegation and also being invited to a debriefing session with the Ministry after CPD 47.

Especially given the prominent role of the Netherlands in speaking up for SRHR internationally, a good relationship with the MoFA is very important for influencing international agendas on SRHR. Having good contacts with the MoFA allows the Alliance to work to influence their standpoint on SRHR issues, to work together with them to coordinate a stronger joint message and to gain access to information about closed spaces (particularly UN spaces). All of these things allow the SRHR Alliance to be more effective in influencing the international development agenda and explain why building and maintaining good relationships with the MoFA is explicitly mentioned in the Alliance's international-level theory of change.

As a specific example, the good relationships between Alliance members and the MoFA resulted in Alliance members being on the Dutch delegation for CPD45, CPD 46 and CPD47. Also, the SRHR Alliance closely collaborates with the Ambassador for SRHR and HIV/AIDS at the MoFA, Lambert Grijns. He has participated in multiple meetings in parliament and was also part of the delegation to CPD 47.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- Ongoing and long-term activities contribute to the strengthening of the relationships between the SRHR Alliance and the MoFA. These activities include maintaining expertise on SRHR issues and on the international development agenda processes, having close ties to global networks of SRHR advocates and providing good and valuable input to the Ministry.
- In the past 1–2 years, the SRHR Alliance has reached beyond the long term contacts within DSO to gain the trust of other departments (especially DMM, the department for Multilateral Institutions and Human Rights) that become increasingly relevant to their work on the post-2015 process. Following the release of Ploumen's vision letter, the SRHR Alliance directors also met with the Minister.

*Outcome 11: The Secretary-General's Index Report on the implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action drew on statements delivered by countries, regional country groups and civil society representatives at CPD 47 and contained strong references to SRHR, SOGI, comprehensive sexuality education and a link to post-2015 (August 2014). (Agenda setting)*

Description:

The ICPD+20 Global Review Index Report includes references to SRHR (3 times), non-discrimination on the basis of SOGI and comprehensive sexuality education. This report was prepared by the Secretary-General and draws on statements delivered by countries, regional country groups and civil society representatives at CPD 47.

Relevance:

The ICPD+20 Global Review Index Report ('Recurrent themes and key elements identified during the sessions of the Commission on Population and Development', 15 July 2014)<sup>222</sup> is the final part of the ICPD+20 review process. Governments had an opportunity to express their support for the Index Report at the UNGASS on 22 September 2014, but many did not do this. The Netherlands government did not make a link between the Index Report and the post-2015 development process in their UNGASS statement. However, the Index Report will be used in advocacy efforts associated with further steps in the post-2015 development agenda, and it is hoped that the advancements made therein will be taken up by countries in future negotiations.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

The strength of the Index Report reflects the unprecedented support for SRHR expressed by countries and CSO at CPD 47, and it also draws upon the Global Review Report. All Alliance activities geared

towards CPD 47 and the regional and thematic conferences contribute to this outcome. (See the separate outcome descriptions for the regional [Outcome 15 below] and thematic [Outcome 16 below] conferences for a summary of the SRHR Alliance contribution to these outcomes.)

*Outcome 12: The CPD 44 outcome document reflected a renewed commitment to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights, but no new progressive language was included (April 2011). (Policy influencing)*

**Description:**

The 44<sup>th</sup> session of the CPD took place in New York on 11–15 April 2011, with the theme of ‘Fertility, Reproductive Health and Development’. The session was characterised by difficult negotiations and resulted in a very mixed outcome document in terms of SRHR.<sup>223</sup> The document contains renewed commitment for sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights; recognition of sexuality education, gender equality, addressing unmet need for family planning including female condoms; and increased youth-friendly language. However, no new language was adopted on SRHR, beyond what was already in documents from CPD sessions in 2009 and 2010.

A new paragraph on the sovereignty of countries to implement their own national policies was added by the Arab group near the beginning of the outcome document of CPD 44. The sovereignty paragraph was in the ICPD Programme of Action, but it was newly introduced in CPD resolutions in 2011. A reference to the rights of parents in relation to young people seeking sexual and reproductive health services was also added by the Arab group and other opposing groups.

**Relevance:**

CPD resolutions can provide advocacy tools for further work. Among civil society working for SRHR internationally, there is a great desire for agreed language on SRHR in UN documents to progress. Although the language around SRHR in the CPD 44 outcome document did not progress, it is an achievement that a resolution was reached following a period of very difficult negotiations. The renewed commitment to previously agreed SRHR issues provides advocates with a tool for further advancing SRHR at national and international level.

**Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:**

- Seven Alliance representatives from two organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and Rutgers WPF) attended CPD 44.
- Alliance representatives reached almost all country delegations and maintained close working relations with the Dutch delegation as well as Zambia, South Africa, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Indonesia and others.
- An SRHR Alliance member (Rutgers WPF) took a leading role in organising and mobilising representatives of 100 civil society organisations from around the world in this strategy group, and SRHR Alliance representatives took the lead in working groups on lobbying country negotiations and language.
- SRHR Alliance representatives also organised a Friends of ICPD networking dinner which was attended by 20 country delegations.
- Alliance representatives lobbied for progressive SRHR including sexual rights recognition and comprehensive sexuality education. They also lobbied against initiatives of opposing groups, including the insertion of the paragraphs on state sovereignty and parental rights regarding young people’s access to sexual and reproductive health services.

*Outcome 13: The CPD 45 outcome document included progressive statements on young people's rights and was the first resolution at UN level recognising adolescents' and young people's sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights (April 2012). (Policy influencing)*

**Description:**

The 45<sup>th</sup> session of the CPD took place in New York on 23–27 April 2012, with the theme of 'Adolescents and Youth'.<sup>224</sup> In addition to young people's SRHR, important topics were employment issues, education issues and many other development areas. Although youth and sexuality and questions of the role of parents remain difficult areas for international discussion, this resulted in more room for negotiation and a more balanced outcome document than in the previous CPD. The African group, for example, wanted to have more language on the employment issues of young people, and by getting that in, they also agreed to have paragraph on sexual and reproductive health.

Despite strong lobbies against young people's rights and progressive SRHR (for example, from the Holy See, some Arab countries and certain European countries such as Poland and Malta), new statements on adolescents and young people were the main achievement of 2012. It was the first time that at UN the right of adolescents and young people to have good quality sexual and reproductive health was acknowledged. The outcome document of CPD 45 was the first and only resolution at UN level that recognised adolescents' (people ages 10–19) and young people's sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights.

**Relevance:**

CPD resolutions can provide advocacy tools for further work. This resolution was also relevant for the Operational Review of the ICPD Programme of Action that began in 2012. With the advancements in language made at CPD 2012, the outcome document from this session was a very strong advocacy tool in partner countries, and also for the discussions on the post-2015 international agenda. The success of the CPD 2012 outcome document also reinvigorated the global SRHR movement, which is increasingly faced with strong opposition forces, very difficult negotiations and a world polarised on SRHR issues. Celebrating this success was key for building morale and confidence within the movement.

**Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:**

- One SRHR Alliance member (Rutgers WPF) took the lead in coordinating and mobilising global civil society focusing on SRHR to prepare for CPD 2012. Working groups set up to prepare for different advocacy strategies prepared input for the Secretary General's report, drafted factsheets on young people's SRHR and planned a mission seminar. Rutgers WPF chaired a core planning group that oversaw all activities and coordinated strategies, co-hosted the ISRRRC morning strategy sessions and co-hosted the mission seminar. Representatives from CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality were also involved in the early stages of planning, especially through organising the youth working group, with representatives from dance4life joining the youth and language working groups early 2012.
- Through the language working group of the international network, three SRHR Alliance organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, dance4life and Rutgers WPF) made efforts to influence the outcome document beginning well before the start of CPD 45. At each stage, most of the language suggested was taken up—first in the Zero Draft by the Secretary General, and then by certain countries—many European countries, New Zealand, the United States, the Latin American Group, South Africa and others.
- Three SRHR Alliance organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, dance4life and Rutgers WPF) had regular CPD 2012 preparation meetings, also with the Dutch delegation.

- Two SRHR Alliance organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and Rutgers WPF) were represented on the Dutch delegation, including one youth delegate.
- Two Alliance organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and dance4life) were active in the youth working group within the international network. These two organisations also held a lunch meeting at CPD 45 to announce Youth and ICPD, a new partnership with the Dutch MoFA geared towards the participation of youth as equal partners in the implementation of the Programme of Action at national level and the ICPD Review Process. One Alliance organisation (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality) also advocated for meaningful youth participation at the CPD 45 through the organisation of a Youth Caucus.
- Two Alliance organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and Rutgers WPF) supported Southern partners to prepare for and attend CPD 45. One Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) had two field offices on their official delegations (Indonesia and Pakistan).

*Outcome 14: The CPD 46 outcome document contained language on human rights for migrants, including their sexual and reproductive health, reproductive rights and access to basic social services (April 2013). (Policy influencing)*

**Description:**

The topic of the 2013 CPD (April 2013) was ‘New Trends in Migration: Demographic Aspects’. In the outcome document,<sup>225</sup> previously agreed language on sexual health and reproductive health and rights was maintained. Additionally, the outcome document includes advancements on human rights language for migrants, including reproductive rights and access to basic social services.

**Relevance:**

CPD resolutions can provide advocacy tools for further work. Although this CPD meeting was less directly relevant for SRHR (because of the migration theme), it was important to maintain previously agreed language on SRHR and to achieve advancements on human rights for migrants.

**Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:**

- One member of the SRHR Alliance (Rutgers WPF) was represented on the official Dutch delegation to CPD 46.
- As in previous years, SRHR Alliance members (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and dance4life) facilitated youth participation and lobbied directly for strong language on SRHR.
- Two Alliance members (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and dance4life) were active in the language group, preparing factsheets and language on SRHR of youth migrants and HIV-positive migrants.
- Rutgers WPF submitted a written statement addressing SRHR and migration and offered their oral statement time to CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, who prepared an oral statement on behalf of youth advocates and activists.<sup>226</sup>

*Outcome 15: At all five regional conferences in the ICPD process (UNESCWA-LAS, UNECE, UNECLAC, UNECA/AU and UNESCAP), progressive language on SRHR was adopted (2013). (Policy influencing)*

**Description:**

As part of the ICPD Operational Review, five regional conferences were held in 2013 (UNESCWA-LAS, UNECE, UNECLAC, UNECA/AU and UNESCAP). Each of these regional conferences resulted in a

progressive outcome document with respect to SRHR. Alliance members or partners took part in three meetings: the UNECE, UNESCAP and UNECA/AU.

- The UNECE Regional Conference for Europe, Central Asia and North America (Geneva, 1–2 July 2013) outcome document included ‘sexual and reproductive health and rights’ as a human right (recommendation 16) and referred to the benefits of ‘comprehensive sexuality education’ for children (recommendation 20). The conference was attended by more than 30 participants from 43 countries and one area.
- At the African Regional Conference on Population and Development Beyond 2014 (UNECA/AU, 30 September–4 October 2013), the Addis Ababa Declaration on Population and Development in Africa Beyond 2014 was adopted, including language on ‘the sexual and reproductive health and rights of all individuals’ (commitment 35). The declaration was adopted by all countries except Chad. Reservations were expressed by 16 out of the 52 countries attending on articles containing language relating to non-discrimination, including the commitment made to SRHR, largely due to concerns that these articles might promote sexual diversity, including homosexuality. Out of the 14 attending countries from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), only the DRC expressed reservations. All but one country withdrew their reservations before the beginning of CPD 47.
- The outcome document from the UNESCAP Asian and Pacific Population Conference (APPC) (Bangkok, 16–20 September 2013) was very progressive, including language on sexual and reproductive rights, comprehensive sexuality education and addressing discrimination based on SOGI. This conference marked the first time the Indonesian government acknowledged the concept of sexual rights. Of the 42 countries present, four did not adopt the declaration (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran and the Russian Federation) because of references to sexual orientation, gender identity, sexual rights, and, in the case of Afghanistan, abortion. Reservations on these points were expressed by several countries.

#### Relevance:

The language on SRHR in the outcome documents from these conferences lays out regional priorities for the ICPD beyond 2014 process. The agreed documents from the regional meetings were taken as one of the inputs in the ICPD Global Review Process and the crucial 47th CPD in 2014. These agreements contributed to positive, higher order outcomes through the ICPD Global Review Report and the Zero Draft for CPD 47 as well as broad support for SRHR expressed by many countries during CPD 47. The (negotiated) regional outcomes were sometimes more useful than the Review Report, because some of the countries did not recognise the Review Report, but they had put their signatures under their own regional outcome documents. The agreed documents from the regional conferences were also used in the advocacy with countries who were signatories on these documents, and the documents can continue to be used to put pressure on government leaders to support strong SRHR language in the future and to strengthen national implementation and accountability.

#### Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- The SRHR Alliance worked to increase the involvement of their Southern partners in the process through their regional meetings, most directly through the sponsorship of partners to attend regional conferences. Simavi’s partners YONECO and CSA attended the African Regional Conference on Population and Development Beyond 2014. Rutgers WPF Pakistan was part of the government delegation to the Asia-Pacific Regional Conference. Several CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality partners were present at their respective regional meetings in Asia and Africa and participated in preparatory youth meetings.

- SRHR Alliance Southern partners were engaged in lobbying and advocacy activities before and during the conferences, including working with other CSOs to develop comprehensive draft declarations. Strategies included using Twitter, email updates and meetings with national and regional government officials, ministers and conference organisers.
- Also contributing to this outcome was the ongoing in-country advocacy capacity development through the SRHR Alliance (evaluated under the country programmes) and ongoing briefs on topics relevant to international advocacy sent by email to SRHR Alliance partners.
- One SRHR Alliance member (Rutgers WPF) was part of the Dutch delegation to the European regional conference, and additional Alliance members attended the conference (from CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and Rutgers WPF). SRHR Alliance members worked within the regional network to improve the EU communication on SRHR in the ICPD process.

*Outcome 16: At two thematic meetings in the ICPD process, progressive language on SRHR was adopted (ICPD Beyond 2014 Global Youth Forum, Bali, 4–6 December 2012; ICPD International Human Rights Conference, The Hague, July 2013). (Policy influencing)*

**Description:**

The ICPD Beyond 2014 Global Youth Forum (Bali, 4–6 December 2012)<sup>227</sup> was attended by approximately 650 young people as well as government representatives and private corporations from 180 countries. The topic of the conference was the place of young people’s issues in the ICPD review and the ICPD agenda in general. The youth-led conference resulted in a very progressive outcome document (The Bali Global Youth Forum Declaration)<sup>228</sup> that highlighted the importance of young people’s participation. This outcome document was the first time the right to safe and legal abortion was recognised in a UN-organised forum. The document also referenced the full inclusion and legal protection of LGBTQI people, youth-friendly health services including SRH services, acknowledgement of sexual rights as human rights, the need for comprehensive sexuality education including information on SOGI, repealing laws opposing same-sex marriage, decriminalisation of sex work and meaningful youth participation in all stages of decision-making in the implementation of rights-based policies and programmes. Over 600 young people from around the world contributed to this declaration.<sup>229</sup>

The ICPD International Human Rights Conference in the Netherlands (The Hague, July 2013)<sup>230</sup> identified gender as a prerequisite for advancement of women’s and girls’ human rights and included rights related to sexuality and reproduction as human rights.

