



Chatting and Playing Chess with Policymakers

Influencing Policy via the Dutch Co-Financing Programme

Buitenlandse Zaken
**Ontwikkelings
samenwerking**



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Preface

This document is the final report of an IOB evaluation on the influencing of policy via the Dutch Co-financing Programme (CFP). Policy influencing is one of the three major intervention strategies of the Dutch Co-Financing Programme, the other two being poverty alleviation and the building of civil society.

Three factors prompted IOB to start an evaluation of policy influencing under the CFP in January 2006: political interest in measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of policy influencing, the significant amounts spent on policy influencing by the Co-financing Organisations (CFOs) and the fact that this intervention strategy has barely been evaluated. The evaluation's remit was to focus on the influencing of economic policies, processes and structures.

From the outset IOB was aware of the complexity and potential delicacy of the subject matter. For that reason, it opted for a systematic and straightforward approach and during all phases of the evaluation maintained close contact with relevant staff of CFOs. Shortly after the phase of data collection, a workshop was held with CFOs to discuss the findings and methodological issues of the desk study and six case studies on the influencing of economic policy that form the basis for the present report.

Four researchers played a key role in the evaluation. The evaluation was designed, supervised and partly conducted by Otto Hospes (inspector IOB). The desk study was conducted by Jaap van der Kloet, junior researcher of IOB. All but one of the case studies were conducted by lead consultant Nora Plaisier (Ecorys/NEI) and consultant Floor Smakman (Ecorys/NEI). Nora Plaisier and Otto Hospes drafted the present report. The desk and case studies can be downloaded from our website at www.minbuza.nl/iob.

I wish to thank the staff of the Co-Financing Organisations, their partner organisations and other lobby partners who kindly supported the evaluation.

Several of them have already indicated that they gained useful knowledge and insights during the evaluation. It is my wish and expectation that the process of reflection on strategy development, documentation and evaluation of policy influencing will continue on the basis of this report at the level of individual CFOs, all CFOs together, and in meetings of lobbyists, evaluators and researchers.

Joy Burrough did a marvellous job of editing the manuscript. She proved to be swift, accurate and did her work with a great sense of humour – again!

Bram van Ojik
Director Policy and Operations Evaluation Department

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Abbreviations

| | |
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| ACP | Africa Caribbean and Pacific states |
| CAP | Common Agricultural Policy |
| CC | Coffee Coalition |
| CFO | Dutch Co-Financing Organisation |
| CFP | Dutch Co-Financing Programme |
| CFT | Coalition for Fair Trade |
| CSR | Corporate Social Responsibility |
| DE | Douwe Egberts |
| EC | European Commission |
| EU | European Union |
| FTN Coalition | Food Trade and Nutrition Coalition |
| GM | Genetically Modified |
| GMO | Genetically Modified Organism |
| HGIS | Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation |
| ICCO | Interchurch organisation for development co-operation |
| ICO | International Coffee Organisation |
| IOB | Policy and Operations Evaluation Department |
| KCSN | Kenya Coffee Solidarity Network |
| KiA | Kerk-in-Actie |
| LDC | Least Developed Countries |
| MP | Member of Parliament |
| MTF | Make Trade Fair |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NSC | Netherlands Soy Coalition |
| OI | Oxfam International |
| SDT | Special and Differential Treatment |
| SL | Sara Lee |
| SMT | Specific, Measurable and Time-bound |
| SP | Special Products |
| TK | Tweede Kamer (Netherlands House of Representatives) |

| | |
|--------|--|
| UNCTAD | United Nations Conference on Trade And Development |
| WSF | World Social Forum |
| WTO | World Trade Organisation |
| WWF | World Wide Fund for Nature |
| 4Cs | Common Code for the Coffee Community |

Conclusions, recommendations and dilemmas

The evaluation of the policy influencing via the Dutch Co-Financing Programme consisted of a desk study of 62 projects and six case studies of campaigns. All these projects and campaigns were intended to influence economic policies. They were funded and/or undertaken by a Dutch Co-financing Organisation: Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO or Oxfam Novib. The main findings and issues of the desk study and case studies led to the formulation of the following conclusions, recommendation and dilemmas:

Conclusions

- 1) Documentation of policy-influencing activities is poor. As the objectives had not been formulated in a Specific, Measurable and Time-bound (SMT) way, the desk study could not assess the effectiveness and efficiency of nearly all of the selected 62 projects of partner organisations. Often, the relevant dossiers did not contain monitoring reports of policy-influencing activities undertaken by the CFO.

In contrast to the desk study, the six case studies of campaigns did generate insights into effectiveness. The case studies consisted of interviews with lobbyists and lobby targets, a second round of desk study, and a limited number of visits to partner organisations. It proved impossible to assess the efficiency of campaigns in terms of realisation of output according to plan, time and budget because of the lack of activity plans accompanied by budgets and timetables.

- 2) In all six cases, intermediate objectives or steps towards the policy changes envisaged by the CFO had been achieved. In two cases, proposed policy changes had been made.

- 3) The case studies on the influencing of economic policy revealed that the lobbies targeting business were more successful than the campaigns focusing on government policies. It was easier to address companies because there tend to be fewer actors and levels in the policy-making process. Furthermore, companies seem to be more sensitive to bad publicity, especially concerning consumer products. Another factor influencing the success of a campaign is the ability to 'sell' a campaign message. It is often more difficult to convey to the general public the message of campaigns focusing on government policies than the message of campaigns focusing on companies.
- 4) In all campaigns, the CFOs held consultations with partner and/or other organisations. However, the case studies revealed great variation in the role and involvement of partner organisations at the start of campaigns and during their implementation. In two cases, the concerns of partners clearly provided the rationale for the CFO to start its own and/or supplementary activities. In two other cases, the CFO took the initiative itself but actively sought collaboration with partner organisations, including one campaign in which a process of joint formulation of objectives and strategies with partners was set in motion. In the remaining two cases, the CFO took the initiative itself, with limited or no direct involvement from partner organisations.

All the partner organisations visited by the evaluators still had limited capacity in the field of policy influencing. Two cases include examples of joint lobbying with partners.

- 5) In all the case studies, CFOs worked in alliances to achieve their objectives. The alliances differed from case to case. Some coalitions were highly institutionalised, others were rather informal. Some coalitions were the main vehicle of a CFO for lobbying, other coalitions were only complementary to the CFO's activities. Some coalitions consisted of similar organisations with a common focus, others consisted of quite different members, each with a particular focus. The fact that lobbying was carried out jointly with other organisations made it difficult to attribute the results of the campaign to one particular organisation.
- 6) The case studies identified a number of factors important for the effectiveness of a campaign: a key factor is the development of a strategy on

the basis of a systematic and step-wise approach (entailing research on the complexity of the issue, the analysis of stakeholders and decision-making processes, the formulation of long-term and intermediate objectives and strategy, and monitoring). With one exception, none of the CFOs, followed such a strategy. Instead, the steps they took, were based on learning by doing, or were taken in response to the demand from and initiatives of partner organisations. Other factors identified were the timing of a campaign (sufficiently early in the decision-making process), the expertise of the lobbyists (understanding the problem, making feasible policy proposals) and their contacts (building a relationship of trust with the most relevant policymakers). The quality of a lobby was also affected by the organisation of lobbying within a CFO, particularly the scope for specialists and specialisation.

Recommendations

- 1) It is important that a CFO develops a realistic strategy for its campaign and sets realistic objectives. This entails formulating objectives and strategies on the basis of preparatory contextual analysis, and formulating intermediate steps and objectives that are Specific, Measurable and Time-bound (SMT). For reasons of accountability as well as for strategic purposes, the achievement of intermediate objectives (or the failure to achieve them) should be monitored on the basis of SMT indicators.

It is important for the CFO to reflect on what it would like to achieve in the policy- influencing process and how this will affect the ambitions, preparation and internal structures of a campaign, given the human and financial constraints (in terms of lobby expertise, coordination capacity and budget). This is especially important if the CFO has no lobby department, or if its lobby department is small.

- 2) The evaluation of the influencing of policy should be directed at judging the quality and capacity of preparatory contextual analysis (of the issues, stakeholders, power relations and decision-making processes) as well as at the realisation of intermediate steps and objectives. To cope with the attribution dilemma in judging policy influencing, it is recommended to systematically document which steps and intermediate objectives have been achieved, using CFO-specific indicators for this purpose. Another approach is to select cases in which lobbying does not take place in coalitions and/or

in which the lobby target can be specified. A final option is to focus on one particular policy process and to systematically document and pay equal attention to the role and contributions of all players during the phases of that process. To follow up the current evaluation of six case studies, fewer cases could be evaluated in a such a way, possibly jointly by CFOs.

- 3) Though it is not easy to evaluate the influencing of policy, it is not impossible. To facilitate the evaluation, it is recommended to envisage policy influencing as a game of chess and then to reflect on what this implies for documentation and evaluation. To evaluate the influencing of policy while taking due account of its particularities and complexity, a three-track approach should be developed that focuses on three Cs: concrete results, capacities and context. Concrete results can be assessed on the basis of the realisation of intermediate steps and objectives. In order to be able to explain why steps were or could not be taken, insights are needed into the capacities of CFOs to prepare and to adjust lobbying, as well as into the actors, processes and other contextual factors that constrained or enabled CFOs to realise their lobby objectives.
- 4) At a more practical level, the timing of an evaluation is important: people should still be able to remember the campaign but also be able to view the situation from a distance. It is also important to be aware of the different stakes of lobbyists and lobby targets, and of the possible bias in their opinions.

Dilemmas

- 1) The most important dilemma is whether a CFO should focus its campaigns on policies in which proposed changes are more likely to be realised or should primarily target policies that are considered structural or global causes of poverty and inequality, but where results are more difficult to attain. This difficulty in attaining results may be related to the complexity of the issue or the decision-making process, but is also relevant in cases where a lobby target disagrees strongly with the policy proposals of a CFO. In such cases, the dilemma is whether a CFO should keep focusing on its own message or shift towards the position of the lobby target to have more chance of influencing the policy-making process. The first option runs the risk of low effectiveness and also, related to this, of incurring a warning or negative assessment from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the principal

donor to a CFO. Choosing the second option, however, may seriously affect the credibility of a CFO in future campaigns, leading to loss of support from the wider public or individual donors.

- 2) It is difficult to determine the optimal level at which to involve partner organisations in a campaign: if they are involved in the design of a campaign, the campaign will have more credibility, is more likely to respond to local needs and will contribute to an increased sense of ownership by its partners. Coordination problems and lack of capacity of partners can, however, diminish both the efficiency and effectiveness of a campaign.
- 3) In networking and alliance building, CFOs face a dilemma: on the one hand they wish to cooperate with a view to increasing effectiveness and efficiency, while on the other hand it is important for the CFO to create and present a distinctive profile as a donor for the wider public and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A related issue that is not easy to address concerns the optimal size and composition of an alliance: to what extent and in what way can and should members of an alliance be different or complementary? Will increasing the size of an alliance contribute to the effectiveness of an alliance or merely reduce efficiency?

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and justification

The influencing of policy is one of the three major intervention strategies of the Dutch Co-Financing Programme (CFP), the other two strategies being poverty alleviation and the building of civil society. All three are intended to contribute to the CFP's two-pronged main objective: to contribute to the structural reduction of poverty of countries in the South and in the poorest countries in Central and Eastern Europe and to the realisation of human rights. The objective of policy influencing is 'to change local, national and international policy, processes and structures that sustain or aggravate poverty and inequality.'¹ In the period 2000 - 2004, a proportion of 12 percent of the total CFP budget of EUR 1.733 billion was used to subsidise policy influencing.

During the general consultation with the Minister for Development Cooperation in June 2003, the Dutch Parliament called for insight into the effectiveness of policy influencing and insisted that measurable indicators of policy influencing be developed (House of Representatives 28880, no. 106, p. 4).

It was the political interest in measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of policy-influencing activities, coupled with the significant amounts spent on policy influencing by the CFOs and the fact that this intervention strategy has barely been evaluated, that prompted IOB to start an evaluation of the influencing of policy under the CFP in January 2006, focusing on the influencing of economic policies, processes and structures.

¹ House of Representatives 27433, 2001, no. 2, p. 11.

1.2 Objectives and central questions

The two main objectives of this evaluation were:

- 1) to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the influencing of economic policy as undertaken and/or supported by the CFOs through the CFP;
- 2) to identify the internal mechanisms and external conditions that could account for the efficiency and effectiveness of such policy influencing.

Efficiency measures the conversion of input into output. Effectiveness is about the relationship between output and outcome. Internal mechanisms include the intervention design and the extent to which this has been based on analysis of the complexity and scope of the policy issues, analysis of stakeholders and power relations, and analysis of the policy-making process (institutional analysis). Internal mechanisms also include the way in which the policy influencing has been institutionalised by the CFO, whether or not working in alliances with other organisations. External conditions refer to elements beyond the control of CFOs, like the power of targeted companies or unforeseen events that boost or undermine the influencing of policy by Dutch CFOs.

The evaluation addressed the following central questions:

- 1) How efficient was policy influencing as undertaken and/or supported by Dutch CFOs and directed at economic policies, processes and structures?
More specifically:
 - 1.1 What was the relationship between the input and output of policy influencing?
 - 1.2 Was the output delivered according to plan, on time and within budget?
- 2) How effective was policy influencing as undertaken and/or supported by Dutch CFOs and directed at economic policies, processes and structures?
More specifically:
 - 2.1 Were the targeted policymakers reached? Did they remember the Dutch CFOs and/or partner organisations and the policy issues they wished to address?
 - 2.2 Were the issues being addressed by Dutch CFOs subsequently added to or moved up the agenda of the targeted policymakers?

- 2.3 Were Dutch CFOs and/or partner organisations invited to sit around the table with the targeted policymakers? Did the targeted policymakers institutionalise relationships with the Dutch CFOs and/or partner organisations?
- 2.4 Did policy influencing by Dutch CFOs and/or partner organisations contribute to the formulation or reformulation of targeted policy, or to the furthering of policy implementation?
- 2.5 How effective was the participation of Dutch CFOs in coalitions in terms of reaching the policymakers targeted by the Dutch CFO (see 2.1), getting the issues of the Dutch CFO added to or moved up the agenda of these policymakers (see 2.2), institutionalising relationships with the targeted policymakers (see 2.3) and contributing to the formulation or reformulation of policy, or to the furthering of policy implementation, as desired and proposed by the Dutch CFO (see 2.4)?

The findings of the evaluation and analysis of critical issues are intended 1) to enable the Minister for Development Cooperation to account to Parliament for Dutch funding of policy influencing through the CFP and 2) to contribute to the policy discussion between Dutch Parliament, the Minister for Development Cooperation and CFOs on the measurability of the results of policy influencing.

1.3 Organisation and methodology

The evaluation consisted of two components: a desk study and six case studies.

The desk study began with an inventory of Dutch financial support of policy influencing through the CFP in the period 2000-2004. In addition, the desk study examined in more detail 62 selected projects in which the major intervention strategy is or was the influencing of economic policy. This was done by administering a questionnaire that focused on the design phase, the results of activities directed at influencing economic policy, and the efficiency and effectiveness of the influencing of economic policy.

The activities entailed in influencing economic policy were selected for the case studies on the basis of the following criteria:

- 1) The CFO considered/had considered the activities to be very important and had invested a relatively large input (money, staff, time);

- 2) The CFO had clustered the activities under a lobby theme or at programme level (as part of a campaign and/or coalition of like-minded organisations).

Shortlists provided by the CFOs were used to select campaigns or lobbying activities with a similar policy issue or targeted policy or institution. Six case studies were carried out: three focusing on the influencing of corporate policy and three focusing on influencing government policy (at national, EU and/or international level). The selected case studies were:

- 1) Cordaid and the adoption of social responsibility criteria for soy production;
- 2) Hivos and the recognition and implementation of codes of conduct in the coffee sector;
- 3) Oxfam Novib and the recognition and implementation of codes of conduct in the coffee sector;
- 4) ICCO and its lobby on the right to adequate food in international food trade policies through the Food Trade and Nutrition (FTN) Coalition;
- 5) Hivos and the adoption of alternative policies and protocols on GMOs;
- 6) Oxfam Novib and the campaign on EU sugar reforms to end EU sugar dumping.

Each case study describes and assesses a combination of channels, ways and tools used by the CFO in an attempt to influence a certain economic policy, process or structure. Specific evaluation matrices (including specific indicators of input, output and outcome) were designed for each of the six cases, taking into account the particular design or context of the campaigns. The analysis entailed scrutinising CFO-funded projects, lobbying by CFO staff and cooperation with or through coalitions. The main research methods used were desk study and interviews. Short field trips were made to Brazil, India and Kenya to assess relevant CFO-funded projects funded in the South.

As well as focusing on the extent to which the desired policy changes were achieved, the evaluation also focused on the intermediate steps to achieving these changes. Though these steps vary per case study, their general structure is as follows: 1) reaching the targeted policymakers, 2) getting the Dutch CFO's issues onto or higher up the agenda of the targeted policymakers, 3) developing/institutionalising relationships with the targeted policymakers, and 4) contributing to the formulation or reformulation of policy, or the furthering of policy implementation, as desired and proposed by the Dutch CFO. The specific questions of the evaluation reflect these different steps (see section 1.2).

One of the ways to cope with the attribution dilemma was to identify CFO-specific steps in every case study. It was expected that this standard evaluation dilemma would be particularly manifest in evaluating policy influencing, because policy arenas and negotiations are not limited to two players (the lobby target and the CFO or partner organisation) but typically include many different players and lobby coalitions as well. Another way of coping with the attribution dilemma and of identifying the specific contributions of the CFO was by focusing on the lobbying activities of the CFO in the North (see 1.4).

1.4 Scope and limitations

Though six CFOs were being funded through the CFP at the start of this evaluation, only four were included in the evaluation: Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO and Oxfam Novib. The other two CFOs – Terre des Hommes and Plan – were not included because policy influencing is a relatively new field to them. By comparison with the other CFOs, Terre des Hommes and Plan had carried out only a small number of activities and allocated small amounts of money to it.

The evaluation does not attempt to describe and assess the contribution of policy influencing to poverty reduction or the fulfilment of human rights, as methodologically it is extremely difficult if not impossible to assess such impact. The ‘highest’ level of effects that was explored and assessed (given the budgetary and time constraints of the evaluation) comprised the intentional and unintentional effects of the policy influencing on the targeted policy or policy processes.

The evaluation focused on one central theme targeted by every CFO and having high political and societal relevance in domestic and international policy debates on poverty and human rights: the economic policies, processes and structures, in the North, South or at global level, which – in the view of the CFOs – sustain or aggravate poverty and do not contribute to the realisation of human rights.

The unit of analysis selected for the case studies was the campaign. A campaign is defined as the combination of strategies and activities used by a CFO and its lobby partners with a view to influencing policies. It may consist of lobbying (directed at government agencies or companies) and/or be a public or media campaign (directed at the wider public and/or indirectly directed at companies or government agencies). This evaluation focused on lobbying. In order to be able

to measure the campaign results, at the time of the evaluation, the campaigns selected had either ended or had been running for a number of years.

Finally, the evaluation focused on policy influencing in the North. The CFP policy framework (House of Representatives 27433, 2001, no. 2, pp. 10 and 12) explicitly indicates that CFOs support the influencing of policy in the Netherlands and elsewhere in the North, with Northern organisations taking responsibility for influencing Northern governments, companies, civil society organisations and individual citizens. In 2002 the Minister for Development Cooperation allowed CFOs and trade unions to spend five percent of the CFP budget on influencing policy in the Netherlands (House of Representatives 28880, 2002, no. 74, p. 11).

1.2 Structure of this report

The structure of this report is as follows. Chapters two and three present the main findings of the desk study and case studies respectively, in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and the factors that account for effectiveness and efficiency. Chapter four addresses a number of policy issues on policy-influencing activities that emanate from the present evaluation.

Two sections of the report in particular address methodological issues: section 1.3 offers a summary of the methodological design of the evaluation as outlined in the Terms of Reference (see Annex 2); section 4.7 presents the problems encountered in recording and assessing policy influencing, together with the lessons learned from the evaluation of policy influencing and recommendations for future evaluations.

2 Inventory and desk study: main findings

This chapter provides an overview of the main findings of an inventory and desk study on the efficiency and effectiveness of 62 selected projects of Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO and Oxfam Novib. Fifty-eight of these projects were implemented by the partner organisation, and of the remaining four, two were implemented by the CFO and two were implemented by the network of organisations of which the CFO was a member. More than half of the budget of all these projects was committed to influencing economic policy.

Without additional interviews and field studies, a desk study can certainly have limitations as a method and source of information. For practical reasons and to assess the quality of project dossiers, no additional interviews were done in The Hague or with partner organisations – on the assumption that the project dossiers included the information required for assessing efficiency and effectiveness.

