

Spearhead	Organisation	Date	Reporting period
V & R	Netherlands Embassy Bujumbura, Burundi	24-09-2013	1st Jan - 31st Dec 2012

Activity numbers	Implementing organisation	Implementation channel	Actual expenditure 2012
23547	CNIDH	Government	50.000
25344	BTC	Multi-donor	300.000
25345	BTC	Multi-donor	800.000
24710	IMF	Multi-donor	700.000
23844	GIZ, various	Various	3.400.000
Stab.fonds	GIZ, various	Various	3.000.000

Result area 1	Human security					
Question 1.1.a: To what extent did security sector institutions and the security sector as a whole provide services that serve the needs of (various social groups within) society? (outcome, country-level)	Physical safety for the people of Burundi has improved due to enhanced technical capacity of army (FDN) and police (PNB), and by improved behaviour of these institutions towards the population. End 2011 90% of the population perceived their security situation as 'very good' or 'good', and as having improved over the previous 12 months. The appreciation of the population for army and police is also increasing. Although human rights violations continue to occur, the number of extra-judicial killings committed by state institutions decreases year after year. Internal control mechanisms are gradually being applied more stringently, both by army and by police. The increased activity by (sometimes armed) youth wings of political parties poses a security risk.					
	Baseline (2011)	Objective (2015)	Result (2012)	(Result) 2013	(Result) 2014	Source
<i>Indicator 1: Violent deaths per 100.000 population has decreased</i>	21.7 (2008)	18	n.a.			UNODC statistics
<i>Indicator 2: % of population perceiving their security situation as 'good' or 'very good'</i>	89%	97%	n.a.			biannual security perception survey
<i>Indicator 3: General appreciation for army by population (x/10)</i>	7.5	8.0	n.a.			biannual security perception survey
<i>Indicator 4: General appreciation for police by population (x/10)</i>	5.8	7.0	n.a.			biannual security perception survey
<i>Indicator 5: Presence of police and state security across the territory vs non-state armed groups has increased</i>	5/7	7/7	6/7			GoB
<i>Indicator 6: Number and presence of non-state armed groups (incl. street gangs, organised crime, militia) has decreased (either through relocation or dissolution)</i>	5/7	7/7	4/7			GoB
<p>Please note:</p> <p>'n.a.' = information not available</p> <p>5/7 = rating of results on a scale of 1 -7, with 1/7 =very poor, 7/7= very good</p>						
Question 1.1b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result?	NL is the lead partner of GoB in the security sector and organises regular political dialogue, such as with the Ministry of Public Security (MSP) on structural reforms and follow-up given to HR violations. Intensive dialogue resulted in stepped up efforts by the national police to apply internal controls and improve HR awareness amongst staff. The independent national HR commission, CNIDH, received support from NL and other donors. CNIDH now maps HR abuses nation-wide and follows or investigates cases. NL supported the ACOTA training programme for Burundian military deployed in Somalia both financially and through deployment of NL trainers in the ACOTA programme. The African Union specifically recognised the good behaviour of Burundian army in contact with the local population, as being in accordance with international standards.					