**Relevance:**

The thematic meeting agreements contributed to positive, higher order outcomes of progressive language in the ICPD Global Review Report and the Zero Draft for CPD 47 as well as broad support for SRHR expressed by many countries during CPD 47.<sup>231</sup> For the Bali Global Youth Forum, in particular, agreements made at UN level and their translation to national policies and actions have a huge impact on youth. For these policies to better meet the true needs of young people, and thus be more effective and sustainable, young people should be engaged as equal partners in decisions that affect their lives. Additionally, it is young people’s right to be heard. Coordinated action by youth organisations furthers a stronger youth voice with regard to youth’s demands and meeting their SRHR. The progressive rights-based language of the declaration and the large number of young people participating contributed to the Bali Global Youth Forum’s usefulness as an advocacy tool. However, the very progressive language created friction with some conservative countries, including Indonesia, whose MoFA representatives walked out of the Forum.<sup>232</sup>



#### Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- Because of their previous involvement in the ICPD process, one SRHR Alliance organisation (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality) was a member of the International Steering Committee, which organised the Global Youth Forum in Bali, Indonesia. Members of this committee were 15 youth organisations, Indonesian government representatives and UNFPA. The Steering Committee advised UNFPA on the structure and content of the Forum and collected input from participating youth to develop the Bali Global Youth Forum Declaration.
- One Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) was in close contact with the reference group prior to the ICPD International Conference on Human Rights. This organisation was also requested to make a video overview of each day of the conference, and they led a World Café session during the conference itself. With a broader civil society network, the Alliance contributed both to the development and dissemination of 'The Hague Civil Society Call to Action on Human Rights and ICPD Beyond 2014: All Different, All Human, All Equal'.<sup>233</sup> The Alliance also issued a public statement ahead of the conference ('Tijd voor Seksualiteit als Mensenrecht', 6 July 2013) urging for sexuality to be recognised as a human right.<sup>234</sup>

*Outcome 17: The CPD 47 outcome document reflected the link between ICPD and post-2015, referred to evidence-based comprehensive education on human sexuality and maintained previously-agreed language on sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights. It did not include full SRHR, as sexual rights were not included (April 2014). (Policy influencing)*

#### Description:

The 47<sup>th</sup> Session of the CPD took place on 7–11 April 2014. For progressive SRHR advocates, the outcome document represents a mixed achievement. On the positive side, 'sexual and reproductive health' and 'reproductive rights', which have previously been contested at CPD meetings, were mentioned several times in the outcome document and were not taken up as a problematic point. Second, although it was somewhat weaker than desired, a link was made between ICPD and post-2015. Third, the document includes 'evidence-based comprehensive education on human sexuality' as an area to continue to address in ICPD implementation. Fourth, given the difficulties achieving negotiations at CPD 47, it must be viewed as an achievement that an outcome document was reached at all. On the negative side, sexual rights, sexual orientation and gender identity and strong language on safe abortion remain absent from the outcome document.

Leading up to CPD 47, very progressive language on SRHR was in several thematic conferences and, especially, all five regional conferences. Most crucially, these documents explicitly included full SRHR. Because these processes led up to CPD 47, many people involved expected SRHR language advances in the CPD 47 agreed language. Before the beginning of CPD 47, the Zero Draft was distributed. This document included full SRHR. CPD 47 was highly unusual, procedurally, with little opportunity for negotiation. (See contribution analysis, section 10.3.2.2 of the main text for further details.) In the final agreed resolution, some paragraphs and words were removed (including sexual rights) and others were added (on the family).

#### Relevance:

Agreed language including 'sexual and reproductive health and rights', in particular, would have given advocates a very powerful tool to push for changes in policy and practice in a variety of national, regional and international contexts. As the last CPD before the end of the ICPD review process, having full SRHR in the outcome document would have had a special weight and power, both for this process and, potentially, for the beyond-2015 development agenda.

The explicit link between the ICPD Operational Review and the beyond-2015 development agenda is important to avoid repeating the situation that happened with the MDG framework: When the MDGs were originally developed, SRHR was left out entirely. After five years, universal access to reproductive health was added to the framework, but being five years late in determining indicators has led to this being one of the most off-track targets in the framework. Establishing the link between the ICPD and post-2015 processes as early as possible in the evolution of the post-2015 development framework is crucial.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- The SRHR Alliance puts a large amount of energy and activities into preparations for CPD meetings, and this was also true for CPD 47—the last CPD before the end of the ICPD Global Review. Alliance activities around CPD 47 included providing input and strategizing with the MoFA on the Dutch position, working through their European network to influence the European bloc, providing information and strategic support to Southern partners seeking to influence their own governments and regions, having a youth delegate and as seconded staff member on the official Dutch delegation and all activities contributing towards the regional and thematic conferences (described above in Outcomes 15 and 16).
- In such a complicated process, it is not possible to say with any certainty what accounted for the lack of language advances in the outcome document, or, in particular, the removal of ‘sexual rights’. It is possible that the lack of real negotiations contributed to preventing language progress. Some of the difficulty may also be attributed to an opposition, especially from the African and Arab blocs, that was more vocal than usual. The long delay in the decision to have negotiations also led to civil society dedicating a great deal of effort, up to the last minute, focusing on getting negotiations instead of organising around other issues.

#### **5.4 International-level outcomes: Post-2015 process**

*Outcome 1 Despite certain limitations in the language, SRHR is well positioned in the Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (published 20 May 2013). (Agenda setting)*

Description:

On 30 May 2013, the Report of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on Post-2015 was published. The report adopted a rights-based perspective throughout, and included a stand-alone goal on the empowerment of women and girls and the achievement of gender equality; recognised access to SRHR as a fundamental human right; recognised concerns of women, girls and young people as a cross-cutting issue; recommended the disaggregation of indicators by gender, geography, age and ethnicity (amongst other things); and brought up gender budgeting.

The 26-member HLP was appointed by the UN Secretary-General in July 2012. Their task was to set a vision for the post-2015 development agenda. The HLP had five meetings around the world involving civil society and other stakeholders between September 2012 and March 2013 before the release of their final report. The HLP was disbanded after completing their report in May 2013.

Relevance:

The High Level Panel Report is an important input in the post-2015 development agenda. The HLP Report is part of the advising process for the development of the global development framework beyond 2015 and was one of the inputs for the Secretary-General’s report to the Special Event towards Achieving the Millennium Development Goals on 25 September 2013, and the HLP report also directly

informed the Special Event. The draft of the Secretary-General's report was much less positive than the HLP report, speaking only of 'sexual and reproductive health'. Existing language on 'reproductive rights and sexual and reproductive health' was brought into the final version, but the S-G report remained less positive on SRHR than the HLP Report.

#### Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

A range of SRHR Alliance activities contributed to this outcome. Most of this work was done in cooperation with an international network of SRHR advocates. The SRHR Alliance participated in a large international advocacy effort to improve the language in the S-G report. Specific activities for 2013 included supporting partners to attend the Monrovia, Liberia, meeting of the HLP (January 2013), meeting with the HLP in London (November 2012), participation in HLP event in Bali (March 2013), attending a lunch meeting with a member of the HLP (August 2013), writing a letter on behalf of the International Civil Society Platform to Promote SRHR Beyond 2015 prior to the release of their report, following up with the Dutch HLP member and making public statements (press releases and website publications).

*Outcome 2 (NL MoFA on post-2015): Two roundtables suggested by the Alliance were later organised at the MoFA on providing input for the vision letter on post-2015 and on providing input on targets and indicators for the Open Working Group (2013 and 2014). (Agenda setting)*

*Outcome 3 (NL MoFA on post-2015): The SRHR Alliance was invited to participate in strategic consultation with a small group from the MoFA on the post-2015 development framework (June 2014). (Agenda setting)*

#### Description:

As was mentioned in discussion of prior outcomes involving the MoFA, already strong relationships between the SRHR Alliance and the MoFA have been maintained or strengthened, evidenced (and also further strengthened) by the fact that the Alliance was invited to a strategic consultation with a small group from the MoFA in June on post-2015. Additionally, two roundtables suggested to the Ministry by the SRHR Alliance and then organised at the MoFA focused on 1) providing input for the 'Vision Letter on Post-2015' (organised by Rutgers WPF, WO=MEN, Share-Net and WECF) and 2) providing input on targets and indicators, contributing to the Open Working Group (OWG) meeting of February 2014 and to the start of the negotiating mode of the OWG.

#### Relevance:

Especially given the prominent role of the Netherlands in speaking up for SRHR internationally, a good relationship with the MoFA is very important for influencing international agendas on SRHR. Having good contacts with the MoFA allows the Alliance to work to influence their standpoint on SRHR issues, to work together with them to coordinate a stronger joint message and to gain access to information about closed spaces (particularly UN spaces). All of these things allow the SRHR Alliance to be more effective in influencing the international development agenda and explain why building and maintaining good relationships with the MoFA is explicitly mentioned in the Alliance's international-level theory of change.

#### Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- Ongoing and long-term activities contribute to the strengthening of the relationships between the SRHR Alliance and the MoFA. These activities include maintaining expertise on SRHR issues and on the international development agenda processes, having close ties to global networks of SRHR advocates and providing good and valuable input to the Ministry.
- In the past 1–2 years, the SRHR Alliance has reached beyond the long-term contacts within DSO to gain the trust of other departments (especially DMM, the department for Multilateral

Institutions and Human Rights) that become increasingly relevant to their work on the post-2015 process. Following the release of Ploumen's vision letter, the SRHR Alliance directors also met with the Minister.

*Outcome 4: The outcome document of the Open Working Group includes 1) a target for sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights, 2) references to the ICPD Programme of Action and the Beijing Platform for Action as well as both of their reviews and related conferences in the Chapeau and 3) a target to ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health care services by 2030 (final session in July 2014). (Agenda setting)*

#### Description:

The Open Working Group's outcome document comprises a list of 17 goals and associated sub-goals. This list includes, under Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages, the sub-goal '3.7 by 2030 ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health care services, including for family planning, information and education and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes' and, under Goal 5: achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls, sub-goal '5.6 ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the ICPD and the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of their review conferences'.

During negotiations, all references to sexual and reproductive health as well as reproductive rights were almost removed from the health goal. Although 'sexual rights' did not make it into the final OWG outcome document, OWG 8 (statement presented on behalf of 49 UN member states)<sup>235</sup>, OWG 10 (statement signed by 24 UN member states)<sup>236</sup> and OWG 13 (statement presented on behalf of 58 member states, including the Netherlands)<sup>237</sup> indicated support for full SRHR. OWG 10 and OWG 13 also endorsed 'comprehensive sexuality education'. The Netherlands government was active in producing a multi-country statement on SRHR read by South Africa at OWG 13.

The Open Working Group on the SDGs, mandated to prepare a proposal on the SDGs for the UN General Assembly, was envisaged by the Rio+20 outcome document and then formally established in January 2013 by the General Assembly. The OWG was co-chaired by Kenya and Hungary and had 70 country members sharing 30 seats. The Netherlands shared a seat with the UK and Australia, forming a strong 'Troika' who made strong statements on SRHR. March 2013–February 2014, the OWG held regular thematic sessions. Before each of these sessions, the OWG held meetings with civil society, who provided input mostly through the Major Groups. Beginning in March 2014, OWG sessions were held to discuss the draft report. The Zero Draft of the OWG goals and targets was released in June 2014. In July 2014, the final (13<sup>th</sup>) session of the OWG was held, and a final outcome document was adopted.

#### Relevance:

The list of sustainable development goals proposed by the OWG was considered and acted upon by the General Assembly at its 68<sup>th</sup> session in September 2014. As such, this outcome document has a very crucial place in the post-2015 development process.

#### Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- To influence the outcome of the Open Working Group, SRHR Alliance members have largely worked through international and European networks. The Major Groups also provided input for the OWG through thematic clusters. Two SRHR Alliance organisations were members of Major Groups (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality in the Major Group on Children and Youth and

Rutgers WPF in the Major Group on Women). CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality gave explicit input for the OWG through the Children and Youth Major Group. Both of these major groups called for (a target on) universal access to sexual and reproductive health and rights. The Major Group on Children and Youth also called for ‘a target guaranteeing universal access to evidence-based comprehensive sexuality education that is grounded on human rights and gender equality’.

- One SRHR Alliance organisation (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality) participated in OWG 8 in February 2014. OWG 8 dealt with, amongst other topics, ‘Promoting equality, including social equity, gender equality and women’s empowerment’.
- Another SRHR Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) supported a Women’s Major Group event on ‘Gender Equality and Women’s Rights—Key for success of Sustainable Development Goals Post-2015’.
- SRHR Alliance members participated in meetings/consultations with the MoFA on the OWG and met with representatives from DMM and DSO to strategize in the weeks before OWG 13.
- Alliance members were involved in the analysis of country statements to identify which countries would be willing to sign on to a joint pro-SRHR statement for the Open Working Group.
- SRHR Alliance members also worked through contact with the Dutch government, who was part of the OWG, urging them to make connections between the post-2015 development agenda and the ICPD review process. The SRHR Alliance also sent a letter with input for the OWG to the Dutch representative in the OWG.

### **5.5 International-level outcomes: Other UN-level processes**

*Outcome 1 The SRHR Alliance as a whole was invited to join the official Dutch delegation to the UN General Assembly High Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS (June 2011). One Alliance member joined the delegation as a representative of the Alliance. Two youth representatives from the Alliance were also part of the delegation. (Agenda setting)*

#### **Description:**

SRHR Alliance representatives were invited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to join a large Dutch delegation, including representatives from the Ministry, the Prime Minister of Sint Maarten and other civil society actors, to the UN General Assembly High Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS. The meeting took place on 8–10 June 2011 in New York. The meeting assessed progress on HIV/AIDS issues and suggested future action worldwide.

The Dutch government has historically taken civil society to High Level Meetings in relation to HIV/AIDS. The head of the Dutch delegation was the Ambassador of HIV/AIDS and SRHR, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to have civil society focusing on HIV and civil society focusing on SRHR in the delegation. The meeting produced positive outcome statements in relation to SRHR, with increased attention given to young people’s perspectives on HIV/AIDS and increased attention for SRHR. These positive outcomes were negotiated in the face of opposition mostly from the Vatican and the Arab region.

#### **Relevance:**

Through the invitation of the SRHR Alliance collectively and one of the Alliance members to be meaningfully involved in the High Level Meeting on HIV and AIDS, the close link between SRHR and HIV/AIDS was emphasised. The positive outcome statements will be used to further lobbying and

advocacy activities in favour of progressive SRHR, worldwide. The 2011 High Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS was the first time that one member of the SRHR Alliance (in this case the director of dance4life) acted as a representative of the Alliance in international advocacy. Alliance members were able to meet with the delegation and the NGO representatives in the delegation. Prior to the meeting, they also prepared input for the Zero Draft and a briefing for parliamentarians and organised a side event on female condoms. This was a great opportunity to influence the outcome of the High level Meeting on HIV/AIDS 2011 in favour of SRHR.

Following the High Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS, ongoing contact was maintained between the SRHR Alliance and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including discussions about CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality contributing to providing a youth perspective on SRHR at CPD.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

Before the High Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS, SRHR Alliance representatives participated in the Civil Society Hearing for the High Level Meeting on HIV and AIDS on 8 April 2011. This one-day hearing allowed for dialogue between civil society and governmental representatives. Additionally, CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality had previously been involved in the High Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS.

*Outcome 2 (Commission on the Status of Women) The Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) 55 outcome document contained more progressive language regarding SRHR (22 February–4 March 2011). (Policy influencing)*

*Outcome 3 (Commission on the Status of Women) The outcome document from CSW 58 included explicit links to the post-2015 development agenda, called for a standalone goal on gender equality and provided the first agreed language related to sexuality education at UN level leading up to the post-2015 process (March 2014). (Policy influencing)*

Description:

The 55<sup>th</sup> session of the CSW took place on 22 February–4 March 2011 in New York. The language in the agreed conclusions document was made more progressive on SRHR issues. The 58<sup>th</sup> Session of the Commission of the Status of Women took place 10–21 March 2014 at UN Headquarters in New York. The CSW 58 was dedicated to the post-2015 development agenda, with the priority theme ‘Challenges and Achievements in the Implementation of the Millennium Development Goals for Women and Girls’. The agreed outcome document<sup>238</sup> made explicit reference to the post-2015 development framework, calling for gender equality, the empowerment of women, human rights of women and girls to be reflected as a standalone goal in the new development framework and comprehensive evidence-based education for human sexuality (as in the previous year). The outcome document maintains but does not advance the language from Beijing on sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights.

