Art.

Aan: Onderwerp: Datum:

Van:

RE: EU Industry Forum & Dinner - Thank You woensdag 4 november 2015 23:06:34

10 lid 2e

Thanks!

Van: Art. 10 lid 2e Verzonden: dinsdag 3 november 2015 13:35 Aan Art. 10 lid 2e CC:

Onderwerp: FW: EU Industry Forum & Dinner - Thank You

Hi Art. 10 lid 2e

Hierbij het bedankje van de Britten voor bijwonen diner ivm EU IT Forum.

Groet, Art. 10 lid 2e

## Art. 10 lid 2e

Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of The Netherlands Kortenberglaan 4-10 1040 Brussel

Art. 10 lid 2e

From: Art. 10 lid 2e Sent: maandag 2 november 2015 16:38 To: Art. 10 lid 2e

Art. 10 lid 2e

Cc: Art. 10 lid 2e

Subject: OFFICIAL EU Industry Forum & Dinner - Thank You

## **OFFICIAL**

Dear Colleagues,

Art. 10 lid 2a + Art. 10 lid 2e

Art. 10 lid 2a + Art. 10 lid 2e	
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Kind Regards, Art. 10 lid 2e

Art. 10 lid 2e



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Onderwerp:	EU Internet aanpak extremisme - Kort verslag 2nd prepatory meeting EU CT Forum incl. diner UK PermRep 26/27 oktober
Datum:	donderdag 29 oktober 2015 14:03:39
Bijlagen:	RAN CoE paper alternative narraives october 2015.pdf

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Beste collega's,

Hierbij een kort verslag van de prepatory meeting voor het EU IT Forum op 27 oktober jl. en het daaraan voorafgaande diner op de permanente vertegenwoordiging van het VK op 26 oktober. Art 11. Lid 1


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## RAN Centre of Excellence Issue Paper: Counter-Natratives and Alternative Natratives1

#### October 2015

This Issue Paper is provided in support of the European Commission's preparatory EU IT Forum workshop, "Countering Violent Extremism: Online Communications", held on 27th October 2015.

The following questions are addressed:

- 1. How do counter-narratives and alternative narratives<sup>2</sup> play a role in prevention of radicalisation?
- 2. What do successful counter-narrative and alternative narrative campaigns look like?
- 3. What are the obstacles to designing and delivering effective campaigns from an industry, government and practitioner perspective and how can they be overcome?
- 4. How can and should success be measured?
- 5. What can the following stakeholders offer to boost counter-narrative and alternative narrative campaigns, including: governments, civil society and CVE practitioners, private sector industries including tech, social media and advertising, and RAN?

The key argument outlined in this paper is:

- There remains a very large gap between the volume and quality of counter- and alternative narrative campaigns and the propaganda machine of ISIL and other extremist groups.
- The primary obstacle to producing more and better quality counter- and alternative narratives is the lack of government, civil society and industry partnerships that are productive, sustained and long-term – with proportionate levels of resource.
- One of the solutions is to create innovative funding models and structures that combine government resources with support and expertise from tech, social media, and advertising companies to support civil society practitioners and grassroots networks in a manner that is sustained and long-term, with creative freedom and rigorous measurement.
- Governments have the resources and motivation to fund counter-narrative campaigns. They can
  encourage partnerships between civil society and industries, such as tech and social media.
  Existing funding mechanisms at EU and national level should be leveraged to a maximum to
  support such partnership initiatives. Here, the EU RAN CoE could provide an important
  platform for innovative solutions between government, industry and CVE practitioners.

This paper draws upon the insights and lessons learned from the RAN @ working group, the RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices and other research materials related to this topic.

#### 1. The role of counter- and alternative narratives in prevention of radicalisation

Exposure to extremist propaganda – both online and offline – is critical to the process of radicalisation. Extremist narratives are effective because of their simplicity, their use of scapegoating, and their emotional appeals to fear, anger, shame and honour. Their messages are crafted to exploit identity issues that many young people may be experiencing. It is upon this scaffolding that their violent and

<sup>1</sup> Authors: Institute for Strategic Dialogue in cooperation with RAN Centre of Excellence

<sup>2</sup> Government strategic communications are presented in Table 1 below, but are not the core focus in this paper.



exclusionary ideologies are built. But the manner of transmission is equally vital. Popular extremist propaganda often includes: high production value, the use of fast-paced editing, music and a charismatic narrator, and a call to action. The professional and sophisticated use of social media by ISIL in particular has been a game-changer.