	Baseline (2011)	Objective (2015)	Result (2012)	(Result) 2013	(Result) 2014	Source
<i>Indicator 1: No. of reported cases of extra-judicial killings and torture by state security agents</i>	63	0	31			UN report
<i>Indicator 2: % of cases where state security organisations staff implicated in HR violations are subject to internal control procedures</i>	13%	25%	n.a.			UN:MDNAC/MSP reports
<i>Indicator 3: Natl Human Rights Commission is undertaking mapping and monitoring of HR abuse, due to NL support</i>	1/7	5/7	2/7			CNIDH annual report
<i>Indicator 4: No. of military staff trained to participate in AU mission Somalia (AMISOM)</i>	1.600 (2008)	25.000	15.000			FDN
<i>Indicator 5: No. of policemen trained to participate in AU mission Somalia (AMISOM)</i>	0%	500	0			PNB

<i>Please indicate the proportion of the NL support in relation to the overall national budget and in relation to other donor support in the targeted area.</i>	Min Defense budget 2012: EUR 43.5 mio; NL support EUR 3.3 mio = 7.5%; other donor support negligible. Min Pub Security budget 2012: EUR 28.3 mio; NL support EUR 4.7 mio = 16.6%; total other donor support approx. EUR 3.4					
Question 1.2a: Is there progress in developing a functioning and coherent security sector as a system? (outcome, country level)	Since the integration of rebel forces into army and police, as agreed under the Arusha Peace Accords and effectively started since 2004, Burundi has made substantive progress in improving management and functioning of these security institutions. Strategies and laws now provide the framework for democratic control of army and police. The National Security Council (CNS) developed the draft National Security Strategy through an inclusive participatory process with all actors, including civil society. The National Defense Forces (FDN) has become a stable organisation, albeit with a limited technical capacity. Transparency of the army towards the population, has improved. The Burundi National Police (PNB) advances more slowly than FDN due to the difficulty of putting untrained, uneducated former rebels in new positions of direct service delivery to the population (i.e police tasks). Serious problems remain with day-to-day corruption of police forces and abuse of power by higher cadre. The trust of the population in the PNB has improved, but is not yet at an acceptable level. Training of FDN and PNB staff in gender, HR, ethics continues.					
	Baseline (2011)	Objective (2015)	Result (2012)	(Result) 2013	(Result) 2014	Source
<i>Indicator 1: Personnel within the security sector (incl. police) are payed salaries on a regular basis</i>	6/7	7/7	6/7			GoB (MDNAC/ MSP)
<i>Indicator 2: Security sector institutions have officers who are sufficiently trained (incl on the gender aspects of their work)</i>	2/7	5/7 (2015)	3/7			GoB (MDNAC/ MSP)
<i>Indicator 3: Number of female police and security staff has increased</i>	n.a.	FDN: 700/26.000 PNB: 1000/16.000	FDN: 239/26.000 PNB: 465/16.000			GoB (MDNAC/ MSP)
<i>Indicator 4: the security sector institutions have sufficient infrastructure (barracks, equipment)</i>	FDN: 3/7 PNB: 1/7	FDN: 5/7 PNB: 4/7	FDN: 3/7 PNB: 1/7			GoB (MDNAC/ MSP)
<i>Indicator 5: The security sector as a whole, rather than individual institutions, is responsible for the formulation of the security sector policy.</i>	1/7	7/7	3/7			National Security Council
<i>Indicator 6: A strategic plan for the entire security sector exists.</i>	2/7	7/7	4/7			NSC
<i>Indicator 7: A structure for dialogue between the various institutions, including civil society, is functioning.</i>	1/7	6/7	2/7			MSP, CivSoc
<i>Indicator 8: The budget for the security sector is proportionally divided over the various institutions</i>	1/7	4/7	1/7			MinFin, MDNAC, MSP
Question 1.2b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result? (output, programme level)	NL has been the main donor in the security sector. With NL help military and police higher cadre officials were sent for specialised trainings. Physical infrastructure was improved, e.g. army barracks, kitchens, and police posts. Mobility was improved through the provision of bicycles to police posts. NL provided first-aid equipment to police posts and a training course to several hundred police officers. With NL support a mass training of all 16.000 police officers is under way aimed to improve the behaviour of police officers towards the population in areas such as road-side controls, gender, human rights, crowd control. At a strategic level NL supported the preparation of the National Security Strategy, where both government and NGOs were fully included. The Burundi government is generally able to pay security personnel and army on time.					