Relevance:

Positive conclusions on SRHR by this influential UN Commission provides an agreed precedent for in-country advocacy to advance the position of women and girls and for shaping the global debates about gender equality and the advancement and empowerment of women and girls, which can be used in further lobbying and advocacy efforts internationally to reach the SRHR Alliance goal of renewed commitment to SRHR in international frameworks after 2014. Because of the timing and theme of CSW 58, it was expected to feed directly into the post-2015 development framework. The language on education for human sexuality is important, because it was the first agreed language in the post-2015 process on the topic.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- Three SRHR Alliance representatives (Amref Flying Doctors, CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and Rutgers WPF) attended CSW 55 (2011), advocating along with the Youth Coalition for Sexual and Reproductive Rights and UNFPA for 'gender equality' and 'comprehensive sexuality education' to be included in the language of the outcome document. The SRHR Alliance representatives had contact moments with the official delegation from the Dutch Ministry of Education and Culture as well as other delegations.
- CSW 58 was attended by two Alliance organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and Rutgers WPF). At CSW 58, CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality worked together with other CSO representatives from the youth rights, women's rights and LGBT caucuses and focused predominantly on language, making and distributing factsheets and contributing to the social media communications. CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality operated within the larger European and international networks.

### **5.6 International-level outcomes: Strengthening of international partnerships and networks between civil society and youth, government and UN bodies**

*Outcome 1: The Dutch MoFA committed to appointing a Youth Ambassador for SRHR and HIV/AIDS in 2012 (Two-way Mentorship with the Dutch SRHR and HIV Ambassador). (Agenda setting)*

Description:

The Health and AIDS Division of the Dutch MoFA committed to recruiting a Youth Ambassador for SRHR and HIV/AIDS to facilitate linkages between the Dutch Ambassador for SRHR and HIV/AIDS and youth-led organisations and networks working on young people's SRHR. This position was a mentorship with the Dutch SRHR and HIV/AIDS Ambassador.

Relevance:

The two-way mentorship provided learning and networking opportunities for both the MoFA (in the person of the SRHR Ambassador) and the young person selected, as well as the young people in her network. The SRHR Ambassador and the Youth Ambassador exchanged ideas and information about events and collaborated strategically in the run-up and at international conferences.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

This outcome was achieved through ongoing contact maintained between the SRHR Alliance (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality in particular) and the Dutch MoFA, including contributions to providing a youth perspective on SRHR at CPD and suggesting a theme and format for a side event on youth during CPD 45.

*Outcome 2 (Expanding international networks): The Civil Society Platform to Promote SRHR Beyond 2015 was established in May 2012 with an SRHR Alliance organisation as one of three co-chairs, representing more than 2000 organisations. (Agenda setting)*

*Outcome 3 (Expanding international networks): SRHR Alliance Southern partner organisations were increasingly linked to international SRHR advocacy networks (2011–2014). (Agenda setting)*

Description:

The global Civil Society Platform to Promote SRHR Beyond 2015 was founded in May 2012.<sup>239</sup> The Platform's coordinating committee represents more than 2,000 organisations. The Platform's listserv currently has 237 wide-ranging civil society members and is one of the leading information-sharing and strategy-development listservs for CSO on the post-2015

Four SRHR Alliance member organisations (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, dance4life, Rutgers WPF and Simavi) have Southern partners who have been newly linked to international SRHR advocacy networks since 2011. This involves gaining access to closed international advocacy listservs and making contact with regional networks.

Relevance:

The mobilisation and coordination of international advocacy networks, including the integration of Southern partners, is explicitly mentioned in the Alliance's international-level theory of change. In light of the complexity of the processes and the large number of actors involved, worldwide, in the post-2015 development agenda and ICPD processes, there is a great need for progressive SRHR organisations to unite around shared goals and to strategize, rather than working against each other or duplicating each other's tasks haphazardly. The strength of this global network, when the constituent CSOs are able to speak with one voice, is much stronger internationally than the voice of any individual organisation ever could be. This allows for a broader outreach and a more significant impact. Knowledge sharing and capacity building are other benefits of working in a broad and varied network. At stages when aspects of the international processes were unclear (particularly for post-2015), the wide international network was especially helpful, allowing for efficient knowledge sharing between many organisations via monthly strategy calls.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- Through involvement with the European network (EuroNGOs), one SRHR Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) was deeply involved in the founding of the global Civil Society Platform to Promote SRHR Beyond 2015 beginning in May 2012, is one of the three co-chairs and continues to work to strategize with this platform. This Alliance organisation represents EuroNGOs on the coordinating committee and moderates the Platform's listserv.
- The Alliance also cooperates with international CSO through the CSW-CPD listserv and the ISRRC.
- Through invited and ongoing partnerships (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and dance4life through the ongoing Youth and ICPD Partnership with the MoFA, CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality through the new Youth Leadership Working Group, Simavi through membership of PMNCH and collaboration with Family Care International), SRHR organisations coordinated and strategized with a growing and increasingly diverse international group of (youth) advocates on SRHR issues at CPD 47 (discussed further in outcome descriptions in the CPD 47 outcome cluster).
- Within the Major Group on Children and Youth, one organisation (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality) has worked with a new network of SRHR-focused youth organisations mobilised around strategizing to give collective input to the Major Group. Additionally, in 2013 a member of one Alliance organisation (dance4life) was invited to join the UNAIDS Youth Advisory Forum.
- The cancellation of the originally planned ILA programme limited the Alliance's activities in bringing Southern partners into international advocacy.<sup>240</sup> Some SRHR Alliance organisations have been active in linking their Southern partners to the international networks on SRHR (e.g. through gaining access to closed listservs), as well as helping to connect the partners with regional networks to work towards international advocacy. One Alliance organisation (Rutgers WPF) took Alliance partners (field offices) to CPD 44, 45 and 46. Three Alliance organisations (CHOICE, Rutgers WPF and Simavi) brought Southern partners to CPD 47, and all of these partners participated in CSO strategy meetings organised through the ISRRC community.



*Outcome 4 An Alliance staff member was seconded to the MoFA for ICPD and the post-2015 process from 1 January 2014. In this role, the Alliance member was included on the CPD 47 delegation (2014). (Agenda setting, Changing Practice)*

*Outcome 8 Relationships between the SRHR Alliance and the MoFA were strengthened and maintained (2013–2014). (Agenda setting)*

Description:

Across SRHR Alliance organisations, already strong relationships with the MoFA have been maintained or strengthened, evidenced (and also further strengthened) by several outcomes presented in this evaluation. Critically, an individual Alliance member was seconded to the MoFA for ICPD and the post-2015 process from January 2014 and was and included on the CPD 47 delegation.

Relevance:

Especially given the prominent role of the Netherlands in speaking up for SRHR internationally, a good relationship with the MoFA is very important for influencing international agendas on SRHR. Having good contacts with the MoFA allows the Alliance to work to influence their standpoint on SRHR issues, to work together with them to coordinate a stronger joint message and to gain access to information about closed spaces (particularly UN spaces). All of these things allow the SRHR Alliance to be more effective in influencing the international development agenda and explain why building and maintaining good relationships with the MoFA is explicitly mentioned in the Alliance's international-level theory of change.

As a specific example, the good relationships between Alliance members and the MoFA resulted in Alliance members being on the Dutch delegations to CPD 45, CPD 46 and CPD 47. Also, the SRHR Alliance closely collaborates with the Ambassador for SRHR and HIV/AIDS at the MoFA, Lambert Grijns. He has participated in multiple meetings in parliament and was also part of the delegation to CPD 47.

Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:

- Ongoing and long-term activities contribute to the strengthening of the relationships between the SRHR Alliance and the MoFA. These activities include maintaining expertise on SRHR issues and on the international development agenda processes, having close ties to global networks of SRHR advocates and providing good and valuable input to the MoFA.
- In the past 1–2 years, the SRHR Alliance has reached beyond the long-term contacts within DSO to gain the trust of other departments (especially DMM, the department for Multilateral Institutions and Human Rights) that become increasingly relevant to their work on the post-2015 process. Following the release of Ploumen's vision letter, the SRHR Alliance directors also met with the Minister.

*Outcome 5 The Youth and ICPD Partnership was established by the Dutch MoFA in cooperation with two SRHR Alliance organisations. This is a partnership of young people, NGOs, UN organisations and national-level governments (announced in April 2012). (Agenda setting, Changing practice)*

Description:

The Youth and ICPD Partnership was established by the Dutch MoFA in cooperation with CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and dance4life (announced in April 2012). Following an invitation by the MoFA to CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality to generate ideas for a possible side event at the CPD 2012, CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and dance4life worked with the Ministry to develop the Youth and ICPD Partnership. This is a partnership of young people, NGOs, UN organisations and national-level

governments to work together towards advancing young people's SRHR. The Partnership was first presented to an outside audience at the lunch meeting during the CPD 2012, where stakeholders (youth, NGO, UN representatives) from a number of different countries were present. This partnership organised a side-event at CPD 47 and the UNGASS on ICPD Beyond 2014 about Youth Participation (2014).

**Relevance:**

The Youth and ICPD Partnership goes beyond an isolated event at CPD 2012, bringing together all relevant partners to establish an ongoing partnership, on the national level, to work on young people's SRHR in the context of ICPD Beyond 2014. The ICPD Programme of Action has not been fully implemented, and much work remains to ensure young people's rights. Worldwide, young people's rights are often denied, in terms of issues such as, for example, health care and access to condoms. International frameworks stand to be improved significantly, both in content and in meaningful youth involvement, in the development of new frameworks.

**Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:**

Past efforts made by CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality to build and maintain good contacts and a good working relationship with the MoFA led to the invitation to explore possibilities for a CPD 2012 side event. From this invitation, the idea for the Youth and ICPD Partnership was developed by CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, dance4life and the MoFA. Following the CPD 2012, CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality and dance4life have further developed the form and content of the Partnership. dance4life takes a coordinating role in moving the Partnership forward, backed by the Steering Committee consisting of CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality, the MoFA and dance4life. By organising the lunch meeting to clarify plans for the Partnership at the CPD 2012, the two SRHR Alliance organisations involved were able to raise international interest in the project.

*Outcome 6: One Alliance organisation was invited by UNFPA to join the Youth Leadership Working Group (2013). (Agenda setting)*

**Description:**

In 2013, UNFPA invited an Alliance organisation (CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality) to join the new Youth Leadership Working Group, consisting of 15 youth organisations and UNFPA.

**Relevance:**

The Youth Leadership Working Group has increased meaningful youth participation in certain key conferences, including the ICPD thematic conferences.<sup>241</sup> Through the reach and financial support of this new working group, participation in the Youth Caucus was made more geographically diverse at CPD 47, compared with previous CPDs. Through this group, UNFPA funded the participation of one person per participating organisation at CPD 47. However, one external informant interviewed found the Southern representation through the Youth Leadership Working Group to be, at times, 'tokenistic'.

**Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:**

- CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality's previous participation in the ICPD process (through activities described in other outcomes in this annex) led to them being invited to join the International Steering Committee, which organised the Global Youth Forum in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2012.
- The participation in the International Steering Committee, in turn, led to an invitation from UNFPA for CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality to join the Youth Leadership Working Group.

*Outcome 7: One Alliance organisation was invited by UNAIDS to join PACT, a collaboration of 25 youth organisations working on HIV and AIDS and SRHR in the post-2015 process (2013). (Agenda setting)*

**Description:**

At the beginning of 2013, dance4life was invited by UNAIDS to join PACT, an initiative that was set up to unite 25 youth-led and youth-serving organisations focusing on post-2015, with a particular focus on HIV.

**Relevance:**

Participating in youth networks is important because youth organisations are not yet seen as equal partners within international development as a whole, and this is also the case in international advocacy settings. Youth-focused networks such as PACT work to increase the possibilities for meaningful participation by youth organisations and young people in the post-2015 process. Focusing on (health) rights of young people in the post-2015 process, PACT is an important youth network, additionally to the existing networks active around the ICPD process. An SRHR Alliance member (dance4life) delivered the PACT Statement to the UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board on the place of young people in the post-2015 target on ending AIDS (July 2014).<sup>242</sup> Being a member of PACT provides the opportunity to influence the post-2015 framework from additional angles, such as through the Board of UNAIDS, in which different governments are represented.

**Contribution of the SRHR Alliance:**

- Ongoing work in the field of HIV/AIDS combined with a focus on youth participation—particularly young people from communities—led to dance4life being invited to apply for a position in the Youth Advisory Forum of UNAIDS.
- Once selected as a member of the Youth Advisory Forum and actively participating in international processes, dance4life was invited to join PACT.

## 6 Together 4 Change Alliance: outcomes, relevance, contribution

This annex refers to the outcomes as reported in chapter 13 but now as per institutional level. Where feasible, outcomes are grouped so as to better reflect the nature of the changes achieved. ACPF envisages to reach out to the entire pan-Africa region, which it does in three ways namely via the African Union, via Civil Society Organisations and likeminded contacts and networks, and via Government contacts though it targets a selection of African countries only. This and the limitation in number of countries visited and respondents consulted, explain why the list of outcomes reported is by no means conceived exhaustive. Outcomes were identified by two approaches namely tracing ACPF work all the way to those who were supposed to benefit as well back-tracking following specific child right and wellbeing issues mentioned.

### 6.1 Changes at Global level

In the initial MFS II planning ACPF had not incorporated to reach out to the global level to promote child rights and wellbeing. However, in the run up to various Post-2015 meetings, ACPF seized the momentum to bring the African voice on child issues into the discussion, resulting in a number of outcomes at different international fora and not only restricted to Post-2015.

#### *Outcome 1: The African Child Friendly Index serving as input for a global (Kids Rights) Index*

##### Description:

In June 2014 the Netherlands NGO Kids Rights and the Netherlands Institute of Social Studies (ISS) sought technical input from ACPF, for the global Kids Rights Index which is a ranking on how countries world-wide are adhering to children's rights as enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. ACPF was approached by Kids Rights to especially present its methodology and experience with its Child Friendly Index (CFI) as it had already developed for Africa.

##### Relevance:

The relevance for the global Kids Rights Index is in sharing the CFI methodology ACPF developed for Africa while the CFI gives the African voice on the pan-African situation.

##### Contribution:

ACPF developed the CFI for its 2011 African Report on Child Wellbeing (ACRW), which report is published every two years.

#### *Outcome 2: The African voice on public spending to realize Child Rights participates in UN fora (UNCRC and UNHRC)*

##### Description:

The UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) in Geneva invited ACPF to provide expert input with regards to the issue: 'towards a better spending to realize children's rights', while the UN Committee on Child Rights (UNCRC) also in Geneva invited ACPF in the writing and drafting committee to develop a general comment in this respect.

##### Relevance:

Both UN committees benefitted from the African research findings, perspectives and input on budgeting and investing in children in Africa and mainstreamed this in the instructions on public budget allocation to realize children's rights in conformity with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Contribution:

This outcome is directly based upon ACPF findings and evidence-based research in this respect as presented in the ARCW 2011 titled Budgeting for Children.

*Outcome 3 Pan- Africa influence in UNICEF's strategic and Post- 2015 agendas; these outcomes will be evolving over the coming years.*

Description:

UNICEF (Geneva) sought input from ACPF for their strategic planning 2014-2017 and also UNICEF's Executive Board (New York) sought ACPF input in the Post-2015 development agenda

Relevance:

A genuine African voice is incorporated in the UN planning and Post-2015 development agenda.

Contribution:

ACPF contributed by way of raising awareness on the African situation on child rights, sharing research findings (ARCW 2011), presenting a situational picture on Africa's common position to Post-2015 on the theme: 'sustainability and development in Africa: a Child centred perspective' and also through participation in a number of IAWGs, personal presentations and briefings.

*Outcome 4: Inter-country adoption on the agenda of a number of governments in Africa as well as in other parts of the world, leading to ratification of inter-country Adoption Guidelines by a number of countries and further research and policy changes in among others Ethiopia, the Netherlands and Australia.*

Description:

Inter-country adoption is a worldwide phenomenon involving national governments and broader public alike. The International Policy Conference (IPC) 2012 on this issue brought together a broad range of stakeholders and received worldwide media attention through the BBC, CNN and other national media stations.

Relevance:

Inter-country adoption was raised as highly relevant issue by African partners to be addressed in an IPC, which materialised in 2012. As a result of the IPC a number of African countries as well as Western countries such as Australia and The Netherlands ratified the inter-country Adoption Guidelines, which underscore also the relevance of the IPC outcomes.

Contribution:

ACPF prepared, organised and convened the IPC 2012 on inter-country adoption together with partners and thus contributed to its success.