2.1 Main findings of the inventory

The instructions on the allocation of the project budget to policy influencing differed per CFO. Individual programme officers decide on the exact allocation of the project budget. Some focus on the characteristics of the partner organisation, others on the characteristics of the specific projects concerned. Some only classify lobbying targeted at government or private sector as lobbying, others also include ‘lobbying’ targeted at the ultimate beneficiaries or at raising awareness among the wider public.

One out of every three approved projects of Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO and Oxfam Novib projects received a CFP grant for policy influencing in 2000–2004: the precise figures are 3,822 out of a total of 11,922 approved projects. Together, Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO and Oxfam Novib committed approximately an estimated

EUR 212 million of CFP funding to policy influencing in 2000-2004. This was 12 percent of the total volume of all the approved projects implemented by these CFOs during the period concerned.

Nearly half (1,790) of the 3,822 projects with a commitment to policy influencing committed 1-25 percent of their budget to policy influencing. A third (1,272) of these 3,822 projects committed 26-50 percent of their budget to policy influencing. About a fifth of those projects (760) committed more than 50 percent of their budget to policy influencing. Of the latter, 504 projects committed 100 percent of their budget to policy influencing. This means that in more than 85 percent of all cases, the CFOs combined policy influencing with poverty reduction and/or civil society building as intervention strategies.

More than a third (1,393) of the 3,822 projects with a commitment to policy influencing focused on the influencing of economic policy, i.e., the influencing of economic policies, processes and structures by CFOs and/or their partner organisations in specific policy fields identified by these organisations: access to markets (Cordaid), economics and sustainable economic development (Hivos), sustainable and fair economic development (ICCO), and trade and markets and food and income security (Oxfam Novib). Almost EUR 74 million was committed to economic policy influencing in 2000-2004. This is more than a third of the total volume of all 3,822 projects with a commitment to policy influencing, and it demonstrates that the influencing of economic policy was an important focus of policy influencing for all four CFOs.

2.2 Main findings of the desk study

For the desk study, 62 projects of Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO and Oxfam Novib were selected in which more than 50 percent of the budget had been committed to policy influencing. The selection was based on the assumption that the efficiency and effectiveness of these projects could be determined for projects whose budget was mainly committed to influencing economic policy. If the largest share of a project's budget is allocated to influencing economic policy, it is reasonable to assume that both the project design and its reporting will focus on that theme and intervention strategy.

In 185 of the 1,393 projects (i.e. about one out of eight) with a commitment to influencing economic policy, more than 50 percent of the budget was committed

to economic policy influencing. Sixty-two of these 185 projects were selected and evaluated by means of a desk study.

Three elements of the project design of the 62 selected projects were assessed: intervention theory, objectives and indicators.

Project design

Nearly all (57) of the 62 projects had formulated an intervention theory on how the policy change should be achieved. Two-thirds (42) of the 62 projects had formulated an intervention theory that included a specification of the relationship between output and outcome. More than two-thirds (44) of the 62 projects had formulated an intervention theory that included a specification of the expected relationship between outcome and impact. In most cases, however, the formulated intervention theories had not been elaborated into a corresponding and systematic set of objectives.

The quality of the formulated objectives was unsatisfactory on two counts. First, few projects had economic policy influencing objectives at output, outcome and/or impact level: 18 of the 62 projects had such objectives at output level, 34 of the 62 projects had such objectives at outcome level and 12 of the 62 projects had such objectives at impact level. Second, nearly all the objectives of these projects were not measurable and were not time-based.

More than half (37) of the 62 projects had formulated indicators for measuring the results of influencing economic policy. The remaining (25) projects had not.

Results of economic policy influencing

In 53 of the 62 cases, the project file contained information about results at output level, but in only 36 of the 62 cases did the project file contain information about results at outcome level.

Efficiency and effectiveness

In four-fifths (51) of the 62 evaluated projects, the efficiency of economic policy influencing could not be determined because the objectives and/or results achieved were poorly formulated. Almost all the remaining (11) projects were found to be efficient in terms of planning and budget.

The effectiveness of the vast majority (56) of the 62 evaluated projects could not be established. In 27 of the projects, this was because no objective for economic

policy influencing had been formulated at outcome level. In 18 of the projects, the objective at outcome level was not sufficiently specific, measurable and/or time-based, making it difficult to ascertain whether it had been attained. The effectiveness of the influencing of economic policy could not be established for 11 projects because the result had not been formulated specifically enough. Of the remaining six of the 62 projects, in two the goal at outcome level had been achieved fully and in four it had been achieved partially.

3 Case studies: main findings

The desk study was complemented by six case studies which, in contrast to the desk study, used campaigns rather than project funding as the unit of analysis. Focusing on campaigns enabled both the financial and non-financial input to be taken into account. Though the campaigns included project funding, they also included lobbying by CFO staff and work with or through coalitions. Interviews were a key method in the case studies.

Each section of this chapter begins with a brief description of the history and objectives of the campaign and then provides a summary assessment in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Detailed evaluation reports are available for each case study.²

3.1 Cordaid and the adoption of social responsibility criteria for soy production

Brazil is the world's largest exporter of soy, which is the most important animal feed in the EU. The Netherlands is the second largest importer of soy in the world. Cordaid has been active in soy since 2003, the year in which it joined the Netherlands Soy Coalition (NSC). NSC's main objective is to reduce the negative environmental and social impact of soy production. Cordaid and its coalition partners have together identified six negative effects:

- deforestation;
- conditions of slavery among soy workers;
- small farmers being driven out of business by large-scale cultivation of soy;
- lack of contribution to food for local markets;
- use of and dependence on genetically modified seeds;
- the negative environmental impact of intensive livestock production; reliant on soy as a feedstuff.

² These reports are available at the IOB-website: www.minbuza.nl/iob

The issues of particular concern to Cordaid are the social issues identified by its partner organisations in Brazil: slavery among soy labourers, threats to family farming, and dependence on GM soy. Cordaid believes that if companies adopted policies and criteria intended to minimise the negative effects of soy production, this would contribute to poverty alleviation and the realisation of human rights.

In order to achieve its aim of reducing the negative environmental and social impact of soy production, the NSC has directed lobbying and campaigning at three targets: the private sector, governments and consumers. Ever since joining the NSC, Cordaid has been active in the NSC private sector working group set up to influence corporate policy, in particular by getting companies that purchase soy and soy products to adopt criteria of social responsibility. Two intermediate objectives of Cordaid and the NSC private sector working group are:

- 1) dialogue with the private sector;
- 2) getting the private sector to acknowledge the negative environmental and social effects of soy production.

Though recognising that there are different ways of attempting to influence corporate policy, Cordaid's approach is based on the assumption that one strategy with great potential to influence policy entails facilitating dialogue between the different stakeholders. Cordaid has therefore supported dialogue between NGOs and the private sector in Brazil and the Netherlands.

3.1.1 Effectiveness

The objective of getting companies that purchase soy and soy products to adopt social responsibility criteria has not yet been achieved. Not a single company has adopted the concrete proposal and set of criteria developed in 2004 by a large network of Brazilian NGOs with the financial support of Cordaid and others.

The intermediate objective of having dialogue with the private sector has, however, been realised: the first meeting of companies and NGOs on soy in the Netherlands took place in January 2004; the first international round table on responsible soy was held in Brazil in March 2005; in the second half of 2005, members of the NSC held bilateral meetings with nine companies and two industry associations in the Netherlands; in August 2006 the second international round table on responsible soy was held in Paraguay; two meetings were held to prepare this round table: a technical meeting in Brazil in April 2006 and a seminar

in the Netherlands in May 2006. In all these meetings, representatives of the private sector and civil society participated.

The intermediate objective of getting the private sector to acknowledge the negative environmental and social effects of soy production has also been realised. The final declaration of the first round table mentions that as well as bringing benefits, soy production also creates problems. The final declaration of the second round table of August 2006 listed nine types of negative effect. However, consensus was not reached on their scale and intensity, and moreover the private sector in Brazil and the Netherlands maintained that soy cultivation is certainly not the sole or necessarily the direct cause of deforestation. While acknowledging there are problems related to soy production, the food and feed industry in the Netherlands felt that many of these were in parts of the soy chain beyond their influence and/or emphasised that these problems need to be addressed at international round tables through multi-stakeholder consultation.

Cordaid's participation in the organising committee of the round table on responsible soy was important to achieve the intermediate objectives of the NSC and to get the social issues of partner organisations of Cordaid in Brazil on the agenda. However, Cordaid was unable to keep the partner organisations at the negotiation table. At the first round table, Cordaid's partners felt that they were being steamrolled by the companies, who were interested solely in imposing their views on the benefits of soy cultivation. They also felt that they were not given sufficient time to voice their concerns. Moreover, the companies refused to consider GMO (Genetically Modified Organisms) as an issue. Shortly after the first round table, all Cordaid's Brazilian partners rejected the round table process.

Although Cordaid is known as a 'dialogue NGO' that seeks solutions through consultation instead of confrontation, its financial support was not limited to NGOs focusing solely on networking, dialogue and research. It also supported protests, mass demonstrations and the media campaigns of individual partner organisations in Brazil. This support and individual action did not trigger dialogue between the private sector and NGOs.

In the Netherlands, Cordaid conducted some small public campaigns and wrote some critical newspaper articles, doing so in collaboration with other members of the NSC that consider public action as their core business. The large campaigns and bad publicity organised by these activist NGOs were not joint activities. Taken together, the public campaigns and media action of members of the NSC did

succeed in getting companies to acknowledge the problems associated with soy and making them willing to talk with members of the NSC. The NSC and Cordaid derived mutual benefit from each other.

The NSC's private sector working group targeted 22 companies for a letter campaign and follow-up bilateral meetings. The five companies classified as 'most important target companies' - Ahold, Hema, Laurus, Nutreco and Unilever - however, did not become the most important discussion partners of this working group. Instead, two federations of the Dutch food and feed industry representing many of the targeted companies, started regular talks with the NSC. One company (Campina) that had been approached by one of the members of the NSC and two like-minded other organisations decided to purchase soy for feedstuff more responsibly. Two Dutch banks incorporated comments and advice from NSC members into draft policy documents on soy. With the consent of Rabobank International, Rabobank Brazil imposed a moratorium on loans for soy cultivation on land that had been deforested in the preceding five years.

3.1.2 Efficiency

It is not possible to judge the relationship between Cordaid's input and output because there are no yardsticks or benchmarks for doing so. However, in terms of delivering concrete output according to plan, time and budget and in terms of addressing the demands of its partners, Cordaid's project funding in relation to soy was certainly efficient.

Cordaid used two types of project funding to support seminars, public action, media campaigns and research on soy: small projects and lump-sum funds. In the period 2003-2005, Cordaid's financial support to projects on soy amounted to EUR 1.3 million.

In the first year of its work on soy (May 2003 to April 2004), Cordaid funded five small projects that were concrete, short (less than 6 months) and low-cost (less than EUR 10,000). Output was according to plan, time and budget. After the first year, Cordaid started to use large lump-sum funds (of about EUR 200,000) to finance a series of small projects in a period of 2-3 years. Though the output was not specified at the beginning of the project period, it met demand: from April 2004 to January 2006 some 40 small projects were financed in response to concrete proposals of partner organisations and to opportunities for networking and lobbying in the Netherlands.

3.1.3 Factors explaining effectiveness and efficiency

In Brazil there is no deeply rooted tradition of dialogue between companies and NGOs. Many NGOs in Brazil take the view that such dialogue is out of the question: entering agreements with or merely talking to companies is seen as taking sides with the enemy. So, the environment was certainly not conducive to starting dialogue; it was tense and hostile.

Though Cordaid had effectively supported partner organisations and other NGOs in Brazil to formulate criteria of social responsibility criteria for companies purchasing soy and soy-related products, it had not produced a clear lobby plan with its partner organisations on how and where to use the results to start negotiations with companies. There was no consensus among the NGOs on whether to start negotiations with companies on these criteria and so the Brazilian network remained divided.

The first round table on responsible soy was poorly prepared and organised. The central objective of the WWF as the host and main organiser of this round table was to have as many stakeholders as possible attend. The round table process lacked systematic preparation and a stepwise approach. The organisers had grossly underestimated the importance of getting NGOs and companies to agree on the nature and magnitude of negative effects of soy cultivation as a first step towards the formulation of joint criteria.

After the Brazilian partners of Cordaid had rejected the round table, Cordaid withdrew from the organising committee in order to retain the right to speak on behalf of its partners. But this meant that Cordaid lost the opportunity to set the agenda of the round table process and to use the round table to facilitate dialogue between its partner organisations, other NGOs and companies. Cordaid's approach did not work in practice because the potential of dialogue to influence policy could not be exploited.

The four large companies controlling the soy market in Brazil are not sitting ducks. The strategies they have used to frustrate the campaigns, research and agenda-setting of NGOs include: not replying, counter-lobbying, physical threats, agenda-setting at multi-stakeholder consultation, taking preventive action and seeking to promote good will. Cordaid did not develop a clear strategic plan to support its partners in response to these strategies.

The soy chain is long and consists of many parts and players. In Europe the major end-products of the soy chain are not soy or soy-related products but meat and milk. Food and feed companies in the Netherlands believe that any problems occur early in the soy chain, not at the end, and that solutions have to be discussed at international round tables. This attempt to deflect the issue to other players and negotiation tables almost ended the dialogue between the NSC private sector working group and companies in the Netherlands. Drawing lessons from the disappointing first international round table, however, the working group regrouped and re-started its policy influencing directed at the private sector in the Netherlands, targeting individual companies.

The food and feed companies in the Netherlands are sensitive to bad publicity that might cost them lost sales. Public action by Cordaid and other members of the NSC, as well as one-liners like 'Eating up the Amazon' (in the report by Greenpeace) that make a direct link between meat consumption in Europe and deforestation in Brazil succeeded in unsettling companies and contributed greatly to their willingness to acknowledge the problems related to soy production. As a result, the food and feed industry associations invited the NSC to dialogue on a more or less regular basis.

3.2 Hivos and the recognition and implementation of codes of conduct in the coffee sector

In 1999 Hivos and a number of other Dutch NGOs created the Coffee Coalition (CC) with the aim of improving labour conditions for coffee plantation workers. For Hivos, this marked the beginning of a more systematic approach to its coffee activities, addressing problems in different parts of the coffee chain. In first instance, the CC focused on improving the conditions for coffee plantation workers, as a number of existing initiatives such as Fair Trade focused solely on small-scale farmers. Over time, the CC extended its aims to improving conditions of all coffee workers, including small-scale farmers.

In the first phase of its existence, from 1999 to 2002, the CC focused on exploring the relevance and feasibility of joint action on coffee. It started its coffee campaign in 2003, after Oxfam Novib's Make Trade Fair campaign on coffee had ended (see section 3.3). The first lobby target of the campaign was Douwe Egberts (DE/SL),³

3 DE is a brand of Sara Lee. Since a reorganisation in 2005, Sara Lee International, which is located in the Netherlands, has been responsible for managing coffee activities outside North America, and therefore it became the target of the CC.

and subsequently supermarkets were also lobbied to implement a code of conduct for their own brand coffee. Hivos's objective was that these companies would purchase certified coffee, i.e. coffee produced under a code of conduct, which is a set of economic, social and environmental criteria for responsible production. It stipulated the following four minimum requirements for such a code of conduct 'to achieve significant increases in both the number of companies buying certified coffee and the share of certified coffee in the total of purchased and sold coffee by these companies: 1) international rules and national legislation, 2) independent verification, 3) chain responsibility, and 4) a price mechanism that makes implementation by producers possible'.

As well as lobbying coffee companies to adopt a code of conduct, Hivos has also been attempting to integrate the various existing codes of conduct and make them more accessible to small farmers.⁴ Quality management is an important issue for Hivos – hence its focus on the content and integration of codes and conduct, as well as their accessibility.

As its approach targets the coffee chain, Hivos funds projects on coffee both in the North and South, but its policy-influencing activities on coffee mainly take place in the North, where the CC has been a major vehicle for its lobbying. The CC uses a combination of public campaigns and dialogue to try to convince its lobby targets. As well as evaluating the policy-influencing activities of Hivos in the North, a field trip was made to Kenya in order to examine a policy-influencing project on coffee in the South funded by Hivos.

3.2.1 Effectiveness

The objective of achieving a significant increase in the number of companies buying certified coffee and in the market share of certified coffee has been realised: sales of certified coffee as a proportion of total coffee sales in the Netherlands increased from 2.9 percent in 2001 to 27.8 percent in 2006.⁵ DE/SL, with the largest market share in the Netherlands, currently buys 7.5 million kilos of coffee per annum (equal to about 13 percent of its Dutch sales) as Utz Kapeh (a code of conduct for the mainstream coffee market).⁶ The own brand coffees of supermarkets Albert Heijn and C1000 are 100 percent Utz Kapeh. Laurus has

4 Hivos had not articulated its objectives for coffee for its coffee campaign, but has done so in a document written up especially for this evaluation prior to the data collection. Despite the risk that objectives reported with hindsight might bias the evaluation, the evaluation team worked on the basis of these objectives, as there was no alternative.

5 Source: Koffie Coalitie (2006) *Koffiebarometer 2006 - gecertificeerde koffie in Nederland*.

6 During the writing of the present report, the name of Utz Kapeh was changed to UTZ CERTIFIED (as per 1 March 2007).

certified its own brand coffee under Rainforest Alliance, which requires that certified coffee accounts for a share of at least 30 percent. And Drie Mollen, a Dutch coffee roaster that roasts the coffee for a large number of supermarket brands, now mixes ten percent certified coffee into these brands.

DE/SL has acknowledged that the CC played an important role in its decision to buy certified coffee as part of its total coffee purchases. As a result of the CC campaign and dialogue with the CC, DE/SL commissioned a study on the transparency of its supply chain, and based on the conclusions and recommendations of this report, decided to cooperate with Utz Kapeh.

With respect to the purchase of certified coffee by supermarkets, the link with activities of the CC seems limited: supermarkets Albert Heijn and C1000 had already started to implement Utz Kapeh certification of their own brand coffee before the CC campaign, and Laurus did so mainly as a result of cooperation with Oxfam Novib on corporate social responsibility (CSR). None of the other Dutch supermarkets have changed their purchasing policy regarding certified coffee. Although most Dutch supermarkets have responded to the activities of the CC, no real dialogue has been established. However, coffee roaster Drie Mollen – not a direct lobby target of the CC – has committed to purchasing ten percent of its total coffee purchases as certified coffee and blending it (at no extra cost) into the supermarkets' own brands of coffee.

Although the share of certified coffee has increased, the two certification programs used in the Dutch market for mainstream coffee, Utz Kapeh and Rainforest Alliance, do not fulfil all four minimum requirements formulated by Hivos. Whereas the certification programmes largely comply with international and national regulations, Hivos feels that there is still often non-compliance, estimated at some 20 percent. Both programmes do work with independent verification. Chain responsibility is reflected in the codes by traceability: it is possible to find out where the coffee comes from, which increases transparency in the chain. Neither system has a price mechanism that makes implementation of the code of conduct (Utz Kapeh and Rainforest Alliance respectively) possible: as the prices and premiums are negotiated between buyers and sellers, there is no guarantee that the final price is sufficient to make implementation possible.

The objective of integrating codes of conduct in order to increase their accessibility for smallholders has not been achieved. The lobby targets interviewed remembered Hivos's ideas on this issue, but organisations differ in their

willingness to work towards implementing the ideas of Hivos: some praised Hivos for the originality of ideas, while others commented that they felt the timing for integration was not right and that it would be difficult or even undesirable to make competitors cooperate. To date, no concrete steps have been taken at an international level, covering all codes. Nevertheless, there are a small number of initiatives for cooperation between some standard-setting bodies, as well as some pilot projects to test Hivos's ideas in the field.

3.2.2 Efficiency

Hivos has no formulated plan with budgets and a timetable for its work on coffee, so therefore it was impossible to assess whether output has been achieved according to plan, budget and timetable.

The total contract value of projects funded by Hivos that include policy-influencing elements and that were approved in the period 2002-2005, amounts to EUR 4,659,429.

The larger projects funded by Hivos have largely achieved the expected output.

From the information available on the CC, it seems that most types of output have been achieved according to plan and budget, with the exception of the training programmes in Guatemala and Kenya, which have not taken place. The training programme in Brazil was realised, albeit with some delay.

The field trip to Kenya showed that management capacity of the local partner was weak, leading to weak programme and project proposals. As a result of this, Hivos is almost micromanaging the project, which implies efficiency is limited.