<i>Due to the programme:</i>	Baseline (2011)	Objective (2015)	Result (2012)	(Result) 2013	(Result) 2014	Source
<i>Indicator 1: Measures taken by a program to ensure salaries paid regularly and reliably to police and security personnel</i>	not an issue	not an issue	not an issue			DSS
<i>Indicator 2: Training for security sector staff</i>	2/7	5/7	3/7			DSS
<i>Indicator 3: Infrastructure provided (barracks, equipment)</i>	2/7	5/7	3/7			DSS
<i>Indicator 4: a strategic plan for the entire sector has been promoted by the key ministries</i>	3/7	7/7	5/7			DSS

<i>Indicator 5: Promotion of multi-institutional/ multi- donor (budget) support plans and projects</i>	2/7	4/7	2/7			DSS
<i>Indicator 6: Inclusion of civil society in security sector is promoted</i>	2/7	6/7	4/7			DSS
<i>Please indicate the proportion of the NL support in relation to the overall national budget and in relation to other donor support in the targeted area.</i>	Min Defense budget 2012: EUR 43.5 mio; NL support EUR 3.3 mio = 7.5%; other donor support negligible. Min Pub Security budget 2012: EUR 28.3 mio; NL support EUR 4.7 mio = 16.6%; total other donor support approx. EUR 3.4					
Question 1.3a: To what extent are separate security sector institutions and the security sector as a whole internally and externally accountable for their performance? (outcome, country level)	Both army (FDN) and police (PNB) have internal control mechanisms that, in the vast majority of cases, lead to misbehaviour being punished. FDN actively encourages better ethics amongst staff. PNB maintains detailed information on punitive actions taken against policestaff. On occasion, PNB investigation into incidents was seen to be sub-standard. Lack of trust in the police may intimidate witnesses from stepping forward and reporting on police wrong-doings. External control on FDN and PNB exists formally, and parliamentary questions regarding FDN and PNB are on the rise. Both FDN and PNB demonstrated increased sensitivity to public outcry (e.g. in media) against any wrong doings. PNB has created public communication cells in all police districts. FDN has publicly presented various documents outlining strategic options and associated future costs of the FDN, and is actively soliciting that political choices are made.					
	Baseline (2011)	Objective (2015)	Result (2012)	(Result) 2013	(Result) 2014	Source
<i>Indicator 1: Security sector institutions have internal accountability mechanisms in place and functioning.</i>	3/7	6/7	3/7			GoB, parliament, press
<i>Indicator 2: Security sector institutions have personnel adequately screened and fairly recruited</i>	1/7	5/7	2/7			idem
<i>Indicator 3: Security sector institutions are accountable to external actors, such as parliament, public</i>	2/7	5/7	2/7			GoB, parliament, press
<i>Indicator 4: No. of times where internal control procedures resulted in disciplinary action against army staff (../total)</i>	n.a.	all	24/..			FDN
<i>Indicator 5: No. of times where internal control procedures resulted in disciplinary action against police staff (../total)</i>	n.a.	all	25/..			PNB
<i>Indicator 6 : Control mechanisms for non-state security providers have been developed and included in national legislation</i>	0/7	4/7	0/7			GoB
Question 1.3b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result? (output, programme level)	The NL support has helped to strengthen internal awareness on ethics and human rights in FDN and PNB, which has helped to improve the behaviour of staff, as well as boost confidence by the population that 'impunity' will not be tolerated internally by these organisations. The NL SSD programme was instrumental in starting 'Open Days' events held by FDN and PNB. which attracted thousands of people. The political dialogue between NL and GoB put pressure on GoB to follow up on cases of severe HR violations.					
