



Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

# Security and rule of law



Organisation	Date	Reporting period
Region Horn of Africa, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Addis Abeba (AU and IGAD)	June 2016	2015

Activity Number	Name	2015		Implemented by		Result area	Rio marker		Gender marker
		Actual expenditure		Name organisation	Channel		Mitigation/Adaptation	Significant/principal	
27633	Support to AU PSD II	973.677		AFRICAN UNION	Multilateral organisation	Human security	[...]	[...]	Significant
27525	IGAD Peace & Security Efforts	500.000		IGAD	Multilateral organisation	Human security	[...]	[...]	[...]
27753	ISS ACPST II	500.000		ISS-INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDY	NGO	Human security	[...]	[...]	Significant
27646	IGAD Zuid Soedan	500.000		IGAD	Multilateral organisation	Human security	[...]	[...]	[...]

Result Area 1			Human security					
<b>Result question 1a: To what extent have physical security and freedom from fear as experienced by men and women from all social groups improved? (country level)</b> <b>Subgoals:</b> 1.1 All kinds of violent acts against citizens, including sexual violence, and other physical security threats are reduced 1.2 Institutions responsible for maintain security perform their tasks effectively, accountably and in better coordination, responding to the needs of citizens (SSR) 1.3 Communities and civil society contribute to human security independently and in coordination with responsible institutions			The AU in partnership with RECS designed a second APSA Roadmap (2016-2020) geared towards effective interventions conflict prevention, management, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and development-strongly aligned to strategic continental Agenda 2063. There are 8 liaison officers from REC's posted within AUC which has enhanced communication and coordination between AUC and RECs. In addition there are now 14 AU liaison offices across the African continent. More emphasis in 2015 was intervention before violence occurs through early warning systems and preventive diplomacy; the crisis in Burundi is an example where the AUC pro-actively initiated action of the Peace and Security Council, independent observers, mediators, special envoys were deployed. The Panel of the Wise conducted advocacy and held preventive diplomacy missions- both in Burundi and DR Congo. The intention to deploy an intervention force was thwarted (MAPROBU) and no international action could be agreed upon. yet, it did demonstrate that APSA 's tools and instruments are being put to use and that AU is a multilateral actor that drives, galvanizes and coordinates decision-making on the African continent in close partnerships with regional actors who often remain first responders: EAC in Burundi- ECOWAS in Burkina Faso and SADC in Lesotho. In South Sudan, IGAD remains the prime actor in implementing the peace accords, for which separate entities were agreed upon, JMEC and CAMMT. The PSC holds frequent meetings on conflict situations and adopts situations on the way forward. The AU PSC holds annual meetings/retreat with EU PSC , AfCHPR, an informal dialogue with UNSC.					
Indicator	Baseline	Target 2017	Result 2012	Result 2013	Result 2014	Result 2015	Result 2016	Source
Indicator 1: Percentage of people that feel safe walking alone – Gallup			Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 69 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 64 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 68 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: 71	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 67 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: 85		
Indicator 2: Number of female military peacekeepers – UN peacekeeping			N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		
Indicator 3: Performance of the security apparatus – Fragile states index			Djibouti: 6.6 Ethiopia: 8.4 Eritrea: 7.5 Somalia: 9.7	Djibouti: 6.9 Ethiopia: 8.1 Eritrea: 7.6 Somalia: 9.4	Djibouti: 6.9 Ethiopia: 8.4 Eritrea: 7.7 Somalia: 10	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A		
Indicator 4: Amount of cleared mined area (in km2) – Landmine monitor			N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		
Indicator 5: Militarisation – Global peace index			Djibouti: 1.7 Ethiopia: 2 Eritrea: 1.5 Somalia: 2.2	Djibouti: 1.6 Ethiopia: 2 Eritrea: 1.4 Somalia: 2.1	Djibouti: 1.7 Ethiopia: 2 Eritrea: 1.4 Somalia: 2.1	Djibouti: 2 Ethiopia: 1.8 Eritrea: 1.5 Somalia: 2.1		
Indicator 6: Societal safety and security – Global Peace Index			Djibouti: 2.1 Ethiopia: 2.7 Eritrea: 1.9 Somalia: 4.3	Djibouti: 2.2 Ethiopia: 2.7 Eritrea: 3 Somalia: 4.3	Djibouti: 2.2 Ethiopia: 2.7 Eritrea: 3.2 Somalia: 4.3	Djibouti: 2.6 Ethiopia: 2.5 Eritrea: 3.1 Somalia: 4.1		
Indicator 7: Peace and security architecture (APSA) is fully operational at all its levels: All 5 APSA institutions (African Standby Force, Econtinental Early Warning System, Panel of the Wise, Peace and Security Council, Peace Fund) function according to their respective mandate.	All are operational	All five APSA institutions are operational				AMANI AFRICA II was conducted in South Africa in October 2015 and validated ASF as an effective response tool.		Joint narrative report AU PSD
Indicator 8: AU and/or IGAD successfully mediated (possible future) conflicts: Igad has successfully mediated in conflicts within its region, e.g. Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan: Mediation structures in place and operational - main qualitative results	Narrative assessment	On track for 'silencing the guns by 2020'			see narrative			IGAD narrative report
Indicator 9: Improved sustainable human security in Africa: the capacity of State and Non-State actors to improve human security has improved significantly: Mo Ibrahim continental indicator safety&rule of law.	Africa 2012: 52,2	pm			57.7			
Indicator 10: Improved sustainable human security in IGAD region: the management and prevention of emerging and contemporary security threats in the IGAD region is enhanced; Mo Ibrahim East Africa indicator safety & rule of law	East Africa 2012: 47,5	pm			47.8			
Indicator 11: Personnel within the AU Peace and Security Department are paid salaries on a regular basis	2013: total 207 Prof. staff: 115; Support staff: 92				2014: total 201 Prof. staff: 107; Support staff: 94	2015: 196 staff paid 90 support staff: 106 professional		Joint narrative report AU PSD
Indicator 12: Number of female (professional) staff within AUC Peace and Security Department	Dec 2013: M/F = 75%/25%				Dec 2014: M/F = 83%/17%	DEC 2015: M/F= no info		
Indicator 13: A strategic plan for the entire security sector exists: AU strategic Plan and Peace and Security Department work plan	Strategic plan 2014-2017 and workplan available	id			both documents have been developed			
Indicator 14: Implementation of IGAD Peace and Security Strategy is well on track	Strategic plan and workplan available	id			See narrative			
Indicator 15: Security sector institutions have internal accountability mechanisms in place and functioning: AMERT, the monitoring and evaluation mechanism is in place and operational, that is used for reporting to AU Commission and international partners	in place				see narrative			
Indicator 16: Peace and Security Council is continuously accountable to external actors, such AU Assembly and international partners	in place				see narrative			