Extremists are also populating the spaces where young people consume and share information, socialise and are socialised. While they are increasingly making use of the so-called 'Dark Net'3, but the majority of their efforts are focused on mainstream sites: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, WhatsApp, Reddit, Snapchat, Ask fm and Kik.<sup>4</sup>

The role of the Internet in the process of radicalisation has been the subject of academic debate, with research suggesting that radicalisation required an *offline* 'radicaliser'.<sup>5</sup> But the rise of social media, and its prominence in the lives of teenagers has dramatically changed in recent years and consequently changes how we should think about the radicalisation challenge.

Insights from research underline why counter-narratives and alternative narratives must be central to CVE efforts. Former extremists cite exposure to alternative sources of information; exposure of hypocrisy and lies of extremists; or boredom (in contrast to the excitement painted by extremist propaganda) as key reasons for their disengagement. Counter-narratives and alternative narratives can deliver these messages.<sup>6</sup>

Research from public health campaigns, for example, shows the potential impact for shifting attitudes and behaviours when communication campaigns are sustained, well-targeted and of a scale that is proportional to the problem.<sup>7</sup> In terms of counter-narratives and alternative narratives more specifically,

http://gelfand.umd.edu/KruglanskiGelfand(2014).pdf.

Neumann, Peter R. (2015), Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. Available at: http://icsr.info/wp-

content/uploads/2015/09/ICSR-Report-Victims-Perpertrators-Assets-The-Narratives-of-Islamic-State-Defectors.pdf.

<sup>7</sup> Lundgren, R. E. and McMakin, A. H. (eds) (2013) Public Health Campaigns, in Risk Communication, Fifth Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA. Cheng, Hong; Kotler and Lee, Nancy R. (2011) Philip and Social Marketing for Public Health – Global Trends and Success Stories Sudbury, Massachusetts: Jones and Bartlett Publishers. Durkin, Sarah; Brennan, Emily and Wakefield, Melanie (2012), Mass Media campaigns to promote smoking cessation among adults: an integrative review, Tobacco Control, Vol 21 (2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Bartlett, Jamie (2014), The Dark Net - Inside the Digital Underworld. London: William Heinemann.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Carter, Joseph A., Maher, Shiraz and Neumann, Peter R. (2014), *#Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks*, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. Available at: <u>http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ICSR-Report-Victims-Perpertrators-Assets-The-Narratives-of-Islamic-State-Defectors.pdf</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See for example: Kruglanski, Arie W. et al. (2014), The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism, Advances in Political Psychology, Vol. 35 (1). Available at:

Von Behr, Ines, Reding, Anaïs, Edwards, Charlie and Gribbon, Luke (2013) Radicalisation in the digital era: the use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism, RAND Corporation. Available at:

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research reports/RR400/RR453/RAND RR453.pdf. Koehler, Daniel (2014), The Radical Online: Individual Radicalisation Processes and the Role of the Internet, Journal for Deradicalization, Winter 2014/15, Vol 1. Available at: http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/8.

Holt, Tom; Freilich, Joshua D.; Chermak, Steven and McCauley, Clark (2015), Political radicalization on the Internet: Extremist content, government control, and the power of victim and jihad videos, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, Special Issue, Vol 8 (2). Available at: <u>http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17467586.2015.1065101</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See for example: Sieckelinck, Dr. Stijn and De Winter, Prof. Dr. Micha (eds., 2015), Formers and Families – Transitional journeys in and out of extremisms in the United Kingdom, Denmark and The Netherlands, National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, Ministry of Security and Justice, Denmark.



there remains a large gap in knowledge and research on the effectiveness of counter-narrative and alternative narrative campaigns because there have been limited numbers of high-quality campaigns to date. Anecdotal knowledge of impact exists and is presented here, but a better understanding requires a substantial scale-up in volume and type of counter- and alternative narratives, with appropriate and sophisticated measurement tools. Moreover, the processes of radicalisation and deradicalisation are complex and involve multiple factors, making it difficult to identify and draw a causal link between changes in attitudes and behaviours, and counter- or alternative narrative campaigns.


One of the key challenges in the counter-narrative spaces is understanding precisely what the term refers to, and the different types of 'counter-messaging' or 'counter-narratives' that exist. Table 1 below outlines different types of counter-narratives, which includes alternative narratives, counter-narratives and government strategic communications. The table provides an indication of what each type involves, their key characteristics, and which stakeholders should be delivering which types.