<i>Due to the programme:</i>	Baseline (2011)	Objective (2015)	Result (2012)	(Result) 2013	(Result) 2014	Source
<i>Indicator 1: Vetting programmes for security sector personnel have been promoted</i>	2/7	4/7	2/7			FDN/PNB
<i>indicator 2: Organised gender sensitive community dialogues and parliamentary hearings</i>	2/7	5/7	3/7			GoB/ Parlmnt
<i>Indicator 3: The existence of internal performance evaluation systems</i>	1/7	5/7	2/7			FDN/PNB
<i>Indicator 4: The existence of external performance evaluation systems</i>	2/7	5/7	2/7			GoB
<i>Indicator 5: Legislation and procedures in place for civilian oversight</i>	4/7	6/7	4/7			GoB
<i>Indicator 6: Estimated no. of people having attended 'Open Days' organised by FDN and PNB</i>	0	20.000	3.500			FDN

<p>Please indicate the proportion of the NL support in relation to the overall national budget and in relation to other donor support in the targeted area.</p>	<p>Min Defense budget 2012: EUR 43.5 mio; NL support EUR 3.3 mio = 7.5%; other donor support unknown (mostly trainings or in kind). Min Pub Security budget 2012: EUR 28.3 mio; NL support EUR 4.7 mio = 16.6%; total other donor support approx. EUR 3.4</p>
<p>Assessment of results achieved across the entire result area, Dutch contribution</p>	<p>B</p>
<p>A. Results achieved better than planned</p>	<p>2012 showed mixed results. On the negative side: serious problems remained with continuation of extra-judicial killings by state security agents (police, SNR, youth wings of political parties); a new police law was proposed which would undemocratically give the power 'by decree' to control the police; public appreciation for police remained very low; and progress in the Defense Review was slower than expected. On the positive side: the total number of extra-judicial killings went down significantly from 2010 (261), 2011 (63) to 2012 (31). The proposed police law was withdrawn following intense parliamentary debate; public appreciation for the overall perceived security situation as well as for the performance of army and police increased. By July 2013 the Defense Review process also regained momentum following the approval of the National Defense Policy. 2012 saw the preparation of a new 'National Security Strategy' by the National Security Council, which was done (with NL support) in a highly participatory way involving government, parliament and civil society. The opinion of civil society and parliament on security sector issues is more and more respected and included in security sector processes. In general there seems to be increasing critical mass within the medium and higher ranks of security sector agencies to continue democratic reforms. Problems remain with political leadership at the highest levels and their vested interests that hamper speedier progress. However, this 'resistance to change' was to be expected.</p>
<p>B. Results achieved as planned</p>	
<p>C. Results achieved poorer than planned</p>	
<p>D. Results achieved much poorer than planned</p>	
<p>Implications for planning</p>	
<p>In 2013 and beyond funding of the SSD programme will in principle continue. There have been sufficient areas of progress, although the pace is sometimes found to be slow. The activities of the programme will gradually be brought more and more under Burundian control to enhance ownership. Continued focus will be on the professionalisation of army and police, with a particular attention to gender. Intensified efforts and inputs will go towards improving state (e.g. parliamentary) and non-state (e.g. civil society/population) control over security sector organisations, as well as strengthening democratic processes in advance of the elections in 2015. NL will try to develop, jointly with the Burundi counterpart government agencies, a list of indicators by which progress can be monitored on a range of aspects related to the Memorandum of Understanding (2009-2017) between NL and Burundi. It is the intention that on the basis of these indicators and their achievement or non-achievement, NL and Burundi will decide to increase, reduce or stop funding specific elements of the security sector programme.</p> <p>The political dialogue with Burundi will continue with focus on economic development and human rights. The dialogue will continue to pay particular attention to four cases of extra-judicial killings and their follow-up by the Burundi government, and will also be included in the indicators.</p>	

Result area 3	Inclusive political processes					
