Foreign Report, 30/4/81

CW
-Iran
Iran-Iraq

Nerve gas in the Iraq-Iran war?

The Iraqis are using a lethal type of nerve agent in their war against Iran, according to information made available to FOREIGN REPORT by Middle East military intelligence sources. It is known as "Type V", which paralyses the nerve centres and immobilises the victim. If even a few drops touch the skin, it is fatal unless the victim receives an antidote in the form of an injection of atropine within five minutes of contact with the gas.

Type V has been developed jointly by the Russians and the East Germans and is now said to be manufactured in a number of east European countries. The East Germans are thought to be Iraq's principal supplier. The Iraqis are said to have first used it in January, in the strategically important Ahwaz-Dezful region, during the unsuccessful Iranian offensive; it is reported to have killed about 100 Iranians.

As an emergency measure to protect the Iranian forces against Type V, four Palestinian experts on biological and chemical warfare flew to Teheran at the beginning of March to act as advisers to the Iranian general staff. Their most urgent task is to organise training in the use of atropine self-injections by Iranian troops who might be subject to further attacks by Type V. They are also setting up and training biological and chemical warfare units in the Iranian army and advising the authorities in Teheran on the suitability and cost of chemical warfare equipment, which the Iranians are shopping around for. The Syrians are considered the most likely suppliers.

The four Palestinian chemical warfare experts were lent to the Iranian general staff from Fatah's military force, Al-Assifa, which is stationed in Lebanon, after an emergency appeal for assistance by an Iranian intelligence officer, **Colonel Abas Kutayaba,** to the head of the PLO's intelligence organisation.

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's-GRAVENHAGE, LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 28
TEL. Nos: 465622; 614941 - 2531

VERZONDEN CODEBERICHT

KOPIE Nos: 044
REFERENTIE Nos: 13903
Dir./Afd.: dio/nn
Visie
Ag. No:
Dossier:

DATUM VAN VERZENDING: 9 sept 1983

AFKOMSTIG VAN: min. van b.z.

MINUUT GEPARAFEERD DOOR: btn/jwe/ahu/jve

BESTEMD VOOR:
1. bagdad
2. teheran

PARAAF/OPM.:

GEANNULEERD 02.08.06

~~CONFIDENTIEEL~~

cc DEF 10.25

ter informatie per koerier aan:
brussel pv navo - pv geneve - washington

onderwerp: gebruik chemische wapens in oorlog iran-irak

volgens een a f p-bericht van 24 augustus, waarvan copie u per koerier toeging, zou irak chemische wapens gebruikt hebben tegen iran. volgens de beschuldigingen die iran gedaan heeft zou irak o.a. mosterdgas gebruikt hebben. iran en irak zijn beide partij bij het geneefse protocol van 1925 dat het gebruik van chemische wapens in oorlog verbiedt. hoewel de iraanse aantijgingen mogelijk niet meer dan oorlogspropaganda zijn, zou ik het toch op prijs stellen indien u , wanneer u over nadere informatie zou beschikken, mij hiervan in kennis zou stellen.

v.d. broek 1) 55.,
2) 106.

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ONTVANGEN CODEBERICHT

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9 november 1983

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min. van b.z.

DATUM VAN AFZENDING:
9 november 1983

AFKOMSTIG VAN: b a g d a d

PARAAF/OPM.:

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GEANNOTEERD 8 2.00 08

onderwerp: irak-iran, de slag om penjwin

in plaats van de kalmerende uitwerking op partijen die de vr met zijn resolutie 540 beoogde, lijkt hij, de zware gevechten in en om penjwin in aanmerking genomen, op het eerste gezicht eerder het omgekeerde te hebben bewerkstelligd. in de nacht van 2 op 3 november begon iran aldaar een nieuw grootscheeps offensief, het derde sinds 20 oktober. ditmaal hebben naar verluidt de iraakse verdedigers in die sector de druk niet kunnen weerstaan en zou penjwin stevig in iraanse handen zijn, dan wel hermetisch omsingeld. de iraakse verdediging kon pas weer worden hersteld door de interventie van de republiekeinse garde, een presidentiele elitebrigade die alleen in noodgevallen wordt ingezet. de iraniers zouden thans plm. 15 km op iraaks territoir zijn doorgedrongen.

afgaande op de iraakse pers is irak vastbesloten iran thans met alle beschikbare middelen en tegen welke doelen dan ook (uitdrukking die onlangs ook door undersecretary al-sahaf werd gebezigd-mijn 117-) aan te vallen. daarbij wordt met name gedoeld op steden en dorpen, waarvan men in iran tot dusver aannam dat zij veilig waren voor iraakse raket-en luchtaanvallen.

voorts wordt in perscommentaren van 3 en 4 dezer (rmt 643 en 644) gesproken van een iraaks antwoord, dat 'bruter' 'wreder' en 'woester' zal zijn dan ooit te voren. ook wordt gesproken van 'paralyzing the enemy'. het is natuurlijk mogelijk dat deze uitdrukkingen deel uitmaken van een campagne bestemd voor het thuisfront, die moet laten zien dat het iraakse leger niet over zich laat lopen, maar men zou er ook uit kunnen distilleren dat irak zich niet meer zal ontzien wapens in te zetten die in een normale oorlog niet worden gebruikt. mijn zwitserse collega wist in dit verband te melden dat een tamelijk betrouwbare bron over aanwijzingen meende te beschikken dat het iraakse leger in de buurt van haj umran inderdaad, doch op kleine schaal, gas had gebruikt (uw 55). het gas zou afkomstig zijn geweest uit zuid-korea, maar thans zou men zelf over de installaties beschikken om het te maken. wel met stelligheid was volgens deze bron komen vast te staan dat de iraqi's tijdens de

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~~CONFIDENTIEEL~~

22782

ONTVANGEN CODEBERICHT

Ref. no.:

VERVOLG =2=

Rubricering:

~~CONFIDENTIEEL~~

GEANNULEERD 2-08.06

strijd om penjwin van napalm gebruik hadden gemaakt.

alhier wordt de heftigheid waarmee iran tracht penjwin en omgeving in handen te krijgen door sommigen in verband gebracht met de wens aldaar een begin van een tegenregering te vestigen. ongetwijfeld is dit een van teheran's hoofddoelen, maar het veroverde gebied lijkt nog te klein en te kwetsbaar om daarmee nu al een begin te maken.

schorer 120

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1029

AMBASSADE VAN HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN

ROYAL NETHERLANDS
EMBASSY

No. 4761/454 Teheran, 21 nov. 1983

Ond.: Iran-Irak: chemische wapens

Hiernevens heb ik de eer U aan te bieden een ter Ambassade vervaardigde vertaling van een nota zijdens het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken hier ter stede ter aanbieding van een eveneens nevensgaande brochure getiteld "Chemical Weapons Deployed by the Iraqi Regime".
Kortheidshalve veroorloof ik mij verwijzing naar genoemde brochure.

Wel moge ik hieraan toevoegen dat berichten over het gebruik van chemische wapens door Irak in de strijd met Iran door militaire waarnemers h.t.s. worden bevestigd.
Over de schaal waarop deze wapens worden ingezet alsmede hun precieze aard is mij echter niets bekend.

De Ambassadeur,
voor deze:

A. Kooijmans

Aan de Minister van
Buitenlandse Zaken
te 's-Gravenhage

WAR INFORMATION
HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME DEFENCE COUNCIL

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

TEHRAN

Telex: 215835 WINIR Tel: 661312

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL

Playing havoc with the cities, massacring civilian population, missile attacking schools while innocent children are attending classes, bombing medical centres in which civilian victims of a previous attack are being treated and deploying chemical bombs, all these exemplify the criminal acts perpetrated by the Iraqi regime against the tyrannized nation of Iran.

Ever since the outbreak of the war forty eight times the Iraqi regime has used chemical weapons against Iranian people. In these attacks Iraq has deployed different varieties of chemical weapons including nauseous, phosphoric, vesicant (blister-making) gases, nitrogen mustard gas, and toxic agents which interfere with the function of the nervous system. The chemical weapons used by Iraq have had the following wide-ranging effects in the victims: Forming malignant ulcer especially on wrinkled parts of the skin, temporary and sometimes permanent blinding, causing intense blisters, sore throat, deep, continuous coughing, dizziness, headache, nausea, eye irritation and chest pain.

The following is a hospital report by the head of Loqman addoleh-Adham hospital, concerning the admission of some victims of an Iraqi chemical attack on Marivan, Kurdestan province, which occured on Oct. 22, 1983.

"Eleven members of the armed forces, IRGC (Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps), and Basij (mobilisation forces), bearing symptoms of chemical poisoning, have been admitted to dermatology ward of the hospital.

"They were contaminated on Oct. 22, 1983, somewhere along the Marivan-Quch-Soltan route, when an Iraqi artillery round fired at 2130 hours, emitted upon explosion a pall of thick smoke which gradually filled the air with a reeking smell, like that of kerocine. The following day the victims were suffering from nausea, vomitting, burning and tear-flowing eyes, blurred vision, itching, breathlessness and lack of appetite. Widespread blisters have errupted on their bodies, particularly at the creased and folding parts of the skin, also discoloration and darkening of skin has occured on some victims."

According to the available records and statistics, the first chemical attack by the Iraqi army took place in an area between Helaleh and Neikhazar in Ilam province, and the latest attack came at Husseiniyeh, almost 40 kilometres to the north of Khorramshahr in Khuzestan province. The targets of the Iraqi chemical attacks will be demonstrated on the map, on the next page.

It is grimly ironic that Iraq is one of the countries which has approved the international regulations and protocols which ban the use of chemical, toxic and bactriological weapons. One such protocl was the June 1925 Protocol number 17 of Geneva Convention, which was later re-approved by resolution B (21) 2161 of the U.N. General Assembly, expressly outlawing the use of toxic chemicals in hostilities. The original French text of this protocol will be given in the next pages.

The victims of Iraqi chemical attacks hereby call on the international and humanitarian organisations, to condemn deployment of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran, thus fulfilling their responsibilities in relation with the control and prevention of deploying chemical, biological and nuclear radiological by the people-battling governments of world.

The following are pictures of some of the victims of the Iraqi chemical attacks against military as well as civilian targets in Iran.

War Information Headquarters,
Supreme Defence Council, February 1984.

PROTOCOL DE GENÈVE

du 17 Juin 1925

CONCERNANT LA PROHIBITION D'EMPLOI À LA GUERRE DE GAZ ASPHYXIANTS, TOXIQUES OU, SIMILAIRES ET DE MOYENS BACTERIOLOGIQUES.

Les plénipotentiaires soussignés, au nom de leurs gouvernements respectifs:

Considérant que l'emploi à la guerre de gas asphyxiants toxiques ou similaires, ainsi que de tous liquides, matières ou procédés analogues, a été à juste titre condamné par l'opinion générale du monde civilisé,

Considérant que l'interdiction de cet emploi a été formulée dans les traités auxquels sont parties la plupart des puissances du monde,

Dans le dessein de faire universellement reconnaître comme incorporée au droit international cette interdiction, qui s'impose également à la conscience et à la pratique des nations,

Déclarent:

Que les hautes parties contractantes, en tant qu'elles ne sont pas déjà parties à des traités prohibant cet emploi, reconnaissant cette interdiction, acceptent d'étendre cette interdiction d'emploi aux moyens de guerre bactériologiques et conviennent de se considérer comme liées entre elles aux termes de cette déclaration.

Les hautes parties contractantes feront tous leurs efforts pour amener les autres Etats à adhérer au présent protocole. Cette adhésion sera notifie au Gouvernement de la République Francaise et, par celui-ci, à toutes les puissances signataires et adhérentes. Elle prendra effet à dater du jour de la notification faite par le Gouvernement de la République Francaise.

Le présent protocole dont le texte francais et anglais feront foi, sera ratifié le plus tot possible. Il portera la date de ce jour.

Les rectifications du présent protocole seront adressées au Gouvernement de la République Francaise, qui en notifiera le dépôt a chacune des puissances signataires ou adhérentes.

Les instruments de ratification ou d'adhésion resteront déposés dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République Francaise.

Le présent protocole entrera en vigueur pour chaque puissance signataire à dater du dépôt de sa ratification et, des ce moment, cette puissance sera liée vis-à-vis des autres puissances ayant déjà procédé au dépôt de leurs ratifications.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentaires ont signé le présent protocole.