What	Why	How	Who
Alternative Narratives	Undercut violent extremist narratives by focusing on what we are 'for' rather than 'against'	Positive story about social values, tolerance, openness, freedom and democracy	Civil society or government
Counter Narratives	Directly deconstruct, discredit and demystify violent extremist messaging	Challenge of ideologies through emotion, theology, humour, exposure of hypocrisy, lies and untruths	Civil society
Government strategic communications	Undercut extremist narratives by explaining government policy and rationale	refuting misinformation, and developing relationships with key constituencies and audiences	Government

Table 1. Types of counter-narratives<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the different types of counter-narratives, determining where the target audience – whether it is taking place 'upstream' i.e. counter-radicalisation (broader messaging to young people to act as prevention against extremist narratives), or downstream i.e. de-radicalisation (including one-to-one messaging with individuals who already hold radical views), as outlined in the figure below, is vital to success. Failure to fully consider the appropriate type of message and how it matches to the target audience is the most common mistake and obstacle to effective campaigns.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Briggs, Rachel and Feve, Sebastien (2013), Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism, Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Available at: <u>http://www.strategicdialogue.org/CounterNarrativesFN2011.pdf</u>.
<sup>9</sup> Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2012), Proposed Policy Recommendations for the High Level Conference, First Working Group Session on 'Exploring innovative ways in which the internet and social media may contribute to the fight against violent extremism', RAN@ Working Group on Internet and Social Media, December 2012. Available at: <u>http://www.strategicdialogue.org/proposed policy recommendations ran at en.pdf</u>



Examples of counter-narrative campaigns – including where they sit on the radicalisation spectrum – are included in the Annex to this paper.

#### 2. What makes a successful campaign?

The key to designing a successful campaign is correct identification and understanding of the chosen target audience and where they are situated on the radicalisation spectrum. This will impact on the types of messages, messengers and mediums that are used. RAN@ Working Group meetings and pilot projects have highlighted how user behaviours that can inform how counter-narratives and alternative narratives can be targeted in prevention. For example, on YouTube, users tend to search for a video and then browse related content, thus browser behaviour is a key strategic level consideration. A combination of network and content analysis can allow organisations to 1) develop strategies to disrupt certain clusters, 2) develop and position counter-messaging, and 3) evaluate the impact of projects at the strategic level. <sup>10</sup>

Principles drawn from previous campaigns stress the following insights for designing successful campaigns.

- Develop a theory of change & know your audience. Careful planning and design, including development of a theory of change, is vital. Key questions to ask are:
  - o Who do you want to influence?
  - o What influences them (e.g., facts, emotions, satire, which credible voices)?
  - O Where do they congregate / what platforms do they use?
  - What are your outcomes / measurables?
- *Target audiences know best.* Campaign content that is co-created with individuals in the target audience (or formerly in the target audience, as in the case of former extremists) will have most resonance. Content should be market-tested with different segments of the target audience through an iterative process.
- Get the timing right. The best campaign could fail if timing is wrong. Rapid response capabilities are required to capitalise on unanticipated events, social media campaigns or announcements.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2013), *Final Meeting Report*, Second Working Group Session on Bringing together government, civil society and the technology sector to explore effective counter-narrative strategies to counter extremism online. ', RAN@ Working Group on Internet and Social Media, March 2013.



- *Emotions are more important than evidence.* Facts and statistics can be dismissed or obfuscated by opposing statistics. Appeals with emotional resonance have greater power.
- Campaigns should be sustained, rather than sporadic. Extremist narratives tell a continuing albeit highly manipulated story. Counter-narrative campaigns implemented over a sustained period of time will have more impact than one-off efforts.
- Professionalism and production quality are vital. The quality and style of production are critical to legitimacy and appeal, particularly for younger audiences.
- Going viral is not the aim. Going viral implies untargeted and unpredictable. By contrast, successful counter-narratives may be highly targeted to specific audiences and platforms.
- Link between online and offline. Successful counter-narrative campaigns are often linked to offline actions, for example, Exit Deutschland's T-shirt campaign, or Hope Not Hate's combination of online campaigns and offline community mobilisation.
- Humour and satire can be effective. Humour has historically played an effective role in undermining extremists (e.g. with the Ku Klux Klan in the US). Satire or humour can be an effective engagement tool.

### 3. Obstacles to designing effective campaigns

The key obstacle to increasing the volume and quality of counter- and alternative narratives is governments, civil society practitioners and private sector companies working together in productive, long-term partnership. Governments, the private sector and civil society practitioners all have a role to play, and each possess a part of the solution. But equally each faces challenges which can make effective partnership working extremely difficult.