<p>Question 3.1a: To what extent are the political and peace processes within the target area of your programme effective and inclusive?</p>	<p>Opposition parties boycotted the second and final round of the elections of 2010. Since then, only three parties are represented in the Assemblée Nationale (AN) and Senat (S): In 2012 the dominant political party, CNDD-FDD, and members of GoB did not engage in regular dialogue with the opposition parties. This changed early in 2013 when a preparation process for the elections of 2015 was initiated under a UN effort. Political parties are typically of mixed ethnicity. The Arusha Peace Accords stipulate a mandatory 60/40% Hutu/Tutsi division of seats/positions for all government bodies, political parties, and AN and S. For army (FDN) and police (PNB) this quota is 50/50%. By and large, these quota are met through self-imposed censorship on appointments.</p> <p>Gender representation in AN and S is relatively high, but in GoB positions is still inadequate. Violent conflicts between youth wings of political parties increased in 2012. Under the Arusha accords and the Burundi constitution, freedom of speech, media and public gathering were guaranteed, thus supporting GoB accountability to the public. However, in October 2012 draft organic laws were introduced by GoB which in practice limit these freedoms, risking to mute the media and reduce political space. In May 2013 the law on the media was passed by the President.</p>					
	Baseline (2011)	Objective (2015)	Result (2012)	(Result) 2013	(Result) 2014	Source
<p><i>Indicator 1 : Diversity (sex, religion, geographical representation, ethnicity, political parties) in representation in important institutions (lawmaking bodies, executive power, army, justice institutions)</i></p>	3/7	5/7	3/7			GoB, AN, S
<p><i>Indicator 2 : Adequate participation in elections and public governance (for example systemic exclusion of groups) .</i></p>	1/7	6/7	2/7			media, informants
<p><i>Indicator 3: Presence of political and social conflicts (extent to which conflicts between parties are resolved peacefully/reduction in violent incidents between groups)</i></p>	5/7	6/7	4/7			media, security reports
<p><i>Indicator 4 : % of population who express trust in political processes</i></p>	n.a.	70%	n.a.			biannual sec. needs survey
<p><i>Indicator 5: Horizontal inclusiveness in political and peace processes: relevant groups are involved (sex, religion, geographical representation, ethnicity, etc.).</i></p>	2/7	5/7	3/7			informants
<p><i>Indicator 6: Vertical inclusiveness in political and peace processes inclusiviteit in politieke en vredesprocessen / access to power: high and low income groups are involved, mobility between different levels.</i></p>	1/7	4/7	1/7			media, informants
<p><i>Indicator 7: Level of probity and integrity of political bodies</i></p>	2/7	5/7	2/7			TI, IDEA
<p><i>Indicator 8: All relevant aspects of peaceprocess are in place and functioning (space for dialogue, constitution, reconciliationproces, early warning, local commissions, etc.)</i></p>	2/7	6/7	3/7			UN
<p><i>Indicator 9 : Freedom of press enshrined in national legislation</i></p>	6/7	7/7	4/7			Govt law on media
<p><i>Indicator 10 : Freedom of gathering and protest enshrined in national legislation</i></p>	7/7	7/7	4/7			GoB law on public gathering
<p><i>Indicator 11 : Freedom of formation and functioning of civil society organisations enshrined in national legislation</i></p>	6/7	7/7	4/7			GoB law on NGOs
<p><i>Indicator 12 : % of women members in Assemblée Nationale(A) and Senat (S)</i></p>	? (2010)	50%	33% AN 43% S			AN / S
<p><i>Indicator 13 : No. of meetings between government and opposition parties</i></p>	2	4	1			media, govt, opp
<p><i>Indicator 14 : No. of political parties represented in Assemblée Nationale</i></p>	2 (2010)	10	3			parlmnt, opp, media
<p>Please note: 'n.a.' = information not available 5/7 = rating of results on a scale of 1 -7 , with 1/7 =very poor, 7/7= very good</p>						

Question 3.1b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result?	The EU (incl NL) and UN regularly called on GoB and political parties to engage in an inclusive dialogue. The UN organised a 'lessons learnt from elections 2010' conference in march 2013 which brought together all political parties. NL supported projects to introduce 'Police de Proximite' and conflict resolution mechanisms at local level, resulting in improved collaboration between police, local govt and population on local security and local conflict resolutions issues. Political dialogue between EU and GoB (Article 8 consultations) took place at 6-monthly intervals. The NL intends to set up a 'network of agents of change' to help bring together progressive elements in GoB, parliament, media, security services and foster change.					
	Baseline (2011)	Objective (2015)	Result (2012)	(Result) 2013	(Result) 2014	Source
<i>Indicator 1: Number of (local and/or national) peace dialogues and meetings with a positive impact</i>	2/7	5/7	2/7			project reports
<i>Indicator 2 : % of communes where 'Police de proximite' is functioning</i>	0	50	4			MSP/CTB
<i>Indicator 3 : % of communes in which instruments for inclusive governance and conflict resolution at local level have been established</i>	0	50%	n.a.			project report NIMD
<i>Indicator 4: Participation in elections is promoted</i>	1/7	7/7	2/7			project reports
<i>Indicator 5 : No. of formal consultations (Article 8) that have taken place between GoB-EU on political inclusiveness</i>	2	2	2			EU
<i>Indicator 6 : No. of meetings per year of 'network of agents of change' in political spectrum</i>	0	4	0			EKN
<i>Please indicate the proportion of the NL support in relation to the overall national budget and in relation to other donor support in the targeted area.</i>	n.a.					