Fait à Genève, en un seul exemplaire, le 17 juin 1925

	date of attack	location	no. of deployment	type of toxic agent	mode of delivery	casualties and fatalities	remarks
1	early in war	Shalamche	1	nerve gas	unknown	unspecified	victims suffering from dizziness
2	early in war	Meymak	1		unknown	unspecified	
3	Dec. 28, '80	area between Helaleh and Neikhazar	1		artillery shell	7-10 combatants martyred	
4	early in 1981	Hoveizeh	1	nerve gas	mortar	1 injured	victims suffering from intense nausea
5	Jun. 3, '81	Allah-o Akbar heights	1	nerve gas	artillery shell	unspecified	victims suffering from eye irritation and chest pain
6	Jun. 22, '81	Naderi Beridge	1	nerve gas	mortar	unspecified	
7	Nov. 20, '81	Khorramshahr	1	nerve gas	artillery	unspecified	
8	Sep. 29, '82	Abadan	1	nerve gas		unspecified	
9	Oct. 22, '82	Savaji	1	nerve gas	artillery	unspecified	
10	Oct. 27, '82	Musian	1	nerve gas	artillery shell	4 combatants martyred 16 affected	
11	late Oct, '82	Height 175	1	mustard gas	mortar	unspecified	
12	late Oct. '82	Height 175	2	nerve gas	artillery shell	9 combatnts martyred	those contaminated are suffering eye irritation
13	Dec. 19, '82	Tangab	1		artillery shell	several combatants poisoned	
14	Nov. 21, '82	north of Shalamche	1		mortar	unspecified	
15	Jan. 1, '82	Bayveh pass	1		artillery shell	5 combatants feel suffocated	
16	Jan. 25, '82	Kurdestan	1		artillery shell	a large number of combatants posisoned	victims feel suffocation, eye irritation, toxic agent smelt like alcohol
17	Feb. 8, '82	Sharhani	1		artillery shell	unspecified	those affected have severe nausea, eye irritation
18	Feb. 24, '82	north of Shalamche	1		artillery shell	unspecified	victims complain of painful throat and nose
19	Mar. 23, '83	Fakkeh	1		mortar	unspecified	victims suffering from nausea
20	Mar. 26, '83	near Moslem Neqabi base	1		mortar	unspecified	victims severlypoisoned, fell nauseated
21	Mar. 29, '83	Sumar	1		artillery shell	4 combatants affected	victims feel dizzy
22	Apr. 8, '83	Sumar	1		artillery shell	several combatants injured	victims feel nauseated
23	Jun. 11, '83	by the Dovizaj river	1		srtillery shell	several combatants	victims feel suffocation and dizzyness
24	Aug. 8, '83	Tamarchin	1	nauseative gas	aerial bomb	unspecified	the bombs dropped emitted nauseative gas
25	Aug. 8, '83	Shiverash	1	vesicant gas	aerial bomb	24 combatants injured	large blisters on victims who felt nauseated
26	Aug. 8, '83	Haj-Omran	1	vesicant gas	aerial bomb	unspecified	victims feeling dizzy and nauseated
27	Aug. 9, '83	Piranshahr	1		aerial bomb	10 people injured	victims feeling dizzy and nauseated
28	Aug. 9, '83	Tamarchin	2	mustard gas	aerial bomb	39 combatnts injured	
29	Aug. 9, '83	near Piranshahr	1		aerial bomb	2 combatants martyred, 118 injured	victims' eyes affected
30	Aug. 14, '83	Qamtareh heights	1	vesicant	artillery shell	2 martyred, 200 injured	victims affected in the eyes, feet, testis
31	Aug. 15, '83	Savaji	1		artillery shell	unspecified	
32	Aug. 29, '83	Sardasht	1		artillery shell	unspecified	
33	Sept. 2, '83	Sumar	1		artillery shell	unspecified	
34	Sept. 24, '83	Bazi-deraz heights	1		artillery shell	4 injured	victims suffering from dizziness and nausea
35	Oct. 21, '83	Kharratha	1		artillery shell	unspecified	victims feeling dizzy
36	Oct. 25, '83	Marivan	1		mortar	unspecified	
37	Oct. 25, '83	Sardasht	1		artillery shell	3 combatants injured	enemy fired 84 rounds, victims suffering from nausea and severe chest pain
38	Oct. 25, '83	Seyyed-lu village	1		artillery shell	unspecified	most of the villagers suffered from temporary loss of vision
39	Oct. 26, '83	Sardush	1		artillery shell	unspecified	enemy fired ten rounds
40	Oct. 27, '83	Bayanjan village	1	vesicant gas	aerial bomb	30 villagers injured	victims suffering from pulmonary damages some have been blinded
41	Oct. 30, '83	Banch	1			8	villagers have been blinded
42	Nov. 1, '83	near Marivan	1		artillery shell	16 combatants injured	victims suffering suffocation and large blisters on their skin
43	Nov. 3, '83	Bayanjan	3	vesicant gas		unspecified	victims have been blinded
44	Nov. 13, '83	Garmab	1	unknown	aerial bomb	40 combatants injured	victims suffering from dizzyness nausea
45	Nov. 13, '83	Panjvin	1	nerve gas		17 combatants martyred, 60 injured	victims suffering from temporary loss of vision, painful throat, cough, severe itch
46	Nov. 25, '83	Paveh	1		artillery shell	unspecified	
47	Dec. 29, '83	Pier 12 Abadan	1		mortar	1 injured	an area within a radius of 500 meters contaminated, the injured suffering sunning eyes and nose
48	Jan. 5, '84	Husseiniyeh	1			1 injured	victim suffering from suffocation


ORUMIYEH
MAHABAD
TAMARCHIN HEIGHTS
QAMTAREH
HAJ OMRAN
PIRANSHAHR
SHIVERASH
SARDASHT
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GARMAB
BAYANJAN VILLAGE
BADENJAN VILLAGE
TANGAB
SEYYEDLU
BAYVEH DEFILE
SAVOJI
PANJVIN
SARDOOSHT
MARIVAN
KURDESTAN
SANANDAJ
PAVEH
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KHORRAMSHAHR
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Iraq
IRA
CHEMICAL ATTACKS
BY THE IRAQI ARMY
AGAINST
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY
TARGETS IN IRAN

W/D CW Iran Iraq

S

UNITED NATIONS

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/16433
26 March 1984

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SPECIALISTS APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS BY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN CONCERNING THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Note by the Secretary-General

1. On 3 November 1983, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran alleged for the first time in a communication to the United Nations that chemical weapons were being used by Iraq (S/16128). The reference to such weapons was made in the context of reiterating a request, made initially on 28 October 1983 (S/16104), that the Secretary-General should send a second mission to the area to ascertain damages to civilian targets. 1/

2. In accordance with the procedure used for the dispatch of the first mission, the Secretary-General consulted Iraq on Iran's request. Iraq indicated that the Security Council had, in the meantime, on 31 October 1983, adopted resolution 540 (1983), by which the Council, inter alia, condemned violations of international humanitarian law and called for the immediate cessation of all military operations against civilian targets, including city and residential areas. By that resolution, the Council also requested the Secretary-General to continue his mediation efforts. The position of Iraq was that the Council's resolution should be implemented in an integrated manner (see A/38/560-S/16120). Iran disassociated itself from the resolution for the reasons given in document S/16213.

3. In the circumstances, and mindful of the concerns expressed by the two parties, the Secretary-General proposed that a mission be sent to the area with a combined mandate to ascertain the authoritative positions of the parties on the issues of the conflict and to examine the damages to civilian targets, including the determination of the type of munitions that might have been used. The proposal was first made by the Secretary-General orally, and was subsequently contained in documents S/16337 and S/16338 as well as in private communications. The reactions of the parties to the Secretary-General's proposal are contained in documents S/16340, S/16342, S/16352 and S/16354.

1/ A previous mission, dispatched by the Secretary-General at the request of Iran and with the concurrence of Iraq, visited the area from 20 May to 2 June 1983 (see S/15834).

4. The Islamic Republic of Iran has reiterated allegations of the use of chemical weapons in a number of subsequent letters 2/ as well as in private discussions held by its Permanent Representative with the Secretary-General. Press reports indicated that the medical authorities in a number of countries in which Iranian nationals were being treated or relevant data were being analysed had not exluded the possibility that chemical weapons had been used. Those reports were accompanied by a growing call by Governments as well as by public and private organizations for an objective and impartial investigation.

5. Conscious of the humanitarian principles embodied in the Charter and of the moral responsibilities vested in his office, the Secretary-General felt duty-bound to ascertain the facts and, to that end, requested four eminent specialists in their respective fields to undertake a fact-finding visit to Iran. These specialists are:

Dr. Gustav Andersson, Ph.D.
Senior Research Chemist
National Defence Research Institute
Umea, Sweden

Dr. Manuel Dominguez
Colonel, Army Medical Corps and specialist in ABC
Professor of Preventive Medicine
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Madrid, Spain

Dr. Peter Dunn, D.Sc., B.Sc. (Hons), FRACI
Superintending Scientist
Materials Research Laboratories
Department of Defence
Melbourne, Australia

Colonel Oberst. Ulrich Imobersteg, Dr. phil. chem.
Chief, NBC Defence Division
Ministry of Defence
Bern, Switzerland

6. The specialists travelled to Teheran on 13 March and returned on 19 March 1984. They were accompanied by Mr. Iqbal Riza, Principal Office in the Office of the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs, who assisted them in the organization of their work and ensured liaison with the competent authorities. The specialists submitted a joint report to the Secretary-General on 21 March 1984.

2/ See documents S/16139, S/16140, S/16154, S/16220, S/16235, S/16331, S/16340, S/16346, S/16352, S/16378, S/16380, S/16384, S/16397, S/16408, A/39/132-S/16416.

7. The Secretary-General wishes to place on record his deep appreciation to the specialists for the dedicated manner in which they discharged their assignment despite constraints in time and resources, and under difficult and hazardous conditions.

* * * * *

8. In the light of the spirit of humanitarian concern which guided his decision to undertake this investigation, the Secretary-General, in transmitting the report of the specialists to the Security Council for its information, cannot but deplore that their unanimous conclusions substantiate the allegations that chemical weapons have been used. Only a few days ago the Secretary-General stated that he strongly condemns the use of such weapons wherever and whenever this may occur.

9. Indeed, the Secretary-General attaches paramount importance to the strict observance of all the principles and rules of international conduct accepted by the world community for the overriding purpose of preventing or alleviating human suffering, whether they relate to the use of specific weapons, the treatment of prisoners of war or any other aspects of military operations.

10. Having said this, the Secretary-General remains deeply convinced that these humanitarian concerns can only be fully satisfied by putting an end, to the tragic conflict that continues to deplete the precious human resources of Iran and Iraq. He therefore once again reiterates his readiness to assist in any endeavour that could lead to peace for the people of these two countries. The Secretary-General earnestly hopes that both Governments will give such efforts a chance, and that all other States will assist them by contributing towards that end in whatever peaceful way they see fit.

ANNEX

Report of the specialists appointed by the Secretary-General to Investigate allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the use of chemical weapons

CONTENTS

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

21 March 1984

Sir,

We have the honour to submit herewith our report on the investigation you requested us to undertake concerning allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Iran.

In order to undertake the investigation, we visited Iran from 13 to 19 March 1984 for the purpose of carrying out on-site collection and examination of evidence. The report was prepared following our return to Geneva.

We would like to record our sincere thanks to the Government of Iran for the co-operation and assistance provided throughout our mission.

We also wish to express our appreciation for the assistance we received from members of the Secretariat of the United Nations, particularly Mr. Iqbal Riza of the Office of the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs. Our special thanks are also due to the two laboratories which assisted us in the technical aspects of this mission.

Although we were appointed in our individual capacities, we agreed to work together as a team and our conclusions were reached unanimously.

We wish, Mr. Secretary-General, to express our gratitude to you for the confidence you have reposed in us.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Dr. Gustav ANDERSSON
Dr. Manuel DOMINGUEZ
Dr. Peter DUNN
Colonel Oberst. U. IMOBERSTEG

I. TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. The specialists were requested by the Secretary-General to determine, to the extent possible, whether chemical weapons had been used in Iran and, if so, the type and extent of their use.

II. METHODOLOGY

2. In order to carry out their task, the specialists adopted, as required, several approaches: (a) interviews were held with government officials, with a view to obtaining information regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons; (b) visits were paid to the war zone in order to examine evidence of weapons by which chemical substances had allegedly been delivered and to collect samples for laboratory examination in specialized laboratories located in Europe; (c) examinations were conducted in Teheran of weapons transported from the war zone to the capital; and (d) clinical examinations were made of a number of patients who were allegedly exposed to an attack of toxic agent. These examinations were undertaken both in the war zone, and in hospitals in Teheran to which such patients had been evacuated.

3. The specialists spent six days in Iran. The chronology of their activities is given in appendix I.

III. MUNITIONS ASPECTS

4. Survey area 1 (Shatt-e-Ali) was reached at 1240 hours on 14 March 1984. The area is marshland surrounded by firm ground (capable of supporting heavy armored cars) and interspersed with patches of water, moorlands and cultivated areas. An artillery unit, which was not visited, was located in the neighbourhood of the target area surveyed, which was in the order of 10,000 sq m. A number of bombs of a similar type were reported to be scattered in the area. Of those, seven partially damaged aerial bombs, whose casings were empty, were examined on the site.

5. Members of the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) reported that the attacks had been made over the previous several days (dates were not specified) and involved three Iraqi aircraft, each of a different type (described, respectively, as MIG, SUKHOI and MIRAGE). The aircraft were said to have carried perhaps eight bombs each and to have flown at an altitude of from 200 to 300 m. The bomb craters in the target area were about 2 m deep and about 5 m in diameter.

6. Survey area 2 (Hoor-Ul-Huwaizeh) was reached at 1430 hours on the same day. It is a completely open, flat desert area without vegetation or cover. The area was, as far as it could be ascertained, occupied by units of the Pasdaran. The attack by Iraq on Hoor-Ul-Huwaizeh was said to have taken place on 13 March 1984 at about 1100 hours, allegedly resulting in a number of casualties, many of whom were examined during the evening of 14 March 1984. In the target area there were a number of bombs which had the same features as those of the bombs inspected in Shatt-e-Ali. Two partially damaged aerial bombs and one unexploded bomb were examined by the specialists.

7. The specialists were not shown any unexploded artillery or rocket ammunition, or fragments from such ammunition, in the two areas inspected.

8. Neither area surveyed appeared to be of a type that would normally be selected as a target for conventional attack. Bombs containing chemicals might be used in an attempt to completely clear the area, so that it could, after a safe period, be occupied by an attacking force. It is also possible that in the reported attack on Shatt-e-Ali, the artillery position might have been the objective and was not correctly targeted.