- Governments have reach and resources, particularly in promoting alternative narratives. But they:
  - O Lack credibility as effective messengers with target audiences (often government endorsement can act as a 'kiss of death' for potentially credible messages and messengers),
  - Are risk-averse in terms of the types of messages that they are comfortable supporting (e.g. messages that criticise foreign policy, or are more radical by nature).
- Civil society practitioners (including grassroots networks) can provide counter-narrative campaigns with credible messengers who ensure that the message is delivered in a trustworthy and convincing manner. But they:
  - o Lack funding, resources and expertise in digital marketing and measurement analytic tools.
  - Are often unable to take a long-term, strategic view because what funding they do receive is predominantly piecemeal and one-off, rather than sustained and long-term, which dramatically undermines their ability to work effectively.
  - May have difficulty finding and supporting credible messengers (including former extremists and survivors of extremism).
  - o May have reputational concerns related to explicit CVE-content or partnerships with government which may undermine credibility with target audiences.
- Technology and social media companies, as well as creative marketing and advertising companies, can use their expertise and experience in conceptualising and disseminating ideas online and offline and affecting or changing attitudes. But:
  - o They lack the specific knowledge of extremist movements and radicalisation.



- Their primary focus is on core business especially if they are accountable to shareholders. This could mean a lack of time and investment in creating counter-narrative campaigns.
- They may have concerns over working in a highly contested and controversial area and/or considered about working too closely with governments could impact on brand reputation.

#### 4. Measuring success

The success of counter messaging overall depends on it being of a scale and quality that is proportional to the challenge we face: equal to the ISIL propaganda machine in terms of volume, production value, and speed. At present, combined counter-narrative and alternative narrative efforts represent a drop in the ocean compared to ISIL. Measuring this overall impact can only be done through macro-level, longitudinal measures and indicators, which is difficult but which new technologies are starting to make possible.

Success should also be measured at a tactical level and used to inform the delivery and impact of individual campaigns. Measures of success at this tactical level will depend on the type of campaign deployed and where it is situated on the radicalisation spectrum. The aim of downstream interventions – targeted at broader populations of young people, for example – will not be a *change* of attitude, but rather an increase in resilience or inoculation to extremist propaganda. An intervention further upstream, by contrast, will be seeking to capture, exploit or spark a 'cognitive opening' that can plant a seed of doubt or slowly chip away at the certainty of extremist narratives.

A more elaborated outline of tactical and strategic approaches, indicators and tools for measuring success is included in the Annex.

#### 5. Recommendation for next steps

The success of groups like ISIL is closely linked to their online propaganda convincing an increasing amount of young people worldwide to join and sympathise with their cause. Counter-narratives and alternative narratives are vital to prevent this, but at present, the volume and quality of counter- and alternative narratives is not even close to being delivered at the same scale, quality and proportion as that produced and disseminated by ISIL. There are several major challenges. One is that governments have limitations in the credibility to directly deliver counter-narratives. At the same time, government funding and engagement is necessary to support initiatives adequately while providing necessary guidance of measures to ensure direction, effect and efficiency. Another obstacle is a lack of innovative funding and collaboration models that take into account the challenges facing each of the relevant stakeholders mentioned above. Below are recommendations for governments, civil society practitioners and tech and social media companies for how these challenges can be met.

• Governments have the resources and motivation to fund counter-narrative campaigns. They can encourage partnerships between civil society and industries, such as tech and social media. Existing funding mechanisms at EU and national level should be leveraged to a maximum to support such partnership initiatives. Governments have an important role in making sure this remains a priority and they are also accountable for how government funding is spent and focused on target audiences. It is important to recognise that governments should not be fronting counter-narrative campaigns, nor should they have sign-off or influence in the content. It is absolutely vital that governments use their resources to develop funding models and infrastructures that avoid the 'kiss of death' phenomenon, and are sustainable and long-term, rather than piecemeal and tied to political cycles. Ultimately, governments need to help to create an infrastructure that is community-owned and

6



operated, but that is non-governmental in how it operates.<sup>11</sup> EU RAN CoE could provide a hub for exchange of initiatives and ideas alongside other initiatives.

