

Factual corrections

- 25. In addition, provinces and municipalities may also issue provincial and municipal regulations if there is no national law concerning the subject at matter.
- 45/111. Since 2014, art. 87 of the Municipalities Act is cancelled. As a result, the possibility to establish sub-municipalities with a municipal bylaw does not exist anymore.
- 56. The meaning of article 124 para 1. of the Constitution lays in the autonomy of the municipalities and provinces. Unless a matter is addressed by national law, municipalities and provinces are free to state matters as a matter of public interest, for which they can develop policies and laws. In addition, the autonomy of municipalities and provinces is recognized in the legal (constitutional) doctrine. The constitution acknowledges the fact that municipalities and provinces (and their autonomous powers) already existed before the constitution.
- 64. Since 2002, Aldermen are not always elected Councillors. The Municipalities Act leaves room to appoint Aldermen from outside the Council.
- 64. The Mayor chairs the Council, but doesn't bear powers regarding the way the council or its members fulfill their duties.
- 146. We don't recognize the recorded percentages of total general government expenditures. This seems to be a misinterpretation of data presented in the SNGWOFI Country Report on the Netherlands.
- 148. We don't recognize the figure of € 103 billion. For municipalities the total income in 2019 is € 60,1 billion, for provinces € 8,2 billion and for water boards € 4,1 billion. Total income for all local governments thus amounts to € 72,4 billion. Sources:
https://www.rijksbegroting.nl/2020/voorbereiding/begroting,kst264831_11.html
https://www.rijksbegroting.nl/2020/voorbereiding/begroting,kst264836_11.html
<https://opendata.cbs.nl/#/CBS/nl/dataset/81861NED/table?ts=1623144987159>
- 149. This statement is correct for municipalities, but not for provinces. The share of local taxes in total income is much higher for provinces (20%) than for municipalities (10%).
- 160. Regarding the improvement of local taxation an official report has been published in 2020 (a co-production of the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance and the VNG). This report presents policy options for reforming the municipal tax area. One of the options is to significantly expand the municipal taxing capacity while diminishing the Municipalities Fund with the same amount. This will strengthen the financial autonomy of the Dutch municipalities and improve the equivalence between the municipalities and the central government. Decisions about reforming the municipal tax area are left to the next cabinet. Source:
<https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/05/18/herziening-gemeentelijk-belastinggebied>
- 162. Municipalities receive income from the national government from the Municipal Fund (Gemeentefonds): **a general grant, a several decentralisation grants (including a new Fund for social affairs to accompany the decentralisation in the social sector)** and specific grants from departments meant to cover the expenses of obligatory delegated tasks. *Explanation: the integration grant for social affairs became part of the general grant in the mean time.*
- 164. Hardly predictable → less predictable. *Explanation: the actual correlation with total spending on central level is very proportionate and also very timely. The instability is a disadvantage. However, there will always be a trade-off between these characteristics.*
- 165: - Income, ~~Income~~: Real Estate Tax (OZB) and Other Own Resources (OEM). *Explanation: Income is a separate cluster next to Physical domain and Social domain.*
- 167: the income that they are capable of generating (**support-fiscal capacity**)
- 169: On top of the municipalities fund, the central government supports several regions realise their challenges by supplying other funds. However, these funds are not yet aimed at reducing structural disparities between municipalities.
- 174: These earmarked funds (~~integration and~~ decentralisation **and specific** grants)
- 233. ~~A major problem is that~~ The amount paid from the Provincial Fund to provinces is determined in relation to the overall level of central government expenditure, i.e. if central government expenditure is reduced or increased, the grants from the fund are reduced correspondingly. This creates ~~problems with regard to some~~ uncertainty in planning, as provinces can never be sure how much money they will actually receive from the provincial funds. **However, the share of provincial taxes in total income is relatively large, which reduces the planning problems.**

- 236. *The addition in paragraph 160 is appropriate here as well.*
- 264. ...which means that they **totally** depend **for a large part** on transfers from central government
- 270. In the current dire situation, **some** municipalities **try need** to raise taxes where possible in order to cover budget deficits, but only few sources of municipal revenue are actually free, **in particular the property tax (which ironically does not produce much income in poor areas, though...).**
- 277. The conclusion about the mayor's appointment procedure is that reform of the democratic relationship between mayor and voter is necessary. That should also be the goal when changing the appointment procedure, according to the rapporteurs. We do not share this conclusion. When considering reforming the procedure of appointment of the mayor, the entire local system must be considered. Which method of appointment of the mayor is appropriate, can only be determined while considering the entire system of checks and balances between the municipal council and the municipal executive.