9. The bombs found in the inspected areas were examined in situ. Three bombs were transported to Teheran by the Iranian authorities in order that they might be more thoroughly examined by the specialists. All the bomb casings examined carried the marking "BR 250 WP". They were of greenish colour and marked with a yellow band, 10 cm wide, near the conical nose section. There were no other markings of any kind. Each of the bombs had two suspension lugs, which would seem to indicate that they were transported on the exterior of the aircraft from which they had been released. Examination of the unexploded and damaged bombs showed that they contained a liquid substance. Since all the bombs examined were of the same type, it was concluded that all of them, including those which had exploded, were designed to carry liquid.

10. The measurement and weight of the bombs were as follows:

Total length: 2.26 m

Length of payload cylinder (without stabilizer and fuse): 1.34 m

Diameter of payload cylinder: 30 cm

Total mass: 135 kg (approx.)

Empty mass: 86 kg (approx.)

Payload: 49 kg (approx.)

11. The interior of each bomb contained a burster tube (approximate length 1.34 m, approximate diameter 53 mm). On Saturday, 17 March 1984, at about 1800 hours at the Padegan Shaheed Beheshti, Pasdaran Avenue, Jaharan Dalat, Teheran, in the presence of the specialists and at some personal risk, Pasdar volunteers opened the burster tube so that the contents might be examined. After the top 60-mm section of the steel tube had been cut off, a yellow painted aluminium cap was prised off to reveal a friable, off-white compacted powder. A small sample was removed and ignited. Because of the intensity of the flame, it was concluded by the specialists that the sample was an explosive, which is normally used to enhance the dispersal of the contents of the bomb.

12. The casings of the bombs were made of thin steel, from 1 to 2 mm thick, which would be broken by the explosive charge into large, mostly longitudinal sections. It was therefore surmised, with a high degree of certainty, that such bombs were not intended to be used as a conventional high-explosive weapon. They would appear

to have been designed so that, when exploded, the liquid content would be dispersed over a relatively large area in the form of spray and vapour, thus producing a great variation in the size of the drops and the concentration of the vapour, and in their subsequent effects.

13. Each bomb was fitted with a timing fuse, indicating that it could be set to explode at an optional altitude to achieve maximum effect with the liquid contents. The fuses carried the following markings:

"PARA TIEMPOS DE ARMADO	["FOR ARMING TIME
INFERIORES A 6 SEGUNDOS	LESS THAN 6 SECONDS,
QUITAR EL TORNILLO	REMOVE SCREW.
VISOR ROJO PELIGRO	RED DIAL READING MEANS DANGER
Esp. MU 09	Type MU 09
LOT 83.01	LOT 83.01]*

* (Translation is uncertain because the Spanish text is unclear.)

IV. CHEMICAL ASPECTS

14. On 14 March, the specialists examined as a matter of priority an unexploded bomb found in Hoor-Ul-Huwaizeh. It had been partially covered with soil in order to provide protection from liquid that was leaking from around the damaged fuse. Samples of the liquid-laden soil were taken by the specialists. Pasdar volunteers removed the fuse so that an authentic sample of the liquid could be taken for examination. With some difficulty (and some danger) the fuse was removed at 1605 hours. Several samples of the liquid were taken by the Pasdaran under supervision of the specialists. The samples - three in all - were packed by the specialists for safe transportation by them back to Teheran. The total volume of sample taken was 40-50 ml.

15. On the morning of Thursday, 15 March 1984, in the Clinical Laboratory of the Labafi-Nejad Medical Centre in Teheran, the samples were examined, tested and repacked for safe transportation to competent laboratories in Europe for critical analytical examination. The samples consisted of a dark brown, oily liquid which, when tested in Teheran, using the Paper Chemical Agent Detector system (Code 6665-21-858-8494), gave a strong red colouration indicating the presence of mustard gas. No positive test for Lewisite or nerve agent was obtained. Three samples, of one millilitre each, were taken and placed in individual dry, screw-capped bottles. Each bottle was repacked in a separate 250-ml screw-capped plastic jar containing active powdered charcoal as an absorbent. The jars were wrapped in heavy plastic film for safe transportation. All operations involving the handling of the liquid agent were conducted in an efficient fume cupboard.

16. Two samples of the liquid were carried by safe hand, one to the National Defence Research Institute (FOA-4), Umea, Sweden, and the second to the AC Laboratory, AC Central, Spiez, Switzerland. The third sample was subsequently deposited in the safe custody of the latter laboratory.

17. The samples were examined at the two laboratories, using sophisticated instrumental analytical techniques, including gas chromatography-mass spectrometry, proton and carbon 13 nuclear magnetic resonance, and comparison with an authentic sample.

18. The samples were shown to be bis-(2-chloroethyl)-sulfide of high quality. There were several minor impurities and a trace of sulphur. The compound is commonly known as mustard gas and has the code designator (H). No evidence was found in either sample of the presence of mycotoxin. The results from the Swedish National Defence Research Institute and those obtained by the AC Laboratory in Switzerland, which are similar, are given in appendices II and III. Spectra, chromatograms and other experimental details can be obtained from the laboratories on request.

19. On Sunday, 18 March 1984, at the urgent request of the Iranian authorities that new evidence be examined, the specialists agreed to visit Ahvaz again. At the Tafti Stadium Infirmary they were shown samples of liquid and soil which it was alleged were associated with an aerial bombing attack on Iranian forces which was said to have taken place in the Jofair area at about 1115 hours on Saturday, 17 March 1984. The specialists were told that at the time of the attack the temperature had been warm and a light wind had been blowing. A Pasdar who had witnessed the attack stated that the casing of one unexploded bomb had ruptured and samples had been collected from the leaking bomb by a fellow Pasdar. He also stated that the bomb had the same appearance as those used in the previous attacks, evidence of which had been shown to the specialists in the preceding days. The specialists requested that components and fragments of the weapons used in the reported attack be brought to Ahvaz for examination. The Iranian authorities stated that that was not feasible owing to the shortage of time before the specialists were scheduled to depart.

20. Using the facilities of the Opthalmic Department of the Infirmary, the specialists took two samples of about 1 ml each of the liquid for detailed examination. The sample bottles were packed in dry soil, as no charcoal was available. They were transported back to Teheran by the specialists. The samples were then transported by safe hand to the laboratories already identified above.

21. The samples were shown to be ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidate (constituting more than 75 per cent) and chlorobenzene (constituting approximately 12 per cent), with small quantities of volatile compounds as well as several other phosphorus-containing materials identified as triethyl phosphate (1-4 per cent) and diethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoroamidate (3-10 per cent). This composition is consistent with the known nerve agent, Tabun, which has the code designator (GA). With this material, chlorobenzene is used as a stabilizer. The results from the National Defence Research Institute, Sweden, and the results obtained by the AC Laboratory, Switzerland, are similar; details are given in appendices IV, V and VI. Analytical details can be obtained from those laboratories on request.

V. MEDICAL ASPECTS

22. The first set of medical examinations was carried out from 14 to 17 March 1984 in the Tafti Stadium Infirmary in Ahvaz (a field hospital); in the Golestan Hospital, which is the University Hospital of Ahvaz; in the Labafi-Nejad Hospital in Teheran; and in the Shadid-Motahari Hospital in Teheran (hospital for burn cases). Examinations were made of 37 patients and of 4 other persons who had not been hospitalized since they had only slight injuries. Examinations were made of the cadavers of 6 persons who had died in the above-mentioned hospitals and were deposited in the Coroner's Mortuary in Teheran, and of 6 other cadavers which had been returned from hospitals in Stockholm and Vienna. The autopsy of a cadaver in the University Hospital of Ahvaz was also witnessed on 18 March.

23. From the above examinations it was concluded that 32 cases presented a clinical pattern which, according to the patients, speaking through an interpreter, had developed after they had been exposed to the explosion of bombs dropped from aircraft. In some cases, the explosions had been detected by the flash produced, and in others by the presence of an odour which some described as acrid and others as resembling that of garlic.

24. According to the patients, the initial symptoms began from 25 minutes after exposure up to four hours later. After examining patients, with varying periods of time having elapsed since their exposure, it was concluded that in the majority of cases the clinical condition had commenced with conjunctivitis, which had increased in intensity, a sensation of a foreign body in the eye and photophobia. In many cases, the symptoms had persisted for at least 18 days, which was the maximum period between exposure and examination. Also, many patients had palpabral oedema, which impeded examination of the cornea. Many exhibited acute rhinorrhea.

25. Intense erythema had developed, in some cases slightly papulous, which had darkened and become wine-coloured or even melanin-coloured. Apparently the condition had developed a few hours after exposure, regardless of whether the skin was covered or not. The erythema covered varying areas of the body, in one case affecting 80 per cent of the skin surface. Although the condition can occur in any cutaneous area, the most frequently and acutely affected areas in the patients examined were found to be armpits, scrotum and penis, followed by the groin and the inner surface of the elbows and knees, possibly because of the greater sensitivity of the skin or the greater degree of sudation in those areas. Very dark lesions had appeared on the genitals.

26. Subsequently, blisters filled with a yellowish fluid, under pressure, had appeared, assuming a domed shape. They ranged from a few millimetres to several decimetres in size, in some cases reaching enormous proportions. They were usually round or elongated, but were, in some cases, irregular in shape. Normally, many appeared on a single patient; the only instance in which only one blister was observed was on a wrist of a technician responsible for defusing the bombs.

27. Many of the patients suffered from nasal obstructions, rhinorrhea and nasal scall. In quite a number of cases, tracheitis was found, as well as laryngitis accompanied by a hoarseness and haemorrhatic expectoration, with emission of mucosa. In some cases, there were clinical and radiological indications of bronchopneumonia and pneumonitis.

28. The vast majority of patients were suffering from leucopenia, which, in one case, reached a level of 300 leucocytes per cu mm in the peripheral blood, the normal level being about 6,000. That rendered the patients highly susceptible to infections. Initially, the leucopenia was of the lymphopenic type. There was also evidence of thrombopeny, although less pronounced. In the cases examined, no anomalies of the red series were observed. The only pronounced biochemical anomaly was a high level of the lacticdehydrogenase enzyme.

29. The combined clinical and analytical results coincide fully with the descriptions of lesions caused by vesicant substances and, more specifically, with those caused by sulphur mustard. Only such vesicant agents are capable of producing a similar pattern.

30. The second set of examinations was carried out on 18 March 1984 of patients admitted to the Tafti Stadium Infirmary in Ahvaz the previous day. More than 40 were still in the Infirmary. Of those, 6 were examined in the time available. It was stated that they had been affected, together with about 400 others, in the area of Jofair as the result of an alleged chemical-weapon attack.

31. According to the information provided, the patients had been admitted suffering from respiratory problems, acute agitation, nausea and vomiting, urinal and faecal incontinence and bradycardia. Only one of those observed was experiencing some respiratory difficulty. All were suffering from lachrymation, rhinorrhea, transpiration, slight tremours of the limbs, tongue and mouth, acute miosis and lack of accommodation of the eye. In two patients, acetylcholine esterase levels were reported to be well below normal. A number of patients were suffering from acute conjunctivitis.

32. It was reported to the specialists that the patients, members of the Pasdaran, had been equipped with self-injectable atropine which they had used immediately after the attack. This measure had probably diminished the intensity of the symptoms.

33. The clinical pattern, the analytical results and the adjuvantibus test with atropine demonstrated that those patients had been exposed to the action of acetylcholine esterase-inhibiting substances, probably chemicals of the organo-phosphorus type. The conjunctivitis observed is not attributable to these but to other, possibly associated, chemicals.

34. A case-by-case summary of the conditions observed in the patients examined is contained in appendix VII.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

35. The following are our unanimous conclusions.

(a) Chemical weapons in the form of aerial bombs have been used in the areas inspected in Iran by the specialists as indicated above.

(b) The types of chemical agents used were bis-(2-chlorethyl)-sulfide, also known as mustard gas, and ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidate, a nerve agent known as Tabun.

36. The extent to which these chemical agents have been used could not be determined within the time and resources available to us.

Appendix I

Chronology of activities

Monday, 12 March 1984:

- Departure from Geneva

Tuesday, 13 March 1984:

- Arrival in Teheran
- Meeting in Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Visit to Coroner's Mortuary of Teheran

Wednesday, 14 March 1984:

- Visit to war zone
  - survey of two sites in war zone, examination of aerial bombs and collection of samples
  - examination of and interviews with patients in field hospital and in Ahvaz

Thursday, 15 March 1984:

- Visit to hospitals in Teheran
  - examination of patients
  - preliminary laboratory tests of samples collected in war zone

Friday, 16 March 1984:

- Examination in Teheran of aerial bombs transported from war zone
- Visit to Coroner's Mortuary of Teheran

Saturday, 17 March 1984:

- Further examination of aerial bombs

Sunday, 18 March 1984:

- Visit to Ahvaz
  - examination of patients in Tafti Stadium Infirmary
  - receipt of samples
- Visit to hospital, Teheran
  - interviews with patients

Monday, 19 March 1984:

- Departure from Teheran
- Arrival in Geneva

/...

Tuesday, 20 March 1984:

- Preparation of report

Wednesday, 21 March 1984:

- Preparation of report

Appendix II

NATIONAL DEFENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Department 4
S-901 82 Umea, Sweden

1984-03-18

REPORT ON ANALYSIS OF ALLEGED CW SAMPLE FROM IRAN

1. The sample was received in Umea 1984-03-18 at 10 a.m. Inspection of the package did not indicate any signs of tampering.

2. The package contained a plastic 250 ml vessel filled with activated charcoal. Embedded in the charcoal was a 20 ml screw-capped glass vessel filled with approximately 1 ml of a brownish-black liquid.