- Tech and social media companies have committed to working in this space in recent years. But more could be done, for example, through offers of pro bono or discounted use of social media advertising tools for civil society counter narrative campaigns. Tech and social media companies could also provide pro bono support with analytic tools that can be used to measure campaign impact. More needs to be invested in longer-term cooperation and support. Training of relevant practitioners in all EU MS could be a useful initiative with greater involvement through EU RAN CoE and associated initiatives to develop partnerships with the credible voices/civil society actors to help/support them in their development of counter narrative campaigns.
- <u>Advertising and film production companies</u> should do more to provide pro bono support to civil society organisations and practitioners in designing effective messages as part of their corporate social responsibilities. They could also help civil society practitioners understand how they measure the impact of their campaigns, and processes for market-testing with target audiences.
- <u>Civil society organisations</u> are critical countervailing voices against violent extremism and can play important role in developing and delivering counter-narratives. They are usually the ones who know most about what it going on with members of the communities and what types of communication and messages will have appeal. Therefore there is a call for civil society organisations to become more pro-active in this space. However, often civil society actors and practitioners lack resources, expertise and capacity in the digital space to effectively deliver and measure the impact of sustained counternarrative campaigns. Greater funding from government (subject to the recommendation above on limiting government's role in sign-off or public association with campaigns) and in-kind assistance by key industry players is needed to support and professionalise civil society efforts in a way that enables them to take a more strategic view and approach.
- Effective messengers, including 'formers' and survivors of extremism can be particularly valuable in crafting counter-narrative campaigns. However, there are barriers to their involvement. Many may not want to have public profiles, or will have full-time jobs and families, and lack resources and time to work on creating counter-narratives and alternative narratives at scale. Ways need to be developed to incentivise and support 'formers and survivors' to take part in this\_work to a greater extent: for example, paying 'formers and survivors' for their time and work should be considered where appropriate. Additional offers should include access to skills-development (for example, from tech, film production or advertising companies) and forms of pastoral support. Furthermore, young people may be able to create effective content, particularly alternative narratives, which resonant with their peers; but many may feel reluctant to work on CVE specific campaigns or topics. Grassroots networks of young people should be recruited to generate content that is more generally related to issues like social cohesion, political activism, including content that may be critical of government, rather than specific CVE topics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> For example, ISD's Innovation Hub, in its initial phases, can serve as one potential model for funding and supporting counter- and alternative narratives: bringing together civil society practitioners and content creators with the support of tech and social media companies, to provide sustained and strategic long-term support, dissemination and evaluation.



## 6. Role and contribution of the RAN Centre of Excellence

The RAN Centre of Excellence (CoE) – including the full range of RAN Working Groups, and especially RAN Communication Narratives Working Group, will play a pivotal role in bringing together government representatives, civil society practitioners and private sector industries to form innovative partnerships. RAN CoE will continue to forge and encourage partnerships related to the challenges and recommendations mentioned above. In that light **RAN CoE will:** 

- Explore ways for frontline practitioners from the public, private and voluntary/community sectors to partner to tackle radicalisation leading to violent extremism both online as offline using narratives and communication tools.
- Improve relationships and cooperation between these different frontline practitioner groups.
- Deliver a series of products for first line workers and/ or individuals at risk and dissemination of its lessons learnt, including training programmes for practitioners.
- Deliver concrete support to content creators and disseminators, most likely in the form of videos, training, knowledge and network connections.
- Involve youngsters to help with the creation of content and exploring dissemination channels.
- Organise peer group exchange of methods and measurement.
- Working together with other related RAN Working Groups such as RAN Education, RAN Victims and RAN Youth, Families and Communities.
- Provide further policy recommendations to the EU, national and local government from a practitioner perspective.



## Annex: Examples of counter- and alternative narratives

The following examples are ordered according to their target audience and 'intervention' in the radicalisation process. While some are more up-stream, trying to raise awareness with the general public and/or influence groups and individuals who are not yet radicalised or at risk, to more down-stream intervention projects who directly intervene with already radicalised individuals to prevent them from committing violent acts and de-radicalise them. More examples may be found in the **RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices**<sup>12</sup>.

#### Extreme Dialogue (up-stream)

Launched across Canada in February 2015, Extreme Dialogue aims to reduce the appeal of extremism among young people and offer a positive alternative to the increasing amounts of extremist material and propaganda available on the Internet and social media platforms. A series of short documentary films tell the personal stories of Canadians profoundly affected by violent extremism; a former member of the extreme far-right and a mother whose son was killed fighting for ISIS in Syria. The films are accompanied by a set of educational resources that can be used with young people in classrooms or community settings and are intended to build resilience to extremism through active discussion and enhanced critical thinking. These resources include Prezi presentations and practitioners' resource packs and are available via the "Stories" pages in both English and French. Funded by Public Safety Canada via the Kanishka Project, Extreme Dialogue has brought together project partners the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, film-makers Duckrabbit, and the educational charity Tim Parry Johnathan Ball Foundation for Peace. Extreme Dialogue will also be coming to Europe in 2016, with funding provided for additional films and educational resources by the European Commission and support from project partners West London Initiative in the UK, Cultures Interactive in Germany and Political Capital in Hungary.