3.2.3 Factors explaining effectiveness and efficiency

The combination of public campaigns and dialogue has worked well, especially in the case of DE. The negative publicity around DE induced the company to talk to the CC and to investigate their supply chain. It is more difficult to target companies that have already taken the first steps (e.g. to speed up implementation) and to make them move faster, as public campaigning against these companies affects the relationship with them. It is also difficult to generate and sustain the general public's interest in coffee.

Cooperation within the CC seems to have contributed positively to the results of the coffee campaign. The fact that all the NGOs actively campaigning on coffee issues from different perspectives have worked together increased the pressure on

companies, as financial resources, knowledge of and contacts in the coffee sector could be pooled.

Hivos has adopted a chain approach and is therefore active in the entire coffee supply chain. It actively tries to increase coherence between the organisations it supports by encouraging cooperation between them. This approach contributes to the effectiveness of Hivos coffee activities.

An important external factor that has improved the results of the coffee campaign is the increasing attention paid to CSR by the business community in general, which is also stimulated by the government and NGOs. The recognition of the importance of CSR implies that companies need to know under what conditions their intermediate products are made. This general interest in CSR was acknowledged by the CC and was one of the reasons for starting its coffee campaign.

A second important external development was the introduction of Utz Kapeh as a new (mainstream) code of conduct in the coffee sector. The CC could present Utz Kapeh to the targets of its lobby as a possible instrument for chain responsibility in the coffee sector. In addition, the Utz Kapeh Foundation has been pro-active, approaching important actors in the Dutch coffee sector, so that companies felt pressure from two sides. The CC and Utz Kapeh Foundation have coordinated their strategy towards these companies.

Similarly, the international multi-stakeholder initiative Common Code for the Coffee Community (4Cs) has also brought different stakeholders together in order to increase sustainability in the coffee sector, thereby drawing attention to the issue from various sides.

3.3 Oxfam Novib and the recognition and implementation of codes and conduct in the coffee sector

Coffee was one of the first campaign issues of Oxfam International's (OI) broader Make Trade Fair (MTF) campaign; it was selected to highlight the broader issue of commodity pricing. Coffee was seen as an illustrative product because at the start of the second millennium there was a coffee crisis: coffee prices fell by 50 percent in three years, affecting producers (often small-scale farmers) in developing countries. The 'official' campaign ran from September 2002 to March 2003, but OI

is still actively campaigning on coffee, because it has become clear that coffee is a complex issue and longer-term efforts are needed to come to a solution.

Before the MTF coffee campaign, Oxfam Novib was already part of the Coffee Coalition (CC), a group of Dutch NGOs active in coffee. In its first phase, from 1999 to 2002, the CC focused on exploring the relevance and feasibility of common action on coffee. After the ‘official’ OI coffee campaign ended in March 2003, Oxfam Novib integrated its coffee campaigning activities in the Netherlands into the CC.

The OI objectives for the coffee campaign are:

- 1) Roaster companies committing to paying a decent price to farmers;
- 2) Roaster companies trading only in coffee that meets the Quality Coffee Schemes Standards of the International Coffee Organisation (ICO);
- 3) The destruction of at least five million bags, as an intermediate measure, to be funded by consumer governments and roaster companies;
- 4) The creation of a diversification fund to help poorly productive farmers create alternative livelihoods;
- 5) Roaster companies committing to buying increasing volumes of coffee under fair trade conditions directly from producers. Within one year this should apply to two percent of their total volume, with subsequent incremental increases.

OI adopted a multi-level approach, targeting among others coffee companies, governments and relevant international organisations. Sara Lee (SL) was one of the four corporate lobby targets of the OI campaign, and Oxfam Novib lobbied Douwe Egberts (DE)/ SL, based in the Netherlands. DE/SL managed all coffee activities of the Sara Lee Corporation outside North America and DE is the market leader in the Netherlands.⁷ Oxfam Novib has focused mainly on OI objectives 1 and 5 in its coffee campaign, asking coffee companies to adopt and implement a code of conduct.

Since April 2003, the lobbying of DE/SL has continued in cooperation with the CC. Supermarkets have subsequently been targeted too, to implement a code of conduct for their own brand coffee. Oxfam Novib’s specific objective related to the

⁷ Since a reorganisation in 2005, the coffee activities outside North America have been managed by Sara Lee International, located in the Netherlands, which became the target of Oxfam Novib and the CC.

supermarkets was that 50 percent of the Dutch retail sector would be committed to a recognised code of conduct for coffee.

In addition to its policy-influencing activities directed at coffee companies in the Netherlands, Oxfam Novib represented OI in the Steering Committee of the Common Code for the Coffee Community (4Cs), a joint initiative of coffee producers, trade and industry, trade unions and social as well as environmental NGOs in order to develop a new global code of conduct aiming at overall sustainability in mainstream coffee. No objectives regarding the 4Cs have been formulated at OI level, but according to Oxfam Novib's annual plans, the objectives regarding the 4Cs at outcome level were first to achieve a final draft of the Code, then to test it in the field, and finally, to make it operational.

The evaluation focused on activities directed at influencing private sector policy (OI objectives 1 and 5, including the specific objective for the retail sector) and with respect to the 4Cs. As these activities and objectives were the specific concern of Oxfam Novib, the evaluation team analysed the policy-influencing activities of Oxfam Novib, not the entire OI coffee campaign. Since the end of the 'official' OI coffee campaign, the CC has been an important vehicle in the lobbying of DE/SL and the supermarkets in the Netherlands. It has used a combination of public campaigns and dialogue in an attempt to persuade its lobby targets. The person responsible for the coffee campaign within Oxfam Novib often represented the CC in meetings with lobby targets, notably with DE/SL.

3.3.1 Effectiveness

The objective of a multinational buying at least two percent of its total coffee purchases under fair trade conditions has not been achieved. Nevertheless, the lobbying of DE/SL in the Netherlands has achieved a policy shift in the desired direction, as DE/SL now includes some certified coffee in its total coffee purchases. In March 2004, DE/SL made its first commitment to buying a percentage of its total coffee purchases under the Utz Kapeh Code of Conduct. In 2005, it tripled this commitment and its current total commitment is now 7,500 tons of certified coffee per year, equivalent to approximately 13 percent of DE/SL's total Dutch coffee sales, which is not to be confused with the total coffee purchases of this multinational. Given that Dutch NGOs had lobbied DE for more than 15 years, this is a significant step, and DE/SL has acknowledged that Oxfam Novib and the CC played a significant role in this decision, as noted in section 3.2.1.

The objective of roaster companies committing to paying a decent price to farmers has not been achieved. DE/SL has adopted the Utz Kapeh code of conduct, and in contrast with Fair Trade, which offers a minimum price to farmers, Utz Kapeh offers a price premium, which is negotiated between buyer and seller.⁸ Buyers are therefore not committed to paying a *decent* price to farmers, only to paying a premium. However, the rise in coffee prices in recent years, coupled with the price premium of Utz Kapeh which offers farmers a better negotiation position, means the price for farmers has improved since the OI coffee campaign began.

It was impossible to verify whether the objective that 50 percent of the Dutch retail sector is committed to a recognised code of conduct has been achieved, as no detailed figures are available for this sector. However, the share of certified coffee in total coffee sales in the Netherlands has increased considerably in recent years (from 2.1 percent in 2001 to 27.8 percent in 2006)⁹ and most supermarkets have at least some certified coffee in their own brand coffee. Not all these supermarkets can be considered to be committed to a recognised code of conduct, however, as not all of them have deliberately opted for certification, as indicated in section 3.2.1. In addition, it should be noted that not all supermarkets opted for certification in response to the coffee campaign, as some were already in the process of Utz Kapeh certification before the campaign started.

A final draft of the Common Code of the Coffee Community (4Cs) has been achieved. At the time of writing this evaluation report, the code was still being tested in the field, so the objective of having the code operational had not yet been achieved. Interviewees differed strongly in their views on whether the 4Cs would indeed become operational and a viable option to the existing codes. Regarding the role of OI in the 4C Steering committee, interviewees recognised OI as an active and constructive participant and felt that OI has had a clear impact on the Rules of Participation of this Code, which lay down the commitments required from coffee buyers.

8 Oxfam Novib indicated that it had been agreed within OI that the coffee campaign would not primarily focus on the fair trade market.

9 Source: Koffie Coalitie (2006) *Koffiebarometer 2006 - gecertificeerde koffie in Nederland*.

3.3.2 Efficiency

As Oxfam Novib has no detailed action plans with timelines and budget for its coffee campaign it was impossible to determine whether output had been achieved according to plan, time and budget at Oxfam Novib level. Information on the total costs of the coffee campaign was also limited, as Oxfam Novib only specifies costs at the level of the MTF campaign, and not at the level of MTF sub-campaigns. The only information available on costs was for certain specific activities. These costs amounted to EUR 11,930 in 2003; EUR 4,250 in 2004 and EUR 10,000 in 2005 (excluding staff costs). They excluded general budget items like paid publicity, printing and promotional material, and popular campaigning activities.

The contract value of coffee-related funding by Oxfam Novib (e.g funding of the CC) was EUR 2,217,966. As most of the projects funded by Oxfam Novib are still ongoing, the achievement of output according to plan, timetable and budget could not be assessed.

From the information available on the CC, most types of output seem to have been realised according to plan and budget, with the exception of the training programmes in Guatemala and Kenya, which have never taken place. The training programme in Brazil did take place, albeit later than planned.

3.3.3 Factors explaining effectiveness and efficiency

As Oxfam Novib lobbied DE/SL and the supermarkets largely in cooperation with the CC, many of the factors explaining effectiveness and efficiency listed in section 3.2.3 also apply to Oxfam Novib's coffee campaign. In terms of international factors, the combination of publications and dialogue has worked well, especially in the case of DE/SL. Cooperation within the CC also seems to have contributed positively to the results of the coffee campaign.

Cooperation within Oxfam International facilitated a division of labour and allowed OI to be active at many levels: targeting the different big multinational roasters, lobbying governments regarding the International Coffee Organisation (ICO) and commodity issues more generally, sharing information from the South (each Oxfam affiliate has its own partners), and participation in several relevant international forums, like the 4Cs. The fact that Oxfam could be active at so many different levels seems to have contributed to the effectiveness: for example, DE/SL will be forced to think about sustainability issues if it knows that other important

market players (in the Netherlands and other European countries) face similar pressure, and that governments also monitor developments in the sector.

On the other hand, OI works in a decentralised way, with each affiliate making its own strategic choices; this sometimes causes confusion about OI's goals and strategies. A prime example of this are the different views on fair trade versus mainstream codes of conduct. However, these differences do not seem to have had a clear impact on the effectiveness of the campaign.

The external factors that play a role are also similar to the ones identified in section 3.2.3. The attention given to corporate social responsibility in the business community, the introduction of Utz Kapeh as a new mainstream code of conduct, and the 4C initiative are factors that positively affected the results of the coffee campaign. It should be noted that although the 4C initiative can be considered as an important external factor, the 4C secretariat commented that OI's coffee campaign was one of the factors (although not the only or most important one) that led to the creation of the 4Cs.

3.4 ICCO and the Food Trade and Nutrition Coalition

In December 2002, ICCO and its partner Wemos jointly launched a global campaign on food and nutritional security in preparation for the 5th WTO Ministerial in Cancun (September 2003). The campaign focused on the right to adequate food and food security becoming major principles and concerns in international policies on food trade. It also included a number of Southern partners already involved with food and nutrition issues. After joint lobbying at the Cancun Ministerial, the parties involved decided to continue their lobbying and formally established the Food, Trade and Nutrition (FTN) coalition. ICCO and Wemos, the main initiators of the coalition, took on the coordination within the coalition.

The overall objective or guiding principle of the FTN coalition pertains to the realisation of the 'universal right to adequate food and the right to health'. Its work particularly relates to the international trade agreements of the WTO and EU. The coalition pays special attention to the consequences of various WTO agreements on the fight against poverty and on the availability, affordability and quality of food for all.

Each year, in consultation with all members, a set of specific objectives of the coalition is formulated. However, these objectives could not be used for assessing the FTN Coalition, because they had not all been formulated at the same level (outcome and activities), or had not been clearly formulated in the first place. In the absence of clear FTN objectives, the evaluation team assessed ICCO's policy-influencing activities on the basis of objectives formulated by the evaluators who focused on key concerns of ICCO/FTN for this purpose. The objectives were: (1) the rights-based approach to food security and health at national and international levels, (2) an end to food dumping, with a focus on food aid in kind, and 3) the right to local market protection by developing countries.¹⁰ ICCO/FTN wants these objectives to be reflected in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, the Dutch / EU positions in international agreements, and Southern partner countries' positions in international agreements.

The FTN coalition is based on the principles of 'the pincer'. Decisions are made at different levels: national (and regional) levels in the North and in the South, and international level, with these different levels influencing each other. The pincer approach entails lobbying effectively at all these different levels, with FTN partners operating on an equal footing. ICCO, Wemos and third Dutch partner KerkinActie (KiA) try to incorporate inputs from Southern partners into their lobbying activities at the EU and Dutch levels, e.g. by presenting case studies prepared by Southern partners and occasionally by engaging these partners directly in lobby meetings with policymakers. In addition, joint lobbying takes place at the international level, notably during international events such as the WTO Ministerials, World Social Forums (WSF) and UNCTAD conferences. Finally, individual FTN members lobby their respective governments on FTN issues. All members are responsible for taking up the common issues in their national lobbying efforts. In addition they develop plans and strategies relevant to their specific national contexts. Southern FTN partners include organisations from Bolivia (4), Brazil (2), India (6), Kenya (2) and Uganda (1). ICCO considers the capacity building of its partners to be strategic and to be a step towards improved lobbying at different levels.

ICCO (and Wemos) lobby Dutch policymakers – in the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs/Development Cooperation, and Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, as well as Members of Parliament (MPs) – and the European

¹⁰ Although GMOs – the right to choose GMO-free food and seeds – were also formally taken up as a main lobbying theme, this issue was only pursued actively by certain partners, e.g. KerkinActie and in the context of specific countries, e.g. India. Achievement of the objectives related to GMOs was therefore not assessed.

Commission. In the Netherlands, the lobbying has often been done in cooperation with the Coalition for Fair Trade (CFT), of which ICCO is a member. Although the FTN coalition as such is not part of the CFT, most of ICCO's lobbying on FTN issues in the run-up to Hong Kong took place within this CFT. At the EU level, ICCO (i.e. not the FTN coalition) engages in lobbying activities through Aprovev.

The evaluation focused on ICCO and its lobbying activities related to FTN at the national (Dutch) and international levels. The policy-influencing activities of Southern partners with their respective governments were not considered in depth, though a field study was done in India to analyse the functioning of the 'pincer' approach. Lobbying activities at the EU level were not assessed, as these mostly took place through other networks and alliances.

3.4.1 Effectiveness

The overall effectiveness of the FTN campaign in terms of meeting the specific objectives described above is rather limited. Although the rights-based approach and main lobby themes of ICCO and the FTN were remembered by all the policymakers interviewed, the Dutch civil servants interviewed in the Netherlands had not adopted the rights-based approach, arguing that human rights were too complicated an issue to bring into trade negotiations. The rights-based approach has not been accepted as part of trade agreements and negotiations at the international level (WTO) either.

The ICCO/FTN stance on food dumping and food aid is reflected in the Dutch stance, but the Dutch civil servants did not consider it to be new. Nevertheless, they saw it as supporting their stance. The existing WTO text is more or less in line with the FTN stance on food dumping and food aid, although details still need to be worked out. However, the topics the FTN lobbies for are not new and the ICCO/FTN are by no means the only lobbyists at international level on these issues. Given the large number of organisations lobbying on these issues and the fact that the Dutch and EU positions - especially on food aid dumping - were already in essence the same as that of the FTN coalition, it is impossible to unequivocally credit the FTN Coalition with achieving change at international level.

With regard to local market protection: the principles of Special and Differential Treatment for developing countries and Special Products are recognised by Dutch policymakers, yet most found the ICCO position to be too much in favour of protectionism. One policymaker argued that ICCO/the coalition did not contribute to actual, constructive solutions. The principles of SDT and SP are

also recognised in the WTO text, but little progress has been made in actual agreements: the contribution of ICCO/FTN can again be considered as negligible.

At the level of policymakers in the Netherlands, it is questionable whether ICCO/the FTN have actually raised awareness of the issues they lobbied for. All the civil servants interviewed argued that the issues ICCO/the FTN addressed were not new. In some cases the policymakers felt supported by ICCO's position, while in other cases they actually expressed irritation with the fact that the issues were not new, but merely a repetition of known stances. A difference was observed in this respect between civil servants within the ministries and the Members of Parliament (MPs) interviewed: the latter tended to be more positive about the usefulness of the information provided by ICCO.

The strategy of strengthening the capacity of partners to improve lobbying at different levels has had limited results. Observations during the field visit to India and from project dossiers suggest¹¹ that actual lobbying by Southern partners of their respective governments is still limited: they seem to focus more on campaigning, networking and advocacy as opposed to engaging in dialogue with policymakers. It seems that capacity building has not – or not yet – actually influenced policy, and therefore the pincer approach has not contributed to achieving the envisaged objectives.

3.4.2 Efficiency

The total amount of direct FTN funding (excluding personnel costs and project funding) amounts to EUR 230,000 per annum. This amount consists of EUR 150,000 for the FTN activities of Wemos (including staff costs and partner funding) and of the contribution from the regional departments for Bolivia, Brazil and India (EUR 20,000 each) and Uganda and Kenya (EUR 10,000 each). In addition, several project/programme grants have been disbursed to Southern partners to support their FTN-related work or to support their general programme including such work. On the basis of available figures, between 2003 and 2006 the total amount of project funding that was FTN-related amounted to approximately EUR 470,000.

Each year a plan was drawn up in consultation with all partners, specifying the coalition's activities and outputs. Most activities planned for 2005 were indeed completed. In 2006 the planning document was never completed, because ICCO

11 Within the scope of this evaluation, no in-depth assessment could be made per country and per FTN partner of the activities, output and outcome.

considered it important for that year to be one of reflection, evaluation and reorganisation of the FTN. Few activities were therefore carried out in 2006.¹²

An attempt to introduce specific national plans per country at the end of 2005 failed. In the absence of such specific FTN plans, it was difficult to gauge the achievement of outputs at the national level, especially as the activities of individual partners were often integrated in larger programmes for multi-year funding, in which specific FTN activities were often not clearly specified. It was therefore also not possible to assess whether outputs were achieved according to budget, as information could not be obtained on the exact breakdown of financial inputs, particularly with regard to partner financing.

3.4.3 Factors explaining effectiveness and efficiency

As the FTN objectives were extremely ambitious and were often unclear and not translated into intermediate objectives, it was hard to conduct a focused lobby. The scope and complexity of the issues and the practical application of the pincer principles seem to have been misjudged. ICCO clearly realised that tackling complex and multilevel issues of trade, food and nutrition required a multilevel approach and therefore developed the pincer model. However, the ambitiousness of the objectives, the large number of initial objectives and lobby targets and the fairly new intervention method of policy influencing (something even the Dutch partners were still learning to apply, but with which Southern partners in particular had little experience), coupled with some of the problems inherent to a general model such as the pincer, resulted in a campaign that was spread so thinly that its effectiveness was limited. As ICCO itself concluded: ‘The pincer was a model that turned out to be mostly a theoretical model that was insufficiently elaborated for practical purposes’.

The input from Southern partners was not as strong as was envisaged and the entire process is still mainly driven from the North. The lobbying by Southern partners of their respective governments is still limited. The monitoring of such activities by ICCO is also limited, making it hard to link the national level to the international level in the case of these partner countries. In general, it appears that big differences in the strength of the Southern partners affects their capacity and effectiveness with regard to lobbying. The efforts made to build capacity have

¹² A detailed plan was also made for 2004, but its realisation could not be assessed, as the person responsible for FTN at ICCO at that time had left the organisation, and project files did not contain sufficient information.

not yet actually influenced policy – in other words, it has proved rather difficult to link the internal and external objectives of the FTN coalition.

ICCO and the FTN partners realised that the intervention design was too ambitious and too complex high and did make some adjustments to focus campaign efforts more, with a narrower (if not exclusive) focus on the WTO system and negotiations, and the selection of a very specific topic (food aid and trade). The more focused approach probably accounts for the high profile presence of ICCO and the FTN at the WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong.

External cooperation has been an important way for ICCO to get its FTN points across at different forums and organisations and in this respect probably contributed to efficiency and effectiveness, most notably in the Coalition for Fair Trade. However, in the case of India, it appears that networking has become an end in itself, as opposed to a means to achieve an end. As such it has merely watered down the message of the coalition, while it also posed problems to ICCO and the Dutch FTN partners in terms of coordination and control of the coalition's activities.