3. By analysis, the presence of the following compounds was demonstrated:

bis-(2-chloroethyl)-sulfide (1) constituting more than 98 per cent of the sample

bis-(2-chloroethyl)-disulfide (2) in traces

1,2 bis-(2-chloroethylthio)-ethane (sesquimustard gas) (3) in traces

bis-(2-chloroethylthioethyl)-ether (4) in traces

sulfur (5) in traces

Compound (1) was detected by GC/MS (Hewlett-Packard 5992 B), H-NMR and C13-NMR. Compounds (2)-(4) were detected by GC/MS. Compound (5) was detected by polarography. Some of the spectra are enclosed.

No other organic compounds, except for the above-mentioned, are present in concentrations higher than 0.5 per cent.

Traces of iron were detected by electron-induced X-ray emission analysis.

National Defence Research Institute
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Appendix III

[Original: German]

Spiez, 19 March 1984

Group for Arms Services
AC Laboratory, Spiez

Analysis of a sample of a chemical-warfare material

- The sample to be analysed consists of about 0.5 ml of a dark-brown liquid.
- On the basis of the mass spectrum, the ^{1}H and ^{13}C nuclear-resonance spectra and thin layer-chromatographic and gas-chromatographic analysis, the main portion consists of sulphur yperite.
- Gas chromatography indicates an yperite content of just under 90 per cent.
- Oxygen yperite (T, O mustard gas) is suspected of being present as one of the minor components (about 5 per cent).
- The sample does not contain lewisite, CS or CN (not detectable by NMR spectroscopy or thin-layer chromatography).
- The pungent smell may possibly be due to one of the chlorinating agents (thionyl chloride, phosphorus trichloride) used in production.
- Mycotoxins: none. (Minimum value detectable by thin layer chromatography is 5 ppm).

Appendix IV

NATIONAL DEFENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Department 4
S-901 82 Umea, Sweden

1984-03-20

REPORT ON ANALYSIS OF ALLEGED CW SAMPLE FROM IRAN

1. This (second) sample was received in Umea 1984-03-19 at 10 p.m.

2. The package contained a screw-capped glass jar filled with dry sand. Embedded in the sand was a screw-capped glass vessel, partly wrapped in adhesive tape, containing approximately 0.5 ml of a dark liquid.

3. By analysis, the presence of the following compounds was demonstrated:

ethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidate (tabun) (1), constituting more than 75 per cent of the sample

chlorobenzine (2), constituting approximately 12 per cent of the sample.

Compound (1) was detected by GC/MS (Hewlett-Packard 5992 B), H-NMR, C13-NMR and P31-NMR. Compound (2) was detected by GC/MS, H-NMR and C13-NMR and quantified by GC. Some of the spectra are enclosed.

Small quantities of highly volatile compounds might be present. The presence of two yet unidentified phosphorus-containing compounds in small amounts is evident from the P31-NMR spectrum.

The sample contains a solid residue which has not yet been analysed.

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Appendix V

NATIONAL DEFENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Department 4
S-901 82 Umea, Sweden

1984-03-21

ADDITIONAL REPORT ON ANALYSIS OF ALLEGED CW SAMPLE FROM IRAN

The sample described in our analysis report dated 1984-03-20 has been subjected to further analyses. In addition to ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanidate and chlorobenzine, the following compounds have been identified:

triethyl phosphate (3), constituting approximately 1-4 per cent of the sample

diethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoroamidate (4), constituting approximately 3-10 per cent of the sample.

Compounds (3) and (4) were identified by GC/MS (Hewlett-Packard) 5992 B) and P31-NMR.

National Defence Research Institute
Division of Chemistry

Johan Santesson

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Appendix VI

[Original: German]

Spiez, 22 March 1984

Group for Arms Services
AC Laboratory, Spiez

Chemical-warfare material, sample II

- The sample to be analysed consists of about 0.5 ml of a brown liquid.

- On the basis of the mass spectrum, the ^{1}H, ^{13}C and ^{31}P nuclear resonance spectra, and gas chromatographic analysis, the sample contains about 50 per cent Tabun and about 20 per cent chlorobenzene. The remainder seems to consist of hydrolysis products and other impurities.

- No other chemical-warfare materials are detectable.

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Appendix VII

[Original: Spanish]

REPORT ON PATIENTS EXAMINED BY DR. MANUEL DOMINGUEZ, WITH THE RELEVANT CLINICAL DATA

Patients examined between 14 and 17 March 1984

1. Hamid Reza Rezayee, age 30.

   Exposed to chemical-warfare agents the preceding day at Zeid Station.

   Admitted to the Tafti Infirmary, Ahvaz.

   Exhibits two large irregularly shaped blisters on the outer surface of the left arm. Others on the penis and smaller ones at the outer corner of the right eye. Intense palpebral oedema.

2. Mostafa Hezardastan, age 40.

   Exposed to chemical-warfare agents the preceding day at Zeid Station.

   Admitted to the Tafti Infirmary, Ahvaz.

   Large blisters on the left wrist, very large oval blisters, about 10 cm long, on the left arm. Palpebral oedema. Enormous oedema on the penis. Dark erythema in the armpits.

3. Mohsen Sharif, age 28.

   Exposed to chemical-warfare agents the preceding day at Zeid Station.

   Admitted to the Tafti Infirmary, Ahvaz.

   Photophobia, conjunctivitis, palpebral oedema; large blisters on the inner surface of the right thigh, left arm and scrotum.

4. Mohamad Abbas Asi, age 24.

   Exposed to chemical-warfare agents five days ago at Majnoon.

   Admitted to the Tafti Infirmary, Ahvaz.

   The skin of the entire back separated, although not detached from the subcutaneous cellular tissue; that is to say, this is a huge blister whose contents have been lost.

5. Ragabi Samad, age 22.

   Exposed to chemical-warfare agents five days ago at Majnoon.

Admitted to the Tafti Infirmary, Ahvaz.

Exhibits respiratory distress, intense tracheal irritation and congestion. Coal-black necrosis of the skin of the scrotum and penis. Facial sphacelus. Black erythema in the left armpit. Intense erythema starting from a transversel line just below the navel and including the posterior surface of the body and the upper thighs. Genitals are black. No leucopenia but does exhibit lymphopenia. Lymphocytes 300 per mm^3.

6. Hojat Dastanjani, age 22.

Admitted to the Tafti Infirmary, Ahvaz.

Exposed five ago at Majnoon. Estimated that he was 5-6 metres from the explosion of the bomb. Noted the explosion and the emission of dark gas with a strong odour. After 20 minutes he developed nausea and vomiting. Exhibits intense conjunctivitis with photophobia. Respiratory distress from tracheal injury and acute pulmonary oedema with dyspnoea.

Blisters on both arms. Diarrhoea with rectal bleeding. On the day of the observation the patient had 2,500 leucocytes with 6 lymphocytes.

7. Aliyar Eslampanau.

Exposed five days ago at Majnoon.

Admitted to the Tafti Infirmary, Ahvaz.

Intense melanoderma on the armpits, penis, scrotum and somewhat less on the inner surface of the thighs. Blisters with detachment of the skin on the left arm. Crusted lesions on the nose. Bronchopneumonia confirmed by X-ray. On the day of the observation he had 6,400 leucocytes but no lymphocytes in the leucocyte formula.

8. Sourab Noroozy, age 24.

Exposed five days ago at Majnoon.

Admitted to the Golestan Hospital, Ahvaz.

Separation and detachment of parts of the skin surface over a very wide area, specifically on the forehead, neck, chest, arms and abdomen, with blisters present in other places. Pulmonary oedema with substantial dyspnoea. General condition very grave. Crepitation due to gas in the chest wall, probably resulting from gas gangrene. On the day of the examination (14 March 1984) the leucocyte count was 300. The patient died the same night.

Admitted to Labafi Nejhad Hospital, Teheran.

Intense conjunctivitis. Livid erythematous lesions on the neck, posterior part of armpit, inner surface of elbow, scrotum and arms.

20. Abdelsarch Alhamidavy, age 40.

Exposed 17 days ago.

Admitted to Shadid-Motahari Hospital, Teheran.

Cutaneous detachment of the skin on the hands and separation of the epidermis over 40 per cent of the body surface. Tracheal obstruction. Crusted lesions on the lower lip. Necrosis on the buttocks and scrotum. Leucocytes 2,000.

21. Hassan Tayi, age 16.

Exposed to chemical-warfare agents 15 days ago.

Admitted to Shadid-Motahari Hospital, Teheran.

Intense erythema on the right arm, with denudation of the skin, and wine-coloured erythema on the left shoulder and arm, scrotum, penis and lower abdomen. Blisters on the upper part of the right arm and shoulder. Leucocytes 16,000.

22. Ghdamera Rezerzaden, age 16.

Exposed to chemical-warfare agents five days ago.

Admitted to Shadid-Motahari Hospital, Teheran.

Very intense conjunctivitis. Ulcers on the eyelids. Wine-coloured erythema on the interior surface of the thighs, scrotum and penis. Great pain if touched or moved. Erythema on the chest formed by elementary lesions a few millimetres in diameter and slightly raised, mostly confluent. At the time of examination the patient had 5,700 leucocytes.

23. Khodanorad Hemati, age 35.

Exposed five days ago.

Admitted to Shadid-Motahari Hospital, Teheran.

Dark erythema extending upward to the pubic-hair line and covering the upper thigh, scrotum and penis. The chest exhibits lesions with separation of the epidermis. Detachment of the skin on the face in several areas. Intense conjunctivitis. Leucocytes 4,500, platelets 50,000.

24. Ahmad Esmalli, age 20.

Exposed to chemical-warfare agents five days ago.

Admitted to Shadid-Motahari Hospital, Teheran.

Very intense palpebral oedema. Erythema with oedema and blistering on the face, scrotum, penis and buttocks. Leucocytes 5,000, platelets 120,000.

25. Mohamed Hassan-Koukabian, age 18.

Exposed to chemical-warfare agents five days ago.

Admitted to Shadid-Motahari Hospital, Teheran.

General condition very grave. Intense dyspnoea. Multiple blisters and cutaneous detachment over the entire surface of the skin. The penis is completely black. Bilateral bronchopneumonia and pneumonitis on left side visible on X-ray. Leucocytes 250, platelets 50,000.

26. Abdolkorim Reaisi, age 30.

Exposed five days ago.

Admitted to Shadid-Motahari Hospital, Teheran.

Intense conjunctivitis. Palpebral oedema. The face, neck and arms exhibit erythema and blisters. Penis and scrotum are also affected. Voice hoarse, with laryngotracheal injury. Bilateral bronchitis; rectal bleeding. On the day of the examination, the patient had 600 leucocytes.

27. Keranatolan Soleinavi, age 17.

Exposed five days ago.

Admitted to Shadid-Motahari Hospital, Teheran.

Wine-coloured erythema on face, trunk and arms. Blisters on arms and hands. Leucocyte count 5,350. Platelets 100,000.

28. Ghorboneili Karinion, age 20.

Exposed five days ago.

Admitted to Shadid-Motahari Hospital, Teheran.

Detached epidermis on face, arms, chest, thighs and genitals, with only a narrow strip (about 2 cm wide) between navel and pubis remaining free. Leucocyte count 6,400. Platelets 60,000.

29. Kazem Maydabadi, age 19.

Denudation of epidermis on face. Skin completely detached from testicles. Blisters at the side of the nose and on the back of the neck. Very dark, almost black, erythematous lesion on armpits. Intestinal bleeding. Leucocytes 7,400. Platelets 130,000.

30. Ali Akbou Soltoni, age 28.

Exposed five days ago.

Admitted to Shadid-Motahari Hospital, Teheran.

Intense dyspnoea. Bloody expectoration with pieces of mucosa. Erythema and blisters on the hand. Denudation of the epidermis on the face, trunk and arms. Leucocyte count 2,100.

31. Baghen Nodavi, age 21.

Exposed five days ago.

Admitted to Shadid-Motahari Hospital, Teheran.

Epidermis detachment and scabs on the face. Wine-coloured erythema over the entire body. On the posterior surface of the left thigh the patient has seven blisters, the largest about 4 cm in diameter and 3 cm high at the apex.

Leucocyte count on the day of the study was 6,600, but two days earlier it had been 2,000.

Patients examined on 18 March 1964 (Ahvaz)

32. Mehran Kafashan Toosi, age 22.

Exposed the preceding day.

Admitted to the Tafti Infirmary, Ahvaz.

Conjunctivitis, lachrymation, rhinorrhoea, salivation. Slight tremor in arms and tongue. Pupillary rigidity. Mydriasis (atropine had been administered). Slight respiratory distress. The acetylcholine esterase concentration in the blood was 470 (normal 1,900 to 3,800).

33. Moharam Forghany, age 38.

Exposed the preceding day.

Admitted to the Tafti Infirmary, Ahvaz.

Nausea, vomiting, colic pains; sweating; miosis. The pupil measured about 1.2 mm. Bradycardia, 59 beats, despite the intensive atropine therapy.

34. Hosein Saidi, age 23.

Exposed the preceding day.

Admitted to the Tafti Infirmary, Ahvaz.

Tremor; lachrymation; miosis. Bradycardia, 55 beats per minute.

35. Abas Saidi.

Exposed the preceding day.

Admitted to the Tafti Infirmary, Ahvaz.

Tremor in the lips and extremities. Intense sweating, with perspiration running down the face and body. Intense lachrymation. Vomiting, intestinal colic pains, intense miosis in spite of the atropine therapy.

36. Asghar Resayut.

Exposed the preceding day.

Admitted to the Tafti Infirmary, Ahvaz. Miosis, 1.5 mm. Paralysis in accommodation. The acetylcholine esterase was 703 (he had already been given 30 mg of atropine).

37. Asadolah Ashrafi.

Exposed the preceding day.

Admitted to the Tafti Infirmary, Ahvaz.