## **6.2 Interagency Working groups**

*Outcome: Inter-Agency Working Groups influence UN institutions and International Committees, assist in creating coherent agendas on Child Rights as well as further certain topics such as child protection systems in sub-Sahara Africa, child policies in the East African Union. ACPF is fully acknowledged as valuable partner in IAWGs.*

### **Description:**

ACPF continued contribution to a diverse range of Inter-Agency Working Groups (strategic and ad hoc partnerships) made up of international NGOs, such as Save, Plan, World Vision, but also UN agencies and bilateral donors on different subject matters all related to Child Rights and Wellbeing either in a specific region or on specific topics and resulting in joint agendas, calls for action, political statements and declarations.

### **Relevance:**

The testimony of the relevance of ACPF input in IAWGs is expressed in the African voice on Child Rights and Wellbeing articulated in pan-Africa (AU) context and in the global UN arena.

### **Contribution:**

ACPF contributed with research findings, awareness raising and well focussed input on topics.

## **6.3 Regional Pan African level**

The focus is on the African Union (AU) representing pan-Africa and the 54 member states as well as the AU's African Committee of Experts on Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC). ACPF provides overall backstopping to the AU Department of Social Affairs/Division of Social Welfare<sup>243</sup> and the Committee within the frame of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990), which cooperation is confirmed in a Memorandum of understanding between ACPF and the AU (July 2012). But also the East Africa Committee called upon ACPF for input.

*Outcome 1: Enriched and evidence based AU agenda and policy for Child Rights and Wellbeing and well prepared and substantive Ministerial Conferences on selected topics in line with the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990).*

### **Description:**

The AU Department of Social Affairs and ACPF regularly meet, discuss and interact for public and political agenda setting purposes and support to development of actions for AU member states.

### **Relevance:**

The frequent and ongoing requests of AU Social Affairs Department for interacting with and support of ACPF demonstrates the relevance of ACPF research and knowlegde for the AU.

### **Contribution:**

ACPF contributes by way of evidence based research and advocacy messages, focussed content and technical support for ministerial conferences.

*Outcome 2: Strengthened and accelerated progress and progress monitoring of the African Charter*

Description:

The Africa Committee of Experts on Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) and ACPF regularly meet, discuss and interact regarding the implementation of the African Charter on Child Well Being and issues arising in need of supportive actions towards member states and African CSOs.

Relevance:

The frequent and ongoing requests of ACERWC for dialogue and interaction with and support of ACPF demonstrates the relevance of its knowledge and supportive work for the Committee.

Contribution:

ACPF evidence based research and advocacy messages, focussed content for campaigns, training and guideline development as well as technical support.

*Outcome 3: Bujumbura Declaration of the East African Community on Child Protection Systems Framework and trained staff.*

Description:

An inter-agency working group on child protection systems was set up at the request of the East Africa Community in which ACPF participated.

Relevance:

The Bujumbura Declaration that was drafted by the IAWG and adopted served as input for EAC policy and subsequent training.

Contribution:

ACPF fully contributed to drafting the declaration using their evidence based research conducted on the issue of child protection systems and designed and conducted training in this respect.

#### **6.4 National Government/ Africa level**

The outcomes identified at governmental level are limited in number because not only few countries were visited and selected people interviewed, but also fieldwork did not allow for in depth review of outcomes at governmental levels. Three types of outcome are found.

*Outcome 1: National research and advocacy on Child issues taken up*

Description:

The African Reports are being used by Government divisions and officials as evidence to embark on further research and advocacy for agenda and policy changes on child issues, and so are IPC outcomes on inter-country adoption inspiring to further research and advocacy among African countries.

Relevance:

Relevance is shown in African countries taking action on child issues raised and addressed in ACPF publications and conferences.

Contribution:

Government officials refer to the evidence based research in the African Reports and to outcomes of the IPC as an important source for changing agendas, policy and practice.

*Outcome 2: Individual politicians and public opinion leaders being influenced and showing changed practice on child issues*

Description:

Influential individuals are referring to child issues (e.g. budgeting and accounting for children) that are also addressed in the African Reports and sometimes confidentially consult ACPF staff directly for advice.

Relevance:

The ARCW, other publications and meetings are often mentioned as important source for action and also used as advocacy tool.

Contribution:

Child issues raised by individuals strongly coincide with ACPF research outcomes (e.g. budgeting and accounting for children) as reported in the ARCW 2011.

*Outcome 3: Concrete actions being taken to implement child protection*

Description:

Under MFS I all kind of preparations were made for assisting the Ethiopian authorities setting up Child Legal Protection Centres (CLPCs), however the project was halted in 2010.

Relevance:

The fact that the CLPCs were restarted in 2012 but now fully under Ethiopian Government management shows its relevance for Ethiopia.

Contribution:

ACPF helped in the preparatory phase on MFS I and in the restart under MFS II.

## **6.5 Civil Society Level**

Outcomes reported by Civil Society Organisations in Africa pertain to three different types namely enhanced capacity for CSO reporting to the AU/ACERWC on the African Charter, network building and child friendlier policy and agendas and attitudes.

*Outcome 1: Enhanced capacity among CSOs for the shadow reporting to the AU/ACERWC on the African Charter*

Description:

CSOs in AU member states are invited by AU/ACERWC to send in shadow reports on the progress of the African Charter in their country as supplement to the Government reports.

Relevance:

CSOs feel acknowledged, inspired and strengthened by ACERWC support to submit their shadow report.



Contribution:

ACPF supports ACERWC in this respect with formats, guidelines, training for CSO reporting

*Outcome 2: Network building on Child Rights and Wellbeing reported especially in Kenya, Uganda and Mozambique enhancing coherence in working approach*

Description:

National CSOs and Governments had attended ACPF workshops that accompanied the launch of the ARCW 2011 or attended IPCs especially on inter-country adoption, which brought participants together in open dialogue and enabled networking.

Relevance:

CSOs reported strengthened and better coordinated networking with governments and more coherent public and political agendas on issues tabled in the ARCW (budgeting and accountability) and at IPCs (inter-country adoption) which shows the relevance of the approach.

Contribution:

ACPF in its meetings is bringing together government and civil society partners thus promoting networking both content-wise as well as convening wise.

*Outcome 3: Inspiration and intentions for more effective and coherent child friendly policy*

Description:

The ARCW identifies gaps and compares country's performance on child rights. The report is widely distributed among countries sometimes with concomitant workshops, whereas IPCs and other conferences also deepen issues that are identified in advance as relevant for African countries.

Relevance:

Requests for policy support extended to ACPF as follow up of a workshop but also other references made to the ARCW and IPC reveal its relevance.

Contribution:

ACPF is acknowledged for its evidence based message and advocacy and the contribution it gives to child friendlier public policies.





## 7 CoC Alliance: outcomes, relevance, contribution

### 7.1 Internal level

*Outcome (agenda setting): the communication and coherence within the WLPS programme and internally cross business units in Cordaid has improved.*

Description:

The WLPS lobby and advocacy has developed a more coherent way of working across the business units, which are directly linked to the women, peace and security agenda such as the gender, post-2015 and New Deal discussions.

Relevance:

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to the capabilities of WLPS lobby and advocacy to comply with the objectives stated in the Theory of Change. It is also relevant in terms of time, as it is a response towards changing Dutch financing policies.

Contribution:

Different programmes within Cordaid, next to WLPS lobby and advocacy, share and keep up to date their agendas and positions regarding women, gender and the global policy agendas, evidence based advocacy, research and publications. They contribute to coherence through the cooperation and interaction and sharing, bundling and using input on gender advocacy, the post-2015 agenda, and New Deal advocacy. Strengthened cooperation is further contributed to through writing and sharing policy and position papers, linking the different policy units within Cordaid.

### 7.2 National level, The Netherlands

*Outcome (agenda setting): Partnership with WO=MEN.*

Description:

On the national level in The Netherlands the important partnership is with the Dutch Gender Platform, WO=MEN is considered an outcome. Through this NL based network WLPS provides input to advocate issues in Dutch internal and Dutch international and defence policies. We consider this as an outcome as well as a strategy, as it is important in order to facilitate other outcomes.

Relevance:

This partnership is relevant as it contributes to the objective The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN. WO=MEN is an important actor in thus, and as such this partnership is relevant.

Contribution:

WLPS lobby and advocacy contributes to this partnership in terms of sharing knowledge, bring in critical case studies and research papers.

*Outcome (agenda setting): Influenced the agenda of the NAP 1325 Working Group in the Netherlands.*

Description:

Through its participation in the NAP 1325 Working Group, Cordaid contributes to the lobby focused on implementation of NAP 1325 in The Netherlands. Cordaid, in cooperation with its partners, voiced needs and provided input in the discussions in the NAP 1325 working group in The Netherlands.

Relevance:

This outcome is relevant in terms of contributing to the objective 'The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN' as the Working group is an important actor in the Netherlands when it comes to this process.

Contribution:

Cordaid's role is more or less behind the scenes as a broker, bringing together the important voices on specific issues and gathering information and sharing knowledge from within their own networks and partnerships. Cordaid also played a role as co-coordinator of a lobby group as part of the working group, during the first implementation of the Dutch NAP 1325. In the second Dutch NAP they are now members of the working group on 1325. In addition, WLPS serves as the lead agency between Dutch NGO's in the working group and the Dutch Government to implement the Dutch NAP 1325 project in pilot countries: Middle East North Africa region; Democratic Republic of Congo and Colombia; as well as being co-implementer in Afghanistan. Cordaid's WLPS serves as the lead agency in the partnership between the Dutch NGO and government to implement the Dutch NAP 1325 project in MENA Region, DRC and Colombia; and as co-implementator for the partnership in Afghanistan. Additionally, Cordaid Netherlands manages the Small Pilot Fund NAP1325 from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 'Small Seeds for Big Baobabs'.

*Outcome (Policy Change, Change of Practice): A fund allocation was made of 4 million per year for UNSCR 1325 in the focus countries in cooperation with WO=MEN: Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Middle East North Africa Region*

Description:

NL MFA earmarked EUR 4 million (approximately USD 5.5 million) annually for Dutch civil society collaboration with local NGOs in priority countries. Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Middle East North Africa Region.

Relevance:

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to the effective implementation of NAP 1325 in the abovementioned countries.

Contribution:

WLPS lobby and advocacy was an active actor in the lobby and advocacy for this outcome through its lobby as part of WO=MEN lobby and advocacy. This outcome is both policy influence and changed practice, as in WPS it is also about actually acknowledging that gender is an issue, and bringing this into practice.

*Outcome (Change of Practice): There is more attention for UNSCR resolution 1325 in the NL Ministry of Defence, The NL National Policy and the NL Security and Justice Ministry.*

Description:

NAP 1325 resulted in uptake broader than the NL Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the so-called 'NAP-buzz' reached out to the in the NL Ministry of Defence, The NL National Policy and the NL Security and Justice Ministry where there is more attention for 1325 and women's rights are included and increasingly embedded in protocols, policies and practices.

Relevance:

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to the effective implementation of the UNSCR resolution in different realms of Dutch policy making.

Contribution:

WLPS contributed to this through its lobby and advocacy activities together with WO=MEN, amongst others through the publication of joint policy papers and participation in the NAP 1325 Working Group.

*Outcome (agenda setting): Increases in invitations for meetings, presentations and discussions, informal and formal discussions from Dutch CSOs and NL MFA.*

Description:

WLPS lobby and advocacy participates and is invited to share information and discussions with NL MFA on Women Peace and Security processes and CSO's.

Relevance:

This outcome is relevant in terms contributing to the objectives 'The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN' and 'Integration of women's perspectives and participation in processes of international policies and practices. The NL MFA and CSO's are both essential partnerships in contributing to these objectives'.

Contribution:

The contribution of WLPS consists of sharing knowledge and information, based on content-based research that has been conducted within the WLPS programme. As such it contributes to agenda setting.

### **7.3 National level, partner countries**

*Outcome (agenda setting): Partnerships with CSO's in conflict affected countries*

Description:

The local voice, which is key to WLPS advocacy is integrated through Cordaids in-country partners as well as through partnerships with GNWP and other international NGOs with their specific constituencies and partners in conflict-affected areas. Important examples here are AWN (Afghanistan), working on Transition Monitoring, and bringing their reports up to the national arena's, and the 1325 Coalition and National Network of Women (Colombia) where Cordaid functions as a broker in the process of implementing and localizing 1325.

Relevance:

This outcome is relevant because through investing in and supporting such partnerships at the same time strengthen such women collectives.

Contribution:

WLPS lobby and advocacy puts a lot of effort into facilitating and training members of local women's collectives through workshops, research and publications. The outcome, in fact, is a strategy for achieving common lobby and advocacy objectives at the same time.

*Outcome (agenda setting): NAP 1325 was put on the agenda of the Ministry of Gender in South Sudan*

**Description:**

The Ministry of Gender in South Sudan invited Cordaid to support them in costing their NAP 1325.

**Relevance:**

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to the objective 'The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN'.

**Contribution:**

WLPS lobby and advocacy contributed to agenda setting of the Ministry of gender in South Sudan. WLPS lobby and advocacy participated in a three day conference organized by the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare and EVE Organization with the support of the Joint Donor Team and the Canadian Embassy in Juba. It was discussed the baseline data and the road map for the development and implementation of South Sudan National Action Plan (NAP) 1325: women, peace and security. WLPS lobby and advocacy gave a presentation on Integrating UNSCR 1325 and NAP into the New Deal Implementation. The South Sudanese CSO's participation in the development and implementation of their NAP 1325, especially in ensuring that local women collective's voice concerning the peace and security in their daily life is used as a compass to guide this process.

*Outcome (agenda setting): Further recognition of effects of the conflicts on women in Asia*

**Description:**

WLPS played an important role in the facilitation of women's organizations to do advocacy and to become aware of the effects of conflict on society and their lives specifically.

**Relevance:**

This outcome is relevant because it contributes to the objective 'Increased capacity of women's collectives' as a way of contributing to Women Peace and Security Processes.

**Contribution:**

Facilitation of the Asian advocacy through the Asia Meeting, a regional advocacy strategy meeting about advancing women's leadership for peace and security in Asia's conflict-affected communities. The meeting was held in February 2014 Bangkok, Thailand.

*Outcome (agenda setting) Colombian government is now open to discuss how they can implement UNSCR 1325.*

**Description:**

After a sustained work by Cordaid's partners at national and global level, the Colombian government is now open to discuss how they can implement UNSCR 1325.

**Relevance:**

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to the objective 'The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN'.

**Contribution:**

WLPS lobby and advocacy facilitated that the Colombian network organisation National Network of Women participated in global events and worked on monitoring the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 although Colombia does not have a National Action Plan for that. This brought the UNSCR 1325 on the agenda of the Colombian government.

*Outcome (policy influencing): Women's networks in Bucaramanga (Colombia) have reached agreements with municipal authorities and the police about the implementation of the UNSCR 1325, especially on how to make women feel more safe in their daily environment.*

**Description:**

WLPS lobby and advocacy has worked on different levels in Colombia. It has supported the national and global lobby through the National Network of Women and at the same time has supported and facilitated the constitution and the work of more local and regional networks of women that lobby for and monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at the regional and local level.

**Relevance:**

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to the objective to 'The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN'. At this local level such implementation becomes very concrete and concerns the daily circumstances in which people live. It is also relevant for the objective to increase the capacity of women's collectives.

**Contribution:**

WLPS lobby and advocacy has contributed to this outcome by facilitating trainings and supporting the work of the local women network in Bucaramanga. Indirectly this is also linked to the progress made at the national level.

*Outcome (agenda setting): Young leaders in Libya and occupied Palestinian territories have increased skills and methodologies to monitor their daily safety, implement alternative community approaches to increase the daily safety of women and influence security policies at the macro level.*

**Description:**

Since the end of 2013 Cordaid and Human Security Collective together with 4 local partners have invested in two youth fora enhancing the leadership skills of approximately 50 young community leaders from the West bank, Gaza and Libya. In 2015 the program will be extended to include 25 more young (community) leaders and activists mainly from Libya.

**Relevance:**

The program promotes the collective empowerment, resilience and agency of young women and men most affected by conflict. By doing so, the program also contributes to equal power relations within local communities by building leadership skills of young women and men creating collective ownership on security concerns that affect the daily security within the community with particular attention to the safety of women and girls.