A number of weaknesses of the internal organisation within ICCO, between the Dutch partners, between partners in certain countries in the South (notably India and Bolivia) and at the international level seem to have diminished the coalition's efficiency and effectiveness. These issues include: ,1) frequent personnel and organisational changes within ICCO and the Dutch FTN, leading to a loss of institutional memory and making it hard to establish lasting relationships particularly with policymakers, 2) lack of clear FTN responsibility within ICCO, particularly with regard to Southern partners (the internal division of tasks and funding strategy were in fact poorly aligned to the nature of the coalition and its work), 3) no clear division of responsibilities between ICCO and Wemos, which has at times caused uncertainty among Southern partners, 4) tensions between Southern partners and related issues of control for ICCO and 5) a general tension between the need to steer the process and assuring that Southern partners have ownership.

In terms of external explanatory factors for effectiveness and efficiency, it must be noted that with the stalling of the WTO negotiations in the Doha Development Round, the main focal point for the coalition has more or less fallen away. Thus there has been no real lobbying momentum since the WTO Ministerial in Hong

Kong in December 2005. For the FTN, 2006 therefore became a year not just for reflection on internal operations, but also for reflections on lobby objectives.

3.5 Hivos and the adoption of alternative policies and protocols on GMOs

Since the end of 2000, Hivos has been actively involved in the debate on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). Hivos decided to become active in this debate mainly because a number of its partners had expressed concern about genetic engineering and its implications for organic agriculture and biodiversity. According to Hivos, the power of multinationals active in genetic engineering and the risk of GMO contamination of organic food products are just two examples of the disadvantages of genetic engineering which could harm small-scale farmers in developing countries.

Hivos and a number of other Dutch NGOs critical of genetic engineering created the Gentech Coalition, which was particularly active during a public debate initiated by the Government in 2001 on biotechnology and food. Called 'Food and Genes' ('Eten en Genen') this debate was organised by the Temporary Committee on Biotechnology and Food, the Terlouw Committee. After this debate, Hivos was active in the North in the discussion on food aid and GMOs, and to a lesser extent on the issue of liability, the EU regulation on GMOs and a trade dispute in the WTO on the EU's GMO policy.

The four headings under which the objectives of Hivos's GMO campaign fall, and the objectives that flow from these headings are listed below:

- 1) Preservation of the possibility for countries to refuse access to products containing GMOs.
 - 1.1) To promote the ratification of the Biosafety Protocol of Cartagena,¹³ and promote references to the recognition of this Protocol in free trade agreements and WTO rules.
 - 1.2) To help establish principles or rules for food aid.
- 2) Preservation of the freedom of choice for consumers, in other words: preservation of a GMO-free chain.
 - 2.1) Preservation of a GMO-free chain in the Netherlands.
 - 2.2) Preservation of a GMO-free chain in the EU.

¹³ Ratification of the Biosafety Protocol would allow signatories of the protocol to refuse GMO imports.

- 2.3) Preservation of a GMO-free chain in developing countries.
- 3) Resistance to the field introduction of GMOs at EU level, in particular for products that might get mixed with GMO-free seed.
 - 3.1) To provide an interpretation of the objective of avoiding cross fertilisation in the Netherlands.
 - 3.2) Stringent rules for field introduction in the EU.
 - 3.3) To get the liability issue on the agenda; through public law, criminal law or civil law.
- 4) Patents on living organisms.
 - 4.1) Rejection of patents on living organisms by the Netherlands and the EU.

In its policy-influencing activities in the North, Hivos has focused on objectives 1.2 and 2.1. The other objectives have mainly been pursued by partner organisations working at international level or in the South. Hivos continued to fund these organisations, even after the GMO campaign in the North ended.¹⁴ It ended the campaign in the Netherlands in 2004 because the debate had started to focus on the coexistence of organic, conventional and GMO agriculture (related to objectives 2.1 and 3.1) and Hivos considered that developing countries had limited stake in this debate.

The Hivos strategy in the GMO campaign in the North focused on awareness raising and campaigning, to make its arguments heard. Another important component of the Hivos GMO campaign was the funding of other organisations worldwide, but in accordance with its remit the evaluation team only assessed the outcome of this funding in terms of the policy-influencing activities related to GMOs in Kenya.

3.5.1 Effectiveness

The objective of helping to establish rules on food aid (objective 1.2) had limited results. Though various organisations have produced statements on food aid and GMOs, there is no internationally recognised set of rules on food aid and GMOs. The statements of these organisations were often in line with Hivos's recommendations, but it was difficult to determine to what extent this can be attributed to Hivos, given that other organisations were active in this debate and the issue attracted much media attention. In addition, for some organisations the statement merely implied making their policy on GMOs explicit, but involved

¹⁴ An analysis of the extent to which the objectives other than 1.2 and 2.1 have been achieved is available in the case study report. However, it was beyond the remit of the evaluation to determine the link between the achievement of these other objectives and Hivos.

no actual policy change. However, Hivos has been able to get the issue on – or higher up – the agendas of certain relevant organisations. The visit of a Zambian government delegation to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs induced the Minister for Development Cooperation to raise the issue at an Executive Board meeting of the World Food Programme. A statement by Hivos on food aid led to an internal discussion on the issue within one German NGO and in turn this NGO induced EuronAid, a network of NGOs active in food aid, to produce a statement on GMOs. In this way, Hivos helped raise awareness of the issue among its lobby targets.

Working towards the realisation of objective 2.1, Hivos was active in the Food and Genes debate, as part of the Gentech Coalition. The Coalition strongly criticised the debate, mainly because it was felt that the debate was biased in favour of GMOs. The Coalition's subsequent decision to withdraw from the debate generated much media attention. The lobby targets interviewed recalled that Hivos had been active on the issue during the debate and had been critical of GMOs, but few remembered specific arguments or activities. None of the interviewees felt that the conclusions or recommendations of the Food and Genes debate were clearly based on the inputs from Hivos or the Gentech Coalition. Many of the lobby targets interviewed felt the stance taken by Hivos and the Gentech Coalition was one-sided and therefore not very reliable and constructive. Hivos decided to end its GMO campaign during the debate in the Netherlands on the 'co-existence regulation', as this was mainly a domestic Dutch debate and Hivos's focus is on policies (and their effects) on developing countries.

The objective of preserving a GMO-free chain in the Netherlands (objective 2.1) has not been achieved in that no regulation has been introduced that guarantees a GMO-free chain. Given that the introduction of GMOs in EU agriculture has been limited, however, in practice there is still a GMO-free chain in the Netherlands. In the debate on this issue, Hivos did contribute to making information on GMOs accessible to the general public and helped to increase attention for the issue, but the evaluation did not find that Hivos contributed to moving the issue up the agenda of policymakers or that it was able to convince policymakers.

3.5.2 Efficiency

Hivos's financial input to GMO-related activities in the Netherlands and EU in the period 2000–2005 amounts to more than EUR 200,000 (excluding staff costs).¹⁵ In addition, Hivos funds a large number of projects that involve influencing policy on GMOs at international level or at national/regional level in the South. The total amount of funds for these projects (approved in the period 2001-2005) is EUR 5,530,790, divided over 41 projects.

The programme documents for the GMO campaign of Hivos do not include a detailed overview of planned activities with budgets and timelines. Activities are formulated in very general terms and therefore it is difficult to assess to what extent output has been realised according to plan. The individual activities (e.g. workshops and publications) and also the projects of partners seem to have been implemented roughly in accordance with the partners' time and budget frames.

3.5.3 Factors explaining effectiveness and efficiency

The fact that Hivos has not been very successful in achieving the objectives set for its GMO campaign can largely be attributed to the ambitiousness of these objectives. Hivos has indicated that it considered the objectives more as an ultimate goal to which its activities should contribute; it did not think that it would achieve these objectives. However, no intermediate objectives were identified, nor was a clear strategy formulated. Consequently, it is often unclear what Hivos aimed to achieve with its specific activities.

In its campaign, Hivos focused on awareness raising and campaigning. For example, it published brochures with accessible information on GMOs and organised a number of workshops on the issue. It had very few face-to-face meetings with policymakers. This strategy of focusing on campaigning rather than lobbying implies that Hivos aimed to bring its own arguments to the fore rather than to engage in dialogue with policymakers and in that way find common ground. This approach is reflected in the views of lobby targets, as many indicated that they considered Hivos not to be a constructive partner in the debate and only to present a one-sided story. This explains why Hivos was unable to convince its lobby targets of its arguments, except in the case of food aid.

The limited amount of time that Hivos could devote to policy influencing is also an issue. There was no time available for research on GMO, and Hivos based

¹⁵ No precise amount can be given, as budget information is not available for all specific projects.

its stance on the arguments of some of its major partners. The lobby targets interviewed felt that Hivos did not provide new information or insights in the debate.

Hivos's cooperation with other organisations increased its outreach and efficiency in the GMO campaign. The research and arguments of international organisations helped Hivos determine its own stance. Cooperation in the Netherlands in the Gentech Coalition enabled Hivos to reach more policymakers and attract more media attention.

An important external factor is the fact that the import and production of GMOs in the EU has been modest over recent years – far below what was feared around the start of the second millennium. This limited use and production of GMOs is largely attributable to the extensive approval procedures at EU level and the *de facto* moratorium on approval of new GMO products from 1998 until 2004. Cultural factors also seem to have played a role, reflected for example in the presence of some aversion in the EU to highly productive agriculture and a focus on risk management. There has therefore been less need than anticipated for policy influencing on some topics, e.g. on stopping the field introduction of GMOs.

Somewhat related to this is the fact that there have not been real policy discussions on GMOs in the Netherlands since the Food and Genes debate. The opportunities for Hivos to undertake policy-influencing activities have therefore been limited since 2002.

3.6 Oxfam Novib and the EU sugar reforms

Since 2002, EU sugar policy has been on the agenda of Oxfam International (OI) and Oxfam Novib. Within the broader OI campaign to Make Trade Fair (MTF), sugar was considered illustrative of dumping practices by developed countries, negatively affecting sugar producers in developing countries. As part of the general reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the European Commission embarked on an ambitious programme for reform of the sector. From the start of 2002 until final political agreement on these reforms was reached in December 2004, OI engaged in a campaign that focused on these sugar reforms.

The overall objective of the sugar campaign was to persuade the EU to implement a reform package that would put an end to dumping and be development-friendly

and sustainable. In addition, the following specific objectives for OI were formulated:

- 1) Stop the direct and indirect subsidising of exports. The continuation of dumping must be rejected. In practice, this means a zero export regime;
- 2) Improve market access for the poorest countries, against a remunerative and predictable price;
- 3) Protect ACP interests. The EU should provide generous and timely support to countries undergoing adjustments;
- 4) Ensure the regime is in line with public interests in the EU, i.e. creating an agricultural system that is sustainable in social and environmental terms.

These objectives were supplemented with a number of specific policy recommendations, which clearly show that OI was in favour of reducing production quotas rather than drastic price cuts to limit EU sugar production, and that it aimed to protect the interests of ACP countries and LDCs.

The overall OI strategy encompassed a multi-level lobbying campaign in which relevant policymakers and other stakeholders at the EU level were jointly targeted by OI, while at the national level the individual Oxfam members lobbied their respective governments and policymakers as well as representatives of the sugar industry. Lobbying efforts were supported by research, publications, and media and public campaigning activities.

Oxfam Novib adopted the OI objectives and formulated a number of more specific objectives for the Netherlands. The overall objective of the Dutch campaign was to influence the Dutch input in the EU Agricultural Council – which was to decide on the EU sugar reforms – along the OI lines. The specific objectives for 2004 and 2005 show the emphasis of Oxfam Novib on getting the support of Parliament (specific political parties) and the sugar sector for sugar reforms along the lines of the OI objectives.¹⁶ In its policy-influencing activities, Oxfam Novib focused on the first three OI objectives. It engaged in lobbying civil servants and ministers from the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (which led the negotiating process in Brussels), the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Development Cooperation. In addition, Members of Parliament were actively lobbied.

¹⁶ The full overview of specific objectives and their achievement for 2004 and 2005 are listed in the case study report.

In addition to lobbying policymakers directly, an important element of the Oxfam Novib campaign in the Netherlands was the establishment of contacts and the encouragement of dialogue between all the main players in the sector (the Dutch sugar industry and farmers' organisations), eventually leading to the formation of a broad, albeit loose alliance, which jointly lobbied policymakers on a number of specific issues. In addition, contacts were also established with labour unions and an organisation in the Netherlands the sugar-producing LDCs. The main issue on which the partners concurred was the need for a reduction of EU sugar production through quota cuts as opposed to a price-led reform.

3.6.1 Effectiveness

At the EU policy level, the OI objectives were achieved to a limited extent. The final political agreement foresees an end to EU sugar exports, hence reduction of production, which would put an end to EU sugar dumping (objective 1). However, this had been an objective of the Commission from the onset of the reform process, as it was needed to bring the EU sugar regime in line with WTO requirements. In contrast to the OI proposals and even against the wishes of a number of EU member states, the agreement proposed to achieve this through drastic price reductions. Thus the objective of moderate price decreases and giving LDCs access to EU markets against a guaranteed higher price was not achieved (objective 2). In addition, although a compensation package for the affected ACP countries was included, it was much less than OI had proposed and certain sugar-producing LDCs were not eligible for it (objective 3).

The objective of influencing the input of the Dutch Government in the Agricultural Council was achieved to only a very limited extent. Although the Dutch Government appears to have been sympathetic to Oxfam Novib's points and has generally taken a more pro-development stance within the EU, ultimately it did not give the interests of developing countries/LDCs high priority and the Minister for Agriculture did not push for these in the Agricultural Council.

Despite the limited results in terms of achieving the OI objectives and the overall objective of Oxfam Novib's Dutch campaign, Oxfam Novib did have some success in its policy-influencing activities, notably at the level of the Dutch Parliament. Oxfam Novib also succeeded in establishing dialogue and cooperation between non-traditional partners, i.e. industry and farmers' organisations, winning their trust and creating awareness of the effects of dumping and general EU policies on

people in developing countries. Oxfam Novib was therefore able to achieve many of its specific intermediate objectives for 2004 and 2005.¹⁷

In June 2004, one of Oxfam Novib's dialogue partners, the Platform Toekomst Suikerindustrie, submitted an alternative proposal for sugar reforms to the Dutch Parliament and relevant ministries. Several of Oxfam Novib's points with regard to ACP and LDC interests were clearly reflected in this alternative proposal, but though the proposal was well received in Parliament, the Ministry of Agriculture did not take it up. Subsequently the different stakeholders presented themselves as a broad coalition in a joint statement sent to Parliament urging it to pressure the Dutch Government to adopt the alternative proposal. This appeal to Parliament and the following lobby meetings set up with Parliamentarians eventually led Parliament to adopt a motion urging the Dutch Government to strive for reforms along the lines of the Platform proposal. The motion explicitly refers to Oxfam Novib as one of the organisations supporting the proposal. However, the successful lobbying of the Dutch Parliament did not achieve much at the level of the Dutch Cabinet: they more or less overruled the motion adopted by Parliament, conceding only to convey the gist of the concerns expressed in the motion to the EC in Brussels.

In line with the limited influence on the Dutch input in the Agricultural Council, lobbying the civil servants of the relevant ministries yielded few results. Policymakers in the relevant ministries stated they shared the attitude of Oxfam Novib that reforms should take into account the plight of developing countries. They were also in favour of a reduction of production and an end to dumping. However, they disagreed with the way Oxfam Novib/OI argued this could be achieved. In general, their position was far more pro-liberalisation, hence pro price cuts and against maintaining quota for LDCs. On the positive side, it is partly due to the sugar campaign that Oxfam Novib succeeded in establishing and to an extent institutionalising contacts within the Ministry of Agriculture, where the organisation is now recognised as a 'natural partner' in dialogue.

17 For more details, see the case study report at www.minbuza.nl/job.

3.6.2 Efficiency

Annual plans were made by OI and by Oxfam Novib (and by the other Oxfam affiliates for that matter), and these were roughly adhered to. Activities were formulated in general terms, i.e. not specifying dates or deadlines. The first stage of the campaign took longer than planned and one of the interviewees from OI indicated that ideally the first paper should have been published much earlier than it was.

As information on financial input was limited, it was not possible to assess whether output was achieved according to budget. As noted in section 3.3.2, Oxfam Novib only specifies costs at the level of the MTF campaign, and not at the level of MTF sub-campaigns. Oxfam Novib estimated the costs of certain specific sugar campaign activities (three studies, a study visit to Mozambique and a visit of Mozambican and Malawian sugar farmers to the EU) at some EUR 48,000, but this should be considered a rough estimate.

3.6.3 Factors explaining effectiveness and efficiency

The clear and consistent set-up of the intervention design - based on research, extensive consultation and internal debates - and implementation of a multi-level lobbying strategy allowed OI and Oxfam Novib to play a major role in the EU sugar reform debate.

OI objectives and recommendation were formulated in a concrete way, particularly at national level in the Netherlands. This ensured that a clear message was conveyed, as evidenced by the fact that all stakeholders and policymakers were well aware of the overall Oxfam position. Research and case studies commissioned and conducted by Oxfam at the OI level and in the Netherlands by Oxfam Novib, provided additional credibility to its proposals. On the whole, and particularly as campaign progressed, Oxfam Novib was therefore considered to be a constructive player in the discussions. OI at the EU level and Oxfam Novib in the Netherlands came to be seen as the leading development NGO and specialist in this field. As it fitted in well with Oxfam's general MTF campaign (against dumping) and work on trade and development issues, the sugar campaign contributed to a further profiling of OI in these areas. Within Oxfam Novib there was a clear and strong lead from the main lobbyist.

A downside to the long internal processes to establish a common OI position was that several other players, particularly the Dutch sugar industry, were already well organised by the time the Oxfam really became engaged. This was clear in the

Netherlands, where the Platform launched an early campaign and was considered by most policymakers interviewed to have been at forefront of the overall lobbying campaign in the Netherlands.

The power analysis conducted at OI level and in the Netherlands allowed for targeted lobbying of specific Ministries, political parties and key stakeholders. This worked well at the level of the Dutch Parliament, where the combination of lobbying efforts targeted at the sector, individual and joint lobbying (with all stakeholders) aimed at Members of Parliament and on occasions at specific parties within Parliament, were clearly instrumental in getting the motion adopted. However, successful lobbying of the Dutch Parliament did not achieve much at the level of the Dutch Cabinet, as the latter more or less overruled Parliament. This was an external factor that was hard to foresee by Oxfam Novib in its initial power analysis, and more generally speaking by any of the parties involved.

The pro-free market political climate prevailing in in the Netherlands, particularly in the Cabinet, made Oxfam Novib's proposals hard to sell: they were considered too protectionist and as promoting the interests of the EU farmers and beet sugar industry.

External cooperation in the sugar campaign in the Netherlands was for the most part 'non-traditional', i.e. hardly any alliances were formed with other NGOs, but dialogue was established with key players in the sector. This can be attributed on the one hand to the efforts made by Oxfam Novib and to a cultural tradition of dialogue in the Netherlands (the 'polder model') and the fact that all the major stakeholders in the Netherlands generally accepted the inevitability of drastic reforms. Most parties therefore realised that they it was in their interest to cooperate and to engage actively and constructively in the reform process. This broad coalition was clearly effective at the level of Parliament. It gave credibility to the alternative proposal and helped convince even the political parties that were not traditionally close to Oxfam Novib, such as the Christian Democrats and Liberal Party. At the level of ministries the picture was somewhat different: policymakers within the Ministry of Agriculture confirmed that Oxfam Novib's strategy of aligning itself with the sugar industry and farmers was a smart move and an important step in becoming accepted as a serious partner in the debate in the Netherlands and EU. However, policymakers in the Ministry of Development Cooperation and of Economic Affairs criticised Oxfam Novib for betraying its

principles and integrity by teaming up with the national protectionist farmers' and sugar industry lobby.

It seems that OI underestimated the relative importance of some players or counter forces, particularly with regard to certain EU member states in which Oxfam's lobby was relatively weak. OI acknowledged this weakness and therefore cooperated with the WWF. However, though this cooperation was strategically logical in terms of complementing Oxfam's contacts and networks and covering EU Member States in which Oxfam had no offices, in practice this complementarity was not fully exploited.

The importance of succeeding in aligning the conflicting interests of ACP countries and LDCs also seems to have been underestimated. The lack of cooperation between these countries reduced their lobbying effectiveness at EU level. In addition, scant attention was paid to the inclusion of Southern partners in the overall approach and strategy of the campaign; greater involvement of these partners might have encouraged and strengthened their lobbying activities in the reform process.

Overall, as the political debate intensified at the EU level, national agricultural and industry interests prevailed and developmental issues were subordinated to these interests. Although initially there seemed to be some policy space for development issues, due in part to OI's efforts, ultimately the process remained Eurocentric.