Assessment of results achieved across the entire result area, Dutch contribution	C
A. Results achieved better than planned	In spite of continuous calls from international partners, GoB was very reluctant throughout 2012 to engage in constructive dialogue with opposition parties. In the course of 2012 incidents of intimidation of political opponents by (youth wings) of the main political party CNDD-FDD increased in frequency giving rise to heightened political tensions. The overall impression is that political space decreased, for instance as a result of proposed laws on media, public gathering and NGOs. In march 2013 a slight improvement could be felt following the 'all parties' meeting organised by BNUB on the 'lessons learnt from elections 2010'.
B. Results achieved as planned	
C. Results achieved poorer than planned	
D. Results achieved much poorer than planned	
Implications for planning	
In 2013 and beyond NL will pay particular attention to developments regarding political space, such as the adoption of relevant laws and actions by security forces with respect to opposition political parties. A contribution will be made to an elections support programme under UNDP management and in the SSD programme special activities will be included on training of police forces on a-political behaviour before and during elections. Separately, media organisations will be supported to enhance and broaden the political process in Burundi. In the political dialogue NL will continue to highlight for free and fair elections, and the rights of all political parties to conduct activities in preparation for the elections of 2015.	

Result area 4	Legitimate and capable government					
<p>Question 4.1a: To what extent are government institutions better able to perform their core tasks, i.e. protecting people and providing basic services, in your programme's target area?</p>	<p>GoB prepared a PRSP2 (CSLP2) in 2012. In this document it sets out clear objectives for improved governance and service delivery across all sectors. The CSLP2 is used as a reference document to which other GoB policies and plans must relate. In principle GoB commits to the CSLP2, but actual progress on implementation is slow and there is still a large unmet demand for services (health, education, employment generation). Primary education and health services for mothers and young children are free of charge but because of the low capacity of the service providers the population profits only partially. In the security sector considerable improvements have been achieved: overall security in the country has improved and is mostly stable, except for incidental disturbances close to the Congolese border and robberies of fishermen on Lake Tanganyika. A long-term strategy for national security has been developed. A sub-sectoral policy for Defense was prepared in 2012 and awaits publication. A sub-sectoral policy for Public Security is under preparation. Budgeting procedures are still sub-standard with the national budget submitted to parliament with only a few days to study before parliamentary discussions are due. GoB is attempting to introduce medium-term planning horizons for expenditures. All these efforts are part of a broader strategy for reforms in the area of public finance management. A strategy on good governance and fighting corruption, adopted by the government end 2011, is being implemented.</p>					
	Baseline (2011)	Objective (2015)	Result (2012)	(Result) 2013	(Result) 2014	Source
<p><i>Indicator 1 : Government (at national, regional, local level) is actively pursuing and implementing plans to broaden the provision of basic services (education, health, housing, transportation, employment)</i></p>	3/7	5/7	3/7			UNDP Human Development Report/Annual Report/ UNICEF country and comparative reports/ICRC
<p><i>Indicator 2: The budget has been approved by parliament in time.</i></p>	2/7	5/7	3/7			parliament
<p><i>Indicator 3: Government is increasing its revenues as a proportion of GNP</i></p>	6/7	7/7	5/7			IMF/World Bank/national statistics bureau/ Global Witness
<p><i>Indicator 4: Perception by civilians that the quality and quantity of basic government services has improved</i></p>	2/7	4/7	2/7			media
<p><i>Indicator 5 : National Security Policy is prepared by Conseil National de Securite, supported by NL SSR programme</i></p>	0/7	7/7	6/7			CNS