#### For more information visit: http://extremedialogue.org/

## 'Rechts gegen Rechts' Charity March (up-stream to mid-stream)

The offline and online counter-narrative campaign "Rechts gegen Rechts" (Right against Right) was launched in 2014 by the Centre for Democratic Culture ZDK in Germany in support of EXIT Germany (see above). The campaign uses Neo-Nazi demonstrations and marches across Germany to collect money for EXIT Germany. For each step the right wing extremists march during their gatherings and for the amount of time they demonstrate overall, local citizens and companies donate money to EXIT Germany to help people leave the right-wing extremist scene. This counter-narrative campaign was also launched online by advertising it on the project's website, on Facebook and YouTube as well as starting an advertisement campaigns on Twitter through the hashtag #rechtsgegenrechts. The campaign received worldwide attention in the news media and received awards which increased the awareness about right-wing extremism and donations made to EXIT Germany substantially.

For more information visit: http://rechts-gegen-rechts.de/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> <u>http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\_awareness\_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran\_collection-approaches\_and\_practices\_en.pdf</u>



## Operation Trojan T-Shirt (mid-stream)

The offline counter-narrative campaign Trojan T-Shirt was launched by EXIT Germany, a civil society initiative which tries to encourage people to leave the right-wing extremism scene and assists them during the process. In 2011, EXIT anonymously donated T-Shirts to the biggest German right-wing rock music festival organiser with the slogan "Hardcore Rebels – National and Free" which the organisation distributed for free at a far-right rock music festival. After the first wash, the T-Shirt Slogan would change to "What your t-shirt can do, you can too – we help you to leave the right-wing scene. EXIT Germany". The campaign reached 250 people directly and received extensive national and European coverage in the media. It was one of the most shared topics on social media in 2011. After the campaign the number of people who wanted to leave the right-wing extremism scene tripled, although this number needs to be looked at cautiously, and private donations to EXIT Germany increased by 334% in 2011 in comparison to 2010<sup>13</sup>.

#### For more information visit: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSIbsHKEP-8 http://www.exit-deutschland.de/english/

#### Abdullah X (mid-stream to down-stream)

Initially an offline initiative working with young people at the grassroots level, the Abdullah-X (AX) project moved online creating a <u>YouTube channel</u>, <u>Twitter</u> and <u>Facebook</u> profiles and a stand-alone <u>website</u> to counter the increasing prevalence of extremist content on such platforms. Using targeted marketing techniques, concise but compelling content and an engaging visual style, the AX counter-narrative videos reached over 52,000 viewers (70% from ads), and more than 1 million 'impressions' (how many individuals' screens the ads for AX content appeared on) in the UK over a 6-week trial period with direct support provided by YouTube. By addressing contemporary and controversial issues relevant to young Muslims, the channel has been able to garner impressive subscription, sharing and discussion figures when compared to other counter-narrative video content online.

#### For more information visit: http://www.abdullahx.com/

#### 'One-to-One' Online Interventions (down-stream)

The One2One initiative by the Institute of Strategic Dialogue (ISD) brings together a team of former extremists from across ideologies that are identifying those at risk of carrying out violent acts and directly reaching out to these individuals online offering to engage in a constructive dialogue. When ISD started this programme, based on similar efforts in the past, 10% of participants were expected to respond with a significant proportion of those responses to be negative. Instead, the programme has resulted in a 59% response rate, with not a single threat or aggressive response. Although it's still early days, this highlights the great potential of this approach. Based on the early success of this pilot programme ISD is developing One2One as a mobile app to apply the lessons learned and to ensure that positive voices online can directly reach young people expressing extremist sympathies at a scale large enough to turn the tide against extremist recruiters online.

For more information visit: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/includes/One2One Web v2.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> "Narratives as a Means of Countering the Radical Right; Looking into the Trojan T-shirt Project"; Dafnos, Andrea, 2014, Journal EXIT Deutschland, http://journals.sfu.ca/jed/index.php/jex/article/view/98/126



#### Impact measurement

#### Tactical, short-term measures

Data such as clicks, views, tweets and follower count can help to provide feedback on daily activities and tracking individual interactions. Social media analytic tools available on most social media platforms, as well as those offered by companies like Google or Bitly, can further assess the tactical impact of a campaign through features such as:

- User Demographics
- User Engagement (e.g. how many people were reached by the campaign and when, how much did they interact with its content, and projects' websites and social media accounts)
- User Geography
- User Behaviour (e.g. did it spark comments and discussion by those who came in contact with counter-narratives; was the content shared online)
- Ad Type, Placement, Content and Targeting (e.g. YouTube "in-stream ads", boosted Tweets on Twitter)
- Media coverage (i.e. fostering debate on the issue)

New software developments are ongoing, many borrowed from digital marketing and the tech industry, and hold further promise for measuring tactical impact. For example, a common tool is 'Hashtagtracking' where the historic and real-time impact of a #hashtag is assessed (e.g. in which context and how often is it used or retweeted, what responses does it generate, who uses it). This gives direct access to actionable data and can help to improve Twitter campaigns and understanding of users' networks and behaviour. But going beyond 'hashtags', other software – utilising natural language processing and machine-learning – can measure and analyse a large volume of tweets in real-time, and categorise them according to theme and sentiment utilising keywords and phrases that may not include hashtags (for example, as used by the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media, 'CASM,' at the London-based think tank Demos).