3.7 Conclusions

Generalised answers to the key questions of this evaluation on effectiveness and efficiency cannot be formulated for all six cases, as this would not do justice to their complexity and diversity.

A general conclusion is that in all cases there were few results in terms of actual policy changes, with the exception of the two coffee cases. It can also be concluded, however, that in all cases, one or more intermediate objectives or steps towards the policy changes envisaged by the CFOs were realised. Below, the campaigns are briefly assessed in terms of the realisation of the main objectives and intermediate objectives or steps of the campaigns.

Both ICCO's FTN Coalition campaign and Hivos' GMO campaign had limited success in terms of achieving their objectives. In both cases, the campaign objectives were extremely ambitious, and the policy issue(s) at stake and related decision-making processes were complex (the objective being nothing less than changing international policies). In both cases, the intermediate objectives and the strategy for achieving the overall objectives were not specified. ICCO's pincer approach at national and regional levels in North and South as well as at international level was very ambitious and proved difficult to apply in practice. The GMO campaign was focused more on awareness raising and public campaigning than on lobbying. In terms of intermediate steps, ICCO in its FTN work and Hivos in its GMO campaign were able to reach the targeted policymakers, and in some cases were able to raise awareness of the issue and get it on – or higher up – the agenda. The evaluation found no evidence that these two campaigns convinced relevant policymakers on specific issues.

Oxfam Novib's sugar campaign was of limited effectiveness in terms of achieving the OI objectives for the EU sugar reforms and specifically in influencing the Dutch position on these reforms. Nevertheless, relevant policymakers in the Netherlands recognised that Oxfam Novib was an important player in the debate. In terms of intermediate steps, Oxfam Novib was not only able to increase awareness of the issues they lobbied on, but also to develop and institutionalise relationships with the targeted policymakers and even to convince some policymakers on specific issues. It was notably successful in establishing dialogue and cooperation with non-traditional partners (the beet sugar industry and farmers' organisations), thereby convincing the Dutch Parliament. However, the Cabinet's overruling of the motion adopted by Parliament limited Oxfam Novib's effectiveness in influencing the Dutch position on EU sugar reforms.

The effectiveness of Cordaid's soy campaign was limited in the sense that it did not achieve the overall objective of adoption of social responsibility criteria by companies that purchase soy or soy products. However, Cordaid was successful in achieving its intermediate objectives: establishing a dialogue with the private sector and getting the private sector to acknowledge the negative environmental and social effects of soy production (although consensus could not be reached on the scale and intensity of these effects). One Dutch company and two Dutch banks incorporated some comments and advice of the Netherlands Soy Coalition in their policy or policy documents. Similarly to Oxfam Novib in its sugar campaign, Cordaid was thus able to raise awareness of the issues they lobbied on, to develop/

institutionalise relationships with the targeted policymakers and to convince some policymakers on specific issues.

The coffee campaigns of Hivos and Oxfam Novib were effective in that their prime lobby target DE/SL decided to include some certified coffee in its total coffee purchases. These two CFOs, working together with other Dutch NGOs in the Coffee Coalition, were therefore able to achieve an actual policy change. In addition, the market share of certified coffee in total coffee sales in the Netherlands has increased considerably in recent years. However, though DE/SL acknowledged that the Coffee Coalition influenced its decision to buy certified coffee, no such causal relationship could be established for other players in the Dutch coffee market (notably supermarkets). An intermediate step was achieved: these players responded to the activities of the CC. However, no real dialogue was established.¹⁸ In addition to the lobby for increasing the share of certified coffee, Oxfam Novib (representing OI) also played a prominent role in the process of introducing a new mainstream code of conduct (the 4Cs) and was able to influence the code's content, although at the time of the evaluation it was not clear whether this code would become operational. Hivos was less successful in their lobby for integration of codes of conduct in the coffee sector: they were able to reach policymakers and to set up dialogue with them, but this has not led to concrete steps.

The differences in the results achieved in the six case studies are partly attributable to the approach adopted by the CFO in its campaign, and partly to the context in which the campaign took place. The following chapter presents a number of findings, lessons and recommendations related to the approach and context of campaigns. The final section of the chapter addresses the evaluability of policy influencing.

¹⁸ With the exception of Laurus, a supermarket organisation that has a cooperation agreement with Oxfam Novib and Stichting Natuur en Milieu for making their products (coffee is one) more sustainable. For details, see the case study report at www.minbuza.nl/iob.

4 Policy issues

This chapter presents a number of policy issues that merit consideration, based on evidence gathered through the desk study and six case studies. It does not prescribe the best way to organise, undertake or evaluate policy influencing, but instead identifies different policy options, approaches and lessons. As the evidence is based on a selection of campaigns directed at influencing economic policies, structures and processes, this presentation of policy issues and experiences does not pretend to be exhaustive.¹⁹ Whenever relevant, reference is made to guidelines for lobbying based on other experiences reported in the literature (see Annex 3).

4.1 Lobby strategy: design and implementation

The extent to which lobby strategies were prepared and implemented on the basis of a systematic and step-wise approach differed per case study. The strategy for the sugar campaign of Oxfam Novib was formulated on the basis of a clear planning process consisting of the following nine steps: 1) research, 2) internal debates and initial positioning (scenarios), 3) consultations and alliance forming, 4) establishment of position in an internal (OI) policy document, 5) publication of briefing notes and papers outlining that position, 6) power analysis, 7) formulation of campaigning plans and activities, 8) further alliance forming and lobbying of policymakers, 9) launch of public campaigns. Oxfam Novib contributed to and profited from the work of Oxfam International to prepare lobbying on EU sugar reforms. Similarly, in the field of coffee, Oxfam Novib contributed to and profited from the groundwork done by OI, which involved researching the complexity of the issue and analysing stakeholders and the decision-making process. IOB's literature review on lobbying (see Annex

¹⁹ For this evaluation, the term 'campaign' is used to refer to a combination of strategies and activities used by a CFO and its lobby partners with a view to influencing policies. The campaign may consist of lobbying (directed at government agencies or companies) and/or public and media campaigns (directed at the wider public and/or indirectly directed at companies or government agencies). This evaluation focuses on lobbying.

3) similarly identified the need for: a) research on and analysis of the subject matter and policy environment, b) a clear and specified intervention strategy, c) a specified lobby theme and d) a step-wise approach to formulating a policy-influencing plan.

In the other four cases, steps were taken in response to what had been learned by doing (Cordaid), or in response to the demands and initiatives of partner organisations (Hivos, Cordaid and ICCO) – or no steps were either planned or taken. Such approaches make it difficult for the evaluation team to determine how a CFO thinks it will achieve its objectives, and more specifically, which steps the CFO considers necessary to achieve its objectives.

It is important that a CFO develops a realistic strategy for its campaign and sets realistic objectives. Two critical issues can be distinguished here: first, the formulation of strategies and objectives on the basis of preparatory contextual analysis (of the policy issue, stakeholders, power relations and decision-making processes). A good analysis of the context (lobby targets, larger playing field, the issue) can help the CFO decide whether lobbying is a sensible option (is it likely to achieve the proposed policy changes). Among the questions the CFO must consider are: what is the current stance of policymakers on the issue? how are decisions made on the issue? which policymakers have an important say in the decision-making process? are other organisations also active on the issue and how powerful are they? what is the added value of the CFO becoming active on the issue? does the CFO have sufficient capacity?

Unless the formulation of a hierarchy of objectives is connected to preparatory contextual analysis, there is a danger that it will become an end in itself: a bureaucratic exercise, not a strategic one. In addition, there is a risk that the hierarchy of objectives and plan of activities will become a straightjacket, making it difficult to quickly respond to newly emerging opportunities or threats, whether related to external or internal changes.

The second issue concerns the formulation of intermediate steps and objectives. It is crucial to formulate these, especially when many stakeholders are involved, the issue is complex and the lobby target disagrees strongly with the lobbyist's point of view. Monitoring the results (or lack of these!) on the basis of S(pecific), M(easurable) and T(ime-bound) indicators of intermediate objectives, benefits accountability as well as strategy and may result in adjustments to the approaches

and instruments used.²⁰ A strategy with intermediate objectives provides a framework for a campaign and facilitates the monitoring and assessing of results. It also makes it easier to adjust the approach of a campaign in response to a lack of results or to developments (whether internal or external).

In some cases, it was clear that the CFO had been monitoring the process and making adjustments if necessary. For example, minutes of meetings of the Coffee Coalition and the Netherlands Soy Coalition show that changes of strategies were discussed on the basis of review of external developments, the responses of lobby targets and the results of activities. Such monitoring and adjusting of strategies was not evident in all cases, however: CFO staff argue that this is because it is time-consuming to record the progress of a campaign. They question the added value of putting information on paper that is already in the head of lobbyists. However, if it were mandatory for CFOs to prepare progress reports for each campaign, using indicators to measure progress, the monitoring and adjustment would become overt. But this again raises questions: to what extent would this effort improve the quality of the campaign? would it merely be an extra burden for CFOs?

4.2 When is policy influencing useful? Timing and targeting for results

The context of each policy-influencing process is different. It may be easier to achieve results in some contexts than in others. This section identifies different contexts that were encountered in the evaluation and that might account for the effectiveness of a campaign. A general question applicable to almost all issues raised in this section is: should a campaign focus on policies in which proposed changes are more likely to be realised, or should it primarily target the policies

20 The policy framework of the funding arrangement in the period 2003–2006 includes the following stipulation: ‘The text of the Annual Plan will make use of measurable indicators as much as possible. Preferably, these indicators should be ‘SMART’ (Specific, Measurable, Agreed upon, Realistic and Time-bound). In any case, indicators of results need to be specified and useful for examination’ (Staatscourant 20 December 2001, no. 247, p. 18). In contrast to S(pecific), M(easurable) and T(ime-bound), the terms of ‘Agreed upon’ and ‘Realistic’ are difficult to quantify and to use for evaluation purposes in the field of policy influencing (and possibly in other fields as well): agreed upon by whom: the CFO, partner organisation, lobby partners and/or who else? realistic in whose eyes and to what extent? For these reasons, the terms of ‘Agreed upon’ and ‘Realistic’ have been left out here. The Free Dictionary gives many meanings of the abbreviation SMART, including seven that may be useful for evaluation purposes. In all seven the S stands for ‘Specific’, in six of them the M is short for ‘measurable’ and in two of them the T stands for ‘Time-bound’. The A stands for Achievable, Actionable, Appropriate or Attainable. The R stands for Realistic, Relevant, Results-oriented or Rewarding (see acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/smart).

considered to be structural or global causes of poverty and inequality, but where results are more difficult to attain?

Lobbying governments or business

The case studies have shown that more results were achieved in the campaigns targeted at companies than in those targeted at governments. Two explanatory factors can be distinguished on the basis of the present evaluation: 1) the number of actors and level(s) involved in the policy-making processes; and 2) the sensitivity to bad publicity. These two factors are dealt with below.

- 1) The lobbies that targeted government policies were often directed at achieving a change of policies and regulations at different levels, often including supra-national or intergovernmental levels: the sugar campaign of Oxfam Novib tried to influence EU agricultural policy; the GMO campaign aimed to influence national, EU and international policies and ICCO's FTN Coalition focused on changing the international trade regulation of the WTO. But even in a single country it may prove very difficult to influence government policy because of the large number of players involved. For instance, in the Netherlands, several ministries are involved in formulating the Dutch stance on genetic engineering, the EU's agricultural policy and the WTO, each one working from a different perspective. In addition, the Dutch Parliament influences the government's stance. For a campaign to be effective, at the very least it is necessary to know the relative power of the different parties and who should be lobbied on what issues. The Netherlands is only one of the 25 Member States in the EU, so at EU level its influence is limited. The same holds true at the international level of the WTO, where there are even more different players and interests. Hence, a successful lobby in the Netherlands does not guarantee success at supra-national or international level. In these situations, a multi-level approach would be needed, but this increases the complexity of the lobby and puts a strain on the human resources. This was evident in the case of the FTN Coalition, for example, where both the issue itself (recognition of the right to food in international trade agreements) and the decision-making process in the WTO were complex. In addition, the lobbying capacity of the FTN members was not very strong. In the sugar campaign of Oxfam Novib, a multi-level approach was pursued on the basis of cooperation with different Oxfam affiliates and WWF. But even this multi-level and joint approach was no guarantee of success: campaigning in certain important member

countries did not bring about the changes in the position of the respective governments necessary to ensure the desired policy changes at EU level.

The decision-making process in business is often more transparent, although this is not to say that it is easy to lobby business: the decision-making processes in multinationals can also be very complex, and persuading a branch in the Netherlands may not be enough to change the policy of a multinational. It is, however, relatively easy to find out who should be lobbied, and sometimes one person can have a very large say in the company's policy, especially if the company is Dutch and relatively small. The soy case shows that it can be quite complicated to lobby business if different companies are part of a global chain and believe that problems and solutions should be found elsewhere in the chain.

- 2) In general, companies seem to be affected much more by public campaigning and media attention than governments and civil servants. Negative publicity could damage a company's reputation and hence sales figures, but governments are not affected in such a direct way, and ministries are affected even less than political parties. Nevertheless, the opportunity for public campaigning also depends on the topic of a campaign. In the soy campaign of Cordaid, public campaigning was much more difficult than campaigning on coffee, as soy is only an intermediate product, and consumers are less likely to change their purchasing behaviour, as this would imply scrutinising the list of ingredients of many of the products they buy.

Lobbying targets that are sympathetic or disagree strongly

The stance of a lobby target is also important for determining whether a campaign is necessary or useful. The evaluation team encountered some cases - especially in the campaigns targeted at the government - where CFOs had lobbied policymakers who already. At first sight this seems to be poor strategy, but when interviewed, the policymakers indicated that they felt supported by the CFOs, and sometimes this induced them to push harder for a specific issue. For example, in the GMO campaign Hivos organised a visit by a Zambian government delegation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to discuss the refusing of food aid containing GMOs, an issue that the Dutch government was sympathetic to as it has traditionally promoted freedom of choice for countries receiving food aid. An outcome of this visit was that the Dutch government raised the issue at an executive board meeting of the World Food Programme. This demonstrates that

lobbying targets that are already sympathetic to a cause may help move an issue up the agenda.

The evaluation also encountered examples where targeted policymakers disagreed strongly with CFO proposals: for example, certain policymakers in the GMO debate were in principle in favour of this new technology (albeit under certain conditions). In the sugar campaign and FTN Coalition, too, certain policymakers were greatly in favour of trade liberalisation, and were not willing to discuss proposals for maintaining or even increasing regulation or protection. In cases of fundamental disagreement between the CFO and the lobby target it is very difficult to see in what way a CFO could convince its lobby target. Lobbying at different levels and trying to create pressure from the general public by organising public campaigns might help, but is no guarantee of success. In such a case, a CFO is faced with a dilemma: should it remain focused on its own message, or should it shift towards the position of the lobby target in order to have a better chance of influencing the policy-making process? If it opts to shift ground, however, it may undermine its credibility for future campaigns.

It is clear that the likelihood of influencing a lobby target that fundamentally disagrees with the proposed policy change is less than the likelihood of influencing a target that is still exploring the best policy solution for a specific problem. However, the question remains whether or not campaigns targeting policymakers who are diametrically opposed to the stance of the CFO should be undertaken, assuming that such campaigns are less likely to achieve their objectives.²¹

Timing of a campaign

To a large extent, policy influencing is a matter of timing: saying or doing the right thing at the right time. It is important to analyse the preconditions and the related probability of positive results. The Coffee Coalition preceded its campaign with such an analysis. Indeed, one reason it decided to launch its campaign was because the analysis revealed the following external factors conducive to the Coalition achieving its objectives: corporate social responsibility had attracted public attention, a coffee crisis had created a sense of urgency, and various codes of conduct were operational in the coffee market. The sense of urgency and the

21 One could argue that this fits in the room for innovation that the policy framework for the CFP offers: 'within a learning organisation there is room for creativity and calculated risks, and for developing activities for which effectiveness cannot be guaranteed, but where results are systematically analysed to achieve effectiveness in the long run'.

availability of existing codes of conduct were external conditions not present in the soy case. Furthermore, that campaign was also more difficult to ‘sell’ to the general public (see section 4.3); these differences might explain why the coffee campaign was more successful than the soy campaign. Once more, the critical question is whether CFOs should focus on campaigns that are likely to succeed, or whether they should act more as whistle blowers, to put an issue on the agenda.

When lobbying government, it is important to know in which phase the decision-making process is. The peak in the lobbying of the FTN Coalition was often during WTO ministerial meetings or other international events, yet it is questionable to what extent it is then still possible to influence policies, as many governments have already formulated their position by then and are not very likely to change their position significantly. When a policy-making body is in the process of determining its position, it tries to collect information from different sources and if a CFO can provide information and present a clear message at that stage, the policymakers are more likely to listen. Thus, as also found in the literature review (see Annex 3), the earlier in the decision-making process a policymaker is approached, the more likely a position can be influenced. Timing was also an issue in the GMO campaign of Hivos, for example, when the government had already determined its position before there was public debate on the issue, so therefore there was limited scope for influencing policies.

4.3 Addressing the wider public or the lobby target directly

Awareness raising or lobbying

Raising the awareness of the wider public may be a precondition for effective lobbying, assuming that the targeted policymakers are sensitive to voters or citizens at large who share their concerns or their outright opposition to particular policies. This, for instance, prompted Hivos to raise awareness of the GMO issue through public campaigning. The evaluation team also noted that many partner organisations do not lobby but instead focus their efforts on raising awareness. One could argue that if a policy debate is biased in favour of a particular view, it might be useful to have organisations drawing attention to the other side of the coin to widen or deepen the debate, and thus to enlighten the general public. However, it is difficult to find evidence of the effects of activities directed at awareness raising is difficult. Furthermore, if a CFO (or its partner organisations) puts emphasis on issues already well known to policymakers, it is questionable that advocacy will have any added value. If, on the other hand, a CFO is able to present new information or insights, this may contribute to the discussion.

Regarding the benefits of informing the general public, it is difficult to establish a direct link between this advocacy work and policy changes, but this is not to say that such a link does not exist.

Ability to 'sell' a campaign message

How feasible it is to explain the issue to the wider public differs from case to case. Of the case studies examined, the coffee campaign was probably the one that could best be explained and 'sold' to the general public. It was clear that Oxfam Novib and Hivos (also as part of the Coffee Coalition) wanted the coffee companies to be accountable for the conditions under which coffee was being produced. They were also able to present a solution: DE should subscribe to and implement a code of conduct. As various codes of conduct were already operational in the coffee market (notably fair trade, organic, and for the mainstream market Utz Kapeh and Rainforest Alliance), the message was easy to understand and to convey, so public campaigning and generating media attention was a central element in the lobby strategy – especially at the start of the campaign. This involvement of the general public was important, as they are the final consumers of coffee and can exert power by choosing to purchase certain brands of coffee. It was more difficult to convince the general public in the soy case, because the consumer product was not so clear-cut (not soy but the end-products meat or milk). However, public action and catchy slogans (like 'Eating up the Amazon') drawing a direct relationship between the loss of Amazon forest and meat consumption, proved very effective in attracting attention from corporations.

The message in campaigns focusing on government issues is often more difficult to convey to the general public. The issue itself is often complex and requires a basic understanding of how certain policies affect the living conditions of people in the North and/or the South. Hivos attached great importance to educating the general public on the risks of genetic engineering in its GMO campaign: many of its activities focused on making information accessible to the general public, e.g. by publications, a website, and conferences and workshops. Although this might have increased the public's knowledge and awareness of GMOs (this was not measured in the evaluation), it is difficult to establish a direct link with the policy-making process. Oxfam Novib used its sugar campaign as an illustration of dumping by the EU, as this was something that could be explained to the public; the details of the sugar reforms itself, however, were too complicated to use in a campaign. Public campaigning activities were therefore a much smaller element in the sugar campaign than in Oxfam Novib's coffee campaign. Public

campaigning activities were also limited in the case of ICCO's FTN coalition, as the right to adequate food is too theoretical an issue to use in public campaigns, and it is difficult to devise a catchy slogan with a view to influencing decision making in the WTO regarding the Agreement on Agriculture.

4.4 The role of partner organisations in campaigns

Involving partners in policy influencing: ownership versus efficiency

The six case studies revealed large variation in the involvement of partner organisations in the campaigns. The difference was already visible in the rationale for a campaign: in some cases, the CFO started a campaign in response to a request from its partners. For example, Hivos started its GMO campaign as its partners expressed concern about the impact of the introduction of GMOs on organic agriculture, while Cordaid became active on soy because its Brazilian partners considered this to be an important issue. This is in contrast to, for example, the Oxfam Novib sugar campaign: prior to the campaign, Oxfam Novib had no partners working specifically on sugar.²²

The differences are also visible in the design and implementation of the campaign. In most cases, the CFO designed the intervention, after discussions with stakeholders in the South or with international organisations (not necessarily partner organisations). Only in the case of the FTN Coalition was a real effort taken to formulate objectives and strategies jointly with partners. However, this effort had limited results: in the first few years, formulation often ended up being the responsibility of the Northern partners (ICCO and Wemos), while in 2006, when tasks were explicitly divided, the formulation of objectives and strategy for that year was never finished.