<p><i>Indicator 6 : Govt implements a MTEF</i></p>	1/7	5/7	2/7			Govt
<p>Please note: 'n.a.' = information not available 5/7 = rating of results on a scale of 1 -7, with 1/7 =very poor, 7/7= very good</p>						
<p>Question 4.1b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result?</p>	<p>Within the wider context of the SSD programme NL provided support for the development of the National Security Strategy which followed an intensive consultative and participatory process involving both state and non-state actors. NL also supports the Defense Review which has resulted in interim products (policy documents) based on a logical and step-by-step planning process. However, publication of policy documents has been slow, hampering progress of the Defense Review. Increased transparency of Defense planning and actions has been the result of this exercise which continues in 2013. MSP is preparing a sub-sectoral national policy on Public Security. These activities are buttressed and complemented by NL contribution to PFM reform.</p>					
	Baseline (2011)	Objective (2015)	Result (2012)	(Result) 2013	(Result) 2014	Source
<p><i>Indicator 1 : Number of meetings with stakeholders</i></p>	0	10	4			National Security Council
<p><i>Indicator 2: Number of training activities for government officials (by sex, age, social groups etc.)</i></p>	5/7	6/7	6/7			DSS prog
<p><i>Indicator 3 : Revue de la Defense completed with NL strategic advice</i></p>	4/7	7/7	4/7			MDNAC

<i>Indicator 4 : Sector-wide security policy by MSP developed, supported by NL SSR programme</i>	1/7	6/7	2/7			MSP
<i>Please indicate the proportion of the NL support in relation to the overall national budget and in relation to other donor support in the targeted area.</i>	n.a.					
Question 4.2a: To what extent has the transparency of the government improved in your programme's target area? And is corruption being addressed?	Generally, budgeting procedures are transparent in most sectors. A notable exception is the Defense sector for which only 2 pages of explanations are provided in the national budget. In november 2012 the ministry of Defense however decided to organise a public presentation on the results of a costing study, outlining the financial implications of current and future strategies for the military. On corruption: Burundi improved its ranking on the Global Corruption Perception but not its actual score. In spite of having a zero tolerance policy towards corruption, "big" corruption still persists. In the fight against "small" corruption some progress has been made.					
	Baseline (2011)	Objective (2015)	Result (2012)	(Result) 2013	(Result) 2014	Source
<i>Indicator 1 : There is transparency in the budgetary processes (formulation, allocations, monitoring of expenditure)</i>	5/7	6/7	5/7			WB/ TI/ GoB
<i>Indicator 2 : There are effective arrangements for protecting office holders who signal fraud and corruption (regulation for whistle-blowers).</i>	0/7	3/7	0/7			TI
<i>Indicator 3: Anti-corruption policy is in place and is implemented</i>	1/7	4/7	2/7			GoB
<i>Indicator 4 : Position of Burundi in global corruption perception ranking</i>	Rank : 172 Score 19	30	Rank: 165 Score: 19			TI annual report
<i>Indicator 5 : Govt has set up joint govt procurement cell and has adequately reviewed procurement laws and procedures</i>	1/7	5/7	2/7			GoB
Question 4.2b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result?	The presence of a NL advisor who coaches the Defense Review process has been instrumental in creating an increased atmosphere of openness by the Burundi military. The presentation of the costing study, in which more details on the military capacity were exposed than in many western countries, is an example of the NL influence. On corruption: NL intends to contribute to a multi-donor Public Finance Management improvement fund from which GoB capacity on PFM is enhanced.					
	Baseline (2011)	Objective (2015)	Result (2012)	(Result) 2013	(Result) 2014	Source
<i>Indicator 1 : Greater accountability achieved within the respected target areas</i>	3/7	6/7	3/7			embassy
<i>Indicator 2 : % NL contribution to common fund for PFM reform</i>	not establ.	10%	not establ.			PFM Common Fund annual report
<i>Please indicate the proportion of the NL support in relation to the overall national budget and in relation to other donor support in the targeted area.</i>	n.a.					