Similarly, internal evaluations of counter-narrative campaigns undertaken by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue shed light on how different promotional and dissemination strategies can impact tactical engagement. For example, driving engagement through paid advertising led to a larger number of 'hits', clicks or views, but of a shorter, more ephemeral duration (e.g. user watching a counter-narrative video for less than three seconds). By contrast, organic engagement (which does not involve the use of paid advertisements for dissemination), may lead to far fewer 'hits', but evaluations suggest a possible higher degree of in-depth engagement (e.g. by commenting on videos or retweeting posts). The impact of different dissemination strategies needs further exploration and 'A/B testing' across multiple campaigns – targeting different audiences, with different messages and approaches.

These tools enable clear measures of *online* reach and short-term impact, but they are also limited: further work is needed to determine whether campaigns have reached intended audiences and or whether they are changing offline behaviour can remain unclear.

#### Strategic, long-term measures

At a strategic level, a successful long-term strategy and proportionate approach to counter- and alternative narratives should lead to:





- Fewer people supporting extremist ideas online (measured through searching, liking, following and sharing content); and
- More people speaking out against extremist ideas online;
- More people supporting (by same metrics as above) content that is critical of extremists; and
- Fewer people supporting violent extremist organisations for example, by traveling abroad to fight with or support groups like ISIL.

Longitudinal measures, particularly online, can be used to measure 'extremity shift' in discourse over an extended period of time:

- Discourse analysis in semi-closed or semi-discrete forums, over a sustained period of time to determine 'natural' level fluctuations and how they are impacted by external events. This provides a baseline control to measure the intervention impact against.
- Network analysis to determine high volume users and map the network ecosystem, including key influencers and behaviours of those on the fringes.

This requires large-scale data collection and social listening techniques that are at the cutting edge of online analysis. But the relationship between online and offline behaviour is still not fully understood. Moreover, even if these measures are made quantifiable there will remain a question of causality and attribution: was it counter- and alternative narratives that had the impact, versus other initiatives, geopolitical developments, or other factors? Randomised control trials (known as 'A/B testing' or 'split testing' in online marketing) and quasi-experimental approaches can help to isolate impact.

Finally, answering the relationship between online and offline interaction requires the triangulation of social media analytic tools with qualitative interviews and / or quantitative online surveys. This is inevitably be challenging. Securing participation in research from target audiences will depend on where on the radicalisation spectrum they are situated, but the offer of financial incentives (which is customary in social research) may help. Interviews with 'formers' – especially those radicalised in the past few years – could also help to shed light on the role of counter- and alternative narratives *online* in the process of deradicalisation.



#### Further data and resources

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   Available at: <u>http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf</u>

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## All

We look forward to seeing you all on Tuesday for our EU IT Forum preparatory discussions focusing on countering violent extremism online. An agenda is attached.

Registration will start from 09:15. We suggest you bring the agenda with you to present to security.

The meeting will take place at the Centre de Conférence Albert Borschette (Room 1A), Rue Froissart 36, Brussels. A link to the map can be found here:

https:/ConferenceCentreAlbertBorschette:

If you have any questions, please not hesitate to contact us.

Kind regards

## Art. 10 lid 2e



European Commission DG Migration and Home Affairs Unit D1 - Terrorism and Crisis Management

Art. 10 lid 2e





EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL MIGRATION & HOME AFFAIRS

Centre Albert Borschette, Rue Froissart 36, 1040 Brussels

## PREPARATIONS FOR EU IT FORUM: AWARENESS RAISING SESSION Countering Violent Extremism:Online Communications 27 OCTOBER 2015 (10:00-16:30) Centre de Conférence Albert Borschette – Room 1A <u>AGENDA</u>

## 09:15-10:00 Registration and coffee

- 10:00-10:20 Introductions

## 10:50-12:00 Internet Companies' Presentations

Industry to advise on how their sites can best be used and to set out what they can offer in relation to supporting counter/alternative narratives online.

## 12:00-12:30 Questions and Answers

## 12:30-14:00 Lunch

## 14:00-14:30 EU Internal Security Fund

Presentation by the Commission on the decentralised funding mechanism.