<b>Result question 1b: To what extent have your programmes contributed to these results?</b> <b>Subgoals:</b> 1.1 All kinds of violent acts against citizens, including sexual violence, and other physical security threats are reduced 1.2 Institutions responsible for maintain security perform their tasks effectively, accountably and in better coordination, responding to the needs of citizens (SSR) 1.3 Communities and civil society contribute to human security independently and in coordination with responsible institutions	We contribute through pooled funds and therefore attribution is hard to prove. However, as we have had flexibility in deploying our funds, we could contribute timely and strategically to 2 particular hard challenges where quick action was warranted. We were able to contribute to the first human rights observers who were deployed to Burundi after the crisis erupted in december 2015 and were able to fund the mediation of ex President Konare, whose mediation proved instrumental in South Sudan. Our funding for Early Warning mechanisms has also been fruitful as briefings were organized, newsreports were sent out with good quality reporting. An integrated system of tools for data collection is installed and in use. Overall there is a notable effort to have better coordination between the various departments, particularly Political Affairs (DPA) and Peace and Security (PSD also on strengthening mediation structures. We are invited at consultations between AU and RECs in which substantial dialogue takes place . Concern is that the link between AU and citizens is not strong. Civil society does not have easy access to AU and its decion-making bodies, even though lately OXFam's office to te AU has been invited to present in PSC sessions on topis as climate change, illicit flows, children in armed conflicts etc.
---	---