Approaches to the implementation of campaigns also differed. In many cases, the partner organisations were invited to the Netherlands to support the lobby in the North: these visits were intended to convince the targeted policymakers of how Northern policies had or might disadvantage them. The Hivos and Oxfam Novib coffee campaigns provide examples of parallel lobbying for improving the conditions of coffee workers. Hivos and Oxfam Novib lobbied coffee companies in the North to apply a code of conduct, while the Southern partners of the Coffee Coalition focused mainly on improving labour conditions directly (e.g. through

22 It should be noted that at Oxfam International level, other affiliates did have contact with partners active in the sugar sector in certain developing countries.

collective labour agreements). Although there was exchange of information between the North and South, there was no real joint lobbying. Cordaid's soy campaign contained more elements of joint lobbying, with Cordaid and its partners participating in (but later withdrawing from) a round table with soy companies. The FTN Coalition also attempted joint lobbying, notably at international events like WTO Ministerial meetings.

What is the optimal level of involvement of local partners? Starting a campaign in response to a request from partners provides a good rationale for a campaign, as it is clear who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the campaign and therefore clear to the targeted policymakers on whose behalf CFOs are lobbying. The literature review in Annex 3 shows that this increases the credibility of a campaign. Nevertheless, there might also be policy decisions with important implications for developing countries, yet local partners may not be aware of this or not be working on this specific issue. The question is whether or not these cases should be taken up.

When formulating objectives and strategies in the design phase of a campaign, input from partners is likely to make the campaign better meet local needs. Furthermore, the partner organisations will feel more involved and at the same time learn from setting up the campaign; in other words, partner input will increase ownership. An important disadvantage, however, is that often the involvement of partners implies a loss of efficiency, partly because it increases the need for coordination and also because partners often lack the capacity to formulate a campaign. If this process leads to a delay in the design or to a watered down design of a campaign, it will also affect the campaign's effectiveness. An important question that CFOs face therefore is whether they should involve their partners as much as possible, or attach more importance to an efficient and effective campaign. This dilemma was an issue, for example, in the Cordaid soy campaign: Cordaid's decision to withdraw from the round table process was made because its partners no longer supported the process. In terms of effectiveness, however, it might have been better to remain involved in the process. In the FTN Coalition too it proved to be difficult to jointly design and implement a campaign as equal partners. Northern partners often considered it their role or responsibility to take steps to ensure progress was made.

Monitoring and supporting campaigns of partner organisations

CFOs are well aware of the lack of capacity of their partner organisations in terms of policy influencing. They therefore often support Southern partners to strengthen their capacity. Capacity building is most overt in the case of the FTN Coalition:

partners were invited to the Netherlands for workshop and to take part in jointly lobbying Dutch MPs, EC officials, and government delegations in Geneva. But there are examples in other cases: Hivos supported its partner KCSN in Kenya in its coffee campaign with a workshop intended to clarify KCSN's objectives and strategies. Although support of this type is likely to have improved the capacity of partners, the field visits revealed that the partner organisations still lacked capacity.²³ Cordaid succeeded in helping its partners to formulate social responsibility criteria for companies that purchased soy or soy-related products but not in formulating a lobby plan and strategy for discussing and negotiating these criteria with the private sector.

In their policy-influencing activities, many partner organisations focused on awareness raising, notably through publications and workshops, but few of them had contacted policymakers directly, so real lobbying was still limited. A related question, especially for CFOs that have limited experience in policy influencing in the Netherlands, is to what extent they are able to support organisations in the South in strengthening capacity. As well as possibly lacking experience in lobbying, CFOs face additional problems in that their knowledge of the local context is limited: they lack information on e.g. who the various stakeholders are, what their interests and power relations are, and how policy decision-making processes are organised.

This lack of knowledge of the local context is also important when monitoring the policy-influencing activities of Southern partners. This monitoring is done mainly on the basis of progress reports, which leads to problems similar to those encountered in the desk study in this evaluation, i.e. it is almost impossible to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the campaign just by analysing proposals and progress reports, often due to a lack of clear objectives and indicators. Although CFO staff also visit Southern partners, they often only speak to their own partners during these visits, and this gives limited (or one-sided) insight into the local context. CFOs sometimes had the impression that their partner organisation had played a much greater role in the policy-influencing process than the evaluation found during the country visits. To address this problem, partner organisations could be required to prepare a detailed lobby strategy (see section 4.1), or CFO staff could talk to stakeholders other than partner organisations during their country visits.

²³ It should be noted that the field visits were short and that the performance of the partners observed may not be representative of the performance of all partner organisations of the CFOs.

4.5 The added value of alliance building

An explicit question addressed by the evaluation was about the functionality of alliances in policy influencing. What became clear during the evaluation is that networking and alliance building took place in all cases. The type of alliance building varied case by case, however, with some alliances being more institutionalised than others, some acting as a main vehicle for the lobby, others only complementing own activities of CFOs, some larger ones being formed with like-minded organisations and others focusing on the complementarity of partners. It should be noted that the evaluation team did not scrutinise all the alliances concluded for the six case studies; emphasis was put on alliances consisting of Dutch NGOs.

The most institutionalised alliance is the Coffee Coalition of Hivos and Oxfam Novib: it has its own secretariat with two staff members that carry out day-to-day activities. All the members of the coalitions meet regularly to discuss objectives, strategies and specific activities, and exchange information about developments in the sector. Other coalitions, like the Gentech Coalition in Hivos GMO campaign, focus more on the coordination of activities and exchange of information, and only occasionally organise joint activities. The Netherlands Soy Coalition is intermediate between these positions: one member of the NSC holds the secretariat, while the NSC plans joint activities through its working groups but also gives its individual members scope to undertake their own activities or even joint activities under their own name.

The role of the alliance in the overall campaign also differs. For the FTN coalition, alliance building was the starting point for the campaign, based on the pincer principle (see section 3.4). In other cases, like the sugar campaign of Oxfam Novib, alliance building was seen as only one element – albeit integral – in its overall approach.

On the one hand, cooperation with many organisations might be useful to create a large support base for a campaign. On the other hand, coordination becomes more difficult in alliances with many partners, as it might take considerable time and effort to reach consensus and could lead to watering down of the message. From the literature it is clear that complementarity of partners may enhance the effectiveness of a lobby, although it is also important for the members of the alliance to have common objectives, shared responsibilities and constructive decision-making (see Annex 3). In most of the six case studies, the

complementarity of partners in an alliance did indeed contribute to the alliance's effectiveness. For instance, in the Gentech Coalition, genetic engineering was analysed from different perspectives: effects on animals, the environment, and developing countries. Different perspectives were represented in the coffee coalition too, as its members had different stakes in the coffee sector. In the FTN Coalition, perspectives from various countries were available. Of all the case studies, the alliance consisting of stakeholders with most divergent interests was that of the Oxfam Novib sugar campaign. It included farmers and the sugar industry. Although Oxfam Novib and the other stakeholders had different opinions on a number of issues, they sought to cooperate on points where they agreed. This was a very effective strategy for persuading MPs, as the MPs felt bound to listen to an alliance comprising so many different stakeholders. On the other hand, some civil servants were sceptical of this alliance, feeling that Oxfam Novib had betrayed its principles and integrity by teaming up with the national protectionist farming and sugar industry lobby.

Next to considerations on the functionality of alliance building, every CFO faces the following dilemma in preparing and undertaking joint lobbying: on the one hand it wishes to cooperate to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its policy influencing, while on the other hand it is important that it creates a distinctive image. It is therefore difficult to decide what should be done under the umbrella of an alliance or under the organisation's own flag. For example, ICCO often seems to have lobbied policymakers in the Netherlands as ICCO rather than explicitly representing the FTN Coalition. As a result, policymakers did not really remember the FTN Coalition but did remember the issues raised by ICCO. Whether this choice affects the effectiveness of a campaign is difficult to say.

A general observation regarding alliance building that emerged during the evaluation was that many policymakers appreciated cooperation between different organisations, not least because this saved having to discuss the issues with the various organisations separately. Nevertheless, policymakers also noted that though organisations present themselves as an alliance, the differences between the members of the alliance are often visible, and the message of an alliance is therefore not always univocal.

4.6 Lobby capacity and organisation of lobbying

The personal qualities of individuals play an important role in the lobby process. Indeed, the success of lobbying may largely be attributable to personality and personal capacities - whether of the lobbyist or the lobby target. If a lobby target is sympathetic to a lobbyist and the lobby target and lobbyist get along well with each other, it is easier to exchange views and to convince that lobby target. Some lobby targets are willing to listen to CFOs, or willing to reflect on the development and sustainability issues in their work; others are not.

The personality of lobby targets is more or less beyond the control of a CFO, but there are a number of factors that are not. In the interviews with policymakers it became clear that the lobbyist's knowledge about the issue is very important. Lobby targets in business appreciate it if the lobbyist understands how the sector functions, and show that (s)he is aware of the problems or possibilities of making certain policy changes. In government, policymakers welcome constructive ideas from CFOs that show a good understanding of the policy problem and that can be used in formulating policy proposals. Presenting evidence of the effects of policies on people in developing countries can also be an important eye opener for policymakers.²⁴ However, at times this can also annoy policymakers, especially if they are already aware of the problem or are weary of 'pathetic cases'.

In addition to knowledge about the issue, another important factor is the contact lobbyists have with policymakers. It is important for lobbyists to be aware of who they need to lobby to get results. Building and maintaining a relation of trust makes policymakers more willing to exchange information and listen to the ideas of a CFO.

The quality of a lobbyist is partly the result of how lobbying is organised in a CFO, notably with respect to the scope provided for for specialisation. For example, Oxfam Novib has a separate policy-influencing department (recently renamed into the Worldwide Strategies and Cooperation department) as well as a Campaigns department. It has therefore acquired much experience with lobbying, and its staff is able to specialise in lobbying and to focus on a limited number of issues. In other CFOs, the lobby department is much smaller, or campaigns are

²⁴ The literature review also revealed that being able to link the micro and macro levels is important for an effective lobby strategy: on the one hand to win the confidence of the people on whose behalf a CFO is lobbying and on the other hand to explain the links between these levels to lobby targets. Also recognised as a positive factor in policy influencing is the ability to come up with alternatives.

organised in the form of ad hoc working groups. This limits the possibilities for lobbying and campaigning, in terms of the number of campaigns or the ‘depth’ of a campaign. It is therefore important for a CFO to consider what it would like to achieve in the policy-influencing process and what this implies for the approach of a lobby: a campaign limited to awareness raising requires a different approach and resources than a focused lobby to achieve a specific policy change.

In terms of coordination too, it is important to think about internal structures to maximise the effect of a campaign: which department does what, how does coordination take place and which department has final responsibility? This issue is particularly important if the set-up of a campaign is more complex. For example, in the FTN campaign of ICCO it was the regional officers who maintained contact with Southern partners – not the lobby and advocacy department, which was the main department accountable to the FTN Coalition. The exchange of information between staff involved differed per country but was generally limited. Recently, ICCO identified this weakness, and attempted to make the regional officers more aware and/or involved in the work of the FTN. In addition to clear coordination, another important way of helping solve problems of coordination is good internal reporting on progress and developments in the campaign. The documentation of progress and problems may also prove to be an asset if and when organisational or personnel changes take place. Such changes may threaten the institutional memory of an organisation and entail loss of useful data, strategic insights and lessons learnt.

4.7 Evaluability of policy influencing

Though it is not easy to evaluate policy influencing, it is not impossible. This section begins by presenting a number of problems encountered in the evaluation of policy influencing. Secondly, lessons and recommendations will be formulated.

Problems encountered

Two types of problems can be distinguished in the process of evaluating policy influencing: problems with the recording of results and problems with the assessment of results.

- 1) The following problems with the recording of results were encountered during the present evaluation: the documentation of the track record on policy influencing was weak. The case studies therefore included interviews with lobbyists and lobby targets that generated additional or first-hand

information that was useful for reconstructing the fragmented track records and for identifying mechanisms that hampered or facilitated policy-influencing processes. However, the individual lobby targets and also the lobbyists proved to have limited recall, especially in the case of the GMO campaign of Hivos that had taken place some time ago (2000–2002) and in which the lobby targets (MPs) had been approached by many lobbyists. The lobby targets of that campaign could not recall the exact stance and activities of the CFO. Does this mean that the CFO did not impress its lobby targets at the time, or did the lobby targets have short memories?

A related problem was that the observations of interviewees were subjective: each person had their own view on a case. In addition, some lobby targets were willing to think along with the evaluators in analysing how their position or a specific policy decision came about, while others were less willing to cooperate or were reluctant to create the impression that they could be influenced by interest groups in general or by CFOs in a specific case. As the number of lobby targets per organisation is often limited (for example, only one or two people from a company talk to a CFO, or there is only one representative of a political party who is responsible for a specific issue), it is difficult to remove this bias by interviewing a large number of people.

- 2) During the evaluation the following problems were encountered when assessing results. The objectives of projects and campaigns taken as a starting point for assessing effectiveness had been poorly formulated, so were of little use. In any case, if the policy field was complex and the objectives were ambitious, the likelihood of realising the objectives was small.

A further complication was the problem of attribution. The policy-influencing activities were often carried out jointly with other organisations, in networks or alliances. In some networks or alliances, a CFO played a leading role as donor, coordinator and lobbyist, while in other cases its role was limited (to only one role). In addition, it was not easy to determine to what extent a breakthrough or stagnation in policy dialogue was related to the efforts or approach of the CFO or to contextual factors. All in all, this made it impossible to precisely determine the extent to which any success or failure could be attributed to a specific organisation.

Lessons and recommendations

- 1) Because of the shortcomings of the project and campaign dossiers, it was not possible to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of policy influencing solely on the basis of dossier study.
- 2) As a result of the shortcomings of the dossiers, interviews were necessary not only to map the outcomes (or lack of these) at different phases of policy-influencing processes but also to get better insights into the factors or mechanisms explaining why lobby efforts failed or succeeded in influencing issue formulation, agenda setting, consultations and policy formulation.
- 3) Given the importance of interviews and the limited recall of lobbyists and lobby targets, the timing of an evaluation is important. If the evaluation takes place some time after the policy-influencing activities, the lobby targets and lobbyists cannot recall what happened. If an evaluation takes place too soon after the policy-influencing activities, the interviewees might not yet be able to look at the situation objectively.
- 4) To cope with personal views or biases of lobbyists and of lobby targets, it is important that the evaluator is aware of the stance and interests of the interviewees and that (s)he repeatedly asks respondents to substantiate their views and to provide concrete evidence or counterevidence.
- 5) To cope with the problem of poorly formulated or highly ambitious objectives, the evaluation team identified intermediate steps, focused on specific objectives related to these steps, and formulated case-specific outcome indicators. This proved very useful in order to systematically document which steps and objectives had been realised (or not) at a particular moment in time. This approach also helped to cope with problems of attribution.
- 6) Though certainly not a solution to attribution problems, the identification of internal and external factors to explain effectiveness and efficiency (or the lack of these) was helpful and also put policy-influencing activities into context. More importantly, such identification led to insights and a better understanding of why some steps or outcomes could be realised but not others.

The way to improve the evaluability of policy influencing is not simply to put more information in the dossiers. Instead, the overall recommendation is to start with a strategic notion of policy influencing as a game of chess and then to reflect on the implication of this notion for documentation and for evaluation.

- 1) Thinking of the strategy of policy influencing as a game of chess reminds one of the need to design an overall strategy but also to define intermediate steps (moves) and to formulate intermediate or specific objectives. The documentation and evaluation should focus on these intermediate steps and objectives.
- 2) To win the game or make a move in the first place, one needs to be well prepared, to play with a vision, to decide on an approach, to anticipate the opponent's moves very seriously and be able to adjust one's strategies. The documentation should reflect such preparatory or capacity-building efforts. Evaluation should be directed at assessing a CFO's capacities, such as:
 - its capacity to prepare its own or joint lobbying;
 - its capacity to formulate objectives on the basis of a systematic analysis of the issue, lobby targets and the larger playing field;
 - its capacity to develop strategies and approaches that are target-specific (business, government) and timely;
 - its capacity to reformulate objectives on the basis of newly emerged opportunities and threats;
 - its capacity to reconsider the selected approach or mix of instruments on the basis of results achieved and new development in policy arenas.
- 3) To explain but also to assess why it was possible to make some moves but not others, one needs to describe the actors, processes and other barriers that limited progress and the ability of the CFO to overcome these barriers. Documentation and evaluation should be directed at describing and analysing these actors, processes and other contextual barriers.

In conclusion, policy influencing is an intervention strategy directed at changing local, national and international policy, processes and structures. The best approach for evaluating policy influencing and taking account of its particularities and complexity is one that is three-track, the tracks being the assessment of the concrete results, the assessment of the capacities of the CFO and its partners, and the assessment of the context.

Annex 1 About the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department

Objectives

The objective of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) is to increase insight into the implementation and effects of Dutch foreign policy. IOB meets the need for independent evaluation of policy and operations in all policy fields falling under the Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). IOB also advises on the planning and implementation of the evaluations for which policy departments and embassies are responsible.

Its evaluations enable the ministers to account to parliament for policy and the allocation of resources. In addition, the evaluations aim to derive lessons for the future. Efforts are accordingly made to incorporate the findings of evaluations into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' policy cycle. Evaluation reports are used to provide targeted feedback, with a view to improving both policy intentions and implementation. Insight into the outcome of implemented policy allows policymakers to devise measures that are more effective and focused.

Approach and methodology

IOB has a staff of experienced evaluators and its own budget. When carrying out evaluations, it calls on the assistance of external experts with specialised knowledge of the topic under investigation. To monitor its own quality, it sets up a reference group for each evaluation, which includes not only external experts but also interested parties from within the Ministry.

Programme

IOB evaluations form part of the Ministry's evaluation programme (set annually by the Senior Management Board) that appears in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' budget.

An organisation in development

Since IOB's establishment in 1977, major shifts have taken place in its approach, areas of focus and responsibilities. In its early years, its activities took the form of separate project evaluations for the Minister for Development Cooperation. Around 1985, evaluations became more comprehensive, taking in sectors, themes and countries. Moreover, IOB's reports were submitted to parliament, thus entering the public domain.

1996 saw a review of foreign policy and a reorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, IOB's mandate was extended to the Dutch government's entire foreign policy. In recent years, it has extended its partnerships with similar departments in other countries, for instance through joint evaluations. Finally, IOB also aims to expand its methodological repertoire. This includes greater emphasis on statistical methods of impact evaluation.

Annex 2 Terms of Reference of IOB evaluation of the influencing of policy via the Dutch Co-Financing Programme, December 15th 2005

1. Background and justification

The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs programmed a series of evaluation studies of the Dutch Co-Financing Programme (CFP) in the period 2003–2006. The Ministry's present funding of this programme covers this period exactly. The ministerial decree for the funding arrangement stipulates that IOB should evaluate the quality of the work delivered on the basis of its own evaluations, also making use of the results of evaluations organised by CFOs themselves for this purpose (Staatscourant 20 December 2001, no. 247, p. 18). One of the studies programmed by IOB is an evaluation of policy influencing, which a scoping study identified as a rarely evaluated CFP topic (Flikkema 2004: 21).

Policy influencing is one of the three major intervention strategies of the CFP. The other two are direct poverty alleviation and civil society building. These three intervention strategies are intended to contribute to the two main objectives of the present CFP: to contribute to structural reduction of poverty in countries in the South and in the poorest countries in Central and Eastern Europe and to the realisation of international human rights (Staatscourant 20 December 2001, no. 247, p. 18).²⁵

²⁵ In contrast to the strategy of *direct* poverty alleviation, *civil society building* and *policy influencing* are considered strategies to contribute *indirectly* to poverty alleviation. The assumption is that the strategy of *direct* poverty alleviation is not enough to realise the objective of *structural* poverty alleviation (see section 2).