## 14:30-14:50 RAN Centre of Excellence Presentation

Key findings from the RAN@ on how to deliver alternative narratives online.

## 14:55-15:10 Coffee

## 15:10-15:30 SSCAT Presentation

Key findings from the SSCAT on Member States' challenges and requirements in this area.

## 15:30-16:15 Moderated Discussion on challenges and solutions

## 16:15-16:30 Conclusions/Next Steps

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Art. 10 Lid 2g

**Subject:** Invitation EU IT Forum workshop "Countering Violent Extremism: Onlie Communications" 27 October 2015, Brussels

Dear CT Focal Points,

Please find attached an invitation signed by Art. 10 Lid 2e DG HOME, to the EU IT Forum workshop "Countering Violent Extremism: Online Communications" which will be held in Brussels, Belgium on 27<sup>th</sup> October from 9:30-16:30. The aim is to share expertise and exchange practical experiences and initiatives to empower civil society partners to increase the volume of alternative narratives which challenge and counter terrorist propaganda found online.

In addition to industry representatives, we would like to bring together representatives from each MS' Ministry of Interior or Justice as well as representatives from civil society groups within each MS. Could we please ask you to cascade the information to the relevant interlocutors in your MS? Please note that the Commission can cover travel arrangements for up to 3 participants per MS (we would therefore suggest one official from the Ministry and two from civil society).

To register, please fill in your details on the following website:

Art. 10 Lid 2g

We look forward welcoming you at this important event.

Kind regards,

EU IT Forum team



European Commission Directorate-General Migration and Home Affairs Unit D1: Terrorism and Crisis Management Art. 10 Lid 2e

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL MIGRATION AND HOME AFFAIRS

Directorate D: Security The Director

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<u>To EU Focal Points</u> <u>Sent by email</u>

## Subject: Invitation to Preparatory Discussions of the EU IT Forum Countering Violent Extremism: Online Communications

## Dear Madam/Sir,

I am grateful to those of you who participated in our discussions on reducing accessibility to online terrorist content on the 24<sup>th</sup> July. As mentioned, as part of our efforts to address terrorists' use of the internet, we also want to explore what more we can do to empower civil society partners to increase the volume of alternative narratives which challenge and counter terrorist propaganda found online. We would therefore like to invite you to the following event:

#### **EU IT Forum Preparatory Discussions**

## **CVE: Online Communications**

## Policy Officials, Civil Society and Industry Representatives

## 27 October 2015 – 9:30-16:30

## Centre Borschette Rue Froissart 36, B-1040 Brussels

Discussions will focus on sharing expertise and exchanging practical experiences and initiatives. We also want to discuss the needs of civil society partners with a view to equipping them with the necessary skills and ability to improve their online communication and boost the volume and impact of alternative narratives. Industry representatives will be invited to set out what technical assistance and training they can offer in this regard. We would like Member States to consider what incentives or forms of support they can offer to their civil society partners.

We would like to bring together a representative from each Member State's Ministry of Interior or Justice as well as representatives from civil society groups within each Member State. A copy of this invitation will also be sent to the RAN and SSCAT to help ensure that this invitation reaches the relevant stakeholders. We are particularly keen to hear the RAN and SSCAT's experience and advice on this matter.

An agenda will be sent out nearer the time, but in the meantime, we would be grateful if you could come prepared to speak about efforts within your Member State to tackle this issue; the challenges as you see them; and those areas on which you would like the Forum to focus and what deliverables you expect.

Interpretation facilities will be provided for in English, French, German, Italian, Dutch and Spanish.

Please register by providing your name and contact details (email, organisation, date of birth, nationality, ID number, ID expiry) of your representative(s) by email to Art. 10 Lid 2e <u>(a)newstravel.eu</u> by 14<sup>th</sup> October 2015.

Please note that the Commission can provide travel arrangements for three representatives from each Member State. The Commission will not be able to reimburse the costs of travel arrangements made directly by the participants.

For queries on the content of the n	neeting, please contact Art. 10 lid 2e
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For administrative issues please co	ontact Art. 10 Lid 2e

The agenda will follow in due course. The Commission is looking forward to your participation at this important event.

As with the meeting on the 24<sup>th</sup> July, these discussions will feed into the preparations for the official launch of the EU IT Forum scheduled for 2<sup>nd</sup> December, which will be hosted by Commissioner Avramopoulos, and to which your ministers will shortly be invited.

Yours sincerely,

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Electronically signed on 07/10/2015 16:24 (UTC+02) in accordance with article 4.2 (Validity of electronic documents) of Commission Decision 2004/563