Indicator	Baseline	Target 2017	Result 2012	Result 2013	Result 2014	Result 2015	Result 2016	Source
Indicator 1: Amount of land (in m2) released with Dutch funding (Reports from Handicap International, DCA, UNMAS, MAG Iraq)								
Indicator 2: AUC capacitated to be up to its tasks because of NL and other partners' support	# positions funded through joint mechanisms: 207	pm						
Indicator 3: IGAD and/or AUC is a key actor on Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia	Narrative assessment	pm						
Indicator 4: IGAD's organisational capacities to defuse conflicts have increased	Narrative assessment	pm						
Indicator 5: Measures taken by a program to ensure Salaries paid regularly and reliably to positions under the Peace and Security Programme (Salary Fund through Joint Financing Arrangement - JFA)	Joint Arrangement in place and functional				See narrative			
Indicator 6: Strengthening the capacity of the Continental Early Warning System; Submission of regular early warning reports and engagement with decision makers	n.a.				See narrative			
Indicator 7: African Union Mediation Capacity is effectively functioning	Mediation on ad hoc basis				See narrative			
Indicator 8: ISS-Africa Centre for Peace and Security training delivered training courses to policy makers and relevant stakeholders through which capacity of State and Non-State actors in the field of human security is enhanced	annual workplans	> 12 courses offered 2015-2017			8 courses offered, based on 2012-2014 plans	9 courses offered		ISS narrative report

Assessment of results achieved by NL across the entire Result Area 1	Human Security
Assess achieved results compared to planning:	C. Results achieved poorer than planned
Reasons for result achieved:	A shortage of capacity at the AUC explains why some of the ambitious planning does not reach a satisfactory implementation phase. Implementation is the continuing weakness, even as Chair Zuma emphasized this throughout her reign. Moreover, problems with financial managemet remain, even when the EU lauds the AUC for progress. Also, the AU is a political organisation in which decision-making takes the course that MS see fit. This is not unlike other multilateral organisations, but at the AU, many of the institutions are still in the making and cannot be shaped to the image of others. Faultlines remain, but positive trends can be noted in the professionalism of the staff and the recent reforms that have stramlined underpinnings of the organisational structure. Money does not get wasted, but remains underused as staff does not have the planning and organisational capacity to coordinate and manage the multitude of donors. The more recent ones with off-budget ambitions (Turkey, China, S.Korea)
Implications for planning:	The paradox of need for more resources and at the same time lack of absorption capacity will remain for some time in this young institution. Within the AU there is a louder call for greater self-sufficiency and independence of external donor resources. Challenge will be whether the AU MS can deliver and are willing to contribute more resources. Thus far there is little sign they will. The EU cannot continue to be the largest contributor of programme funds. At the moment we are preparing a planning that takes the political context into account to determine how we will continue our engagement with the AU through what channels. It is evident that we will need to interact at more political levels as development cooperation for capacity building proves insufficient without political engagement. Unpacking the state of the AU is still a political challenge in its own right without our own multilateral policies.