Nausea. Conjunctivitis, miosis, paralysis in accommodation (he had been treated intensively with atropine).

Patients not hospitalized but seen and studied in the Hoor-Ul-Howaizeh zone, on 14 March 1984

1. Explosives technician.

On the outer rim and anterior surface of the forearm the patient had a reddish-brown erythema about 12 cm long and 8 cm wide, in the centre of which was a denuded area about 2 cm in diameter produced by a drop of liquid contained in a bomb which had not exploded upon defusing.

2. The technician's assistant.

Had two blisters about 2 cm long, one of them 0.5 cm wide and the other 0.5 or 0.25 cm wide, on the left thumb, with smaller blisters on the second, third and fifth fingers of the left hand, and another blister about 1.5 cm in diameter on the left foot, in front of the astragalus.

3. A soldier

Exhibited papulous lesions about 2 cm in diameter on the face, neck and hands, dark around the edges; these had appeared two days after the explosion of a bomb about 150 metres from the soldier, who had smelled a strong odour of garlic.

4. Another soldier

Exhibited only an area of intense melanoderma on the back of the neck.

WOCW - gebruik 1-1

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Aan Verzendlijst

GEANNULEERD 02.08.06

[redacted]

datum 14 juni 1984
uw brief
ons nummer 84 CR 456
bijlagen -
onderwerp onderzoek Iraanse patiënten Utrecht

(chemische wapens)

In het Prins Maurits Laboratorium worden in het kader van opdracht A74/K/029 (DWP-sektor 2.3) methoden ontwikkeld voor de monsterneming, isolering en identifikatie van chemische strijdmiddelen vanuit onontplofte munitie, grond, water, lucht, lichaamsvloeistoffen etc. De op dit gebied vergaarde kennis werd onder meer toegepast bij een in opdracht van de Verenigde Naties uitgevoerd onderzoek aan een aantal uit Zuid-West Azië afkomstige monsters van uiteenlopende aard (PML rapport 1982-57).

Op 19 maart jl. werd het instituut betrokken bij het onderzoek van een vijftal Iraanse patiënten, die in het reanimatie-centrum van het Akademisch Ziekenhuis te Utrecht werden verpleegd. Zowel het ziektebeeld van de patiënten als de berichten in de pers wezen duidelijk in de richting van een vergiftiging met het blaartrekkend strijdmiddel mosterdgas. Door bovengenoemd ziekenhuis werd prijs gesteld op een chemisch-analytisch onderzoek van urine- en bloedmonsters van de patiënten, teneinde deze voorzichtige konklusie harder te kunnen maken. Op basis van de resultaten van een literatuuronderzoek betreffende het metabolisme van mosterdgas in de rat werd besloten een analyse-procedure te ontwikkelen voor thiodiglycol, het hydrolyseprodukt van mosterdgas in urine. Deze procedure is intussen in grote lijnen uitgewerkt.

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Ze berust op de omzetting van thiodiglycol in mosterdgas met behulp van gekoncentreerd zoutzuur, gevolgd door een kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve analyse daarvan met behulp van de gaschromatograaf/massaspektrometer kombinatie. De onderste analysegrens van de methode bedraagt ongeveer 5 nanogram thiodiglycol per milliliter urine.
De analytische procedure werd vervolgens toegepast op urinemonsters van de Iraanse patiënten. Deze monsters werden tien dagen na de beweerde aanval met het chemisch strijdmiddel geproduceerd. In vier van de vijf monsters werd op deze wijze mosterdgas aangetroffen. Indien wordt aangenomen dat de vorming hiervan op dezelfde manier plaats vond als in de urinemonsters die gebruikt werden voor de ontwikkeling van de methode, dan varieerden de thiodiglycol-koncentraties in de urine van de patiënten tussen 6 en 80 nanogram per milliliter.
Bovengenoemde aanname dient nog verder onderbouwd te worden door de uitvoering van aanvullende kontrole-experimenten. Daarbij dienen artefakten als gevolg van bijvoorbeeld het gebruik van polytheenflesjes als monstervat en van de aan de patiënten toegediende medicijnen te worden uitgesloten. Het ligt voorts in de bedoeling ook de bloedmonsters volgens eerdergenoemde procedure te onderzoeken.

Ik hoop u hiermee naar genoegen op de hoogte te hebben gesteld over onze bemoeienis met deze zaak en over de tot nu toe bereikte resultaten.

Op verzoek van de behandelend arts in verband met het door hem gevoerde beleid geen mededelingen te doen over de Iraanse patiënten, is deze informatie Confidentieel geclassificeerd.

Directeur Chemische Research

ir. M. van Zelm

CW gebruik

A S

UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly Security Council

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29 June 1984

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Thirty-ninth session
Item 64 of the preliminary list*
CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Thirty-ninth year

Letter dated 28 June 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter dated 12 April 1984 (A/39/182-S/16481), I have the honour to present the table of chemical attacks carried out by the Iraqi army against the Islamic Republic of Iran until 29 May 1984.

As the table clearly shows, since the circulation of Your Excellency's report (see S/16433 and A/39/210), there have been 20 cases of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq.

This bitter fact indicates how the inadequacy of the Security Council encouraged the rulers of Iraq to continue to resort to the use of chemical weapons.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 64 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Said RAJAIE-KHORASSANI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/39/50.

Date and hour of attacks	Location	Number of shells	Mode of delivery	Casualties and fatalities	Remarks
15. 11 April 1984 - 1020	north part of Majnoon Island	1	aerial bomb	-	contamination of water at Hoor
16. 11 April 1984 - 1000 2040	north part of Majnoon Island	2	aerial bomb	-	-
17. 14 April 1984 - 1800 1810	north part of Majnoon Island	2	aerial bomb	-	-
18. 15 April 1984 - 0830	north part of Majnoon Island	1	aerial bomb	-	-
19. 15 April 1984 - 1215	north and south parts of Majnoon Island	1	aerial bomb	-	-
20. 24 April 1984	Majnoon Island	1	aerial bomb	-	-
21. 25 April 1984	Majnoon Island	1	aerial bomb	several people were martyred and injured	-
22. 1 May 1984 - 1830	Marivan	1	artillery shell	-	victims suffering from skin irritation
23. 20 May 1984	Majnoon Island	1	artillery shell	several people were poisoned	-
24. 29 May 1984 - 2220	area of Chazzabeh	1	shelling, some can-sized bullets	-	contamination of area

VERZONDEN CODEBERICHT

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VERVOLG =2=

Rubricering: CONFIDENTIEEL

aangemoedigd om chemische wapens te blijven gebruiken. in tweede instantie meende de ambassadeur voorts dat nederland, gezien zijn ''internationaal prestige'' een belangrijke rol ten dezen kon spelen.

in zijn reactie heeft t toegezegd dat deze boodschap aan m zal worden doorgegeven en tevens nederlandse betrokkenheid bij het handhaven van het verbod op chemische wapens, onderstreept. de gelegenheid werd gebruikt om ook de stand van zaken aan de frontlijn en de situatie in de golf te bezien: voor wat het laatste betreft, deed t (langs lijnen van d.z.z. 123 - aan teheran - resp. 43 - aan bagdad) een beroep op de iraanse regering om reddings- en bergings operaties niet in gevaar te brengen. de ambassadeur (die op het laatste punt zelfs verzekerde dat iran geen nederlandse schepen zou aanvallen) stelde in zijn reactie de iraanse bereidheid om af te zien van elke aanval op scheepvaart - op basis van wederkerigheid - vooroop en voegde nog toe dat iran slechts schepen van veronderstelde supporters van irak aanviel en dan nog ''lightly''., voor reddings- en bergings operaties had iran alleen maar waardering (op de aanval op de ''british renown'' die in dit verhaal niet goed past, werd door de ambassadeur niet ingegaan).

voor teheran en bagdad beide: u kunt bij voorkomende gelegenheid nederlandse standpunt over gebruik van chemische wapens, te uwent toelichten (met - in teheran - verwijzing naar deze demarche van amb. taj-gardoon).

voor bagdad: stel belang in eventuele opvattingen, dan wel uitleg te uwent - wellicht ook in e p s-kader te bezien - omtrent uitblijven iraakse reactie op jongste verzoek s g v n.

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FACT SHEET

CHEMICAL WEAPONS I

May 1984

CHEMICAL WARFARE IN THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR

Allegations of the use of chemical weapons have been frequent during the Iraq-Iran War. One of the instances reported by Iran has been conclusively verified by an international team dispatched to Iran by the UN Secretary-General

Both Iran (1929) and Iraq (1931) are parties to the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, as well as the use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

The UN Security Council has issued a statement condemning the use of chemical weapons during the Gulf War. It remains uncertain whether the sources of supply were indigenous or external. Export controls have been placed on certain chemicals that could be used in the production of mustard and nerve gases.

In this Fact Sheet, SIPRI provides background information on the international law which has been violated, the two poison gases which the UN team identified in its samples, and the possible origins of the chemical weapons used in the Iraq-Iran War.

Questions about the allegations of use of chemical weapons should be addressed to Julian Perry Robinson, Science Policy Research Unit, The University of Sussex, Brighton, Sussex BN1 9RF, UK, tel. (0273) 686758, and about the General Protocol to Jozef Goldblat, SIPRI.

INTRODUCTION

Allegations

There have been reports of chemical warfare from the Gulf War since the early months of Iraq's invasion of Iran. In November 1980, Tehran Radio was broadcasting allegations of Iraqi chemical bombing at Susangerd. Three and a quarter years later, by which time the outside world was listening more seriously to such charges, the Iranian Foreign Minister told the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that there had been at least 49 instances of Iraqi chemical-warfare attack in 40 border regions, and that the documented dead totalled 109 people, with hundreds more wounded. He made this statement on 16 February 1984, the day on which Iran launched a major offensive on the central front, and one week before the start of offensives and counter-offensives further south, in the border marshlands to the immediate north of Basra where, at Majnoon Islands, Iraq has vast untapped oil reserves. According to official Iranian statements during the 31 days following the Foreign Minister's allegation, Iraq used chemical weapons on at least 14 further occasions, adding more than 2 200 to the total number of people wounded by poison gas.

Verification

One of the chemical-warfare instances reported by Iran, at Hoor-ul-Huzwaizeh on 13 March 1984, has since been conclusively verified by an international team of specialists dispatched to Iran by the United Nations Secretary General. The evidence adduced in the report by the UN team lends substantial credence to Iranian allegations of Iraqi chemical warfare on at least six other occasions during the period from 26 February to 17 March.

The efficiency and dispatch with which this UN verification operation was mounted stand greatly to the credit of the Secretary General. His hand had presumably been strengthened by the announcement on 7 March by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that 160 cases of wounded combatants visited in Tehran hospitals by an ICRC team "presented a clinical picture whose nature leads to the presumption of the recent use of substances prohibited by international law". The casualties visited were reportedly all victims of an incident on 27 February. The ICRC statement came two days after the US State Department had announced that "the US Government has concluded that the available evidence indicates that Iraq has used lethal chemical weapons". Iraq had denounced the Washington statement as "political hypocrisy", "full of lies", a fabrication by the CIA; and had suggested that the hospital patients examined by the ICRC had "sustained the effects of these substances in places other than the war front". On 17 March, at almost the same moment as the UN team was acquiring its most damning evidence, the general commanding the Iraqi Third Corps, then counter-attacking in the battle for the Majnoon Islands, spoke as follows to foreign reporters: "We have not used chemical weapons so far and I swear by God's Word I have not seen any such weapons. But if I had to finish off the enemy, and if I am allowed to use them, I will not hesitate to do so".

Some consequences

On 30 March, the UN Security Council issued a statement condemning the use of chemical weapons during the Gulf War. Evidently none of the five permanent members used its veto power to block the condemnation. That same day the US government announced that it

chemical warfare. Indeed, there can be no guarantee that the weapons banned by the Geneva Protocol will not be resorted to as long as there is no absolute prohibition on their very possession, subject to international control.

However, at the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, Iran has declared that, due to humanitarian considerations, it would not embark on retaliatory action with chemical weapons against Iraq.

THE POISON GASES IDENTIFIED BY THE UN TEAM

Mustard gas

From an unexploded bomb found at an Iraqi-attack site, the UN team drew a sample which its analysts in Sweden and Switzerland later found to be high-quality mustard gas.

What is mustard gas?

Mustard is bis (2-chloroethyl) sulphide, an oily liquid with a garlic-like smell. Even in warm weather it evaporates slowly enough for an area over which it has been scattered to remain dangerous for many hours, even days, yet fast enough for the imperceptible vapour that it gives off also to cause casualties. Both in vapour and in liquid form its effect is to 'burn' any body-tissue which it touches. Taken into the body, it can act as a systemic poison deadlier, weight for weight, than hydrogen cyanide. Its burning effects are not normally apparent for some hours after exposure, whereupon they build up into the hideous picture of blindness, blistering and lung damage such as was displayed by the patients sent from Iran to hospitals in Austria, Belgium, Britain, France, FR Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.

Mustard gas was first used as a chemical-warfare agent during World War I, when it was responsible for about 70 per cent of the million-plus gas casualties. Its most prominent use after that war was by Italy in Ethiopia during 1936. During World War II it was produced by Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, South Africa, the USA and the USSR. It was the CW agent that was stockpiled in by far the largest quantity--on the order of hundreds of thousands of tons overall--but was used only by Japan in China. It is probably still the most heavily stockpiled CW agent today. Its last established use appears to have been by Egypt intervening in the (North) Yemeni civil war of the mid-1960s.