**Contribution:**

the MENA region supported by NAP 1325 program (MENA region), MFS and own funds (Cordaid) In March 2015, a lobby & training advocacy is organized in the Netherlands with 12 young leaders from the Mena program and 14 other youth from other conflict countries (organized together with Human Security Collective and United Network of Young Peacebuilders).



*Outcome (Changed Practice): Women from South Sudan and Colombia are now more involved in processes related to the Peace Process in both countries.*

**Description:**

On the national level of partner countries, the opening of closed spaces has been an important change. Opening space for women participation in peace and security processes in South Sudan, Colombia and Asia where women are increasingly included in peace processes is an outcome we were not able to assess in depth in all countries. In both Colombia and South Sudan WLPS lobby and advocacy has supported the participation of women's collectives in peace processes. The participation of women and inclusion of women's voices is difficult in these national contexts because there is no culture of providing space for women's rights or CSOs. For that reason, other entry points have been used such as focusing on sexual violence in Colombia and the development linked to post 2015 in South Sudan. As a result In South Sudan We consider this a changed practice as although the participation of women in these processes might not have showed visible results yet, it is a changed practice in itself that women participate in peace negotiations.

**Relevance:**

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to the three objectives formulated within in the Theory of Change: 'Integration of women's perspectives and participation in processes of international policies and practices' in terms of setting the stage and creating the possibilities to acquires change in these domains.

**Contribution:**

WLPS has contributed to these processes by facilitating and supporting the involved women's networks and finding the right entry points for getting women involved in these processes. WLPS lobby and advocacy has been involved in the process of organizing South Sudanese women. They have now had several meetings with high level officials from the African Union to advocate their case for involving women in the upcoming peace negotiations. In Colombia, WLPS lobby and advocacy brokers and facilitates the process of implementation of UNSCR in Colombia, a process that is very much related with the peace process.

## **7.4 Regional and global level**

*Outcome (agenda setting): Partnership with GNWP to share knowledge in order to link local needs and international arenas*

**Description:**

Partnerships and networks are important for Cordaid. The most prominent partnership on international level is GNWP. GNWP is a network of women's organizations and women working on women, peace and security issues on local, national and international levels. Their geographical location in New York provides for a good entry point at UN level, integrating local voices in the global policy arena. Together GNWP Cordaid support the advocacy on international level as well as on local level in conflict-affected countries. On international level the support is about strategic linking and learning in partnership with those working closely to the UN system. Networks and partnerships are used to strengthen capacity and share knowledge in order to link local needs and international policy arenas.

Relevance:

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to the three objectives formulated within in the Theory of Change: 1) The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN; 2) Increased capacity of women's collectives and 3) Integration of women's perspectives and participation in processes of international policies and practices, in terms of setting the stage and creating the possibilities to acquires change in these domains.

Contribution:

WLPS contributes to this partnership and to linking global and local levels through providing input at meetings as a collective voice, bringing in Southern partners to the meeting tables on international levels and also linking the international levels with national partners.

*Outcome: Membership EPLO (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office) and partnership with EPLO Working Group on Gender.*

Description:

On regional level, Cordaid also ensures numerous engagements through partnerships. An example is, its membership of the (EPLO). For European level advocacy, WLPS lobby works closely in partnership with EPLO's Working Group on Gender.

Relevance:

Membership and partnering with EPLO and its Working Group on Gender is relevant as it sets the stage for bringing gender in in the Women Peace and Security domain, as such contributing to the objective 'Integration of women's perspectives and participation in processes of international policies and practices'.

Contribution:

WLPS lobby and advocacy contributes to this partnership by bringing in critical cases, based on its content based research.

*Outcome (agenda setting): Cordaid together with GNWP and regional partners will coordinate regional CSO survey in Africa and Asia Pacific as input for UN Global Study.*

Description:

In 2015, the Security Council will convene a High-level Review to assess progress at the global, regional and national levels in implementing the resolution. Women's perspectives continue to be underrepresented in conflict prevention, resolution, protection and peacebuilding without a significant shift in how the resolution is implemented. The Secretary-General has encouraged Member States, regional organizations and United Nations entities to review existing implementation plans and targets ahead of the 2015 High-level Review. In preparation for the 2015 High-level Review, the Secretary-General has commissioned a global study on the implementation of resolution 1325. The study will highlight examples of good practice, implementation gaps and challenges, and priorities for action. The results will be included in the Secretary-General's annual report to the Security Council in 2015 and will be made available to all Member States. The study will also build on the findings of the two high-level studies on women, peace and security undertaken in 2002<sup>1</sup> and lessons learned from the tenth anniversary of resolution 1325 in 2010.

Relevance:

This outcome is relevant as it will provide data that will contribute to more information about the state of the art of the implementation of the UNSCR 1325, as such contributing to the outcome 'The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN'.

Contribution:

WLPS lobby and advocacy contributes to this process through coordinating the survey in Africa and Asia Pacific.

*Outcome (agenda setting): Increases in invitations for meetings, presentations, conferences and discussions, informal and formal discussions from CSOs, Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), Regional Intergovernmental Organizations (RIGOs) and regional or national policy institutions.*

Description:

The increase of invitations is reflected from the past two years but builds on the strong relations and credible voice WLPS lobby has built for itself over the past years previous to the MFS II period. The relations built, the content developed and spread is a long term process leading step by step to progress. The stakeholders, partners and targeted policy makers react by providing space for the WLPS lobby and advocacy officer as a resource person, and as such opportunities are created to influence the public debate. There has been an increase of invitations to meetings where the travel costs are expensed. Cordaid WLPS is thus recognized as a credible voice and partner, leading to agenda setting beyond the stakeholders targeted. Three sub outcomes can be distinguished here:

- Invitations to NATO meetings on specific issues and occasions (Afghanistan Transition Monitoring;
- Invitations to UN meetings (UNWOMEN Global Technical Review 2013; formal and informal closed meetings).
- Input on Afghanistan Transition Monitoring at NATO meetings and as such informed the NATO agenda setting

Relevance:

This outcome and its suboutcomes is especially relevant to the objectives to effectively implement UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN and to integrate women's perspectives and participation in processes of international policies and practices. Through these meetings issues of WPS become part of the target's agendas.

Contribution:

WLPS lobby and advocacy has contributed to the process of being invited by presenting itself and its work in a thoughtful and serious manner. During meetings WLPS lobby and advocacy contributes by bringing critical cases in based on content based research and publications.

*Outcome (agenda setting): Space for partners' voices by bringing in partners in meetings at global (UNWOMEN Global Technical Review; side meetings during the CSW58 and 1325 Weeks in New York in 2013 and 2014 co-hosted by various missions such as Finland, Denmark, Swiss) and on regional levels (Kenya CSO Meeting 2013 hosted by UNWOMEN; Afghanistan Transition Monitoring).*

**Description:**

The linking between the local and global proves to be crucial and central to Cordaid's work. In an e-mail conversation between NATO and Cordaid, it comes to the fore that part of the input were the critical lessons learned on these thematic issues by Cordaid and partners as well as critical reflection on the NATO policies and practices in this light. There are two sub outcomes to this outcome worth mentioning:

- Input during the Africa Regional Meeting hosted by UN Women in Kenya
- Linking of national level, in this case transition monitoring in Afghanistan through networks and partners on the ground in Afghanistan, and international arena's (NATO)

**Relevance:**

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to two objectives at the same time: 1) The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN and 2) Increased capacity of women's collectives. As such it contributes to the way WLPS see change happens, by bringing local and global level together.

**Contribution:**

WLPS lobby and advocacy is part of the 'Planning Committee' to prepare the Global Technical Review in November 2013 on Women Peace and Security. Thanks to their content based policy and research reports, their reputation and their contacts, Cordaid and its partners (especially Afghan Women Network, AWN, partner from Afghanistan, involved in Transition Monitoring) have been asked to participate in a number of high level meetings in Brussels, Berlin, New York and Belgrade (2013 and 2014) to speak about women, peace and security, implementation issues UNSCR 1325, and the transition monitoring and the role of women in Afghanistan.

*Outcome (agenda setting): WLPS facilitated the visit of Mari Skare at the national Consultation meeting in Kabul.*

**Description:**

This outcome was reached as part of the process in Afghanistan, resulting in WLPS facilitating the former Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security of NATO, Mari Skare, at the National Consultation meeting in Kabul, organized by AWN.

**Relevance:**

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to strengthening women's collectives in Afghanistan on the one hand, and makes the local voice visible and audible in the global realm on the other.

**Contribution:**

WLPS lobby and advocacy contributed to this process as a broker: facilitating and supporting the voice of Afghan women, and having the network with the NATO, and by bringing these two together. This was done, in order to close the circle of accountability, bringing in an international policy maker to meet directly with WLPS partners and their constituencies.

*Outcome (agenda setting): opening closed spaces of the NATO.*

**Description:**

Various governmental and CS voices have confirmed this closed institution is changing. WLPS lobby and advocacy has been the most active in actually getting around the table with NATO.

**Relevance:**

This outcome is relevant in relation to objective to 'Integrate women's perspectives and participation in processes of international policies and practices'. Through its participation in open and closed meetings of the NATO, WLPS lobby and advocacy contributes to shape the agenda of the NATO.

**Contribution:**

WLPS lobby and advocacy contributes to opening these spaces by providing critical cases and trustworthy information, based on content based research and experience in the field of WPS. Input in discussions at open and closed meetings and workshops are based on research and own publications on the issue.

*Outcome (policy influencing) Cordaid was invited to provide input for a series of workshops to develop an independent Scorecard to monitor how NATO implements UNSCR 1325.*

**Description:**

The 1325 NATO Scorecard is intended as an educational tool and will focus on how best to increase implementation and learn from the experiences of others. WLPS lobby and advocacy participated in a NATO-supported project on developing a NATO 1325 scorecard. WLPS lobby and advocacy contribution to this process has resulted in being invited to and being resource person in a follow up meeting on the NATO 1325 Score Card project in Washington. The Score Card is to be developed in order to monitor how NATO implemented UNSCR 1325 and is coordinated by Women In International Security (WIIS) and Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.

**Relevance:**

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to the objective of 'The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN', in terms of contributing to NATO policies in the realm of WPS.

**Contribution:**

The critical input that WLPS lobby and advocacy provided during two workshops (the third workshop was out of scope of this evaluation) was integrated. WLPS participated in the workshops that brought together academics, policy makers, and experts from military and civilian administrations. The first workshop was held in Belgrade May 2014, gathering basic information and exchange best practices and lessons learned with respect to UNSCR 1325 implementation in NATO member and partner nations. The second workshop was in September 2014 in Washington, DC, contrasting and comparing existing evaluation mechanisms and indicators and focus on the development of the Scorecard methodology. The third workshop will be held in Brussels at the end of 2014 or early 2015 and it will present the 1325 NATO Scorecard to a broad public.

*Outcome (agenda setting): awareness raised on the issues around the financing and implementation of NAP's 1325 and space created to further the discussions on the issues raised in different policy circles*

Description:

The research reports by Cordaid and its partners, i.e. the research report on 'Financing for implementation of National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325' is used for internal agenda setting and policy making by policy makers such as UNWOMEN, UK NAP 1325, Swiss NAP 1325 process and is the reason for many of the invitations for presentations by multiple stakeholders such as EU, NATO, UNWOMEN and CSO organizations. Other CSOs working on NAP's for 1325, such as UK Women's Network, have taken up Cordaid's research and recommendations on financing.

Relevance:

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to the objective 'The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN', especially in terms of the financing at the global level.

Contribution:

WLPS has contributed to this outcome mostly through its publication of the report 'Financing for implementation of National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325'. This has been widely used for agenda setting. On the basis of this report WLPS lobby and advocacy has also received numerous invitations to participate in and as such contribute to discussions regarding the theme.

*Outcome (agenda setting): The integration and uptake of the financing issue within UNWOMEN internally, to join Cordaid in leading a Financing Discussion Group and promote the establishment of a Global Acceleration Fund on WPS.*

Description:

The full implementation of UNSCR 1325 member states must integrate these resolutions into regional and national policies and programmes to ensure that implementation is systematic, sustainable, and results-driven. This integration not only demands coherence in policy and political will, but adequate financial support and other resources as well. These issues are discussed during the This meeting brought together government officials (NL, Finland, Nepal, Burundi, Philippines among others); UNWOMEN, independent experts and consultants on the issues discussed, evaluation experts and CSO representatives from all over the world. Spin-offs:

- The Global Acceleration Fund, outside the scope of this evaluation, was implemented in October 2014.
- The UN Secretary General included the Financing Discussion Group initiative and Cordaid's name in the report to the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security

Relevance:

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to the agenda setting related to The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN.

Contribution:

WLPS lobby and advocacy provided input as one of the facilitators and resource persons during the UNWOMEN Global Technical Review on WPS resolutions in November 2013.

*Outcome (agenda setting): invitations to provide input and a closed door meeting with a number of delegations during the CSW58 week*

**Description:**

Together with UN Women, Cordaid co-hosted a high level Panel Discussion during CSW 58<sup>th</sup> Session in March 2014. Such meetings create opportunities and space for influencing and agenda setting and the meeting put women, peace and security on the agenda of the representatives. This resulted in further invitations to provide input in closed door meetings with a number of delegations during the CSW58 week.

**Relevance:**

This outcome is relevant in terms of contributing to the objective 'The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN'.

**Contribution:**

WLPS lobby and advocacy contributed to these meetings by bringing in experiences and case studies in the realm of UNSCR 1325 and as such shape the agenda of the representatives present at the meetings.

*Outcome (agenda setting): Integrating gender perspectives within the New Deal processes.*

**Description:**

The New Deal offers an important opportunity to advance women, peace and security issues. WLPS raised awareness on integrating gender into the New Deal. This has led to proposals such as the 'Fragility Assessment' conducted by the government, which will then result in the 'compacts', the country's national plan which will be supported by their partner/donor governments. Fragility assessments are intended as a tool that can be used by governments to foster a constructive dialogue across different ministries and civil society, and with some input from donor representatives.

**Relevance:**

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to the objective 'Integration of women's perspectives and participation in processes of international policies and practices'.

**Contribution:**

WLPS lobby and advocacy has contributed to this process through providing input on a meeting in Juba in 2012 for a meeting with the steering committee of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State building (IDPS) on the New Deal. WLPS further contributes to the integration of gender in the New Deal through working closely with the IDPS and the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS). Additionally, the integration of gender is discussed during meetings, with input from WLPS lobby and advocacy in New York during the CSW57 week in 2013 in a side event at the Netherlands Mission to the UN and also during the CSW58 week in 2014 in cooperation with the Danish Government. An important contribution has been the policy paper 'integrating gender into the new deal for engagement in fragile states'.

*Outcome (agenda setting): Cordaid WLPS collaborates with ICAN (International Civil Society Action Network), UN Women and others in the development of a toolkit that will be used by relevant parties, to ensure a 'Better Peace'.*

Description:

WLPS was invited to ICAN Virginia International Peace symposium, organised by ICAN together with various UN agencies, government representatives and women's groups, including those from South Sudan and Afghanistan. Here it was discussed how to realise more inclusive peace and mediation processes. To be able to realise this, an open source tool, the "Better Peace Tool", as an endorsed standard of inclusive peace-making, will be developed.

Relevance:

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to two objectives that are part of the theory of change: 'Increased capacity of women's collectives' and the 'Integration of women's perspectives and participation in processes of international policies and practices'.

Contribution:

At the International Peace Symposium, WLPS facilitated two sessions, combining lobby and capacity building. WLPS lobby and advocacy is now involved in the development of the toolkit, bringing in expertise and networks from its own role in such prior processes.

*Outcome (agenda setting) WLPS lobby and advocacy influenced the agenda setting of the post 2015-agenda*

Description:

The post-2015 process is a predominantly global policy process on which many CSOs are working to have issues included. This encompasses including women, peace and security and is about the inclusion of women in the new global agenda post-2015. The work of the post-2015 agenda is integrated in the work conducted on the New Deal, the NATO and the UNSCR 1325.