Result Area 2				Rule of law				
<p><b>Result question 2a: To what extent do men and women from all social groups have access to effective and independent justice institutions and have confidence in the rule of law? (country level)</b></p> <p><b>Subgoals:</b></p> <p>2.1 Men and women from all social groups are aware of their basic rights and fundamental freedoms and have equal means to access formal and informal justice systems (legal empowerment, access to justice)</p> <p>2.2 All justice institutions perform their tasks effectively, accountably and in better coordination, responding to the needs of citizens (justice sector reform)</p> <p>2.3 The justice system is independent and effectively curbs abuse of power by state institutions, armed actors or powerful private actors</p> <p>2.4 Formal and informal justice institutions effectively address legacies of human rights violations and serious crimes committed during periods of armed conflict or dictatorship, and address root causes that give rise to conflict (transitional justice)</p>				<p>The African Union has made its voice heard through the AU's inter-ministerial committee on the Statute of Rome which prepares a strategy for withdrawal from African countries from the ICC. This polarizing position is putting attention again on the role of internal criminal justice, peace and reconciliation. The ICC is a court of last resort that has come into being to protect the victims against predators who use power of the state to oppress and even kill citizens. There have been others form of justice, such as the Sierra Leone Court and the trial in Senegal against Hisssein Habre. Currently, the putting into place of the Hybrid Court in South Sudan to find justice and accountability for the atrocious committetude there against citizens is on the agenda. Justice is still hard to get and not surprisingly a politizide topic in the hands of human rights violators, often backed high up at political levels. The AU proves itself to be a coordinating political actor and we should acknowledge that coming of age and strive to conduct an open and equal dialogue at State party levels.</p>				
Indicator	Baseline	Target 2017	Result 2012	Result 2013	Result 2014	Result 2015	Result 2016	Source
Indicator 1: Human Rights and Rule of Law - Fragile States Index			Djibouti: 7 Ethiopia: 8.7 Eritrea: 9.1 Somalia: 10	Djibouti: 6.9 Ethiopia: 8.5 Eritrea: 9.2 Somalia: 9.8	Djibouti: 7.2 Ethiopia: 8.5 Eritrea: 9.3 Somalia: 10	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A		
Indicator 2: Rule of Law overall standing – World Justice Project Rule of Law index			Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 0.42 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 0.42 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A		
Indicator 3: Confidence in Judicial System – Gallup World Poll			Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 54 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 56 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: 49	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 72 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: 58		
Indicator 4: Civil justice free of improper government influence - World Justice Project Rule of Law index			Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 0.25 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 0.26 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A		
Indicator 5: Criminal justice free of improper government influence - World Justice Project Rule of Law index			Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 0.25 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 0.33 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A		
Indicator 6: Corruption Perceptions Index -Transparency International			Djibouti: 36 Ethiopia: 33 Eritrea: 25 Somalia: 8	Djibouti: 36 Ethiopia: 33 Eritrea: 20 Somalia: 8	Djibouti: 34 Ethiopia: 33 Eritrea: 18 Somalia: 8	Djibouti: 34 Ethiopia: 33 Eritrea: 18 Somalia: 8		
<p><b>Result question 2b: To what extent have your programmes contributed to these results?</b></p> <p><b>Subgoals:</b></p> <p>2.1 Men and women from all social groups are aware of their basic rights and fundamental freedoms and have equal means to access formal and informal justice systems (legal empowerment, access to justice)</p> <p>2.2 All justice institutions perform their tasks effectively, accountably and in better coordination, responding to the needs of citizens (justice sector reform)</p> <p>2.3 The justice system is independent and effectively curbs abuse of power by state institutions, armed actors or powerful private actors</p> <p>2.4 Formal and informal justice institutions effectively address legacies of human rights violations and serious crimes committed during periods of armed conflict or dictatorship, and address root causes that give rise to conflict (transitional justice)</p>				<p>Our contributions towards mediation and early warning will not have immediate impact, but in the longer run they will bear fruit in supporting peace and stability with opportunities for justice for citizens. This is however an area that may become more prominent with many African interlocutors when we would get a seat at the UNSC. Overall a seat at the UNSC will drastically impact on our work with African partners in AU and RECs. decision-making in PSC and coordination with A3 and African Group in New York will put us in the changing dynamics on peace and security as it affects the African continent.</p>				