Effectiveness of mustard gas

Mustard gas can be spread from munitions deliverable by virtually any type of weapon, including the mortars, artillery and aircraft with which Iraqi forces are reported to have used it. Among the many air-deliverable mustard munitions which Britain produced during World War II, one report judged the most cost-effective to be no more than a 5-gallon oil drum filled with mustard and fitted with a simple burster charge. The munition from which the UN team retrieved its sample in Iran appears to have been a light-case 250-lb white-phosphorus bomb, such as might otherwise be used for

smoke-screening or incendiary purposes. Published eye-witness accounts suggest that Iraqi practice was for eight such bombs to be carried per ground-attack jet aircraft, dropped from a height of 200-300 metres. There may well be an international trade in such munitions. It would be relatively easy, though hazardous, to exchange the phosphorus payload for mustard gas.

Manufacture

Mustard gas may be made in different ways according to whether ethylene, vinyl chloride or thiodiglycol is chosen as the starting material. Published UN findings suggest that the Iraqi mustard had been made from the last of these precursors. Thiodiglycol is a quite widely used industrial commodity, finding application as an antioxidant, as a vulcanizing agent, as an intermediate for other commodities, and as a solvent for dyes used in the textile industry. Its conversion to mustard gas is very simple indeed, the only technological problem being that of preventing its manufacturers from becoming its first casualties. That, however, is not a small problem. When Britain first manufactured mustard gas, there were, over a six-month period during 1918, 1.27 cases of mustard illness per person employed.

The quantity of thiodiglycol needed to produce enough mustard gas to fill eight of the bombs sampled by the UN team would be about 350 kg. A hundred tons could yield sufficient mustard to arm maybe 300 aircraft sorties or to keep a medium-artillery battalion firing nothing but mustard shell for a fortnight.

Tabun

The second poison gas identified by the UN team was the nerve-gas tabun. This was found in a sample which the team was assured by Iranian authorities had been drawn by an Iranian soldier from a dud bomb. The bomb was said to have had the same appearance as the one from which the UN team had drawn mustard gas.

Iranian authorities told the UN team that about 400 people had been affected by chemical weapons during the attack from which the tabun sample was said to have originated. The attack purportedly happened on 17 March, while the UN team was in Tehran, and was said to have been delivered by four Iraqi aircraft. Forty of the casualties were in a field hospital which the UN team was taken to visit the following day. The signs and symptoms in the six cases which the UN team had time to examine were quite different from those associated with the mustard-gas sample. The UN team concluded from them that the patients had been exposed to an anticholinesterase agent.

What is tabun?

Tabun, or ethyl NN-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate, otherwise known as GA, is such an agent. It is a liquid that evaporates only half as fast as mustard gas, but so powerful a poison is it that even short exposure to small concentrations of its vapour can result in almost immediate symptoms, felt first in the eyes (as a persistent contraction of the pupil) and chest (as a tightness or asthma-like constriction). If a lethal dosage has been taken up, either from inhalation of the vapour or by absorption of the liquid through the skin, a characteristic sequence of toxic manifestations ensues,

some of great violence, including running nose, sweating, involuntary urination and defaecation, vomiting, twitching, convulsions, paralysis and unconsciousness. Prior to the observations made by the UN team at the field hospital, such signs had apparently not been seen in hospitalized chemical-warfare casualties, although one or two of the earlier Iranian communiqués (as from the northern front in October 1983) had referred briefly to "nervous system" effects. And since mid-March, Iranian publications have been stating that 'nerve gas' had been used on at least 10 occasions during 1980-83.

Effectiveness of tabun

Because tabun acts much more rapidly than mustard, it could be thought capable of stopping massed infantry assaults on the move, at least when dropped in large air-burst bombs. In static situations, it would probably not, in warm weather, be significantly more effective than mustard gas as a weapon of attrition. The chief significance of the tabun reports is twofold. First, if the reports are true, they may well be describing the first ever use of nerve gas in combat operations, thus providing lessons which military authorities around the world may be eager to absorb. Second, if resort to tabun has been motivated by the military consideration just outlined, there may well be powerful incentives operating upon the Gulf War belligerents to introduce those even deadlier nerve gases that offer still more potential for rapid mass-destruction: agents such as the sarin, VX and, reportedly, soman stockpiled by the USA, France and the USSR. Against unprotected people an aircraft armed with sarin could be as destructive as the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

Manufacture

Tabun, like sarin, was a secret discovery of Germany's at the time of World War II. Germany manufactured about 12 000 tons of it during 1943-44, and also, in 1944, manufactured sarin on a small pilot plant scale. Soman was not manufactured by Germany. For filling into munitions--artillery shell and bombs--the German tabun was left diluted with up to 20 per cent of the solvent that had been used during its synthesis, namely monochlorobenzene. The sample analysed by the UN team contained a comparable proportion of monochlorobenzene, suggesting it had been made by the original German method.

That method used the simplest of a number of possible routes to tabun. It started from phosphoryl chloride in a two-stage chemical process, both stages of which were conducted within the same reactor. Advanced containment measures were used to protect plant workers from the tabun, but even they were insufficient to prevent at least ten deaths and innumerable lesser exposures.

The quantity of physphoryl chloride needed to produce enough tabun to fill, undiluted, eight of the bombs examined by the UN team would be about 500 kg. Also needed would be about 120 kg of sodium cyanide, 150 kg of ethyl alcohol and 65 kg of dimethylamine (synthesizable from ammonia and methyl alcohol). A hundred tons of phosphoryl chloride could yield sufficient tabun to arm maybe 200 sorties by MiG, Mirage or Sukhoi aircraft.

ORIGIN OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The UN report provides only negative evidence of the origin of the mustard gas sample. The absence in the sample analysed in Sweden and Switzerland of polysulphides and of more than a trace of sulphur indicates that it is not of past US-government manufacture, for all US mustard was made by the Levinstein process from ethylene and mixed sulphur chlorides. That process is also said to have been the one used by the USSR. From similar reasoning, British-made mustard, too, can probably be ruled out, even though substantial stocks were once held at British depots in the Middle East. For more positive evidence other sources of information must be used. Over the years since the mid-1960s quite a lot of information has been published purporting to describe Iraqi chemical weapons, but much of it is contradictory and all of it is of a reliability which SIPRI is in no position to judge. A major caveat must be entered: chemical warfare is such an emotive subject that it lends itself very readily to campaigns of disinformation and 'black' propaganda, campaigns which the politics both of the Gulf War and of the current chemical-weapons negotiations have unquestionably stimulated to no small degree.

We may look first at the nature of the chemical-weapons technology which Iraq has been reported to have acquired.

In addition to bulk-filled free-fall aircraft bombs, at least two other categories of chemical munition have reportedly been employed: artillery shell and air-to-ground rockets. Iranians sent for hospital treatment in London who were suffering from what must almost certainly have been mustard-gas burns have attributed their injuries to all three categories of munition. There is no evidence that mustard-filled air-to-ground rockets have ever been stockpiled by Western countries. The rockets whose use was described by one of the Iranians apparently had submunition warheads, a relatively sophisticated design.

Other agents reported to have been used

Tear gas: In August 1982, US officials were quoted in the press as being "confident" that the Iraqis did not possess any "deadly chemical weapons", only tear gas.

Choking gas: Chlorine,, the archetypal war gas, is included in at least one of the lists of Iraqi chemical-warfare agents published this year by Iranian authorities.

Arsenicals: Iran informed the UN Secretary-General last year that "compounds containing arsenic" had been used in Iraqi chemical weapons. Speaking to reporters, one of the Swedish specialists treating Iranian gas casualties said he thought it probable that the latter had been exposed to a mixture of mustard gas and lewisite. Such mixtures were standard munition-fills in the arsenals of Japan, the USSR and probably other states too during World War II.

Nitrogen mustard: Official Iranian sources have several times stated that an agent of this type had been identified by Iranian military experts in samples from Iraqi chemical munitions. "Knowledgeable" but unidentified US officials have also been reported as speaking of Iraqi nitrogen mustard.

Germ-warfare agents: Israeli intelligence sources have been cited for reports that anthrax had been found in hospitalized Iranians. Iranian sources have referred to Iraqi use of "microbic" and "bacteriological" weapons.

Mycotoxins: A Belgian forensic toxicologist has claimed that his laboratory has found mycotoxins (T2, HT2, nivalenol and verrucarol) in addition to mustard gas in samples of blood, urine and faeces taken from Iranian gas victims hospitalized in Vienna, but this claim currently remains unverified and open to question. There are reports of similar findings from patients hospitalized in Belgium, France, FR Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, but these too still remain open to doubt, especially since, in the Swedish case, the Swedish authorities concerned have expressly repudiated the report. The UN team inspected cadavers returned to Tehran from Swedish and Austrian hospitals, but its report makes no mention of any post-mortem tissue samples having been taken for analysis. Mycotoxins were sought but not found in the chemical samples analyzed by the UN team. The search method used had a detection limit of 0.00005 per cent: i.e., capable of finding mycotoxins at loadings greater than a third of a gram per 250-lb bomb.

Novel unidentified agent: There has been speculation in the press about Iraqi use of a toxic agent unknown in the West. This was excited by reports early in March from the Gzaiel sector, just to the north of Basra, of groups of Iranian corpses having been seen that were said to bear no external trace of injury--looking as though they had fallen asleep in their foxholes.

Indigenous or external sources of supply?

With the exceptions, maybe, of the last two of these different categories of putative Iraqi agent, sources of supply might as well be indigenous as external to Iraq, given the technology implied. Involvement of the last three categories would, in some circles, implicate the USSR as supplier, for the reason that the USSR is said, on evidence that has yet to be solidly substantiated but which has nonetheless attracted some firm believers, to have weaponized all three of them in recent years. For its part, the USSR has expressly denied supplying Iraq with toxic weapons. Reports of Soviet supply attributed to US and other intelligence sources have nonetheless recurred. The earliest predate reports of Iraqi use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War.

Official Iranian commentaries, too, have pointed to the USSR as a supplier of the Iraqi weapons. These sources have also accused Brazil, France and, most conspicuously, Britain of supplying the weapons. No basis for any of these Iranian accusations has been disclosed. France, alongside Czechoslovakia and both Germanies, is reportedly also rumoured, among "foreign military and diplomatic sources" in Baghdad, to have supplied Iraq with chemical precursors needed for an indigenous production effort. Unofficial published sources have cited Egypt as a possible supplier of actual chemical weapons. In the mid-1960s, when Iraq was alleged to be using chemical weapons against insurgent Kurdish forces, Swiss and German sources of supply were reported in the Western press.

Production capability in Iraq

Increasingly persuasive evidence is now emerging in published sources that, whether Iraq has or has not been receiving chemical weapons from abroad, it has been acquiring a development and production capability for them of its own. An official Iranian commentry dates the beginning of this effort back to 1976, claiming that information to that effect had been provided to Iran by West German intelligence officials. Unidentified US intelligence sources have been quoted as saying that Iraq began making mustard gas in the early 1970s. Such sources have been quoted as believing that Iraq is now attempting to produce sarin nerve gas. Associated with this belief is the assessment, it was reported in the US press at the end of March, that, while Iraq has already been using nerve gas in the Gulf War, this has been on an experimental scale using stocks accumulated during the development programme; supplies of nerve gas from large-scale production facilities were expected--the reporting continued--to be available within a matter of months, even weeks. Further, the press has reported US government sources as having identified three, possibly five, chemical-agent production sites in Iraq. The locations that have been specified in the press are Samawa, Ramadi, Samarra and Akashat. The last of these has, however, been toured by foreign correspondents, including a British journalist who has reported finding only contra-indicative evidence of a nerve gas plant being there.

Technological capacity

Other than the need for elaborate safety measures, there seems to be nothing about the technology of producing mustard gas or tabun--or lewisite or nitrogen mustard--that would obviously be beyond the capacities of the Iraqi chemical industry: an industry which has been growing rapidly in size and sophistication since the early 1970s. However, if nerve gases of a type whose production would necessitate the technically demanding and comparatively specialized processes of phosphorus-fluorination and/or phosphorus-alkylation--i.e. nerve gases such as sarin, soman and VX--foreign technology might very well have to be imported. There is strong public evidence (but by no means conclusive yet) that Iraq has been endeavouring to acquire these or related technologies from private corporations in the USA, Britain, FR Germany and Italy since 1975; and that it has been dissembling these endeavours under the guise of acquiring production capacity for organophosphorus pesticides.

The search for materials

Any need to import special chemical-process plant and associated know-how could be lessened by importing, instead, some of the chemical intermediates needed to produce chemical-warfare agents, rather than attempting to manufacture those intermediates from indigenous raw materials (of which the Iraqi mining, petroleum and related industries appear to provide the full range needed for mustard and nerve gases, with the possible expection for some of the latter of fluoride minerals). Certain intermediates can be identified which could reduce the requirements for chemical plant to processing equipments of standard off-the-shelf or easily improvised types. Iraq has not concealed the fact that it is in the market for chemicals which do indeed fall within this category. This has been most conspicuous in Iraq's search in America for supplies of methylphosphonous dichloride and dimethyl methyl-

Table of export-controlled chemicals

Chemical	Chemical-warfare utility[c]
Thiodiglycol[a,b]	Convertible into mustard gas simply by contact with hydrogen chloride.
Chloroethanol[b]	Essential to one of the ways for making thiodiglycol (see above).
Phosphoryl chloride[a,b]	Essential to tabun production. Can also be converted, with some difficulty, into methylphosphonyl dichloride (see below).
Dimethylamine[b]	Like phosphoryl chloride (see above), essential to tabun production, but much easier to make.
Methylphosphonyl difluoride[a,b]	Convertible into sarin-family nerve gases simply by contact with any of many alcohols.
Methylphosphonyl dichloride[b]	Convertible into sarin-family nerve gases by carefully controlled reaction with an alcohol and a fluoride such as potassium fluoride (see below). Convertible into methylphosphonyl difluoride (see above) by heating with a fluoride such as potassium fluoride.
Dimethyl methylphosphonate[a,b]	One of many methylphosphonyl compounds from which methylphosphonyl dichloride (see above) can be made quite easily.
Potassium fluoride[a,b]	One of many fluorine compounds that could be used in the production of sarin-family nerve gases. Insignificant in the absence of a supply of methylphosphonyl or ethylphosphonyl compounds.
Conspicuously absent from the list	
Sodium fluoride	A fluorinating agent more common than potassium fluoride.
Methylphosphonous dichloride	Essential precursor in most of the better routes of VX-family nerve gases. Easily convertible into methylphosphonyl dichloride (see above.
O-alkyl methylphosphonothioates	Precursors for VX-family nerve gases, also convertible into sarin-family nerve gases.
Other methylphosphonyl compounds	See dimethyl methylphosphonate above.
P-ethyl homologues of all the methylphosphorus compounds above	Precursors for ethylphosphonate-family nerve gases.