Relevance:

This outcomes related to the post-2015 agenda, and possible spin-offs of these outcomes in the future are relevant because they contribute to the objective Integration of women's perspectives and participation in processes of international policies and practices''.

Contribution:

The post-2015 discussions are integrated into the presentations, meetings and discussions at global level during the Gender week in 2013 and 2014 and during the UNSCR 1325 week in 2013. Cordaid seeks to influence the post-2015 agenda through their cooperation with MFA of different countries. This is done through linking the Post 2015 framework with UNSCR 1325 and the New Deal for Engagement in fragile States. High level Side Events were organized during CSW Session and UNSCR 1325 Anniversary in New York and the World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington D.C. Coordination is also done with other Dutch organizations and the Netherlands government, through contributing to the Dutch CSO Position Paper on "Challenges and achievements in the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals for women and girls". For example WLPS lobby and advocacy has contributed to agenda setting regarding the post-2015 agenda through:

- WLPS was invited to contribute to the Africa Regional Meeting hosted by UNWOMEN on gender in post-2015 in 2013 and also to the Swiss Peace meeting on gender in post-2015 in Zurich in 2013.
- WLPS lobby and advocacy works together with Swiss and Danish MFA's in terms of developing content on the post-2015 agenda presentations and regular meetings with targets such as UN Women and national governments.



- Recommendations of Netherlands civil society ‘Challenges and achievements in the implementation of the MDGs for women and girls. Setting the agenda for post 2015’.

*Outcome (policy influencing): The Multi Stakeholder Financing Mechanism (MFM) is becoming part of the policy discussions and the policies at international and national levels.*

**Description:**

CSOs, such as UK, GAP and Womankind adhere to the MFM and changed their NAP accordingly. Additionally, the missions and CSOs also UNWOMEN takes up the issue during the global review and includes it as a priority result area in their report and actions following the Global Technical Review in November 2013 (see case study and contribution analysis).

**Relevance:**

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to effective implementation of the UNSCR 1325 in the global domain.

**Contribution:**

MFM research is presented numerous times in side-events in cooperation with missions such as Netherlands, Finland and Switzerland at the global level around NAP 1325 week, CSW processes as well as in the Global Review of UNWOMEN in 2013.

*Outcome (policy influencing): The Secretary-General Report to the Security Council in September 2014 mentions implementation and financing of UNSCR 1325 as an issue while also mentioning the Cordaid co-lead initiative of the formation of a global discussion group on financing.*

**Description:**

Cordaid WLPS was engaged with UNWOMEN and GNWP in the development of the Secretary-General Report to the Security Council in September 2014. At the international level it can be considered a change of practice that UN Women is now taking the co-leadership position in facilitating the Financing Discussion Group WPS (Global Acceleration Instrument WPS).

**Relevance:**

This outcome is relevant as it contributes to the objective of WLPS lobby and advocacy to ‘The effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on national and global levels: focusing on pilot conflict-affected countries, NL and UN’.

**Contribution:**

Cordaid WLPS was engaged with UNWOMEN and GNWP in the development of the Secretary-General Report to the Security Council in September 2014.

*Outcome (policy influencing): NATO policy includes UNSCR 1325 in its policy.*

**Description:**

Since 2013 WLPS lobby and advocacy has been active in the process of integrating the UNSCR 1325 resolution in the work of the NATO. Although this has mainly focused on Afghanistan, it should be considered as a broader process of integrating women’s perspectives in security issues. This outcome is closely related to the outcomes in the result area of Transition Monitoring in Afghanistan.

**Contribution:**

In 2013 (May) the *Report Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the conduct of NATO led operations and missions* was published. In the foregoing process, WLPS participated in roundtables and made recommendations. One year later, WLPS participated in a workshop *UNSCR 1325 and NATO Project – Gender Mainstreaming: Indicators for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325*.



## 8 Freedom From Fear Alliance: outcomes, relevance, contribution

Below is an overview of the outcomes for Programme IV of the Freedom from Fear as observed and to various levels verified and substantiated during the evaluation. The programme is carried out worldwide. Regions and programmes have reported over 300 outcomes over the evaluated period, and these have been reported by dozens of organizations. For reasons of feasibility and legibility, we have here chosen to integrate outcomes as we have done in the Alliance report (chapter 15). The overview is not exhaustive and does not discuss outcomes in detail, but rather shows the nature of outcomes as reported for the evaluated programme, highlighting outcomes deemed of high significance by GPPAC. Outcomes are described in clusters, by priority result area, providing a short description of outcomes as also a brief analysis of their relevance and the ways in which GPPAC has contributed to outcomes, as structure within which outcomes were achieved (often by organisations that are GPPAC members but also operate in their own right).

### 8.1 Agenda Setting

*Outcome: Internal network strengthening*

Description:

- Improvement of formal network structures: governance structures and collaboration structures are further put in place and strengthened. This includes, for example: the role and performance of the Programme Steering Committee; the development and performance of Working Groups that functions as hubs for interaction and collaboration on GPPAC thematic priorities; a community of Gender focal points; the establishment of an advocacy Liaison at the UN; the development of the Peace Portal, set up to function as a hub for information exchange and collaboration within the network.
- Improvement of informal network structures: organizational culture is further developed such as a shared understanding on the leading role of regional priorities; Global Secretariat as supportive and facilitative key node in the network, facilitating the regional members; the development and maintenance of working relations across involved staff and members.
- Many regions report as outcomes of their annual RSG meetings the development and endorsement of Regional Action Agenda's and work plans.

Relevance:

The relevance of the outcome cluster is the further strengthening of the network structures to the end of strengthening the network, strengthening collaboration and enhancing a civil society lead network driven by regional members and priorities.

Contribution:

From within the network and through management and support by the Global Secretariat, formal and informal network structures were strengthened or (further) developed through network wide initiatives and discussions, as also through collaboration between and amongst some of regions and GS staff. Steps have been taken to improve regional collaboration, but the fact remains that some regions are weaker than others. Reasons for this are in some cases beyond GPPAC's control, such as the financial and political conditions under which civil society in specific regions need to operate.

### *Outcome: Interaction with Targets*

#### Description:

- Gender, in particular advancement and implementation of UNSCR 1325 (state targets; RIGOs; UN)
- Human security discussions, publications and dialogue with targets in for example: Pacific Islands Forum – PIFS; Mali; and at the UN.
- Infrastructures for Peace (targets in West-Africa including ECOWAS, Kyrgyzstan, UN, OSCE)
- Peace education (practitioners; national education institutions and systems; several international organizations); dialogue and mediation (UN, state targets)
- Civil-Military interactions (UN, CCOE, state targets)
- RIGO capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding (RIGOS including ECOWAS, EEAS, ASEAN, OAS, LAS, PIFS)
- Policies ensuring protection of civil society space in the context of repressive counterterrorism measures (UN).
- GPPAC SEA engages with regional/local targets in the Mindanao peace process, dialogue set up.
- GPPAC SEA provided a role in the conflict between Malaysia and Sulu in 2013.
- Civil society networking in order to contribute to regional security in Northeast Asia, in particular with regard to relations with DPRK (GPPAC Northeast Asia);
- Track 2 (recently developed into track 1.5) dialogue following the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict (GPPAC Caucasus)
- Track 2 dialogue on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (GPPAC Caucasus).
- Latin America member CRIES' and GPPAC Pacific/FemlinkPacific's engagements with the UN.
- GPPAC SEA engages with ASEAN on UNSCR 1325.

#### Relevance:

The attained outcomes contribute to shaping more inclusive and people-centred peacebuilding and conflict prevention practice.

#### Contribution:

Linking and convening towards shaping more inclusive and people-centred peacebuilding and conflict prevention practice is central to GPPAC's way of working. GPPAC has succeeded in bringing about interactions and often long-term collaborations with a range of targets and partners, on the full range of themes identified in the Theory of Change. Interactions mostly take the form of consultation, dialogue and, in some cases, collaboration in the context of policy development, training and conflict prevention and peacebuilding practices such as dialogue and mediation, peace education and preventive action. Many of the outcomes were attained at regional level, often with support from the Global Secretariat. At global level, the Global Secretariat has had a more leading role. In some cases, the contribution of GPPAC, as a network, to outcomes achieved by members is less evident than in others.

### *Outcome: Learning and knowledge sharing*

#### Description:

- Members acknowledge forms of support by the Global Secretariat, including organizational support, technical expertise, exchange of knowledge and assistance in the obtaining of funding.
- Cross-regional support, and the usefulness of GPPAC-produced knowledge and tools is acknowledged. Members speak of learning and knowledge sharing in different ways. Learning through meeting and exchanging with other GPPAC members.
- Working Group exchanges, sharing and learning through collective GPPAC lead and inspired activities: participation and organization of workshops; engagement with targets; development of tools and workbooks on e.g. peace education; network produced content such as GPPAC ALERT and Conflict Analysis Field Guide; Mediation and Dialogue; and continuous communication cross members and cross regions, via skype.
- Solidarity missions in South East Asia, exchanges through internships and missions resulted in learning and the development and establishment of new peace networks in South Thailand and Kachin State/Burma/Myanmar.
- Inspired by GPPAC SEA mission to Myanmar a women's network was established in Myanmar, WIN Peace.
- The Peace Portal led to further exchanges and interactions amongst members.

#### Relevance:

Learning and sharing information is key to the network dynamics and mentioned often in the interviews with members and staff. Learning and sharing information contributes to the advancement of regional priorities and supports the networked development of conflict prevention and peacebuilding tools, publications, practices, ideas and statements, and combines strengths.

#### Contribution:

The learning and sharing of information are facilitated and supported by GPPAC. Within GPPAC, it has been noted that the working groups feed into the activities of the regions to a degree that is more limited than was hoped. At the same time, much learning may have been of a tacit and multifaceted nature that cannot reasonably be expected to find direct reflection in planned activities and outcomes. In addition, learning has also taken place through direct involvement of Global Secretariat staff with regional programmes and activities, involving technical and organizational support as also training.

### *Outcome: Development of positions and strategies through networking*

#### Description:

- Linking regional and global level processes: progress in operationalization of key concepts and objectives, clearer articulation of positions and recommendations within the network.
- Human Security as a concept and an issue to pursue carries legitimacy in the network as it has been developed through deliberation in the GPPAC structure.
- On regional levels: production and use of GPPAC network produced content such as: Conflict Analysis Field Guide, GPPAC media training manual, GPPAC media training, GPPAC ALERT, Peace education guide and manual.
- At the global level regional activity increased over the evaluated period, although it remains relatively limited as compared to stated ambitions. For some regional members, UN engagement is relatively disconnected from regional priorities and processes.

- The operationalization and translation into action of objectives by taking up specific issues in the production of advocacy materials and reports. For example: a policy note on the inclusion of a peace and stability objective in the Post-2015 development goals; a position paper and a scoping study on the New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States; a position paper and a conference report on human security.
- In the recent past, higher regional involvement was achieved in the context of human security advocacy. An extensive research-based report, called, 'Empowerment and Protection. Stories of Human Security', brings together local perspectives on human security from members around the world, integrated and translated into a set of recommendations towards international, state and other actors.
- The online campaign 'Human Security First', brings together videos and photos stressing the diverse meanings of human security in different contexts, directly involves regions and various videos and photos are added.

Relevance:

Development of positions and strategies is a part of the network dynamics in order to advance effective strategies for inclusive conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes. It contributes to development of conflict prevention and peacebuilding tools, publications practices, ideas and statements to work with in specific contexts, adapted when necessary

Contribution:

We should note that GPPAC's focus is often not on advancing specific positions, but rather on advancing people-centred peacebuilding or conflict prevention practices as such. Especially in efforts led by the Global Secretariat, the key message has been towards advancement of a normative framework centring on inclusiveness, advancing openness to 'local voices' and awareness of their prime importance, through positions and recommendations on this and by embodiment of the message embedded in the global network. This message is about inclusiveness embracing the diversity of the field and stakeholders involved and is not expressed by a clearly delineated key message.

*Outcome: Inclusion of CSOs in peacebuilding and conflict prevention processes*

Description:

- GPPAC has contributed to inclusive conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes on different GPPAC themes. To provide some examples: the Central Asia region has advanced Infrastructures for Peace (I4P) working with the state of Kyrgyzstan, and the Western Balkans has advanced tools and recommendations on Peace Education, collaborating with state institutions.
- A number of regions succeeded at advancing positions, tools or recommendations at the level of RIGOs, including ASEAN, ECOWAS, EEAS, PIFS and LAS.
- In 2013-2014, the Executive Director (Gender Liaison) and Programme Director (Regional Liaison Officer) of FemlinkPacific have been actively inputting into the discussions related to Human Security and materials and resources have been shared with the Ministry of Defence for them to take into account during the development of Fiji's National Human Security Framework.
- Regions and regional members have advanced positions and recommendations in cooperation with regional offices of UNDP in: West Africa, Pacific, Latin America, Caribbean; and at the UN General Assembly by WANEP West Africa and FemlinkPacific.

- GPPAC has contributed to opening spaces for civil society by linking regional actors with targets previously inaccessible, or less accessible, to members. Examples include prominent instances, like the invitation of Oulie Keita of GPPAC West Africa to speak at a UNGA debate on Human Security and assigning a civil society servant at the League of Arab States as a direct result of lobbying and relation building by GPPAC with key decision makers of LAS since 2011.
- The more invisible linking that takes place between regional members and a range of different spaces that regional members obtain access to through GPPAC, more specifically through the efforts and contacts of Global Secretariat Staff and the Working Groups.
- In 2013, GPPAC conducted a Training of Trainers on Conflict Analysis for the group of analysts and monitoring experts of the office of OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Having valued GPPAC's conflict analysis framework, as well as its training capacity OCSE HCNM office requested follow-up in-country trainings for their local experts. Building on the successful training, the OCSE office in Vienna requested GPPAC to conduct training on conflict analysis for OSCE's during their Annual Early Warning Focal Point meeting. Additionally, as a result of closer collaboration with OSCE, the GPPAC Regional Representative for Western Balkans, and the Director of Nansen Dialogue Centre in Montenegro was invited to attend OCSE's Regional Early Warning Focal Point meeting in Belgrade in 2014
- GPPAC also reports having contributed to a number of formal or informal changes that increase inclusiveness of previously closed decision making spaces (i.e., CSOs, their networks, and their constituents' ability to participate in decision making has increased). Having lobbied (together with others including EPLO and PAX) for the League of Arab States' opening up to civil society, GPPAC reports that, as part of an internal restructuring process at the League of Arab States and as a way to underline the importance of civil society in the current political context in the region, the Secretary General of the LAS appointed a special envoy for civil society. At the same time, a new director of the department of civil society was also appointed. Subsequently, the LAS Secretariat and GPPAC have worked closely together in the establishment of a civil society liaison to the LAS. This can be seen as a major step for the League, so far known as an institution with little openness to civil society.
- The Japanese and South Korean Governments began to develop their respective National Action Plans on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace & Security in 2013, and GPPAC members have been centrally involved in developing and coordinating relevant civil society recommendations; in turn, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of each country have launched consultation processes with civil society (including GPPAC), representing the recognition of the importance of civil society input and participation, and with some recommendations taken up in the drafting and monitoring process. In South Korea, the Government announced the first draft of its NAP on UNSCR 1325 in January 2013. Until then no civil society consultation had taken place; following this a civil society 1325 Network was launched and in late January the first consultation roundtable took place. This network continued to make numerous recommendations to the Government, including for example the establishment of the high-level governmental and civil society consultative body for developing the NAP, which was later realised.
- Regions and regional members have advanced positions, tools and recommendations in contexts beyond (inter)governmental organizations, most prominently through Track 2 diplomacy initiatives, through multi-stakeholder fora such as conferences, and through working with schools and training institutions in Caucasus, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, Central-Asia.



Relevance:

The achieved outcomes are relevant considering the central aim of GPPAC: inclusion of civil society in peacebuilding and conflict prevention processes. The achieved interactions with targets open doors for agenda setting and policy influencing and change of practices. Relevant are the creation of space for CS to provide input, to discuss and dialogue but also to mediate and provide input in policy processes in order to help develop and shape practice-informed policy.