Six development organisations presently enjoy funding from the Ministry through the Co-Financing Programme: Cordaid, ICCO and Oxfam Novib (since 1965), Hivos (since 1977), Plan Netherlands (since 2000) and Terre des Hommes (since 2003). In 2003 the first generation of Co-Financing Organisations (CFOs) each received EUR 90 to 120 million of government subsidies. In that year, Hivos (as a second-generation CFO) received nearly EUR 70 million. Plan and Terre des Hommes are third-generation CFOs. In 2003, they received more than EUR 20 million and nearly EUR 5 million of CFP subsidies, respectively. The percentage spent in 2003 on policy influencing differed per CFO, but in every case was 10 to 18 percent of total CFP expenditures (Flikkema 2004: 13). In 2003 some EUR 57.3 million was reportedly spent on policy influencing via the CFP.

During the general consultation with the Minister for Development Cooperation in June 2003, the Dutch Parliament called for insight into the effectiveness and forms of policy influencing and demanded that measurable indicators of policy influencing be developed (TK 28880, 30 June 2003, nr. 106, pg. 4 and 11).²⁶ The Minister for Development Cooperation concurred and made inquiries in the CFOs on the possibility of introducing measurable indicators of policy influencing in the annual planning cycle.²⁷ All the CFOs responded to the Minister that the development of measurable indicators is of great importance, but at the same time noted that it is not easy to measure the effects of policy influencing (TK 27433, 8 October 2003, no. 19, p. 1).

2. Objective, channels and approaches of policy influencing

In the business plans of the CFOs for the period 2003–2006, policy influencing is sometimes treated together with and sometimes separately from direct alleviation of poverty and the building of civil society. The central idea, however, is that poverty alleviation and the fulfilment of human rights require a comprehensive approach. Addressing poverty through programmes and projects at grassroots level is not enough in a globalising world where policies and institutions in the North and the South affect the chances of poor people breaking out of the cycle of poverty. The philosophy underlying the use of policy influencing as an intervention strategy is that policies, institutions and other structures in the North

²⁶ TK signifies ‘Tweede Kamer’ and refers to letters to the Dutch Parliament.

²⁷ The policy framework of the funding arrangement in the period 2003–2006 includes the following stipulation: ‘The text of the Annual Plan will make use of measurable indicators as much as possible. Preferably, these indicators should be ‘SMART’ (Specific, Measurable, Agreed upon, Realistic and Time-bound). In any case, indicators of results need to be specified and useful for examination’ (Staatscourant 20 December 2001, no. 247, p. 18).

and the South need to be changed to create better opportunities and conditions for poor people, to enable them to overcome their poverty and to enjoy their human rights. The objective of policy influencing is ‘to change local, national and international policy, processes and structures that sustain or aggravate poverty and inequality’ (TK 27433, 2001, no. 2, p. 11).

Each CFO has identified three to five themes (policy domains, rights or types of capital) to structure its approach and focus its interventions.²⁸ CFOs emphasise that policy influencing is a feature of activities under every theme, but also mention that policy influencing has been more substantial with some themes than with others.

CFOs use and have used different channels and approaches to policy influencing. The channels include support to partner organisations, network organisations and to the CFO’s own activities. Roughly speaking, support to partner organisations is meant to influence national policies in the South and, increasingly, at the global level, whereas support to network organisations and to the CFO’s own activities is meant to influence policies and policymakers in the North – particularly in the Netherlands and the EU. As well as this division of labour, CFOs and their partner and network organisations also undertake joint efforts when trying to address key global decision makers. Finally, international coalitions have developed joint international advocacy strategies and planning, in which the Dutch CFO forms a small element.

Different roles or approaches of CFOs can be distinguished in the field of policy influencing. These include the role of donor and facilitator of the partner organisations’ influencing of policy; the role of broker, bringing together different stakeholders and networks to discuss and develop new policies, rules, codes of conduct, etc; the role of an independent and pro-active agency trying to influence policies in the Netherlands and in international policy arenas. Some CFOs are emphatic that policy influencing should in the first place be a matter for partner organisations, not for the CFO itself. Others take the view that policy

²⁸ Cordaid distinguishes five themes: urban livelihood; access to market; health and care; peace and conflict; and HIV/AIDS. Hivos concentrates on five sectors or policy domains: economy; environment and sustainable development; gender, women and development; human rights and AIDS and arts and culture. ICCO focuses on three themes: access to basic services; sustainable and fair economic development; and democratisation and peace-building. Novib distinguishes five rights: sustainable livelihood; basic social services; life and security; social and political participation; and identity (gender and diversity). Plan focuses on five domains and concentrates its interventions on health; learning; habitat; livelihood; and building relations. Terre des Hommes has committed itself to the seven pledges of the UN and distinguishes five types of capital on the basis of the concept of sustainable livelihood (see Flikkema 2004: 5-6 and 25-36).

influencing is a matter of playing simultaneous chess at different tables, requiring coordinated efforts of the CFO and partner organisations at different levels. Approaches also differ in terms of the strategy used (for instance: confrontation versus consultation), target group (like politicians, civil servants or private sector) and the targeting of the phase of the policy process (such as formulation or implementation).

CFOs have used a range of instruments to influence policy, the two main ones generally being considered to be lobbying and advocacy. The differences between these two instruments are not clearly defined. Often, CFOs use ‘policy influencing’, ‘lobbying’ and ‘advocacy’ interchangeably. According to Oxfam Novib, advocacy and campaigning are largely synonymous. At the same time, Oxfam Novib also considers popular campaigning or campaigns directed at the general public to be an instrument of advocacy (Oxfam Novib 2004, p. 20), next to lobbying (engaging directly with key players within the policy and decision-making arena), research, involving the media, alliance building, etc.

As a result of the different roles and approaches adopted by CFOs, policy influencing has been differently organised per CFO. In principle, each officer in a CFO can give financial support to policy influencing by partner organisations. On top of this, CFOs have hired lobby experts, have given some staff a special assignment in the field of policy influencing, have put in place a special lobbying team and/or have developed mechanisms to coordinate policy influencing in the South, the North and worldwide.

3. Scope and limitations

For both Terre des Hommes and Plan, policy influencing is a relatively new field involving small sums of money and few activities by comparison with the other CFOs. For this reason, these two co-financing agencies and their activities will not be included in the present study.

The evaluation will not attempt to describe and assess the contribution of policy influencing to poverty reduction or to the fulfilment of human rights. Methodologically speaking, it is extremely difficult – if not impossible – to assess such impact. The ‘highest’ level of effects that can be explored and assessed, particularly given the current time and budgetary constraints of the evaluation, concerns the intentional and unintentional effects of policy influencing on the targeted policy (or processes). The operationalised objectives, means or stepping

stones of policy influencing will be investigated and assessed. These may include research, problem diagnosis, consultation with constituencies or target groups, stakeholder analysis, mapping and analysis of policy processes, supply of information, issue raising, media campaigns, popular campaigning, agenda setting, drafting of policy proposals, networking, consultation, confrontation and monitoring of policy implementation.

The total number of approved projects (of Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO and Oxfam Novib) with a commitment to policy influencing in the period 2000-2004 was 3,720 (see Annex A.2.1). The total sum committed to these projects amounted to EUR 698.7 million. Given the time and budget constraints, it is not feasible to assess the results of a sample that is representative for all CFOs, for all categories of projects with a policy-influencing component, and for all types of projects in terms of the policy theme that is being addressed. The evaluation will instead focus on one central theme or policy domain that has been targeted by every CFO and, more generally, has high political and social relevance as a recurrent global theme or North-South issue in international or domestic policy debates on poverty and human rights: *economic* policies, processes and structures in the North, in the South and at the global level, that - in the view of CFOs - sustain or aggravate poverty and do not contribute to the realisation of human rights. Each CFO has taken steps and/or supported policy influencing directed at economic policies.

In the period 2000-2004, a total of 1,333 approved projects of the four CFOs included a commitment to the influencing of economic policy (see Annex A.2.2: Table A). The total sum committed to these projects (to policy influencing, civil society building *and/or* direct poverty alleviation) amounted to EUR 339.7 million, of which EUR 72.4 million was earmarked for influencing economic policies, processes or structures (see Annex A.2.2: Table B). These projects were categorised under specific, yet quite similar, themes or strategic objectives. They are called 'access to markets' (Cordaid), 'economy' and 'sustainable economic development' (Hivos), 'sustainable and fair economic development' (ICCO), and 'trade and markets' and 'food and income security' (Oxfam Novib). For these specific themes, projects will be selected for desk study in which the commitment to policy influencing is more than 50 percent of the total commitment. In addition, cases will be selected for in-depth study from projects in which the commitment to policy influencing is more than 75 percent of the total commitment. The findings of the evaluation will be representative for activities funded and/or undertaken by selected CFOs in which economic policy influencing - in terms of size of commitment - is the major intervention strategy.

4. Objectives and research questions

The two main objectives of the IOB evaluation are:

- 1) To assess the efficiency and effectiveness of economic policy influencing as undertaken and/or supported by Dutch Co-Financing Agencies through the Co-Financing Programme;
- 2) To identify the internal mechanisms and external conditions that might explain the efficiency and effectiveness (or lack of these) of such policy influencing.

Efficiency measures the conversion of input into output. Effectiveness is about the relationship between output and outcome. Output and outcome are two levels of results. Internal mechanisms include a) the extent to which the formulation of objectives of policy influencing has been based on analysis of the complexity and scope of the policy issue (through research), mapping of stakeholders (stakeholder analysis or power analysis), and up-to-date information and analysis of decision-making processes of policymakers (institutional analysis). Internal mechanisms also include b) the way in which policy influencing has been institutionalised by the CFO. External conditions refer to a) the complexity of targeted policies, the rules of the negotiation game, and the power of the targeted policymakers. They may also include b) unforeseen events or regime changes that have boosted or undermined policy influencing by Dutch CFOs and their partner organisations.

The key questions are:

- 1) How efficient was the policy influencing as undertaken and/or supported by Dutch CFOs and directed at economic policies, processes and structures?
More specifically:
 - 1.1 What was the relationship between the input and output of the policy influencing?
 - 1.2 Was the output delivered according to plan, time and budget?
- 2) How effective was the policy influencing as undertaken and/or supported by Dutch CFOs and directed at economic policies, processes and structures?
More specifically:

- 2.1 Were the targeted policymakers reached? Did they remember the Dutch CFOs and/or partner organisations and the policy issues they wanted to address?
- 2.2 Were issues that were being addressed by the Dutch CFOs subsequently added to or moved higher up the agenda of the targeted policymakers?
- 2.3 Were the Dutch CFOs and/or partner organisations invited to sit around the table with the targeted policymakers? Did the targeted policymakers institutionalise relationships with the Dutch CFOs and/or partner organisations?
- 2.4 Did policy influencing by the Dutch CFOs and/or partner organisations contribute to the formulation or reformulation of the targeted policy, or to furthering of the implementation of policy?
- 2.5 How effective was participation of Dutch CFOs in coalitions for reaching the policymakers targeted by the Dutch CFO (see 2.1), for putting issues of the Dutch CFO onto or higher up the agenda of these policymakers (see 2.2), for institutionalising the relationships with the targeted policymakers (see 2.3) and for contributing to the formulation or reformulation of policy, or furthering of the implementation of policy, as desired and proposed by the Dutch CFO (see 2.4)?

Annex A.2.3 provides a schematic picture of the objects, criteria and scope of the evaluation.

The purpose of the evaluation is 1) to enable the Minister for Development Cooperation to account to the Dutch Parliament for Dutch funding of policy influencing through the Co-Financing Programme and 2) to collect and learn lessons on the measurability of results of policy influencing, so as to contribute to the policy discussion between the Dutch Parliament, the Minister for Development Cooperation and CFOs on this issue.

5. Methodology

The IOB evaluation will consist of two components: a desk study of selected approved projects, and case studies.

5.1 Desk study

For the desk study, an inventory has been made of all approved projects that took place in the period 2002-2004 categorised under a CFO-specific version of the theme of fair and/or sustainable economic policies. These projects have been classified in terms of the percentage of the budget committed to influencing economic policy (see Table A of Annex A.2.2).

Projects will be selected in which the percentage of the budget committed to economic policy influencing is more than 50 percent, meaning that – financially speaking – such policy influencing is the dominant intervention. The total number of these projects in the period 2000-2004 is 178. The total sum of commitments to these 178 projects was EUR 28,892,353. For the desk study, about 100 projects will be selected, not including projects selected for case study (see 5.2). On the basis of screening of projects and additional information from CFO staff, specific criteria will be developed for this selection.

Each study of a project dossier will consist of three steps. First, project design will be analysed. The following research questions will be addressed:

- Did the CFO and/or partner organisation formulate or adopt specific intervention theories on the expected relationships between input, output and outcome?
- Were different levels of results distinguished in the formulation of objectives?
- Were objectives formulated, specified or operationalised in such a way that their realisation could be determined?
- Were indicators of results formulated that are specific, measurable and time-bound?

Secondly, any evidence of output and outcome of policy influencing as documented in the dossiers will be recorded. Thirdly, for those projects in which this evidence is available and specific, efficiency and effectiveness will be determined.

5.2 Case studies

Activities of economic policy influencing have been selected for the case studies on the basis of the following criteria:

- The activities were or had been considered of high importance by the CFO and were or had been receiving a relatively large input (money, staff, time) from the CFO.
- The activities were or had been clustered by the CFO under a lobby theme or at a programmatic level (as part of a campaign and/or coalition of like-minded organisations).

Shortlists from all CFOs have been used to select campaigns or lobby activities that are similar in terms of the specific policy issue or targeted policy or institution.

Each case study will describe and assess a combination of channels, ways and instruments used by the CFO to try to influence a certain economic policy, process or structure. Not only funding of projects but also lobbying by staff and work with or through coalitions will be investigated. Brief profiles of the selected cases follow below:

Case 1: ICCO and the formulation of international trade agreements based on the right to adequate food.

This case is about ICCO's projects, campaigns and coalitions to make food security the major concern of international policies on food trade and to make the right to adequate food the leading principle of international agreements on food trade. According to ICCO, international food trade is not fair and sustainable because international food trade policies lack a food security and rights-based perspective. Based on these considerations, ICCO founded the Consortium on Food Security, Sustainable Agriculture and Trade in 1999. In the run-up to the WTO Ministerial Conference of 2003 in Cancun, ICCO launched the campaign on Food and Nutritional Security: A Global Concern', together with like-minded NGOs and partner organisations in Brazil, Bolivia, India, Kenya, Uganda. The campaigners decided to institutionalise their working relationships and formed the Food, Trade and Nutrition Coalition. As a coalition partner, ICCO is lobbying the Dutch Government, the EC and members of the European Parliament. It also supports and prepares lobbying at WTO meetings.

Case 2: Cordaid and the establishment of a code of conduct on soy production.

This case is about Cordaid's projects, campaign and coalition to establish a code of conduct on soy production involving producers and traders in the South and the North – with a view to end what Cordaid considers 'unsustainable' production of soy. According to Cordaid, large-scale and capital-intensive cultivation of genetically modified and regular soy is unsustainable because such cultivation contributes to land conflicts, rural unemployment, low incomes, destruction of ecosystems and intensification of bio-industry (which uses soy as a feedstuff). The Netherlands is one of the biggest transit ports of soy to Western Europe. Cordaid has facilitated dialogue between producers, traders and buyers of soy and works together with like-minded organisations in the Soy Coalition (started in 2003). This coalition has a Dutch, European and Latin American division.

Case 3: Hivos and the inclusion of environmental and social criteria in GMO protocols.

This case is about the projects, campaigns and coalitions of Hivos directed at the establishment of alternative policies and protocols on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). According to Hivos, the introduction of GMOs in agriculture is bound to produce a fundamental change in agricultural patterns worldwide and is likely to have a negative impact on small and medium farmers in developing countries. The increase in corporate control that accompanies the introduction of GMOs not only threatens farmer's rights but also biodiversity. Hivos has been active in several GMO projects: it has organised a number of symposia and meetings with politicians on 'GMOs in developing countries', was actively involved in the 'Terlouw debat' (public debate in the Netherlands on GMOs), invited GMO speakers from NGO's in developing countries, co-organised a European speakers' tour, actively participated in the debate on GMOs and food aid, joined the Gentech Coalition, set up the Dutch Gentech.nl website, investigated liability issues, lobbied at COP IV, lobbied for ratification of the Cartagena protocol, and was active in a WTO-directed campaign 'hands off my plate' as part of the international 'Bite Back' campaign to lobby against WTO undermining biosafety measures and freedom of choice for consumers.

Case 4: Hivos and the recognition and implementation of codes of conduct on coffee production.

This case is about projects and networks of Hivos directed at the recognition and implementation of international codes of conduct on coffee production. According to Hivos, the coffee chain is a critical element of North–South trade, providing a livelihood for 25 million farmers in 50 developing countries. Overproduction and declining prices have reportedly led to social and environmental degradation. Hivos has concluded that coffee pickers on large plantations and also small coffee farmers work and live under deplorable conditions. For these reasons, Hivos has lobbied and campaigned for better social and environmental standards in the coffee sector. Hivos aims to enlarge the share of coffee certified according to social and environmental standards like Utz Kapeh or Max Havelaar by lobbying roasters and supermarkets such as Douwe Egberts, Albert Heijn and Aldi. Hivos is an active member of the Dutch Coffee Coalition. Its own activities are intended to strengthen the bigger campaign of the Coffee Coalition and to voice Hivos’s specific input. Hivos has also supported the Utz Kapeh standard in the Netherlands and Europe through the Coffee Support Network. This standard has been designed by Ahold Coffee Company and is a modification of EurepGap, a quality system created by 20 European supermarkets. The top three countries with the largest number of Utz Kapeh certified producers are Brazil, Colombia and Kenya.

Case 5: Oxfam Novib and the demonstration of corporate social responsibility by Dutch coffee companies.

This case is about Oxfam Novib’s projects, campaigns and lobbying directed at the demonstration of corporate social responsibility by Dutch coffee companies. According to Oxfam Novib, the prices paid to small coffee growers are too low and insecure. To raise public awareness of this issue and to contribute to higher and more stable prices to small coffee growers, Oxfam Novib undertook a public campaign in 1999–2000, contributed to the coffee campaign of the larger, international Make Trade Fair campaign of Oxfam International in 2002–2003, and joined the Dutch Coffee Coalition in 2003. Both Oxfam Novib and Hivos are members of the Coffee Coalition and together coordinated the lobbying of Dutch MPs. The lobbying of Douwe Egberts was done in cooperation with the Dutch trade union FNV.

Case 6: *Oxfam Novib and the end of sugar dumping.*

This case is about Oxfam Novib's projects and campaign against dumping of sugar as part of its larger campaign against the dumping of agricultural products. According to Oxfam Novib, such dumping has contributed to poverty in developing countries. In 2004, Oxfam International analysed the potential of EU sugar reform to contribute to poverty reduction in Southern Africa. Oxfam Novib started a sugar campaign, consisting of a public awareness campaign and the lobbying of Dutch Parliament and producers' organisations.

Similar to the desk study, each case study will consist of three steps, concentrating on project design first, then the recording of output and outcome, and finally assessing these results in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. In contrast to the desk study, the case studies will not only assess the individual funding of projects but also programmatic campaigns, the CFO's own lobbying and work with/through coalitions. Each case study will start with dossier study but try to gain in-depth information through structured interviews and field visits, with a view (a) to further develop or reconstruct intervention theories and (b) to verify and collect data on output and outcome.

The structured interviews and field visits will be held with targeted policymakers or companies at national and European levels, coalition partners in the Netherlands and Europe, and key experts. In addition, interviews will be held with partner organisations, coalition partners and representatives of small farmers in Brazil and Kenya. These two countries have a relatively high 'density' of organisations, partners and/or representatives of small farmers that are part of or linked to selected projects and campaigns of CFOs. Brazil hosts a coalition partner of ICCO in their campaign on the right to food (see case 1); Cordaid's project funding of the soy coalition focused on Brazil (see case 2), the country that also has the highest number of Utz Kapeh certified coffee producers (see cases 4 and 5). Like Brazil, Kenya also hosts a coalition partner of ICCO in their campaign on the right to food (see case 1). In addition, it has the highest number of African Utz Kapeh coffee producers (see cases 4 and 5).

Indicators of output and outcome will be adopted or developed per case study in order to assess efficiency and effectiveness. Each case study consists of a combination of funding of projects, use of the CFO's own staff for lobbying and campaigning purposes, and working through/with coalitions, so for each project, a lobbying work plan and work through/with a coalition, specific indicators of

output and outcome will be identified or formulated. An important part of each case study will be mapping what was actually done and what happened (or did not happen) through time.²⁹

Finally, the case studies will identify the internal mechanisms and external conditions that might explain the efficiency and effectiveness (or lack of these) of the policy influencing. For the identification of these mechanisms, open-ended questions and structured interviews will be used on CFO staff, coalition partners, targeted policymakers and independent experts. The case studies will pay special attention to any reformulation of objectives (or ‘shifting of goal posts’) as an issue that relates both to project design and to internal mechanisms.³⁰

6. Organisation, planning, products and budget

6.1 Organisation

Overall responsibility for preparation, design, implementation and reporting is with Otto Hospes, inspector IOB. He will be assisted by two junior researchers (Jaap van der Kloet and Martine Weve) whose special task will be to conduct desk studies. A lead consultant will be responsible for drafting specific evaluation designs for five case studies, implementing five case studies, and writing case study reports and summary reports. One case study will be prepared, implemented and reported by Otto Hospes. He will also draft a synthesis document on the basis of the desk study and case study reports.