[a] Subjected to 'foreign policy controls' by the US government on 30 March 1984.

[b] Subjected to special export-licensing requirements by the British government on 12 April 1984.

[c] Except for methylphosphonyl difluoride, all of the controlled chemicals have significant civil applications.

COPIE-MEMORANDUM

GEANNULEERD 02.08.

WD

Van : DIO/NN Datum : 7 september 1984

Aan : DAH/MO via DIO/OV en DIO/PZ 144/84

Onderwerp : Gebruik chemische wapens in oorlog Iran-Irak

Met het oog op het gesprek dat de Irakese onderstaatssecretaris Kettani binnenkort met DGPZ zal hebben zend ik U hierbij een aantekening over het gebruik van chemische wapens in de oorlog Iran-Irak.

bth

1101-8-82

Gebruik chemische wapens in de oorlog Iran-Irak

In maart 1984 werd door een internationale onderzoekscommissie, die daartoe opdracht had gekregen van de Secretaris-Generaal van de VN, onomstotelijk vastgesteld dat in de oorlog tussen Iran en Irak gebruik is gemaakt van chemische wapens. Het ging daarbij niet alleen om mosterdgas (dat voor het eerst in de Ie Wereldoorlog werd gebruikt), maar ook om het zenuwgas Tabun. Dit was de eerste maal in de wereldgeschiedenis dat het gebruik van zenuwgassen in een oorlog werd geconstateerd.

Het lijdt geen enkele twijfel dat Irak zich hieraan heeft schuldig gemaakt. Om politieke redenen worden in het VN-rapport geen namen genoemd evenmin als in de verklaring waarin de Veiligheidsraad op 30 maart het gebruik van chemische wapens veroordeelde.

Iran heeft te kennen gegeven tijdens de komende AVVN een ontwerpresolutie in te willen dienen waarin het gebruik van chemische wapens nogmaals wordt veroordeeld.

Door de meeste westerse industrielanden zijn maatregelen genomen om de uitvoer van sleutelvoorlopers van chemische wapens met name naar Iran en Irak, te voorkomen. De Nederlandse maatregelen hebben overigens een erga omnes werking, d.w.z. zij gelden voor uitvoer naar alle landen buiten de EG.

Van Nederlandse zijde zou Kettani met nadruk kunnen worden gewezen op:

- de ernstige ondermijning van het internationale rechtsregiem dat door het gebruik van chemische wapens is ontstaan (Irak is partij bij het Protocol van Genève van 1925 waarin het gebruik van chemische wapens wordt verboden);
- e.e.a. vormt mogelijk ook een stimulans tot proliferatie van chemische wapens, juist nu we proberen in Genève tot een CW-verbod te komen;
- Nederland het buitengewoon onplezierig vindt dat Nederlandse bedrijven via aankopen vanuit Irak betrokken kunnen worden bij de produktie van chemische wapens.

bth

Arend zie blz. 2 antwoord op 1e vraag? → Bos n.t. WD CW-gebruik blz. 2 Iran Irak

KOPIE:
gs m r t s
dgpz ap
dvl,-/dp ac
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MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

AFDELING VERBINDINGEN

's-GRAVENHAGE, LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 28

TEL. Nos: 465622; 614941 - 2531

VERZONDEN CODEBERICHT

KOPIE No: 063

REFERENTIE No: 15966

Dir./Afd.: dam/mo

Visie

Ag. No:

Dossier:

DATUM VAN VERZENDING: 19 september 1984

AFKOMSTIG VAN: mn van b.z.

MINUUT GEPARAFEERD DOOR: jda/ah /fe/veg/ap/dgpz

BESTEMD VOOR: b a g d a d

PARAAF/OPM.:

3. Om de inhoud van een codeber. mag niet met verwijzing naar dat bericht per telefoon worden gesproken.
4. Dossiers, welke codeber. bevatten, dienen veilig te worden opgeborgen.

Afschriften van codeberichten mogen uitsluitend door de afdeling Verbindingen worden vervaardigd.

1. Op een codeber. mag telegr. niet in open taal worden geantwoord, tenzij aan bepaalde voorwaarden wordt voldaan (zie Richtlijnen).

onderwerp: bezoek undersecretary kettani

GEANNULEERD 02.08.06

r.m.c. 54

~~CONFIDENTIEEL~~

samenvatting:

d g p z ontving op 17 en 18 dezer op diens verzoek de iraakse undersecretary voor buza kettani. onderwerp van gesprek waren : a) het gewapend conflict tussen iran en irak
b) het israelisch - arabisch conflict
c) de 39e avvn

ad a) centraal stond de vraag hoe nederland, al dan niet in het kader van de tien, een bijdrage zou kunnen leveren tot de oplossing van het conflict in de golf. kettani betoogde dat nederland druk zou kunnen uitoefenen op iran om de gedachte aan een militaire oplossing van het conflict op te geven. als eerste aanzet tot het stopzetten van de vijandelijkheden kwam mogelijk een beperkt staakt-het-vuren, onder toezicht van v n -waarnemers, in aanmerking. in navolging van de voorstellen destijds van de speciaal vertegenwoordiger van de s g v n, palme, en het gestelde in par. 3 van v r -res. 540, zou dit staakt-het-vuren vergezeld kunnen gaan van het weer openstellen van de shatt-al-arab en de hervatting van het vrije scheepvaartverkeer in de noordelijke golf. iran zou hiervan direct profiteren, terwijl irak eerst na 6-8 maanden zijn havens weer in gebruik zou kunnen nemen. deze vertrouwenwekkende maatregelen zouden na verloop van tijd tot beeindiging van het conflict kunnen leiden. desgevraagd gaf hij aan dat bij uitvoering van het plan tot opruiming van de shatt de troepenontplooiing aan het zuidelijke front ongewijzigd zou blijven, met uiteraard een staakt het vuren in die sector. kettani zelf gaf evenwel reeds aan de kans op medewerking van iran niet hoog aan te slaan. evenmin zou irak zelf een dergelijk voorstel pousseren nu de militaire situatie in irak's voordeel was gewijzigd. andere landen konden het echter opnemen.

d g p z gaf blijk van de nederlandse ongerustheid over voortgaande beschietingen van schepen van derde landen in de golf.

==2==

~~CONFIDENTIEEL~~

ook op juridische gronden kon nederland irak hierin niet volgen. methodes als een blokkade of het opbrengen van schepen waren volkenrechtelijk mogelijk, doch niet aanvallen op neutrale scheepvaart. kettani bracht hier tegen in dat iran een military exclusion zone had afgekondigd, waarvan iedere belanghebbende op de hoogte was. ook viel irak slechts schepen aan komende van of gaande naar iran, terwijl iran op zijn beurt niet alleen schepen buiten de oorlogszone aanviel, maar bovendien schepen van derden op weg naar neutrale havens. nu iran vasthield aan een militaire oplossing had irak geen andere optie dan iran's oorlogscapaciteit en ''currency earning capacity'' aan te tasten. andere landen zouden irak hierbij dienen te helpen. het realiseren van deze doelstelling noemde kettani het voornaamste doel van zijn bezoek.

op een vraag van d g p z naar de syrische opstelling t.a.v. iran-irak conflict gaf kettani te kennen dat syrie met iran gemeen had dat beide landen de val van saddam hussein eisten en van het iraakse baath regime. syrie verkeerde verder in de ambivalente positie dat iran heeft gedreigd met evt. maatregelen tegen syrie's geldschieter saoedi-arabie. president assad zou de bezoekende iraanse president khamenei dan ook hebben aangeraden het reeds dikwijls aangekondigde grote offensief tegen irak geen doorgang te doen vinden doch de uitputtingsoorlog gaande te houden. saoedi-arabie, koeweit en zelfs de sovjet-unie zouden hebben getracht syrie tot een gematigder standpunt t.o.v. irak te bewegen. tot nu toe zonder resultaat: grens, pijpleiding en spoorweg blijven gesloten.

uit eigen beweging bracht kettani de chemische wapens ter sprake. hij ontkende noch bevestigde het gebruik ervan door irak, doch zei dat iran de kwestie van chemische wapens opvoerde om de publieke opinie te beinvloeden. hetzelfde gold voor aanvallen op burgerdoelen. de brief van de s g v n van 29 juni jl. was volgens kettani geschreven om de aandringende iraniers ter wille te zijn. irak was niet van plan op de brief te antwoorden. het beschouwde deze als een iraans propagandamiddel. d g p z heeft de onaanvaardbaarheid van het gebruik dezer wapens onderstreept.

ad b) overgaande naar het israelisch-arabisch conflict wees d g p z op de wenselijkheid dat de nieuwe israelische regering overging tot terugtrekking uit zuid-libanon en ombuiging van het nederzettingenbeleid.
hoewel israel alleen zichzelf vertrouwde als het de veiligheid van zijn grenzen betrof, zou de v n mogelijk een nuttige rol kunnen vervullen bij de totstandkoming van een veiligheidsarrangement aan israel's noordgrens, zeker nu de p l o zuid-libanon had verlaten. middels terugtrekking uit libanon en ombuiging van het nederzettingenbeleid zou israel een signaal kunnen geven aan de buurlanden.

over de nieuwe israelische regering kon kettanie weinig concreets zeggen. wel merkte hij op dat de aanwezigheid van sharon verontrustend was. ook verwachtte hij dat de regering het in het verleden gevoerde nederzettingenbeleid verder zou consolideren. eerdere voorstellen van labour aangaande terugtrekking uit de west-bank leken van de baan. de

VERZONDEN CODEBERICHT

Ref. no.: 15966

VERVOLG

Rubricering: ~~CONFIDENTIEEL~~ GEANNULEERD 07 08. 06

gevoelens in de regio, en m.n. in amman, zouden na de regeringsvorming ''dark'' zijn. israel zou zich verder geheel uit libanon moeten terugtrekken. i d f -patrouilles op libanees territoir waren niet aanvaardbaar evenmin als aanwezigheid van de s l a van generaal l a h a d welke kettani als een verlengstuk van israel zag. hoewel kettani de israelische en syrische aanwezigheid in libanon van verschillende aard achtte, gaf hij niettemin te kennen dat ook syrie zich zou moeten terugtrekken. irak was van de aanvang af tegen syrische bemoeienis met libanon geweest.

wil men tot vrede komen in het m.o., aluds kettani, dan zal israel ook besprekingen met de p l o dienen te beginnen. israel heeft de kans de p l o in gematigde richting te beinvloeden door ook de gematigde palestijnen van de west-bank in staat te stellen de palestijnse nationale raad bij te wonen. de p l o vecht thans tegen dominatie door syrie enerzijds en een uiteenvallen anderzijds. of wil israel misschien in het geheel geen gematigde p l o , vroeg kettani zich af.
op de vraag van d g p z of een p n c bijeenkomst verwacht kon worden als daardoor splitsing dreigde antwoordde kettani dat dit een zaak van de palestijnen zelf was. de recente reis van president assad naar algerije zou overigens ten doel hebben gehad het houden van het p n c tegen te gaan.
over de mogelijkheden van een jordaans-palestijnse onderhandeling met israel zei kettani dat hetgeen aanvaardbaar was voor de palestijnen ook aanvaardbaar was voor irak.
kettani achtte de tijd niet rijp voor een oplossing van het israelisch-arabisch conflict. daarvoor was israel te sterk en de arabische wereld alsmede de p l o te verdeeld. veel zou afhangen van initiatieven van de v.s. na de a.s. presidentsverkiezingen. kettani dacht niet, dat een vredesconferentie inzake het m.o. thans succesvol zou zijn. niettemin oordeelde hij een dergelijke conferentie nuttig, aangezien alle bij het conflict betrokken partijen verzameld zouden zijn wat op zich al een stap in de goede richting was. het zou onverstandig zijn de sovjet-unie van een dergelijke conferentie uit te sluiten. bovendien waren alle andere pogingen tot vooruitgang in het m.o. overleg thans vastgelopen, zodat de conferentie als enig alternatief overbleef.

op een uiteenzetting dat nederland principieel gekant was tegen pogingen om israel's geloofsbrieven in de a v v n niet te aanvaarden (iran heeft een dergelijk voorstel in voorbereiding), antwoordde kettani dat het zo'n vaart wel niet zou lopen. ook vorig jaar hadden de arabische landen zich niet verzet tegen een noorse procedurele resolutie het voorstel niet in behandeling te nemen, zo deed kettani het ten onrechte voorkomen. het overleg in de arabische groep over de israelische geloofsbrieven zou eerdaags aanvangen, en kettani liet doorschemeren dat er verschillen van mening bestonden.

ad c) kettani deelde mee dat, behoudens in het geval van een iraanse aanval, irak geen resolutie in de komende

1. Op een codeber. mag telegr. niet in open taal worden geantwoord, tenzij aan bepaalde voorwaarden wordt voldaan (zie Richtlijnen).