Result Area 3			Peace processes and political governance					
<b>Result question 3a: To what extent are processes and political governance in place that stimulate peace and stability? (country level)</b> <b>Subgoals:</b> 3.1 Programmes are adjusted to the local situation on the basis of adequate conflict analysis 3.2 Domestic and international actors take responsibility for effective and inclusive mechanisms for peacebuilding and prevention of conflict at different levels, with an active role for women (Inclusive peace building, UNSCR resolution 1325) 3.3 Ensure effective, responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels			This results reporting at country level is not adequate for multilateral organisations, which is not an aggregated level of country situations. However, IGAD and AU are prime political organisations in which our attention for the African Governance Architecture has been slow. However, also in political affairs there have been progress at political level. Early Warning exists in the shape of improved political reporting, revamped peer review processes (APRMs) and a sophisticated toolkit to mitigate risks of violent elections. Election monitoring has also improved a lot, and as violent elections and constitutional disputes ("3rd term") are more often the spark of conflicts in fragile and volatile settings, it is an area of growing importance for peace and security and is acknowledged as such by the PSC. The AU has a special envoy on gender, peace and security (UNSR 1325) who is seen to be actively engaging governments. She has direct access to MME Zuma who attached great importance to this agenda and often in public refers to gender relevant topics. One of her credits is that she has introduced hard gender rules in staffing, e.g making her commissioners 50 % female and her senior staff is equally screened on gender criteria. This topic has therefore received a push from the AUC, is on the agenda of AU summits and has mirror infrastructure in the RECs (which ECOWAS most prominent player). In AMISOM female officers are visible and often publicly acknowledged. The sex scandals that affected several peace keeping operations (as in CAR with peacekeepers as perpetrators) have received attention in AU discussions and are part of a broader dialogue with UN on codes of conduct and new ways of collaboration.					
Indicator	Baseline	Target 2017	Result 2012	Result 2013	Result 2014	Result 2015	Result 2016	Source
Indicator 1: Factionalised elites – Fragile States Index			Djibouti: 7.5 Ethiopia: 8.7 Eritrea: 8.1 Somalia: 10	Djibouti: 7.6 Ethiopia: 8.7 Eritrea: Somalia: 10	Djibouti: 7.3 Ethiopia: 8.6 Eritrea: 8.2 Somalia: 10	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A		
Indicator 2: Group Grievance – Fragile States Index			Djibouti: 6.2 Ethiopia: 8.6 Eritrea: 6.1 Somalia: 9.3	Djibouti: 8.4 Ethiopia: 8.9 Eritrea: 6.4 Somalia: 9.3	Djibouti: 7.6 Ethiopia: 8.5 Eritrea: 6.1 Somalia: 9.5	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A		
Indicator 3: Confidence in national government – Gallup World Poll			Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 77 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 68 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: 63	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: 83 Eritrea: N/A Somalia: 78		
Indicator 4: State legitimacy - Fragile State Index			Djibouti: 7.8 Ethiopia: 7.3 Eritrea: 8.7 Somalia: 9.5	Djibouti: 7.9 Ethiopia: 7.1 Eritrea: 8.8 Somalia: 9.1	Djibouti: 6.6 Ethiopia: 7.4 Eritrea: 9.1 Somalia: 9.3	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A		

Result Area 4			Social and economic reconstruction					
<b>Result question 4a: To what extent have sustainable services and employment opportunities aimed at key conflict-related grievances – especially for marginalized groups – increased and improved?</b> <b>Subgoals:</b> 4.1 Government institutions, (local) civil society and the private sector increase sustainable income-generating opportunities (incl. for IDPs and hosted refugees) in a conflict sensitive manner, working towards inclusive development and social cohesion 4.2 Governments institutions, (local) civil society and the private sector improve (equitable access to) basic services (incl. for IDPs and hosted refugees) in a manner that increases legitimacy of institutions and social cohesion								
Indicator	Baseline	Target 2017	Result 2012	Result 2013	Result 2014	Result 2015	Result 2016	Source
Indicator 1: Public services - Fragile States Index			Djibouti: 7.4 Ethiopia: 8.7 Eritrea: 8.4 Somalia: 9.8	Djibouti: 7.7 Ethiopia: 8.9 Eritrea: 8.4 Somalia: 9.6	Djibouti: 7.8 Ethiopia: 8.6 Eritrea: 8.7 Somalia: 9.3	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A		
Indicator 2: Poverty & economic decline, including unemployment – Fragile States Index			Djibouti: 6.9 Ethiopia: 7.7 Eritrea: 8.3 Somalia: 9.4	Djibouti: 7.9 Ethiopia: 7.4 Eritrea: 8 Somalia: 9.1	Djibouti: 7.4 Ethiopia: 6.9 Eritrea: 8.3 Somalia: 9.1	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A		
Indicator 3: Perception of individual well-being: a) job satisfaction b) standard of living – UNDP Human Development Report			A: Djibouti: 70 Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A B: Djibouti: 0.445 Ethiopia: 0.396 Eritrea: 0.351 Somalia: N/A	A: Djibouti: 70 Ethiopia: 65 Eritrea: 56 Somalia: N/A B: Djibouti: 0.469 Ethiopia: 0.435 Eritrea: 0.390 Somalia: N/A	A: Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: Somalia: N/A B: Djibouti: 0.470 Ethiopia: 0.442 Eritrea: 0.391 Somalia: N/A	A: Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A B: Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A		
Indicator 4: Uneven economic development - Fragile States Index			Djibouti: 7.2 Ethiopia: 7.6 Eritrea: 6.9 Somalia: 8.4	Djibouti: 7.2 Ethiopia: 7.3 Eritrea: 7.2 Somalia: 8.7	Djibouti: 7.8 Ethiopia: 7.1 Eritrea: 7.2 Somalia: 9	Djibouti: N/A Ethiopia: N/A Eritrea: N/A Somalia: N/A		