Contribution:

Many outcomes here were attained by regional members; GPPAC has often contributed to such outcomes by providing technical and financial support, supporting and facilitating cross-regional exchanges and the development of tools and practices, networked infrastructure, contacts in regional and global policy arenas and learning processes. Interaction within the network has in some cases, contributed to the development of positions, tools and recommendations. Interactions to create space for civil society at global level are largely led by Global Secretariat staff. Staff members have sought to build relations with a set of UN institutions for the advancement of elements of GPPAC's global level agenda, most prominently the advancement of human security and, relatedly, the inclusion of peace and stability into the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. In this advocacy, member involvement has been sought and advanced, but this has been more limited than hoped for; the final year of the evaluated period shows some improvement on this front, with relatively more regional members collaborating and interaction towards advocacy at UN level.

*Outcome: Partnerships*

Description:

- Collaboration between GPPAC network and its targets in track-2 processes: Venezuela, Latin America, Caribbean, Kyrgyzstan, North Korea; but also with UNDP BCPR in a project on infrastructures for peace and with 5 regional offices.
- Increasing collaborations with other civil society organisations and networks working on similar issues to combine strengths: examples are collaborations with AfP; EPLO; QUNO; Cordaid; WFM; Saferworld.
- GPPAC has also collaborated with other CSOs in specific policy processes, for example GPPAC North America, in partnership with other CSOs, targeted the Mexican government on legislation for the protection of Human Right Defenders and Journalists. Other examples include advocacy towards the League of Arab States led by GPPAC and involving PAX, EPLO and GPPAC Middle East and North Africa and other CSOs; GPPAC's joint advocacy with a range of other CSOs towards the inclusion of a peace and stability goal in the post-2015 sustainable development goals.

Relevance:

Collaborations have been relevant in that they combined strengths and increase outreach, contributed to sharing of experiences and development of articulated voices for civil society.

Contribution:

GPPAC has contributed to the development of partnerships through Global Secretariat leadership, as also through linking and convening with other organisations and members, as also, in some cases, technical and organisational support to members. In track-2 processes, the provision of the relatively 'neutral' GPPAC umbrella is reported to have contributed to members' standing and legitimacy in

regional and national contexts. Interactions to create space and cooperation for civil society at global level were largely led by Global Secretariat staff and a few prominent regional members.

*Outcome: Visibility and engagement*

Description:

- GPPAC reports numerous reactions by targets to their work. These reactions are in most cases not in the form of public endorsement or other forms of public reaction to activities. In most cases, these reactions have taken the forms that match GPPAC's practice of engaging with targets through collaborative forms of interaction. Moreover, it is in the course of engagement that reactions are registered, and thus cannot be seen as separate from these processes. Members and global Secretariat staff report targets' expressions of interest in GPPAC, development of access to targets, in the form of invitations for consultation, to provide trainings, or to give presentations encouragements to further engagements.
- In a number of instances, members report that their input in peacebuilding and conflict prevention processes is being acknowledged and taken seriously.
- GPPAC has developed Alliance-like collaborations with targets, as with the UN Human Security Unit.
- Organisations build on their access, reputation and capacities built outside of GPPAC, with GPPAC sometimes having a supportive role. In some cases, this also involves interaction at global level. Examples here include the invitation of Sharon Bhagwan Rolls (Regional Representative of GPPAC Pacific and director of FemlinkPacific) being invited to speak at the UN General Assembly Thematic Debate 'Ensuring Stable and Peaceful Societies'.
- Recognition at international levels, including for example: the invitations of GPPAC member from West Africa, Oulie Keita, to speak at a UN General Assembly Debate on human security; the mentioning of GPPAC's work on human security in the third UN Secretary General (UNSG)'s report on Human Security; agreement with UNITAR to officially partner with GPPAC to produce an SSR e-learning curriculum on the UN Learning Portal; GPPAC received an official invitation to do a training session for the Dutch Ministry of Defence staff that will participate in the UN Mission to Mali – MINUSMA on civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).
- Recognition of the significance of such relations: The UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (the inter-agency programme of the United Nations, mandated to promote and develop constructive relations between the UN and CSOs), stressed how the two GPPAC-affiliated individuals who spoke at UNGA debates in 2014 through the agency's mediation, offered a valuable contribution. The officer stressed this to be exactly because of their ability to speak from their connection to local communities and from a constructive stance. For this officer, who did not know about GPPAC until then, these contributions showed GPPAC's practice of empowering locally grounded voices and as such a clear added value of GPPAC in the world of peacebuilding and conflict prevention, encouraging further involvement of GPPAC by her agency.
- Recognition of the significance of the relations: The Officer-in-Charge of a UN body that GPPAC has been working with highly commended GPPAC as special and valuable for its capacity not only to bring forward and give access to voices on the ground, but also for having 'as its whole purpose' the creation of constructive relations, both horizontally and vertically; 'a rare if not unique way of working in a context where INGOs generally work with 'local' partners on project basis'.

- Occasionally, members report having found and worked with a ‘champion’ for a cause, in a policy process.
- Members of GPPAC have also reported obtaining more standing or legitimacy in their work because of their association with GPPAC, as a global network. Reactions are not always tangible and often members are, self-evidently, not in a position to present evidence to back up their claims.
- The two campaigns Breaking the Nuclear Chain and Human Security First [the Human Security First campaign has 1372 likes on Facebook; 258 followers on Twitter; the Breaking the Nuclear Chain campaign has 3050 likes on Facebook and 859 followers on Twitter (at the time of the writing of this report)].
- GPPAC has sought visibility and public support for the network and its goals through the public sphere through mainstream and alternative media. Some outreach is seen through newspaper articles and a BBC world service radio interview, all on specific issues that GPPAC has sought to advance its position and recommendations on. Several articles were published in the Global Observatory, an online journal of the International Peace Institute. Relatively substantial coverage in mainstream media was achieved by GPPAC Northeast Asia, focusing on regional conflict. Some further coverage was achieved by other regional members, again focusing on regional issues. In many of these publications, GPPAC is not mentioned or promoted. The emphasis is on engaging with media in order to advance conflict prevention and peacebuilding, not the GPPAC brand. Further media coverage was attained through alternative media, most prominently Pressenza, an international news agency dedicated to news about peace and nonviolence. This has been largely coordinated by the Global Secretariat, but has consistently involved regional members, their work and focusing on members’ regional priorities.

Relevance:

Recognition of GPPAC (e.g. as a global network offering locally grounded voices), and access to these voices that is supported by such recognition, are relevant for the furthering of the inclusive conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes that GPPAC seeks to advance.

Contribution:

GPPAC has contributed to visibility and engagement by advancing its image of a global network offering truly locally grounded voices, advancing the legitimacy of GPPAC and advancing members’ access to peacebuilding and conflict prevention arenas through the network and its relations, and the linking and convening that especially the Global Secretariat has worked towards.

## **8.2 Policy influencing**

Description:

- GPPAC West Africa reports having advanced conflict prevention infrastructure and mechanisms in West Africa through collaboration with other stakeholders in the region, most prominently ECOWAS. These collaborations have evolved around WANEP’s work on Early Warning and Early Response.
- GPPAC North America reports having contributed to change in the area of law protection for human rights defenders in Mexico. The contribution was through lobbying together with other CSOs.
- GPPAC Central Asia reports having contributed to the development of Infrastructures for Peace in Kyrgyzstan, in collaboration with the Regional Secretariat, FTI, UNDP’s Programme’s

office in Kyrgyzstan and GPPAC. More concretely, outcomes contributed to the establishment of a State Agency on Local-Self Government and Interethnic Relations, to respond to peace and conflict processes in Kyrgyzstan. The mandate of the Agency is the implementation of strategies and programmes on LSG development and interethnic relations and the cooperation with civil society organisations on peacebuilding initiatives.

- GPPAC Pacific reports having contributed to the development of a Human Security Framework for The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (this is a RIGO). The aim of the framework is to provide a clear common foundation and strategic guidance to Forum Island Countries, its Secretariat and other stakeholders for improving the understanding, planning and implementation of human security approaches peace and development initiatives in the Pacific context. Through long-term engagement, GPPAC Pacific reports it has contributed to the Secretariat's adoption of the Framework as well as elements of its content.
- Several regions report having successfully advanced peace education policies of schools, ministries and other institutions in the countries in which they are active: Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Western Balkans.
- The points made by GPPAC North America's Regional secretariat included in a Majority Staff Report of the US Senate on Judicial and Police Reforms in Mexico.
- The inclusion of GPPAC frames in three UN reports (most prominently the third UN Secretary General (UNSG)'s report on Human Security).
- The employment of a human security approach by a leading official of the League of Arab states, seen as at least partly an outcome of GPPAC advocacy by staff that has engaged with this organisation.
- In the Great Lakes Project influence is reported with regards to the inclusion of content on linking youth unemployment with peace and security in a draft declaration by ICGLR, an intergovernmental organisation around the Great Lakes.
- The public endorsement of Chile's Mission to the UN of GPPAC's Human Security campaign at an UNGA thematic debate on Human Security.

#### Relevance:

Outcomes in this priority result area are limited, compared to the ambitions stated in GPPAC's Theory of Change, including: 'targets (UN, RIGOs, State actors) adopt local CSO's recommendations in decision making and conflict prevention and policies' and 'targets (UN, RIGOs, State actors), develop standards for effective coordination and government engagement for preventing conflicts'. At the same time, it should be noted that these ambitions are very broadly formulated, and understood to be long-term affairs that GPPAC can contribute to rather than achieve. Nevertheless, limits stand out not only in terms of magnitude, but also in terms of the uneven distribution of success. Seven regions report demonstrable changes by targets, and only four of these report outcomes that clearly speak to the stated ambitions. It is noteworthy here that two of the regions reporting these outcomes exist as networks independent from GPPAC (FemlinkPacific (Regional Secretariat of GPPAC Pacific) and WANEP (equals GPPAC West Africa), with GPPAC having a supporting role. These regions largely advocate by their own content and achieved credibility as being part of their own organizational work scope and other networks they are a part of, rather than that of GPPAC per se – even if working with GPPAC has a clearly supportive role in both cases.

The relevance framing being taken up by targets has been limited to the degree that there is as yet no sign that these have directly contributed to the shifts in understanding and approach that GPPAC works for. However, such relevance would be hard to establish. Furthermore, it is likely that the visibility and legitimacy of GPPAC as a civil society actor associated with these frames have been enhanced by its

mentioning and association with human security, within the UN, opening up avenues for further collaboration.

Contribution:

GPPAC's contribution has consisted of technical and financial support to regional members, linking and convening through network infrastructure and exchanges, content development and the legitimacy provided by the GPPAC image.

### **8.3 Changes in practice**

Description:

- Organizing and facilitating a conference with RIGOs, in which GPPAC in collaboration with the OAS convened 13 RIGOs, civil society and private sector actors to discuss the strengthening of a regional approach to peace and security resulting in a different way of working in the field more focused towards RIGOs as well as interactions with RIGOs otherwise not open for CS or not yet in cooperation with CS. This has recently progressed towards further collaborations with RIGOs including the formation of a Global Working Group on RIGO-CSO collaboration established by GPPAC and the OAS.
- Thematic exchanges, such as the organization of interactions on human security, bringing together regional members and UN actors.
- Advancement of regional approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, e.g. GPPAC's Executive Director Peter van Tuijl met with the Secretary General of ASEAN, Ambassador Le Luong Minh. They discussed ASEAN's increasing institutional developments to address conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including the formal establishment of the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) and the newly established Asian Peace and Reconciliation Council. This is an initiative beyond ASEAN which includes senior figures from more Asian countries, with the purpose of providing an 'Eminent person' kind of network that could intervene in crisis and conflict situations.
- Track-2 diplomacy process involving dialogue between Georgian and Russian actors, in which a GPPAC member has played a central role, partly acting under the 'umbrella' of, and with support from, GPPAC (GPPAC Caucasus).
- Advancement of regional approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, e.g. Advancement of DPRK inclusion into GPPAC Northeast Asia. Following step-by-step relationship building and development of exchange between GPPAC and the North Korean organization Korean National Peace Committee. The latter has become a full-fledged member of GPPAC North East Asia.

Relevance:

While GPPAC has not contributed to changes in practice as operationalized through the outcome indicators developed for the evaluation, we wish to include here certain practice-oriented outcomes specific for the domain of conflict prevention and peacebuilding as relevant when it comes to changes in practice. GPPAC has contributed to practice change by the creation and use of GPPAC as a platform providing space for dialogue previously non-existent, hence we speak here of changes in practice, also when there is no clear involvement of state or international governmental actors.

Especially the achievements in the area of RIGOs, particularly the development of interaction on and between RIGOs through a global platform, form a unique achievement that came about due to GPPAC's global reach and strengths in linking and convening. Here, the added value of global

networking, as also benefits of GPPAC's approach to networking, make themselves evident. Such practices as GPPAC has advanced arguably contribute to inclusiveness in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, a key objective in GPPAC's Theory of Change. At the same time, the outcomes suggest practice changes in the sense of creation of inclusive practices, rather than that GPPAC's work contributes to a more general opening of space to civil society in the societies in which GPPAC is active, or makes for shifts in state actor behaviour or (implementation of) policy.

#### Contribution:

GPPAC has contributed to the creation of platforms for the inclusion of civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes. By building relations, (co-) organizing conferences, workshops, roundtables and other forms of exchange under the GPPAC umbrella, GPPAC has advanced opportunities for interaction between civil society actors and other actors including states as well as international organisations on numerous occasions.

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<sup>1</sup> See for example: [http://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/tana\\_seaplan\\_tcm9-312844.pdf](http://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/tana_seaplan_tcm9-312844.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> See for example: [http://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/deltainkenya\\_tcm9-291828.pdf](http://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/deltainkenya_tcm9-291828.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.unece.org/env/water/>

<sup>4</sup> See for example: <http://www.unece.org/index.php?id=34460>

<sup>5</sup> According to information from EA received after the deadline for the data collection for this evaluation, this action plan was approved at the COP12 in October 2014.

<sup>6</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/internal\\_market/accounting/non-financial\\_reporting/](http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/non-financial_reporting/).

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/nl/news-room/content/20131216IPR31032/html/MEPs-back-plans-to-boost-transparency-on-firms%E2%80%99-environmental-and-social-impact>

<sup>8</sup> [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc\\_152231.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152231.pdf)

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<sup>142</sup> World Bank 2013.

<sup>143</sup> From case study on Worldbank.

<sup>144</sup> Although the evaluator is familiar with a lot of criticism towards the WBG saying that implementation of its own policies, guidances and safeguards is weak.

<sup>145</sup> 'A G11 position agreed before the meeting said "it is unacceptable for the Bank Group to discriminate between categories of countries in terms of fuel base" and that discussions with countries on Bank support for energy should take place "without excluding any energy source upfront."' (Bretton Woods Project. Article: World Bank energy strategy stalled. 14 JUNE 2011.

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<sup>150</sup> All from case study Uganda.

<sup>151</sup> Energy Access concerns for contributing to Sustainable energy for All were obtained from the Policy brief; Energy situation report and discussion notes made by the partners in the Energy Access project funded by HIVOS.

<sup>152</sup> Working under the umbrella of CSBAG which represents more than 50 organisations makes it difficult to target any one group; given the Uganda context is one where the government has not always been pro civil society or any emerging critics.

<sup>153</sup> Atos Origin, Easynet Nederland BV, Global Switch, Level3 Communications BV, Interxion Nederland, Switch Datacenters, BT Nederland NV, Terremark, Interoute Managed Services Netherlands BV, The Data Center Group Amsterdam, EU Networks, Equinix, Schuberg Philis and Tele2.

<sup>154</sup> The source of this information for Hivos is Hivos' personal information with these companies of which the details are confidential.

<sup>155</sup> CE Delft 2012. Zakelijke groene stroomproducten. L.M.L. Wielders and M.R. Afman. Delft, December 2012.

<sup>156</sup> See at: [www.hivos.nl/expertmeeting](http://www.hivos.nl/expertmeeting)

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<sup>159</sup> The outcomes in this annex follow the numbering introduced in section 10.2.2 of the main report. However, in the annex, related outcomes are clustered together to allow for a comprehensive description of the outcome while minimising repetition, rather than being presented separately by priority result area. For this reason, the outcomes are not numbered fully consecutively in the annex.