Question 4.3a: Has progress been made in promoting democracy, in your programme's target area?	Formally, any citizen can participate in democratic and decision-making processes. However, ethnic lines are often still adhered to and hinder a fully democratic process. Public knowledge of their rights to participation is still low and the gender balance in positions of power is skewed. A lot of high-level decision-making takes place behind the scenes. Dialogue between GoB and opposition parties is strained, but opposition parties themselves are also weak in formulating clear points of view or party programmes with which they can woo potential voters. The GoB submits the national budget to parliament but this process is always delayed, leaving parliament with only two weeks to review and provide comments before the parliamentary debate is scheduled.					
	Baseline (2011)	Objective (2015)	Result (2012)	(Result) 2013	(Result) 2014	Source
<i>Indicator 1 : Citizens, men and women, including those from minority groups, can equally participate in decision-making processes</i>	3/7	5/7	3/7			IDEA, (NGOs)
<i>Indicator 2 : Political parties, including those in the opposition, engage in substantive development discussions</i>	1/7	5/7	1/7			embassy
<i>Indicator 3: Participatory role of youth in democratisation process has increased</i>	2/7	5/7	2/7			embassy
<i>Indicator 4 : Organic law on functioning and control of PNB is passed</i>	0/7	6/7	1/7			Govt

<i>Indicator 5 : State budget and expenditures are published in nation-wide media</i>	6/7	6/7	6/7			Govt
<i>Indicator 6: No. of weeks between GoB submittance of national budget and parliamentary debate</i>	2	8	2			parliament
<i>Indicator 7 : State budget contains adequate details for all sectors/state agents</i>	2/7	4/7	2/7			Govt
<i>Indicator 8 : State expenditures are discussed in parliament</i>	3/7	5/7	4/7			Parl.mt reports
Question 4.3b: To what extent has your programme contributed to this result?	The NL funded SSD programme monitored the content of proposed laws and provided expertise to GoB, parliament and civil society for critical review of legislation. EKN staff lobbied for review of non-democratic elements in concept laws. With support from the SSD programma, parliamentarians, representatives of civil society and GoB staff jointly analysed the budget preparation and democratic control process, and identified shortcomings and improvement measures. An IMF resident advisor, funded by the embassy, has started his work in early 2013. He will advise the GoB in implementing its PFM-strategy.					
	Baseline (2011)	Objective (2015)	Result (2012)	(Result) 2013	(Result) 2014	Source
<i>Indicator 1 : Number of activities geared towards youth and vulnerable groups</i>	0	2	0			embassy
<i>Indicator 2 : Improvements made by GoB to national budgeting proces</i>	1/7	5/7	2/7			GoB
<i>Please indicate the proportion of the NL support in relation to the overall national budget and in relation to other donor support in the targeted area.</i>	n.a.					

Assessment of results achieved across the entire result area, Dutch contribution	C
A. Results achieved better than planned	In 2012 GoB made progress in the development of laws and policies foreseen under the Arusha Accords. However, GoB somewhat under-delivered in terms of demonstrating a true willingness to implement activities that would help to advance crucial reforms and combat corruption. A notable exception to this are the reforms undertaken in the defense sub-sector, e.g. on enhancing ethics and transparency. The FDN is well underway to becoming a legitimate and capable organisation. In principle democracy exists in Burundi and all can participate. In practice however, favoritism and intimidation still determine people's attitude to and participation in the political process. A critical mass of engaged citizens is slowly gaining ground however.
B. Results achieved as planned	
C. Results achieved poorer than planned	
D. Results achieved much poorer than planned	
Implications for planning	In 2013 and beyond NL will intensify its engagement in the 'gouvernance' axis of the SSD programme, gradually increasing control over and ownership of the governance agenda with the Burundian counterparts. Programmes to support the professionalisation of the ministries of Defense and Public Security, and the respective related organisations of national Army and Police will continue. Existing platforms where government, parliament and civil society organisations are brought together will be continued or expanded. NL will support capacity building of the government through the SSD programme. A separate activity will be started to enhance the capacity of government and NGOs involved in the implementation of Burundi's NAP 1325.