2. Afschriften van codeberichten mogen uit**end** door de afdeling Verbin- di .. worden vervaardigd.

3. Over de inhoud van een codeber. mag niet met verwijzing naar dat bericht pe efoon worden gesproken.

4. Dossiers, ke codeber. bevatten, dienen veilig te worden opgeborgen.

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Ref. no.: 15966

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VERVOLG ==4==

a v v n zou indienen. deze hadden in het verleden immers niets opgeleverd. irak had evenmin plannen om zich tot grote debatten te laten verleiden bij het agendapunt iran-irak. indien echter iran de chemische oorlogsvoering opbracht dan diende dit in de context van de oorlog irak-iran behandeld te worden en niet onder het algemeen thema ''chemische wapens''.

kettani bracht nog naar voren dat iran tot nu toe alle v n - resoluties had verworpen en als eerste land in de geschiedenis van de v n geweigerd had om na een oproep een staakt-het-vuren af te kondigen. iran komt de verplichtingen krachtens het handvest van de v n , die het is aangegaan, niet/aldus kettani. /na

celer 61 ++

~~CONFIDENTIEEL~~

cc DAM
Sc DIO
DAM/MO
DAV/PN
DIO/NW
DIO/PZ
Def/CDS
Def/DAB
LAMID
(dr.Koster)
PV Genève
PV New York
PV NAVO Brussel
Bagdad
Teheran
dr. Ooms TNO

MEMORANDUM

GEANNULEERD 02.08.06

Van: DIO/NN Datum: 12 oktober 1984

Aan: DIO/OV Nr. 155/84

Onderwerp: Gebruik van chemische wapens/Iraanse brochure 'Victims of Iraqi chemical weapons'

Vorige maand werd door Iran in de Geneefse Ontwapeningsconferentie een op glanspapier gedrukte brochure rondgedeeld met foto's van slachtoffers van het gebruik van chemische wapens. In de inleiding en het overzicht van 50 aanvallen met chemische wapens tussen december 1980 en mei 1984 valt het volgende op.

- De inleiding staat bol van gezwollen taal vol dwaze beschuldigingen. Het VK zou nu chemische wapens aan Irak geven opdat Saddam 'the lilliputian lackey' de opdracht van Churchill kan uitvoeren. Churchill zou gezegd hebben 'I am strongly in favor of using poison gas against any uncivilized tribe'. De Grote Mogendheden zouden Saddam het groene licht gegeven hebben 'to proceed with his devastating the Iranian cities by chemical weapons'.

- Hiermee enigszins in contrast staat dat de aanvallen met chemische wapens tot nu toe volgens Iran meer dan 3000 zwaar gewonden en meer dan 50 dodelijke slachtoffers hebben geëist. De meeste van deze slachtoffers zouden volgens de door Iran verstrekte gegevens tijdens de laatste twee beschreven aanvallen gevallen zijn (op 25 februari en 25 mei van dit jaar). Het aantal slachtoffers van de eerste 48 aanvallen zou slechts enkele honderden bedragen.

  Hieruit zou afgeleid kunnen worden dat Irak tot nu toe slechts spaarzaam gebruik heeft gemaakt van chemische wapens. De toename van het aantal slachtoffers bij de laatste twee aanvallen van de 50 zou erop kunnen wijzen dat Irak inmiddels over grotere voorraden beschikt of de voorraden effektiever weet in te zetten, maar het valt ook niet uit te sluiten dat Iran het nodig achtte om het aantal slachtoffers in de statistieken wat op te schroeven. In die richting wijzen de nogal merkwaardige cijfers (in februari 3000 gewonden en geen doden, in mei 40 doden en blijkbaar geen gewonden.

- Niet belangrijk maar wel opvallend is het veelvuldige gebruik van alliterererende zinswendingen.

bth

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL

Britain, as it seems, has brought the unfinished scenario: "Saga of Saddam's Savagery", initially penned by the Soviets (dispatching long-term missiles to Iraq), to its final chapter, blood-and-disgrace-stained as it appears, (by equipping the Zionist regime of Iraq with her most advanced chains of chemical weapons). Anyone capable of catching even an opaque glimpse of the present world affairs would not fail to conceive the tragic reality that if Britain is providing Iraq with chemical weapons it is certainly not because of her pure and profound reverence for the 1925 Geneva Conventions, nor is it for the sake of her ardent adoration as well as advocation of the "Human Rights" ... The heinously conspicuous fact concerning her grewsome mode of behavior reveals the naked truth that her illegitimate interest in the region has been met with jeopardy. The "green light" given to Saddam by the Superpowers to proceed with his devastating the Iranian cities by chemical weapons is to be regarded as execrable an act of crime as history could ever recall. Numerous Iranian cities have been utterly demolished by the so-called "Frog Missiles" for over 36 murky months. Thousands of homes and hearths have been shelled to bits and pieces and many infants of innocence, while still asleep in their mothers' bosoms, suddenly turned into heaps of lifeless ashes. Tens of factories, hospitals, schools and bazaars have been fiercely laid waste and hundreds of workers, patients, men and women whose only vice seemed to lie in their passionately deep-rooted love for Islam and their homeland have become victims of the Iraqi aggression since Sept. 20, 1980, by the mirthless missiles, mortars and air attacks as the result of which 20,000 civilians have been either seriously injured or drastically disabled. No rational mind could justifiably hold that these vicious circles of crimes were the end of Saddam's blind brutaliy. Later massacres by dint of deadly chemical bombs were soon repeated and on countless occasions played havoc with the innocent Iranian civilians. Needless to say that such chemical bombs which contain mustard gas, yellow rain, nicotoxin and nerve gas, were presented to Iraq as small tokens of friendship by one of the fiery advocates of the so-called "Human Rights" — Britain. En route to Baghdad, one of the vessels carrying the lethal chemicals, for some reason, was drowned in French waters.It is of utmost interest to note how panic-stricken the French government grew in no time and how frantically the French officials started evacuating a vast coastal area, lest the mere breeze of the chemicals bestowed friendly kisses of death upon the French civilians...

The Iraqi regime has repeatedly and shamelessly used chemical weapons against the Muslim Iranians by deliberately conniving at the 1925 Geneva Conventions regarding the non-use of any chemical weapons in time of war. Saddam's unprincipled and insolent smirking at the Geneva Conventions, so far has left behind over 3,000 deeply injured and well over 50 martyrs. Such an overt anti-human brutality is a sad indication of Saddam's persistence in burying the Geneva Conventions deep within the tomb of oblivion. Saddam's total absence of respect as regards the international laws has gravely endangered the peace and security of the region. One is sorrowfully, at this juncture of evil events, reminded of the ill use of similar chemicals by the Tel Aviv regime against the Palestinian school children. It stands to reason to arrive at the following inevitable conclusion that the analogy between the Baghdad and Tel Aviv inhuman war tactics is far from an accidental occurrence and that it stems from the joint expansionistic nature of the two regime under discussion. No doubt such blood-stained acts of aggression would be out of question, had the

global arrogant powers not shown the "green light" to their low lackey — Saddam, to proceed with his ferocious follies. In conclusion, it is of utmost historical interest to note what Churchill, this so-called advocate of "Human Rights" had to say concerning the safety of the unprotected civilians, innocent women and children in time of war WHEN THE INTEREST OF HIS OWN COUNTRY WAS JEOPARDIZED.

"I am strongly in favor of using poison gas against any uncivilized tribe," to safegaurd British interests. And thus Saddam, the Lilliputian Lackey obeys his Master's inhumanly dire decree...


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JETTY 12 OF ABADAN
IRAN
Iraq
CHEMICAL ATTACKS
BY THE IRAQI ARMY
AGAINST
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY
TARGETS IN IRAN

TABLE OF CHEMICAL ATTACKS CARRIED OUT BY THE IRAQI

	date	location	no.of deployment	type of toxic agent	mode of delivery	casualties and fatalities	remarks
1	early in war	Shalamche	1	nerve gas	unknown	unspecified	victims suffering from dizziness
2	early in war	Meymak	1		unknown	unspecified	
3	Dec. 28,'80	area between Helaleh and Nefkhazar	1		artillery shell	7-10 combatants martyred	
4	early in 1981	Hoveizeh	1	nerve gas	mortar	1 injured	victims suffering from intense nausea
5	Jun. 3,'81	Allah-o Akbar heights	1	nerve gas	artillery shell	unspecified	victims suffering from eye irritation and chest pain
6	Jun. 22,'81	Naderi Beridge	1	nerve gas	mortar	unspecified	
7	Nov. 20,'81	Khorramshahr	1	nerve gas	artillery	unspecified	
8	Sept. 29,'82	Abadan	1	nerve gas		unspecified	
9	Oct. 22,'82	Savajl	1	nerve gas	artillery	unspecified	
10	Oct. 27,'82	Musian	1	nerve gas	artillery shell	4 combatants martyred 16 affected	
11	late Oct,'82	Height 175	1	mustard gas	mortar	unspecified	
12	late Oct.'82	Height 175	2	nerve gas	artillery shell	9 combatants martyred	those contaminated are suffering eye irritation
13	Dec. 19,'82	Tangab	1		artillery shell	several combatants poisoned	
14	Nov. 21,'82	north of Shalamche	1		mortar	unspecified	
15	Jan. 1,'82	Bayveh pass	1		artillery shell	5 combatants feel suffocated	
16	Jan. 25,'82	Kurdestan	1		artillery shell	a large number of combatants poisoned	victims feel suffocation, eye irritation, toxic agent smelt like alochol
17	Feb. 8,'82	Sharhani	1		artillery shell	unspecified	those affected have sevire nausea, eye irritation
18	Feb. 24,'82	north of Shalamche	1		artillery shell	unspecified	victims complain of painful throat and nose
19	Mar. 23,'83	Fakkeh	1		mortar	unspecified	victims suffering from nausea
20	Mar. 26,'83	near Moslem Neqabi base	1		mortar	unspecified	victims severly poisoned, feel nauseated
21	Mar. 29,'83	Sumar	1		artillery shell	4 combatants affected	victims feel dizzy
22	Apr. 8,'83	Sumar	1		artillery shell	several combatants injured	victims feel nauseated
23	Jun. 11,'83	by the Dovizaj river	1		artillery shell	several combatants	victims feel suffocation and dizziness
24	Aug. 8,'83	Tamarchin	1	nausea tive gas	aerial bomb	unspecified	the bombs dropped emitted nauseative gas
25	Aug. 8,'83	Shiversah	1	vesicant	aerial bomb	24 combatants	large blisters on victims who

ARMY AGAINST CIVILIAN AND MILITARY TARGETS IN IRAN

				gas		injured	felt nauseated
26	Aug. 8,'	Haj-Omran	1	vesicant gas	aerial bomb	unspecified	victims feeling dizzy and nauseated
27	Aug.9,'83	Piranshahr	1		aerial bomb	10 people injured	victims feeling dizzy and nauseated
28	Aug. 9,'83	Tamarchin	2	mustard gas	aerial bomb	39 combatants injured	
29	Aug. 9,'83	near Piranshahr	1		aerial bomb	2 combatants martyred, 118 injured	victims' eyes affected
30	Aug. 14,'83	Qamtareh heights	1	vesicant	artillery shell	2 martyred, 200 injured	victims affected in the eyes, feet, testis
31	Aug. 15,'83	Savajl	1		artillery shell	unspecified	
32	Aug. 29,'83	Sardasht	1		artillery shell	unspecified	
33	Sept. 2,'83	Sumar	1		artillery shell	unspecified	
34	Sept. 24,'83	Bazi-deraz heights	1		artillery shell	4 injured	victims suffering from dizziness and nausea
35	Oct. 21,'83	Kharratha	1		artillery shell	unspecified	victims feeling dizzy
36	Oct. 25,'83	Marivan	1		mortar	unspecified	
37	Oct. 25,'83	Sardasht	1		artillery shell	3 combatants injured	enemy fired 84 rounds, victims suffering from nausea and severe chest pain
38	Oct. 25,'83	Seyyed-lu village	1		artillery shell	unspecified	most of the villagers suffered from temporary loss of vision
39	Oct. 26,'83	Sardush	1		artillery shell	unspecified	enemy fired ten rounds
40	Oct. 27,'83	Bayanjan village	1	vesicant gas	aerial bomb	30 villagers injured	victims suffering from pulmonary damages some have been blinded
41	Oct. 30,'83	Baneh	1			8	villagers have been blinded
42	Nov. 1,'83	near Marivan	1		artillery shell	16 combatants injured	victims suffering suffocation and large blisters on their skin
43	Nov. 3,'83	Bayanjan	3	vesicant gas		unspecified	victims have been blinded
44	Nov. 13,'83	Garmab	1	unknown	aerial bomb	40 combatants injured	victims suffering from dizziness nausea
45	Nov. 13,'83	Panjvin	1	nerve gas		17 combatants martyred 60 injured	victims suffering from temporary loss of vision, painful throat, cough, severe itch
46	Nov. 25,'83	Paveh	1		artillery shell	unspecified	
47	Dec. 29,'83	Pier 12 Abadan	1		mortar	1 injured	an area within a radius of 500 meters contaminated, the injured suffering sunning eyes and nose
48	Jan. 5,'84	Husseiniyeh	1			1 injured	victims suffering from suffocation
49	Feb. 25,'84	Hur-al-Hoveizeh	1	mycot-oxic Mustard gas	aerial bombing	3000 injured	
50	May. 25,'84			nerve gas	artillery shell	40 martyred	