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<sup>170</sup> A sentence requiring the government to indicate the impact of organisations using scorecards was removed. The Minister argued that scorecards would be too specific and be similar to an evaluation. Another sentence was adapted, and 'impact' was still included. Tweede Kamer. (2014). *VAO Voortgang Speerpunten Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (AO d.d. 12/02)*. Stenogram. Retrieved from

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<sup>171</sup> Ploumen, L. (2014). *Kamerbrief over hulp, handel en investeringen*. 10 April 2014. Retrieved from

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<sup>175</sup> Ploumen, L. (2014). *Toespraak minister Ploumen tijdens 58e sessie Commissie voor de Status van Vrouwen*. 10 March 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/bewindspersonen/lilianne-ploumen/toespraken/2014/03/10/toespraak-ploumen-58e-sessie-commissie-status-van-vrouwen.html>

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- <sup>196</sup> Tweede Kamer. (2011). *Amendement van het lid Hachchi c.s. dat beoogt via een toekenning van 10 miljoen euro aan artikel 5.4 de bezuinigingen die de regering heeft voorzien op SRGR, hiv-aids en gezondheid te beperken*. 21 November 2011. Retrieved from <http://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/amendementen/detail?id=2011Z23555&did=2011D56904>
- <sup>197</sup> Tweede Kamer. (2011). *Nadere toelichting op de middelen die gereserveerd zijn voor het speerpunt SRGR en het thema gender in de begroting van 2012*. Retrieved from [http://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven\\_regering/detail?id=2011Z23812&did=2011D57428](http://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2011Z23812&did=2011D57428)
- <sup>198</sup> Tweede Kamer. (2011). *Amendement van de leden De Caluwé en Ferrier beoogt via een toekenning van 8,0 miljoen euro aan artikel 5.4 de bezuinigingen die de regering heeft voorzien op SRGR/ Hiv-Aids te beperken*. 21 November 2011 Retrieved from <http://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/amendementen/detail?id=2011Z23644&did=2011D57071>
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- <sup>200</sup> Tweede Kamer. (2011). *Amendement van de leden De Caluwé en Ferrier beoogt via een toekenning van 8,0 miljoen euro aan artikel 5.4 de bezuinigingen die de regering heeft voorzien op SRGR/ Hiv-Aids te beperken*. 21 November 2011. Retrieved from <http://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/amendementen/detail?id=2011Z23644&did=2011D57071>
- <sup>201</sup> Tweede Kamer. (2011). *Amendement van het lid Hachchi c.s. dat beoogt via een toekenning van 10 miljoen euro aan artikel 5.4 de bezuinigingen die de regering heeft voorzien op SRGR, hiv-aids en gezondheid te beperken*. 21 November 2011. Retrieved from <http://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/amendementen/detail?id=2011Z23555&did=2011D56904>
- <sup>202</sup> Tweede Kamer. (2011). *Amendement van het lid Dijkers over het toekennenvan gelden SRGR*. 21 November 2011. Retrieved from <http://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/amendementen/detail?id=2011Z23652&did=2011D57102>
- <sup>203</sup> Tweede Kamer. (2014). *Gewijzigde motie van de leden Van Laar en Sjoerdsma (t.v.v. 33625, nr. 76) over 5 miljoen euro oormerken voor projecten voor veilige abortus*. Retrieved from <http://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2014Z04435&did=2014D08756>
- <sup>204</sup> The SRHR budget line is a combined budget line of SRHR, HIV/AIDS and health. The SRHR Alliance is trying to monitor the relative increase of the specific budget of SRHR within this combined budget line as was promised by former State Secretary of Development Cooperation Knapen.

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<sup>205</sup> Tweede Kamer. (2013). *Verslag houdende een lijst van vragen en antwoorden over de vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (XVII) voor het jaar 2014*. 7 November 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2013Z17136&did=2013D44323>

<sup>206</sup> UN DESA. (2014). Commission on Population and Development concludes 47<sup>th</sup> session. *DESA News*, 18(5). May 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/newsletter/desanews/dialogue/2014/05/index.html>

<sup>207</sup> CPD. (2014). *Forty-seventh session, Commission on Population and Development*. Retrieved from <http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ecosoc/cpd/47th-session/statements/>; See also: UN DESA. (2014). Commission on Population and Development concludes 47<sup>th</sup> session. *DESA News*, 18(5). May 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/newsletter/desanews/dialogue/2014/05/index.html>

<sup>208</sup> Based on analysis of the English-language statements by the evaluation team. Two statements were in Spanish and could not be read. The other nine CSO statements did not specifically address SRHR. Seven focused on (prohibiting the legalisation of) abortion and/or advocated for putting reproductive health services and/or the family at centre core, one focused on migration and one was very explicitly against 'controversial references' including sexual and reproductive rights: CPD. (2014). *Forty-seventh session Commission on Population and Development*. Statements. Retrieved from <http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ecosoc/cpd/47th-session/statements/>

<sup>209</sup> A complete overview of youth participation at the 47<sup>th</sup> Session of CPD can be found in: Youth Coalition. (2014). *Youth at CPD47: speaking on sexual and reproductive rights*. Retrieved from [http://issuu.com/youthcoalition/docs/cpd47\\_youth\\_caucus\\_press\\_kit](http://issuu.com/youthcoalition/docs/cpd47_youth_caucus_press_kit). Other sources that witness the successful participation and contribution of youth at CPD 47: NGOs Beyond 2014. (2014). *Young people speak up for their sexual and reproductive rights at 47<sup>th</sup> CPD*. 16 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.youthcoalition.org/un-processes/young-people-speak-sexual-reproductive-rights-47th-cpd-2/>; UNFPA. (2014). *Making youth participation a reality*. 13 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.unfpa.org/news/making-youth-participation-reality>

<sup>210</sup> SRHR Alliance members contributed to a blog on Dutch CSO participation and analysis of the process during the CPD: [www.womeninnewyork.blogspot.nl](http://www.womeninnewyork.blogspot.nl)

<sup>211</sup> dance4life. (2014). *Joining forces for youth participation: successful side event at UN CPD47*. 11 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.dance4life.com/en/news-blogs/news/2014/joining-forces-for-youth-participation-successful-side-event-at-the-un-cpd47/>; UNFPA. (2014). *Making youth participation a reality*. 13 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.unfpa.org/news/making-youth-participation-reality>

<sup>212</sup> External informant interview.

<sup>213</sup> Statement of the Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations after the adoption of the resolution on the 'Assessment of the Status of Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development.' 12 April 2014. Retrieved from

[http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%208/Netherlands\\_Item8.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%208/Netherlands_Item8.pdf); Statement dir DSO, agendapunt 3, Commission on Population and Development (CPD). 7 April 2014. Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%203/Netherlands\\_Item3.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%203/Netherlands_Item3.pdf); National statement on agenda item 4 by Mr. Stefan Hennis, youth representative and member of the official delegation of the Netherlands to the 47th Commission on Population and development. Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%204/Netherlands\\_Item4.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%204/Netherlands_Item4.pdf); Statement on agenda item 5 by Mr. Lambert Grijns, Ambassador for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights & HIV/AIDS and Director of the Social Development Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. Agenda item 5: The relation between population and development issues and the theme of this year's Annual Ministerial Review (ECOSOC). Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%205/Netherlands\\_Item5.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%205/Netherlands_Item5.pdf)

<sup>214</sup> UNFPA. (2011). *Moving beyond 2014: a civil society stakeholder meeting*. 9–10 December 2011. Retrieved from [http://icpdbeyond2014.org/uploads/browser/files/global\\_cso\\_stakeholders\\_meeting\\_report\\_final.pdf](http://icpdbeyond2014.org/uploads/browser/files/global_cso_stakeholders_meeting_report_final.pdf)

<sup>215</sup> United Nations. (2014). *Framework of actions for the follow-up to the Programme of Action of the International Conference of Population and Development Beyond 2014*. Retrieved from [http://icpdbeyond2014.org/uploads/browser/files/93632\\_unfpa\\_eng\\_web.pdf](http://icpdbeyond2014.org/uploads/browser/files/93632_unfpa_eng_web.pdf)

<sup>216</sup> United Nations Economic and Social Council. (2014). *Framework of actions for the follow-up to the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) Beyond 2014: Report of the Secretary-General*. 20 January 20014. Retrieved from [http://icpdbeyond2014.org/uploads/browser/files/sg\\_report\\_on\\_icpd\\_operational\\_review\\_final.unedited.pdf](http://icpdbeyond2014.org/uploads/browser/files/sg_report_on_icpd_operational_review_final.unedited.pdf)

<sup>217</sup> NGOs Beyond 2014. (2011). *CSO survey in preparation of ICPD Beyond 2014*. 17 November 2011. Retrieved from <http://ngosbeyond2014.org/articles/2011/11/17/cso-survey-in-preparation-of-icpd-beyond-2014.html>

<sup>218</sup> The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2014). *Taking stock of the implementation of the Cairo Programme of Action*. Retrieved from [http://health.bmz.de/events/Events\\_2014/UN\\_Commission\\_Population\\_Development\\_\\_2014/index.html](http://health.bmz.de/events/Events_2014/UN_Commission_Population_Development__2014/index.html)

<sup>219</sup> IPPF. (2014). *Governments call for increased efforts to promote sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights in development policies*. 14 April, 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.ippf.org/news/Governments-Call-Increased-Efforts-Promote-Sexual-and-Reproductive-Health-and-Reproductive-Righ>

<sup>220</sup> CPD. (2014). *Forty-seventh session, Commission on Population and Development*. Retrieved from <http://papersmart.unmeetings.org/en/ecosoc/cpd/47th-session/statements/>. Evidence of commitments by governments can also be found on websites of many different organisations, for example: Amnesty International. (2014). *Document - 47th session of the Commission on Population and Development: Governments commit to promoting sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights in development policies*. 14 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR41/011/2014/en/3b80c549-1e50-4faf-a583-9541a14c1c7b/ior410112014en.html>; NGOs Beyond 2014. (2014). *Commission on Population and Development ends – governments call for increased efforts to promote sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights in development policies*. 13 April 2014. Retrieved from <http://ngosbeyond2014.org/articles/2014/4/13/commission-on-population-and-development-ends-governments-ca.html>

<sup>221</sup> Statement of the Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations after the adoption of the resolution on the 'Assessment of the Status of Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development.' 12 April 2014. Retrieved from

[http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%208/Netherlands\\_Item8.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%208/Netherlands_Item8.pdf); Statement dir DSO, agendapunt 3, Commission on Population and Development (CPD). 7 April 2014. Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%203/Netherlands\\_Item3.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%203/Netherlands_Item3.pdf); National statement on agenda item 4 by Mr. Stefan Hennis, youth representative and member of the official delegation of the Netherlands to the 47th Commission on Population and development. Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%204/Netherlands\\_Item4.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2014/country/Agenda%20item%204/Netherlands_Item4.pdf);

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<sup>222</sup> UN General Assembly. (2014). *Recurrent themes and key elements identified during the sessions of the Commission on Population and Development: report of the Secretary-General*. Retrieved from <http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/event-pdf/SG%20Report%20themes%20and%20key%20elements.pdf>

<sup>223</sup> CPD. (2011). *Commission on Population and Development forty-fourth session resolution adopted at the closing plenary session*. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/esa/population/cpd/cpd2011/cpd44-resolution.pdf>

<sup>224</sup> CPD. (2012). *Resolution 2012/1 adolescents and youth*. Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2012/country/Agenda%20item%208/Decisions%20and%20resolutions/Resolution%202012\\_1\\_Adolescents%20and%20Youth.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2012/country/Agenda%20item%208/Decisions%20and%20resolutions/Resolution%202012_1_Adolescents%20and%20Youth.pdf)

<sup>225</sup> CPD. (2013). *Resolution 2013/1 new trends in migration: demographic aspects*. Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2013/documents/CPD46\\_Resolution\\_2013\\_1.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2013/documents/CPD46_Resolution_2013_1.pdf)

<sup>226</sup> Rutgers WPF. (2013). *Oral statement RutgersWPF*. Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2013/ngo/Rutgers\\_Item4.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2013/ngo/Rutgers_Item4.pdf)

<sup>227</sup> ICPD Beyond 2014. (2012). *ICPD Global Youth Forum*. Retrieved from <http://icpdbeyond2014.org/about/view/13-icpd-global-youth-forum>

<sup>228</sup> ICPD Beyond 2014. (2012). *Bali Global Youth Forum Declaration*. Retrieved from [http://icpdbeyond2014.org/uploads/browser/files/bali\\_global\\_youth\\_forum\\_declaration.pdf](http://icpdbeyond2014.org/uploads/browser/files/bali_global_youth_forum_declaration.pdf)

<sup>229</sup> CHOICE for Youth and Sexuality. (2012). *Bali Global Youth Forum Declaration: a historic moment*. Retrieved from <http://www.choiceforyouth.org/news/bali-global-youth-forum-declaration-a-historic-moment>

<sup>230</sup> ICPD Beyond 2014. (2013). *International Conference on Human Rights*. Retrieved from <http://humanrights.icpdbeyond2014.org/>

<sup>231</sup> Note however that the report of the Human Rights Conference in the Netherlands was released only after the CPD 47 meeting, though the document may have been available to UN institutions while preparing the Review Report.

<sup>232</sup> External informant interviews in Indonesia and internationally.

<sup>233</sup> *Hague civil society call to action on human rights and ICPD beyond 2014: all different, all human, all equal*. (2013). Retrieved from [http://sexualrightsinitiative.com/wp-content/uploads/Hague-Civil-Society-Call-to-Action-on-Human-Rights-and-ICPD-Beyond-2014\\_Final-with-signatories\\_Final.pdf](http://sexualrightsinitiative.com/wp-content/uploads/Hague-Civil-Society-Call-to-Action-on-Human-Rights-and-ICPD-Beyond-2014_Final-with-signatories_Final.pdf)

<sup>234</sup> Simavi. (2013). *Tijd voor seksualiteit als mensenrecht*. 6 July 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.simavi.nl/actueel/nieuws/archief/tijd-voor-seksualiteit-als-mensenrecht/>

<sup>235</sup> General Assembly Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals. (2014). *Eighth Session Summary*. Retrieved from <http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/3417OWG8%20Summary.pdf>

<sup>236</sup> *Major Groups and other stakeholder dialogue with the CO-chairs on SDGs*. (2014). 2 April 2014. Retrieved from [http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/3674Compilation%20Document%20on%20Goals%20and%20Targets\\_April%2011-%20final.pdf](http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/3674Compilation%20Document%20on%20Goals%20and%20Targets_April%2011-%20final.pdf)

<sup>237</sup> *Final compilation of amendments to goals and targets by Major Groups and other stakeholders including citizen's responses to MY World 6 priorities*. (2014). Retrieved from <http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/4438mgscompilationowg13.pdf>

<sup>238</sup> UN Economic and Social Council. (2014). *Commission on the Status of Women 58<sup>th</sup> session: challenges and achievements in the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals for women and girls*. Retrieved from <http://www.unwomen.org/~media/headquarters/attachments/sections/csw/58/csw58-agreedconclusions-advanceduneditedversion.ashx>

<sup>239</sup> ASTRA. (n.d.). *Civil Society Platform to Promote SRHR Beyond 2015*. Retrieved from <http://www.astra.org.pl/repronews/89-civil-society-platform-to-promote-srhr-beyond-2015.html>

<sup>240</sup> Some SRHR Alliance Southern partners interviewed in the case study countries noted that they would have benefited from additional assistance with integration into international networks and from being better informed of international processes. However, these kinds of activities were not officially part of the ILA programme but were nevertheless carried out to some extent on a voluntary basis by Dutch SRHR Alliance members and Southern partners because of a commitment to influencing the development agenda in a positive way.

<sup>241</sup> External informant interview.

<sup>242</sup> Hildebrand, M. (2014). *The PACT statement UNAIDS PCB 34<sup>th</sup> meeting: agenda item 3 on post-2015*. 2 July 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.crowdoutaids.org/wordpress/the-pact-statement-unaid-pcb-34th-meeting-agenda-item-3-on-post-2015/>

<sup>243</sup> In full Division of Social Welfare, Vulnerable Groups, Drug Control and Crime Prevention