The lead consultant will be Nora Plaisier (Ecorys). She will be assisted by consultant Floor Smakman (Ecorys) and two local consultants (one in Brazil and one in Kenya).

Interviews with targeted policymakers or companies at national and European levels, coalition partners in the Netherlands and Europe, and key experts will be prepared by the lead consultant and conducted by the lead consultant and Floor Smakman. Interviews with partner organisations and coalition partners in Brazil and Kenya will be prepared by the lead consultant and conducted by local consultants. Either the lead consultant or Floor Smakman will visit Brazil and Kenya to test the questions prepared for structured interviews.

²⁹ Mapping of what was actually done refers to output, whereas mapping of what happened refers to outcome.

³⁰ ‘Shifting of goal posts’ refers to a change in the objectives of projects, programmes or campaigns from one phase to another or from one moment to another during a phase.

An advisory committee will be formed from the IOB inspectors, staff of the Ministry and CFOs that have acted as advisors during the preparation of the terms of reference. It will meet and discuss the following three products: the final draft of the specific evaluation design for case studies, the final draft reports of the case studies and summary report, and the draft synthesis report (IOB final report). The committee will consist of one IOB inspector, one staff member of the Ministry and one representative of the CFOs. In addition, two academics (one specialised in lobbying, one specialised in agricultural economic policies at international level) will be invited to participate in the advisory committee. The committee will be chaired by the director of IOB.

6.2 Planning

Desk study

January 1st to January 31st 2006: final selection of activities; drafting, pre-testing and finalisation of questionnaire.

February 1st to April 30th 2006: data collection.

May 1st to May 31st 2006: writing of desk study report.

Case studies

January 1st to February 15th 2006: drafting of specific evaluation design for six case studies.

February 16th to June 31st 2006: data collection and writing of case study reports.

July 1st to July 15th 2006: writing of summary report.

Synthesis report

August 1st to October 30th 2006: writing of synthesis report (IOB evaluation report) on the basis of the desk study and case studies.

6.3 Products

The IOB junior researchers will draft the desk study of selected activities.

The lead consultant will draft a final report consisting of a description and assessment of five case studies. To this, the description and assessment of the case study conducted by Otto Hospes will be added, following the same format. The lead consultant will draft a summary report on the basis of all case study reports.

On the basis of the desk study and case study reports, Otto Hospes (IOB) will draft a synthesis document, to be considered for publication as an IOB evaluation report.

6.4 Budget

| a. Desk studies (by IOB junior researchers) | | | |
|---|---------------|------------|-------------------|
| | Months | Fee | Totals |
| Jaap van der Kloet | 6 | 3500 | 21,000.00 |
| Martine Weve | 4 | 3500 | 14,000.00 |
| Sub-total (in EUR) | 10 | 3500 | 35,000.00 |
| b. Case studies (by Ecorys consultants)¹ | | | |
| | Days | Fee | Totals |
| Consultants | - | - | 115,900.00 |
| VAT (19%) | | | 22,021.00 |
| Travel costs | | | 8,478.00 |
| Sub-total (in EUR) | | | 146,399.00 |
| c. Costs of editing and publication | | | |
| Editing | | | 2,000.00 |
| Publication | | | 12,000.00 |
| Sub-total (in EUR) | | | 14,000.00 |
| Sum of sub-totals of a, b and c: total budget (in EUR) | | | 185,399.00 |

¹ IOB project administration contains a specification of fees, travel costs, subsistence costs and working days per consultant per case study.

Annex A.2.1 Projects with a commitment to policy influencing, approved in the period 2000-2004, per CFO

For every activity, the programme officers of CFOs (except Plan and Terre des Hommes) have to specify the percentage of the budget committed to direct poverty alleviation, civil society building and/or policy influencing. The total percentage has to be 100 percent. The percentage committed to policy influencing may be zero or 25 percent or 100 percent. The following tables present the total numbers of Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO and Oxfam Novib projects approved in 2000–2004, the number of these projects with a commitment to policy influencing, and the percentage of the funding allocated to policy influencing.

Table A Cordaid projects approved in 2001-2004 with a commitment to policy influencing (PI)¹

| | Number of projects | Volume (EUR) |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|
| Total of approved projects | 2358 | 377,179,461 |
| Approved projects with 1 to 25% PI | 666 | 125,196,862 |
| Approved projects with 26 to 50% PI | 439 | 67,598,247 |
| Approved projects with 51 to 75% PI | 66 | 6,780,797 |
| Approved projects with 76 to 100% PI | 77 | 7,141,118 |
| Total of approved projects with PI | 1,248 | 206,717,023 |

¹ No data were available for 2000.

Source: Cordaid project administration.

Table B Hivos projects approved in 2000-2004 with a commitment to policy influencing (PI)

| | Number of projects | Volume (EUR) |
|---|--------------------|-------------------|
| Total of approved projects | 2369 | 222,347,410 |
| Approved projects with 1 to 25 % PI | 240 | 34,477,482 |
| Approved projects with 26 to 50% PI | 368 | 43,943,117 |
| Approved projects with 51 to 75% PI | 89 | 9,136,313 |
| Approved projects with 76 to 100% PI | 220 | 8,128,781 |
| Total of approved projects with PI | 917 | 95,685,693 |

Source: Hivos project administration.

Table C ICCO projects approved in 2000–2004 with a commitment to policy influencing (PI)

| | Number of projects | Volume (EUR) |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|
| Total of approved projects | 3105 | 465,534,164 |
| Approved projects with 1 to 25 % PI | 209 | 63,356,610 |
| Approved projects with 26 to 50% PI | 199 | 42,342,800 |
| Approved projects with 51 to 75% PI | 31 | 6,324,789 |
| Approved projects with 76 to 100% PI | 157 | 24,366,936 |
| Total of approved projects with PI | 596 | 136,391,140 |

Source: ICCO project administration.

Table D Oxfam Novib projects approved in 2000–2004 with a commitment to policy influencing (PI)¹

| | Number of projects | Volume (EUR) |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|
| Total of approved projects | 3262 | 591,642,546 |
| Approved projects with 1 to 25 % PI | 612 | 185,634,067 |
| Approved projects with 26 to 50% PI | 236 | 53,985,664 |
| Approved projects with 51 to 75% PI | 34 | 9,037,907 |
| Approved projects with 76 to 100% PI | 77 | 11,224,732 |
| Total of approved projects with PI | 959 | 259,882,368 |

¹ This excludes projects financed with non-CFP money.

Source: Oxfam Novib project administration.

In 2004, Plan started to classify activities in three categories: direct alleviation of poverty, the strengthening of civil society, and finally, development education, advocacy, alliances and research.³¹ For this purpose, programme officers were asked to consider the design or intent of the project or programme, not the financial commitment. The total expenditure on policy influencing in the five-year period 2000–2004 are estimated by Plan at EUR 22.3 million (of which EUR 13.5 million in Asia, EUR 4.0 million in West Africa, EUR 3.2 million in Southern Africa, EUR 1.3 million in Latin America and EUR 0.3 million in the Netherlands). These figures include expenditure on development education, advocacy, alliances and research. Plan's policy influencing has been mostly directed at child protection.

³¹ For Plan, the strengthening of civil society includes strengthening lobby and advocacy. The cluster of development education, advocacy, alliances and research is divided into three: 1) strengthening alliances and networks, 2) development education and advocacy, and 3) research.

Terre des Hommes classifies projects in terms of the kind of help and the target group. The total expenditure of Terre des Hommes on policy influencing in the period 2003-2004 is estimated at EUR 763.954³².

Annex A.2.2 Projects with a commitment to influencing economic policy approved in the period 2000-2004, per CFO

This annex specifies the number of approved projects of Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO and Oxfam Novib in which a share of the funding was committed to economic policy influencing (see Table A). The total sum of funding committed to economic policy influencing was calculated from the exact percentage committed to the CFO-specific theme or strategic objective in the field of fair and sustainable economic development (see Table B). Tables C to F provide details for each CFO, in terms of numbers and volume of commitments.

| CFO and selected policy theme or strategic objective | Number of approved projects with a commitment to economic policy influencing (differentiated in terms of the percentage of the budget committed to economic policy influencing) | | | | |
|---|---|------------|-----------|------------|--------------|
| | 1 to 25% | 26 to 50% | 51 to 75% | 76 to 100% | Total |
| Cordaid | | | | | |
| • Access to markets | 397 | 26 | 5 | 8 | 436 |
| Hivos | | | | | |
| • Economy (2001-2003) | 13 | 36 | 9 | 19 | 77 |
| • Environment and sustainable development (2001-2003) | 38 | 48 | 12 | 24 | 122 |
| • Sustainable economic development (2004) | 1 | 1 | 2 | 13 | 17 |
| ICCO | | | | | |
| • Sustainable and fair economic development | 84 | 46 | 8 | 20 | 158 |
| Oxfam Novib | | | | | |
| • Trade and markets | 86 | 41 | 11 | 18 | 156 |
| • Food and income security | 269 | 69 | 14 | 15 | 367 |
| Total | 888 | 267 | 61 | 117 | 1,333 |

Source: project administrations of Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO and Oxfam Novib.

³² Terre des Hommes joined the CFP in 2003. In that year, Terre des Hommes spent EUR 763,954 on policy influencing, a large part of which (EUR 405,761) was used to support activities in research, awareness and lobbying. From the information available it is difficult to identify how much was spent per component.

Table B Total volume of commitments of projects (that include a commitment to economic policy influencing) approved in the period 2000-2004 and total volume of commitments earmarked for influencing economic policy

| CFO | Total number of projects with a commitment to economic policy influencing | Total volume of commitments (including commitment to economic policy influencing) | Total volume of commitments earmarked for influencing economic policy |
|--------------|---|---|---|
| Cordaid | 436 | 88,780,134 | 10,301,271 |
| Hivos | 216 | 24,313,846 | 11,485,990 |
| ICCO | 158 | 45,835,192 | 13,359,404 |
| Oxfam Novib | 523 | 188,120,105 | 39,846,696 |
| Total | 1,333 | 339,725,835 | 72,485,223 |

Source: project administrations of Cordaid, Hivos, ICCO and Novib.

Table C Number of approved projects of Cordaid and volume of commitments to economic policy influencing in the period 2001-2004

| Cordaid and selected policy theme or strategic objective and volume of commitment | Number of approved projects in the field of the theme 'Access to Markets' with a commitment to policy influencing (differentiated in terms of the percentage of the budget committed to policy influencing) | | | | |
|---|---|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|
| | 1 to 25% | 26 to 50% | 51 to 75% | 76 to 100% | Total |
| Access to markets | 397 | 26 | 5 | 8 | 436 |
| Total volume of commitments | 84,128,815 | 3,450,284 | 560,077 | 640,958 | 88,780,134 |
| Total volume of commitments to 'Access to Markets' | 8,129,910 | 1,244,554 | 379,760 | 547,048 | 10,301,271 |

Source: Cordaid project administration.

Table D Number of approved projects of Hivos and volume of commitments to economic policy influencing in the period 2000-2004

| Hivos and selected policy theme or strategic objective and volume of commitment | Number of approved projects in the field of Hivos's fair economic themes with a commitment to policy influencing (differentiated in terms of the percentage of the budget committed to policy influencing) | | | | |
|---|--|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|
| | 1 to 25% | 26 to 50% | 51 to 75% | 76 to 100% | Total |
| Economy (2001-2003) | 13 | 36 | 9 | 19 | 77 |
| Total volume of commitments | 1,236,884 | 3,076,418 | 680,108 | 738,815 | 5,732,225 |
| Total volume of commitments to economic policy influencing | 309,221 | 1,472,790 | 510,081 | 738,815 | 3,030,907 |
| Environment and sustainable development (2001-2003) | 38 | 48 | 12 | 24 | 122 |
| Total volume of commitments | 8,579,353 | 5,490,625 | 1,385,983 | 1,597,924 | 17,053,885 |
| Total volume of commitments to economic policy influencing | 2,144,838 | 2,398,757 | 1,039,487 | 1,597,924 | 7,181,006 |
| Sustainable economic development (2004) | 1 | 1 | 2 | 13 | 17 |
| Total volume of commitments | 10,000 | 100,000 | 778,635 | 639,101 | 1,527,736 |
| Total volume of commitments to economic policy influencing | 1,000 | 50,000 | 583,976 | 639,101 | 1,274,077 |

Source: Hivos project administration.

| ICCO and selected policy theme or strategic objective and volume of commitment | Number of approved projects in the field of fair economic policies with a commitment to policy influencing (differentiated in terms of the percentage of the budget committed to policy influencing) | | | | |
|--|--|------------|-----------|------------|-------------------|
| | 1 to 25% | 26 to 50% | 51 to 75% | 76 to 100% | Total |
| Sustainable and fair economic development | 84 | 46 | 8 | 20 | 158 |
| Total volume of commitments | 28,895,012 | 12,130,529 | 1,946,714 | 2,862,937 | 45,835,192 |
| Total volume of commitments to economic policy influencing | 4,373,324 | 4,855,341 | 1,336,802 | 2,793,937 | 13,359,404 |

Source: ICCO project administration.


Table F **Number of approved projects of Oxfam Novib and volume of commitments to economic policy influencing in the period 2000-2004¹**

| Oxfam Novib and selected policy theme or strategic objective and volume of commitment | Number of approved projects in the field of fair economic policies with a commitment to policy influencing (differentiated in terms of the percentage of the budget committed to policy influencing) | | | | |
|---|--|------------|-----------|------------|-------------|
| | 1 to 25% | 26 to 50% | 51 to 75% | 76 to 100% | Total |
| Trade and markets | 100 | 44 | 14 | 19 | 177 |
| Total volume of commitments | 51,465,574 | 13,352,557 | 6,044,564 | 4,303,543 | 75,166,238 |
| Total volume of commitments to economic policy influencing | 3,694,368 | 4,326,202 | 2,627,057 | 3,761,720 | 14,409,347 |
| Food and income security | 303 | 71 | 15 | 17 | 406 |
| Total volume of commitments | 131,119,791 | 24,636,031 | 7,906,507 | 4,983,292 | 168,645,621 |
| Total volume of commitments to economic policy influencing | 10,770,381 | 6,356,679 | 3,766,509 | 3,219,569 | 24,113,138 |

¹ This excludes projects financed with non-CFP money.

Source: Oxfam Novib project administration.

Annex A.2.3 Schematic and simplified picture of the objects, criteria and scope of the evaluation



Explanation: schematically, the objects of the evaluation are input, output and outcome. The evaluation criteria are efficiency and effectiveness. The assessment of impact and of relevance does not fall within the remit of the present evaluation.

Annex 3 A desk study of guidelines on lobbying

This annex puts together guidelines on lobbying based on a review of handbooks, toolkits, review papers, scoping and overview studies (see Sources). The handbooks, etc refer to different elements of lobbying and lobby processes. These elements are not guarantees of effectiveness but rather preconditions for or potential aids to effective lobbying. IOB has grouped the guidelines into six categories, each referring to a different element of lobbying and lobbying processes:

- 1) Preparation
- 2) Organisation
- 3) Developing relations
- 4) Capacities of the lobbyists
- 5) Lobby strategies
- 6) The act of lobbying

1. Preparation

a) Planning steps

Lobbyists are advised to develop a lobby plan. Avner distinguishes eight so-called 'planning steps' that NGOs should follow when developing such a plan:

- Planning step 1: prepare the planning team
- Planning step 2: articulate vision and goals
- Planning step 3: establish criteria and identify issues
- Planning step 4: target arenas of influence
- Planning step 5: choose strategies and tactics
- Planning step 6: design organisational infrastructure
- Planning step 7: create your work plan
- Planning step 8: present the work plan

b) *Research and analysis*

Research and analysis should be part of the preparation of lobbying. Lobbyists should undertake or organise research and analysis in order to gain knowledge and insights about two fields:

- 1) the subject matter (complexity, past and current issues)
- 2) the policy environment or political playing field (mandates, competences, roles, relationships and positions of different players)

Lobbyists are advised to ensure that the information they use for lobbying is up-to-date, correct and detailed.

c) *A clear and clearly specified intervention strategy*

Before starting their lobbying, lobbyists should formulate a clear and clearly specified intervention strategy. This strategy should consist of clear and achievable objectives and specify means–end propositions including desired policy changes. The intervention strategy should be based on an assessment of the potential impact of the opposing players on a campaign,

A lobbyist should formulate objectives at the lowest possible level of result, or elaborate general objectives into specific ones. Related to this, in addition to formulating long-term objectives, it is advisable to formulate short-term objectives .

d) *Lobby theme*

The lobby theme and the issues the lobby will aim at should be specified before the lobbying starts.

2. Organisation

a) *Decision-making processes*

Prompt and clear decision-making processes may influence the effectiveness of lobbying because they enable lobbyists to respond quickly to changing circumstances in the lobbying process.

b) *Institutionalisation of lobbying within the organisation*

The effectiveness of lobbying may be influenced by the way and the degree to which preparation and decision-making on lobby has been institutionalised within the organisation. A clear plan for or view on the mandate and roles of lobbyists or the lobby unit within the organisation should be developed and shared.

3. Developing relations

a) *Building and maintaining relations with other lobby organisations*

Coalitions and alliances may enhance the effectiveness of lobbying if coalition partners take on complementary roles and approach problems in different ways. At the same time, coalitions and alliances may delay or decrease the effectiveness of lobbying if common objectives, shared responsibilities and constructive decision making are lacking.

b) *Relations at micro- and macro-levels*

Relations with grassroots organisations (at the micro-level) and policymakers (at the macro-level) may influence the extent to which lobbying is effective. Lobby themes deemed urgent by grassroots organisations and by policymakers can help forge such relationships and enhance the effectiveness of lobbying. The more abstract a lobby objective, the more difficult it is for an NGO to keep or win the confidence of the people or organisations they are lobbying for. For instance, for whom does an NGO lobby when the lobby objective is a change of WTO policy?

c) *Relations with influential policymakers*

Building and maintaining relations with policymakers may be of importance for an effective lobby. The support of policymakers for a certain policy change can strengthen the lobby and increase its legitimacy. Lobbyists should refrain from taking a generalised perspective on the situation and instead try to develop relations with like-minded or open-minded officials.

d) *Relations with media*

Contacts with journalists and knowledge on how to use media can be important to make lobbying effective.

4. Capacities of lobbyists

a) *Professionalism*

The degree of effectiveness of a lobby may be affected by the capacities of the lobbyist. A lobbyist should preferably:

- have experience in lobbying;
- have intelligence about and contacts with lobby targets;
- be recognised as a source of information;

- be willing to cooperate in coalitions and alliances;
- be able to seize unexpected opportunities for achieving changes;
- be able to systematically prepare for meetings;
- be able to deliver concise and clear presentations or position papers;
- be aware of the possibilities and limitations of lobbying.

b) *Capacity to connect macro- and micro-levels*

Lobbyists should have the capacity to demonstrate connections between actors and processes at the micro- and macro-levels. This means that lobbyists should be able to make clear how policy changes at the macro-level (for example: WTO, World Bank, EU, national policy) have affected and may affect people and processes at the micro-level (for example: grassroots organisation, beneficiaries).

5. Lobby strategies

a) *Willingness to deliberate with the government*

The willingness and capacity to deliberate with the government may affect the effectiveness of the lobby.

b) *Lobbying at different levels*

For a lobby to be effective, it may be important to focus it on different levels at the same time.

c) *Contributing to public awareness*

Public campaigns directed at creating public awareness may be useful preparation for lobbying and can be an integral part of a lobby campaign.

d) *Capacity building of partner organisations*

Capacity building of partner organisations may be useful preparation for lobbying and can be part of a lobby strategy.

6. The act of lobbying

a) *Timing of lobbying*

Well-timed lobbying may influence the effectiveness of lobby. This means, among other things, addressing the right person in the right place at the right moment. When in possession of correct and trustworthy information, a lobbyist should preferably try to influence policymakers in an early phase, when the first draft of a proposal has to be written.

b) *Proposing alternatives*

The extent to which lobbying is effective may also be influenced by a lobbyist who not only makes comments but can also propose policy alternatives. This cooperative attitude may strengthen the relationship with policymakers.

c) *Lobbying instruments*

Lobbying should consist of several different lobbying instruments that have been geared to different lobby targets.

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